Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
February 12, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33460
Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Summary
A pro-reform, pro-Western government has emerged in Ukraine after the collapse of the
government of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych on February 21, 2014. Russia responded
to the change of government in Kyiv by seizing Ukraine’s Crimea region and annexing it on
March 18, 2014. Since April 2014, armed pro-Russian separatists have seized parts of the Donbas
region of eastern Ukraine, which was made possible by men, weaponry, and leadership from
Russia. A cease-fire agreement signed in Minsk, Belarus, in September 2014 failed to halt the
fighting. After a summit meeting of the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany in
Minsk, the sides agreed on February 12 on a new cease-fire to take effect on February 15.
Ukraine has long-standing problems in attracting foreign investment, in part due to rampant
corruption and other shortcomings in the rule of law. The war has added to these problems,
including the destruction of infrastructure in the Donbas region and a steep drop in the value of
Ukraine’s currency. On February 12, 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Ukraine
agreed on a new loan package of $17.5 billion to Ukraine, bringing the total IMF commitment to
Ukraine to $22 billion over four years. In 2014, the European Union unveiled an 11.1-billion-
Euro (about $15.5 billion) aid package for Ukraine and is considering further funding. The IMF
estimates that the total commitment to Ukraine could come to $40 billion, when money from the
European Union (EU), the United States, and other sources is included.
In February 2015, the Administration said that the United States has provided over $355 million
in aid to Ukraine over the previous year to help the new government in Kyiv carry out political
and economic reforms and bolster the capabilities of its security sector, including its army. In
addition, in May 2014 the United States provided a $1-billion loan guarantee to Ukraine. The
Administration has strongly condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its incursion into
eastern Ukraine. The United States and the European Union have imposed sanctions against
Russian individuals and key firms for destabilizing Ukraine.
Congressional action has focused on providing assistance to the new Ukrainian government and
supporting sanctions against Russia for its occupation of Crimea and efforts to destabilize
Ukraine. H.R. 4152 authorized aid to help Ukraine carry out reforms; authorized security
assistance to Ukraine and other Central and Eastern European countries; and required the
President to impose visa bans and asset seizures against persons in Ukraine and Russia who are
responsible for violence or undermining the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial
integrity of Ukraine. On April 3, 2014, President Obama signed H.R. 4152 into law, as well as S.
2183, a related bill requiring Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty and Voice of America to increase
broadcasting in eastern Ukraine, Crimea, and Moldova. The FY2015 omnibus appropriations bill
(P.L. 113-235) appropriated aid for Ukraine.
On December 18, 2014, President Obama signed H.R. 5859, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act.
The measure permits the President to impose sanctions on Russian defense, energy, and other
firms and foreign persons; authorizes increased military and economic assistance for Ukraine;
authorizes funding for U.S. Russian-language broadcasting in the region; authorizes support for
Russian civil society and democracy organizations; and requires a report on Russian
noncompliance with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Some Members of Congress
are urging the President to provide defensive weaponry to Ukraine.
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Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
The EuroMaidan and the Collapse of the Yanukovych Regime ................................................ 1
Russia’s Seizure of Crimea and Support for Insurgents in Eastern Ukraine ............................. 2
Ukraine’s Current Political Situation ............................................................................................... 4
Current Economic Situation............................................................................................................. 5
Ukraine’s Foreign Policy ................................................................................................................. 6
Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 6
Energy Issues ....................................................................................................................... 9
European Union ....................................................................................................................... 10
EU Aid to Ukraine ............................................................................................................. 10
EU Sanctions ..................................................................................................................... 11
U.S. Policy ..................................................................................................................................... 12
U.S. Sanctions Against Russia ................................................................................................. 13
Congressional Response .......................................................................................................... 14
U.S. Aid to Ukraine ........................................................................................................... 14
Other Legislation ............................................................................................................... 15
Congressional Debate ........................................................................................................ 17
Figures
Figure 1. Ukraine ........................................................................................................................... 18
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 18
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Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Background
Ukraine, comparable in size and population to France, is a large, important, European state. It
occupies the sensitive position between Russia and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
member states Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Many Russian politicians, as well as
ordinary citizens, have never been fully reconciled to Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991, and feel that the country belongs in Russia’s political and economic orbit. The
U.S. and European view (particularly in Central and Eastern Europe) is that a strong, independent
Ukraine is an important part of building a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
Since Ukraine achieved independence in 1991, Ukraine’s political scene has been dominated by
“oligarchs” (powerful, politically well-connected businessmen, mainly based in eastern and
southern Ukraine), which have divided up the country’s economic assets among themselves and
raided the government budget for their own profit. President Viktor Yanukovych, who was elected
in February 2010, drew his main support from oligarchs from the Donets Basin (Donbas) region
of eastern Ukraine. His government was criticized for massive high-level corruption, in part
committed by Yanukovych’s own family and close associates. U.S. and European Union (EU)
officials expressed strong concern over the government’s human rights record, especially the
targeting of opposition leaders for selective prosecution.
The EuroMaidan and the Collapse of the Yanukovych Regime
Many observers have believed that, despite growing dissatisfaction with the government, there
was little likelihood of public unrest in Ukraine, given widespread disillusionment with the
political class as a whole. However, in November 2013, the government made a last-minute
decision to not sign an Association Agreement with the European Union that would have aligned
Ukraine more toward Europe, at least in the areas of economics and trade, due to Russian
pressure. The about-face sparked anti-government demonstrations. On November 30, Ukrainian
special police attacked peaceful protestors (many of them young people) in Kyiv’s central
Maidan Nezalezhnosti, or Independence Square. The action outraged many Ukrainians and
resulted in a massive upsurge in participation in the protests in Kyiv. Smaller protests occurred in
other Ukrainian cities, mainly in opposition strongholds in western and central Ukraine.
Observers noted that demonstrators were not just protesting against Ukraine’s failure to sign the
Association Agreement, but against the government’s lack of respect for the basic human dignity
of Ukraine’s citizens.
Through the next three months, the Yanukovych government alternated between attempted
crackdowns and conciliatory gestures. On February 18, the government embarked on its most
violent crackdown attempt against the Maidan, one that quickly resulted in the regime’s own
demise. Elite “Berkut” riot police attempted to clear protestors from the Maidan and other areas
of Kyiv, with the support of roving gangs of street thugs hired by the government. Over 100
persons were killed. Many hundreds more were injured. Many casualties were caused by
firearms, mainly used by the police, including by snipers. The death toll may have caused support
in the Ukrainian parliament for the crackdown and the regime to collapse. On February 20, it
approved a resolution calling for the pullout of the Interior Ministry and military forces from
Kyiv to their bases and a ban on the use of firearms. Once the police and military complied with
the resolution, groups of protestors seized key government buildings. Yanukoyvch and many of
his supporters in the government and parliament fled the capital by February 21. Many of them
are currently being harbored by Russia.
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After Yanukovych and his supporters fled Ukraine, the Ukrainian parliament, now composed
mainly of opposition deputies, rapidly passed sweeping measures. The parliament deposed
Yanukovych as president on February 22 for abandoning his duties. Oleksandr Turchynov, a long-
time top aide of Yuliya Tymoshenko, was elected as speaker of the parliament and made acting
president until new presidential elections were held on May 25. The parliament restored the
provisions of the 2004 Ukrainian constitution, eliminating changes made by Yanukovych to
strengthen the presidency. On February 27, the Ukrainian parliament approved a new
government, headed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk, a former prime minister. The government included no
key figures from the former ruling regime. Nevertheless, many Maidan protestors viewed the new
government skeptically, suspecting that they are nearly as opportunistic and corrupt as the
Yanukovych regime.
Russia’s Seizure of Crimea and Support for Insurgents in
Eastern Ukraine
Russia responded to the change of government in Kyiv by seizing Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula.
Starting on February 27, heavily armed Russian-speaking troops poured into Crimea, seizing
airports and other key installations throughout the peninsula. At the time, Russian President
Vladimir Putin claimed that the troops were not Russian Federation military forces, but only local
Crimean self-defense forces. In April 2014, Putin admitted that Russian Federation military forces
did in fact invade Crimea. On March 16, the Crimean authorities held a referendum on Crimea’s
annexation to Russia. According to Crimean officials, Crimea’s union with Russia was allegedly
approved by 96.77% of those voting, with a turnout of 83.1%. Ukraine, the United States, the
European Union, and other countries denounced the referendum as illegal and not held in a free
or fair manner. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a “treaty” with Crimean leaders on
March 18 formally incorporating Crimea into Russia.
In addition to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainian government struggled to establish
control over eastern and southern Ukraine. In March 2014, thousands of pro-Russian protestors
demonstrated in the region, especially in the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbas region
and in Kharkiv. Some demonstrators favored union with Russia, others only greater autonomy
from the government in Kyiv. Demonstrators seized government buildings. They also faced off
against pro-Maidan demonstrators. Unrest in eastern Ukraine soon took an even more ominous
turn in April 2014. Armed men stormed and occupied key government buildings and broadcast
facilities in the key cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as in Slovyansk and more than a dozen
other towns in the Donbas region.
The Ukrainian government said Russian intelligence agents orchestrated the separatists’ attacks
and released video, photographs, and audio recordings allegedly identifying them. Senior U.S.
officials and NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Philip Breedlove have also said that
they believe Russia is playing a leading role in the activities of the armed separatist groups in
eastern Ukraine.
On May 11, the armed separatist forces, in the guise of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the
“Luhansk People’s Republic,” held “referendums” on their “sovereignty.” According to the
organizers, the question was approved by 89% of those voting in Donetsk region, and by 96% in
Luhansk region, with a turnout of 75%. No international observers monitored the vote, and
witnesses reported rampant irregularities. The leaders of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the
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“Luhansk People’s Republic” declared their entities to be sovereign states after the vote. The
Ukrainian government denounced the referendums as illegal.
After a brief unilateral cease-fire by Ukraine in late June failed to lead to progress on a peace plan
put forward by newly elected Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine restarted its “anti-
terrorist operation” against the separatist forces. In July and August, Ukraine routed the gunmen
from strongholds in Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and other towns, and besieged separatist forces in
the key cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.
However, in late August and early September, U.S. and NATO officials said that Russia massively
stepped up its support to the separatists, including by deploying thousands of Russian troops to
fight in Ukraine. Both the Russian troops and the separatists were supplied with hundreds of
tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and other military equipment
from Russia. As a result, Ukrainian forces lost ground and suffered heavy casualties.
Perhaps fearing further casualties and lost territory, Ukraine agreed to a 12-point ceasefire plan
during talks with separatist representatives and Russian officials in Minsk, Belarus on September
5. Among other provisions, the plan calls for a cease-fire along the then-current lines of control,
an exchange of hostages and/or prisoners, the monitoring of the cease-fire and of the Russian-
Ukrainian border by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the
withdrawal of “illegal armed groups, militants, as well as militants and mercenaries from the
territory of Ukraine.” The Minsk agreement also called for Ukraine to adopt a law on amnesty for
those involved in the war in the Donbas; a law on “special status” for separatist-held areas that
will allow them greater self-rule for three years; the organization of local elections in those areas;
and plan for the economic recovery of the region.1
The signing of the agreement led to the end of the massive Russian-led offensive on Ukrainian
forces. However, none of the points of the Minsk protocol has been implemented fully. Sporadic,
sometime intense, fighting has continued, resulting in over 1,300 deaths since the Minsk protocol
was signed. (According to U.N. officials, over 5,500 persons have died in the fighting since the
conflict began in April 2014.) Ukrainian officials have said that the separatists had seized over
500 sq. km of Ukrainian territory since the Minsk protocol’s signature. In January 2015, President
Poroshenko said Russia had 9,000 troops inside Ukraine, along with hundreds of tanks, armored
fighting vehicles, and artillery pieces.2
The United States and the European Union made its full implementation of the Minsk protocol a
precondition for easing their sanctions on Russia. A particularly violent flare-up of attacks by the
pro-Russian gunmen against Ukrainian-held territory in late January and early February 2015 led
the United States and the EU to warn Russia that it faced possible additional sanctions for its
military intervention in Ukraine.
1 For an English-language translation of the Minsk protocol, see http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/osce-releases-
the-12-point-protocol-agreements-reached-between-ukraine-russia-and-separatists-in-minsk-363816.html. For the
Russian-language original, see http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258?download=true.
2 Some experts believe Russian troop levels in Ukraine are significantly lower. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Douglas
Lute has said Russian troops in Ukraine are mainly intelligence officers serving a command and control function and
Russian servicemen operating highly sophisticated, specialized equipment, such as that used for electronic warfare and
air defense. See http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/04/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-usa-idUSKBN0L81S220150204.
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The presidents of France, Russia, and Ukraine and Chancellor Merkel of Germany met in Minsk
on February 11 in Minsk to try to secure an agreement to stop the fighting. On February 12, a
cease-fire agreement was signed, to take effect on February 15. The agreement calls on both sides
to pull back their heavy weapons to create a “security zone” of 50 to 70 km, depending on the
range of the weapons system and OSCE monitoring of the cease-fire. The separatists apparently
will remain in effective control of the areas they have seized since the first Minsk agreement was
signed in September.
The agreement calls for local elections in rebel-held regions and legal and constitutional reforms
to be negotiated with the rebels to give a special status to the region. The elections and reforms
are to be implemented before the end of this year. The return of control to Ukraine of the Russia-
Ukraine border is conditioned on the carrying out of these decentralization reforms agreed with
the separatists. Ukraine is also required to resume financial flows to the rebel-held regions.
Foreign forces and equipment, mercenaries, and illegal armed groups are supposed to be
removed, under OSCE monitoring. (It should be noted that Russia still contends that none of its
forces and equipment are in Ukraine, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.)3 The terms
of the agreement are similar to those of the original Minsk protocol last September. Some
observers have expressed skepticism about whether this agreement is more likely to be
implemented than the previous one was.
Ukraine’s Current Political Situation
Since the fall of the Yanukovych regime, Ukraine has elected a new pro-Western president and a
parliament with a pro-Western majority. On May 25, 2014, Ukraine held a presidential election.
The winner, Petro Poroshenko, took 54.7% of the vote. Poroshenko is a pro-Western billionaire
whose holdings include Roshen, a leading chocolate brand in the region. His nearest competitor,
former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, won 12.81%. Voter turnout for Ukraine as a whole
was 60.29%. The lowest turnout was in Donetsk region (15.37%) and Luhansk region (38.94%),
where Russian-backed separatist gunmen seized polling places and used threats, kidnappings, and
other forms of intimidation to stop the vote. An International Election Monitoring Mission, which
included several Members of Congress, observed the elections. A preliminary statement from the
mission said that the vote was “largely in line with international commitments and with a respect
for fundamental freedoms in the vast majority of the country” despite the “hostile security
environment” in Donetsk and Luhansk.
Ukraine held an early parliamentary election on October 26, 2014. The result was a victory for
forces in favor of closer ties with the EU and the United States. Half of the seats were allocated
by voting for party lists, the rest by voting in individual districts. However, due to the inability to
hold elections in districts held by Russian-backed separatists, 29 of the 450 seats in the parliament
will remain unfilled. The results were an overwhelming victory for pro-Western forces.
The main victors were the Petro Poroshenko Bloc with 132 seats and the People’s Front, led by
outgoing Prime Minister Viktor Yatsenyuk, with 82 seats. In a surprise, the pro-reform
Samopomich (self-help) Union won 33 seats. The unpredictable, populist Radical Party of Oleh
Liashko won 22, while Batkivshchina, the party of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko,
3 For an unofficial translation of the Russian-language original, see, for example, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de.html#axzz3RXfwD5VC.
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won 19. The Opposition Bloc, composed of supporters of the Yanukovych regime, won 29 seats.
Far-right groups, often held up by Russian propaganda as dominant in Ukraine, did very poorly.
One key group, Svoboda, won only six seats, while another, Right Sector, won only one.
On December 2, the new parliament approved a new government led by Yatsenyuk, who returned
as prime minister. Figures selected by the Poroshenko Bloc, People’s Front, Samopomich, and
Batkivshchina are represented in the new government. The government has the support of over
300 seats, which will enable it to pass amendments to the Ukrainian constitution.
Prime Minister Yatsenyuk has said Ukraine’s main goal was to adopt European standards, with
the ultimate objective of European Union membership for Ukraine. He called for sharp budget
cuts, including in social programs, but increases in defense spending. He said a key focus of the
new government would be to fight corruption, including by reducing government regulation and
the size of the bureaucracy. He said Ukraine would cut the number of taxes it collects and would
devolve more budgetary power to local authorities.
In an important symbolic move, Natalie Jaresko, a U.S. citizen and former State Department
official who has lived in Ukraine for over two decades, is Ukraine’s finance minister. The
economy minister is a Lithuanian citizen, and the health minister is from Georgia. These moves
may have been meant to signal that the new government is dedicated to moving the country
toward the West and that these key figures are not from what many Ukrainians believe is the
country’s morally compromised political elite.
The government is currently setting up an Anti-Corruption Bureau that will investigate corruption
among government officials. New anti-corruption laws passed last year, including stricter
provisions against bribery and conflicts of interest, and require annual disclosures of income by
public officials. Nevertheless, opinion polls have shown that public skepticism is high about the
new government will make a serious impact in fighting the country’s deeply ingrained, crippling
problem with corruption.
Current Economic Situation
Some observers have warned that Ukraine is close to economic collapse. Ukraine’s currency, the
hryvnia, has plummeted by more than 50% against the dollar in the past year. This has increased
Ukraine’s real debt burden (which is denominated in foreign currencies) and has hurt ordinary
Ukrainians, in part because it makes imported consumer items more expensive. Ukraine’s gross
domestic product (GDP) dropped by 8.2% in 2014, according to the World Bank. The World
Bank projects a drop in GDP of 2.3% in 2015. Ukraine’s government statistics office estimated
inflation in 2014 at 24.7%.
The economic situation in the rebel-held regions is also poor, due to the disruption caused by the
conflict. Ukraine’s decision to cut off financial flows (including pensions) to the region in order
to avoid subsidizing the rebellion has also had a negative impact, as has Ukraine’s increasingly
strict controls over movement into and out of the rebel-held areas to prevent the movement of
spies and saboteurs into the rest of Ukraine. For its part, aside from “humanitarian convoys”
staged for public effect, Russia has so far appeared unwilling to offer massive subsidies to the
rebel-held areas itself, instead insisting that Kyiv restore its financial flows to the region. Indeed,
the February 2015 cease-fire agreement contains such a provision. Some observers claim that this
effectively requires Kyiv to subsidize the forces that are trying to break Ukraine apart.
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In April 2014, the IMF approved a $17 billion loan for Ukraine, but Kyiv only received $4.5
billion of the amount. On February 12, 2015, the IMF and Ukraine agreed on a new loan package
of $17.5 billion, bringing the total IMF commitment to Ukraine to $22 billion over four years.
The IMF estimates that the total international commitment to Ukraine could come to $40 billion
when money from the EU, the United States, and other sources is included.
In announcing the agreement, the IMF noted that Ukraine has shown strong fiscal discipline—
cutting the budget deficit to 4.6% of GDP, maintaining a flexible exchange rate for its currency,
and increasing household gas prices to 56% of the import price and heating prices to about 40%
of the import price in 2014. The IMF pointed out areas where Ukraine has committed to make
rapid progress on reforms, including further energy price increases, bank restructuring,
governance reforms of state-owned enterprises, and legal changes to implement the anti-
corruption and judicial reforms.4
Ukraine’s Foreign Policy
The Ukrainian government’s main foreign policy priorities are to secure international support for
Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including non-recognition of Russia’s annexation
of Crimea, as well as international assistance to ameliorate the country’s dire economic situation.
In December 2014, the Ukrainian parliament overwhelming renounced Ukraine’s former neutral,
“non-bloc” status. President Poroshenko has said that Ukraine will eventually seek NATO
membership but will first embark on needed reforms to become a viable membership candidate,
culminating in a public referendum on joining NATO at the end of this decade. Many observers
have noted that key European NATO countries are opposed to NATO membership for Ukraine, or
even a key stepping stone to membership, a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine. They
reportedly fear that such a move would further provoke Russia.
Ukraine has requested assistance from NATO for its military. At the September 2014 NATO
summit in Wales, the alliance agreed to set up four trust funds to help Ukraine’s military in such
areas as logistics, command and control, military personnel issues (including wounded soldiers),
and cyberdefense.5 NATO is leaving the issue of supplying weapons and other possible lethal and
non-lethal aid to Ukraine’s armed forces to individual member countries. NATO as an
organization hasn’t provided lethal military aid to Ukraine, leaving that to each member state to
decide for itself. France and Germany have expressed opposition to providing arms to Ukraine.
However, some experts believe other European countries may provide such assistance, but only if
the United States does so first.
Russia
In some ways, recent Russian actions in Ukraine are the culmination of long-standing Russian
resentment of the outcome of the Cold War. In 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the
4 See https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr1550.htm.
5 For more on NATO’s response to the Ukraine crisis, see CRS Report R43478, NATO: Response to the Crisis in
Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe, coordinated by Paul Belkin. See also
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112695.htm.
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collapse of the Soviet Union “a major geopolitical disaster.” Russian leaders have also asserted
that the post-Soviet region is an area of privileged interests of Russia. Part of the justification for
that assertion is an alleged right to protect Russian citizens and “compatriots” (persons deemed to
be linked to Russia by language, culture, or ethnicity).
Moreover, Ukraine has a particularly important place in Russian psychology, according to many
experts. Putin has referred to Ukrainians as “brothers” of the Russian people. Eastern Orthodox
civilization, in which Russians see themselves as the leading force, got its start in Kievan Rus (a
state centered on what is now part of Ukraine) when Prince Vladimir converted to Christianity in
988. Russians often point out that their ancestors spilled a great deal of blood to incorporate
Crimea and most of the rest of Ukraine into the Russian empire, and a great deal more to keep it
within the empire (and its successor, the Soviet Union) through many wars.
Ethnic Russians make up 17.3% of Ukraine’s population, according to the 2001 Ukrainian census.
They are concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the country. They make up 58.3% of
the population in the Crimea (a peninsula in the Black Sea in southern Ukraine). In addition,
many ethnic Ukrainians in the east and south also tend to be Russian-speaking, are suspicious of
Ukrainian nationalism, and support close ties with Russia. Soviet leaders concentrated important
heavy industries (including defense industry) in eastern Ukraine, which tied the region to Russia
economically and fostered what many analysts have viewed as a lingering Soviet-style mindset
there. This is particularly true of the Donbas region, on the border with Russia.
Until the collapse of the Yanukovych regime in February 2014, Putin preferred using indirect
methods of influence in Ukraine. These included “carrots,” such as lucrative business deals with
Ukrainian politicians and oligarchs, but also “sticks,” such as de facto economic sanctions and
using Russian media (which are very popular in Ukraine) to attack uncooperative leaders.
Russia reacted with great hostility to the emergence of a new, more pro-Western leadership in
Ukraine in February 2014. A Russian foreign ministry statement on February 24 claimed that
“terroristic methods” were being used to suppress dissent in the Russian-speaking regions of the
country. The statement also criticized “Western partners” for acting not out of concern for the
people of Ukraine, but out of “unilateral geopolitical considerations.” Russian forces occupied
Ukraine’s Crimea region in late February and annexed it in March. Beginning in April 2014,
Russian intelligence operatives and other Russian troops have been involved in fighting in eastern
Ukraine. Russia has also supplied separatist forces with artillery, tanks, and other heavy
weaponry. Nevertheless, Russia continues to deny that it has intervened militarily in eastern
Ukraine.
Many experts on Russia have speculated that Putin’s key objective in Ukraine is to weaken and
discredit the pro-Western government in Kyiv and Western policy generally. A successful, pro-
Western Ukraine could pose unwelcome comparisons with the authoritarian, kleptocratic regime
at home in Russia.
Moscow has so far declined to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” as
independent countries or annex them to Russia. However, Russian official statements and the
February 2015 cease-fire agreement view the separatist regimes as legitimate interlocutors for
Kyiv in determining the future of Ukraine. Russia has made also strident demands on the subject
of Ukraine’s political future. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has called for making Russian the
second official language in Ukraine and for constitutional reforms that would confirm Ukraine’s
neutral status. Moscow has also insisted on “federalization” of Ukraine, under which the various
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regions would have wide autonomy in the areas of the economy, finances, culture, language,
education, and external economic and cultural ties with neighboring countries or regions.
Like its military support for the separatists, Russia’s federalization proposal appears to many
analysts to be an effort to permanently cripple the central government in Kyiv, giving forces in
eastern Ukraine under Moscow’s sway a veto power over important decisions, including on
Ukraine’s current pro-Western orientation. Russia’s plan appears to be broadly similar to the
Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia or the Kozak Memorandum, a 2003 Russian federalization
proposal for Moldova. Federalization could also be used to give Russia enhanced control over
economic assets in the east.
However, it appears highly unlikely that Ukrainian leaders or the public would accept the
constitutional changes needed to create such a federation. It is unclear whether the
“decentralization” called for in the February 2015 cease-fire agreement will be more acceptable
to Ukrainians. Some analysts believe that official Russian rhetoric about an alleged “party of
war” in Kyiv centered around Prime Minister Yatsenyuk may indicate another possible strategy—
to pit the prime minister and President Poroshenko against each other and perhaps bully or cajole
President Poroshenko into enter into an accommodation with Moscow.
What has largely disappeared from official Russian rhetoric in recent months is the concept of
“Novorossiya;” that is, expanding the Russian-controlled area to include most of eastern and
southern Ukraine, perhaps linking Russian-controlled areas in southern Ukraine with Crimea.
This goal may have seemed easily achievable to Putin last spring when he first used the term.
Since then, however, Ukrainian forces have become somewhat more capable, and it may appear
to Putin than such an objective would now likely require a massive, and perhaps politically
unacceptable, infusion of Russian military forces to realize. There may also be financial
considerations. Moscow has so far provided very meager financial support for the regions in
eastern Ukraine that it has effectively seized. This may signal that Russia doesn’t want to incur
major new expenses in the current economic environment created by falling oil prices and
Western sanctions. Possible concern about intensified sanctions in the event of a more massive
intervention could also be a factor. Nevertheless, given Putin’s past unpredictability, even this
scenario cannot be ruled out.
If Russia does not want to continue the war in eastern Ukraine indefinitely, it could genuinely
implement the military provisions of the February 2015 cease-fire, thereby creating a “frozen
conflict,” as it has done in Moldova’s Transnistria region and Georgia’s Abkhazia and South
Ossetia regions. The outcome would likely at best amount to a cease-fire in place with Russia
continuing to have control over the Russia-Ukraine border, given the unlikelihood of an
agreement between Kyiv and the separatists on elections and decentralization. Such an outcome
could still provide Moscow with leverage over Kyiv but might not afford the same opportunity to
destabilize Ukraine as continuing the war would. On the other hand, an effective cease-fire could
provide an opening for Putin to secure an easing of sanctions in a few months, particularly from
sympathetic European countries.
Russia has taken other steps against Ukraine, including imposing some de facto trade sanctions
against Ukrainian imports. Russia could decide to expand these sanctions into economic warfare
against Ukraine. Ukrainian government servers have been hit by sophisticated cyberattacks,
which may have come from Russia, although no proof of this has been publicly disclosed so far.
Russia could harass or expel some of the large number of Ukrainian citizens living and working
in Russia.
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Energy Issues
Energy is a key factor in Ukraine’s relations with Russia as Ukraine is heavily dependent on
Russia for its energy supplies. In 2012, 63% of Ukraine’s natural gas consumption came from
Russia, as well as nearly three-quarters of its oil and other liquid fuels.6 However, Ukraine’s
vulnerability to Russian pressure has been mitigated by the fact that the main oil and natural gas
pipelines to Central and Western Europe transit its territory. In 2014, about 40% of Russian
natural gas destined for Europe transited Ukraine. (Just two years earlier, the figure had been
about 60%.) Past Russian efforts to greatly increase gas prices for Ukraine provoked a crisis that
resulted in a cutoff of Russian gas to Western Europe for several days in January 2006. A second
gas crisis occurred in January 2009, resulting in a gas cutoff of nearly three weeks.
Until recently, Russia had long sought control of Ukraine’s natural gas pipelines and storage
facilities. Moscow’s efforts were unsuccessful, even with friendly governments in Kyiv, due to
Kyiv’s refusal to cede control of one of its key economic assets. This fact, as well as the 2006 and
2009 gas cutoffs, has led Russia and some European countries to plan and build pipelines to
bypass Ukraine. Gazprom has developed gas pipelines under the Baltic Sea (called Nord Stream)
and through the Balkans (called South Stream) to Western Europe. Nord Stream made its first gas
deliveries in 2011. On the other hand, Russia cancelled the South Stream project in December
2014, annoyed by EU objections that the project as planned violated EU rules. Russia now plans
to build a pipeline through Turkey to the Greek border (dubbed Turkish Stream), leaving the EU
the task of transporting gas on EU territory. Gazprom says that it will phase out gas transit via
Ukraine by 2020, but many experts are skeptical as to whether this is feasible.
Russia has also used gas prices as a tool in its policy toward Ukraine. Russia had raised the
natural gas price for Ukraine from $268 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) while President
Yanukovych was in power to $485 per tcm of gas when Ukraine’s new government took power,
an increase of about 80%. Ukraine refused to pay the increased amount and demanded a new gas
contract with a lower price. Russia responded in June 2014 by cutting off natural gas supplies to
Ukraine for non-payment of debts. (Ukraine continued to allow gas destined for Western Europe
to transit its territory.) In October 2014, the EU brokered a deal between Gazprom and Ukraine on
gas supplies at a lower price through March 2015 in exchange for Ukraine’s repayment of some
of its debts to Gazprom.
Ukrainian leaders acknowledge that the current deal with Gazprom is only a temporary expedient.
In order to avoid likely future Russian efforts to use energy supplies as a political weapon,
Ukraine has to sharply reduce its dependence on Russian gas. However, Ukraine has few short-
term alternatives. Ukraine began last year to import significant amounts of gas from Poland,
Hungary, and Slovakia. However, Ukrainian officials admit that these “reverse flow” supplies
alone will not suffice to meet demand in Ukraine.
In the long term, Ukraine could develop its own shale gas deposits and improve exploitation of its
conventional gas reserves; import liquefied natural gas; or import gas from Azerbaijan, Central
Asia, and elsewhere via pipelines through the EU’s planned Southern Energy Corridor. Ukraine
will also to have to make much greater strides in energy conservation, which has required a steep
and politically unpopular hike in natural gas prices, including for households.
6 U.S. Energy Information Agency Country Brief: Ukraine, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15411.
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European Union
The European Union’s main instrument to promote European values and deepen economic ties
with Ukraine is the Association Agreement. The agreement includes a free trade agreement with
the EU, formally known as a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA).
Although the DCFTA further opens potentially lucrative EU markets to Ukraine, it also requires
Ukraine to adopt EU legislation and standards and to gradually expose Ukrainian firms to tough
competition from EU imports. Approximation to EU norms could also lead to increased foreign
investment in Ukraine. Under intense pressure from Russia, which strongly opposed Ukraine’s
intention to sign the AA, the Ukrainian government announced on November 21 that it would not
sign the agreement, the first in a series of events that led to the regime’s demise three months
later.
The collapse of the Yanukovych regime improved prospects for a closer relationship with the EU.
The EU and Ukraine signed the parts of Ukraine’s Association Agreement dealing with political
issues in March 2014, and the parts dealing with economic issues (including the DCFTA) were
signed on June 27.
Ratification of the pact was delayed due to Russian threats to block Ukrainian imports from its
markets unless the pact was modified to protect Russia’s interests. The EU and Ukraine refused to
do so, and the European Parliament and the Ukrainian parliament ratified the accord on
September 16. However, the EU and Ukraine did appear to bow to Russian threats by agreeing to
postpone implementation of the DCFTA until 2016. Ukraine will continue to enjoy unilateral
trade preferences from the EU until then.
As part of an international effort involving international financial institutions, the United States,
and other countries, the EU has also offered substantial assistance to Ukraine to reform its
political and economic system and to shore up its finances. In addition, the EU has imposed
sanctions on Russia and separatists in Ukraine in conjunction with the United States and other
countries. Although the sanctions are supposed to help persuade Russia to agree to a peace
settlement in Ukraine, the EU as an organization does not play a major role in brokering peace
talks. Instead, EU member states Germany and France have taken the lead in that effort.
EU Aid to Ukraine
On March 5, 2014, the European Commission unveiled an 11.1-billion-Euro (about $15.5 billion)
aid package for Ukraine. The package included 1.6 billion Euro (about $2.2 billion) in macro
financial assistance loans to support Ukraine’s government finances. The EU will also provide
1.565 billion Euro (about $2.17 billion) in grant aid between 2014 and 2020 to assist Ukraine’s
reform efforts. The package includes up to 3 billion Euro (about $4.16 billion) in loans from the
European Investment Bank and 5 billion Euro (nearly $7 billion) from the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. In addition, the EU will establish a High Level Investment
Forum/Task Force; help modernize Ukraine’s natural gas transit system and work on reversing
the flow of pipelines through Slovakia so that Ukraine can receive gas from the west; accelerate
its Visa Liberalisation Action Plan; and provide technical assistance on a number of areas from
constitutional to judicial reform and preparation of elections.7
7 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-159_en.htm.
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The war in eastern Ukraine and the sharply negative impact it has had on Ukraine’s economy has
led the EU to consider additional aid to Ukraine. The EU is reportedly considering providing as
much as 2.5 billion Euro ($2.8 billion) in additional macrofinancial assistance loans this year,
depending on whether Ukraine can reach a new loan agreement with the IMF and keep reforms
on track.
EU Sanctions
On March 17, 2014, the day after Crimean authorities held a referendum on joining Russia, the
European Union imposed a visa ban and an asset freeze on 21 figures from Ukraine and Russia
who played roles in Russia’s seizure of Crimea. On March 21, the EU imposed sanctions on 12
additional Russian leading figures, after President Putin signed an agreement with Crimean
leaders incorporating the region into Russia. On April 28, the EU added 15 more names to the list.
On May 12, 2014, the EU added 13 additional names of Russian officials and two companies
based in Crimea.
The EU list included some senior government officials and members of the Russian parliament,
but also fairly low-level figures directly involved in the Crimea operation and efforts to
destabilize Ukraine. In contrast to the United States, the EU has stopped short of sanctioning
Putin’s “inner circle” or key firms associated with them.8
However, the political mood in many EU countries changed after 298 people (mainly EU
citizens) were killed as a result of the July 17 shootdown of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over
separatist-held territory. On July 22, EU foreign ministers agreed to expand Ukraine-related
sanctions against Russia by adding individuals and companies to the existing travel ban and asset
freeze list, including some persons in Putin’s inner circle.
On July 29, the EU agreed to impose sanctions on Russia’s financial, defense, and energy sectors.
These sanctions were strengthened in September, in response to a massive Russian-supported
offensive in Ukraine. The sanctions barred EU nationals and companies from providing loans to
five major Russian state-owned banks and barred trade in new bonds, equity, or similar financial
instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days, issued by the same banks. The same restrictions
were also extended to three major Russian defense companies and three major energy companies.
The EU banned certain services necessary for deep water oil exploration and production, Arctic
oil exploration or production, and shale oil projects in Russia. The EU has also banned exporting
dual use goods and technology for military use in Russia. The EU also added new persons to its
travel ban and asset freeze list.
In December 2014, the EU banned or restricted most European investment, trade, and tourism
with Russian-occupied Crimea. As of January 2015, the EU has sanctions on 132 persons and 28
entities. The EU is currently considering additional sanctions in response to Russian support for a
separatist offensive in eastern Ukraine in January and February 2015.
8 For the sanctions decision and the initial list of names, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:32014D0145&rid=5. For the March 21 additions, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32014D0151&rid=2. For the April 28 additions, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32014D0238&rid=1. For the May 12 additions, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=
uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.137.01.0009.01.ENG.
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However, observers have noted that the sanctions have been crafted to reduce the economic harm
to EU countries, for example by not targeting the sensitive natural gas sector; the sale of dual use
technologies to civilian firms; or France’s planned (now indefinitely postponed) delivery of two
Mistral amphibious assault ships. Observers have also noted that the sanctions were imposed for a
one-year period only. It is therefore possible that EU countries sympathetic to Russia could block
renewal of sanctions as they come up for consideration this year. In January 2015, the EU decided
to extend the sanctions on individuals and entities until September 2015. Key sectoral sanctions
do not expire until July.9
U.S. Policy
During the upheaval in Ukraine in the past year, Administration officials have tried
unsuccessfully to reassure Russia that the United States was not in a geopolitical competition with
Moscow over Ukraine. The United States has strongly condemned the Russian military invasion
of Crimea and Russia’s ongoing efforts to destabilize eastern Ukraine as violations of
international law. Over the past year, the United States, in coordination with the EU and other
countries, has imposed sanctions against Russia to increase the costs to Russia of its aggression,
with the objective of pressing it to implement a genuine political settlement with Ukraine.
However, the Administration has appeared leave the leading role in negotiating such a settlement
to France and Germany, whose representatives have met with those of Russia, Ukraine, and the
rebels in the so-called “Normandy format,” named after the place where they first occurred last
year. Nevertheless, President Obama and Administration officials have been in regular contact
with the main figures in the talks, including President Putin, President Poroshenko, German
Chancellor Merkel, and President Hollande of France.
Another focus of U.S. efforts has been to support Ukraine’s efforts to reform and increase its
cooperation and integration with the European Union. The United States, in cooperation with the
EU and international financial institutions, is providing financial and technical assistance to
Ukraine. The United States has also provided non-lethal aid to Ukraine’s security sector,
including its army, but has declined so far provide weapons to Ukraine, out of concern of
escalating the conflict and making a political settlement less likely. Nevertheless, President
Obama said in February 2015 that providing defense weapons to Ukraine is an option the
Administration is considering if diplomatic efforts fail.
Secretary of State John Kerry issued a statement on February 12 expressing support for the cease-
fire agreement reached in Minsk earlier that day. He said that the United States would consider
rolling back sanctions against Russia when the agreement (and the previous Minsk agreement of
September 2014) are fully implemented.10
9 For more on the EU’s policy on Ukraine, see CRS Report IN10129, U.S.-EU Cooperation on Ukraine and Russia, by
Kristin Archick and Derek E. Mix.
10 See http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/02/237439.htm.
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U.S. Sanctions Against Russia
The United States has suspended most bilateral cooperation with Russia. On April 2, the
Administration announced that it was suspending several projects planned under the aegis of the
U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission as well as some law enforcement cooperation
activities and planned to use that funding for aid instead to Ukraine. The United States has also
placed additional restrictions on defense-related exports to Russia.
On March 6, the Administration issued an executive order imposing visa bans and asset freezes
against persons who “undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threaten its
peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and contribute to the
misappropriation of its assets.... ”11 On March 17, the Administration announced visa bans and
asset freezes against several senior figures from Russia and the secessionist Crimean government.
On March 16 and 20, after Russia moved to annex Crimea, the Administration issued two
additional executive orders expanding the scope of sanctions. They permit the Administration to
freeze the assets of persons working in key areas of the Russian economy, including “financial
services, energy, metals and mining, engineering, and defense and related materiel.”
On March 20, the Administration announced asset freezes on 16 high-ranking Russian
government officials and members of parliament. Four additional persons, all wealthy
businessmen, were sanctioned as members of Putin’s “inner circle.” One bank, Bank Rossiya,
was also sanctioned due to its role as the personal bank of senior Russian officials.12
On April 28, the Administration imposed asset freezes on an additional seven senior Russian
officials. They include Igor Sechin, the president of Rosneft, Russia’s leading oil company, and
former chief of staff to Putin. The Administration also sanctioned 17 entities, including banks and
other businesses. The companies appear to have been chosen due to their links to sanctioned
persons in Putin’s inner circle, such as energy trader Genneddy Timchenko and bankers Arkady
and Boris Rotenberg, or to Bank Rossiya.13 Due to privacy laws, the names of those receiving
visa bans have not been made public, but it is likely that they include those persons under asset
freezes.
On July 16, 2014, the United States imposed sanctions unilaterally on key firms in Russia’s
financial, energy, and military technology sectors—including Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank
(VEB), Novatek, and Rosneft. U.S. firms and persons are barred from dealing in new equity or
loans of greater than 90 days maturity for these companies. After the Malaysian airlines tragedy
on the 17th, the EU largely matched and even in some cases went beyond these sanctions. On July
27, the Administration responded by adding Bank of Moscow, VTB Bank, and Russian
Agricultural Bank to the list of companies with restricted access to U.S. capital markets. In
addition, the U.S. assets of United Shipbuilding Company were frozen.
11 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/06/executive-order-blocking-property-certain-persons-
contributing-situation.
12 For a list of Russian figures sanctioned in March, see http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl23331.aspx. For the text of the executive order greatly expanding the scope of sanctions, see
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/20/executive-order-blocking-property-additional-persons-
contributing-situation.
13 For a list of Russian figures sanctioned in April, see http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl2369.aspx.
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In September 2014, in response to a separatist offensive in Ukraine massively supported by
Russian combat troops, the United States imposed sanctions against additional key Russian
companies, including Transneft, Lukoil, Gazprom Neft, Rostec, Surgutneftegaz, and Sberbank.14
On December 19, 2014, the President issued an executive order to bar any U.S. person from
participating in new investment in Crimea; imports from and exports to the Crimea region; and
any financing, facilitation, or guarantee of any related transaction by a U.S. person.15
Congressional Response
U.S. Aid to Ukraine
According to the U.S. Aid for International Development (USAID) “Greenbook” website, the
United States obligated over $4 billion in aid to Ukraine from FY1990 through FY2012.16
According to other State Department figures, the United States allocated $92.4 million in aid for
Ukraine in FY2013 and $88.1 million in FY2014.
According to a State Department statement on February 5, 2015, the United States has provided
over $355 million in U.S. aid to Ukraine over the previous year. In addition, the United States
provided a $1 billion loan guarantee to Ukraine. The government of Ukraine issued the bond in
May 2014. Ukraine was able to price the five-year bonds at 28 basis points over Treasury bonds.
Ukraine has committed to using the loan to compensate about 2 million vulnerable households
from the impact of increases in gas and heating prices.17
U.S. technical assistance has been aimed at helping Ukraine stabilize its financial sector; carry out
reforms in the agricultural sector; improve the business climate; help Ukraine hold free and fair
parliamentary and presidential elections; support constitutional reforms; bolster civil society to
participate and monitor the reform process; and support independent media.
Assistance is also devoted to helping Ukraine develop laws and regulations to fight corruption,
one of Ukraine’s biggest challenges. Technical assistance is also being used to improve its energy
security, including by enhancing energy efficiency. U.S. aid also provides humanitarian assistance
to Ukraine in cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
international organizations to improve Ukraine’s ability to assist internally displaced persons
(IDP.) U.S. aid has been used by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America to
produce Russian-language news broadcasts that are aired in Ukraine.
U.S. aid has also gone into helping bolster Ukraine’s security sector. Over $120 million has been
allocated for this purpose. The assistance includes providing body armor, helmets, vehicles, night
14 See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140912.aspx.
15 For more on U.S. sanctions on Russia, see CRS Report IN10048, U.S. Sanctions on Russia in Response to Events in
Ukraine, coordinated by Dianne E. Rennack. For more on the economic impact of sanctions on Russia, see CRS Report
R43895, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: Economic Implications, by Rebecca M. Nelson.
16 See https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/.
17 See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237203.htm.
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and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations,
tents, counter-mortar radars, uniforms, and first aid equipment and supplies.18
In February 2015, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges announced that a U.S. Army battalion would begin
training Ukrainian forces in Poland, including on how to operate against Russian electronic
warfare and how to protect themselves from Russian and rebel artillery.
However, some critics have claimed that this aid has been slow to arrive in Ukraine due to
bureaucratic impediments. Moreover, some Members of Congress have expressed support for
going beyond the non-lethal support given by the United States so far to provide “defensive
weapons” such as man-portable anti-tank weapons. Other suggested assistance includes
additional non-lethal items, such as secure communications equipment, reconnaissance drones,
and radars capable of tracking longer-range heavy artillery, not just mortars. 19
The FY2015 omnibus appropriations bill (P.L. 113-235) appropriates aid for Ukraine. The bill
includes $47 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and $139.283 million in Economic
Support Fund (ESF) aid, which can be used for technical assistance and for additional loan
guarantees for Ukraine. In addition to this amount, Ukraine will likely also receive a portion of
Europe and Eurasia regional funding to fight Russian aggression, including $502 million in ESF;
$15.8 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) aid; $5.85
million from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)
account; and $29.55 million in FMF funding.20
In its FY2016 Congressional Budget Justification, the Administration requested $154.1 million in
ESF funding for Ukraine in its base request. The Administration also requested $31.615 million in
Global Health funding; and $2.9 million in IMET military training funds. The Administration
requested an additional $275 million in ESF from the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
account to fund possible additional loan guarantees for Ukraine. The Administration request also
includes $42.3 million in FMF aid for Ukraine from the OCO account.21
In January 2015, Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew announced Administration plans to provide
another $1 billion in loan guarantees in the first half of 2015, if Ukraine makes progress on
reforms. He also said that the Administration would also seek Congressional approval for yet
another $1 billion guarantee, making $3 billion in loan guarantees in all.22
Other Legislation
The 113th Congress passed legislation in response to the crisis in Ukraine. On January 7, 2014, the
Senate passed S.Res. 319. Among other provisions, the resolution sponsored by Senator Murphy
urges the United States and EU to work together to promote a peaceful resolution of the crisis that
moves Ukraine toward a future in the Euro-Atlantic community; encourages all parties to avoid
18 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/21/fact-sheet-us-assistance-ukraine.
19 For a report by former senior U.S. officials advocating U.S. defensive arms for Ukraine, see
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/UkraineReport_February2015_FINAL.pdf.
20 See the Explanatory Statement on H.R. 83 at https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/2014/12/11/house-
section/article/H9307-1.
21 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236395.pdf
22 See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9751.aspx.
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violence and engage in dialogue; and states that, in the event of further government violence
against peaceful protestors, the President and Congress should consider whether to apply targeted
sanctions, including visa bans and asset freezes, against individuals responsible for ordering or
carrying out the violence.
On February 10, 2014, the House passed H.Res. 447 by a vote of 381-2. The resolution,
introduced by Representative Eliot Engel on December 16, 2013, contains provisions broadly
similar to those of S.Res. 319, including raising the possibility of sanctions against Ukrainian
leaders if they use violence against protestors. The House Foreign Affairs Committee approved an
amended version of H.Res. 447 on January 29. The new version takes into account the events that
had occurred since the resolution’s introduction. The resolution expresses support for the visa
bans that the United States has already imposed on Ukrainian officials responsible for violence
against protestors, and urges the Administration to consider additional sanctions against those
responsible for the use of force.
On March 11, the House of Representatives approved H.Res. 499 by a vote of 402-7. Among
other provisions, the resolution calls on NATO allies and European Union member states to
immediately suspend military cooperation with Russia, including arms sales; calls for the United
States and its allies to adopt visa, financial, trade, and other sanctions on senior Russian
Federation officials, Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs, and others complicit in Russia’s
intervention and interference in Ukraine, majority state-owned banks and commercial
organizations, and other state agencies, as appropriate; and calls on the United States to work with
its allies and other countries to aid Ukraine’s economic recovery efforts.
On March 6, the House passed H.R. 4152 by a vote of 385-23. The bill funds the loan guarantees
requested by the Administration for Ukraine from the amounts appropriated for FY2014 for the
Economic Support Fund, and from unobligated balances for State Department and Foreign
Operations funding for prior years.
On March 27, the Senate approved an amended version of H.R. 4152 by voice vote. The bill
includes the loan guarantees for Ukraine, but also provisions of S. 2124, which had been
approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 12. These portions of the Senate-
passed version of H.R. 4152 require the U.S. government to assist Ukraine to recover assets
stolen by the previous regime through corruption; authorize $50 million in U.S. aid in FY2015 to
help Ukraine carry out political and economic reforms; authorize $100 million in security
assistance for Ukraine and other Central and Eastern European countries for FY2015-FY2017;
and require the President to impose visa bans and asset seizures against persons in Ukraine and
Russia who are responsible for violence or undermining the peace, security, stability, sovereignty,
or territorial integrity of Ukraine. The bill also “encourages” the President to impose these
sanctions on Russian figures responsible for corruption in Russia and requires an annual report by
the Secretary of Defense on military and security developments involving the Russian Federation.
On April 1, the House passed the Senate-amended version of H.R. 4152 by a vote of 378-34.
Representative Royce, who introduced a broadly similar bill (H.R. 4278) passed by the House on
March 27, expressed his preference for the “more comprehensive” H.R. 4278, but supported
passage of the Senate version of H.R. 4152 to “demonstrate bipartisan support for Ukraine.”
President Obama signed the bill into law on April 3.
On April 1, the House also passed S. 2183, which requires Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty and
Voice of American to start a programming “surge” to provide accurate information to eastern
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Ukraine, Crimea, and Moldova in order to counteract inflammatory Russian propaganda. The bill
authorizes up to $10 million in appropriations for this effort. The provisions of S. 2183 were
originally part of H.R. 4278, and were passed by the Senate as a separate bill on March 27 by
unanimous consent. President Obama also signed S. 2183 into law on April 3.
On December 11, the House passed H.R. 5859, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act. The Senate
passed the bill on December 13, and the bill was signed by the President on December 18 (P.L.
113-272). On December 18, 2014, President Obama signed H.R. 5859, the Ukraine Freedom
Support Act. The measure permits the President to impose sanctions on Russian defense, energy,
and other firms and foreign persons; authorizes increase military and economic assistance for
Ukraine; authorizes funding for U.S. Russian-language broadcasting in the region; authorizes
support for Russian civil society and democracy organizations; and requires a report on Russian
noncompliance with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291) bars the use of Department of
Defense funds for military cooperation with Russia until the President certifies that Russia has
ended its aggression against Ukraine; requires detailed reports by the Administration on U.S.
military assistance to Ukraine; and authorizes $75 million in security assistance to Ukraine as part
of the European Reassurance Initiative.
Congressional Debate
One issue that has sparked significant Congressional debate in recent months has been whether
the United States should supply defensive weapons to Ukraine. On February 3, 2015, a bipartisan
group of 15 Senators sent a letter to President Obama urging him to act on the authorization
provided by the Ukrainian Freedom Support Act to supply an “immediate infusion of effective
defensive military equipment and financial aid to thwart Putin’s naked aggression. Defensive
military assistance—such as anti-tank weapons, counter-battery radars, armored Humvees, and
increased training—are all critical to ensuring Ukraine has the capabilities to defend its territory
and its citizens.” 23
Advocates of arming Ukraine say that sanctions alone are unlikely to stop Russian aggression and
that boosting Ukraine’s defense capabilities are essential to stop further Russian conquest of
Ukrainian territory and to pressure Putin to agree to a genuine peace agreement. Those opposed to
arming Ukraine say that Putin could use the move as an excuse to escalate the conflict beyond our
desire to respond, thereby increasing the level of violence. Some experts say escalation could
even result in a new Cold War, eliminating the possibility for U.S.-Russian cooperation on key
issues elsewhere. It could also split Western unity on Russia policy, they claim, as France and
Germany are strongly opposed to arming the Ukrainians.24
23 See http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-portman-lead-bipartisan-senators-calling-for-
increased-military-assistance-to-ukraine.
24 See for example http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/02/06-aiding-ukrainian-military-goad-putin-war-
gaddy-hill.
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Figure 1. Ukraine
Author Contact Information
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291
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