International Trade and Finance:
Key Policy Issues for the 114th Congress
Mary A. Irace, Coordinator
Section Research Manager
Brock R. Williams, Coordinator
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
January 2, 2015
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43841

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International Trade and Finance: Key Policy Issues for the 114th Congress

Summary
The U.S. Constitution grants authority over the regulation of foreign commerce to Congress. It
exercises this authority in numerous ways, including through oversight of trade policy and the
consideration of legislation to approve trade agreements and authorize trade programs. Policy
issues cover such areas as: U.S. trade negotiations; U.S. trade and economic relations with
regions and countries; international trade institutions; tariff and nontariff barriers; worker
dislocation from trade liberalization; trade remedy laws; import and export policies; international
investment; economic sanctions; and trade policy functions of the federal government. Congress
also has an important role in international finance. It has the authority over U.S. financial
commitments to international financial institutions and oversight responsibilities for trade- and
finance-related agencies of the U.S. Government.
The 113th Congress reauthorized the Export-Import Bank through June 30, 2015, enacted or
maintained economic sanctions against Russia and Iran, continued its oversight of the
Administration’s ongoing trade negotiations, and funded Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)
programs, among other action. Members also introduced a range of legislation on international
trade and finance issues, including bicameral legislation to renew Trade Promotion Authority
(TPA). The 114th Congress may revisit these issues and address new ones. Among the more
potentially prominent issues are:
• Possible renewal of TPA, providing expedited legislative procedures to consider
trade agreement implementing bills, setting forth trade negotiating objectives,
and establishing congressional-executive notification and consultation
mechanisms on trade negotiations;
• Ongoing negotiations for comprehensive reciprocal free trade agreements with
major trading partners and regions, including a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
with the United States and 11 countries in the Asia-Pacific, and a Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) Agreement between the United States
and the European Union (EU);
• Potential reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank beyond June 30, 2015;
• Possible Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program reauthorization;
• Potential reauthorization of trade preference programs, including the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), as well as reauthorization of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and possible action on a miscellaneous tariff bill (MTB);
• U.S.-China trade relations, including investment issues, intellectual property
rights protection, currency issues, and market access liberalization;
• International finance and investment issues, including remaining implications of
the Eurozone debt crisis such as persistent slow economic growth, oversight and
reform of international financial institutions, and negotiations to conclude new
bilateral investment treaties (BITs);
• Oversight of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round negotiations,
including the completed Trade Facilitation Agreement, and separate new and
ongoing plurilateral trade liberalization negotiations (e.g., information
technology; services; and environmental goods); and
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• Review of the President’s export control reform initiative and possible renewal of
the Export Control Act (EAA), and review of recent sanctions on Russia and
other countries.
A list of CRS reports covering these issues and containing relevant citations is provided at the end
of the report.

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International Trade and Finance: Key Policy Issues for the 114th Congress

Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
The Role of Congress in International Trade and Finance............................................................... 3
Policy Issues for Congress ............................................................................................................... 4
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) ............................................................................................. 4
Trade Agreements and Negotiations .......................................................................................... 5
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) .......................................................................................... 5
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) .................................................... 6
The WTO and WTO Doha Round ....................................................................................... 7
Trade in International Services Agreement (TISA) ............................................................. 9
20 Years of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ................................... 10
U.S.-China Trade Relations ..................................................................................................... 11
Industrial Policies .............................................................................................................. 12
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection ................................................................... 12
Currency Issues ................................................................................................................. 13
Chinese Economic Reforms and Rebalancing .................................................................. 13
Current Trade and Investment Negotiations with China ................................................... 14
U.S. Trade Promotion and Financing ...................................................................................... 15
Export Controls and Sanctions ................................................................................................ 16
The President’s Export Control Initiative .......................................................................... 17
Economic Sanctions .......................................................................................................... 18
Import Policies......................................................................................................................... 19
Trade Remedies ................................................................................................................. 19
Trade Preferences .............................................................................................................. 20
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) ................................................................ 20
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Reauthorization ........................................... 21
Miscellaneous Tariff Bill (MTB) ....................................................................................... 22
Trade Adjustment Assistance ............................................................................................ 22
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) ........................................................................................... 23
IPR and U.S. Trade Negotiations ...................................................................................... 23
IPR and Other U.S. Trade Policy Tools ............................................................................. 24
International Investment .......................................................................................................... 25
Foreign Investment and National Security ........................................................................ 25
U.S. International Investment Agreements ........................................................................ 26
Promoting Investment in the United States ....................................................................... 26
International Finance, Institutions, and Crises ........................................................................ 27
International Monetary Fund ............................................................................................. 27
Multilateral Development Banks....................................................................................... 28
The BRICs Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) .......................... 28
G-20 ................................................................................................................................... 29
The Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis ................................................................................ 30
Argentina Sovereign Debt Default .................................................................................... 30
Currency Debates .............................................................................................................. 31
Select CRS Products ...................................................................................................................... 31
Renewal of Trade Promotion Authority ................................................................................... 32
Trade Agreements and Negotiations ........................................................................................ 32
U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relations ............................................................................. 33
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U.S. Trade Promotion and Financing ...................................................................................... 33
Export Controls and Sanctions ................................................................................................ 34
Import Policies......................................................................................................................... 35
International Property Rights in U.S. Trade Policy ................................................................. 36
International Investment .......................................................................................................... 36
International Finance, Institutions, and Crises ........................................................................ 36

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 37
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 38

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International Trade and Finance: Key Policy Issues for the 114th Congress

Introduction
The 114th Congress, in exercising both its legislative and oversight responsibilities, faces
numerous international trade and finance policy issues. These issues are important to Congress
because they can affect the health of the U.S. economy, the success of U.S. businesses and their
workers, and the standard of living of Americans. They also have implications for U.S. foreign
policy interests.
International trade and finance issues are complex and at times controversial, and developments
in the global economy often make policy deliberation more challenging. The world continues to
recover unevenly from the 2008 global financial crisis. Higher sustained rates of economic
growth remain elusive in many developed economies, particularly in Japan and parts of Europe.
Rates of growth are also slowing in China and other emerging economies. At the same time, the
major decrease in oil prices is creating greater volatility in currency markets and economies, such
as Russia, that rely on exporting oil. Shifts in international capital flows arising from changes in
oil prices could add to uncertainties in global financial markets and complicate the efforts of
some major international banks to rebuild their capital bases. Lower oil prices are expected to
benefit consumers and oil-consuming industries, potentially boosting economic growth in oil-
importing economies.
The U.S. economy is a relative bright spot in terms of the global economic outlook, particularly
among advanced economies. Although it is still recovering from its worst recession in eight
decades, overall conditions have improved with unemployment down to 5.8% in 2014 from a
high of 10% in 2009, and GDP growth is projected to be above 2% in 2014 for the third straight
year. Greater domestic energy production has eased pressure on the U.S. trade balance as crude
oil imports have fallen and increased the competitiveness of U.S. industry as energy costs have
declined. This positions the United States to become a potentially major driver of global growth.
Global economic imbalances and debt levels continue to influence international economic
policies and discussions, but the dynamics of global imbalances (savings, investment, and trade
balances) have changed somewhat in recent years. Since their peak in 2006, current account
imbalances, as a share of world gross domestic product (GDP), have fallen significantly,
particularly the deficit in the United States and the surpluses in China and Japan. Questions over
the permanence of these recent shifts and the persistent imbalances in some countries prompt
continued calls for “global rebalancing” through national and foreign responses. For the United
States, this would involve increased saving (less spending and less borrowing from abroad)
relative to investment that would produce a rise in net exports (reduction in trade deficit). For
trade surplus countries, it implies the opposite—an increase in domestic demand and decrease in
saving relative to investment that would lead to a fall in net exports (reduction in trade surplus).
Rebalancing also implies changes in relative exchange rates.
International trade and investment flows continue to evolve in significant ways, most notably
through the growing integration of markets and production, and supply chain networks brought
about by advances in technology, communications, transportation, and lower barriers to trade.
These transformative changes in the global economy have led to large decreases in transaction
costs that have spurred significant growth in trade, particularly of intermediate goods, which now
account for over 60% of the world’s commercial exchange. Domestically, jobs are supported by
U.S. exports to U.S. foreign affiliates and production abroad, as well as foreign firms operating in
the United States. At the same time, these complex production networks have raised new “behind
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the border” trade barriers that are the subject of current trade negotiations. These developments
further complicate trade and employment policy debates, and raise other questions such as what
constitutes an “American-made” product, who gains from trade, and how will innovation and
production strategies continue to change the economic landscape.
Another transformative change in the global economy is the growing role of China and other
rising economic powers. These and other developments present significant opportunities and
policy challenges for the United States as it seeks to achieve more open markets, transparent and
rules-based trade, and financial and monetary stability in the global economy. They also have
significant implications with respect to the role and evolution of international trade and financial
institutions and governance, including new mechanisms such as the Group of 20 (G-20)
economies as a major forum for international economic cooperation.
On U.S. trade policy issues, the 114th Congress may exercise its oversight responsibilities and
may consider legislation related to numerous international trade issues, including renewal of U.S.
trade promotion authority (TPA), formerly known as fast track. It may also debate and consider
legislation to implement future “mega-regional” free trade agreements (FTAs), including the
proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (T-TIP). These potential trade agreements would cover a substantial portion of world
trade and economic activity, and address new issues, such as cross-border data flows, state-owned
enterprises, and global value chains. The United States is also part of ongoing multilateral trade
negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and is negotiating plurilaterally with “like-
minded” economies to further liberalize trade in services, information technology, and
environmental goods. Additionally, it is negotiating bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with
China and India to provide nondiscriminatory treatment and remove barriers to investment,
among other provisions. As treaties, BITs would require ratification by the Senate for approval,
whereas most trade agreements would require implementing legislation passed by both houses of
Congress.
On international finance issues, the 114th Congress has a range of policy and institutional issues
of potential interest. These include foreign exchange rate policies and continued international
policy efforts to prevent future financial crises. Attention may also turn to the role and
effectiveness of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and multilateral development banks, such
as the World Bank. Congress may consider possible IMF reforms that would impact U.S.
financial commitments to the institution and align its governance better with the increased role of
emerging economies in the global economy. Additionally, China and other emerging economies
have launched a new development bank (the “BRICS Bank”) and China is establishing a new
regional infrastructure bank, which raise a number of issues for Congress, including these banks’
relationships to existing multilateral and regional institutions.
While global economic integration has increased trade and economic growth, it also has exposed
U.S. firms and workers to greater competition from lower-cost and more efficient producers in
certain sectors and increasingly, from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other firms that receive
government support. Globalization and the larger volume of imports of goods and services,
therefore, may force some U.S. firms to make costly adjustments to remain competitive. In some
cases this may take the form of worker dislocation and shifts to production abroad, and may raise
concerns in Congress over distributional issues of global production and trade, how to respond to
unfair foreign trade practices, and the scope and effectiveness of U.S. worker training and trade
adjustment assistance programs.
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In sum, U.S. costs and benefits linked to an increasingly interconnected global economy are
multifaceted. The trade policy debate extends beyond free trade versus protectionism, to also
involve domestic and foreign macroeconomic policies, the participation of foreign states in
markets, the competitiveness of U.S. firms and workers, implications of value-chain and cross-
country production, and the financial stability of the international economy. For the United States,
an overarching goal is to ensure a high standard of living by remaining innovative, productive,
and responsive to international competition, while safeguarding those stakeholders who otherwise
may be left behind in a fast-changing global economy or injured by noncompetitive trade
practices, which may suggest a supporting role for complementary domestic policies.
Congress is in a unique position to address these issues, particularly given its constitutional
mandate for legislating and overseeing international trade and financial policy. In addition to
congressional oversight of the economic and political context of the current U.S. participation in
the global economy, this report highlights major international trade and finance issues that the
114th Congress may address. A list of CRS reports covering in detail each of the issues addressed
in this report and containing relevant citations is provided at the end of the report.
The Role of Congress in International Trade
and Finance
The U.S. Constitution assigns express authority over foreign trade to Congress. Article I, Section
8, gives Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations” and to “lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.” For roughly the first 150 years of the United States, Congress
exercised its authority over foreign trade by setting tariff rates on all imported products.
Congressional trade debates in the 19th century often pitted Members from northern
manufacturing regions, who benefitted from high tariffs, against those from largely southern raw
material exporting regions, who gained from and advocated for low tariffs.
A major shift in U.S. trade policy occurred after Congress passed the highly protective “Smoot-
Hawley” Tariff Act of 1930, which, by raising U.S. tariff rates to an all-time high level, led U.S.
trading partners to respond in kind. In response, world trade declined rapidly, exacerbating the
impact of the Great Depression. Since passage of this tariff act, Congress has delegated certain
trade authority to the executive branch. First, Congress enacted the Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act of 1934, which authorized the President to enter into reciprocal agreements to reduce tariffs
within congressionally preapproved levels, and to implement the new tariffs by proclamation
without additional legislation. Congress has renewed this authority periodically. Second,
Congress enacted the Trade Act of 1974 aimed at opening markets and establishing
nondiscriminatory international trade for nontariff barriers as well. Because changes in nontariff
barriers in reciprocal bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agreements usually involve
amending U.S. law, the agreements require congressional approval and implementing legislation.
Congress has renewed and amended the 1974 Act four times since 1974, which includes fast-
track trade negotiating authority, known as trade promotion authority (TPA) since 2002.
Congress also exercises trade policy authority through its oversight responsibilities and the
enactment of laws authorizing trade programs and governing trade policy generally. These
include such areas as U.S. trade agreement negotiations; tariffs and nontariff barriers; trade
remedy laws; import and export policies; economic sanctions; and the trade policy functions of
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the federal government. In addition, Congress oversees the implementation of trade policies,
programs, and agreements.
Congress has an important role in international investment and finance as well. It has authority
over bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the level of U.S. financial commitments to the
multilateral development banks (MDBs), including the World Bank, and to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). It also authorizes the activities of such agencies as the Export-Import
Bank (Ex-Im Bank) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Congress has
oversight responsibilities over these institutions, as well as the Federal Reserve and the Treasury
Department, whose activities affect international capital flows. Congress also closely monitors
developments in international financial markets that could affect the U.S. economy, such as the
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
Policy Issues for Congress
The 114th Congress, as discussed above, may consider a number of significant policy issues on
international trade and finance. They include renewal of trade promotion authority (TPA);
implementation of existing and renewal of potential trade agreements including a Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), a Trade in Services
Agreement (TISA), and also expanded agreements in information technology products and trade
facilitation under the WTO as well as newly launched negotiations on environmental goods and
services; U.S.-China trade relations; international finance issues; review of the U.S. export
control regime; reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank; and reauthorization of U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) and expiring trade preference programs.
Congress confronts these issues against the backdrop of a rapidly globalizing economy and the
growing importance of emerging economies that have increased the role of global supply or value
production chains, state-owned enterprises, and cross-border data flows, among other factors.
These and other issues are discussed in more depth below.
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)1
The 114th Congress is expected to debate the possible renewal of TPA. TPA allows implementing
bills for trade agreements to be considered under expedited legislative procedures—limited
debate, no amendments, and an up or down vote—provided the President observes certain
statutory obligations in negotiating trade agreements. These obligations include adhering to
congressionally defined U.S. trade policy negotiating objectives, as well as congressional
notification and consultation requirements before, during, and after the completion of the
negotiation process. The primary purpose of TPA is to preserve the constitutional role of
Congress with respect to consideration of implementing legislation for trade agreements that
require changes in domestic law, while also bolstering the negotiating credibility of the executive
branch by ensuring that the trade agreements will not be changed once concluded. Since first
enacted in the Trade Act of 1974, TPA has been renewed four times (1979, 1984, 1988, 2002),

1 Written by Ian F. Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-4997. See CRS Report RL33743,
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, by Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report R43491,
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions, by Ian F. Fergusson and Richard S. Beth; and CRS In
Focus IF00002, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) (In Focus), by Ian F. Fergusson.
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with the latest grant of authority expiring on July 1, 2007. Legislation to renew TPA, the
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act (H.R. 3830; S. 1900), was introduced but not
considered in the second session of the 113th Congress.
In light of TPA’s special provisions governing trade agreement implementing bills, many consider
its renewal necessary to approve and implement new trade agreements. Others question whether
TPA is necessary to pass trade implementing bills and note that it is not a prerequisite for
initiating or concluding trade agreement negotiations. Some experts argue that TPA would have to
be renewed if the United States is to be a credible negotiator in concluding proposed trade
agreements such as the TPP, T-TIP, Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), future WTO
agreements, and other future trade agreements. Although the Obama Administration has been
notifying and consulting Congress on these negotiations per previous TPA requirements,
Congress has not formally expressed its views in the form of new or updated legislative
negotiating objectives for trade agreements, which have been an important part of previous
TPA/fast track authorities.
Trade Agreements and Negotiations
The United States has historically led in establishing multinational agreements under the WTO
and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to reduce and eliminate
barriers to trade and create nondiscriminatory rules and principles to govern trade. The United
States also has worked to further advance these goals in plurilateral and bilateral contexts and has
concluded 14 free trade agreements (FTAs) with 20 countries since 1985, when the first U.S.
bilateral free trade agreement was concluded with Israel. Monitoring the implementation of these
agreements, particularly those most recently enacted, such as the U.S.-South Korea FTA
(KORUS), remains an ongoing U.S. trade policy interest. In addition, several trade negotiations
are currently underway with important regions and in the WTO. Among these are the negotiations
with the TPP countries—now 12 countries and possibly more—to create a comprehensive and
high-standard regional FTA in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the United States has entered
into similar negotiations with the European Union on the proposed T-TIP. The United States is
also engaged in the plurilateral TISA and Information Technology Agreement (ITA) negotiations
on services and information technology tariffs, respectively, as well as new negotiations on
environmental goods tariff liberalization. Congress may also wish to examine the agreements
reached during the December 2013 WTO Ministerial in Bali, Indonesia, including a Trade
Facilitation Agreement (TFA).
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)2
The TPP is a proposed comprehensive and high-standard free trade agreement (FTA) among 12
countries to liberalize trade and investment through enhanced rules and disciplines and greater
market access. It may become a vehicle to advance a wider Asia-Pacific free trade area as well as
a U.S. policy response to the rapidly increasing economic and strategic linkages among Asian-
Pacific states. It is portrayed by the Administration as the key economic component of the

2 Written by Brock R. Williams, Analyst in International Trade and Finance, x7-1157. See CRS Report R42694, The
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report
R42344, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative Trade and Economic Analysis, by Brock R.
Williams; and CRS Report IF10000, Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, by Brock R. Williams and Ian F. Fergusson.
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“rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific. The TPP has slowly evolved from a more limited agreement
among four countries concluded in 2006 into the current 12-country FTA negotiations, with the
United States joining the negotiations in 2008. Japan, the most recent country to participate,
joined the negotiations in 2013. The United States has existing FTAs with 6 of the 11 countries
participating. The 114th Congress has a direct legislative interest in the progress and content of the
negotiations, and would need to pass implementing legislation for a final TPP agreement to enter
into force in U.S. law.
The TPP is potentially an important and strategic “mega-regional” trade agreement for the United
States. Views on the agreement, however, vary widely. Proponents argue that the TPP has the
opportunity to expand trade and investment opportunities with negotiating partners that make up
37% of total U.S. goods and services trade, and establish trade and investment disciplines on new
issues such as supply chain management, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), regulatory coherence,
and digital trade barriers, in a region of strategic economic and geopolitical importance.
Opponents voice concerns over greater competition in import sensitive industries, and how the
potential TPP agreement might impact U.S. sovereignty in establishing future U.S. regulations in
areas such as health, food safety, and environment.
As a result of these varying views in the United States and among the 12 negotiating partners,
certain aspects of the negotiations have proven controversial. These include select market access
issues, such as on agriculture, and textiles and apparel, as well as the level of intellectual property
protection, the enforcement of environmental and worker rights, the treatment of state-owned
enterprises, investor-state dispute settlement, access to government procurement, and possible
currency provisions. Bilateral market access talks with Japan, the largest U.S. trading partner in
the TPP negotiations without an existing FTA with the United States, have proven particularly
challenging, especially in the areas of autos and agricultural trade. Given the economic
significance of both the United States and Japan among TPP members, resolution of these
bilateral talks would likely advance the conclusion of the overall negotiations.
The TPP negotiations are reportedly nearing conclusion. As the negotiations themselves are
confidential it is difficult to assess how many issues remain unresolved, but according to TPP
Trade Ministers the end of the negotiations is now “in focus.” Remaining issues are likely also the
most sensitive and their resolution may require high-level political decisions. Conclusion of the
TPP negotiations may also be impacted by congressional consideration of TPA (see above),
legislation which some Members of Congress view as necessary before TPP is concluded and
then considered by Congress.
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP)3
T-TIP is a proposed comprehensive and high-standard FTA between the United States and
European Union (EU), through which the two sides seek to enhance trade disciplines and market
access by addressing remaining transatlantic barriers to trade and investment. The Obama

3 Written by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-9253 and Vivian C. Jones,
Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-7823. See CRS Report R43387, Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (T-TIP) Negotiations, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Vivian C. Jones; CRS Report R43158, Proposed
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP): In Brief, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Vivian C. Jones; and
CRS In Focus IF00005, Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) (In Focus), by Shayerah Ilias
Akhtar and Vivian C. Jones.
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Administration notified Congress of its intent to negotiate T-TIP on March 20, 2013. Formal
negotiations commenced in July 2013, with seven rounds held to date. U.S. and EU negotiators
announced a goal of concluding T-TIP in two years. Given the complexity of issues involved,
some question the likelihood of reaching this goal. Core components of the negotiations include
reducing and eliminating tariffs; enhancing cooperation, convergence, and transparency in
regulations and standards-setting processes; further opening government procurement markets;
and strengthening and developing new rules in areas such as intellectual property rights,
investment, digital trade, trade facilitation, labor and the environment, localization barriers to
trade, and state-owned enterprises. Some potential rules could exceed existing U.S. FTA or WTO
commitments. Certain T-TIP issues are active areas of debate, including regulatory cooperation,
which is sensitive, in part, because of divergent U.S. and EU cultural preferences and values;
treatment of geographical indications; inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement, complicated
by differing views on its impact on government regulatory abilities; and facilitation of cross-
border data flows and potential data privacy implications.
T-TIP is a potentially significant and strategic FTA for the United States. In 2013, the EU
accounted for around one-fifth of total U.S. trade in goods and services, one-half of U.S. direct
investment abroad, and some 60% of foreign direct investment in the United States. T-TIP also is
a potentially globally significant FTA, as it involves the world’s two largest advanced economies,
which combined represent almost half of global GDP. However, views on T-TIP vary broadly.
Supporters see an opportunity to boost transatlantic economic growth and jobs by addressing
costly trade barriers; strengthen the U.S.-EU bilateral relationship; support broader and deeper
trade liberalization; and address challenges associated with third-country markets. Opponents are
concerned about adverse effects on import sensitive sectors; the impact on U.S.-EU relations
should negotiations stall; a focus on regional and bilateral FTAs detracting from multilateral trade
liberalization; and potential infringement on U.S. and EU sovereignty, including the ability to
regulate health, labor, and environmental interests. Both U.S. and EU officials continue to meet
with representatives of NGOs, consumer groups, trade unions, professional organizations, and
businesses to inform the public about the goals and progress of T-TIP negotiations.
Congress has a direct interest in the T-TIP negotiations, since it establishes overall U.S. trade
negotiating objectives and would consider legislation to implement a final T-TIP agreement.
Possible congressional consideration of renewal of TPA (see above), which expired in 2007,
could affect T-TIP. As part of its oversight role, Congress could examine the impact of greater
transatlantic trade liberalization on the U.S. economy and particular sectors; the role of a potential
T-TIP in U.S.-EU relations; how T-TIP would compare with other FTAs currently being
negotiated, such as the TPP and TISA; and whether T-TIP should be broadened to include other
countries.
The WTO and WTO Doha Round4
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization that administers the trade
rules and agreements negotiated by 160 participating parties, and it serves as a forum for dispute
settlement resolution and trade liberalization negotiations. The United States was a major force
behind the establishment of the WTO on January 1, 1995, and the new rules and trade

4 Written by Ian F. Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-4997. See CRS In Focus IF10002, The
World Trade Organization at 20, by Ian F. Fergusson and CRS Report R43592, Agriculture in the WTO Bali
Ministerial Agreement, by Randy Schnepf.
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liberalization agreements that occurred as a result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations (1986-1994). The WTO succeeded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), first established in 1947.
The WTO Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, begun in November 2001, has remained
deadlocked for several years. However, WTO Members at the 9th Ministerial Conference held in
Bali, Indonesia on December 3-7, 2013, agreed to a package of trade facilitation, agriculture, and
development measures. Though modest in scope, it represented the first successful conclusion of
a negotiation in the WTO’s nearly 20-year history. In July 2014, however, the protocols of
implementation for the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) were blocked by India over food
security “peace clause” concerns (see below). In subsequent negotiations culminating in
November 2014, the United States and India resolved their differences regarding the
interpretation of the peace clause that could allow for the implementation of the TFA. The
agreements reached at the WTO Bali Ministerial include the following:
• Trade facilitation. Members agreed to a package that would impose binding
disciplines on issues concerning the process of trade: freedom of transit, fees and
formalities associated with the import and export of goods, and transparency and
publication of goods. These provisions are designed to reduce transaction costs
and improve efficiencies, especially with regard to trade with and between
developing countries. The accord places binding disciplines on developing
countries to implement these reforms. While wealthy donor countries and
international organizations have pledged funds to least-developed countries
(LDCs) to implement these reforms through capacity building assistance, the
agreement itself places no obligations on Member states to provide assistance.
• Agriculture. Members agreed to a compromise “peace clause” on so-called food
security issues. This agreement would exempt food stockpiling programs,
especially for developing countries, subject to certain transparency requirements,
from dispute settlement until a permanent solution to the relationship between
these programs and trade-distorting subsidy limitations in the WTO Agriculture
Agreement is negotiated. Members also agreed to provisions concerning the
administration of tariff-rate quotas (TRQ) and recommitted themselves to
negotiate the parallel elimination of export subsidies.
• Development Issues. The Members agreed to a package of items to enhance
trade with least-developed countries. The agreement contained: a commitment to
develop simplified preferential rules-of-origin for LDCs; a “services waiver” to
grant LDCs greater access to the services markets of developed countries; a
commitment to negotiate duty-free, quota-free access to LDCs; and a
commitment to improve market access for cotton from LDCs.
The Bali agreements also directed the WTO Secretariat to develop a clearly defined work
program to complete the Doha Round. This task remains formidable. The negotiations have been
characterized by persistent differences among the United States, the European Union, and
advanced developing countries on major issues, such as agriculture, industrial tariffs and nontariff
barriers, services, and trade remedies. While some have lauded the Bali accord as a vindication of
the body’s negotiating function, the summer blockage on its implementation reminded WTO
members of the fragile nature of consensus among 160 members. It remains to be seen whether
the Bali accord has lasting momentum to propel agreement on the wider Doha Round agenda.
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Work has continued on expanding the reach of current WTO agreements outside the scope of the
Doha Round, including through plurilateral agreements or those that involve only a subset of
WTO members. A group now composed of 46 developed and advanced developing countries are
negotiating the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA, discussed below). The expansion of the
scope of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), negotiations for which were
concluded in March 2012, entered into force on April 6, 2014. Several countries, including China,
are in negotiations to accede to the GPA.
Negotiations to expand the product scope of the WTO’s plurilateral Information Technology
Agreement (ITA) may be back on track after the United States and China reached an
“understanding” in November 2014 on an expansion of China’s offer of greater tariff-free
treatment of information technology goods. Originally concluded in 1996, talks for an ITA-II
most recently resumed in 2012. The talks broke down in November 2013 after China’s previous
offers were deemed insufficient by the United States and other signatories. How that
understanding translates into a revised product list and the extent of tariff phase-out periods may
determine whether the new ITA can be concluded in the near term.
In July 2014, the United States and 13 other countries launched negotiations within the WTO to
liberalize trade in environmental goods and services—goods and services viewed as promoting
sustainable development—through tariff elimination. The first stage of the talks are building on a
list of 54 environmental goods produced by the APEC forum and are being conducted on an open
plurilateral basis, meaning that all benefits achieved through negotiation would be extended on a
most-favored-nation (MFN) basis to all members of the WTO. Thus, achieving a “critical mass”
of participation by the producers of such goods—suggested to be 90%—is considered necessary
to avoid the problem of free-riders. A second stage may consider the provision of environmental
services.
Trade in International Services Agreement (TISA)5
The term “services” refers to an expanding range of economic activities, such as construction,
retail and wholesale sales, e-commerce, financial services, professional services (such as
accounting and legal services), logistics, transportation, tourism, and telecommunications.
Services are a significant sector of the U.S. economy, accounting for almost 70% of U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP) and for over 80% of U.S. civilian employment. They not only function
as end-user products by themselves, but also act as the “lifeblood” of the rest of the economy with
transportation services ensuring that goods reach customers and financial services providing
financing for the manufacture of goods. Services have been an important priority in U.S. foreign
trade and trade policy and of global trade in general.
Services present unique trade policy issues and challenges, such as how to construct trade rules
that are applicable across a wide range of varied economic activities. The General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) under the WTO is the only multilateral set of rules on trade in services.
GATS came into effect in 1995, and many policy experts have argued that the GATS must be
updated and expanded if it is to govern services trade effectively. This prospect is diminished
given that GATS reform is part of the stalled Doha Round of WTO negotiations.

5 Written by Rebecca Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, 7-6819. See CRS Report R43291, U.S.
Foreign Trade in Services: Trends and U.S. Policy Challenges, by William H. Cooper and Rebecca M. Nelson.
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Due to the lack of progress on the Doha Round, a group of WTO members, led by the United
States and Australia, launched informal discussions in early 2012 to explore negotiating a TISA.
On January 15, 2013, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) notified
congressional leaders of the United States’ intention to engage formally in negotiations to reach a
plurilateral TISA, in conformity with the now-expired TPA congressional notification
requirements. Among U.S. objectives would be to (1) allow U.S. service providers to compete on
the basis of quality and competence rather than nationality; (2) permit comprehensive coverage of
all services, including services that have yet to be conceived; (3) seek to secure greater
transparency and predictability from U.S. trading partners regarding regulatory policies that
present barriers to trade in services and hinder U.S. exports; and (4) address new issues arising
from globalization and new mechanisms for conducting trade. Negotiations began on April 15,
2013, and include, in addition to the United States, Australia, Canada, Chile, Taiwan (Chinese
Taipei), Colombia, Costa Rica, EU (28 members), Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan; South
Korea, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway; Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Switzerland, and Turkey. Together, these 23 countries account for more than 70% of global trade
in services. China has expressed interest in joining.
Some Members of Congress have long had interest in trade agreements that could affect
important domestic sectors, such as services. In addition, Congress would have to approve TISA
for it to enter into force in the United States and, therefore, would likely want to play a role in
shaping the content and outcome of a TISA. Opening services markets globally has been a
longstanding U.S. trade negotiating objective.
20 Years of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)6
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a comprehensive FTA among the United
States, Canada, and Mexico, entered into force on January 1, 1994. It continues to be of interest to
Congress because of the strong U.S. trade and investment ties with Canada and Mexico and
NAFTA’s significance for U.S. trade policy. NAFTA initiated a new generation of trade
agreements influencing negotiations in areas such as market access, rules of origin, intellectual
property rights (IPR), foreign investment, dispute resolution, worker rights, and environmental
protection.
The rising number of regional trade agreements throughout the world, in addition to the growing
presence of China in Latin America, could have implications for U.S. trade policy with its
NAFTA partners. Some trade policy experts contend that a deepening of economic relations with
Canada and Mexico will help promote a common trade agenda with shared values. In addition to
economic effects, some proponents state that forming deeper trade and investment ties would
have positive implications for corporate governance, worker rights, environmental protection, and
democratic governance. However, labor groups and some consumer-advocacy groups argue that
the agreement has had negative effects. They maintain that the agreement resulted in outsourcing
and lower wages that have had a negative effect on the U.S. economy and that it has caused job
dislocations in Mexico, especially in agriculture.
Both proponents and critics of NAFTA agree that the three countries should look at the
shortcomings of the agreement as they look to the future of North American trade and economic

6 Written by M. Angeles Villarreal, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-0321. See CRS Report R42965,
NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson.
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relations. Policies could include strengthening institutions to protect the environment and worker
rights; considering the establishment of a border infrastructure plan, including more investment in
infrastructure to make border crossings more efficient; increasing regulatory cooperation;
promoting research and development to enhance the global competiveness of North American
industries; and/or creating more efforts to lessen income differentials within the region.
Some of these issues could be addressed in the TPP as all three NAFTA members are part of the
TPP negotiations. If an agreement is reached and is approved by the U.S. Congress, it would alter
the rules governing North American trade since NAFTA’s entry into force. While NAFTA would
likely continue to be in effect, the three trading partners may have modified or expanded
commitments in areas such as IPR, state-owned enterprises, global value chains, discriminatory
regulatory barriers, labor, and environmental provisions.
U.S.-China Trade Relations7
Since China embarked upon a policy of economic and trade liberalization in 1979, U.S.-Chinese
economic ties have grown extensively. Total U.S.-China trade rose from $2 billion in 1979 to
$562 billion in 2013. China was the United States’ second-largest trading partner, its largest
source of imports, and its third largest export market. According to one U.S. business group,
China is a $350 billion market for U.S. firms, based on U.S. merchandise and services exports
plus sales by U.S. affiliates in China. China’s large population and rapidly growing economy
make it a sizeable market for U.S. exports, and lower-cost imports from China benefit U.S.
consumers. China is also an important part of the global supply chain for many U.S. companies,
some of which use China as a final point of assembly for their products. China’s large-scale
holdings of U.S. Treasury securities (at nearly $1.25 trillion as of October 2014) have helped the
federal government finance its budget deficits, thereby helping to keep U.S. real interest rates
low. China has emerged as a major economic power. In October 2014, the IMF projected that
China would overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy on a purchasing power
parity basis in 2014. China’s continued economic rise will likely have a significant impact on the
global economy.
Despite growing commercial ties between the United States and China, the relationship has
become increasingly complex and often contentious. From the U.S. perspective, many trade
tensions stem from China’s incomplete transition to an open-market economy. While China has
significantly liberalized its economic and trade regimes over the past three decades (especially
since joining the WTO in 2011), it continues to maintain, (or has imposed) a number of state-
directed policies that appear to distort trade and investment flows, which some argue, undermine
U.S. economic interests. As a result, U.S.-China commercial relations may continue to be a major
focus for Congress. Important areas of congressional concern are discussed below.

7 Written by Wayne M. Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, x7-7767. See CRS Report RL33536, China-
U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison; CRS Report RL33534, China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends,
Challenges, and Implications for the United States, by Wayne M. Morrison; and CRS In Focus IF10030, U.S.-China
Trade Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison.
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Industrial Policies
Numerous policies have been implemented by China to promote the development of domestic
industries deemed critical to its future economic growth. China’s primary goals include
transitioning from a manufacturing center to a major global source of innovation and reducing the
country’s dependence on foreign technology by promoting “indigenous innovation.” The latter
policy can amount to discrimination against foreign firms and has become a major source of trade
tension with the United States. The Chinese government has responded that they have not and
will not discriminate against foreign firms or violate global trade rules, but many U.S. business
leaders remain skeptical even as they have acknowledged China’s pledge to delink indigenous
innovation from government procurement. Some U.S. firms have also complained about Chinese
pressure to establish production facilities in China, share proprietary technology with Chinese
partners, or set up R&D centers as a condition for gaining market access. Over the past year or so,
several foreign business groups have complained about China’s enforcement of its anti-monopoly
laws, arguing that such enforcement may be unfairly targeting foreign firms. The Obama
Administration has initiated WTO dispute settlement cases against a number of Chinese industrial
policies, including China’s export subsidies provided to auto and auto parts (initiated in
September 2012), export restrictions on rare earth elements (March 2012), and preferential
subsidies given to Chinese wind power equipment manufacturers (December 2010).
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection
Lack of effective and consistent protection and enforcement in China of U.S. intellectual property
rights (IPR) has been cited by U.S. firms as one of the most significant problems they face in
doing business in China. Although China has significantly improved its IPR protection regime
over the past few years, U.S. industry officials complain that piracy rates in China remain
unacceptably high. A 2013 survey by the American Chamber in China found that 72% of
respondents felt that China’s IPR enforcement regime was ineffective, up from 59% in its 2012
survey. A May 2013 study by the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property
estimated the annual cost to the U.S. economy of global IPR theft at $300 billion, of which, China
accounted for up to 80% ($240 billion) of those losses.
Cyberattacks by Chinese entities against U.S. firms have raised concerns over the potential theft
of U.S. IPR, especially trade secrets, and its implications for the U.S. economy. A February 2013
report by Mandiant, a U.S. information security company, documented extensive economic cyber
espionage by a Chinese unit (designated as “APT1”) with alleged links to the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) against 141 firms, covering 20 industries, since 2006. Following a
meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in June 2013, President Obama warned that if cyber
security issues are not addressed and if there continues to be direct theft of U.S. property, then
“this was going to be a very difficult problem in the economic relationship and was going to be an
inhibitor to the relationship really reaching its full potential.”
On May 19, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a 31-count indictment against five
members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for cyber espionage and other offenses
that allegedly targeted five U.S. firms and a labor union for commercial advantage, the first time
the Federal government has initiated such action against state actors. The indictment appears to
indicate a high level of U.S. government concern about the extent of Chinese state-sponsored
cyber commercial theft against U.S. firms. China strongly condemned the U.S. indictment and
suspended its participation in the U.S.-China Cyber Working Group, established in 2013.
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Currency Issues
Unlike most major economies, China does not have a floating currency. Instead, the government
pegs its currency (the renminbi—RMB) largely to the U.S. dollar, and intervenes in currency
markets to limit its appreciation. Critics charge that China manipulates its currency in order to
give its exporters an unfair competitive advantage by making Chinese exports to the United States
relatively less expensive and U.S. exports to China relatively more expensive than would occur
under free market conditions. They argue that if China’s currency is undervalued, it acts as a
subsidy conveyed to Chinese exporters while constituting an additional trade barrier to U.S.
exports to China. Some U.S. policymakers contend that China’s currency policy has been a major
contributor to large annual U.S. bilateral trade deficits with China (which totaled $318 billion in
2013) and the loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs. Others, while continuing to call for China to move
more quickly toward a more market-oriented exchange rate system, argue that China’s currency
situation is of less concern as a trade or commercial issue than it was previously. For example,
according to the U.S.-China Business Council’s 2014 survey of China’s business environment,
the impact of China’s exchange rate on company competitiveness does not rank among top
company concerns. Determining the extent to which the RMB is undervalued, if at all, and its
impact on U.S.-China trade is subject to ongoing debate.
In 2005, China began to liberalize its currency policy, due in part to international pressure, and
allowed the RMB to appreciate gradually. From July 2005 to July 2009, the RMB was allowed to
appreciate by 21%. However, once the effects of the global financial crisis became apparent, the
Chinese government halted its appreciation of the RMB and kept it relatively constant through
June 2010, when it was allowed to appreciate again. From June 2010 through December 2012, the
RMB appreciated 9.3% against the dollar. However, from 2012 to 2013, the RMB increased by
only 2.8% against the dollar and during the first 10 months of 2014 it depreciated by 1.0%. In
October 2014 the Department of the Treasury stated that the RMB remained “significantly
undervalued.”
Chinese Economic Reforms and Rebalancing
A major focus of U.S. economic policy towards China has been to persuade it to rebalance its
economy by reducing the country’s policy preference for exporting and investing, and to increase
an emphasis on consumer demand. This goal could be achieved with a number of policies to
boost household incomes (e.g., developing a social safety net and reducing the need to maintain
high rates of savings) and implementing reforms to reduce distortive government policies (e.g.,
maintaining an undervalued currency and using the government-controlled banking system to
subsidize state-owned enterprises). Many economists argue that boosting Chinese domestic
consumption and eliminating distortive economic policies would greatly increase China’s demand
for imports, promote greater competition in China, improve Chinese living standards, and help
reduce trade tensions with the United States.
From November 9-12, 2013, the Communist Party of China held the 3rd Plenum of its 18th Party
Congress, a meeting that many analysts anticipated would result in the initiation of extensive new
economic reforms under China’s new leadership. Following the meeting, the Communist Party
issued a communique with a number of broad policy statements. One highlighted by the Chinese
media was that the market would now play a “decisive” role in allocating resources in the
economy. This was in contrast to previous statements that the market was a “basic” means of
allocating economic resources. Some analysts have raised concerns over the communique’s
statement that China “must unwaveringly consolidate and develop the publicly owned economy,
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persist in the dominant role of the public ownership system, give rein to the leading role of the
State-owned economy, and incessantly strengthen the vitality, control strength and influence of
the State-owned economy.” Some observers contend that this indicates that China will not
implement reforms that reduce the role of the government in promoting and supporting state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), a goal of U.S. economic officials. Others argue that the Plenum’s
signals indicate that SOEs will be subject to greater market forces.
Current Trade and Investment Negotiations with China
The United States engages China through a number of fora that seek to resolve trade disputes and
expand bilateral trade and investment relations. For example, bilateral discussions are held
annually under the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), established in 2009 (it
replaced a previous forum established under the Bush Administration called the Strategic
Economic Dialogue, or SED). The S&ED represents the highest-level bilateral forum to discuss a
broad range of issues between the two nations. In addition, the two sides hold annual meetings
under the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), established in 1983,
which focuses primarily on bilateral trade and investment issues. Highlights of recent U.S.-China
negotiations on commercial issues include the following:
• Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. At the December 2014 session of
the JCCT, China stated that it would: approve the importation of new
biotechnology varieties of U.S. soybeans and corn and improve IPR trademark
protection for certain agricultural products; amend its trade secrets law and
increase cooperation with the United States on enhancing sales of legitimate U.S.
intellectual property-intensive goods and services in China; streamline China’s
processes and cut red tape for imports of pharmaceuticals and medical devices;
and make improvements to its competition enforcement policies by improving
transparency and ensuring equal treatment for foreign firms in anti-monopoly
investigations with Chinese firms.
• Information Technology Agreement (ITA). During President Obama’s visit to
China in November 2014, the United States and China announced they had
reached an understanding on products that would be covered under a new ITA, a
plurilateral agreement that is currently being negotiated among 70 members of
the WTO. The agreement would seek to expand on the 1996 ITA by adding more
than 200 tariff lines that would be subject to zero tariffs. Up until recently, China
had been criticized by U.S. officials for holding up the ITA by seeking to exclude
a broad range of products from tariff elimination in order to product certain
Chinese industries, such as semiconductors, a position that contributed to a
suspension in the ITA negotiations in November 2013.
• Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). The United States and China have held
negotiations over the past few years on reaching a BIT with the goal of
expanding bilateral investment opportunities. U.S. negotiators hope such a treaty
would improve the investment climate for U.S. firms in China by opening up
sectors previously closed to foreign investors, enhancing legal protections and
dispute resolution procedures, and ensuring U.S. investors are treated no less
favorably than Chinese investors. During the July 2013 session of the S&ED,
China agreed that it would negotiate a “high-standard” BIT with the United
States that would include all stages of investment and all sectors, a commitment
U.S. officials described as “a significant breakthrough, and the first time China
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has agreed to do so with another country.” China also agreed to use the “negative
list” approach in reducing ownership restrictions via the BIT, where all industries
except those explicitly listed would be open to investment. The two sides have
set a goal of completing the major articles of the BIT by the end of 2014 and to
begin negotiations on the negative list by early 2015. A short negative list would
be viewed as a good sign that China was now ready to significantly liberalize its
foreign investment regime and might improve the chances of the treaty being
passed in the U.S. Senate, while a long negative list might indicate that
negotiations would take much longer.
• Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Government procurement
policies are largely exempt from WTO rules, except for those 43 members that
are parties to the WTO GPA. China’s membership in the GPA has been a top U.S.
priority because China is one of the world’s largest and fastest growing public
procurement markets, estimated by U.S. officials at $200 billion annually. China
indicated that it would join the GPA after it joined the WTO, but did not begin
negotiations until 2007. While it has submitted several offers, it has failed, to
date, to submit an offer acceptable to current GPA members. At the December
2013 JCCT meeting, China stated that it would submit a new improved offer by
the end of 2014.
U.S. Trade Promotion and Financing8
In addition to U.S. trade negotiations, the federal government promotes U.S. exports and
investments through providing finance and insurance programs that are administered chiefly by
the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank); Department of Agriculture; and Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC). In addition, the Department of Commerce supports U.S. exports
and inward investment into the United States through trade missions, advocacy, market research,
and other activities, often with an emphasis on U.S. small businesses. Other agencies also play a
role. U.S. trade promotion activities can be focused through various Administration initiatives,
broad-based as well as targeted to specific geographic regions or sectors. General issues regarding
trade promotion and financing include the extent to which federal government efforts are aligned
or serve competing U.S. policy goals; the adequacy of federal funding of such efforts;
coordination of such activities; and whether alternative policy options may be more effective.
Reauthorization of Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank and Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC)
Ex-Im Bank and OPIC are two U.S. government agencies that help facilitate international
transactions by U.S. businesses and are subject to reauthorization by Congress. Ex-Im Bank
provides direct loans, guarantees, and insurance to help finance U.S. exports, in support of U.S.

8 Written by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-9253. See CRS Report R41495,
U.S. Government Agencies Involved in Export Promotion: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Shayerah
Ilias Akhtar; CRS Report R43581, Export-Import Bank: Overview and Reauthorization Issues, by Shayerah Ilias
Akhtar; CRS Report R43671, Export-Import Bank Reauthorization: Frequently Asked Questions, coordinated by
Shayerah Ilias Akhtar; CRS In Focus IF10017, Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) Reauthorization, by Shayerah Ilias
Akhtar; and CRS Report 98-567, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation: Background and Legislative Issues, by
Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.
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employment. OPIC provides political risk insurance and finance to facilitate U.S. private
investment in developing countries, in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. The financial
activities of Ex-Im Bank and OPIC are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.
Both agencies seek to fill gaps in private sector finance, and to help level the playing field for
U.S. businesses competing against foreign companies that receive government-supported
financing. As demand-driven agencies, their actual levels of financial support depend on
commercial interests. Both agencies use offsetting collections, generated from fees charged for
their services and other sources, to fund their activities. Congress approves an annual
appropriation setting an upper limit on each of the agencies’ administrative and program
expenses.
Congress has responsibility for reauthorizing Ex-Im Bank and OPIC. The FY2015 continuing
resolution (P.L. 113-164) extends Ex-Im Bank’s general statutory charter through June 30, 2015.
Previously, the charter, which was extended for about two years and four months, was set to
sunset on September 30, 2014 (P.L. 112-122). As the new sunset date nears, Congress may debate
whether to renew Ex-Im Bank’s authority; if so, for how long and under what terms; and if not,
other policy alternatives. In contrast, Congress last reauthorized OPIC via “stand-alone
legislation” in 2003, extending its authority through FY2007. Since then, Congress has extended
OPIC’s authority to conduct its programs through the annual appropriations process. The FY2015
appropriations legislation (P.L. 113-235) extends OPIC’s authority until September 30, 2015.
Although Congress has made some adjustments to OPIC’s activities through appropriations
legislation, consideration of OPIC reauthorization could afford Members greater opportunity to
weigh in on broader OPIC issues, such as the agency’s role in U.S. foreign policy.
The 114th Congress could consider a range of issues related to Ex-Im Bank and OPIC
reauthorization. Most fundamentally, Congress faces a decision of whether to reauthorize them.
Congress could examine these agencies’ economic and competitive rationales, their implications
for the size and scope of the U.S. government, how these agencies compare to foreign
counterparts, and international trade rules that may guide these agencies’ financing practices.
Should Congress decide to renew their authorities, the length of reauthorization may be debated.
On one hand, a multi-year or permanent authorization could enhance these agencies’ long-term
planning capacity and ability to assure businesses of the stability of their programs. On the other
hand, shorter-term renewals could permit enhanced congressional oversight. Congress also could
examine possible revisions to these agencies’ policies, viewing them in the context of their
effectiveness and efficiency in meeting statutory mandates and other requirements; the
competitiveness of such policies relative to those of foreign countries’ counterparts; implications
for business, labor, environmental, taxpayer, and other stakeholder interests; and financial
soundness and risk management.
Export Controls and Sanctions
Congress has authorized the President to control the export of various items for national security,
foreign policy, and economic reasons. Separate programs and statutes for controlling different
types of exports exist for nuclear materials and technology, defense articles and services, and
dual-use goods and technology. Under each program, licenses of various types are required before
an export can be undertaken. The Departments of Commerce, State, and Defense administer these
programs. At the same time, Congress also legislates country-specific sanctions that restrict aid,
trade, and other transactions to address U.S. policy concerns about proliferation, regional
stability, and human rights. In the 114th Congress, these controls and sanctions may raise difficult
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issues over how to balance U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives against U.S.
commercial and economic interests.
The President’s Export Control Initiative9
In 2009, the Obama Administration launched a comprehensive review of the U.S. export control
system. In the current system, responsibility for controlling exports is divided among the
Departments of Commerce, State, and the Treasury, based on the nature of the product (munitions
or dual-use goods) and basis for control, with enforcement shared among these agencies, as well
as the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security. Key elements of the Administration’s
reform agenda include a four-pronged approach that would create a single export control
licensing agency for both dual-use and munitions exports; adopt a unified control list; create a
single integrated information technology system, which would include a single database of
sanctioned and denied parties; and establish a single enforcement coordination agency.
The Administration’s blueprint envisions that these changes would be implemented in three
phases with the final tier requiring legislative action. To date, efforts have been undertaken to
harmonize the Commerce Control List (CCL), which focuses on dual-use items (i.e., both
commercial and defense uses), with the U.S. Munitions List (USML). This has been done through
an ongoing category-by-category review of USML items and a migration of what the
Administration deems as less sensitive items to the CCL. Congressional notification is required if
items are moved from the munitions list to the dual-use list; the first of these notifications
occurred in March 2013. Since the first rulemakings were announced in November 2013, rules to
transfer certain items in 15 of 21 USML categories have been issued and taken effect with the
most recent on December 30, 2014. The President also made the determination required by the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2013 that the transition of certain satellites and
related items from the USML to the CCL was in the national interest. An Export Enforcement
Coordination Center (E2C2), which was created by executive order on November 9, 2010, has
been set up within the Department of Homeland Security to synchronize enforcement efforts. An
integrated information technology system based on the Defense Department’s USXports platform
has been adopted by the Department of State, although its implementation by Commerce is still
ongoing.
The 114th Congress may scrutinize this effort through oversight and may be asked to approve
certain changes proposed by the Administration, including the creation and placement of a
proposed licensing agency. Congress may also attempt to reauthorize or rewrite the currently
expired Export Administration Act (EAA), the statutory basis of dual-use export controls.

9 Written by Ian F. Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-4997. See CRS Report R41916, The
U.S. Export Control System and the President’s Reform Initiative, by Ian F. Fergusson and Paul K. Kerr.
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Economic Sanctions10
Economic sanctions may be defined as coercive economic measures taken against a target to
bring about a change in policies. They typically include measures such as trade embargoes;
restrictions on particular exports or imports; denial of foreign assistance, loans, and investments;
or control of foreign assets and economic transactions that involve U.S. citizens or businesses.
The decision to apply trade and aid sanctions is based, to some extent, on a country’s record with
respect to human rights, religious freedom, international terrorism, terrorist financing,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, treaty violations, international narcotics trafficking,
trafficking in persons, trafficking in protected natural resources and endangered species, child
abduction, interference with democratic processes, war crimes, corruption, cyber espionage, and
money laundering. The United States currently maintains robust sanctions regimes against foreign
governments it has identified as supporters of acts of international terrorism (Cuba, Iran, Sudan,
Syria), nuclear arms proliferators (Iran, North Korea, Syria), egregious violators of international
human rights standards (Belarus, Burma, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria), and those
threatening regional stability (Iran, North Korea, Russia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria). The United
States also targets individuals and entities with economic and diplomatic restrictions to meet the
requirements of the United Nations Security Council (Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Liberia, Libya, North Korea,
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen).
The 113th Congress, in its closing days, passed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (H.R.
5859, signed by the President on December 18, 2014) to require the President to impose
economic and diplomatic restrictions on Rosoboronexport—a Russian-state-controlled arms
dealer whose clients include the governments of Syria, Iran, and Venezuela. The act also
expanded the President’s discretionary authorities to tighten sanctions on Russia’s defense,
energy, and financial sectors, particularly those involved in supplying the Syrian government with
defense articles, or those that support Russia’s incursions into, or threats toward, Ukraine,
Georgia, and Moldova. The 114th Congress may closely monitor implementation of the Ukraine
Freedom Support Act.
The 113th Congress left on the table legislative proposals targeting some 20 foreign governments,
all of which continue to engage in the original activities that attracted Congress’ attention enough
to consider changing the bilateral relationship. Three areas will be of particular attention: North
Korea (see H.R. 1771, 113th Congress); Iran, which might be subject to new sanctions in 2015
targeting Iran’s nuclear ambitions conditional on the success of multilateral negotiations that were
extended in late November 2014; and Cuba, to curtail the President’s announcement in December
2014 that he intends to seek normalized relations with that country.
Thus it seems the odds are high that economic sanctions will continue as a foreign policy or
national security tool.

10 Written by Dianne E. Rennack, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation, x7-7608. See CRS Report R43835, State
Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by Dianne E. Rennack; CRS Report
RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL33948, State and Local Economic Sanctions:
Constitutional Issues, by Michael John Garcia and Todd Garvey; CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions
and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack; CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for
U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack; CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?, by
Mark E. Manyin; and CRS Report RL33460, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel.
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Import Policies
U.S. policies affecting imports are shaped by a mixture of economic objectives, foreign policy
interests, and political considerations. The case for supporting freer trade and more open markets
rests on the view that they yield substantial economic benefits for all participating countries.
However, since the gains from trade may be disproportionately allocated within domestic
economies, some industries and workers may be adversely affected by import competition. Thus,
international trade rules also allow governments to provide means (called “trade remedies”) by
which certain groups may petition for temporary protection from import surges of “fairly” traded
imports, or for redress in certain cases of “unfair” imports. The U.S. government has also
provided direct relief to workers, firms, and farmers adversely impacted by trade through the
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. U.S. import policies also support more open trade
with developing countries in the form of trade preference programs that provide nonreciprocal
preferential access to the U.S. market in order to form closer economic ties and support economic
growth in developing countries. Import policy issues in which Congress has a direct interest
include five broad policy areas: (1) trade remedies; (2) trade preferences; (3) border security and
trade facilitation; (4) tariffs; and (5) trade adjustment assistance.
Trade Remedies11
The United States and its trading partners use laws known as trade remedies to mitigate the injury
(or threat thereof) of various trade practices to domestic industries and workers. The three most
frequently applied U.S. trade remedies are (1) antidumping (AD), which provides relief from
injurious imports sold at less than fair market value; (2) countervailing duty (CVD), which
provides relief from injurious imports subsidized by a foreign government or public entity; and
(3) safeguards, which provide temporary relief from import surges of fairly traded goods. They
are enforced primarily through the administrative procedures of two U.S. government agencies,
the Department of Commerce and the United States International Trade Commission. In AD and
CVD cases, the remedy is an additional duty assessed to offset the calculated amount of dumping
or subsidy. In safeguard cases that are determined by the President, a temporary import quota or a
tariff may be assessed. In addition, the WTO agreements contain specific obligations on these
measures to which its member countries, including the United States, adhere.
Congress enacted and over time has amended these trade remedy laws, but individual AD and
CVD cases require no direct congressional action. Nonetheless, they are often the subject of
congressional interest, especially if constituents are involved as domestic manufacturers or as
importers of merchandise subject to trade remedy investigations. In 2014, a case on oil country
tubular goods (OCTG) from China and other countries was the subject of intense interest from
members of the Congressional Steel Caucus. The Department of Commerce is negotiating
prospective suspension agreements (in lieu of additional AD/CVD action) in two other high-
profile investigations, on solar panels from Mexico, and on solar panels from China. The results
of these negotiations may be announced early in the 114th Congress. If an agreement is not
reached, the trade remedy investigations will continue.

11 Written by Vivian C. Jones, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-7823. See CRS Report RL32371,
Trade Remedies: A Primer, by Vivian C. Jones; and CRS Report IF10018, Trade Remedies: Antidumping and
Countervailing Duties, by Vivian C. Jones.
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Trade Preferences12
Since 1974, Congress has created six trade preference programs designed to assist “lesser
developed” countries: (1) the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP—expired July 31, 2013),
which applies to all eligible developing countries; (2) the Andean Trade Preference Act (APTA—
expired July 31, 2013); (3) the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA—permanent);
(4) the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA—expires September 30, 2020); (5) the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA—expires September 30, 2015); and (6) the Haitian
Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE—expires September 30, 2020).
Except for CBERA, which is permanent, these programs give temporary, nonreciprocal, duty-free
access to the U.S. market for a select group of exports from eligible countries.
Congress authorizes, revises, and conducts regular oversight of these programs. Given GSP’s
expiration in 2013 and AGOA’s upcoming expiration in September 2015, the 114th Congress may
consider legislation to extend and perhaps revise these programs, both of which typically enjoy
bipartisan support. In 2014, the EU and Canada made substantial changes to their GSP programs
which may be of interest as Congress considers GSP renewal. ATPA also expired in 2013, but at
the time of its expiration, Ecuador was the only remaining beneficiary country and tensions in
U.S. relations with the country make it less likely that the program will be considered for
reauthorization in the 114th Congress.
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)13
With its current expiration set for 2015, AGOA received increased congressional interest in the
113th Congress. Both the Administration and relevant congressional committees have requested
agency evaluations of the preference program in preparation for the renewal debate. The
Administration has also initiated an interagency review of trade capacity building efforts in the
region with recommendations due early in 2015. The 113th Congress introduced legislation to
expand U.S. trade with Africa and improve the region’s energy production and transmission
capabilities. As a cornerstone of U.S.-Africa trade policy, the potential reauthorization and reform
of AGOA may build upon these broader efforts to increase U.S.-Africa trade and investment.
Given the significant improvement in the economies of several African countries since AGOA
was enacted and increased focus on opportunities for U.S. businesses in the region, the AGOA
renewal debate may also have a greater focus on two-way U.S.-Africa trade, particularly with
South Africa, the most developed economy in the region. In the South African market some U.S.
exporters currently face a disadvantage relative to EU exporters given the EU’s reciprocal trade
agreement with South Africa. As a nonreciprocal preference program, AGOA currently provides
tariff benefits for African exports destined for the United States.
The timing of AGOA’s renewal may also be of interest to the 114th Congress. In 2012, an
important provision (“third country fabric provision”) related to AGOA apparel exports was
renewed one month before it was scheduled to expire. Some stakeholders argued that the

12 Written by Vivian C. Jones, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-7823. See CRS Report R41429, Trade
Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options, coordinated by Vivian C. Jones; and CRS Report RL33663,
Generalized System of Preferences: Background and Renewal Debate, by Vivian C. Jones.
13 Written by Brock Williams, Analyst in International Trade and Finance, x7-1157. See CRS Report, R43173, African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Background and Reauthorization, by Brock R. Williams; and CRS In Focus
IF00041, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (In Focus), by Brock R. Williams.
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uncertainty over the renewal caused a drop in apparel orders from the region and subsequent
employment losses. Proponents of AGOA’s renewal would like to see the preference program
renewed as early as possible to prevent a similar disruption in trade during this renewal debate.
Such concerns may impact what reforms, if any, the 114th Congress considers for AGOA, as
potentially controversial reforms could delay the renewal process.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Reauthorization14
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
is the primary agency charged with ensuring the smooth flow of trade through U.S. ports of entry
(POEs)—in 2013 more than $2 trillion in goods were imported into the United States. CBP’s
policies with regard to U.S. imports are designed to (1) facilitate the smooth flow of imported
cargo through U.S. ports of entry; (2) enforce trade and customs laws designed to protect U.S.
consumers and business and to collect customs revenue; and (3) enforce import security laws
designed to prevent weapons of mass destruction, illegal drugs, and other contraband from
entering the United States—a complex and difficult mission. Congress has a direct role in
organizing, authorizing, and defining CBP’s international trade functions, as well as appropriating
funding for and conducting oversight of its programs.
The 114th Congress may consider legislation to reauthorize CBP’s trade functions in the above
areas, and to provide additional funding for CBP’s modernization efforts, such as the continuing
development of the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), an online platform designed to
facilitate the import process, and the International Trade Data System (ITDS), a U.S. Treasury
Department-led effort to develop an online “single window” for all U.S. agencies involved in
import processing to clear goods for entry into the U.S. market. In mid-February 2014, President
Obama signed an Executive Order mandating Federal agencies to coordinate efforts to insure that
the ITDS is completed by December 31, 2016.
Trade facilitation aims to improve the efficiency of international trade by harmonizing and
streamlining customs procedures, such as duplicative documentation requirements, customs
processing delays, and nontransparent or unequally enforced importation rules and requirements.
Multilateral efforts to streamline trade facilitation procedures were addressed as part of a “Bali
Package” of “deliverables” at the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2013 (see WTO
above). The final text contains several provisions sought by U.S. negotiators, including
transparent multilateral rules for timely, binding advance customs rulings; and procedures that
would allow expedited release for goods entered through air cargo facilities.
One issue of congressional interest in prior customs reauthorization legislation is CBP’s under-
collection of AD and CVD duties. Improving AD/CVD duty collection is a priority trade issue for
CBP, and the agency has attempted to modify its procedures (e.g., requiring additional bond
amounts for subject merchandise) in ways that have been subject to court challenges. Thus, this
could also become an issue in 114th Congress reauthorization legislation. Interested parties also
allege that CBP and its sister agency U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are slow
to investigate allegations of AD/CVD duty circumvention. These issues were addressed in the
112th (H.R. 6642 and H.R. 6656) and 113th Congresses (S. 662) in customs reauthorization

14 Written by Vivian C. Jones, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-7823. See CRS Report R43014, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security, by Vivian C. Jones and Marc R.
Rosenblum.
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legislation introduced by the committees of jurisdiction. Oversight into CBP efforts to enhance
cargo security may also receive congressional attention as part of, or separate from, consideration
of a CBP reauthorization bill. The SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347), as amended, included a
statutory mandate to scan all U.S. maritime cargo with nonintrusive inspection equipment at
overseas ports of loading by July 2012. On May 2, 2012, Homeland Security Secretary
Napolitano notified Congress that she would exercise her authority to extend the 100% scanning
deadline. Thus, cargo screening could become a focus of additional legislation in the 114th
Congress, among other issues.
Miscellaneous Tariff Bill (MTB)15
Many Members of Congress have introduced bills that support importer requests for the
temporary suspension of tariffs on chemicals, raw materials, or other nondomestically made
components generally used as inputs in the manufacturing process. A rationale for these requests
is that they help domestic producers of manufactured goods reduce costs, making their products
more competitive. Due to the large number of bills typically introduced, they are often packaged
together in a broader miscellaneous tariff bill. P.L. 111-227, the most recent MTB, was enacted on
August 11, 2010 and expired on December 31, 2012.
Legislation could emerge in the 114th Congress proposing to retroactively renew these duty
suspensions, enact new ones, or make procedural changes to the MTB process. Consideration of
an MTB bill could be controversial because of past congressional moratoriums on “earmarks,”
which have included measures to provide “limited tariff benefits.”
Trade Adjustment Assistance16
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) provides federal assistance to domestic workers, firms, and
farmers who have been adversely affected by increased trade liberalization. It is justified
presently, as it has been historically, on grounds that the government has an obligation to help
those hurt by policy-driven trade opening. TAA is also presented as an alternative to policies that
would restrict imports, and so provides assistance for adversely affected workers and firms while
bolstering freer trade and diminishing prospects for potentially costly tension (retaliation) among
trade partners. As in the past, critics debate the merits of TAA on equity, efficiency, and budgetary
grounds.
The TAA program for workers is the largest TAA program. It supports qualified workers who
have lost their jobs because of increased imports or because of production shifts to a foreign
country. The program has operated under several different sets of provisions in recent years.
While the specific benefits under the program have varied, the primary benefits under the TAA
for workers program are (1) training subsidies to prepare workers for new occupations and (2)

15 Written by Vivian C. Jones, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-7823. See CRS Report RL33867,
Miscellaneous Tariff Bills: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Vivian C. Jones.
16 Written by M. Angeles Villarreal, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-0321 and Benjamin Collins,
Analyst in Labor Policy, x7-7382. For more information, see CRS Report R42012, Trade Adjustment Assistance for
Workers, by Benjamin Collins; CRS Report RS20210, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms: Economic, Program,
and Policy Issues, by Glennon J. Harrison; CRS Report R40206, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers, by Mark A.
McMinimy; and CRS Report R41922, Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy, by J. F.
Hornbeck.
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income support for workers who are enrolled in training and have exhausted their unemployment
insurance. Prior to 2009, the program was limited to dislocated production workers. From 2009 to
2013, service workers were also eligible to be certified to TAA benefits. Beginning in 2014,
eligibility for new petitioners was once again limited to production workers.
In addition to the TAA for workers program, TAA programs are also available to firms and
farmers that have been adversely affected by international competition. TAA for firms supports
trade-impacted businesses by providing technical assistance in developing business recovery
plans and by providing matching funds to implement those plans. TAA for farmers provides
technical support and cash benefits to producers of agricultural commodities and fisherman who
are adversely affected by increased imports.
TAA is authorized by Title II of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. It was last reauthorized by
the Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011 (TAAEA; Title II of P.L. 112-40).
TAAEA was considered and passed alongside the three 2011 FTAs. Under TAAEA, the TAA
program was set to be phased out beginning December 31, 2014. However, the Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provided funding for the program
and the appropriation bill’s explanatory statement expressed the intent of providing for “the full
operation of the program throughout fiscal year 2015.”
TAA renewal continues to spur debate in Congress. Some members have suggested that TAA
reauthorizations be tied to the granting of trade negotiating authority. On July 30, 2013, President
Obama announced support for reauthorization of TAA and linked it to the passage of the Trade
Promotion Authority. In the 113th Congress, legislation was introduced to extend and reauthorize
TAA (H.R. 4163 and S. 2964). Some Members question the need for renewal of TAA and suggest
that dislocations caused by trade should be addressed by broader U.S. employment and worker
training programs.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)17
The international protection and enforcement of IPR—such as patents, copyrights, trademarks,
and trade secrets—is a major component of U.S. trade policy, due to the significant role of IPR in
the U.S. economy and the potentially negative commercial, health, safety, and security
consequences of counterfeiting and piracy. The United States pursues intellectual property
objectives using a range of trade policy mechanisms, including multilaterally through the WTO,
which administers the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS Agreement”); regionally and bilaterally through the negotiation and enforcement of
FTAs; and domestically through U.S. trade laws.
IPR and U.S. Trade Negotiations
IPR protection and enforcement have been a key negotiating objective in U.S. trade agreement
negotiations. The United States generally seeks intellectual property commitments that exceed the

17 Written by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-9253; and Ian F. Fergusson,
Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-4997. See CRS Report RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and
International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Ian F. Fergusson; and CRS In Focus IF10033, Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR) and International Trade (In Focus), by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Ian F. Fergusson.
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minimum standards of the WTO TRIPS Agreement, known as “TRIPS-plus.” In the 114th
Congress, issues include possible oversight of enforcement of IPR commitments in existing U.S.
FTAs and the treatment of IPR issues in current U.S. trade negotiations on TPP and T-TIP.
Newer prominent IPR issues have surfaced in the current TPP and T-TIP negotiations, such as
IPR issues related to the digital environment, including
• Internet Service Provider (ISP) liability;
• trade secret protection to combat cybertheft; and
• cross-border data flows, localization barriers, and data privacy.
Other key IPR issues in these trade negotiations include
• the scope of patentability;
• pharmaceutical patents and implications for access to medicines;
• data exclusivity for pharmaceuticals and biologics (restrictions on using test data
given for market approval); and
• treatment of geographical indications (GIs, which protect distinctive products
from a certain region, applying primarily to agricultural products) and their effect
on market access.
The proposed TPP and T-TIP could be used to develop common IPR approaches for addressing
issues of mutual interest related to countries outside of these FTAs, as well as through the WTO.
IPR and Other U.S. Trade Policy Tools
The United States has certain domestic trade policy tools to advance IPR goals. These tools may
be particularly relevant in addressing U.S. IPR goals with respect to key emerging economies,
such as China, India, and Brazil, which are not a part of existing U.S. FTAs or current FTA
negotiations.
One tool is the “Special 301” report, which the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
publishes annually, pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. The report identifies countries
that do not offer “adequate and effective” IPR protection, designating the countries on various
“watch lists.” A country can be designated even if it is complying with its TRIPS commitments.
Special 301 designations, according to USTR, are based on interagency deliberations, as well as
consultations with Congress, affected stakeholders, foreign governments, and other interested
parties. China and India are among countries of top concern identified in the report. Trade secret
theft, including through cybertheft, is a growing area of focus. The 114th Congress could examine
the effectiveness of the Special 301 in encouraging countries’ compliance with their IPR
commitments, as well as whether Special 301 designations represent a balanced assessment of
countries’ IPR regimes.
Another tool is Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, which authorizes the U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC) to prohibit imports of products into the United States that
infringe on U.S. intellectual property. Section 337 cases have been largely patent-focused. In the
112th Congress, legislative efforts related to Section 337 focused on addressing jurisdictional
problems associated with holding foreign websites accountable for piracy and counterfeiting,
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renewing debate about the balance between protecting U.S. intellectual property and promoting
innovation. Since then, digital IPR infringement issues have remained a core IPR focus in U.S.
trade negotiations. The 114th Congress could take these issues up again, as well as other issues,
including CBP’s enforcement of Section 337 exclusion orders. Concerns have been raised by
some Members, as well as other stakeholders, about the effectiveness, efficiency, and
transparency of the Section 337 enforcement process.
International Investment
The United States is the largest source and recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the
world. This dual position points to one aspect of globalization, the spread of economic activity by
firms across national borders, which has become a prominent feature of the U.S. economy.
Globalization also means the United States has important economic, political, and social interests
at stake in the development of international policies regarding direct investment. Congress weighs
in on all aspects of these international investment issues.
Foreign Investment and National Security18
The United States has established domestic policies that treat foreign investors no less favorably
than U.S. firms, with some exceptions for national security. Under current U.S. law, the President
exercises broad discretionary authority over developing and implementing U.S. direct investment
policy, including the authority to suspend or block investments that “threaten to impair the
national security.” Despite the leading role of the President, Congress also is directly involved in
formulating the scope and direction of U.S. foreign investment policy. For instance, following the
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, some Members questioned the
traditional U.S. open-door policy and argued for greater consideration of the long-term impact of
foreign direct investment on the structure and industrial capacity of the economy, and on the
ability of the economy to meet the needs of U.S. defense and security interests.
In July 2007, Congress asserted its own role in making and conducting foreign investment policy
when it adopted and the President signed the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of
2007 (P.L. 110-49) that formally established the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS). This law broadens Congress’s oversight role, and explicitly includes the areas of
homeland security and critical infrastructure as separately identifiable components of national
security that the President must consider when evaluating the national security implications of
foreign investment transactions. The law also grants the President the authority to suspend or
block foreign investments that are judged to threaten U.S. national security, although the law does
not define what constitutes national security relative to a foreign investment. To date, the law has
been used twice to block a foreign acquisition of a U.S. firm. At times, the act has drawn
Congress into a greater dialogue over the role of foreign investment in the economy and the
relationship between foreign investment and the general concept of national economic security.

18 Written by James K. Jackson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-7751. See CRS Report RL34561,
Foreign Investment and National Security: Economic Considerations, by James K. Jackson; CRS Report RS22863,
Foreign Investment, CFIUS, and Homeland Security: An Overview, by James K. Jackson; and CRS Report IF00027,
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (In Focus), by James K. Jackson.
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U.S. International Investment Agreements19
The United States promotes international investment agreements to reduce restrictions on foreign
investment, ensure nondiscriminatory treatment of foreign investment, protect investor rights,
provide impartial investor-state dispute settlement, and balance other U.S. policy interests.
International investment agreements typically take two forms: bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
and BIT-like chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs). In April 2012, the Obama Administration
announced the conclusion of its review of the U.S. Model BIT, the template the United States
uses to negotiate with foreign countries on BITs and investment chapters in FTAs. BITs are
submitted to Congress as treaties, which require a two-thirds vote of approval in the Senate for
ratification. FTAs, by contrast, require simple majority approval of the trade agreement
implementing legislation by both Houses of Congress.
The 2012 Model BIT maintains the “core” or substantive investor protections affirmed in the
2004 Model BIT review. In addition, it clarifies that BIT obligations apply to state-owned
enterprises (SOEs); includes language further limiting performance requirements; clarifies labor
and environmental provisions; clarifies which financial services provisions may fall under a
prudential exception (such as to address balance of payments problems); and expands
transparency obligations, among other provisions. The conclusion of the Model BIT review has
renewed interest in concluding previously launched negotiations and launching negotiations with
other U.S. trading partners. Focal points on the U.S. BIT agenda include ongoing negotiations
with China and India, countries with markets that include both significant market opportunities
and challenges. The United States also continues to explore the possibility of investment treaties
with other trading partners, including the East African Community (EAC).
Investment policy issues feature prominently in U.S. FTA negotiations. Over the past several
years, the United States has been negotiating the TPP with eleven other countries in the Asia-
Pacific and, more recently, the T-TIP with the European Union. In both negotiations, a
particularly active area of debate has been investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), which allows
investors to bring claims against forum governments for binding resolution in an impartial forum.
ISDS elicits debate about the relationship between protecting investors and ensuring
governments’ ability to regulate in the public interest. Additionally, for both TPP and T-TIP, any
investment commitments reached could be used to signal the importance of investment
protections to third countries or develop common international investment rules. Given the scale
and scope of international investment that would be covered under these agreements, the
treatment of investment may continue to be a key issue for Members of Congress during the 114th
Congress.
Promoting Investment in the United States20
U.S. investment policy includes a focus on attracting investment to the United States. The
Department of Commerce’s SelectUSA program, established by Executive Order 13577 (June
2011), is intended to coordinate federal efforts to attract and retain investment in the United
States, complementing states’ investment promotion activities. Its role includes serving as an

19 Written by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, x7-9253 and Martin A. Weiss, x7-5407, Specialists in International Trade and
Finance. CRS Report R43052, U.S. International Investment Agreements: Issues for Congress, by Shayerah Ilias
Akhtar and Martin A. Weiss.
20 Ibid.
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information resource on investment; helping to resolve investment issues involving federal
programs and activities; and advocating at a national level to attract inward investment.
SelectUSA seeks to be geographically neutral regarding investment locations in the United States.
In the 113th Congress, legislation was introduced to authorize appropriations for SelectUSA for
FY2014-2018 (H.R. 1413/S. 1608). The 114th Congress could consider SelectUSA’s authorization
status, funding levels, and effectiveness in supporting U.S. investment goals.
International Finance, Institutions, and Crises
The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) include the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
whose main task is ensuring international monetary and financial stability, and several
multilateral development banks (MDBs), including the World Bank and four regional
development banks—the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank. The
United States is a member and major contributor to all these institutions.
The IFIs and the Group of Twenty (G-20) major economies were at the forefront of the global
response to the financial crisis in 2008 and ensuing crisis in the Eurozone, dramatically increasing
their lending to help countries absorb the impact of reduced economic growth and its effects on
trade and financial flows. To cover increased lending, the IMF and the MDBs sought new donor
resources. The rise of emerging markets in the global economy and their role in the international
financial architecture is also a major policy issue. As the urgency of the financial crisis and
Eurozone crisis has waned, attention has turned from crisis response measures to promoting
sustainable growth in the global economy.
International Monetary Fund21
Recent congressional attention has centered on how IMF resources have been used since the 2008
global economic crisis, on proposed IMF governance changes, and on the IMF’s role in the
Eurozone debt crisis.
In December 2010, the Board of Governors of the IMF agreed to a wide-ranging set of
institutional reforms. If enacted, they would increase the institution’s core source of funding and
expand the representation of major emerging market countries, such as Brazil, India, China, and
Mexico. In order for key elements of the reform package to take effect, IMF rules dictate that the
reforms must be approved by three-fifths of IMF members (113) representing 85% of the total
voting power. Under this formula, approval by the United States is essential because it controls
16.75% of the voting power. Under U.S. law, congressional authorization is required for the
United States to consent to change the U.S. quota in the IMF, which determines the U.S. share of
total voting power. Furthermore, depending on the budgetary treatment of any newly authorized
U.S. contributions to the IMF, appropriations may be required.

21 Written by Martin A. Weiss, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-5407. See CRS Report R42019,
International Monetary Fund: Background and Issues for Congress, by Martin A. Weiss; CRS Report R42844, IMF
Reforms: Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A. Weiss; CRS Report RL33626, International
Monetary Fund: Reforming Country Representation, by Martin A. Weiss; and CRS Report IF00015, IMF Quota and
Governance Reforms (In Focus), by Martin A. Weiss.
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To date, a majority of IMF member countries have approved these reforms, but the United States
has not. In spring 2013, there was discussion about including the IMF reform package in Ukraine-
related legislation. The Senate Ukraine assistance bill (S. 2124), as introduced and passed by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, included IMF reform language but was removed by Senate
leadership to ease passage in the House, where there was greater opposition. Critics argued that
the IMF has sufficient available capital to fund any potential loan program and that there are
“exceptional access” procedures in the event that Ukraine needs to borrow beyond its access
limits. Rather than attaching the IMF language to a Ukraine-related measure, they argued, it
would be more prudent to address U.S. funding to the IMF as part of the regular appropriations
process.
U.S. inaction reportedly created tensions at the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings in October
2013 and October 2014, with some IMF members frustrated because the United States was
instrumental in initially advancing some of the reforms.
Multilateral Development Banks22
Many policymakers view U.S. participation in the MDBs as important because the United States
is the largest overall shareholder at the MDBs, a position which also defines its power to veto,
which it can exercise under certain circumstances. The Obama Administration has strongly
supported capital increases and concessional replenishments at the MDBs, but cautioned that the
increases must be tied to policy reforms to: improve transparency, accountability, and
governance; better align management performance and incentives with improved development
outcomes; and delineate more clearly the division of labor between the World Bank and the
regional development banks. Congress may evaluate the effectiveness of and possibly consider
future appropriations for MDBs.
The BRICs Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
On October 24, 2014, China and 20 other countries signed an agreement to establish a new
development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As its name suggests, the
new entity is expected to focus on financing infrastructure projects throughout the region. The
AIIB announcement followed closely an agreement in July 2014 on a separate development
institution, the New Development Bank (NDB), by the leaders of the BRICS countries, Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Some observers are concerned that these new
development banks may be duplicative of existing multilateral and regional institutions, and
might provide financing with minimal, if any, policy conditionality and without adhering to
established environmental and social safeguards, which many developing countries believe are
too burdensome. By contrast, the United States and other major donors consider policy
conditionality, safeguards, and other best practices, measures such as rules on procurement, as
being central to the effectiveness of development assistance, and have used their leadership in the
MDBs to advance these priorities.

22 Written by Martin A. Weiss, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-5407. See CRS Report R41170,
Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson; and CRS Report R41537,
Multilateral Development Banks: How the United States Makes and Implements Policy, by Rebecca M. Nelson and
Martin A. Weiss.
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While the United States has not outright opposed the creation of the AIIB and the BRICs Bank,
officials have reportedly pressured governments from joining. U.S. State Department officials
have also publicly raised reservations about the AIIB, noting that any new institutions should
“incorporate high standards of governance, environmental and social safeguards.” During the
114th Congress, Members may choose to monitor the development of these institutions and
explore options for the Administration to meaningfully engage with them.
G-2023
The Group of 20, or G-20, is the premier forum for international economic cooperation and
coordination, and includes 20 major advanced and emerging-market economies that, together,
account for two-thirds of the world’s population and 90% of world GDP. Members of the G-20
include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, and
the United States, as well as the European Union (EU). The leaders of the G-20 countries hold
annual “summits,” as well as more frequent gatherings of finance ministers, central bankers, and
other officials. Discussions and agreements primarily focus on international economic and
financial issues, although related topics, such as development, food security, and the environment,
may also be featured.
The G-20 has a rotating presidency, which was held by Australia in 2014. Australia focused the
2014 agenda on global economic growth. In February 2014, the G-20 finance ministers and
central bank governors pledged to develop policies that would boost the G-20’s collective GDP
by 2.1% over the next five years. At the 2014 summit held in Brisbane, Australia in November,
the G-20 leaders announced a “Brisbane Action Plan” of individual country commitments and
collective actions to meet this goal. At the November summit, leaders also discussed a range of
issues, including investment in infrastructure, climate change, trade liberalization, female
participation in the workforce, anti-corruption efforts, Ebola, and reforms at the IMF.
Russia’s participation in the 2014 summit was one of the most controversial issues. Several G-20
members, including the United States, the EU, Australia, Canada, and Japan, have imposed
economic sanctions on Russian individuals and entities in response to Russia’s annexation of the
Crimean region of Ukraine and efforts to destabilize eastern and southern Ukraine. In March
2014, the United States and other countries announced that they were effectively banning Russia
from the G-8, a small forum for advanced economies, and instead would convene as the G-7,
which excludes Russia. Some analysts and policy makers also called for Russia to be excluded
from the G-20 summit in November. Russian President Vladimir Putin ultimately did attend the
G-20 summit, although left early. Reportedly, Russia’s actions in Ukraine and sanctions were the
subject of heated debates in meetings, although the issues were not reflected in the official
summit communiqué. Some analysts argue that, regardless of the other outcomes of the summit,
Australia’s G-20 legacy will be the precedent that members are not excluded from G-20
discussions.

23 Written by Rebecca M. Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-6819. See CRS Report R40977,
The G-20 and International Economic Cooperation: Background and Implications for Congress, by Rebecca M.
Nelson.
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The Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis24
The United States and Europe have the largest bilateral economic relationship in the world, and
many Members of Congress have stressed that a robust European economy is important to U.S.
interests. Members have closely monitored the economic crisis in the Eurozone and subsequent
economic developments in Europe. Beginning in late 2009, the Eurozone faced an economic
crisis that has posed serious threats to economic stability in Europe and the broader international
economy. The concerns of investors and policymakers have focused on high, and potentially
unsustainable, levels of public and private debt in some Eurozone countries, particularly Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus. Concerns about debt levels were compounded by
weaknesses in the Eurozone banking system, slow or negative growth, high unemployment, and
persistent trade imbalances within the Eurozone. The financial crisis also became a political
crisis, provoking large scale protests and directly or indirectly leading to the fall of several
governments in Europe. European leaders and institutions pursued a number of policies to stem
the crisis. Many analysts argue that, ultimately, measures by the European Central Bank helped
calm market pressure and attenuate the crisis.
Although the acute phase of the Eurozone crisis appears to have subsided, the Eurozone faces
many long-term economic challenges, particularly related to growth, unemployment, and high
debt levels. Some economists believe that the Eurozone could be heading towards a period of
economic stagnation. This includes Germany, which many view as a vital engine of growth for
the rest of the Eurozone. A prolonged economic slowdown could have implications for the U.S.
economy, and particularly could depress demand for U.S. exports. The launch of T-TIP was in
part an effort to stimulate economic growth and expand export opportunities in the region.
Argentina Sovereign Debt Default25
In December 2001, a severe financial crisis led Argentina to default on nearly $100 billion in
foreign debt owed to private creditors, the IMF, and foreign governments. At the time, it was the
largest sovereign default in history. Argentina repaid the IMF in full in 2006 but only reached an
agreement to repay the Paris Club creditor governments (including the United States) in May
2014. In terms of debt owed to private creditors, Argentina restructured more than 90% of the
debt owed to private bondholders. A small group of private investors, the holdouts, did not
participate in the exchanges and have not received any payment from Argentina since the 2001
default. The holdouts, mostly hedge funds that bought the bonds in secondary markets at steep
discounts, have pursued litigation to seek full repayment from Argentina, primarily in the United
States, since a large proportion of Argentine bonds were issued under New York law. Recent court
rulings have been in favor of the holdouts. As a result of the court rulings, U.S. financial
institutions legally cannot transfer interest payments from Argentina to holders of the restructured
bonds, if Argentina does not also pay the holdouts. Argentina has not paid the holdouts, and in
July 2014, funds transferred from Argentina to an intermediary bank could not be disbursed to the
holders of the restructured bonds. On July 30, 2014, the credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s

24 Written by Rebecca M. Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-6819. See CRS Report R42377,
The Eurozone Crisis: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson.
25 Written by Rebecca Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-6819 and Martin Weiss, Specialist in
International Trade and Finance, x7-5047. See CRS Report R43816, Argentina: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Mark P. Sullivan and Rebecca M. Nelson.
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declared Argentina to be in default, for the eighth time in Argentina’s history. Some analysts
expect Argentina to reach a settlement with the holdouts in 2015.
In the past, policymakers have been frustrated by Argentina’s reluctance to settle with U.S.
bondholders and members of the Paris Club. It remains to be seen how recent events will affect
U.S. policy towards Argentina. On one hand, Argentina has taken steps to repay debt owed to the
U.S. government, which may cause U.S. policymakers to soften their policy stance towards
Argentina. Formalization of the Paris Club deal between Argentina and the United States, for
example, is expected to lift restrictions on some types of U.S. assistance to Argentina. On the
other hand, tensions between the Argentine government and holdouts may be increasing, which
could cause U.S. policymakers to take a stronger stand.
Currency Debates26
Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about the exchange rate policies of other
countries and how they are impacting the competitiveness of U.S. goods. Generally, Member
concerns have focused on the claim that certain countries are using, or have used in the past,
various economic policies to “manipulate” or unfairly lower the value of their currency in order
to boost exports at the expense of other countries, including the United States. Although concerns
have long focused on China, recently attention has also focused on Japan. Japan’s currency, the
yen, has depreciated against the U.S. dollar by about 50% between mid-2012 and the end of 2014
following a new set of expansionary monetary policies, similar to the Fed’s quantitative easing
programs.
Some economists are skeptical about “currency manipulation” and whether it is a significant
problem. They raise questions about whether government policies have long-term effects on
exchange rates; whether it is possible to differentiate between “manipulation” and legitimate
central bank activities; and the net effect of alleged currency manipulation on the U.S. economy.
Some Members of Congress have called for “currency manipulation” to be addressed either
through free-standing legislation (for example, see H.R. 1276 and S. 1114 introduced in the
113th Congress) or in trade negotiations. In 2013, 230 Representatives and 60 Senators sent letters
to the Obama Administration calling for currency manipulation to be addressed in trade
agreements under negotiation, particularly the TPP. Additionally, addressing currency
manipulation is identified as a principal negotiating objective in the proposed TPA legislation
introduced in the House and the Senate in January 2014. It is not clear to what extent TPP
negotiators are discussing currency issues. The 114th Congress may consider currency issues
during debates about TPA and ongoing trade negotiations.
Select CRS Products
Select CRS products follow on key trade and finance issues for the 114th Congress that are
discussed in this report. The products take the form of reports or In Focus products, which are
two-page executive briefs.

26 Written by Rebecca Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, x7-6819. See CRS Report R43242,
Current Debates over Exchange Rates: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson; and CRS In Focus
IF00045, Debates over “Currency Manipulation” (In Focus), by Rebecca M. Nelson.
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Renewal of Trade Promotion Authority
Reports
CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade
Policy, by Ian F. Fergusson.
CRS Report R43491, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions, by Ian F.
Fergusson and Richard S. Beth.
CRS Report RS21004, Trade Promotion Authority and Fast-Track Negotiating Authority for
Trade Agreements: Major Votes, by Carolyn C. Smith.
CRS Report 97-896, Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive
Agreements Rather Than Treaties, by Jane M. Smith, Daniel T. Shedd, and Brandon J. Murrill.
CRS Report RL33944, U.S. Trade Concepts, Performance, and Policy: Frequently Asked
Questions, coordinated by Wayne M. Morrison.
In Focus
CRS In Focus IF00002, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) , by Ian F. Fergusson
Trade Agreements and Negotiations
Reports
CRS Report R42694, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress,
coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson.
CRS Report R42344, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative Trade and
Economic Analysis, by Brock R. Williams.
CRS Report R43387, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) Negotiations, by
Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Vivian C. Jones.
CRS Report R43158, Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP): In Brief,
by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Vivian C. Jones.
CRS Report RL34330, The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions
and Implementation, coordinated by Brock R. Williams.
CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues, by M.
Angeles Villarreal.
CRS Report R42965, NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects, by M. Angeles Villarreal and
Ian F. Fergusson.
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CRS Report RL31356, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S.
Trade Policy, by William H. Cooper.
CRS Report RS22154, World Trade Organization (WTO) Decisions and Their Effect in U.S. Law,
by Jane M. Smith, Brandon J. Murrill, and Daniel T. Shedd.
CRS Report RS20088, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO): An Overview,
by Daniel T. Shedd, Brandon J. Murrill, and Jane M. Smith.
In Focus
CRS In Focus IF10000, Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, by Brock R. Williams and Ian F.
Fergusson.
CRS In Focus IF00005, Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) , by
Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Vivian C. Jones.
CRS In Focus IF10002, The World Trade Organization at 20, by Ian F. Fergusson.
U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relations
Reports
CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison.
CRS Report RL33534, China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for
the United States, by Wayne M. Morrison.
CRS Report RS21625, China’s Currency Policy: An Analysis of the Economic Issues, by Wayne
M. Morrison and Marc Labonte.
CRS Report RL34314, China’s Holdings of U.S. Securities: Implications for the U.S. Economy,
by Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte.
CRS Report R41748, China and the United States—A Comparison of Green Energy Programs
and Policies, by Richard J. Campbell.
In Focus
CRS Report IF10030, U.S.-China Trade Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison.
U.S. Trade Promotion and Financing
Reports
CRS Report R41929, Boosting U.S. Exports: Selected Issues for Congress, by Shayerah Ilias
Akhtar et al.
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CRS Report R41495, U.S. Government Agencies Involved in Export Promotion: Overview and
Issues for Congress, coordinated by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.
CRS Report R43581, Export-Import Bank: Overview and Reauthorization Issues, by Shayerah
Ilias Akhtar.
CRS Report R43671, Export-Import Bank Reauthorization: Frequently Asked Questions,
coordinated by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.
CRS Report 98-567, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation: Background and Legislative
Issues, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.
In Focus
CRS Report IF00039, Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank and the Federal Budget (In Focus), by Mindy
R. Levit.
CRS Report IF10017, Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) Reauthorization, by Shayerah Ilias
Akhtar.
Export Controls and Sanctions
Reports
CRS Report R41916, The U.S. Export Control System and the President’s Reform Initiative, by
Ian F. Fergusson and Paul K. Kerr.
CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters:
In Brief, by Dianne E. Rennack.
CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by
Dianne E. Rennack.
CRS Report R43492, Achievements of and Outlook for Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman.
CRS Report RL33948, State and Local Economic Sanctions: Constitutional Issues, by Michael
John Garcia and Todd Garvey.
CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E.
Rennack.
CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?, by Mark E. Manyin.
CRS Report RL33460, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel.
CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions:
Selected Current Law, by Dianne E. Rennack.
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CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan.
Import Policies
Reports
CRS Report RL34524, International Trade: Rules of Origin, by Vivian C. Jones and Michael F.
Martin.
CRS Report RL33867, Miscellaneous Tariff Bills: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Vivian
C. Jones.
CRS Report RL32371, Trade Remedies: A Primer, by Vivian C. Jones.
CRS Report R41429, Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options, coordinated by
Vivian C. Jones.
CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences: Background and Renewal Debate, by
Vivian C. Jones.
CRS Report RS22541, Generalized System of Preferences: Agricultural Imports, by Renée
Johnson.
CRS Report R43173, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Background and
Reauthorization, by Brock R. Williams.
CRS Report RS22548, ATPA Renewal: Background and Issues, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
CRS Report R43014, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and
Security, by Vivian C. Jones.
CRS Report R41922, Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy, by J.
F. Hornbeck.
CRS Report R42012, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers, by Benjamin Collins.
CRS Report RS20210, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms: Economic, Program, and Policy
Issues, by Glennon J. Harrison.
CRS Report R40206, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers, by Mark A. McMinimy.
In Focus
CRS In Focus IF10018, Trade Remedies: Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, by Vivian C.
Jones.
CRS In Focus IF00041, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) , by Brock R. Williams.
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International Property Rights in U.S. Trade Policy
Reports
CRS Report RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias
Akhtar and Ian F. Fergusson.
CRS Report R41107, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Background and Key
Issues, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.
CRS Report RS22880, Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Enforcement: Section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.
In Focus
CRS Report IF10033, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and International Trade, by Shayerah
Ilias Akhtar and Ian F. Fergusson.
International Investment
Reports
CRS Report R43052, U.S. International Investment Agreements: Issues for Congress, by
Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Martin A. Weiss.
CRS Report RL33984, Foreign Direct Investment: Current Issues, by James K. Jackson.
CRS Report RL32462, Foreign Investment in U.S. Securities, by James K. Jackson.
CRS Report RL33388, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), by
James K. Jackson.
CRS Report RL32461, Outsourcing and Insourcing Jobs in the U.S. Economy: Evidence Based
on Foreign Investment Data, by James K. Jackson.
International Finance, Institutions, and Crises
Reports
CRS Report R41170, Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress, by
Rebecca M. Nelson.
CRS Report RS20792, Multilateral Development Banks: U.S. Contributions FY2000-FY2014, by
Rebecca M. Nelson.
CRS Report R42019, International Monetary Fund: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Martin A. Weiss.
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CRS Report R42844, IMF Reforms: Issues for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A.
Weiss.
CRS Report R42377, The Eurozone Crisis: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by
Rebecca M. Nelson.
CRS Report R40977, The G-20 and International Economic Cooperation: Background and
Implications for Congress, by Rebecca M. Nelson.
CRS Report R43242, Current Debates over Exchange Rates: Overview and Issues for Congress,
by Rebecca M. Nelson.
CRS Report R43816, Argentina: Background and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan and
Rebecca M. Nelson.
In Focus
CRS Report IF00045, Debates over “Currency Manipulation” (In Focus), by Rebecca M.
Nelson.
CRS Report IF00015, IMF Quota and Governance Reforms (In Focus), by Martin A. Weiss.

Author Contact Information

Mary A. Irace, Coordinator
James K. Jackson
Section Research Manager
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
mirace@crs.loc.gov, 7-7679
jjackson@crs.loc.gov, 7-7751
Brock R. Williams, Coordinator
Wayne M. Morrison
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
bwilliams@crs.loc.gov, 7-1157
wmorrison@crs.loc.gov, 7-7767
Shayerah Ilias Akhtar
Rebecca M. Nelson
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
siliasakhtar@crs.loc.gov, 7-9253
rnelson@crs.loc.gov, 7-6819
Benjamin Collins
Dianne E. Rennack
Analyst in Labor Policy
Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation
bcollins@crs.loc.gov, 7-7382
drennack@crs.loc.gov, 7-7608
Ian F. Fergusson
M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
ifergusson@crs.loc.gov, 7-4997
avillarreal@crs.loc.gov, 7-0321
Vivian C. Jones
Martin A. Weiss
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
vcjones@crs.loc.gov, 7-7823
mweiss@crs.loc.gov, 7-5407

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Acknowledgments
Previous versions of this report were coordinated by Jeff Hornbeck and William Cooper, former CRS
Specialists in International Trade and Finance
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