Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
February 20, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
95-1013
Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
An uprising against Bahrain’s Al Khalifa royal family that began on February 14, 2011, has not
achieved the goals of the mostly Shiite opposition to establish a constitutional monarchy.
Demonstrations have diminished since 2012, although not ended, and the opposition’s boycotts of
elections and its denunciations of arrests of dissidents counter government assertions that the
political situation in Bahrain has returned to “normal.” The government and opposition have
attempted to resolve the unrest through two “national dialogues” (2011 and 2013), but neither
reached a comprehensive solution. The government has enacted some reforms that do not
fundamentally dilute its authority, and it has successfully avoided any significant international
isolation. Perhaps reflecting some radicalization of the opposition, violent underground factions
have claimed responsibility for increasingly frequent bombings and other attacks primarily
against security officials.
The unrest in Bahrain has presented a policy dilemma for the Obama Administration because
Bahrain is a pivotal ally. It has hosted the U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf region since 1946.
The United States has had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Bahrain since
1991 and has designated it a “major non-NATO ally.” There are about 7,000 U.S. forces in
Bahrain, mostly located at the naval headquarters site. Apparently to pressure the government to
reduce its use of force against protesters, the Administration has held up some sales to Bahrain of
arms that could be used for internal security purposes, has implemented broader holds on
weapons sales, and has somewhat reduced Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Bahrain. Yet,
the U.S.-Bahrain defense relationship apparently remains strong, as exemplified by Bahrain’s
active participation in U.S.-led air strikes against the Islamic State organization in Syria.
Bahrain’s opposition asserts that the United States is downplaying regime abuses in order to
protect the U.S.-Bahrain security relationship.
Bahrain’s primary foreign policy concern has been Iran. Bahraini leaders, with some
corroboration from U.S. and other statements, blame Iran for providing material support to
hardline, violent factions in Bahrain. Bahrain has supported Saudi and UAE criticism of Iran not
only for its purported activities against Bahrain’s government, but more broadly for Iran’s
unqualified support for pro-Iranian Shiite movements and governments in the region. Bahrain has
supported a Saudi concept of increased political unity among the GCC countries and has
generally deferred to Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries to resolve political crises in the
region such as those in Libya in and in Yemen. Unlike Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain
has refrained from backing any opposition groups in the Syria conflict.
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf
monarchies and therefore has lacked ample resources to easily and significantly improve Shiite
standards of living. In 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA);
legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further
strained, although not crippled, Bahrain’s economy.
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Contents
The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights ....................................................................... 1
The Ruling Family and Its Dynamics ........................................................................................ 1
Executive and Legislative Powers ............................................................................................. 2
Political Groups and Elections .................................................................................................. 3
Pre-Uprising Elections ........................................................................................................ 5
2011 Uprising: Origin, Developments, and Prognosis .............................................................. 6
Crown Prince Salman’s “Seven Principles” Reform Plan ................................................... 6
The Saudi-led Intervention .................................................................................................. 6
“National Dialogue” Begun and Inquiry Commission Established .................................... 7
Dialogue Recommendations Produce Constitutional Amendments .................................... 8
The BICI Report and Implementation Process .................................................................... 9
Second National Dialogue ................................................................................................. 11
Recent Developments/Current Situation ........................................................................... 11
Prospects and Way Forward? ............................................................................................ 13
U.S. Posture on the Uprising ............................................................................................. 16
Other Human Rights Issues ..................................................................................................... 18
Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 19
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 20
Media Freedoms ................................................................................................................ 20
Labor Rights ...................................................................................................................... 20
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 21
Executions and Torture ...................................................................................................... 21
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations ..................................................................... 21
U.S. Naval Headquarters in Bahrain ....................................................................................... 22
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) ................................................................................. 24
U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid ..................................................................................... 25
Assistance to the Bahrain Defense Forces ........................................................................ 25
Assistance to the Ministry of Interior ................................................................................ 28
Other Foreign Policy Issues ..................................................................................................... 29
Iran .................................................................................................................................... 31
Iraq/Syria/Islamic State Organization ............................................................................... 33
Countering Terrorism Financing ....................................................................................... 34
Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 34
Figures
Figure 1. Bahrain ........................................................................................................................... 37
Tables
Table 1. Comparative Composition of the National Assembly ...................................................... 13
Table 2. Status of Prominent Dissidents/Other Metrics of the Uprising ........................................ 15
Table 3. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain ..................................................................................... 35
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Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain ............................................................................................... 36
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 37
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights1
The site of the ancient Bronze Age civilization of Dilmun, Bahrain was a trade hub linking
Mesopotamia and the Indus valley until a drop in trade from India caused the Dilmun civilization
to decline around 2,000 B.C. The inhabitants of Bahrain converted to Islam in the 7th century.
Bahrain subsequently fell under the control of Islamic caliphates based in Damascus, then
Baghdad, and later Persian, Omani, and Portuguese forces.
The Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni Muslim and generally not as religiously conservative as the
leaders of neighboring Saudi Arabia, has ruled Bahrain since 1783. That year, the family, a branch
of the Bani Utbah tribe, arrived from the Saudi peninsula and succeeded in capturing a Persian
garrison controlling the island. In 1830, the ruling family signed a treaty establishing Bahrain as a
protectorate of Britain, which was the dominant power in the Persian Gulf until the early 1970s.
In the 1930s, Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran unsuccessfully sought to deny Bahrain the right to grant
oil concessions to the United States and Britain. As Britain began reducing its responsibilities in
the Gulf in 1968, Bahrain and other Persian Gulf emirates (principalities) began deciding on their
permanent status. A 1970 U.N. survey (some refer to it as a “referendum”) determined that
Bahrain’s inhabitants did not want to join with Iran. Those findings were endorsed by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 278, which was ratified by Iran’s parliament. Bahrain negotiated
with eight other Persian Gulf emirates during 1970-71 to try to form a broad federation, but
Bahrain and Qatar each decided to become independent. The seven other emirates formed a
federation called the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Bahrain declared itself independent on August
15, 1971 and a U.S. Embassy opened in Manama, Bahrain’s capital, immediately thereafter.
The Ruling Family and Its Dynamics
Bahrain is led by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (about 65 years old), who succeeded his father,
Shaykh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, upon his death in March 1999. Educated at Sandhurst Military
Academy in Britain, King Hamad was previously commander of the Bahraini Defense Forces
(BDF). The king is considered to be a proponent of accommodation with Bahrain’s Shiites, who
constitute a majority of about 600,000 citizens.2 Citizens are about half of the overall population,
and the remainder are expatriates mainly from South and East Asia and other parts of the Middle
East. Bahrain’s Shiite Muslims have long asserted they are treated as “second class citizens,”
deprived of a proportionate share of political power and the nation’s economic wealth. About
25% of the citizen population is age 14 or younger. However, the King is also widely assessed as
unwilling to override hardline, anti-reform Khalifa family members.
Within the upper echelons of the ruling family, the most active proponent of reform and
accommodation with the Shiite opposition is the King’s son, Shaykh Salman bin Hamad, about
1 Much of the information in this section is from State Department Human Rights Report for 2013, released February
27, 2014 (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220348#wrapper). CRS
has no means of independently investigating the human rights situation in Bahrain.
2 Government officials dispute that the Shiite community is as large a majority as the 70% figure used in most
factbooks and academic work on Bahrain. The Shiite community in Bahrain consists of the more numerous “Baharna,”
who are of Arab ethnicity and descended from Arab tribes who inhabited the area from pre-Islamic times. Shiites of
Persian ethnicity, referred to as Ajam, arrived in Bahrain over the past 400 years and are less numerous than the
Baharna. The Ajam speak Persian and generally do not integrate with the Baharna or with Sunni Arabs.
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45 years old, who is Crown Prince. On March 11, 2013, he was appointed first deputy Prime
Minister concurrently. Shaykh Salman is U.S.-and U.K.-educated. The Crown Prince has a
substantial network of allies, who assert that the level of unrest reached in 2011 would have
occurred long ago had the King’s earlier reforms not been enacted. Allies of the Crown Prince
include deputy Prime Minister, Muhammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa and Foreign Minister Khalid
bin Ahmad bin Muhammad Al Khalifa.3 The faction was apparently strengthened by the March
2013 appointment of Crown Prince Salman to a new position of first deputy Prime Minister.
The “anti-reform” faction is led by the King’s uncle (the brother of the late Amir Isa), Prime
Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, has been in position since Bahrain’s independence in
1971. He is about 80 years old but still highly active. He is aligned with family hard-liners that
include Minister of the Royal Court Khalid bin Ahmad bin Salman Al Khalifa4 and his brother the
Commander of the BDF Khalifa bin Ahmad Al Khalifa. The two brothers are known as
“Khawalids”—they hail from a branch of the Al Khalifa family that is traced to an ancestor
Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa—and are considered implacably opposed to compromise with the
Shiites.5 The Khawalids reportedly have allies throughout the security and intelligence services
and the judiciary, including for example the Royal Court Minister’s protégé, Ahmad bin
Ateyatallah Al Khalifa (Royal Court minister for “follow-up affairs”). These and other hard liners
assert that concessions made to the Shiite majority since 1999 caused the Shiites to increase their
political demands and therefore caused the 2011 uprising. In September 2013, Bahrain appointed
another purported hardliner Lieutenant Colonel Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Rashid, a
subordinate of the BDF commander, as Ambassador to the United States.
Executive and Legislative Powers
The King, working through the Prime Minister and the cabinet, has broad powers. The King,
through the Prime Minister, makes all cabinet appointments. Al Khalifa family members have
consistently held about half of all ministerial slots, including all defense, internal security, and
foreign policy positions. Before the 2011 unrest, there were only 4 Shiite ministers out of 23
cabinet positions (plus one out of the four deputy prime ministers), and those ministries run by
Shiites have been considered less critical. The number of Shiite ministers was increased to six in
2012, in part as a gesture to the opposition. Shiites who serve in the security forces have generally
been confined to administrative tasks. The King appoints all judges by royal decree and he has
the authority to amend the constitution.
As Hamad’s first reform steps upon taking office, he assumed the title of King—a leadership title
that implies more accountability to the population than the traditional title “Amir.” He held a
referendum on February 14, 2002, that adopted a “National Action Charter,” including the text of
a constitution. However, many Shiites criticized the constitution because it established that the
elected Council of Representatives (COR)6 and the all-appointed Shura (Consultative) Council
were of equal size (40 seats each). Together, they constitute a National Assembly (parliament).
The government has tended to appoint generally more educated and pro-Western members to the
3 The foreign minister’s name is similar to, but slightly different from, that of the hardline Royal Court Minister.
4 The name of this official is similar to that of the Foreign Minister, Khalid bin Ahmad bin Mohammad Al Khalifa.
5 Differences between the khawalids and others in the family are discussed in, Charles Levinson. “A Palace Rift in
Persian Gulf Bedevils Key U.S. Navy Base.” Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2013.
6 This body is also referred to as the Council of Deputies (Majles al-Nawwab).
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Shura Council, and it is generally more supportive of the government than is the COR, which
explains why the opposition seeks maximum authority for the COR. There is no “quota” for
females in the National Assembly.
• The Assembly serves as a partial check on government power, despite
constitutional amendments adopted in May 2012 that gave the Assembly greater
authority. The amendments declared the elected COR as the presiding chamber of
the Assembly, thereby giving it the lead when the two chambers disagree.
• The National Assembly has the power to confirm individual cabinet
appointments. However, as a consequence of the May 2012 amendments, it does
have the power to reject the government’s four-year work plan—and therefore
the whole cabinet. The COR has always had the power to remove sitting
ministers through a vote of no-confidence (requiring a two-thirds majority). The
COR can also, by a similar super-majority, declare that it cannot “cooperate”
with the Prime Minister, but the King then rules on whether to dismiss the Prime
Minister or disband the COR. None of these actions has ever been taken.
• Either chamber of the National Assembly can originate legislation but enactment
into law requires concurrence by the King.7 Prior to the May 2012 amendments,
only the COR could originate legislation. A royal “veto” can be overridden by a
two-thirds majority vote of both chambers. A decree issued by the king on August
23, 2012, gives the National Assembly the ability to recommend constitutional
amendments, which are then vetted by a “Legislation and Legal Opinion
Commission” before consideration by the King.
The adoption of the National Charter and other early reforms instituted by King Hamad, although
still short of the expectations of the Shiite majority, were more extensive than those made by his
father, Amir Isa. Amir Isa’s most significant reform was his establishment in late 1992 of a 30-
member all-appointed Consultative Council, whose mandate was limited to commenting on
proposed laws. In June 1996, he expanded it to 40 members. However, his actions did not satisfy
the demands of both Shiites and Sunnis for the restoration of the elected national assembly that
was established under the 1973 constitution but abolished in August 1975 because of Sunni-Shiite
tensions within it. Amir Isa’s refusal to restore an elected Assembly contributed to the daily anti-
government violence during 1994-1998, conducted mostly by Shiites.
Political Groups and Elections
COR elections have been held every four years since 2002—each time marked by substantial
tension over perceived government efforts to prevent election of a Shiite majority in the COR.
The Shiite opposition has sought, unsuccessfully to date, to establish election processes and
district boundaries that would allow Shiites to translate their numbers into political strength. If no
candidate in a district wins more than 50% in the first round, a runoff is held one week later.
Formal political parties are banned, but factions organize, for the elections and other political
activity, as “political societies”—the functional equivalent of parties:
7 Before the May 2012 constitutional amendments, only the COR could draft legislation.
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• Wifaq,formally, the Al Wifaq (Accord) National Islamic Society, is the largest and
most prominent Shiite political society. It is considered a relatively moderate
opposition faction and has participated in the formal national dialogues with the
government and royal family since 2011. Wifaq’s leaders, including Secretary-
General and Shiite cleric Shaykh Ali al-Salman, have been pressured by the
regime. Salman was slightly injured by security forces during a protest in June
2012 and he was arrested in late 2013 for “insulting authorities” and “incitement
to religious hatred,” respectively. He was arrested again in late December 2014,
and has been incarcerated since. His deputy leader, Khalil al-Marzuq, was
arrested in September 2013, for “inciting terrorism” in an anti-government
speech, but was acquitted in June 2014. Another of Wifaq’s top figures, the 75-
year-old Shiite cleric Isa Qasim, is considered a hardliner who has opposed
government proposals to settle the crisis. His home was raided by the regime in
May 2013 and again in late November 2014. On July 20, 2014, the government
filed suit that barred Wifaq from operating for a three month period, during which
time it could correct alleged breaches of Bahrain’s law on political societies.
Wifaq allies include the National Democratic Action Society, the National
Democratic Assembly, the Democratic Progressive Tribune, and Al Ekhaa.
• Al Haq (Movement of Freedom and Democracy), a small Shiite faction, is
outlawed because of its calls for outright change of regime and has boycotted all
the COR elections. Its key leaders are wheelchair-bound Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace
and Hassan Mushaima, both of whom are alleged by the government to have ties
to Iran. Both have been imprisoned since the February 2011 uprising. Prior to the
uprising, Alsingace had visited the United States several times to discuss the
human rights situation in Bahrain.
• The Bahrain Islamic Action Society, another small Shiite faction, also is
outlawed. It is a successor to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
(IFLB), a party purportedly linked Iran-backed extremist actions in Bahrain the
1980s and 1990s. Another IFLB offshoot, Amal, is known as the “Shirazi
faction” for its ties to radical Shiite clerics in Iran linked to Ayatollah Shirazi.
Amal’s leader, Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Mafoodh, has been in prison since
2011 and Amal was outlawed in 2012.
• Waad (“promise”) is a left-leaning secular political opposition society whose
members are both Sunni and Shiite. Waad’s leader, Ibrahim Sharif, has been in
prison since 2011.
• Sunni opinion is generally, but not exclusively, represented by the government.
However, there are two major Sunni Islamist political societies that criticize the
government for refusing to seek a larger role for Islamic law and values in
Bahraini socieity. The two are: Minbar (Arabic for “platform”), which is an
offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Al Asala, which is a harder-line
“Salafist” political society. Outspoken Salafist critic of the government Jassim al-
Saeedi is an Asala member, although he runs as an independent. Smaller Sunni
Islamist factions include Al Saff, the Islamic Shura Society, and the Al Wasat Al
Arabi Islamic Society. In June 2011, a non-Islamist, generally pro-government
Sunni political society—the National Unity Gathering/National Unity
Association—was formed as a response to the Shiite-led 2011 uprising. Ten
candidates from this grouping ran in the 2014 COR election as the “Al Fatih
Coalition.”
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Pre-Uprising Elections
Several elections were held during 2002-2010 which suggested to some outside observers that
political differences in Bahrain could be resolved electorally and legislatively.
• October 2002 Election. In the first elections under the National Charter, Wifaq
and other Shiite political groups boycotted on the grounds that establishing an
elected COR and an appointed Shura Council of the same size dilutes popular
will. The boycott lowered turnout to about 52%, and Sunnis won two-thirds of
the 40 COR seats. Of the 170 total candidates, 8 were women, but none was
elected.
• November 2006 Election. Sunni-Shiite tensions escalated in advance of the COR
and municipal elections, perhaps aggravated by the perception that a Shiite
majority had come to power in Iraq through elections. The election was also
clouded by a government adviser’s (Salah al-Bandar) revelations in August that
the government had adjusted election districts to favor Sunni candidates and had
issued passports to Sunnis in an attempt to increase the number of Sunni voters.
Wifaq did not boycott, helping lift turnout to 72%, and the faction won 17 seats—
virtually all those it contested—making it the largest bloc in the COR. Sunni
Muslims won the remaining 23 seats; of which eight were won by secular Sunnis
and 15 were won by Islamists. One woman, who was unopposed in her district,
was elected out of 18 female candidates. The King subsequently named a new
Shura Council with 20 Shiites, 19 Sunnis, and one Christian (a female). Nine
were women. In the post-election cabinet, a Shiite was named one of four deputy
prime ministers and another, a Wifaq supporter, became minister of state for
foreign affairs.
• October 2010 Election. The tensions in this COR and municipal council election
foreshadowed the uprising that began in February 2011. Shiite oppositionists
again accused the government of gerrymandering to favor Sunni candidates and
23 Shiite leaders were arrested the previous month under a 2006 anti-terrorism
law, but Wifaq participated nonetheless. Of the 200 candidates, six were women,
but only one, Munira Fakhro, was endorsed by a political society (Waad).
Turnout was about 67%. The election increased Wifaq’s representation to 18
seats, although still not a majority; reduced Sunni Islamists to five seats from 15;
and empowered Sunni independents, who won 17 seats (up from nine in the
2006-2010 COR). The same woman who had won in 2006 was elected. In the
municipal elections conducted concurrently, one woman was elected in the
second round—the first woman to be elected to a municipal council. The King
reappointed 30 of the 40 serving Shura Council members and 10 new members.
Of its membership, 19 were Shiites, including the speaker, Ali bin Salih al-Salih.
The Council had four women, substantially fewer than the 2006-2010 Council.
Among the four, one was Jewish (Nancy Khadouri), out of a Jewish population in
Bahrain of about 40 persons, and one was Christian (Hala Qarrisah). Bahrain has
an estimated 1,000 Christian citizens. Two Bahraini human rights watchdog
groups, the Bahrain Human Rights Society and the Bahrain Transparency
Society, jointly monitored the elections, along with some international observers.
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2011 Uprising: Origin, Developments, and Prognosis
Shiite aspirations were demonstrated to have remained unsatisfied when a major uprising began
on February 14, 2011, in the aftermath of the toppling of Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak.8
After a few days of minor confrontations with security forces, mostly Shiite demonstrators
converged on the interior of a major traffic circle, “Pearl Roundabout,” named after a statue there
depicting Bahrain’s pearl-diving past. The protesters demanded altering the constitution to expand
the powers of the COR; ending gerrymandering of election districts to favor Sunnis; providing
more jobs and economic opportunities; and replacing hard-line Prime Minister Khalifa. On
February 15, 2011, King Hamad formed a committee to investigate the use of force against
protestors, which had killed two by that time.
The unrest escalated on February 17-18, 2011, when security forces using rubber bullets and tear
gas to clear Pearl Roundabout killed four demonstrators. Wifaq pulled all 18 deputies out of the
COR, and Britain closed its embassy and banned arms exports to Bahrain. In part at the reported
urging of the United States, on February 19, 2011, the government pulled security forces back,
and on February 22 and 25, 2011, demonstrations said to be the largest in Bahrain’s history were
held. Wifaq and other Shiite groups boycotted a September-October 2011 special election to fill
those seats, producing a COR with 32 Sunni to only 8 Shiite-held seats.
The government, with Crown Prince Salman leading the effort, invited the representatives of the
protesters to begin a formal dialogue. That effort was supported by a gesture by King Hamad on
February 22, 2011, to release or pardon 308 Bahrainis, including Al Haq leader Mushaima,
paving the way for him to return from exile. On February 26, 2011, the King dropped two Al
Khalifa family members from cabinet posts as an apparent gesture to the opposition.
Crown Prince Salman’s “Seven Principles” Reform Plan
On March 13, 2011, Crown Prince Salman articulated “seven principles” that would guide a
national dialogue, including a “parliament with full authority;” a “government that meets the will
of the people”; fair voting districts; and several other measures.9 The articulation of the seven
principles gave Wifaq and other moderate oppositionists hope that many of their demands could
be met through dialogue. However, anger at the government’s use of force appeared to shift many
demonstrators closer to hardline groups such as Al Haq that demanded an end to the monarchy.10
The Saudi-led Intervention
With Shiite groups refusing to accept the offer of dialogue, protests escalated and sparked broader
Sunni-Shiite clashes. On March 13, 2011, protesters blockaded the financial district of the capital,
Manama, prompting governmental fears that this major economic sector could be harmed.
Bahrain requested that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which it is a member, send
security forces to protect key sites and, on March 14, 2011, a GCC force (from the GCC joint
8 The events of the uprising, and the government’s political and security reaction, are examined in substantial detail in
the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report released November 23, 2011. Text of the report is at
http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf.
9 BICI report, op. cit., p. 165.
10 “Bahrain Hard-Liners Call for Royal Family to Go.” Cable News Network website, March 9, 2011.
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Peninsula Shield unit) spearheaded by a reported 1,200 Saudi armored forces and 600 UAE
police crossed into Bahrain and took up positions at key locations. Kuwait sent naval forces to
help Bahrain secure its maritime borders. On March 15, 2011, King Hamad declared (Royal
Decree Number 18) a three-month state of emergency. Bahrain’s security forces, freed up by the
GCC deployment, cleared demonstrators from Pearl Roundabout and demolished the Pearl
Monument on March 18, 2011.11 That action caused many Shiites in the governing structure to
resign. Most public protests in downtown Manama ceased.
Perceiving he had regained the upper hand, the King announced in May 2011 that the state of
emergency would end on June 1, 2011, two weeks earlier than scheduled. The GCC forces began
to depart in late June 2011, although some, including some of the UAE police, remained to
bolster Bahraini security force ranks. King Hamad addressed the population on May 31, 2011 to
mark the end of the emergency and to offer unconditional dialogue with the opposition beginning
July 1, 2011. The GCC intervention represented an escalation from earlier steps to help the
Bahrain government. They had earlier pledged about $20 billion to help both Bahrain (and Oman,
which also faced unrest) create jobs.
“National Dialogue” Begun and Inquiry Commission Established
On June 29, 2011, as a significant gesture toward the opposition and international critics, the king
named a five-person “Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry,” (BICI) headed by highly
regarded international legal expert Dr. Cherif Bassiouni, to investigate the government’s response
to the unrest. The BICI held a public forum on July 24, 2011, but came under criticism from
Shiite oppositionists who interpreted certain Bassiouni statements as exonerating top officials.
The formation of the BICI set the stage for the “National Dialogue” on political and economic
reform that began on July 2, 2011, under the chairmanship of speaker of the COR Dhahrani.
About 300 delegates participated, of which the Shiite opposition broadly comprised 40-50
delegates, of which 5 belonged to Wifaq.12 Over several weeks, the dialogue addressed political,
economic, social, and human rights issues that government officials said was intended to outline a
vision of Bahrain rather than specific steps. The detention of many oppositionists clouded the
meetings, and Wifaq exited the talks on July 18, 2011. Others noted that the Crown Prince did not
chair the meetings, suggesting he was eclipsed by hard line figures within the royal family.
The dialogue concluded in late July 2011 after reaching consensus on the following
recommendations, which were endorsed by the government on July 29, 2011.
• an elected parliament (lower house) with expanded powers, including the power
to confirm or reject a nominated cabinet; the power to confirm or veto the
government’s four-year work plan; the right to discuss any agenda item; and the
power for the full COR to question ministers on their performance or plans. In
addition, the overall chairmanship of the National Assembly should be exercised
by the elected COR, not the Shura Council.
• a government “reflecting the will of the people.”
11 Some accounts differ on the involvement of the Peninsula Shield force, with some observers arguing that members of
the force participated directly in suppressing protests, and others accepting the Bahrain/GCC view that the GCC force
guarded key locations and infrastructure.
12 Mohamed Hasni. “Bahrain Opens Dialogue Buoyed by Shiite Attendance.” Agence France Presse, July 2, 2011.
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• “fairly” demarcated electoral boundaries.
• reworking of laws on naturalization and citizenship.
• combating financial and administrative corruption.
• efforts to reduce sectarian divisions.
There were reportedly 82 economic recommendations, including new mechanisms to provide
food subsidies to only the most needy citizens.
As a gesture of reconciliation after the dialogue concluded, in a speech on August 28, 2011, near
the conclusion of the holy month of Ramadan, King Hamad pardoned some protesters and
reinstated some of the approximately 2,700 of those who had been fired for alleged participation
in unrest. On August 8, 2011, the government released the two jailed Wifaq COR deputies, Matar
and Fairuz, along with several other activists.
“Manama Document” Opposition Proposal. Wifaq and other Shiite opposition groups rejected
the outcome of the national dialogue as failing to fulfill even the Crown Prince’s offer of a
parliament with “full authority.” The groups, led by Wifaq and Waad, unveiled their own
proposals—the “Manama Document”—on October 12, 2011. The manifesto called for a fully
elected one-chamber parliament with legislative powers, the direct selection of the prime minister
by the largest coalition in the elected legislature, and the running of elections by an independent
election commission. The opposition also viewed the government’s pledge of “fairly demarcated”
election boundaries as vague, and likely to enable the government to continue to gerrymander
districts to ensure a Sunni majority in the lower house.
Dialogue Recommendations Produce Constitutional Amendments
Despite the opposition’s criticism of the dialogue results, the government appointed a committee,
headed by deputy Prime Minister Muhammad Mubarak Al Khalifa, to implement the consensus
recommendations. After rounds of meetings between both houses of the National Assembly and
various ministries, the King announced draft amendments to the Bahraini constitution on January
16, 2012. They were adopted by the National Assembly, and ratified by the King on May 3, 2012.
The amendments:
• Imposed limitations on the power of the king to appoint the members of the
Shura Council, and a requirement that he consult the heads of the two chambers
of the National Assembly before dissolving the COR.
• Gave either chamber of the National Assembly the ability to draft legislation or
constitutional amendments.
• Changed the overall chair of the National Assembly to the speaker of the elected
COR instead of the chairman of the appointed Shura Council.
• Gave the COR the ability to veto the government’s four-year work plan—
essentially an ability to veto the nomination of the entire cabinet—without the
concurrence of the Shura Council. This was an expansion of previous powers to
vote no confidence against individual ministers.
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The BICI Report and Implementation Process
In addition to the dialogue, the government looked to the BICI report to help resolve the crisis,
even though the mission of the BICI focused on government handling of the unrest rather than on
ideas for political reform. It was initially due by October 30, 2011, but was released on November
23, 2011. The 500+ page report provided some support for the narratives of both sides in the
crisis, and recommendations, including the following:13
• There was “systematic” and “deliberate” use of excessive force, including torture
and forced confessions, against protesters.
• The opposition articulated additional demands as the uprising progressed.
• The government did not provide evidence to establish a link between the unrest
in Bahrain and the government of Iran. (p. 378)
• There was no evidence of human rights abuses committed by the GCC forces that
intervened at the request of the Bahraini government. (p. 378)
The report contained 26 recommendations (pp. 411-415) to try to prevent future violence against
peaceful protesters and to hold accountable those responsible for abuses against protesters. In
keeping with the BICI’s mandate, the recommendations did not address the political structure of
Bahrain. Apparently recognizing that it would be judged by the international community on its
response to the report, King Hamad issued a statement accepting the criticism and promising full
implementation of the recommendations. Wifaq criticized it as failing to state that abuse of
protesters were deliberate government policy.
On November 26, 2011, the King issued a decree to establish a 19-member National Commission
to oversee implementation of the recommendations, chaired by Shura Council Chairman Ali al-
Salih (a Shiite). He also announced that the “National Human Rights Institution,” established in
2010, would be fully independent of the government. Subsequently, a “Follow-Up Unit,” headed
by Ms. Dana Al Zayani, was established by the Ministry of Justice.14 According to these
governmental bodies, the regime implemented the vast majority of the 26 BICI
recommendations.15 However, a study by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED),
issued on the one-year anniversary of the BICI recommendations, found that the government had
fully implemented only three of the recommendations, partially implemented 15, not
implemented six at all, and two others had “unclear” implementation.16 This more critical
assessment was supported by BICI chair Bassiouni in public comments marking the one-year
anniversary of the report. The conference report on the FY2013 defense authorization act (P.L.
112-239, signed January 2, 2013) directed the Secretary of State to report to Congress within 180
days of enactment (by July 2, 2013) on Bahrain’s implementation of the BICI recommendations.
(A formal provision of the law to this effect was taken out in conference and substituted with
conference report language to the same effect.) The report was submitted but not made public;17
13 http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf.
14 The Follow-Up Unit’s June report can be found at http://www.iaa.bh/downloads/bici_followup_report_en.pdf.
15 The full text of the National Commission’s March 20, 2012, report is at http://www.biciactions.bh/wps/portal/BICI/.
16 POMED. “One Year Later: Assessing Bahrain’s Implementation of the BICI Report.” November 2012.
17 Author conversation with congressional staff, July 2013.
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press reports indicate that it concluded that the government had fully implemented five out of the
26 recommendations—a finding broadly similar to those of POMED.18
The recommendations that observers agree were fully implemented include
• Stripping the National Security Agency of law enforcement powers and limiting
it to purely intelligence gathering. That occurred with the issuing of an
amendment to the 2002 decree establishing that agency. The head of the
organization was removed and replaced by Adel bin Khalifa Al Fadhil, a
nonroyal. The arrest powers were transferred to the Ministry of Interior.
• Drafting and providing training on a code of conduct for the police, based on
international best practices. The government hired former Miami police chief
John Timoney and former British police chief John Yates to teach Bahraini police
tactics and techniques that conform to international standards of human rights
practices. However, the State Department’s human rights report for 2012, issued
on April 19, 2013, said that the Ministry of Interior’s enforcement of the code of
conduct is unclear.19
• Training judiciary employees and prosecutors on preventing and eradicating
torture and ill-treatment.
There appears to be broad agreement among observers that the government has not implemented
several recommendations (5, 8, 10, 14, 22, and 24) that address investigation and prevention of
torture, detention without prompt access to legal counsel, dropping charges on those who
protested but did not use violence, and allowing the opposition free expression and access to
media.
Most of the other recommendations fall into an intermediate category of partial implementation,
including the following:
• Holding security officials accountable for abuses (recommendations No. 2 and
No. 7).
• Referral of all cases of security personnel who committed major abuses to the
public prosecutor for subsequent prosecution. In May 2014, the Ministry of
Interior Ombudsman’s office, established in July 2013, issued its first report,
stating that 45 Ministry personnel had been referred for prosecution by various
courts.20
• Establishment of new procedures to record interrogations of detainees (No. 13).
• Integrating Shiites into the security services (No. 11).
• Reinstatement of fired workers, public sector employees, and students (No. 18,
No. 19, and No. 20). According to the government, almost all of the over 2,500
18 http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/14/the_peril_of_ignoring_bahrain_s_iron_fist.
19 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper. p.11.
20 http://ombudsman.bh/mcms-store/pdf/610-First%20Annual%20Report%20%202013-2014-2812251.pdf?
utm_source=Project+on+Middle+East+Democracy+-+All+Contacts&utm_campaign=1e97a6b50f-
Bahrain_Weekly_Update_Nov_1_2012&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_75a06056d7-1e97a6b50f-215946089
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dismissed workers have been reinstated, although Bahraini labor organizations
say some cases of dismissed laborers remain unresolved.
• Establishment of a compensation fund for the victims of torture and families of
deceased victims (No.16 and No. 17). In August 2011, the King announced a
“Civil Settlement Initiative” to provide $25 million to compensate these victims.
• The rebuilding of destroyed religious sites (No. 21). About 22 of the more than
53 Shiite religious sites demolished by the regime during the course of the
uprising have been mostly rebuilt.
Second National Dialogue
Continued demonstrations, use of force against them, and increasing incidents of anti-government
violence caused the government and the opposition to seek to resume dialogue. Moderates on
both sides stressed that the Crown Prince’s “Seven Principles,” the national dialogue consensus
recommendations, and the Manama Document had many points in common. The State
Department praised the Crown Prince’s speech at the December 7-8, 2012, Manama Dialogue
(annual international security conference sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies) calling for a resumption of national dialogue. On January 22, 2013, the King formally
reiterated his earlier calls for a restart of the dialogue and, the same day, Wifaq and five allied
parties accepted the invitation.
This dialogue began on February 10, 2013, consisting of twice per week meetings attended by:
the Minister of Justice (an Al Khalifa family member) and two other ministers, eight opposition
representatives (Wifaq and allied parties), eight representatives of pro-government organizations,
and five members of the National Assembly (both the upper and lower house). To facilitate
progress, on March 11, 2013, the King appointed Crown Prince Salman first deputy Prime
Minister—a new position that appeared intended to increase the Crown Prince’s authority.
The second national dialogue quickly bogged down and ultimately produced few results. The
opposition insisted any consensus recommendations be put to a popular referendum, while the
government insisted that agreements be enacted by the National Assembly. The opposition
demanded that the dialogue include authoritative decision makers and representatives of the
King—higher-level figures than the ministers that participated. Opposition participants began
boycotting the talks in mid-September 2013, to protest lack of progress as well as the arrest of
Khalil al-Marzuq, the deputy chief of Wifaq and Wifaq’s representative to the dialogue. The
government formally suspended the dialogue on January 8, 2014.
Recent Developments/Current Situation
Crown Prince Salman sought to quickly revive the dialogue process by meeting with Marzuq and
Wifaq leader Shaykh Ali al-Salman on January 15, 2014, despite the fact that both oppositionists
faced criminal charges for their roles in the uprising. The meeting addressed Wifaq’s demand that
political dialogue be conducted with senior Al Khalifa members. The Minister of the Royal Court
Shaykh Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa (see above) subsequently met with opposition
representatives to discuss their proposals for altering the governing structure. The Royal Court
Minister said any renewed dialogue would include a greater number of senior officials than was
the case previously.
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On September 19, 2014, Crown Prince Salman issued a five-point “framework” for a renewed
national dialogue that would address some opposition demands, centering on (1) redefining
electoral districts; (2) a revised process for appointing the Shura Council; (3) giving the elected
COR new powers to approve or reject the formation of a new cabinet; (4) having international
organizations work Bahrain’s judiciary; and (5) introducing new codes of conduct for security
forces. Opposition political societies rejected the proposals primarily because they did not offer to
further empower the COR by allowing it—rather than the King—to select a Prime Minister.
COR Elections in November 2014
No new national dialogue was convened, and the government subsequently sought to induce the
opposition to participate in the 2014 COR election—a development that would give the elections
substantial legitimacy. On September 22, the government announced the vote for November 22,
with a runoff to be held a week later. The government also announced that there would be only
four electoral districts instead of five by abolishing the “central governorate” district and
redistributing its seat allocations. Experts said the redistricting might enable the Shiite opposition
to win 50% of the 40 seats. The previous districts limited the Shiite opposition to 18 seats, even
though Wifaq won 67% of the total vote in the 2010 election.
The redistricting did not have government’s intended effect, even though the redistricting did not
clearly harm opposition electoral prospects. Wifaq and its allies announced in early October that
they would boycott the COR election. Subsequently, the government went ahead with a three
month ban on political activities by Wifaq. Candidate registration took place October 15-19. The
boycott reduced the turnout significantly from most past elections (to 51%, according to the
government, or 30%, according to the opposition), but there was little or no violence during the
November 22 vote and November 29 runoff round.
Some experts noted that seats were mostly won by independent candidates, perhaps suggesting
that those who voted seek a less polarized political climate. Only three candidates of the Sunni
Islamist political societies won, and none of the 10 candidates of the pro-government Al Fatih
coalition was elected. The 14 Shiite winners were independents, although some reportedly are
members of Wifaq or other opposition political societies. Ahmad Ibrahim al-Mulla was elected
COR speaker. Ali bin Salih Al Salih, a Shiite remained chairman of the Shura that was appointed
on December 8, which again had rough parity in the number of Shiites and Sunnis as well as one
Chrisitian and one Jewish representative. Of the 40 members, 23 were appointed to the body for
the first time. The combined National Assembly convened on December 14.
After the election, the King reappointed Prime Minister Khalifa to form a new government. The
King also paired the number of ministries down to 17 by eliminating some outright or combining
some of them. However, the reappointment of Khalifa as Prime Minister appeared to represent a
possible signal of unwillingness to compromise with the opposition. Some in the opposition, and
in the broader international community, have in the past few years suggested that, as a gesture to
the opposition, Prime Minister Khalifa might be replaced with a moderate Al Khalifa member.
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Table 1. Comparative Composition of the National Assembly
Post-By-Election
2006
2010
(October 2011)
2014
Council of Representatives (COR)
Wifaq (Shiite
17 18 0 0
Islamist)
Shi te
Independent
0 0 8 14
Sunni Independent
8 17 27 23
(mostly secular)
Minbar (Sunni
7 2 2 1
Islamist, Muslim
Brotherhood)
Asala (Sunni Islamist,
8 3 3 2
Salafi)
COR Sect
23 Sunni, 17 Shiite
22 Sunni, 18 Shiite
32 Sunni, 8 Shiite
26 Sunni, 14 Shiite
Composition
Women in COR
1
1
4
3
Shura Council (Upper House, appointed)
Sectarian, Religious
20 Shi te, 19 Sunni, 1 19 Shi te, 19 Sunni, 1
No change
roughly equal
Composition Upper
Christian
Christian, 1 Jew
numbers of Sunnis
House (Shura
and Shiites, 1
Council)
Christian, 1 Jew
Number of Women
9
4
11
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Re-Arrest of Wifaq Leader and Demonstrations Revive
On December 28, 2014, about one month after the conclusion of the COR election process, the
government re-arrested Wifaq leader Ali al-Salman. His lawyer states that he has been charged
with “inciting hatred against the regime,” apparently reflecting his role in encouraging Shiites to
boycott the election and for joining post-election demonstrations against the government. His
arrest touched off several days of clashes between Shiite demonstrators and security forces. In
early February 2015, the government revoked the citizenship of 72 persons for various anti-
government activities, and shut down a new independent satellite TV station, Al Arab News
Channel, for airing an interview with Wifaq deputy leader Marzuq.21 Additional demonstrations
marked the February 14, 2015, fourth anniversary of the uprising.
Prospects and Way Forward?
Some experts express optimism that a political settlement is possible. The government and the
opposition have at times discussed an interim compromise in which the opposition gains seats in
a new cabinet. Saudi statements in 2014 appeared to signal a softening of Saudi resistance to
21 Ben Hubbard. “Channel in Bahrain Goes Silent After Giving Opposition Airtime.” New York Times, February 3,
2015.
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concessions to the Bahrain opposition. And, despite the unrest, six Shiites ministers continue to
serve in Bahrain’s council of ministers. Others assert that conditions favor a settlement because
the opposition appears to realize it cannot topple the government and the government appears to
have concluded it cannot end forcibly demonstrations and unrest entirely.
Emergence of Violent Underground Groups Cloud Outlook
Some experts express pessimism about a political settlement on the grounds that the uprising
might be evolving into an increasingly organized insurgency. One hardline group, the “14
February Youth Coalition” (named for the anniversary of the Bahrain uprising) claims to be
inspired by the “Tamarod” (rebel)-led protests in Egypt that prompted the Egyptian military to
remove Muslim Brotherhood president Mohammad Morsi. The Bahraini government asserts that
the 14 February Youth Coalition is a terrorist movement that seeks to overthrow the state, and the
movement gave some support to that assertion when it claimed responsibility for an April 14,
2013, explosion in the Financial Harbour district. On September 29, 2013, 50 Shiites were
sentenced to up to 15 years in prison for alleged involvement in the 14 February Coalition.
There are several violent groups that include22
• Sayara al-Ashtar (Ashtar Brigades). It issued its first public statement in April
2013 and has since claimed responsibility for 20 bombings against security
personnel. It claimed responsibility for a March 3, 2014, bombing that killed
three police officers who were confronting protesters outside Manama. One of
them was a UAE police officer—part of the contingent that has helped Bahraini
security forces since the 2011 GCC intervention.
• Popular Resistance Brigades. This group also claimed responsibility for the
March 3, 2014, bombing discussed above and openly affiliates with the 14
February Youth Coalition.
• Sayara al-Mukhtar (Mukhtar Brigades). It has claimed responsibility for several
attacks on security forces, including by implanted Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs).
Among other recent bombings carried out by these or other violent oppositionists are: a bomb on
February 14, 2014, the third anniversary of the uprising, that killed one police officer; and a bomb
on March 11, 2014, that wounded two Bahrain police officers. On two successive days
(December 8 and 9, 2014), blasts in Bahrain killed a civilian and a Jordanian police officer
assisting Bahrain’s Interior Ministry forces, respectively.
In concert with the emergence of groups that use violent tactics, the use, storage, and manufacture
of explosives against Bahraini security forces appears to be increasing. On June 14, 2012, the
government discovered bomb-making materials in several locations. On April 29, 2013, the
government claimed to have uncovered an arms warehouse used by oppositionists. On October 7,
2013, a Bahrain court convicted nine Bahraini Shiites linked to the bomb-making facilities
discussed above On December 30, 2013, authorities seized a ship, originating in Iraq, allegedly
22 Matthew Levitt. “Iran and Bahrain: Crying Wolf, or Wolf at the Door?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
May 16, 2014.
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carrying Iranian weaponry and bomb-making material for the Bahrain opposition.23 Pro-
government Bahrainis say that the bombings show intent of the opposition to overthrow the
regime by any means necessary, whereas the opposition political societies insist they have no
connection to violent underground groups.
Table 2. Status of Prominent Dissidents/Other Metrics of the Uprising
Abdul Hadi al-
Arrested April 9, 2011, was one of 13 prominent dissidents tried by state security court
Khawaja, founder
May 8, 2011, and sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to overthrow the government
of Bahrain Center
and for espionage on June 22, 2011. He conducted a hunger strike in prison in early 2012
for Human Rights
but was force fed by Bahraini officials and remains alive. Daughters Zainab and Maryam
have been repeatedly arrested for opposition activities and released, and have campaigned
abroad for their father’s release and for the Shi te opposition generally. His brother, Salah
Abdullah al-Khawaja, was sentenced in June 2011 to five years in prison.
Hassan Mushaima and
Two of the 13 prominent dissidents tried by state security court May 8, 2011, sentenced
Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace,
to life in prison on June 22, 2011. Sentence upheld September 4, 2012. Mushaima’s son
Al Haq leaders
was one of the 31 whose citizenship was revoked in November 2012.
Other prominent
Along with the Khawaja brothers, Mushaima, and Alsingace, the June 22, 2011, sentences
oppositionists sentenced of nine other prominent dissidents were upheld on September 4, 2012, and reaffirmed by
on June 22, 2011
the Court of Cassation on January 8, 2013. Four are sentenced to life in prison—
Abdulwahab Ahmed; Mohammad al-Saffaf; Abduljalil Mansour; and Said Mirza Ahmad.
Nabeel Rajab
Successor to al-Khawaja as head of BCHR. Arrested February 15, 2012, for inciting illegal
assembly and organizing unlicensed demonstrations, released, and rearrested on April 1,
2012. Sentenced on August 16, 2012, to three years in jail but, on December 11, 2012,
sentence was reduced to two years on appeal. Released May 24, 2014. Rearrested in
October 2014 for online posts al eging security force links to the Islamic State.
Sayed Yousif al-
Member of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, has catalogued and reported on
Muhafdha
protests over social media. Arrested December 17, 2012, and detained for two weeks in
November 2012.
21 medical personnel
Twenty-one medical personnel were arrested in April 2011 and subsequently tried for
from Salmaniya Medical
inciting sectarian hatred, possession of illegal weapons, and forcibly occupying a public
Complex
building. The personnel argued that they were helping wounded protesters. They were
tried in a military court before the government announced their retrial in a civilian court.
All were eventually acquitted, most recently in late March 2013 by an appeals court.
However, they have not been able to regain their jobs at the medical center.
Matar Matar and Jawad
Arrested May 2, 2011, and released August 8, 2011. Matar formal y acquitted on February
Fairuz, members of the
19, 2012. Fairuz was one of the 31 whose citizenship was revoked in Nov. 2012. His
COR, Ayatollah Najati
brother, Jalal Fairuz, was another stripped of citizenship, as was Shi te Ayatol ah Hussein
al-Najati. Najati was ordered expel ed from Bahrain on April 23, 2014, for acting as a
representative of Iraqi senior Ayatol ah Ali al-Sistani “without permission.”
Deputy Secretary
Arrested in September 2013 for “inciting terrorism,” but released after 38 days and
General of Wifaq, Khalil banned from leaving Bahrain. Was acquitted of al charges on June 25, 2014.
al-Marzuq
Number killed in the
About 100
uprising to date
Citizenship Revocations
About 115
Number Arrested
Approximately 3,000 total detentions since 2011.
Sources: Various press and interest group reports.
23 Sandeep Singh Grewal. Arms Ring is Smashed by Police. Daily News, December 31. 2013.
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U.S. Posture on the Uprising
The Administration has not called for the Al Khalifa regime to step down, asserting that Bahrain’s
use of force against demonstrators has been limited and that the Bahrain government has—prior
to and since the uprising began—undertaken reform. The Administration has repeatedly urged
Bahraini authorities against using force against protesters, it opposed the GCC intervention, and it
has called on all parties to engage in sustained political dialogue on reforms.24 After the GCC
intervention, on March 19, 2011, then Secretary Clinton said:
Bahrain obviously has the sovereign right to invited GCC forces into its territory under its
defense and security agreements…. [The United States has] made clear that security alone
cannot resolve the challenges facing Bahrain. As I said earlier this week, violence is not and
cannot be the answer. A political process is. We have raised our concerns about the current
measures directly with Bahraini officials and will continue to do so.
President Obama’s May 19, 2011, speech on the uprisings in the Middle East said the prospects
for success of a Bahrain government dialogue with the opposition were compromised by the
jailing of opposition figures. In a September 21, 2011, speech to the U.N. General Assembly,
President Obama said:
In Bahrain, steps have been taken toward reform and accountability. We’re pleased with that,
but more is required. America is a close friend of Bahrain, and we will continue to call on the
government and the main opposition bloc—the Wifaq—to pursue a meaningful dialogue that
brings peaceful change that is responsive to the people. We believe the patriotism that binds
Bahrainis together must be more powerful than the sectarian forces that would tear them
apart. It will be hard, but it is possible.
After the release of the BICI report, then-Secretary of State Clinton said that the United States is
deeply concerned about the abuses identified in the report … and believe[s] that the BICI
report offers a historic opportunity for all Bahrainis to participate in a healing process that
will address long-standing grievances and move the nation onto a path of genuine, sustained,
reform.
On June 6, 2013, following a meeting between Secretary of State John Kerry and the Crown
Prince, the State Department said: the United States and Bahrain “agreed that all sides should
contribute constructively to reconciliation, meaningful dialogue, and reform that meets the
aspirations of all Bahrainis. Secretary Kerry reiterated [the U.S.] belief that all sides must reject
violence and pursue actions that will contribute to Bahrain’s future growth and prosperity.” Then
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited Bahrain to speak before the 2013 Manama Dialogue
(IISS security conference discussed above), becoming the first U.S. Cabinet member to visit
Bahrain since the 2011 uprising began. (He returned for that same conference in December 2014.)
On February 29, 2014, then Deputy Secretary of State William Burns praised the efforts of the
Crown Prince to revive the national dialogue process.25
24 Secretary of State Clinton Comments on the Situation in the Middle East. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
GbucMZUg3Gc.
25 http://www.state.gov/s/d/2014/221809.htm?utm_source=Project+on+Middle+East+Democracy+-+All+Contacts&
utm_campaign=027fa1d218-Bahrain_Weekly_Update_Nov_1_2012&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_75a06056d7-
027fa1d218-215946089
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Critics of the Administration—primarily human rights-oriented groups such as Human Rights
Watch and the Project on Middle East Democracy—say that U.S. criticism of Bahrain’s handling
of the unrest has been insufficient—a result of the Administration’s perception of vital U.S.
security interests in Bahrain.26 Critics add that the Administration is concerned that a fall of the Al
Khalifa regime and ascension of a Shiite-led government could increase Iran’s influence and lead
to an unwanted loss of the U.S. use of Bahrain’s military facilities. As a possible example of a
U.S. emphasis on security issues, the Administration publicly praised the Bahrain government for
joining the anti-Islamic State organization in September 2014.
Critics add that continued U.S. military sales and aid to the government represents a tacit
endorsement of the government’s stance on the unrest. The Administration counters that it has
reduced or placed on hold some U.S. aid and sales. For example, $25 million in military aid
(Foreign Military Financing, FMF) was requested for Bahrain for FY2012 (figures determined
just before the uprising began), but only $10 million was provided. FMF for Bahrain has since
continued to fall to a level of $7.5 million being provided in FY2015, and another $7.5 million
requested for FY2016. After the February 2014 Malinowski expulsion (discussed above), the
Administration apparently put on hold deliveries of some arms sales to the Defense Ministry and
all assistance to the Interior Ministry.
Some human rights-related groups have suggested that the United States should go further and
ban travel to the United States or freeze any U.S.-based assets of Bahraini officials determined by
the Administration to have committed or authorized human rights abuses against peaceful
protesters. Such sanctions have been imposed on members of adversary governments such as
Syria and Iran, for example in the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195). To date, the Administration has not imposed any sanctions on Bahrain
or on Bahraini officials for human rights abuses.
The Bahrain government and its supporters assert that Administration criticism has been too
harsh. Bahrain’s sentiment was exemplified on July 7, 2014, when it ordered Assistant Secretary
of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) Tom Malinowski out of Bahrain for
meeting separately with Wifaq leader Shaykh Salman. The government asserted he breached a
requirement that all foreign government meetings with opposition political societies have a
Bahrain government official present. Secretary of State Kerry, in a phone call to Bahrain’s
Foreign Minister, called that requirement “unacceptable” and contrary to international diplomatic
protocol. A July 18, 2014, letter to King Hamad, signed by 18 Members of the House of
Representatives, called on the King to invite Assistant Secretary Malinowski back to Bahrain.27
The Malinowski expulsion went well beyond the established Bahrain government pattern of
criticizing then U.S. Ambassador Tom Krajeski for his meetings with opposition political
societies. In July 2014, after Krajeski had served a normal three year term as Ambassador, the
Administration nominated William V. Roebuck, another career diplomat, to succeed him. He was
confirmed and took up his duties in mid-December 2014. In September 2014, Bahrain refused to
provide Representative Jim McGovern a guarantee of access to Bahrain, scuttling his planned
visit to meet with all sides involved in the political disputes.28 Suggesting that the two countries
26 Stephen McInerny. “Silence on Bahrain.” Washington Post op-ed. November 5, 2012.
27 Congress of the United States. Letter to King Hamad. July 18, 2014.
28 http://mcgovern.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/us-rep-jim-mcgovern-issues-statement-on-refusal-of-
bahraini-govt-to?utm_source=Project+on+Middle+East+Democracy+-+All+Contacts&utm_campaign=b2cd02f711-
(continued...)
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had resolved differences over the Malinowski visit, Malinowski and Assistant Secretary of State
for the Near East Anne Patterson visited Bahrain in early December 2014 to hold meetings with
the government as well as members of civil society.
Pre-2011 U.S. Posture on Bahraini Democracy and Human Rights
Well before the 2011 unrest began, human rights groups and Bahraini Shiite oppositionists had
accused successive U.S. Administrations of downplaying government abuses. Critics point to then
Secretary of State Clinton’s comments in Bahrain on December 3, 2010, referring to the October
2010 elections, saying: “I am impressed by the commitment that the government has to the
democratic path that Bahrain is walking on ... ”29 In May 2006 Bahrain revoked the visa for the
resident program director of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and did not allow the office
to reopen. NDI was conducting programs to enhance parliamentary capabilities through a local
NGO. Successive State Department International Religious Freedom reports have noted that the
U.S. government discusses religious freedom with the [Bahraini] government as part of its overall
policy to promote human rights.
MEPI Funding Uses in Bahrain.30 The Administration counters the criticism with assertions that,
for many years prior to the 2011 unrest, the United States sought to accelerate political reform in
Bahrain and to empower its political societies through several programs. The primary vehicle has
been the “Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI),” which began funding programs in Bahrain
in 2003. MEPI funds have been used for an American Bar Association (ABA) program to support
the Ministry of Justice’s Judicial and Legal Studies Institute (JLSI), which conducts specialized
training for judges, lawyers, law schools, and Bahrain’s bar association. The ABA also provided
technical assistance to Bahrain’s implementation of the BICI recommendations, inclduing
legislation on fair trial standards. MEPI funds have also been used to fund U.S. Department of
Commerce programs to provide Bahrain with technical assistance in support of trade
liberalization and economic diversification. The Commerce Department program has also helped
Bahrain modernize commercial laws and regulations. In 2010, MEPI supported the signing of a
Memorandum of Understanding between the Small Business Administration and Bahrain’s
Ministry of Industry and Commerce to support small and medium enterprises in Bahrain. Other
MEPI funds were used for AFL-CIO projects with Bahraini labor organizations, and to help
Bahrain implement the U.S.-Bahrain FTA.
Other Human Rights Issues31
Most of the human rights problems identified in Bahrain are directly tied to the government’s
response to the unrest, as noted in human rights reports such as those by the State Department,
(...continued)
Bahrain_Weekly_Update_Nov_1_2012&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_75a06056d7-b2cd02f711-215946089.
29 Department of State. “Remarks With Foreign Minister Al Khalifa After Their Meeting.” December 3, 2010.
30 Statement from the U.S. Embassy in Bahrain Concerning MEPI. June 17, 2014.
31 Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2013 (released
February 27, 2014), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=
220348#wrapper; the International Religious Freedom Report for 2013 (July 28, 2014), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/
irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=222285#wrapper; and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2013
(June 19, 2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210740.pdf. See also: Human Rights Watch: World
Report 2014.
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Human Rights Watch, and other groups. The State Department human rights report for 2013,
released February 27, 2014, notes additional problems in Bahrain for non-Muslims and for non-
Shiite opponents of the government, as well as limitations in the rights of organized labor.
There are several Bahraini human rights groups, mainly advocates for Shiite rights and causes.
The most prominent are the Bahrain Human Rights Society (the primary licensed human rights
organization), the Bahrain Transparency Society, and the Bahrain Center for Human Rights
(BCHR) and its offshoot, the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights (BYSHR). The latter
organization was officially dissolved but remain active informally. As noted above, the
government has arrested several leaders of these organizations.
Bahrain has drawn increasing attention from U.N. human rights bodies and other governments.
On June 28, 2012, 28 countries issued a joint declaration, during U.N. Human Rights Council
debate, condemning human rights abuses by the Bahrain government. The United States, Britain,
and eight other EU countries did not support the initiative. Human rights groups criticized the
Administration for refusing to block the September 28, 2012, vote in the U.N. Human Rights
Council to fill one of its advisory committee vacancies with a Bahraini representative, Saeed
Mohammad al-Faihani. That vote came nine days after the Human Rights Council accepted a
Universal Periodic Review of Bahrain’s human rights record, in which the government agreed to
fully accept 140 out of 176 recommendations of the review. On September 9, 2013, 47 countries,
including the United States, joined the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
in stating that the human rights situation in Bahrain remains an issue of serious concern.32
Opposition activists reportedly have requested the appointment of a U.N. Special Rapporteur on
human rights in Bahrain and the establishment of a formal U.N. office in Bahrain that would
monitor human rights practices there. These steps have not been taken, to date.
Women’s Rights
As do the other GCC countries, Bahraini practices and customs tend to limit women’s rights.
Women can drive, own and inherit property, and initiate divorce cases, but religious courts may
refuse a woman’s divorce request. Some prominent Bahraini women have campaigned for a
codified family law that would enhance and secure women’s rights, but were blocked by Bahraini
clerics who opposed such reforms. The campaign for the law was backed by King Hamad’s wife,
Shaykha Sabeeka, and the Supreme Council for Women, which is one association that promotes
women’s rights in Bahrain. Others include the Bahrain Women’s Union, the Bahrain Women’s
Association, and the Young Ladies Association.
The government promotes women to high positions. Since 2005, there has always been at least
two female ministers—Minister of Human Rights and Social Development Fatima bint Ahmad al-
Balushi and Minister of Information and Culture Mai bint Muhammad Al Khalifa. A third, Samira
Rajab, was added to the cabinet in 2012 as minister of state for media affairs. Huda Azar Nonoo,
an attorney and formerly the only Jew in the Shura Council, was ambassador to the United States
during 2008-2013. As noted above, a female—Dana Zayani—heads the “Follow Up Unit” that
32 http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Joint-Statement-on-the-OHCHR-and-the-human-rights-situation-in-
Bahrain-FINAL.pdf?utm_source=Project+on+Middle+East+Democracy+-+All+Contacts&utm_campaign=
52543e5858-Bahrain_Weekly_Update_Nov_1_2012&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_75a06056d7-52543e5858-
215946089.
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oversaw implementation of the BICI recommendations. The number of women in both chambers
of the National Assembly is provided in Table 1, above.
Religious Freedom
The State Department report on international religious freedom for 2013 (released July 28, 2014)
was similar to that of previous years in that it focuses extensively on Sunni-Shiite differences and
the unrest. As an example, in September 2013 the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs, which
regulates the affairs of Muslim organizations in Bahrain, filed a lawsuit against the main
assembly of Shiite clerics in Bahrain, called the Islamic Ulema Council. The Ministry claimed it
was an illegal organization and sought to halt its activities and liquidate its assets.
According to the report, the government allows freedom of worship for Christians, Jews, and
Hindus although the constitution declares Islam the official religion. Non-Muslim groups must
register with the Ministry of Social Development to operate and Muslim groups must register
with the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs. To date, 19 non-Muslim religious groups are
registered, including Christian churches and a Hindu temple. In 2012, the government donated
land for the Roman Catholic Vicariate of Northern Arabia to relocate from Kuwait to Bahrain.
The Baha’i faith, declared blasphemous in Iran and Afghanistan, has been discriminated against
in Bahrain, although recent State Department human rights reports say that the Baha’i community
can gather and operates openly. According to the State Department human rights report for 2011,
there are about 40 Jews in Bahrain, and no recent reports of anti-Semitic acts.
Aside from sectarian differences, religious conservatives, both Sunni and Shiite, are active in
Bahrain. On September 14, 2012, about 2,000 Bahrainis demonstrated in the mostly Shiite district
of Diraz against the U.S.-produced video “The Innocence of Muslims.” Similar demonstrations
took place throughout the Middle East and South Asia.
Media Freedoms
Media freedoms have been curbed since the uprising began. The State Department human rights
reports states that the government suppresses critical speech. As have several of the other Gulf
states, the government has made increased use of laws allowing jail sentences for “insulting the
King,” and has increased the penalty for that offense to five years, from two years. As noted
above, in October 2014, the government rearrested Nabil Rajab for posting online reports that
members of the Bahrain security forces had joined the Islamic State organization.
Labor Rights
On labor issues, Bahrain has been credited with significant labor reforms, including a 2002 law
granting workers, including noncitizens, the right to form and join unions. The law holds that the
right to strike is a legitimate means for workers to defend their rights and interests, but their right
is restricted in practice, including a prohibition on strikes in the oil and gas, education, and health
sectors. There are about 50 trade unions in Bahrain, but all unions must join the General
Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU). As a sign of the degree to which the GFBTU is
dominated by oppositionists, during the height of unrest in 2011, the GFBTU called at least two
general strikes to protest excessive force by security forces. In apparent retaliation by the
government and employers, during March-May 2011, employers dismissed almost 2,500 workers
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from the private sector, and almost 2,000 from the public sector, including 25% of the country’s
union leadership.
Human Trafficking
On human trafficking, the State Department “Trafficking in Persons Report” for 2014, released in
July 2014, again placed Bahrain in “Tier 2: Watch List.” This is the third year in a row that
Bahrain is rated at that level.33 The Tier 2 Watch List ranking is based on the government’s failure
to demonstrate increasing effort to address the human trafficking issue. However, it was given a
waiver for a mandatory downgrade to Tier 3 (a requirement if a country is on the Watch List for
three consecutive years) on the grounds that it has a written plan to bring its efforts against
trafficking into compliance with international standards. The 2014 report adds that the
government has increased prosecutions for trafficking, as compared to 2013. The report for 2014
asserts that Bahrain is a destination country for migrant workers from India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Eritrea to be
subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.
Executions and Torture
Another issue that has been widely discussed in the context of the uprising, but which predated it,
is that of executions and torture. Human Rights Watch and other groups long asserted that
Bahrain had been going against the international trend of ending executions. In November 2009,
Bahrain’s Court of Cassation upheld the sentencing to death by firing squad of a citizen of
Bangladesh. That sentenced was imposed for a 2005 murder. From 1977 until 2006, there were no
executions in Bahrain.
In February 2010, well before the uprising began, Human Rights Watch issued a study alleging
systematic use by Bahraini security forces of torture.34 Witnesses at a May 13, 2011, hearing of
the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission asserted that torture was being used regularly on
those (mostly Shiites) arrested in the unrest. The State Department human rights report for 2011
said there were numerous reports of torture and other cruel punishments during the state of
emergency (March-June 2011). The government cancelled the planned May 2013 visit of the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Juan Mendez—the second cancellation of his visit since the unrest began. On June 7,
2013, 20 Senators and Representatives signed a letter to the King urging him to allow a visit by
Mendez in order to demonstrate Bahrain’s “commitment to help put an end to such abuses.”35
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations36
The U.S.-Bahrain security relationship dates to the end of World War II and, since the late 1970s,
defense and security issues have been central to U.S.-Bahrain relations. In large part to keep
33 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/226845.pdf.
34 Human Rights Watch. “Bahrain: Torture Redux.” February 2010.
35 http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/HRF-King-Al-Khalifa-Letter.pdf.
36 Information in this section obtained from a variety of press reports, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA).
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powerful neighbors in check, Bahrain has linked its security to the United States, and has placed
its facilities at U.S. disposal to address threats from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, international
terrorism, and piracy in the Gulf and Arabia Sea. Bahrain, as much as any GCC state, considers
Iran’s nuclear program a major potential threat. Since the U.S.-led ousting of Saddam Hussein in
Iraq, the perceived threat from Iraq has receded because Iraq’s military is far smaller and less
well-armed than it was during the rule of Saddam Hussein.
In addition to the long-standing U.S. naval headquarters presence in Bahrain, the two countries
signed a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in 1991. In March 2002, President Bush
(Presidential Determination 2002-10) designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a
designation that qualifies Bahrain to purchase the same U.S. arms that NATO allies can purchase.
There are about 7,000 U.S. military personnel, mostly Navy, deployed in Bahrain implementing
various missions and U.S.-Bahrain defense cooperation initiatives.37 In December 2014, the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) announced it would form a joint naval force based in Bahrain.
U.S. officials say that U.S.- Bahrain differences over Bahrain’s handling of the unrest has caused
Bahraini officers to become slightly less forthcoming with in-kind support to the U.S. military
presence in Bahrain. This could represent resentment over the U.S. withholding of some arms
sales to Bahrain or retaliation for U.S. criticism of the government’s handling of the unrest.
However, the continued strength of the defense relationship was displayed in September 2014
when Bahrain joined the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition by flying airstrikes on Islamic State
positions in Syria.
Opposition leaders, including Wifaq leader Salman, publicly support the security relationship with
the United States, but they assert that the United States should use the leverage of its military
presence in Bahrain to persuade the Bahraini government to enact significant political reforms.
Others observers say that, were the opposition to come to power, Iran might influence its Shiite
allies in Bahrain to expel U.S. forces from Bahrain.
U.S. Naval Headquarters in Bahrain
The cornerstone of U.S.-Bahrain defense relations is U.S. access to Bahrain’s naval facilities.
February 2008 marked the 60th anniversary of a U.S. naval command presence in Bahrain;
MIDEASTFOR (U.S. Middle East Force), its successor, NAVCENT (naval component of U.S.
Central Command), as well as the Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in June 1995) are headquartered
there, at a sprawling facility called “Naval Support Activity-Bahrain.” It is also home to U.S.
Marine Forces Central Command, Destroyer Squadron Fifty, and three Combined Maritime
Forces.38 The “on-shore” U.S. command presence in Bahrain was established after the 1991 Gulf
war against Iraq; prior to that, the U.S. naval headquarters in Bahrain was on a command ship
mostly docked in Bahrain and technically “off shore.”
Some smaller U.S. ships (e.g., minesweepers) are home-ported there, but the Fifth Fleet consists
mostly of U.S.-homeported ships that are sent to the region on six- to seven-month deployments.
Ships operating in the Fifth Fleet at any given time typically include a carrier strike group, an
37 Hendrick Simoes. “Bahrain Expansion Latest Sign of Continued Presence.” Stars and Stripes, December 16, 2013.
38 For an extended discussion of the U.S. military presence in Bahrain, see Brookings Institution, Center for 21st
Century Security and Intelligence, Policy Paper “No ‘Plan B’: U.S. Strategic Access in the Middle East and the
Question of Bahrain. June 2013, by Commander Richard McDaniel, U.S.N.
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amphibious ready group, and some additional surface combatants, and operate in both the Persian
Gulf and Indian Ocean/Northern Arabian Sea. In March 2012, the U.S. Navy doubled its
minesweepers in the Gulf to eight, and sent additional mine-hunting helicopters, as tensions
escalated over Iran’s nuclear program. In May 2013, the U.S. Navy move five coastal patrol ships
to Bahrain to join five already there. The naval headquarters in Bahrain serves as the command
headquarters for periodic exercises intended to signal resolve to Iran, such as a mine-sweeping
exercise involving 41 countries on May 5-30, 2013.
The naval headquarters also coordinates the operations of over 20 U.S. and allied warships in
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 and 152 that seek to interdict the movement of terrorists,
pirates, arms, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related technology and narcotics across the
Arabian Sea. In March 2008, Bahrain took a turn in a rotation to command CTF-152, and it
commanded again in December 2010. Bahrain commanded an anti-piracy task force in
Gulf/Arabian Sea waters in October 2010. These operations are offshoots of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, which ousted the Taliban after the September 11 attacks.
To further develop the naval facility (sometimes referred to as “Bahrain Island”), and other
military facilities, the U.S. military is implementing a planned $580 million military construction
program in Bahrain.39 That construction, which began in May 2010, will add 77 acres (the
decommissioned Mina (port) Al Salman Pier, leased by the Navy under a January 2008 lease
agreement) to the existing 80 acre facility. When completed in 2017, the expansion will provide a
new administration building and additional space for maintenance, barracks, warehousing, and
dining facilities. The expansion will support the deployment of additional U.S. coastal patrol
ships and the Navy’s new littoral combat ship, and permit larger U.S. ships to dock at the naval
facility.40 A separate deep water port in Bahrain, Khalifa bin Salman, is one of the few facilities in
the Gulf that can accommodate U.S. aircraft carriers and amphibious ships.41
Of the military construction program under way in Bahrain, $45 million is being used to expand
an apron at Shaykh Isa Air Base, where a variety of U.S. aircraft are stationed, including F-16s, F-
18s, and P-3 surveillance aircraft. About $19 million is being used for a U.S. Special Operations
Forces facility.
The naval headquarters took on additional significance in December 2014 when Britain
announced a deal with Bahrain to establish a fixed naval base in part of the Mina Al Salman pier.
Under the reported agreement, facilities at Mina Al Salman will be improved to allow Britain’s
royal Navy to plan, store equipment, and house military personnel there.42
Some say that the United States should begin examining alternate facilities in the Gulf region in
the expectation that continued Bahraini hosting of the U.S. naval headquarters has become
unstable. On July 22, 2011, the U.S. Navy in Bahrain issued a statement refuting a British press
report that the Navy is planning to relocate the facility. Should there be a decision to take that
step, likely alternatives in the Gulf would include Qatar’s New Doha Port (to open in 2016),
39 Among the recent appropriations to fund the expansion are: $54 million for FY2008 (Division 1 of P.L. 110-161);
$41.5 million for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117); $258 million for FY2011 (P.L. 112-10). $100 million was requested for
FY2012 for two projects, but was not funded in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 112-74).
40 Hendrick Simoes. “Bahrain Expansion Latest Sign of Continued Presence.” Stars and Stripes, December 16, 2013.
41 Ibid.
42 “U.K. to Boost Military Presence in the Persian Gulf.” Associated Press, December 7, 2014.
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Kuwait’s Shuaiba port, and the UAE’s Jebel Ali.43 None of these countries has publicly expressed
a position on whether it would be willing to host such an expanded facility, but they have been
highly cooperative with U.S. defense efforts in the Gulf and presumably would be willing to host
the naval headquarters. U.S. officials say other Gulf state facilities, such as Jebel Ali in UAE, do
not currently provide large U.S. ships with the ease of docking access that Bahrain does, and that
many of the alternative possibilities inconveniently share docking and other facilities with large
commercial operations. Such facilities could be improved, if necessary, by further construction.
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
Bahrain was part of the U.S.-led allied coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. Bahrain
allowed the stationing of 17,500 U.S. troops and 250 U.S. combat aircraft at Shaykh Isa Air Base
that participated in the 1991 “Desert Storm” offensive against Iraqi forces. Bahraini pilots flew
strikes over Iraq during the war, and Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain during the war, of
which three hit facilities there.
Bahrain and the United States subsequently decided to institutionalize the expanded cooperation
by signing a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) on October 28, 1991, for an initial period of
10 years. The DCA remains in effect.44 The pact reportedly not only provides the United States
access to Bahrain’s air bases and to pre-position strategic materiel (mostly U.S. Air Force
munitions), but also requires consultations with Bahrain if its security is threatened, and it
expanded exercises and U.S. training of Bahraini forces.45 The pact includes a “Status of Forces
Agreement” (SOFA) under which U.S. military personnel serving in Bahrain operate under U.S.,
and not Bahraini, law.
The DCA was the framework for U.S.-Bahrain cooperation to contain Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
during the 1990s. Bahrain hosted the U.S.-led Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that
enforced a U.N. embargo on Iraq during 1991-2003. Since the early 1990s, the United States has
reportedly stationed two Patriot anti-missile batteries there.46 Separately, Bahrain hosted the
regional headquarters for U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq during 1991-1998.
Under the DCA, U.S. pilots flew combat missions from Bahraini air bases (Shaykh Isa Air Base)
in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan (after the September 11, 2001, attacks
on the United States) and the war to oust Saddam Hussein in March-April 2003 (Operation Iraqi
Freedom, OIF). During both OEF and OIF, Bahrain publicly deployed its U.S.-supplied frigate
warship (the Subha) to help protect U.S. ships, and it sent ground and air assets to Kuwait in
support of OIF.
Bahrain and UAE have been the only Gulf states to deploy their own forces to provide aid to
Afghanistan. In January 2009, Bahrain sent 100 police officers to Afghanistan on a two-year tour
43 Ibid.
44 “U.S.-Bahrain Defense Pact Renewed.” Agence France Presse, August 5, 2011.
45 Details of the U.S.-Bahrain defense agreement are classified. Some provisions are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S.
Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March
2002, p. 27. The State and Defense Departments have not provided CRS with requested information on the duration of
the pact, or whether its terms had been modified in recent years.
46 Walter Pincus. “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Washington Post, February 22,
2011.
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to help U.S./NATO-led stabilization operations there. Their tour was extended until the end of the
NATO mission at the end of 2014.
U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid
To assist Bahrain’s ability to cooperate with the United States on regional security issues, the
United States has provided the country with small amounts of military assistance. Because U.S.
military aid has been relatively small, Bahrain has mostly used national funds to buy the $1.4
billion worth of U.S. weaponry it bought from 2000-2013.47 The unrest has caused the
Administration to put on hold sales to Bahrain equipment that could easily be used against
protesters, primarily equipment provided to the Interior Ministry, while generally continuing to
provide equipment that is suited to Bahrain’s external defense capabilities.
Assistance to the Bahrain Defense Forces
The main recipient of U.S. military assistance has been the relatively small BDF—Bahrain’s
military force—which has less than 10,000 active duty personnel, including 1,200 National
Guard. The BDF, as well as Bahrain’s police forces, are run by Sunni Bahrainis, but supplement
their ranks with unknown percentages of paid recruits from Sunni Muslim neighboring countries,
including Pakistan, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Some human rights groups say that BDF
equipment, such as Cobra helicopters, have been used against protesters and that the United
States cannot be sure that sales to and training of the BDF is not being used to crush unrest.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
Most of the U.S. assistance to the BDF is Foreign Military Financing (FMF). According to the
Administration, FMF (and funds provided under “Section 1206” of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2006, P.L. 109-163) is provided to Bahrain to help it maintain U.S.-origin
weapons, to enhance inter-operability with U.S. forces, to augment Bahrain’s air defenses, to
support and upgrade the avionics of its F-16 combat aircraft (see below), and to improve
counterterrorism capabilities. The United States has supplied Bahrain with a coastal radar system
that reportedly provides Bahrain and the U.S. Navy a 360-degree field of vision around Bahrain.48
In recent years, some FMF funds have been used to build up Bahrain’s Special Operations forces
and to help the BDF use its U.S.-made Blackhawk helicopters.49 The Defense Department
estimates that, in part due to U.S. assistance, about 50% of Bahrain’s forces are fully capable of
integrating into a U.S.-led coalition.
The Administration’s FY2012 aid request, made at the start of the unrest, asked for $25 million in
FMF for Bahrain. However, as shown in Table 4 below, only $10 million was provided for
FY2012, due in large part to the Administration’s intent to retain leverage against Bahrain to
compel it to make reforms. A slightly increased amount was provided for FY2013 but the amount
47 Justin Elliott. “Revealed: America’s Arms Sales to Bahrain Amid Bloody Crackdown.” Propublica, January 15,
2013.
48 “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep,” op. cit.
49 “Revealed: America’s Arms Sales to Bahrain Amid Bloody Crackdown,” op. cit.
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dropped back to $10 million for FY2014. The Administration plans to provide $7.5 million for
Bahrain FMF for FY2015 and has again requested $7.5 million for FY2016.
Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
The BDF is eligible to receive grant “excess defense articles” (EDA), and it has received over
$400 million worth of EDA since the program began for Bahrain in 1993. In June 1995, the
United States provided 50 M-60A3 tanks to Bahrain as a “no cost” five-year lease. Bahrain later
received title to the equipment. In July 1997, the United States transferred the FFG-7 “Perry
class” frigate Subha (see above) as EDA. In the State Department’s FY2012 budget request, the
Administration supported providing another frigate (an “extended deck frigate”) to Bahrain as
EDA because the Subha is approaching the end of its service life. The Administration said on
May 11, 2012, that it continued to support that transfer, which is planned for 2014, subject to
passage of authorizing legislation.50 However, the FY2014 foreign aid budget justification says
that the BDF has put acquisition of a new frigate on hold, and would put U.S. military aid toward
maintaining the Subha instead.
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET)
As noted in Table 4, small amounts of International Military Education and Training funds
(IMET) are provided to Bahrain to inculcate principles of civilian control of the military,
democracy, and interoperability with U.S. forces. Approximately 250 BDF students attend U.S.
military schools each year, either through the IMET program (57% of them), or using FMF funds,
in connection with the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program.
Major Foreign Military Sales (FMS) from Bahrain National Funds
Bahrain’s total government budget is about $6 billion per year, allowing modest amounts of
national funds to be used for purchases of major combat systems. About 85% of Bahrain’s
defense equipment is of U.S.-origin. Section 581 of the FY1990 foreign operations appropriation
act (P.L. 101-167) made Bahrain the only Gulf state eligible to receive the Stinger shoulder-fired
anti-aircraft missile, and the United States has sold Bahrain about 70 Stingers since 1990. (This
authorization has been repeated in subsequent legislation.)
Some of the sales to Bahrain have been in accordance with longstanding State and Defense
Department efforts to promote greater defense cooperation among the GCC states and to deal
with the GCC collectively rather than individually. The core of these initiatives involves missile
defense integration, and it is primarily Bahrain’s wealthier neighbors, such as UAE, that are
buying advanced U.S. missile defense equipment. That prevents Bahrain from becoming a major
factor in the U.S. effort to assemble a Gulf-wide, coordinated missile defense network. That effort
has been discussed extensively with the Gulf states, most recently during Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel’s meeting with GCC defense ministers in Jeddah during May 13-14, 2014. Among
the major past sales:
• In 1998, Bahrain purchased 10 U.S.-made F-16Cs from new production, worth
about $390 million. It later purchased 12 more of the system, bringing its F-16
50 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/189810.htm.
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fleet to 22. In 1999 and 2009, the United States sold Bahrain Advanced Medium-
Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) to arm the F-16s.
• An August 2000 sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs, a system
of short-range ballistic missiles fired from a multiple rocket launcher), valued at
about $70 million, included an agreement for joint U.S.-Bahraini control of the
weapon. That arrangement was reached in part to allay U.S. congressional
concerns about possible U.S. promotion of missile proliferation in the region.
• In 2007, the United States sold Bahrain several hundred “Javelin” anti-armor
missiles worth up to $42 million; 9 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters worth up to
$252 million; and 6 Bell search and recovery helicopters, valued at about $160
million.
• Sales of small arms are generally commercial sales, licensed by State Department
with Defense Department concurrence. On September 10, 2011, the State
Department licensed a sale of 250 pistols to the BDF and other firearms for the
protection of a high ranking Bahraini official. Since 2012, the department has put
“on hold” license requests for sales to Bahrain of small arms, light weapons, and
ammunition.51
Post-Uprising FMS Policy
The Administration has adjusted its arms sales policy to Bahrain in response to Bahrain’s actions
in the context of the Shiite-led uprising.
Humvee Sale Held Up. In September 2011, the Administration announced a sale to the BDF of 44
“Humvee” (M115A1B2) armored vehicles and several hundred TOW missiles of various models,
of which 50 are “bunker busters.” Along with associated equipment and support, the proposed
sale was worth an estimated $53 million. Critics asserted that the sale represented U.S.
downplaying of the abuses committed by the Bahraini government and that the Humvees could be
used against peaceful protesters. When the sale was announced, State Department officials said
the sale would not violate the intent of the “Leahy amendment”—a provision of foreign aid and
defense appropriations laws that forbids U.S. sales of equipment to security units that have
committed human rights abuses.52
Two joint resolutions were introduced in the 112th Congress to block the sale: S.J.Res. 28,
introduced by Senator Ron Wyden, and H.J.Res. 80, introduced by Representative James
McGovern. Both joint resolutions would have prohibited the sale unless the Administration
certifies that Bahrain is rectifying the alleged abuses connected to its suppression of the uprising
in 2011. To block a proposed arms sale would require passage of a joint resolution to do so, and
with a veto-proof majority. The House bill attracted 14 co-sponsors, the Senate bill 2 co-sponsors.
On October 19, 2011, even though the sale had passed the period of congressional review, and
apparently addressing the criticism and legislative initiatives, the Administration told Congress it
would delay the sale until it could review the BICI report discussed above. The State Department
stated on January 27, 2012, that the Humvee sale would be placed on hold. The Administration
stated in May 2012 that sales of other equipment that could be used against protesters (tear gas
51 Email from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, May 20, 2013.
52 James Lobe. “Bahrain: U.S. Congress Urged to Reject Arms Sales.” IPS News Service, September 29, 2011.
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and rifles, for example) would similarly remain on hold. Appearing to refer to Bahrain, a
provision of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriation Act (P.L. 113-76) prohibited use of U.S.
funds for “tear gas, small arms, light weapons, ammunition, or other items for crowd control
purposes for foreign security forces that use excessive force to repress peaceful expression,
association, or assembly in countries undergoing democratic transition.”
External Defense-Related Sales in 2012. Asserting that sales of equipment suited only for external
defense should proceed, the Administration announced in January 2012 that it was releasing to
Bahrain previously notified and cleared spare parts and maintenance—worth a reported $1
million—needed for the BDF’s support of U.S. Fifth Fleet operations. None of the released items
can be used against protesters, according to the State Department statement.53
On May 11, 2012, in conjunction with a visit to Washington, DC, by Bahrain’s Crown Prince
Salman, the Administration announced that, despite continuing concerns about Bahrain’s handling
of the unrest, it would release additional U.S. arms for the BDF, Bahrain’s Coast Guard, and
Bahrain’s National Guard. The Administration stated that the weaponry is not suited for use
against protesters but was instead supporting U.S.-Bahrain decisions for Bahrain’s forces to focus
more on broader maritime defense. The Administration did not release a complete list of weapons
to be sold, but it gave a few examples as follows:
• The Perry-class frigate, as EDA, discussed above; but later mooted;
• Harbor security boats for the Bahrain Coast Guard, as EDA;
• An upgrade to the engines on Bahrain’s U.S.-made F-16s; and
• Additional AMRAAMs (see above), according to press reports quoting U.S.
officials knowledgeable about the decision.54
Some Members of Congress publicly criticized the May 11, 2012, decision as yielding U.S.
leverage on the government to enact more substantial reforms. Some threatened to try to block the
proposed sales,55 but no such legislation was enacted.
Malinowski-Related Holds. Subsequent to the expulsion of Assistant Secretary Malinowski in
February 2014, the Administration reportedly suspended some arms sales to the BDF until he is
allowed to return and until various progress on human rights was demonstrated. Malinowski’s
return visit there in December 2014 might have satisfied the conditions to end the suspensions,
although no new sales have been announced.
Assistance to the Ministry of Interior
The United States works with Bahrain’s Interior Ministry on counter-terrorism issues, but U.S.
cooperation with that Ministry has been limited by the uprising because of its lead role in internal
seccurity. Still, many assess that the Ministry has reformed since the late 1990s, when Bahrain’s
internal security services were run by a former British colonial police officer, Ian Henderson, who
had a reputation among Shiites for using excessive brutality.
53 Department of State. Taken Question: Bahrain’s Security Assistance. January 27, 2012.
54 Nicole Gaouette. “U.S. Resumes Bahrain Arms Sales Citing Security Interests.” Bloomberg News, May 11, 2012.
55 Sara Sorcher. “Arms Sales to Bahrain Anger Senators.” National Journal Daily, May 14, 2012.
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At the start of FY2012, the Administration “reviewed” the use of NADR-ATA support to Bahrain
to ensure that none was used “against protestors” in the 2011 unrest. The FY2014 and FY2015
budget justifications said that NADR-ATA support would continue to go to the Ministry of
Interior primarily to help it investigate and respond to the use of explosives by “terrorists.” The
budget document appears to be referring to the increased use of bombings and violence by
underground oppositionists, discussed above. The State Department, as noted above, has placed
on hold license requests for small arms and related equipment to the Bahraini government in
general. Some of the NADR-ATA funds have previously been used to provide training to its
counterterrorism institutions, in part to augment the ability of Bahraini forces to protect U.S.
diplomatic and military facilities in Bahrain, and to help train Bahrain’s police contingent in
Afghanistan guard Camp Leatherneck in Helmand Province.
The February 2014 expulsion of visiting Assistant Secretary Malinowski reportedly led the
Administration to suspend assistance to the Ministry of Interior indefinitely.56
Other Foreign Policy Issues
Bahrain is closely aligned with the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states
as well as with the United States. Virtually all the GCC states have political structures similar to
that of Bahrain. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have sizeable Shiite minorities, but no other GCC state
has a Shiite majority. Within the GCC, Bahrain is particularly close to Saudi Arabia, as evidenced
by the Saudi-led GCC intervention in Bahrain in 2011. Well before intervening in Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia and other GCC states had begun to express concerns that the Bahrain unrest could spread
and create opportunities for Iran to acquire influence and leverage in the GCC. The Saudi position
is that it will not permit a Shiite takeover in Bahrain, and the Saudi government is seen as backing
hardline officials in the Bahrain ruling family. Beyond the strategic ties, a Saudi oil field (Abu
Safa) provides a large portion of Bahrain’s government revenue. Many Saudis visit Bahrain to
enjoy the relatively more liberal social atmosphere there, using a causeway constructed in 1986
that links to the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia, where most of the Kingdom’s Shiites (about
10% of the population) live. King Hamad’s fifth son, Khalid bin Hamad, married a daughter of
Saudi King Abdullah in 2011. Since the beginning of the Bahrain unrest, Saudi Arabia reportedly
has donated at least $500 million to help Bahrain’s economy. On May 14, 2012, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain announced they supported a plan to form a close political and military union among the
GCC states (“Riyadh Declaration”). The other four GCC states have opposed such a union and
blocked the proposal.
Bahrain is also close to Kuwait because of historic ties between their two royal families. Kuwait
has sometimes been touted as a potential mediator in the Bahraini political crisis. Both royal
families hail from the Anizah tribe that settled in Bahrain and some of whom went on to what is
now Kuwait. Kuwaiti Shiites in Kuwait’s parliament have argued against Kuwait’s siding firmly
with the Al Khalifa regime. However, the Kuwaiti government did, as noted with its naval
deployments, join the GCC position on the side of the government and it is giving financial aid to
Bahrain.
Qatar. In contrast to relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Bahrain’s relations with Qatar have
been fraught with disputes. The resolution of their territorial dispute in 2001 eased one major
56 Michael Gordon. “Expelled U.S. Official to Return to Bahrain.” New York Times, December 2, 2014.
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source of tension between them. The dispute had roots in the 18th century, when the ruling
families of both countries controlled parts of the Arabian peninsula. Both sides agreed to take the
dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1991 after clashes in 1986 in which Qatar
landed military personnel on a man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal) that was in dispute, and took some
Bahrainis prisoner. The ICJ ruled on March 16, 2001, in favor of Bahrain on the central dispute
over the Hawar Islands. It ruled in favor of Qatar on ownership of the Fasht al-Dibal reef and the
town of Zubara on the Qatari mainland, where some members of the Al Khalifa family were long
buried. Two smaller islands, Janan and Hadd Janan, were ruled not part of the Hawar Islands
group and were also awarded to Qatar. Qatar expressed disappointment over the ruling but said it
accepted it as binding, and the two have since cooperated on major regional issues. Saudi
mediation of the issue during 1986-1991 proved fruitless.
More recently, Bahrain and Qatar have been at odds on regional policies. In March 2014, Bahrain
joined Saudi Arabia and UAE in removing its ambassador from Qatar. The disagreement centered
on Qatar’s support for Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated opposition movements in several Middle
Eastern countries. Qatar views the Brotherhood as a constructive movement that can help bring
peaceful transition to democracy in the region. That stance runs counter to the views of almost all
the other GCC states who view the Brotherhood as a source of unrest within the GCC states
themselves. The dispute was resolved in November 2014 and the GCC ambassadors who had left
all returned to Doha.
Other Regional Issues. Bahrain tends to defer to a GCC consensus on many regional issues, in
part because of Bahrain’s resource constraints and its focus on the internal situation. Unlike Qatar
and UAE, Bahrain did not play a significant role in the effort to oust Libyan leader Muammar Al
Qadhafi. Had Bahrain intervened in Libya, doing so could have been viewed as a contradiction—
supporting revolution in another Arab state while arguing that its domestic opposition lacks
legitimacy. Bahrain did join the GCC diplomatic efforts to persuade Yemen’s President Ali
Abdullah Saleh to cede power to a transition process. He left Yemen in January 2012, although
the security situation has deteriorated sharply since then, and pro-Iranian Houthi militia rebels
have taken control of the capital, Sanaa, as of January 2015.
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has tended to act within a GCC consensus, although some
Bahraini leaders have occasionally expressed independent positions. In July 2009, Crown Prince
Salman authored an op-ed calling on the Arab states to do more to communicate directly with the
Israeli people on their ideas for peaceful resolution of the dispute.57 In October 2009, Bahrain’s
then foreign minister called for direct talks with Israel. Still, Bahrain supports the efforts of
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to obtain U.N. recognition for a State of
Palestine, despite U.S. opposition to doing so prior to a peace settlement. Earlier, Bahrain
participated in the 1990-1996 multilateral Arab-Israeli talks, and it hosted a session on the
environment (October 1994). In September 1994, all GCC states ceased enforcing secondary and
tertiary boycotts of Israel, but Bahrain did not at that time follow Oman and Qatar in exchanging
trade offices with Israel. In conjunction with the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Bahrain dropped the primary
boycott and closed boycott-related offices in Bahrain.
The Arab-Israeli dispute has sometimes become a political issue within Bahrain. In October 2009,
the COR passed a bill making it a crime (punishable by up to five years in jail) for Bahrainis to
travel to Israel or hold talks with Israelis. The bill, which did not become law, apparently was a
57 “Arabs Need to Talk to the Israelis.” Washington Post, July 16, 2009.
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reaction to a visit by Bahraini officials to Israel in July 2009 to obtain the release of five
Bahrainis taken prisoner by Israel when it seized a ship bound with goods for Gaza, which is
controlled by Hamas. In June 2010, Sunni and Shiite Islamists in Bahrain held a demonstration to
denounce the Israeli seizure of a ship in a flotilla intended to run the Israeli blockade of the
Hamas-run Gaza Strip. During a visit to Manama by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud
Abbas in July 2014, King Hamad criticized Israel and called for the international community to
halt the conflict taking place at that time between Israel and Hamas.58
Iran
Bahrain focuses intently on Iran, which the government asserts is supporting Shiite opposition
groups. Bahrain has supported U.S.-led efforts to increase economic pressure on Iran to compel it
to limit its nuclear program. In a joint news conference with then Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton on December 3, 2010, Bahrain’s foreign minister restated Bahrain’s support for Iran’s
right to nuclear power for peaceful uses, but that “when it comes to taking that [nuclear] power, to
developing it into a cycle for weapon grade, that is something that we can never accept, and we
can never live with in this region.”59 Bahrain supported publicly the November 24, 2013, interim
nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community, calling it “consistent with
[Bahrain’s] stances and policies which advocate diplomatic solutions to maintain stability.”
However, some Bahraini leaders are apparently concerned that a comprehensive deal being
negotiated could cause the United States to reduce its commitment to the security of the Gulf. In a
December 7, 2013, speech at the Manama Dialogue, then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
attempted to reassure Bahrain and all the GCC states of U.S. resolve to maintain the security of
the region. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia were the only two GCC states that did not host a visit by
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif or his associates after the interim nuclear
agreement was signed, although Saudi Arabia subsequently invited Zarif.
Bahraini leaders have consistently asserted that Iran is actively stoking the Bahrain unrest. On
March 21, 2011, King Hamad indirectly accused Iran of involvement in the unrest by saying a
“foreign plot” had been foiled by the GCC intervention. Iran and Bahrain withdrew their
ambassadors in mid-March 2011, but returned them in August 2012. On February 21, 2013, the
government said that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had helped form a
Bahraini cell to recruit other agents and store weapons in Bahrain for possible attacks on officials
and key locations.60 In May 2013, the government declared Lebanese Hezbollah a terrorist
organization, accusing that organization of helping orchestrate a Shiite-led insurgency in
Bahrain.61 Bahrain’s accusations against Iran and Hezbollah, have not changed since the August
2013 accession of Iran’s relatively moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Bahraini authorities used
the ship interception of December 2013, discussed above, to underscore their point about Iranian
support for radical Bahrain oppositionists.
U.S. officials publicly do not differ dramatically with the Bahraini assertions on Iran. On April
14, 2011, U.S. officials, speaking on background, told journalists that there was some information
58 “Fresh Challenge to U.S.-Bahrain Relations.” op.cit.
59 Department of State. Transcript of Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Al Khalifa. December 3,
2010.
60 “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Behind Terror Cell, Says Bahrain.” Saudi Gazette, February 22, 2013.
61 The United States designated Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, FTO, in 1997 when that list was
established by the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. 1189.
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to indicate that Iran might have transferred small amounts of weapons to Bahraini
oppositionists.62 U.S. officials reportedly assert that Iran has urged hardline Bahraini Shiite
factions not to compromise.63 In his January 29, 2014, “Worldwide Threat Assessment”
testimony, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated that “In the broader Middle
East, Iran will continue to provide arms and other aid to Palestinian groups, Houthi rebels in
Yemen, and Shia militants in Bahrain to expand Iranian influence and to counter perceived
foreign threats.”64 The State Department report on terrorism for 2013, cited above, states that Iran
has attempted to smuggle arms to Shiite oppositionists in Bahrain.65
The recent Bahraini assertions build on earlier allegations of Iranian meddling in Bahrain and
Iranian rejection of Bahrain’s independence. In December 1981, and then again in June 1996—
times when Iran actively sought to export its Islamic revolution—Bahrain publicly accused Iran
of trying to organize a coup by pro-Iranian Bahraini Shiites (the Islamic Front for the Liberation
of Bahrain, IFLB). The group’s successor is the Bahrain Islamic Action Society, which is
outlawed. A July 2007 Iranian newspaper article reasserted Iran’s claim to Bahrain, and in March
2009, Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, referred to Bahrain as Iran’s
14th province. As a consequence of that statement, Morocco broke relations with Iran.
At the same time, Bahrain, like the other GCC states, tries not to openly or directly antagonize
Iran. Bahrain permitted then Iranian President Ahmadinejad to visit Bahrain on November 17,
2007. Bahrain maintains normal trade with Iran, as do the other GCC states. In September 2012,
Bahrain confiscated carbon fiber bound for Iran, an item that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear
program.Energy market observers say that some Bahrain energy firms may still be supplying
gasoline to Iran. No U.N. Security Council Resolution bars such sales, but a U.S. law signed on
July 1, 2010—the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA, P.L. 111-195)—provides for sanctions against foreign firms that sell more than $1
million worth of gasoline to Iran.66 No Bahraini gasoline traders have been sanctioned.
Foreign banks that deal with sanctioned Iranian banks or Iran’s Central Bank are subject to U.S.
sanctions under several U.S. laws (see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth
Katzman). In March 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice sanctioned Future Bank, headquartered
in Bahrain, because it is controlled and partially owned by Iran’s Bank Melli. The sanctions,
under Executive Order 13382 (anti-proliferation), prevent U.S. citizens from participating in
transactions with Future Bank and require the freezing of any U.S.-based bank assets. The bank
remains in operation.
The Bahrain unrest has clouded the prospects for further energy cooperation between the two
countries. The 2007 Ahmadinejad visit to Bahrain resulted in a preliminary agreement for Bahrain
to buy 1.2 billion cubic feet per day (for 25 years) of Iranian gas via an undersea pipeline to be
built. The deal would have involved a $4 billion investment by Bahrain to develop Phases 15 and
62 Adam Entous and Matthew Rosenberg. “U.S. Says Iran Helps Crackdown in Syria.” Wall Street Journal, April 14,
2011.
63 http://www.stripes.com/gates-protracted-bahrain-negotiations-allowing-greater-iran-influence-1.137532.
64 Director of National Intelligence. Statement for the Record. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2014.
65 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm
66 For a list of possible sanctions that could be imposed, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth
Katzman.
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16 of Iran’s South Pars gas field, which presumably would be the source of the gas that Bahrain
would import. Largely because of Bahrain’s suspicions of Iran, there has been no recent
movement on the arrangement.
Iraq/Syria/Islamic State Organization
Bahrain cooperated with the U.S.-led effort in 2003 to overthrow Saddam Hussein of Iraq, despite
the ruling family’s opposition to that war. Bahrain did not contribute any of its limited funds to
Iraq reconstruction, but it attended the “Expanded Neighbors of Iraq” regional conference process
that ended in 2008. In October 2008, Bahrain’s first post-Saddam ambassador to Iraq (Saleh Ali
al-Maliki) presented his credentials in Baghdad, in line with King Hamad’s pledge to President
Bush in March 2008 to appoint an ambassador to Iraq.
Bahrain-Iraq relations deteriorated as Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government appeared to
sympathize with the Shiite uprising in Bahrain. On March 9, 2012, Iraqi Shiites rallied in support
of Bahrain’s Shiites on the same day as Bahrain’s opposition mounted a major demonstration.
King Hamad did not attend the March 27-29 Arab League summit in Baghdad, instead sending a
relatively low-level delegation. As have the other GCC states, Bahrain’s government blamed
former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki for marginalizing Iraq’s Sunnis and provoking the rise of
the Islamic State organization in Iraq.
Bahrain, like the other GCC states, has also blamed Syrian President Bashar Al Assad for
authoritarian policies that alienated Syria’s majority Sunni population and stoked support for the
Islamic State organization. In August 2011, Bahrain joined the other GCC countries in
withdrawing their ambassadors to Syria. In November 2011, the GCC voted with other Arab
League states to suspend Syria’s membership in the body. Unlike several of the other GCC states,
Bahrain’s government has not provided funding or weaponry to any Syrian opposition groups,
including those that are battling both the Islamic State and the Assad government.
Bahrain and the other GCC states assert that destroying the Islamic State organization requires
Assad’s ouster, in addition to military and other action against Islamic State positions in Syria.
Even though the U.S. objective is to destroy the Islamic State organization and not necessarily
oust Assad, on September 22, 2014, Bahrain (as well as GCC allies Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates) joined the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition. Bahrain is conducting air
strikes against Islamic State positions in Syria, as are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and on some
occasions Qatar. In early February 2015, following the Islamic State’s execution of a captured
Jordanian pilot, Bahrain redeployed at least some of its aircraft involved in the anti-Islamic State
operations to Jordan as a show of support for that ally. Possibly in light of sensitivities of Iraq’s
Shiite-led government, neither Bahrain nor any of the other GCC members of the U.S.-led
coalition are engaging in anti-Islamic State air operations in Iraq.
At a September 11, 2014, GCC meeting in Jeddah with Secretary of State John Kerry, Bahrain
also offered to host a meeting to coordinate joint international action against the Islamic State
organization’s finances.67 Bahrain hosted an international conference on that issue on November
9, 2014. In November 2014, the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter
the Islamic State organization, General John Allen, visited Bahrain to thank its leaders for steps
67 Testimony of Secretary of State John Kerry before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “U.S. Strategy on ISIL.”
September 17, 2014.
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against the Islamic State, including the air strikes, efforts to halt the flow of foreign fighters to the
organization, efforts to counter extremist messaging, and its declaration that it is illegal for
Bahraini citizens to fight abroad.
Countering Terrorism Financing
Bahrain has been a regional leader in countering terrorism financing since well before the Islamic
State organization became a perceived regional threat. That expertise made Bahrain a prime
candidate to host the conferences against Islamic State financing discussed above. The State
Department’s report on international terrorism for 2013 (released April 30, 2014)68credited
Bahrain with strongly cooperating with U.S. and international counterterrorism efforts. Bahrain
has hosted the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA/FATF)
secretariat, and its Central Bank, Financial Information Unit (within the Central Bank), and local
banks have cooperated with U.S. efforts against terrorism financing and money laundering. In
August and September 2013, the government amended the Charity Fundraising Law of 1956 to
tighten terrorism financing monitoring and penalties. The State Department report for 2013 also
credits Bahrain with working “proactively” to expand air, sea and Saudi-Bahrain causeway border
control points.
Economic Issues
Like the other Gulf states, Bahrain was affected by the international financial crisis of 2008-2009,
but perhaps to a lesser extent than the wealthier states of Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
Bahrain did not experience the construction and real estate “bubble” to the degree that this
occurred in, for example, UAE. It is also apparently being affected by the 2011 unrest; in May
2011 Moody’s, a bond rating agency, downgraded the quality of Bahrain’s bonds, thereby costing
the government more to borrow funds.
Bahrain has little cushion to deal with economic downturns. It has the lowest oil and gas reserves
of the Gulf monarchy states, estimated respectively at 210 million barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion
cubic feet of gas. Some economic statistics are presented in Table 3. Without the ample oil or gas
resources of its neighbors, Bahrain has diversified its economy by emphasizing banking and
financial services (about 25.5% of GDP). At current rates of production (35,000 barrels per day of
crude oil), Bahrain’s onshore oil reserves will be exhausted in 15 years. However, Saudi Arabia
shares equally with Bahrain the 300,000 barrels per day produced from the offshore Abu Safa
field, which provides about 70% of the funds expended in Bahrain’s annual budget.
The United States buys virtually no oil from Bahrain; the major U.S. import from it is aluminum.
Aluminum and other manufacturing sectors in Bahrain account for the existence in Bahrain of a
vibrant middle and working class among its citizens. However, these classes are largely
composed of Shiites, and this has made many Shiites envious of the “ownership class” of Sunni
Muslims. On the other hand, many Shiites own businesses and have done well economically.
To encourage reform and signal U.S. appreciation, the United States and Bahrain signed an FTA
on September 14, 2004. Implementing legislation was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169).
68 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224823.htm
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However, in light of the unrest, the AFL-CIO has urged the United States to void the FTA on the
grounds that Bahrain is preventing free association of workers and abridging their rights.
In 2013, the United States exported about $1.017 billion in goods to Bahrain, lower than the
$1.21 billion exported in 2012. The United States imported $636 million in goods from Bahrain,
slightly lower than the $700 million imported in 2012. In 2005, total bilateral trade was about
$780 million, suggesting that trade has more than doubled since the U.S.-Bahrain FTA.
U.S. Assistance. Most U.S. assistance to Bahrain in military assistance under the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) program, discussed above. However, some in Congress seek to provide
assistance to Bahrain for nonmilitary purposes, in order to support a political solution to the
unrest. The report on a Senate foreign operations appropriations bill for FY2015 (S.Rept. 113-195
on S. 2499) states that the Appropriations Committee directs that at least $3.5 million in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) be made available for “programs and activities to promote
reconciliation, democratic reform, and adherence to international human rights and labor rights
standards in Bahrain.”
Table 3. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain
Population
About 1.25 million, of which slightly less than half are citizens
Religions
Nearly all the citizenry is Muslim, while Christians, Hindus,
Bahais, and Jews constitute about 1% of the citizenry. Of the
total population, 70% is Muslim, 9% is Christian, 10% are of other
religions.
GDP (purchasing power parity)
$35 billion (2013)
Budget
$8.14 billion revenues, $9.23 billion expenditures (2013)
Inflation Rate
3% (2013)
Unemployment Rate
15%
GDP Real Growth Rate
4.4% in 2013
Size of Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF)
About 13,000, plus about 1,200 National Guard. Some personnel
are expatriates, including other Arab and Pakistani.
Source: CIA, The World Factbook.
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Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain
($ in millions)
16
FY2003 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 request
FMF
90.0 24.6
18.9
15.6
15 3.968
8.0
19.0
15.46
10
12.575
10
7.5 7.5
IMET
0.448 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.616 0.622 .661 .670 .435 .554 .487 .522 .801 .700
NADR
1.49
2.76
.776
0.744
.500
1.10
1.5
.50
.45
.45
.45
“Section
1206”
5.3
24.54
4.3
16.2
ESF/Dem.
3.0
and Gov.
Notes: IMET = International Military Education and Training Funds, used mainly to enhance BDF military
professionalism and promote U.S. values. NADR = Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related
Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists. Section 1206 are DOD
funds used to train and equip Bahrain’s special forces, its coastal surveillance and patrol capabilities, and to
develop its counterterrorism assessment capabilities. (Named for a section of the FY2006 Defense Authorization
Act, P.L. 109-163.).
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Figure 1. Bahrain
Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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