Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Amy Belasco
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
January 9, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43727

Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

Summary
The FY2015 continuing appropriations resolution (P.L. 113-164, H.J.Res. 124, FY2015 CR),
enacted on September 19, 2014, authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) through December
11, 2014, or until the passage of a FY2015 national defense authorization act (NDAA), to provide
overt assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to vetted members of
the Syrian opposition and other vetted Syrians for select purposes. The FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113-
291, H.R. 3979) and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L.
113-235, H.R. 83) provide further authority and funding for the program. Congress acted in
response to President Obama’s request for authority to begin such a program as part of U.S.
efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria and to set the
conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria’s civil war.
The FY2015 measures authorize DOD to submit reprogramming requests to the four
congressional defense committees to transfer available funds. DOD submitted the first such
reprogramming request in November 2014 under authorities provided by P.L. 113-164, and, in
December, Congress approved $220 million in requested funds to begin program activities. H.R.
83 states that up to $500 million of $1.3 billion made available by the act for a new
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) may be used to support the Syria train and equip
program. Additional funds could be available for this program if DOD chose to transfer funds
from other DOD accounts or received contributions from other countries.
Compared with the authority first adopted in the September 2014 CR, the FY2015 NDAA and its
accompanying explanatory statement further specify the types of assistance to be provided,
expand reporting requirements, include human rights and rule of law commitments, set vetting
requirements, authorize the provision of assistance to third countries for the purposes of the
program, and create a broad waiver authority for the President to implementing a train and equip
program for Syria subject to approval of a reprogramming to transfer the funds. The authority
provided in the NDAA expires after December 31, 2016; the authority related to this assistance
provided in the FY2015 appropriations act expires on September 30, 2015.
This report reviews the authorities and funds granted by Congress for the Syria train and equip
program to date and explores similarities and differences among them and the President’s
requests.
For more information on the Islamic State crisis and U.S. policy, see CRS Report R43612, The
“Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman et al., and CRS Report RL33487,
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
For analysis of proposals related to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force relative to the
Islamic State, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
the Islamic State: Comparison of Proposals in Brief, by Matthew C. Weed.

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Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Policy Questions and Potential Implications ................................................................................... 3
Political-Military Context .......................................................................................................... 4
Measuring “Effectiveness” ........................................................................................................ 5
Enacted Provisions and Related Debate .......................................................................................... 7
What authority has Congress provided to the President for the Syria “train and equip”
program? ................................................................................................................................. 7
Restrictions on MANPADs ................................................................................................. 8
Waiver Authority ................................................................................................................. 8
State Department Nonlethal Assistance .............................................................................. 9
Stated Purposes of U.S. Assistance ........................................................................................... 9
Defending Syrian Civilians from Attacks ........................................................................... 9
“Securing” vs. “Stabilizing” Opposition-held Territory and Facilitating the
Provision of Essential Services ...................................................................................... 10
Promoting the Conditions for a Negotiated Settlement to End the Conflict
in Syria ........................................................................................................................... 10
Sunset Provisions..................................................................................................................... 10
Implications of Different Funding Sources and Directives ..................................................... 11
Definitions of Vetting Requirements ....................................................................................... 11
Advance Notification and Reporting of Oversight Information to Congress .......................... 12
Terms Related to Authorization for the Use of Military Force ................................................ 13

Tables
Table 1. Comparison of Select “Train and Equip” Provisions for Vetted Syrians ......................... 14

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 23

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Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

Introduction
Congress and the President have debated proposals for the provision of U.S. assistance to the
Syrian opposition since the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in 2011. Members of Congress have
articulated varying views on the potential purposes, scope, risks, and rewards of such assistance.
The executive branch, with the support of Congress, has provided overt non-lethal assistance to
unarmed and armed groups in Syria, in addition to providing humanitarian assistance in Syria and
in neighboring countries. U.S. assistance and weaponry also reportedly has been provided to
select Syrian opposition groups under covert action authorities.1 Until mid-2014, President
Obama and some Members of Congress were opposed to the overt provision of U.S. military
training or equipment to opposition forces reportedly in part because of concerns about its
effectiveness.
The President’s stance was altered by the failure in early 2014 of United Nations-backed
negotiations aimed at ending the Syrian civil war and the mid-2014 offensive in Iraq by the
extremist group known as the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL or ISIS). In the
Administration’s June 2014 amended request for war funding, President Obama requested
authority and funding from Congress to begin an overt “train and equip” program for vetted
Syrians for the following purposes:
defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime, facilitating the provision of
essential services, and stabilizing territory controlled by the opposition;
defending the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats
posed by terrorists in Syria; and,
promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.
The President amended the request in September to reflect additional goals for combatting the
Islamic State.
H.J.Res. 124 (P.L. 113-164, “the CR”) contained a temporary authorization for the training and
equipping of vetted Syrians that differed from the Administration’s June and September requests.
The CR’s provisions expired on December 11, 2014.
The FY2015 NDAA (Sections 1209, 1510, and 1534 of H.R. 3979, P.L. 113-291) and the
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (‘Counterterrorism Partnership
Fund’ and Section 9016 of H.R. 83, P.L. 113-235) provide further authority and funding for the
program. Like the CR, H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 authorize the provision of U.S. assistance to vetted
Syrians by the Department of Defense (DOD) in coordination with the State Department for the
following purposes:
1) Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL), and securing territory controlled by the Syrian opposition.

1 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said in a September 2013 hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that the Administration was taking steps to provide arms to some Syrian rebels under covert action authorities.
Secretary Hagel described lethal assistance program and said, “This is, as you know, a covert action. And, as Secretary
Kerry noted, probably to [go] into much more detail would—would require a closed or classified hearing.”
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(2) Protecting the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats
posed by terrorists in Syria.
(3) Promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.

Chronology of “Train and Equip” Proposals
•
In 2013, legislation was introduced in both houses of Congress (H.R. 1327, S. 617, and S. 960) and considered by
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (S. 960) that would have provided authority to provide training and
assistance to armed elements of the Syrian opposition, subject to certain conditions.
•
In June 2014, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the FY2015 defense authorization
bill, S. 2410, which would have provided a comparable, conditional authority, and, later that month, the Obama
Administration requested related so-cal ed “train and equip” authority and funding as part of its Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) request to Congress for FY2015.
•
Senate Appropriations Committee Members debated and approved a version of “train and equip” authority for
Syrians in July 2014 in their reported version of the FY2015 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 4870 RS). The
Senate Appropriations Committee considered and rejected a proposed amendment to strip the authority and
related funding from the bill. The House-enacted version of the bill does not include such authority.
•
In September, the Obama Administration submitted an informal revision of its OCO request to Congress to
reflect its new goal of “degrading and defeating” the “Islamic State” organization in Iraq and Syria.
•
On September 15, Representative Howard “Buck” McKeon, who is Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee, introduced an amendment (hereinafter the McKeon Amendment) to the FY2015 continuing
resolution (H.J.Res. 124) that represented a counterproposal to the President’s informal revisionr. The House
adopted the amendment (H.Amdt. 1141) by a vote of 273 to 156 on September 17, and the Senate passed the
amended bill by a vote of 78 to 22 on September 18. The amendment text is included as Section 149 of H.J.Res.
124/P.L. 113-164.
•
FY2015 Department of Defense appropriations, which included funds and authorities for the Department of
Defense to train and equip vetted Syrians, were enacted in H.R. 83. On December 11, the House agreed to the
final version of H.R. 83 by a vote 219-206. This version was agreed to by the Senate two days later, by a vote of
56-40. President Obama signed H.R. 83 into law (P.L.113-235) on December 16, 2014.
•
The FY2015 NDAA (H.R.3979) also included authorities for the Department of Defense to train and equip
vetted Syrians. On December 4, the House adopted the final version of the NDAA by a vote of 300-119. The
Senate agreed to the House version on December 12, 2014, by a vote of 89-11. President Obama signed the bill
into law (P.L. 113-291) on December 19, 2014.
Relative to the authority enacted in the CR, the FY2015 appropriations and NDAA:
• Expand the types of assistance to be provided from training and equipment to
include stipends and construction of training and other facilities.
• Add vetting requirements for program participants to include commitment to
human rights, rule of law, and “a peaceful and democratic Syria.”
• Require 15-day advance notifications of a detailed plan before funds can be
obligated, and continue to require approval by the four congressional defense
committees of individual reprogramming requests.
• Add criteria to notification and progress reporting requirements to provide further
metrics for program evaluation.
• Authorize assistance to third countries for program-related purposes.
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• While the Syrian program could draw on FY2015 CTPF funds that are available
for two years, during execution, these funds would be transferred to individual
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts that are available for one-year.
• End (“sunset”) the authority on December 31, 2016, and limit related funds to
FY2015 monies and reprogramming requests to OCO-designated Defense funds
available from October 1, 2014, through September 30, 2016.
• Permit the President to waive any other provisions of law that would otherwise
restrict the provision of assistance authorized for the Syria program, provided
that the President notifies Congress 30-days in advance.
Policy Questions and Potential Implications
Members of Congress have considered a number of basic policy questions when considering the
creation and extension of “train and equip” authority related to the ongoing conflict in Syria.
These questions include:
• For what purposes, if any, should the United States train and equip Syrians? How
might the short and long term goals of the United States and those of Syrians
align or conflict?
• Who should receive such U.S. training and assistance? Will DOD develop an
effective vetting process that complies with the criteria in the law?
• How much and what types of training and equipment will be sufficient to
accomplish stated U.S. objectives or achieve the stated purposes of authorizing
language? How might the “train and equip” mission expand in size, geographic
scope, depending on different scenarios? What risks might such expansion pose?
How much might this level of effort cost and how long might it take to reach
these goals?
• How should such a program be funded? Through base budget funding or
overseas contingency operations funding-designated (OCO) funds not subject to
budget caps? How long should authority for such a program be available and on
what terms? How might this program affect other defense or foreign assistance
priorities? Is there sufficient public support for a potentially long-standing
commitment?
• Will DOD exercise its waiver authority to exempt this program from terrorism,
human rights, and other constraints in U.S. law? Under what circumstances might
waivers of such legislation be necessary? How might the executive branch’s use
of any waiver provisions provided affect perceptions of U.S. foreign policy
abroad or the effectiveness of U.S. assistance in Syria and in other places?
• What assistance should be provided to third countries in relation to a Syria train
and equip program if any?
• How effective have other “train and equip” programs been in other contexts?
What lessons learned from those efforts should be applied to a Syria-related
effort? How should success be defined and assessed?
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Political-Military Context
Current political-military conditions in Syria may pose challenges for U.S. efforts to train and
equip vetted Syrians for U.S.-defined purposes. Most armed opposition groups have sought U.S.
and other third-party assistance since the outbreak of conflict for the expressed purpose of
toppling the government of Bashar al Asad and replacing it with various Islamist or secular
alternatives. Legislation enacted by Congress to date would not authorize the provision of U.S.
assistance for this purpose and identifies the Islamic State organization rather than the Syrian
government as the entity from which Syrians should be trained and equipped to protect
themselves. U.S. assistance may aid vetted Syrians in providing for the defense of territory under
opposition control, but assistance to support offensive operations by U.S.-trained forces has not
been explicitly authorized.
President Obama has suggested that U.S. engagement will remain focused “narrowly” on
assisting Syrians in combatting the Islamic State, while continuing “to look for opportunities” to
support a political resolution to Syria’s conflict.2 In an October 2014 interview with London-
based newspaper Al Sharq Al Awsat, U.S. anti-IS coalition leader General (ret.) John Allen
reportedly responded to a question about whether Syrian units being trained to fight the Islamic
State would be “those who will later fight the regime’s armed forces” by saying:
No. What we would like to see is for the FSA [Free Syrian Army] and the forces that we will
ultimately generate, train and equip to become the credible force that the Assad government
ultimately has to acknowledge and recognize. There is not going to be a military solution
here [in Syria]. We have to create so much credibility within the moderate Syrian opposition
at a political level ... that they earn their spot at the table when the time comes for the
political solution. Now, there could be FSA elements that ultimately clash with the regime,
that may well be the case, as they seek to defend themselves and those areas that they
dominate and as they seek to defend their families and their ways of life ... it could be an
outcome. But the intent is not to create a field force to liberate Damascus—that is not the
intent. The intent is that in the political outcome, they [the moderate Syrian opposition] must
be a prominent—perhaps the preeminent voice—at the table to ultimately contribute to the
political outcome that we seek.3
In December, General Allen’s deputy, Ambassador Brett McGurk told the House Foreign Affairs
Committee that the program should begin training efforts in March 2015 and that U.S. trainees
“will be organized to fight ISIS, but they’re also going to be able to defend themselves against the
[Asad] regime.” Some Syrian political and military opposition forces appear to resent a narrow
focus on the Islamic State and some have indicated they may insist on broader support for their
anti-Asad goals as a condition of working with a U.S.-backed coalition against the group.
Legislation enacted by Congress envisions the use of U.S. training and equipment to promote
undefined “conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.” Most parties
assume such a settlement would include some changes to the leadership or structure of the Syrian
government. Administration officials have not publicly described mechanisms under

2 The President said, “our attitude towards Asad continues to be that you know, through his actions, through using
chemical weapons on his own people, dropping barrel bombs that killed innocent children that he—he has foregone
legitimacy. But when it comes to our policy and the coalition that we're putting together, our focus specifically is on
ISIL. It’s narrowly on ISIL.” President Obama interview with NBC News Meet the Press, September 6, 2014.
3 Min al Oraibi, “Exclusive: General Allen discusses coalition plans for defeating ISIS as regional tour starts,” Al Sharq
al Awsat (UK), October 25, 2014.
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consideration for ensuring that U.S. training and assistance is used for congressionally defined
purposes and not for others. It is not clear how the Administration intends to direct types and
amounts of assistance in order to achieve discrete security-related goals along with the inherently
political goal of promoting conditions conducive to a negotiated conflict settlement. Insofar as
this political goal may be dependent on variables outside of U.S. control, it may be more difficult
to assess whether given levels and types of assistance are “enough” to achieve it.
While the Department of Defense is currently planning to train 5,400 Syrian program participants
in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar over the coming year that mission could expand.
Measuring “Effectiveness”
As in past cases involving the provision of U.S. security assistance, different observers may
define “success” and “effectiveness” differently based on their perspectives and priorities about
the proper purposes and scope of assistance. For example, in the current Syria case, observers
differ over whether a training program should train and equip vetted fighters to offensively attack
Islamic State forces or pro-Asad forces or whether it should focus on enabling Syrians to better
defend against Islamic State or government attacks.
There are no direct recent analogues to the type of overt and broadly defined “train and equip”
program for vetted Syrians recently authorized by Congress. Most current “train and equip”
authorities are far more limited in scope and funding, and targeted to government security forces.
Independent evaluations of some recent U.S. security assistance programs suggest that even when
measured against broadly stated purposes and objectives, these types of programs can face
significant difficulties in implementation or show questionable results including the far larger and
longer-lasting efforts to train Iraq and Afghan security forces over the past decade4
Programs with some partial similarities in context and content to the Syria program include the
following:
• Congress debated and imposed limits on the purposes and scope of covert U.S.
assistance programs to so-called resistance movements in Angola, Afghanistan,
Cambodia, and Nicaragua during the 1980s and early 1990s.5 While these efforts
occurred in similarly complex conflict settings, they were perceived to be part of
a global U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War. Their relative successes and
failures remain the subject of ongoing study and debate.
• In 1998, Congress authorized the drawdown of Department of Defense goods and
services for Iraqi opposition groups, but did not authorize sustained or direct U.S.
training or the transfer of weaponry.6 A subsequent Department of Defense

4 See the work of the Special Inspectors General for Afghanistan and Iraq Reconstruction on respective efforts to train
and equip security forces in those countries. See also, RAND, “How Successful Are U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity in
Developing Countries? A Framework to Assess the Global Train and Equip ‘1206’ Program,” Jennifer D. P. Moroney,
Beth Grill, Joe Hogler, Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, Christopher Paul, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
2011. See also discussion in CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco
5 See Raymond Copson and Robert Sutter, “Support for Third World Resistance Movements: Changing Priorities,” in
Congressional Research Service, Congress and Foreign Policy, 1990, pp. 77-107.
6 The Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998) gave President Clinton the authority to provide up to $97
(continued...)
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training program for so-called Free Iraqi Forces in early 2003 trained a small
number of recruits to facilitate U.S. civil-military operations in Iraq.7
• The Sudan Peace Act (P.L. 107-245, October 21, 2002) authorized President
George W. Bush “to provide increased assistance to the areas of Sudan that are
not controlled by the Government of Sudan to prepare the population for peace
and democratic governance, including support for civil administration,
communications infrastructure, education, health, and agriculture.” In support of
these purposes, the act authorized to be appropriated $100 million in fiscal years
2003, 2004, and 2005 “to remain available until expended.” Some recipients of
U.S. assistance authorized by the act held both civilian and military leadership
positions in the South Sudanese opposition.
• The U.S. government has provided overt training and equipment to Palestinian
security forces for strictly defined purposes using foreign affairs authorities and
funds, but participants in those programs are members of official Palestinian
Authority security bodies rather than individuals unaffiliated or not currently
affiliated with official government institutions.8
• The Obama Administration notified Congress of a drawdown of up to $25
million in U.S. government goods and services for Libyan forces in 2011, but
Congress did not act to expressly authorize U.S. military engagement in a “train
and equip” program for Libyan opposition members.
The provision of overt assistance to non-governmental groups poses particular challenges.
Members of Congress may want to consider some of the policy questions that were debated
during consideration of these efforts when conducting oversight of the new “train and equip”
assistance program for vetted Syrians. In particular, Members of Congress may wish to consider:9
• the net effects of the introduction of outside arms and training in previous cases
on the prospects for conflict settlement, the duration and intensity of violence,
U.S. national security goals, and humanitarian conditions;
• the potential tradeoffs and dilemmas associated with the pursuit of specific short-
term security or counterterrorism objectives alongside longer term political goals
and the promotion of human rights and democratic governance;
• the relative roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense and the
Department of State in carrying out this program;

(...continued)
million worth of defense articles and services to designated Iraqi opposition groups. A designation procedure and
criteria for identifying eligible groups was also prescribed by the act in Section 5, stating that only those organizations
that (1) include a broad spectrum of Iraqi individuals, groups, or both, opposed to the Saddam Hussein regime; and (2)
are committed to democratic values, to respect for human rights, to peaceful relations with Iraq’s neighbors, to
maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, and to fostering cooperation among democratic opponents of the Saddam
Hussein regime” would be eligible for such assistance.
7 See Army Maj. Gen. David Barno, Briefing on Free Iraqi Forces, Department of Defense, March 14, 2003.
8 See CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.
9 For a fuller discussion of similar thematic questions that can be applied to Syria and other cases where the United
States may seek to partner with non-state entities, see Larry Hanauer and Stephanie Pezard, Security Cooperation
Amidst Political Uncertainty: An Agenda for Future Research, RAND International Security and Defense Policy
Center, WR-1052-IRD, July 2014.
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• the challenges U.S. policy makers have faced in ensuring the reliability and
integrity of recipients of U.S. assistance in past cases and the implications of
those challenges for efforts to design vetting and oversight measures;
• the contributions of past cases to debates about the roles and responsibilities of
the executive branch and Congress in defining the purposes, terms, scope, and
duration of U.S. security assistance abroad; and,
• the regional security and global strategic implications of the provision,
modulation, and termination of U.S. training and equipment in analogous cases.
Enacted Provisions and Related Debate
Table 1 below reproduces the language enacted in the FY2015 NDAA (H.R. 3979, P.L.113-291)
and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83, P.L.113-235)
alongside the President’s 2014 requests.
What authority has Congress provided to the President for the
Syria “train and equip” program?
The “train and equip” authorities granted in H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 are unique because, in the
view of the Obama Administration and some in Congress, there are no other existing legal
authorities that allow such overt “train and equip” assistance to be provided to non-government
actors in Syria in the current context.10 Pre-existing Department of Defense (DOD) authorities to
provide overt security assistance to U.S. partners abroad require that such assistance be provided
on a government-to-government basis.11 U.S. sanctions on Syria and restrictions on U.S.
engagement with terrorist-designated entities fighting in Syria also limit the executive branch’s
ability to provide assistance.
The Administration requested authority from Congress in September 2014 “to provide assistance,
including the provision of defense articles and defense services, to, appropriately vetted elements
of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups or individuals.” As enacted,
H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 authorize DOD in coordination with the State Department to provide
“assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, stipends, construction of training and

10 Prior to the passage of H.J.Res. 124, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel told the Senate Armed Services Committee
on September 16, 2014 that the Department of Defense did not have the authority to conduct a “train and equip”
mission for vetted Syrians. On September 15, Representative Mac Thornberry presented a statement from House
Armed Services Committee Chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon, the author of the McKeon Amendment, before the
House Rules Committee. Thornberry said that, according to McKeon, the provision of specific authority in response to
the President’s request was necessary, because “none of the existing Department of Defense authorities in law fit the
conditions requested by the President—to “train and equip” non-government entities fighting in non-U.S. led
operations.”
11 Exceptions include activities authorized by Section 1208 of the FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
108-375) as amended, which authorizes the provision of up to $50 million in U.S. assistance to “foreign forces,
irregular forces, groups, or individuals” that assist or facilitate U.S.-led counterterrorism-related special operations. An
existing authority such as Section 1208 would require U.S. leadership of operations and would not have provided
corresponding funding authority sufficient to support the scope of activities envisioned under the Administration’s
request for the Syria program. The Administration’s stated purposes for the requested Syria authority also extend
beyond strict counterterrorism purposes.
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associated facilities,12 and sustainment,13 to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian
opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals.”
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel told the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 16,
2014, that the Administration seeks to provide a “package of assistance” that would “initially…
consist of small arms, vehicles, and basic equipment like communications, as well as tactical and
strategic training.” According to Secretary Hagel, “As these forces prove their effectiveness on
the battlefield, we would be prepared to provide increasingly sophisticated types of assistance to
the most trusted commanders and capable forces.”
The Administration submitted its first reprogramming request for $225 million to support this
program on November 10. The requests proposed that the funds would be used for
infrastructure and facilities work, leasing cost, construction of firing ranges, force protection,
training and support, stipends, transportation, base operations, and life support. A portion of
the funds will be use for the acquisition of long lead time supplies, equipment, arms,
ammunition, and other support items… .
Restrictions on MANPADs
H.R. 83 includes a reworded version of an amendment adopted as part of the House-passed
version of the FY2015 defense appropriations bill (H.Amdt. 914 to H.R. 4870) that prohibits the
use of funds made available in the act for the procurement or transfer of man-portable air defense
systems (MANPADS) as part of the Syria train and equip program. This restriction reflects
concerns that these systems could fall into the hands of other parties and threaten civilian aircraft,
allied military aircraft, and U.S. aircraft conducting air strikes in support of Syrian opposition
groups.
Other proposals introduced and considered in the 113th Congress also sought to define the types
of assistance that could be provided and to place conditions or restrictions on the transfer of
certain weapons systems to Syrians (S. 960, H.R. 1327).
Waiver Authority
It is unclear whether further authorization beyond that enacted may be required for the purposes
of the proposed “train and equip” program for Syrians. The inclusion of a broad waiver authority
in H.R. 3979 (Section 1209 (j)) suggests that the Administration and some congressional leaders
envision instances where such broader authority may be required. The Administration has not
publicly commented on what circumstances might require such a waiver provision, what existing
legislation might need to be waived, or how the use of such a waiver in the context of the planned
Syria program might affect other U.S. programs and priorities overseas.

12 H.R. 83 does not explicitly authorize the use of appropriated funds for constriction purposes.
13 The Joint Explanatory Statement issued with H.R. 3979 defines sustainment as follows: “at a minimum, includes the
provision of logistics, intelligence, communications, and other enabling support necessary to maintain operations in
support of the mission; supply of food, fuel, arms, munitions, and equipment; maintenance of equipment; and repair
and renovation of facilities.”
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State Department Nonlethal Assistance
With regard to the provision of nonlethal assistance, including to armed groups, the State
Department has sought and obtained authority notwithstanding other provisions of law restricting
the provision of U.S. assistance in Syria and to Syrians.
• Section 7041(i) of Division K of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R.
3547/P.L. 113-76) significantly expanded the Administration’s authority to provide
nonlethal assistance in Syria for certain purposes using the Economic Support Fund
(ESF) account. Such assistance had been restricted by a series of preexisting provisions
of law (including some terrorism-related provisions) that required the President to assert
emergency and contingency authorities to provide such assistance to the Syrian
opposition and communities in Syria.
• The Administration sought a broad expansion of this notwithstanding authority as part of
its amended November 2014 request for OCO funds to combat the Islamic State
organization. That request was not granted, although Section 7041(h) of Division J of
H.R. 83 extends the notwithstanding authority for ESF funds granted in FY2014, subject
to an update of a required strategy document.
Stated Purposes of U.S. Assistance
Programs designed for different purposes may present different potential risks and rewards. An
assistance program explicitly intended not only to defend Syrians from attack, but also to assist in
the stabilization of and provision of essential services in territory under opposition control may be
of much broader scope, cost, or duration than a program intended to defend Syrians from attack
by one specified group and/or securing territory under opposition control. Moreover, the scope of
opposition-held territory may conceivably expand or contract to include more or less of Syria
than at present, with follow-on effects for potential costs to the United States.
In the wake of the enactment of the Syria train and equip authorities by Congress, some Syrian
opposition forces and their U.S. supporters have stated their preference for a broader scope of
U.S. assistance and military intervention. However, other Syrian groups may reject deeper U.S.
involvement and prefer that the United States focus any assistance on toppling the Asad
government rather than pursuing counterterrorism, security, stability, and/or quality of life
concerns.
In light of these dynamics, Members of Congress may wish to focus specific oversight on the
relation between U.S. assistance delivered through the program and the legislative purposes
defined by Congress to date. Reporting requirement changes included in H.R. 3979 require DOD
to report on spending totals by authorized purpose, and assessments of the effectiveness of trained
personnel and activities relative to authorized purposes.
Defending Syrian Civilians from Attacks
As noted above (see “Introduction”), the Administration’s September 2014 request for authority
envisioned a broader protection purpose for U.S. assistance relative to the purposes defined in
H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83. The purposes stated in H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 authorize assistance to
assist vetted Syrians in defending against attacks by the Islamic State organization and do not
Congressional Research Service
9

Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

mention the Asad government in this context. They also do not specify the types of attacks
Syrians are to be assisted in defending against.
President Obama and Administration officials have indicated that U.S. assistance will be provided
in line with a so-called “ISIL-first strategy,” but may also permit program participants to defend
against attacks by pro-Asad forces. Overall, press reports citing unnamed U.S. officials indicate
that defensive rather than offensive training and equipment is to be provided under the program.14
“Securing” vs. “Stabilizing” Opposition-held Territory and Facilitating the
Provision of Essential Services
H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 state a more limited purpose for assistance with regard to opposition-
controlled territory than the Administration’s original requests. Like the CR and unlike the
President’s proposal, H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 do not authorize assistance to “stabilize” opposition-
held territory or to facilitate the provision of essential services. Instead they authorize assistance
for “securing territory controlled by the opposition.” Both “stabilizing” territory and facilitating
the provision of services in opposition-held areas could be interpreted as longer-term, costlier,
and more involved commitments than “securing” territory. It is possible that the Administration
may seek to use State Department funds to achieve stabilization objectives in parallel with the
DOD-led train and equip program.
Promoting the Conditions for a Negotiated Settlement to End the Conflict
in Syria
H.R. 3979, H.R. 83, and the President’s proposals include the same goal of providing assistance
that will promote conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria but do not
define or specify those conditions. In broad terms, the Administration argues that pressure must
be brought to bear on the government of Bashar al Asad in order to convince its leaders to
negotiate a settlement to the conflict that might or might not result in their departure from office.
Administration officials have not publicly described the precise nature of such intended pressure,
the specific terms of its application, or potential measures of its success in achieving its related
strategic ends. The Administration’s requests, H.R. 3979, and H.R. 83 do not explicitly state that
the departure of Bashar al Asad or members of his government is an essential condition for a
negotiated settlement.
Sunset Provisions
H.R. 3979 includes a “sunset” date for the Syria Train and Equip authorities of December 31,
2016 instead of the December 31, 2018 date requested by the Administration and proposed by the
Senate Armed Services Committee in its report.
While the authority in H.R. 83, the FY2015 Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act
sunsets at an earlier date—September 30, 2015—FY2015 funds drawn from the CTPF would be
available for two years (Section 1510, H.R. 3979).

14 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Syrians to be trained to defend territory, not take ground from jihadists, officials say,”
Washington Post, October 22, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
10

Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

The relative length of the authorization could be interpreted as a signal of relative congressional
support for the Administration’s plan to train vetted Syrians over a period of multiple years. The
annualized target for the current program is 5,400 personnel, meaning that a two-year program
might conservatively produce double that number or less.
Implications of Different Funding Sources and Directives
Whether a separate source of funding is available for train and equip efforts or funds for the
program are drawn from within existing accounts may signal the level of congressional support
for the program and have implications for the Administration’s continued commitment to it.
H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 do not identify specific funds for the program or place overall dollar
limits on the cost of the authorized program. Instead, H.R. 83 provides $1.3 billion for a new
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) and states that “up to $500,000,000” of those funds
may be used for activities authorized by the Syria “train and equip” section of the act (Section
9016).15 H.R. 3979 does not authorize specific amounts to be appropriated to carry out Section
1209 of that act but limits transfers of CTPF funds to O&M accounts (Sec. 1534).
H.R. 3979 authorizes the Department of Defense to submit reprogramming requests to the four
congressional defense committees to redirect funds from any OCO-designated Department of
Defense accounts to support the “train and equip” program. To obtain such funds, the Department
of Defense must submit reprogramming requests that in turn must be approved in writing by the
four congressional defense committees (Armed Services and Appropriations) under Department
of Defense regulations. Thus, H.R. 3979 provides the four congressional defense committees an
opportunity to approve or disapprove particular proposals. The committees also would review
proposals for the use of CTPF funding for the program.
The Administration’s request would not have required reprogramming requests to congressional
defense committees. As noted above, the Administration submitted an initial $225 million
reprogramming request in relation to the Syria program in November 2014, and congressional
committees reportedly approved $220.5 million of the request in December 2015.16
Definitions of Vetting Requirements
H.R. 3979 requires participants be vetted for their commitment to promoting human rights and
the rule of law and H.R. 83 requires vetting for commitment to “the rule of law and a peaceful
and democratic Syria.” Both include vetting requirements first stated in the CR that prohibit
members of certain armed groups and terrorist groups from participating in the program.17 The
CR authority did not include specific human rights or ideological vetting requirements.

15 In its initial request in June 2014, the Administration presented the Syria “train and equip” program as a component
of its broader request for $4 billion in OCO-designated Department of Defense Operation and Maintenance funds for a
new “Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund” (CTPF) category within the Operation and maintenance (O&M), Defense-
wide account. The Administration’s budget justification material suggested that $500 million would be allocated for an
assistance program for vetted Syrians, for which specific authority was sought.
16 John M. Donnelly, “Congress Approving $721 Million for Syrian Rebels,” CQ Roll Call, December 12, 2014.
17 Like the CR, H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 define “appropriately vetted” to mean that, “at a minimum” the executive
branch will conduct assessments of proposed recipients’ associations with terrorist groups including, but not limited to
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
11

Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

The Administration’s June and September 2014 requests envisioned vetting of Syrians, but did
not include definitions of vetting procedures or vetting criteria. Presumably, this would have
given the Department of Defense additional leeway in selecting participants.
SASC- and SAC-reported versions of the FY2015 defense authorization and appropriations bills
included more expansive vetting criteria.
• The SASC-reported NDAA would have required vetting to preclude the
involvement of U.S.-designated terrorists and would have authorized assistance
to individuals who reject terrorism; support U.S. counterterrorism and
nonproliferation efforts; oppose sectarian violence and revenge killings; seek “a
peaceful, pluralistic, and democratic Syria that respects the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of all its citizens”; and are committed to civilian rule,
civilian control of the military, and the rule of law.
• Similarly, the SAC-reported defense appropriations bill would have excluded
designated terrorists and required that vetting assess recipients’ commitment to
the rule of law, opposition to sectarian violence, and commitment to a peaceful
and democratic Syria under civilian rule. The SAC-reported bill also would have
required the Syria program’s compliance with provisions prohibiting the
provision of assistance to “members of a unit of a foreign security force if the
Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit has committed a gross
violation of human rights.” The prohibition could have been waived under
“extraordinary” circumstances, but would have required detailed reporting to the
congressional defense and appropriations committees.
Advance Notification and Reporting of Oversight Information
to Congress
Relative to the CR, H.R. 3979 expands required reporting to Congress in advance of the use of
“train and equip” authority and once such authority is in use. Like the CR, H.R. 3979 requires 15-
day advance notice of the intended provision of authorized assistance and the submission of
implementation plans and an overarching strategy describing how the assistance program relates
to other U.S. objectives and activities. The four congressional defense committees also will
receive reprogramming requests in advance that will have to be approved according to DOD
regulations.
H.R. 3979 adds additional criteria to current notification and progress reporting requirements. It
requires reporting on sustainment and support activities in the context of the overall strategy as
well as progress reporting on the command and control of supported individuals and groups,
descriptions of sustainment and construction activities, periodic and aggregate spending totals by
authorized purpose, and assessments of the effectiveness of trained personnel and activities
relative to authorized purposes and required plans and notifications to Congress.

(...continued)
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat al Nusrah, Ahrar al Sham, and other al-Qaeda related groups;
Hezbollah and Shia militias aligned with or supporting the Government of Syria; and groups associated with the
Government of Iran.
Congressional Research Service
12

Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

Like the CR, H.R. 3979 requires the Administration to report to Congress on procedures and
criteria for vetting at least 15 days prior to the first provision of authorized assistance. It further
requires reporting every 90 days on the progress of authorized assistance, to include any changes
in program operations (which presumably would include changes to vetting procedures) and any
misuse of U.S. assistance. Under H.R. 3979, the House and Senate Committees on Armed
Services, Foreign Affairs/Relations, Intelligence, and Appropriations will receive the
implementation plan, presidential strategy, and progress reports.
Terms Related to Authorization for the Use of Military Force
For analysis of proposals related to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force relative to the
Islamic State, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
the Islamic State: Comparison of Proposals in Brief, by Matthew C. Weed.
The Obama Administration argues that it already has constitutional and statutory authority for the
use of force in Iraq and Syria (e.g., the President’s commander in chief and foreign affairs powers
under the Constitution, and the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for the Use of Military Force
against Al Qaeda and in Iraq, or AUMFs),18 but it has committed to engaging Congress for
additional authorization for the use of force in support of its plans to degrade and destroy the
Islamic State organization or other terrorist entities in those countries. Several Members of the
113th Congress introduced proposals to authorize the use of military force against the Islamic
State, and the Obama Administration said it welcomes specific authorization from Congress
under certain conditions.
H.R. 3979 and H.R. 83 state that nothing in their terms should be construed to constitute a
statutory authorization for the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into “hostilities” or
circumstances that could be considered “hostilities” as defined pursuant to the War Powers
Resolution.19
Related provisions in these bills and others are described in more detail in the table below.

18 See Letters from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate, War Powers Resolution Regarding Syria and Iraq, September 23, 2014.
19 See CRS Report R42699, The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Eight Years, by Richard F. Grimmett; and CRS
Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and
Legal Implications, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Matthew C. Weed. During the 2011 debate over the authorization of U.S.
military operations in Libya, the Obama Administration argued that U.S. military operations did not constitute
“hostilities” for specific reasons. Some Members of Congress disagreed with the Administration’s arguments.
Congressional Research Service
13

Table 1. Comparison of Select “Train and Equip” Provisions for Vetted Syrians
Revised
FY2015 Consolidated
FY2015 OCO
Administration
FY2015 CR (Section 149
FY2015 NDAA (Section
Appropriations Act
Request – June 2014
Request for CR –
of H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-
1209 of H.R. 3979, P.L.
(Section 9016 of H.R. 83,

September 2015
164)
113-291)
P.L. 113-235)
Authority
“Notwithstanding any
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Defense is
Secretary of Defense is
other provision of law,”
authorized, with
authorized “in coordination
authorized, “in coordination
authorized, “in coordination
Secretary of Defense
concurrence of
with the Secretary of State
with the Secretary of State, to
with the Secretary of State, to
authorized, with
Secretary of State, “to
to provide assistance,
provide assistance, including
provide assistance, including
concurrence of
provide assistance,
including training,
training, equipment, supplies,
training, equipment, supplies,
Secretary of State, “to
including the provision
equipment, supplies, and
stipends, construction of
sustainment and stipends, to
provide assistance,
of defense articles and
sustainment, to
training and associated
appropriately vetted elements
including the provision
defense services, to
appropriately vetted
facilities, and sustainment, to
of the Syrian opposition and
of defense articles and
appropriately vetted
elements of the Syrian
appropriately vetted elements
other appropriately vetted
defense services, to
elements of the Syrian
opposition and other
of the Syrian opposition and
Syrian groups or individuals”
appropriately vetted
opposition and other
appropriately vetted Syrian
other appropriately vetted
elements of the Syrian
appropriately vetted
groups and individuals”
Syrian groups and individuals”
(See separate vetting provision
opposition and other
Syrian groups or
below)
appropriately vetted
individuals”
(See separate vetting
(See separate vetting provision
Syrian groups or
provision below)
below)
individuals”
Interagency
Authority requires
Authority requires
Authority requires
Authority requires
Authority requires
Process
“concurrence” of
“concurrence” of
“coordination with the
“coordination with the
“coordination with the
Secretary of State.
Secretary of State.
Secretary of State” in
Secretary of State” in general
Secretary of State” in general
general terms and on
terms and on submission of
terms.
submission of required
required assistance plan and
assistance plan and required required progress reports.
progress reports.
CRS-14

Revised
FY2015 Consolidated
FY2015 OCO
Administration
FY2015 CR (Section 149
FY2015 NDAA (Section
of H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-
1209 of H.R. 3979, P.L.
Appropriations Act
Request – June 2014
Request for CR –
164)
113-291)
(Section 9016 of H.R. 83,

September 2015
P.L. 113-235)
Purposes
“(1) Defending the
“(1) Defending the
“(1) Defending the Syrian
“1) Defending the Syrian
“defending the Syrian people
Syrian people from
Syrian people from
people from attacks by the
people from attacks by the
from attacks by the Islamic
attacks by the Syrian
attacks by the Islamic
Islamic State of Iraq and the
Islamic State of Iraq and the
State of Iraq and the Levant
regime, facilitating the
State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL), and securing
Levant (ISIL), and securing
(ISIL), and securing territory
provision of essential
Levant and the Syrian
territory control ed by the
territory control ed by the
control ed by the Syrian
services, and stabilizing
regime, facilitating the
opposition;
Syrian opposition.
opposition;
territory control ed by
provision of essential
the opposition;
services, and stabilizing
(2) Protecting the United
(2) Protecting the United
Protecting the United States,
territory control ed by
States, its friends and allies,
States, its friends and allies, and its friends and allies, and the
(2) Defending the
the opposition;
and the Syrian people from
the Syrian people from the
Syrian people from the threats
United States, its friends
the threats posed by
threats posed by terrorists in
posed by terrorists in Syria;
and allies, and the Syrian (2) Protecting the
terrorists in Syria;
Syria.
and
people from the threats
United States, its friends
posed by terrorists in
and allies, and the Syrian (3) Promoting the
(3) Promoting the conditions
Promoting the conditions for a
Syria; and
people from the threats
conditions for a negotiated
for a negotiated settlement to
negotiated settlement to end
posed by terrorists in
settlement to end the
end the conflict in Syria.”
the conflict in Syria”
(3) Promoting the
Syria;
conflict in Syria.”
conditions for a
negotiated settlement to (3) Promoting the
end the conflict in
conditions for a
Syria.”
negotiated settlement to
end the conflict in Syria”
CRS-15

Revised
FY2015 Consolidated
FY2015 OCO
Administration
FY2015 CR (Section 149
FY2015 NDAA (Section
of H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-
1209 of H.R. 3979, P.L.
Appropriations Act
Request – June 2014
Request for CR –
164)
113-291)
(Section 9016 of H.R. 83,

September 2015
P.L. 113-235)
Vetting
None
None
“the term ‘appropriately
“The term ‘’appropriately
“the term ‘‘appropriately
Definitions
vetted’ means, with respect
vetted’’ means, with respect to
vetted’’ as used in this section
to elements of the Syrian
elements of the Syrian
shall be construed to mean, at
opposition and other Syrian
opposition and other Syrian
a minimum, assessments of
groups and individuals, at a
groups and individuals, at a
possible recipients for
minimum, assessments of
minimum—
associations with terrorist
such elements, groups, and
groups including the Islamic
individuals for associations
(A) assessments of such
State of Iraq and the Levant
with terrorist groups, Shia
elements, groups, and
(ISIL), Jabhat al Nusrah, Ahrar
militias aligned with or
individuals for associations with al Sham, other al-Qaeda
supporting the Government
terrorist groups, Shia militias
related groups, Hezbollah, or
of Syria, and groups
aligned with or supporting the
Shia militias supporting the
associated with the
Government of Syria, and
Governments of Syria or Iran;
Government of Iran, Such
groups associated with the
and for commitment to the
groups include, but are not
Government of Iran. Such
rule of law and a peaceful and
limited to, the Islamic State
groups include, but are not
democratic Syria”
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), limited to, the Islamic State of
Jabhat al Nusrah, Ahrar al
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
Sham, and other al-Qaeda
Jabhat al Nusrah, Ahrar al
related groups, and
Sham, other al-Qaeda related
Hezbollah.”
groups, and Hezbollah; and,
(B) a commitment from such
elements, groups, and
individuals to promoting the
respect for human rights and
the rule of law.”
Conditions on
None
None
Requires reporting 15 days
Requires reporting 15 days
States that “none of the funds
Eligible
prior to transfer on plans
prior to transfer on plans for
used pursuant to this authority
Defense
for end-use monitoring and,
end-use monitoring and, inter
shal be used for the
Articles or
inter alia, details on
alia, details on intended “types
procurement or transfer of
Services
intended “types of training,
of training, equipment, and
man portable air defense
equipment, and supplies to
supplies to be provided”
systems.”
be provided”
CRS-16

Revised
FY2015 Consolidated
FY2015 OCO
Administration
FY2015 CR (Section 149
FY2015 NDAA (Section
of H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-
1209 of H.R. 3979, P.L.
Appropriations Act
Request – June 2014
Request for CR –
164)
113-291)
(Section 9016 of H.R. 83,

September 2015
P.L. 113-235)
Sunset
December 31, 2018
The earlier of passage of The earlier of CR end date
December 31, 2016
September 30, 2015
Provisions
FY2015 NDAA or
or passage of FY2015
September 30, 2015.
NDAA.
(Sec. 1209, Authority to
(Sec. 9016 permitting up to
provide assistance to Vetted
$500 million of CTPF funds to
Syrian opposition.
be used for Syria train and
equip)
Sec. 1510 makes FY2015 CTPF
funds available for two years.)
Funding Source OCO-designated
Any OCO-designated
Authorizes reprogramming
Authorizes reprogramming of
Says that “up to $500,000,000
‘Operation and
Department of Defense
of any OCO-designated
any OCO-designated
of funds appropriated for the
Maintenance,
Operation and
Department of Defense
Department of Defense funds
Counterterrorism Partnerships
Counterterrorism
Maintenance funds made funds made available
made available “beginning on
Fund may be used for activities
Partnerships Fund’
available by H.J.Res. 124
pursuant to H.J.Res. 124
October 1, 2014, and ending
authorized by this section.”
proposed account
or any other act.
on December 31, 2016” to any
operation and maintenance
Designates funds made
account (Sec. 1534).
available pursuant to the
authority as OCO funds.
Availability of
Three-year Funding
One-year Funding
Varies by life of funds of
Varies by life of funds of
Varies by life of funds of
Funds
account to which funds are
account to which funds are
account to which funds are
transferred.
transferred.
transferred.
Spending
None.
None
No $ cap in legislation.
No $ cap in legislation.
From CTPF fund, up to $500
Amount Limit
Depends on
Depends on reprogrammings
million may be used. No other
Notional $500 million
reprogrammings approved
approved by four congressional $ cap in legislation.
figure in text
by four congressional
defense committees.
accompanying
defense committees.
Counterterrorism
Partnerships Fund/Syria
Regional Stabilization
Initiative request.
CRS-17

Revised
FY2015 Consolidated
FY2015 OCO
Administration
FY2015 CR (Section 149
FY2015 NDAA (Section
of H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-
1209 of H.R. 3979, P.L.
Appropriations Act
Request – June 2014
Request for CR –
164)
113-291)
(Section 9016 of H.R. 83,

September 2015
P.L. 113-235)
Statements re:
None
None
Not to be “construed to
“Nothing in this section shall
Section 9014 states: “None of
Authorization
constitute a specific
be construed to constitute a
the funds made available by this
for the Use of
statutory authorization for
specific statutory authorization
Act may be used with respect
Military Force
the introduction of the
for the introduction of United
to Syria in contravention of the
United States Armed Forces States Armed Forces into
War Powers Resolution (50
into hostilities or into
hostilities or into situations
U.S.C. 1541 et seq.), including
situations wherein
wherein hostilities are clearly
for the introduction of United
hostilities are clearly
indicated by the
States armed or military forces
indicated by the
circumstances.”
into hostilities in Syria, into
circumstances.”
situations in Syria where
“Nothing in this section
imminent involvement in
supersedes or alters the
hostilities is clearly indicated by
continuing obligations of the
the circumstances, or into
President to report to
Syrian territory, airspace, or
Congress pursuant to section 4 waters while equipped for
of the War Powers Resolution
combat, in contravention of
(50 U.S.C. 1543) regarding the
the congressional consultation
use of United States Armed
and reporting requirements of
Forces abroad.”
sections 3 and 4 of that law (50
U.S.C. 1542 and 1543).”
Section 9016 states “nothing in
this section shall be construed
to constitute a specific
statutory authorization for the
introduction of the United
States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations
wherein hostilities are clearly
indicated by the circumstances,
in accordance with section
8(a)(1) of the War Powers
Resolution”
CRS-19

Revised
FY2015 Consolidated
FY2015 OCO
Administration
FY2015 CR (Section 149
FY2015 NDAA (Section
of H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-
1209 of H.R. 3979, P.L.
Appropriations Act
Request – June 2014
Request for CR –
164)
113-291)
(Section 9016 of H.R. 83,

September 2015
P.L. 113-235)
Notification
None
15 days prior to
15 days prior to providing
15 days prior to providing
Directs President and
Requirements
initiating a program to
authorized assistance “to
authorized assistance the
Secretary of Defense to
transfer defense articles
vetted recipients for the
Secretary of Defense “in
“comply with the reporting
or provide defense
first time” the Secretary of
coordination with the
requirements in section
services as authorized
Defense “in coordination
Secretary of State” shall submit 149(b)(1), (b)(2), (c), and (d) of
by this section, the
with the Secretary of State”
a report describing the
the Continuing Appropriations
Secretary of Defense
shall submit a report
assistance plan, vetting
Resolution, 2015 (Public Law
shall provide the
describing the assistance
requirements and procedures;
113-164).”
congressional defense
plan, vetting requirements
and end-use monitoring plans.
committees with a
and procedures; and end-
report describing the
use monitoring plans.
Requires the President to
details and objectives of
submit a report to appropriate
such program, including
Requires the President to
congressional committees and
the goals of the
submit a report to
House and Senate leadership
program, a concept of
appropriate congressional
on “how such assistance fits
operations, the amount
committees and House and
within a larger regional
of assistance to be
Senate leadership on “how
strategy,” to include reporting
provided, the
such assistance fits within a
on goals and objectives,
cooperation of partner
larger regional strategy,” to
concept of operations, roles
nations, the number of
include reporting on goals
and contributions of partners,
United States Armed
and objectives, concept of
the number of U.S. Armed
Forces personnel
operations, roles and
Forces personnel deployed,
involved, and other
contributions of partners,
and additional military support
relevant details.
and the number of U.S.
and sustainment activities.
Armed Forces personnel
deployed.
CRS-20

Revised
FY2015 Consolidated
FY2015 OCO
Administration
FY2015 CR (Section 149
FY2015 NDAA (Section
of H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-
1209 of H.R. 3979, P.L.
Appropriations Act
Request – June 2014
Request for CR –
164)
113-291)
(Section 9016 of H.R. 83,

September 2015
P.L. 113-235)
Program
None
None
90 days after the submission 90 days after the submission of
Directs President and
Oversight
of assistance plan by
assistance plan by Secretary of
Secretary of Defense to
Reporting
Secretary of Defense and
Defense and each 90 days
“comply with the reporting
Requirements
each 90 days thereafter, the
thereafter, the Secretary of
requirements in section
Secretary of Defense, in
Defense, in coordination with
149(b)(1), (b)(2), (c), and (d) of
coordination with the
the Secretary of State, shall
the Continuing Appropriations
Secretary of State, shall
provide a “progress report” to
Resolution, 2015 (Public Law
provide a “progress report” appropriate congressional
113–164).”
to appropriate
committees and House and
congressional committees
Senate leadership, to include
and House and Senate
changes in plan, groups
leadership, to include
receiving assistance,
changes in plan, groups
recruitment and retention,
receiving assistance,
misuse or loss of equipment,
recruitment and retention,
command and control,
misuse or loss of
descriptions of sustainment and
equipment, and assessment
construction activities, periodic
of effectiveness.
and aggregate spending totals
by authorized purpose, and
assessments of the
effectiveness of trained
personnel and activities relative
to authorized purposes and
required plans and notifications
to Congress.
Appropriate
None
Refers to congressional
House and Senate
House and Senate Committees
Refers to P.L. 113-164 for
Congressional
defense committees
Committees on Armed
on Armed Services, Foreign
reporting requirements,
Committees
Services, Foreign
Affairs/Relations, Intelligence,
implying endorsement of
Defined
Affairs/Relations,
and Appropriations
definition of appropriate
Intelligence, and
committees.
Appropriations.
CRS-21

Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

Author Contact Information

Christopher M. Blanchard
Amy Belasco
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
abelasco@crs.loc.gov, 7-7627

Congressional Research Service
23