February 3, 2015
Mali: Transition from Conflict?
Overview
Figure 1. Mali Facts
With substantial international assistance, Mali began to
emerge in 2013 from a complex political and security crisis.
Despite some progress, the underlying causes of conflict
and poor governance have not been resolved, and security
conditions have deteriorated since mid-2014. These factors
pose policy dilemmas for the United States and others
seeking to foster regional stability and prevent a new
security vacuum and humanitarian crisis from emerging.
Congress authorizes and appropriates funding for U.S. aid
to Mali and for U.S. support to a U.N. peacekeeping
operation. Congress also oversees long-standing U.S.
efforts to address humanitarian needs, promote
development, and counter transnational terrorism in Mali
and across West Africa’s Sahel region.

Challenges include an ongoing, multi-faceted conflict in the
vast desert north of the country, widespread poverty, and
In January 2013, France launched a military intervention
state corruption. Peace talks between the government and
that ousted extremist groups from most northern towns.
northern separatist rebels began in 2014, but have yet to
Mali’s transitional government and the main separatist
deliver an agreement. In early 2015, the talks appeared to
groups signed a ceasefire agreement that called for the start
falter. In the meantime, the separatists, Islamist extremist
of peace talks as soon as an elected government was seated
groups, and government actors appear to be backing local-
in Bamako. MINUSMA was rolled out in July 2013,
level proxies in intercommunal conflicts, contributing to
absorbing an African Union military force. Veteran
ethnic tensions and battling over the spoils of endemic
politician Ibrahim Boubacar Kéïta (KAY-tah, often referred
illicit smuggling, including drug trafficking.
to as IBK) was elected president later that year and his
supporters won a majority in parliament, putting an end to a
In 2013, donors pledged about $4 billion for post-conflict
shaky transitional government that was widely perceived as
assistance to Mali, about half of which had been disbursed
influenced by the former junta.
as of late 2014. Foreign troops are also deployed in Mali to
support the extension of state authority in the north and for
Security and governance challenges have severely
counterterrorism purposes. The U.N. Multidimensional
undermined already daunting development prospects in
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is
Mali, one of the world’s poorest countries. Cotton and gold
authorized to have up to 12,640 uniformed personnel.
are key export earners. Some 80% of the labor force is
France, which conducted a military intervention in Mali in
engaged in agriculture. Droughts, poor infrastructure, high
2013, is drawing down from a peak of about 4,500 troops to
population growth, and land degradation have contributed
about 1,000, now considered part of a regional
to endemic food insecurity. Security threats and contested
counterterrorism mission, Operation Barkhane.
political control in the north have reduced humanitarian
groups’ access to needy populations. About 143,000
Background
Malians are refugees in neighboring states, with the largest
populations in Mauritania and Niger, and about 86,000
Members of Mali’s semi-nomadic minority ethnic Tuareg
more were internally displaced as of late 2014. Many
community launched a separatist rebellion in the north in
refugees reportedly fear that they would not be safe
2011, leveraging flows of fighters and arms from Libya.
returning to their home regions.
Mid-ranking soldiers, reportedly angry at their
commanders’ mishandling of the war, overthrew Mali’s
Government Struggles
elected government in a coup. By mid-2012, Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Algerian-led regional
Despite the 2013 ceasefire agreement, President Kéïta
network that has had a presence in northern Mali for over a
delayed seeking a meaningful peace process for nearly a
decade, along with two loosely allied groups, had ousted or
year after being elected. For their part, northern rebel
absorbed most of the separatists and asserted control over
commanders refused to confine their combatants to
most of the north. These events displaced hundreds of
barracks or to abandon claims of territorial administration.
thousands of Malians and exacerbated a regional
Broadly, Kéïta faces challenges in meeting the expectations
humanitarian emergency caused by a severe drought.
of his southern constituents (e.g., improving living
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Mali: Transition from Conflict?
conditions, fighting corruption, and reasserting sovereignty)
U.N. Peacekeeping Challenges
while also responding to international pressures to
acknowledge and address northern grievances stemming
The U.N. Security Council has mandated MINUSMA to
from perceived state neglect and persecution. Meanwhile, a
help stabilize the north and protect civilians, promote the
series of high-level corruption scandals have undermined
reestablishment of state authority, and assist with political
public and donor confidence in his administration.
dialogue, among other tasks. In northern Mali, MINUSMA
faces severe logistical constraints and security threats, and
In May 2014, clashes broke out between the military and
its troops have suffered high casualty rates in extremist
rebel forces when then-Prime Minister Moussa Mara
attacks. Leading troop contributors include impoverished
attempted to visit the far-northern town of Kidal, which
African states—such as Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, and
remains under rebel control. The rebels defeated
Togo—as well as frequent U.N. peacekeeping contributors
government troops, reportedly killing civilian officials as
such as Bangladesh, and several European countries,
well as soldiers. Although a ceasefire was ultimately
notably The Netherlands. The operation has reached only
brokered, the military withdrew from much of the north
three-quarters of its authorized size, and many troop
after the Kidal violence. Apparent internal military
contingents remain under-equipped by U.N. standards.
dysfunction during the clashes revealed continued
Strained Donor Relations
shortcomings, in spite of European Union-supported efforts
to retrain the Malian armed forces. Efforts to re-extend the
In December 2014, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
government’s presence in the north were also set back. The
resumed lending to Mali after the government agreed to
Kidal events arguably forced Bamako to the negotiating
independently audit several controversial spending
table, and talks began in Algeria in July 2014.
decisions. In May 2014, the IMF had suspended its Mali
programs, stating that the purchase of a new presidential jet
President Kéïta reshuffled the cabinet in January 2015,
and a set of defense procurement contracts had
appointing as Prime Minister Modibo Kéïta (not a direct
demonstrated improper fiscal management and a lack of
relation), a senior advisor and former head of Bamako’s
budget transparency. The decision prompted other donors to
peace negotiation team. Observers have portrayed the new
suspend their budget support as well. According to news
prime minister as more experienced and effective than his
reports, the purchases were overvalued; spending was not
predecessor, Mara, a populist youth leader. Whether he and
included in the official budget; and contracts involved
his cabinet can salvage the peace process and boost the
middle men reputed to be close to President Kéita.
government’s reputation remains to be seen.
Stalled Peace Talks
U.S. Policy and Aid
U.S. officials have emphasized the need to improve
Northern armed groups, both separatist and loyalist, are
governance, foster reconciliation, and marginalize violent
represented in Algiers by two fractious alliances. The
extremist groups. U.S. aid aims to support peace and
“Coordination” includes the largest Tuareg-led separatist
reconciliation, development, and health programs in Mali.
group, the National Movement for the Liberation of
The United States has also provided humanitarian
Azawad (MNLA), and the High Council for the Unity of
assistance; financial support for MINUSMA’s budget;
Azawad (HCUA), which broke from the AQIM-aligned
logistical support for French military operations; training
Tuareg-led group Ansar al Dine. The second alliance,
and equipment for African troops in MINUSMA; and
known as the “Platform,” is viewed as close to Bamako.
security assistance for neighboring states seeking to prevent
Ceasefire agreements laid out commitments to respect
terrorist spillover. U.S. bilateral aid in FY2014 totaled $116
Mali’s territorial integrity and secularism, but commitment
million, in addition to $319 million for MINUSMA’s
to these principles likely varies among participants. In late
budget, emergency humanitarian aid, and other funds
2014, talks stalled over the government’s rejection of
budgeted on a regional or global basis. For FY2015, the
federalism, which the Coordination has insisted on. In early
Administration requested $122 million for bilateral aid and
2015, the Coordination threatened to withdraw from the
contributed an estimated $291 million to MINUSMA.
talks after U.N. airstrikes on its positions. (MINUSMA
maintained that its troops had come under rebel fire.)
Prior to 2012, Mali received substantial U.S.
counterterrorism assistance under the State Department-led,
Peace talks are expected to deliver a consensus on thorny
multi-country Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership
issues such as the decentralization of political power;
(TSCTP). Mali continues to receive TSCTP assistance,
security arrangements in the north; the potential integration
notably for countering extremist ideology. In the near-term,
of rebel combatants into the security forces and state
U.S. security assistance appears likely to focus on defense
administration; and justice and reconciliation issues.
sector reform rather than building counterterrorism
Similar issues were nominally addressed in peace accords
capacity. Mali is one of six African focus countries under
in the 1990s and 2000s that broke down, making the path to
the Administration’s new Africa Security Governance
a sustainable agreement uncertain. The talks are also
Initiative (SGI), but the program’s scope and the level of
unlikely to resolve local struggles that have fed conflict in
funding for Mali remain to be seen.
the north, related to disputed political legitimacy, shifting
social hierarchies, control of smuggling routes and
Alexis Arieff, aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
patronage, and access to scarce water and arable land.

IF10116
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