Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
December 16, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42917
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
Congress has maintained significant interest in neighboring Mexico, a close ally and top trade
partner whose political and economic situation has significant ramifications for the United States.
President Enrique Peña Nieto of the centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) assumed the
Mexican presidency on December 1, 2012, after 12 years of rule by the conservative National
Action Party (PAN). Peña Nieto has enacted structural reforms and bolstered economic relations
with the United States, but observers maintain he mishandled recent high-profile human rights
cases and allegations of a conflict of interest between his family and a government contractor.
President Peña Nieto’s first two years in office have brought mixed results for Mexico. During
2013, Peña Nieto’s “Pact for Mexico” agreement with the PAN and leftist Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD) facilitated the passage of significant financial, education,
telecommunications, and energy reforms. Still, the economy faltered (GDP growth fell from 3.7%
in 2012 to 1.2% in 2013) and some types of violent crime—including kidnapping and extortion—
increased. Implementation of the reforms began in 2014, but has been overshadowed by the
government’s inability to resolve a case involving 43 students who were forcibly abducted from
Guerrero in September. Local and state officials’ alleged complicity in the forced disappearance—
and likely murder—of the students, as well as federal mishandling of the investigation, have been
widely criticized and sparked ongoing protests.
U.S. Policy
As Mexico has experienced a presidential transition from a PAN to a PRI government, U.S.-
Mexican relations have also evolved. President Obama has embraced Peña Nieto’s desire to
bolster economic ties and focus on issues beyond security, including education and trade
facilitation. Those issues figured prominently during President Obama’s participation in the
February 2014 North American Leaders’ Summit and are likely to be discussed at a bilateral
meeting between Presidents Obama and Peña Nieto scheduled for January 6, 2015. Now that
Mexico has implemented historic energy reforms, energy cooperation has accelerated. U.S.-
Mexican security cooperation has continued under the Mérida Initiative framework; its focus is
on justice sector reform and securing Mexico’s southern border. Mexico has stepped up efforts to
combat illegal Central American migration. However, some U.S. stakeholders remain frustrated at
Mexico’s failure to fully and predictably make water deliveries in the Rio Grande Valley, as per a
1944 water sharing treaty. The Mexican government has welcomed President Obama’s recent
executive order on immigration, which may impact 3 million unauthorized Mexicans in the
United States.
Legislative Action
A range of issues affecting Mexico have received congressional attention during the 113th
Congress. The Senate passed S. 744 in June 2013, a comprehensive immigration reform bill that
includes additional funding for border security. In December 2013, Congress approved the U.S.-
Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement that is intended to facilitate joint development
of oil and natural gas in part of the Gulf of Mexico (P.L. 113-67). Congress has continued
oversight of the Mérida Initiative and provided $194 million in Mérida assistance to Mexico in
the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 113-76, subject to human rights conditions.
The Obama Administration asked for $115 million for Mérida in its FY2015 budget request.
Congress approved the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R.
Congressional Research Service
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
83) on December 13, 2014, and it is awaiting the President’s signature. H.R. 83 included $194
million in Mérida Initiative aid for Mexico.
The recent energy reforms that Mexico has enacted have generated congressional interest, as has
Mexico’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations.
Further Reading
CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by
Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea.
CRS Report R43001, Supporting Criminal Justice System Reform in Mexico: The U.S. Role, by
Clare Ribando Seelke.
CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M.
Angeles Villarreal.
CRS Report R43313, Mexico’s Oil and Gas Sector: Background, Reform Efforts, and
Implications for the United States, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
CRS Report R43312, U.S.-Mexico Water Sharing: Background and Recent Developments, by
Nicole T. Carter, Clare Ribando Seelke, and Daniel T. Shedd.
CRS Report R43320, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 113th Congress, coordinated by
Andorra Bruno.
CRS Report R43798, The Obama Administration’s November 2014 Immigration Initiatives:
Questions and Answers, by Kate M. Manuel.
Congressional Research Service
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Political Situation ............................................................................................................................. 1
July 1, 2012, Elections: Return of PRI Dominance ................................................................... 3
Structure and Leadership in the Pena Nieto Administration ...................................................... 4
The Pact for Mexico and Structural Reform .............................................................................. 5
Security and Institutional Reform: Responding to Events in Iguala, Guerrero ......................... 7
2015 Mid-Term Elections ........................................................................................................ 10
Foreign Policy ......................................................................................................................... 11
Economic and Social Conditions ................................................................................................... 11
Growth: Will Reforms Bring Faster GDP Growth? ................................................................. 12
Combating Poverty .................................................................................................................. 13
U.S. Relations and Issues for Congress ......................................................................................... 14
Security and U.S. Assistance through the Mérida Initiative .................................................... 15
Human Rights and Judicial Reform ......................................................................................... 17
Trade, NAFTA, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) ....................................................... 19
Migration and Border Issues ................................................................................................... 21
Mexico-U.S. Immigration Issues ...................................................................................... 21
Dealing with Central American Migration, Including Unaccompanied Children ............. 23
Modernizing the U.S.-Mexico Border ............................................................................... 23
Mexico’s Energy Reforms ....................................................................................................... 25
Water Sharing .......................................................................................................................... 27
Colorado River .................................................................................................................. 27
Rio Grande ........................................................................................................................ 28
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 29
Figures
Figure 1. Mexico at a Glance ........................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Composition of the Mexican Congress ............................................................................ 3
Figure 3. Snapshot of the U.S.-Mexico Border ............................................................................. 24
Tables
Table 1. Key Reforms Enacted During 2013-2014 .......................................................................... 6
Table 2. FY2008–FY2015 Mérida Funding for Mexico ................................................................ 16
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 30
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 30
Congressional Research Service
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Key Policy Staff ............................................................................................................................. 30
Congressional Research Service
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Introduction
Congress has maintained a strong interest in Mexico, a top trade partner and energy supplier, with
which the United States shares a nearly 2,000 mile border and strong cultural and historical ties.
Economically, the United States and Mexico are heavily interdependent, and the U.S. economy
could benefit if Mexico is able to boost its economic growth rates by successfully implementing
the historic reforms its Congress enacted in 2013. Similarly, security conditions in Mexico affect
U.S. national security, particularly along the U.S.-Mexico border. Mexico’s apparent inability to
effectively combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law has implications for U.S. economic
and strategic interests in the country and underscores the need for continued cooperation on those
issues. Maintaining strong bilateral cooperation, while also protecting U.S. interests, has been a
key concern for Congress.
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) President Enrique Peña Nieto, former governor of the
state of Mexico, took office on December 1, 2012, pledging to significantly reduce violent crime
and bolster economic growth. Despite shepherding several significant structural reforms through
the Mexican Congress (see Table 1), he has struggled to fulfill his inaugural pledges. Organized
crime-related homicides have continued to trend downward as they have since 2012, but
extortions and kidnappings have increased.1 Military involvement in extrajudicial killings in
Tlatlaya, Mexico in June 2014 and local officials’ roles in the forced disappearances and apparent
murders of 43 university students in Iguala, Guerrero in September have galvanized protesters
against official corruption and impunity (see Tlatlaya and Iguala below). In 2013, economic
growth dropped to 1.3%; forecasts for 2014 have been revised to 2.3%.2 Peña Nieto posted a
lower first year approval rating (49.7%) than his two PAN predecessors and his second year
approval rating fell further to 39%.3 Despite those ratings, President Peña Nieto’s party is widely
predicted to perform well in the June 2015 mid-term elections.
This report provides an overview of political and economic conditions in Mexico followed by
assessments of some key issues of congressional interest in Mexico: security, human rights, trade,
migration, energy, and water issues. The report summarizes legislative action that occurred
related to these topics during the 113th Congress and refers to other CRS products and experts that
can be consulted for further information. It will be updated to address major developments in
Mexico and in Mexican-U.S. relations that are of interest to the 114th Congress.
Political Situation
Over the past two decades, Mexico has transitioned from a centralized political system dominated
by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to a true multiparty democracy. Since the PRI last
governed in the 1990s, presidential power has become increasingly constrained by Mexico’s
1 Kimberly Heinle, Octavio Rodríguez Ferreira, and David Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico; Data and Analysis
Through 2013, Justice in Mexico Project, University of San Diego, April 2014, available at:
http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/140415-dvm-2014-releasered1.pdf. Hereinafter Shirk, April 2014.
2 “Mexico: Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, December 3, 2014.
3 Roy Campos, México: Evaluación de Gobierno de Enrique Peña Nieto: Primer Año, Consulta Mitofsky, December
2013; Anthony Harrup, “Mexican President’s Approval Ratings Slump,” Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
1
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Congress, Supreme Court, and increasingly powerful governors.4 Partially as a result of those
constraints, two successive National Action Party (PAN) administrations struggled to enact the
structural reforms needed to boost Mexico’s economic competitiveness and effectively address
the country’s security challenges.
Figure 1. Mexico at a Glance
4 For background, see Andrew Selee and Jacqueline Peschard eds., Mexico’s Democratic Challenges: Politics,
Government, and Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).
Congressional Research Service
2
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
The PAN government of Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) pursued an aggressive anticrime strategy
and increased security cooperation with the United States. Those efforts helped Mexico arrest or
kill record numbers of drug kingpins, but some 60,000 people may have died as a result of
organized crime-related violence during the Calderón Administration. Mexico’s security
challenges overshadowed some of the government’s achievements, including its economic
stewardship during and after the global financial crisis and expansion of access to health care.5
July 1, 2012, Elections: Return of PRI Dominance6
The July 1, 2012, elections occurred at a time when Mexico was experiencing modest economic
growth after a downturn in 2009 caused by the global financial crisis and a growing security crisis
under two successive PAN administrations. As a result, economic and security issues figured as
top concerns among the Mexican electorate. Voters appeared to believe that the PRI would be
best equipped to restore order and hasten economic growth, despite uncertainty about how the
party’s return might impact Mexican democracy given its past reputation for corruption and
undemocratic practices.7
Twelve years after losing the presidency for the first time in 71 years, the PRI won the
presidential election, a plurality of seats in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and three of six
gubernatorial elections held on July 1, 2012. Despite those victories, PRI/Green Ecological Party
(PVEM) candidate Enrique Peña Nieto won by a relatively narrow margin (6.6% of the vote) over
Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the
PRI/PVEM failed to capture a majority in either legislative chamber (see Figure 2 below).
However, unlike his predecessor, President Enrique Peña Nieto took office with his party
controlling 20 of 32 governorships.
Figure 2. Composition of the Mexican Congress
Source: Mexican Congress as adapted by CRS graphics.
5 See CRS Report RL32724, Mexico and the 112th Congress, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
6 See CRS Report R42548, Mexico’s 2012 Elections, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
7 Dave Graham, “Mexico’s Old Rulers Bounce Back as New Start Beckons,” Reuters, June 19, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
3
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Notes: PRI= Institutional Revolutionary Party, PAN= National Action Party. PRD= Party of the Democratic
Revolution, PVEM= Green Ecological Party, PT= Worker’s Party, PANAL= National Alliance Party, and MC=
Citizen’s Movement Party. The MC and the PT are part of the PRD coalition.
Structure and Leadership in the Pena Nieto Administration
Mexico’s presidential transitions are characterized not only by a high level of turnover in
government agencies, but often by a complete overhaul of governmental structures and
organizational patterns. For example, President Peña Nieto has returned much of the power to the
Interior Ministry that it had before the PAN took office. With congressional approval, he placed
the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP, including the Federal Police8) and intelligence functions
under the authority of the Interior Ministry. That ministry, rather than the SSP, now coordinates
security efforts with the military and state and municipal authorities. The Interior Ministry also
commands the new militarized police entity within the Federal Police, the National Gendarmerie.9
The Attorney General’s Office (PGR) is being revamped and modernized, potentially to serve as a
counterweight to the increased power of the Interior Ministry. The PGR’s budget increased much
less during the Felipe Calderón Administration (2006-2012) than those of the SSP or the military.
Per reforms enacted by the Mexican Congress in December 2013, the PGR is to be replaced by an
independent Prosecutor General’s Office that could potentially focus more on combating official
corruption and prioritizing high-level criminal cases.
Additionally, President Peña Nieto sought and achieved the dissolution of the Ministry of Public
Administration, Mexico’s anti-corruption authority. Peña Nieto has proposed replacing that entity
with an anti-corruption commission that would reside within the Treasury Department and have
the power to issue administrative sanctions for corruption found in all levels and branches of
government. The Mexican Senate approved legislation to establish the autonomous anti-
corruption commission in December 2013, but final legislative action is still pending. For
different reasons, all three major parties in Congress are under pressure to respond to President
Peña Nieto’s November 27, 2014, proposals to address corruption and rule of law challenges in
the wake of 43 students’ disappearance in Iguala, Guerrero.10
President Peña Nieto selected many of his close confidantes and transition team leaders for key
positions in his government. Peña Nieto’s appointments reflect his desire to reestablish a strong
presidency backed by a few key advisers: the Ministers of Finance and the Interior. Luis
Videgaray Caso, who served as the Transition Team’s General Coordinator, is the Minister of
Finance, a post which he also held in the state of Mexico during Peña Nieto’s governorship.
Miguel Angel Osorio Chong, the Transition Team’s General Coordinator for Political and
Security Issues, is head of the powerful Interior Ministry. Osorio Chong served as governor of
8 Recent Mexican presidents have also sought to create new or revamped federal police entities. The Peña Nieto
government is reforming, rather than dismantling, the Federal Police that were recruited, trained, and equipped by
former President Calderón with significant U.S. assistance.
9 The size of the Gendarmerie has been significantly scaled back from the government’s original proposal to create a
40,000-member militarized police. After several delays, the force of roughly 5,000 officers—now focused on helping
reestablish security in states facing high-levels of violence—became operational in August 2014.
10 The PAN launched the aggressive attack on criminal groups that led to dramatic increases in violence in Mexico. The
PRD is the party of the mayor of Iguala who has been accused of involvement in ordering the abduction of the students
and the governor of Guerrero who resigned following the abduction. Dave Graham, “Mired in Crisis, Mexican
President Aided by Discredited Opposition,” Reuters, November 24, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
4
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Hidalgo, which borders the state of Mexico, when Peña Nieto governed. Those ministers, as well
as the President’s Chief of Staff, Aurelio Nuño Mayer, all may have future presidential
aspirations.
The remainder of the Cabinet consists of a combination of younger PRI leaders with technical
expertise and postgraduate education abroad; senior PRI politicians, many of whom served as
governors; and a few individuals from outside the party.11 Most of the technocratic leaders are in
the economic ministries. However, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs José Antonio Meade, former
Finance Minister for President Calderón, is one exception.
Peña Nieto’s government has avoided the public infighting that occurred among some of former
President Calderón’s ministers, but has recently struggled to manage public relations effectively
amidst a growing political crisis. Until recent months, the government had tightly controlled the
message it sought to project, which has emphasized its commitment to implementing structural
reforms and attracting investment, rather than focusing on its efforts against organized crime (as
Calderón did). In December 2013, the Economist Intelligence Unit reported that Peña Nieto’s
government has “essentially taken its eyes off … crime and corruption to concentrate on
structural reform.”12 At first, that strategy successfully improved Mexico’s image abroad,
particularly among foreign investors. More recently, however, prominent pro-business news
outlets that once praised the Peña Nieto government’s reformist zeal have criticized its handling
of government officials’ alleged involvement in extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances.13
Mexican and international observers have also criticized the way President Peña Nieto has not
responded directly to reports of a conflict of interest involving a luxury home bought by his wife
from a firm that has received government contracts.14
The Pact for Mexico and Structural Reform
Upon his inauguration, President Peña Nieto announced a reform agenda with specific proposals
under five broad pillars: (1) reducing violence; (2) combating poverty; (3) boosting economic
growth; (4) reforming education; and (5) fostering social responsibility. On December 2, 2012,
leaders of the conservative PAN and leftist PRD surprised many analysts by signing on to
President Peña Nieto’s “Pact for Mexico,” which contained 95 agreements on key issues facing
the country. Those agreements provided a baseline for the parties to debate legislative proposals.
While some opposition legislators later balked at their leaders’ decisions to endorse the PRI-led
pact, the Congress approved education and telecommunications reform legislation, two measures
that Peña Nieto had identified as short-term priorities, as well as a long-stalled crime victim’s law
during its first session (February-April 2013).15
Until recently, investors and analysts had widely praised President Peña Nieto and his top
advisors for focusing their attention and political capital on shepherding structural reforms
11 “Mexico’s New Government: With a Little Help From My Friends,” The Economist, December 8, 2012.
12 “Enrique Peña Nieto’s First Year: A Mixed Picture,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), December 2, 2013.
13 Mary O’Grady, “Mexico’s Rule of Law Crisis,” Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2014.
14 David Luhnow, “Mexico Leader’s Woes Follow Him to China,” Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2014.
15 The victim’s law provides for government assistance to crime victims and their families. President Peña Nieto’s
legislative priorities, along with executive actions that have been given precedence, are summarized in Spanish at
México, Presidencia de la República, “Decisiones Presidenciales Anunciadas el 1º de Diciembre,” Press Release,
December 1, 2012, http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/decisiones-presidenciales-anunciadas-el-1o-de-diciembre/.
Congressional Research Service
5
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
through the Mexican Congress in 2013-2014 (see Table 1). Many of the reforms that Peña Nieto
has prioritized have long been recommended by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and others as crucial for boosting Mexico’s competitiveness. As discussed
below, Peña Nieto has proven much more adept at engaging in the type of multi-party
negotiations needed to enact legislation when lacking a congressional majority than former
Presidents Ernesto Zedillo, Vicente Fox, or Felipe Calderón. The reforms were enacted despite
large-scale protests from interest groups whom they will affect, namely Mexican teachers’ unions
and oligopolies.
Table 1. Key Reforms Enacted During 2013-2014
•
Energy Reform: creates several different types of contracts, including production-sharing and licensing; al ows
companies to post reserves for accounting purposes; gives Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) budget autonomy;
establishes a sovereign wealth fund; creates new regulators; and removes the union from the Pemex board.
•
Antitrust Reform: creates an autonomous Federal Economic Competition Commission to regulate all sectors
except telecommunications and energy. The Commission is given the power to oversee mergers, regulate
industries, and sanction monopolistic practices.
•
Telecommunications Reform: increases consumers’ access to more affordable and reliable TV, radio,
Internet, and mobile phone services; increases privacy protections for consumers; and creates an independent
entity, the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (IFETEL), to regulate radio, television, and
telecommunications companies.
•
Financial Reform: increases access to credit, particularly for small-and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) and
creates more competition in the banking sector.
•
Fiscal Reform: raises additional revenue by increasing income taxes for upper income earners, upping the value
added tax (VAT) to16% in northern border states (where it had been 11% before), and creating new taxes on
stock market profits, as well as sugary beverages and other snack foods.
•
Education Reform: gives the government, rather than the union, control over hiring and firing teachers;
creates a new entity to evaluate teachers; and, increases funding for education, including full-day schooling.
•
Unified Code of Criminal Procedure (CPC): replaces the procedural rules that existed in the country so
that the same general rules apply for all states and the federal government; reduces the margin for impunity as
crimes will be punished by the same penalties; facilitates coordination between authorities; and aims to improve
the efficiency of investigations. As a result of the unified code, all states will have oral, adversarial trials with the
presumption of innocence and the use of alternative dispute mechanisms as required by constitutional reforms
enacted in 2008.
•
Political Reform: provides for the re-election of federal deputies for up to four terms beginning in 2015 and of
senators for up to two terms beginning in 2018, the reelection of mayors, and local legislators; replaces the
current Attorney General’s Office with an independent Prosecutor General’s Office; creates a new national
electoral institute, and calls for the annulment of an election if there is evidence that a party engaged in
“systematic” violations of campaign finance restrictions.
•
Transparency Reform: extends the rights of citizens to seek information from all levels of government,
unions, and political parties and strengthens the entity charged with managing access to information (the Federal
Institute of Access to Information and Data Protection).
Source: For information on the reforms, see: http://reformas.gob.mx/en/reforms.
During his first year, Peña Nieto benefitted from the fact that the PAN and the PRI agreed on
many of the economic reforms that needed to be enacted.16 Some of the reforms passed with
16 Another key reform touted by the Peña Nieto government that was enacted late in the Calderón Administration is
labor reform. As enacted, the labor reform package makes hiring and firing workers easier, regulates subcontracting
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
6
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
PAN-PRI support, such as the energy reforms, were similar to efforts that PAN Presidents had put
forth in the past only to have them blocked by the PRI. Prospects for reform brightened after no
party dominated the July 7, 2013, state and municipal elections.
Many of the 2013-2014 reforms were constitutional reforms requiring two thirds votes of both
chambers of Congress and the approval of a majority of state legislatures. The PRI had to garner
support from other parties to pass those reforms. The fiscal reform, passed with PRD support,
increased taxes on corporations and high-wage earners rather than applying the value added tax to
food and medicines. A PRI-PAN alliance enabled the December 2013 approval of constitutional
reforms on energy, but led the PRD to leave the Pact for Mexico. The energy reform created more
avenues for private participation in the energy sector than the PRI had originally proposed (per
the PAN’s pressure). On August 11, 2014, secondary laws to implement those reforms officially
opened Mexico’s oil, natural gas, and power sectors to private investment.17
Security and Institutional Reform: Responding to Events in Iguala,
Guerrero
On December 17, 2012, President Peña Nieto outlined a state security policy that involved
binding commitments from all levels of government and civic participation. The six pillars of the
strategy include (1) planning; (2) prevention; (3) protection and respect of human rights; (4)
coordination; (5) institutional transformation; and (6) monitoring and evaluation. President Peña
Nieto said that although his government would not abandon the fight against organized crime, the
primary goal of his security strategy would be to reduce violent crime. Two priority proposals
Peña Nieto sought to achieve in the security realm that have been accomplished include launching
a national crime prevention plan18 and establishing a unified code of criminal procedures to cover
judicial procedures for the federal government and the states. Other key proposals—creating a
large National Gendarmerie (militarized police) and a centralized intelligence agency—have
either been delayed or significantly watered down.19
Two years into his Administration, criticism is mounting concerning Peña Nieto’s security
strategy. Many argue that Peña Nieto has struggled to define his security priorities and how they
will be achieved. Others assert that Peña Nieto maintained Calderón’s reactive approach of
deploying federal forces—including the military—to areas where crime surges rather than
engaging in a proactive effort aimed at strengthening institutions to deter crime and violence
(until forced to following events in Guerrero).20 High-value targeting of top criminal leaders has
(...continued)
and outsourcing, strengthens safeguards against child labor, and protects working women.
17 CRS Report R43313, Mexico’s Oil and Gas Sector: Background, Reform Efforts, and Implications for the United
States, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
18 The program has been criticized, however, for lacking a rigorous methodology for selecting and evaluating the
communities and interventions that it is funding. México Evalua, Prevención del Delito en México: Dónde Quedó la
Evidencia?, January 2014.
19 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Changing the Game or Dropping the Ball? Mexico’s Security and Anti-Crime Strategy Under
President Enrique Peña Nieto, Brookings Institution, November 2014, available at,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/11/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20f
elbabbrown/mexico%20security%20anti%20crime%20nieto%20v1%20felbabbrown.pdf.
20 Ibid. Alfredo Méndez, “Peña Nieto Mantiene el Errático Plan de Seguridad de Calderón, Dicen Juristas, July 30,
2013.
Congressional Research Service
7
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
also continued. Indeed, despite restrictions placed on U.S. security agencies working in Mexico,
U.S. intelligence reportedly helped Mexican marines successfully track and arrest Miguel Angel
Treviño Morales (“Z-40”), the leader of Los Zetas (one of the most violent criminal groups), in
July 2013 and Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán, head of the Sinaloa organization, in February 2014.21
In September 2014, President Peña Nieto asserted that 84 of 122 high-value targets identified by
his government had been detained.22 While impressive, this strategy has contributed to crime
groups splintering, proliferating, and diversifying their activities from drug trafficking into other
types of crime.
Organized crime-related homicides continued to decline in 2013 as they had during the last year
of the Calderón government, yet serious security challenges remain in many parts of Mexico.
President Peña Nieto has said that organized-crime violence declined by 30% in 2013.23 Since the
government is no longer publicly releasing information on trends in organized crime-related
killings as opposed to all homicides, it is difficult to analyze the security situation with precision.
According to Mexican government figures, all homicides fell by 16.5% as compared to 2012.24
Independent estimates appear to verify that figure.25 Nevertheless, kidnappings increased in 2013,
with police among those accused of carrying them out.26 Violence has declined in some parts of
northern Mexico (except for Tamaulipas), but has spiked in the interior of the country and along
the Pacific Coast, particularly in Michoacán. The failures of past federal efforts to quell violence
and reestablish state presence there have led to the development of armed civilian “self-defense
groups” there that have clashed with crime groups. Recent events, including discoveries of mass
graves, have laid bare the dire security situation in Guerrero.
Reforming Mexico’s criminal justice system is widely regarded as a crucial step toward
combating criminality, strengthening the rule of law, and better protecting citizen security and
human rights in the country. Prior to the Tlatlaya and Guerrero incidents discussed below, the
Peña Nieto government had taken some steps to accelerate implementation of judicial reform,
establish national police standards, and investigate cases of forced disappearances. Human rights
groups and security analysts had asserted, however, that much more needed to be done to bolster
institutional reform, anticorruption efforts, and respect for human rights.27
21 “No Shots Fired: Leader of Mexico’s Zetas Cartel Captured in Precision Operation, with U.S. Help,” Associated
Press, July 16, 2013; Damien Cave, “How a Kingpin Above the Law Fell, Incredibly, Without a Shot,” New York
Times, February 23, 2014. For background, see: CRS Report R41576, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations:
Source and Scope of the Violence, by June S. Beittel.
22 Lally Weymouth, “An Interview with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto,” Washington Post, September 25,
2014.
23 “Mexico Poised to Take-Off, Peña Nieto Tells Davos,” Latin News Daily, January 24, 2014.
24 Rafael Cabrera, “Menos Homicidios y más Secuestros Durante 2013: SNSP,” Animal Político, January 24, 2014.
25 Shirk, April 2014.
26 Tim Johnson, “Kidnappings Soar in Mexico, with Police Often Among the Perpetrators,” McClatchyDC, October 31,
2013.
27 Maureen Meyer and Clay Boggs, One Year into Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s Administration: Little
Progress has Been Made on Security or Human Rights, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), November 27,
2013.
Congressional Research Service
8
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Tlatlaya and Guerrero: Extrajudicial Killings and Forced Disappearances
For years, human rights groups and annual State Department human rights reports have chronicled cases of Mexican
security officials’ involvement in extrajudicial killings.28 On July 1, 2014, Mexico’s Secretrary of Defense (SEDENA)
initially confirmed that 22 criminals and one Mexican soldier had died after an armed confrontation near a warehouse
in Tlatlaya, state of Mexico. Evidence contradicting that claim indicating that some of those who died appeared to
have been shot at close range near a wall, as well as eyewitness testimony corroborating that evidence prompted
Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) to investigate SEDENA’s account of the incident even though
the state of Mexico’s Attorney General had declared in July that there was no sign of a massacre,29 CNDH issued a
report in October asserting that at least 15 of the 22 people killed in Tlatlaya were executed by soldiers after already
having surrendered and that the crime scene had been altered. CNDH recommended that those soldiers be tried and
the victims’ families compensated. It also issued a recommendation criticizing how the case had been handled by state
and federal prosecutors (who did not intervene to carry out their own investigations).30 SEDENA accepted CNDH’s
findings and while at least seven soldiers and one officer are in custody, no higher level officials appear to have been
accused of trying to cover up the crime.31
On September 26, 2014, 43 students from the ‘Raúl Isidro Burgos’ rural teaching school near Ayotzinapa, Guerrero
stopped in Iguala, Mexico on their way to participate in protests in Mexico City to commemorate student killings that
occurred in 1968. Municipal police mistakenly thought the students aimed to disrupt a political speech by the mayor’s
wife. On orders from Luis Abarca (then-mayor of Iguala) and his wife María de los Angeles Pineda—PRD officials
thought to have ties to organized crime—municipal police confronted the students. During the confrontation, six
people died and 43 students went missing. The students were then transferred to individuals from the Guerreros
Unidos criminal organization.32 According to several confessions by members of that crime group to the federal
Attorney General’s office, the students were taken to a site near Cocula, Guerrero where they were killed, their
bodies were incinerated, and their remains were disposed of in a river. Families of the students have vigorously
rejected the assertion that their children—some of the roughly 23,00033 who have disappeared since 2007—were
likely murdered. However, the first remains that were sent by the Mexican government to Austria to be examined
have been confirmed to match a missing student’s DNA.34
The disappearance of the students in Iguala has prompted massive protests throughout Mexico, particularly since
President Peña Nieto decided to attend an economic summit in China in mid-November rather than staying in Mexico
to oversee federal efforts to respond to the crisis. Protests have been generally peaceful, but have, at times, turned
violent. Critics have decried the federal government’s failure to get involved in the case until 10 days after the crime
took place (during which time state officials handled the investigation) and the length of time it took to find the
al eged bodies and perpetrators (during which time some 18 mass graves have been recovered). The federal
government has responded by maintaining that 80 people have been arrested thus far (including mayor Abarca and his
wife), 10,000 people have been involved in the investigation, and federal efforts have been supported since mid-
November by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. They have also explained that Mexico’s federal
system is designed in such a way that state prosecutors investigate murder cases unless they show a clear nexus to
organized crime, and that federal forces that were in the area at the time of the crime could not have intervened
unless the local authorities, who, in that case were acting against civilians, requested their support.35
28 See, for example: U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Mexico, March
2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220457.
29 Mark Stevenson, “In Mexico, Lopsided Death Tolls Draw Suspicion,” AP, July 8, 2014.
30 “La CNDH ve 15 Ejecuciones en Tlatlaya y Emite Recomendación a Autoridades,” CNN México, October 21, 2014.
31 Bernardino Hernandez, “Mexican Soldiers Face Charges, But not Officials who Tried to Hide Massacre,” AP,
November 13, 2014.
32 Embassy of Mexico in Washington, DC, “Fact Sheet: Regarding the Disappearance of 43 Students in Iguala,
Guerrero and Security in Mexico,” November 12, 2014.
33 Paris Martinez, “2014, el año con más casos de desapariciones en México: van 5 mil 98 víctimas,” Animal Politico,
November 19, 2014.
34 Paulina Villegas and Randal C. Archibold, “Rage and Sorrow Flow as Student in Mexico Is Declared Dead,” New
York Times, December 8, 2014.
35 Embassy of Mexico in Washington, DC, “Fact Sheet: Regarding the Disappearance of 43 Students in Iguala,
Guerrero and Security in Mexico,” November 12, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
9
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Corruption has been, and remains, a major obstacle to reform efforts. Mexico is ranked 103 of
175 countries in Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perception Index. President Peña
Nieto has portrayed corruption as mainly a local level issue present in some parts of Mexico, but
experts have pointed to evidence of corruption at all levels of government.36 Allegations that
President Peña Nieto has personally benefitted from ties to a firm that has won lucrative
government contracts have further tarnished the image of his government.37 Finance Minister
Videgaray also purchased property from that contractor.38
On November 27, 2014, President Peña Nieto proposed ten initiatives to strengthen the rule of
law and human rights in a national address aimed at responding to the ongoing nationwide
protests about Iguala and similar incidents.39 The proposals included constitutional reforms to
allow federal forces to take over security functions in municipalities that have been overcome by
organized crime and to clarify roles of federal, state, and municipal authorities in combating
crime. They also involve creating a national emergency hotline, a unique identification number
for each citizen, special federal operations in Guerrero and surrounding states, and a variety of
human rights and judicial reforms. These justice sector proposals have been accompanied by the
proposal to create special zones of economic development in southern Mexico. Some have
welcomed the proposals.40 Others remain skeptical, asserting that some of the main proposals -
such as having municipal police forces absorbed by state police forces - have been proposed and
rejected in the past because corruption is pervasive in many state forces and governors’ offices as
well.41 Still other critics have lamented the lack of a focus on human rights within the proposals
and a failure to mention the negative impacts of Mexico’s military-led public security strategy.42
The Mexican Congress did not enact Peña Nieto’s proposals before its session ended on
December 15, 2014.
2015 Mid-Term Elections
Mexico is scheduled to convene legislative and state elections on June 7, 2015. These elections
are the first elections being handled by Mexico’s new electoral agency, the National Electoral
Institute, which was created as part of the political and electoral reforms described in Table 1. Its
predecessor, the Federal Electoral Institute, only conducted presidential and legislative elections.
All 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies are up for election, with 300 selected by direct election
and 200 chosen by proportional representation. Gubernatorial elections are being held in nine of
the 17 states holding state and municipal elections on that day.
36 Viridiana Ríos, “Time for Mexico to Accept Responsibility for the Violence,” New York Times, December 2, 2014.
37 David Luhnow and Santiago Pérez, “Mexico Digs Into Ties Between Leader, Builder,” Wall Street Journal,
December 4, 2014.
38 Juan Montes, “New Ties Emerge Between Mexico Government and Builder,” Wall Street Journal, December 11,
2014.
39 Embassy of Mexico in Washington, DC, “10 Measures to Strengthen Security, Justice, and the Rule of Law,” press
release, December 4, 2014.
40 Duncan Wood, “Mexico and the U.S. Should Work Together to Combat Violence,” New York Times, December 2,
2014.
41 “Analistas Consideran que Plan de Peña Nieto es Insuficiente en México,” El Universal, November 28, 2014; Patrick
Corcoran, “Peña Nieto's Mexico Police Reform Proposal Fails to Convince,” Insight Crime, December 1, 2014.
42 INSYDE, Pronunciamiento y Exhorto en torno a la Iniciativa Presidencial de Reforma Constitucional Enviada al
Senado el 1° de Diciembre, December 8, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
10
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Despite the current challenges facing President Peña Nieto and the PRI, the party’s formidable
state and local networks and divisions within the PRD and PAN have combined to improve its
chances of performing well in the June elections. The PAN faced divisive internal elections in the
spring of 2014, while Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the founder of the PRD, recently resigned from the
party due to his dissatisfaction with the way current party leaders were handling the response to
events in Iguala, Guerrero. According to a November 2014 poll, 30% of voters favored the PRI,
16% the PAN, and 10% the PRD. Despite that, some 55% of those surveyed would prefer the PRI
not capture a majority in the Chamber of Deputies.43
Foreign Policy
President Peña Nieto has prioritized promoting trade and investment in Mexico as a core goal of
his Administration’s foreign policy, but also signaled Mexico’s willingness to participate in U.N.
peacekeeping efforts, a major step for a country with a history of non-intervention. President Peña
Nieto and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Joe Antonio Meade have not only reoriented U.S.-
Mexican relations to focus on economic issues, but sought to create closer trade ties with Europe,
Asia, and the rest of Latin America, including Cuba. President Peña Nieto has hosted Chinese
Premier Xi Jinping for a state visit to Mexico and visited China twice thus far. His government is
actively involved in negotiations for a proposed Trans Pacific Partnership44 trade agreement with
other Asia Pacific countries, as well as economic integration efforts with the pro-trade Pacific
Alliance countries of Chile, Colombia, and Peru.45 Promoting investment opportunities that have
been created by Mexico’s recent energy reforms may figure prominently in Mexico’s foreign
policy as well. Not only is Mexico seeking foreign investment, but it is also investing in Central
American energy projects, most notably in Guatemala.
Economic and Social Conditions
Over the last 25 years, Mexico has transitioned from a closed, state-led economy to an open
market economy. While the transition began in the late 1980s, it accelerated after Mexico entered
into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada in
1994. Since NAFTA, the Mexican economy has increasingly become a manufacturing-for-export
nation, with exports representing some 32% of Mexico’s GDP, up from 10% twenty years ago.
Mexico remains a major U.S. crude oil supplier, but its top exports to the United States have
diversified to include automobiles and auto parts, television receivers, and other manufactured
goods. Mexico has entered into 12 free trade agreements (FTAs) involving 44 other countries.46
Despite attempts to diversify its economic ties and build its domestic economy, Mexico continues
to remain heavily dependent on the United States as an export market (roughly 80% of Mexico’s
exports in 2013 were U.S.-bound), and as a source of tourism revenues, remittances, and
investment. Economic conditions in Mexico tend to follow economic patterns in the United
43 “PRI Leads in Poll Taken Ahead of the Legislative Elections,” EIU, November 27, 2014.
44 See CRS Report R42694, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress, coordinated
by Ian F. Fergusson.
45 CRS Report R43748, The Pacific Alliance: A Trade Integration Initiative in Latin America, by M. Angeles
Villarreal.
46 CRS Report R40784, Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
Congressional Research Service
11
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
States. When the U.S. economy is expanding, the Mexican economy tends to grow as well.
However, when the U.S. economy stagnates or is in decline, the Mexican economy tends to
decline as well, often to a greater degree. In 2009, for example, GDP growth in the United States
fell by 2.5% and Mexico’s GDP declined by 6.5%.47
Many economists praised the sound fiscal policies of the past two PAN administrations, but
faulted them for failing to address some of the structural issues that have constrained the
country’s growth potential. The Calderón government maintained macroeconomic stability in the
face of the 2008 global economic crisis and U.S. recession, a 2009 H1N1 swine flu epidemic that
damaged the tourism industry, and declining oil production.48 With careful economic planning,
the Mexican economy recovered from the 2009 crisis, with growth rates averaging 4.4% from
2010-2012. Despite that recovery, economists criticized the PAN’s failure to address Mexico’s
low tax base and over-reliance on declining oil revenues, weak education system, and lack of
competition in some sectors.49
Growth: Will Reforms Bring Faster GDP Growth?
Enrique Peña Nieto and his top advisors have long stressed the importance of passing structural
reforms to make the Mexican economy more competitive. During the 2012 campaign, Peña Nieto
acknowledged that the PAN had maintained a stable economy, but criticized the past two
Administrations for failing to spur rapid economic growth. He identified several reasons why
Mexico’s economic growth had lagged: low productivity, insufficient access to credit, deficient
investment in infrastructure, monopolies, a large and expanding informal sector, and a continued
over-reliance on the U.S. market. To counter these deficiencies, Peña Nieto advocated a 10-point
economic plan that included, among other measures, implementing legislation to counter
monopolistic practices, passing a fiscal reform, opening up the oil sector to private investment,
making farmers more productive, and doubling infrastructure investments. Peña Nieto also
endorsed an active international trade policy aimed at increasing Mexico’s trade with Asia, South
America, and other markets.
During his first two years in office, President Peña Nieto shepherded historic economic reforms
through the Mexican Congress (see Table 1), but failed to maintain the economic growth rates
that Mexico had posted for the last three years of the Calderón government. Economists blamed
the government’s failure to promote investment, natural gas shortages, weak external demand,
and a slowdown in Mexico’s construction industry for the country’s 1.2% growth rate in 2013.50
Economic growth picked up in 2014 to an estimated 2.3%; however, that rate is not as high as had
been expected. Mexican business leaders have faulted tax increases that came into effect in
January for dragging down the domestic economy; the Peña Nieto government has since
promised not to seek further tax hikes. Business leaders have also criticized the government for
failing to increase infrastructure investments outside of funds dedicated to the energy sector and
to a massive Mexico City airport project that was recently announced.
47 CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
48 Duncan Wood, “Mexico’s Elections and the Economy—Voters Face a Tough Decision,” Center for Strategic &
International Studies, May 2012.
49 Francisco Gonzalez, “Drug Violence Isn’t Mexico’s Only Problem,” Current History, February 2011; Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Economic Surveys: Mexico, May 2011.
50 “Mexico: Country Report,” EIU, December 2013.
Congressional Research Service
12
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Analysts have estimated that the package of reforms that was approved in 2013 could increase
annual economic growth rates by 1.0-1.5 percentage points.51 They predict that growth in Mexico
could average 3.8% per year over the coming years as the impact of the reforms begins to be
felt.52 The Peña Nieto government maintains that the recently-enacted energy reforms will result
in lower energy prices, create 500,000 new jobs, and boost GDP growth by 1 percentage point by
the end of his term in 2018. JP Morgan has estimated that the energy reforms may increase annual
growth rates in Mexico by up to 0.8% and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico by $20
billion per year by 2016 or 2017.53 Although it is difficult to predict how increasing private
participation in Mexico’s oil and gas sectors will affect the country’s economic development,
skeptics see reason to doubt the government’s positive predictions, warning of the potential for
corruption and waste. Other analysts warn that declines in global oil prices could hinder the
success of the reforms.54
In addition to bringing in more investment, a key goal of the reforms that were enacted in 2013-
14 is to boost formal sector employment and productivity, particularly among the small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that together employ some 60% of Mexican workers, often in
the informal sector. While productivity in Mexico’s large companies (many of which produce
internationally traded goods and have benefitted from NAFTA) increased by 5.8% per year
between 1999 and 2009, productivity in small businesses fell by 6.5% per year.55 To address that
discrepancy, the financial reform aimed to increase access to credit for SMEs and the fiscal
reform sought to incentivize their participation in the formal (tax-paying) economy by offering
insurance, retirement savings accounts, and home loans to those who register with the national tax
agency.56 Economists maintain that reducing informality is crucial for addressing income
inequality and poverty, while at the same time expanding Mexico’s low tax base.
Combating Poverty
President Peña Nieto sought to boost tax revenues in order to establish a universal social safety
net with social security and unemployment insurance that builds upon the last two governments’
provision of nearly universal access to health care. Mexico has long had relatively high poverty
rates for its level of economic development (45.5% in 2012),57 particularly in rural regions and
among indigenous populations. Traditionally, those employed in subsistence agriculture and/or
small, informal businesses tend to be among the poorest citizens. Some assert that conditions in
indigenous communities have not measurably improved in the twenty years since the Zapatistas
(Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional), a leftist revolutionary group based in Chiapas,
51 Ibid.
52 “Mexico: Country Outlook,” IHS Global Insight, December 19, 2013.
53 “Mexico: Positive Surprises in Mexico Energy Reform and Implications for Fixed Income Markets,” J. P. Morgan,
December 16, 2013.
54 Shannon K. O’Neil, Spillovers From Falling Oil Prices: Risks to Mexico and the United States, Council on Foreign
Relations, December12, 2014.
55 McKinsey Global Institute, A Tale of Two Mexicos: Growth and Prosperity in a Two-Speed Economy, March 2014.
56 “Mexico: Peña Nieto Wants 30 Million Mexicans to Join the Formal Economy,” Latin News Daily Briefing,
September 9, 2014.
57 This figure is from Mexico’s National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) in a
study that is available at http://www.coneval.gob.mx/Paginas/principal-EN.aspx. According to CONEVAL, Mexico’s
poverty rate increased by 2.9 percentage points between 2006 and 2012, although it did decline 0.6 percentage points
from 2010 to 2012 as the country recovered from the effects of the 2008-9 global financial crisis and U.S. recession.
Congressional Research Service
13
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
launched an uprising for indigenous rights in 1994.58 The same could be said about neighboring
Guerrero as well.
Finance Minister Videgaray has acknowledged the contributions that social programs have made
to preventing Mexicans from falling into poverty in times of crisis (including the 2009 recession),
but maintained that boosting GDP growth and job creation is needed to reduce poverty rates.
President Peña Nieto has expanded access to federal pensions, created a new life insurance
program for female heads of household and a national anti-hunger program (that benefits 7
million people), and increased funding for the Oportunidades (Opportunities) conditional cash
transfer program.59 Oportunidades has been renamed Prospera (Prosperity) and redesigned to
encourage its beneficiaries to engage in productive projects.
U.S. Relations and Issues for Congress
As Mexico has experienced a presidential transition from a PAN government focused on security
issues to a PRI government that prioritizes economic reforms, U.S.-Mexican relations have also
evolved. President Obama and Vice President Biden have embraced President Peña Nieto’s desire
to bolster economic ties and focus on issues beyond security, including education and border
trade facilitation. Those issues have figured prominently during several recent visits to Mexico,
including President Obama’s participation in the February 2014 North American Leaders’
Summit. Now that Mexico has implemented historic energy reforms, bilateral cooperation on
energy has also moved to the forefront of the bilateral relationship. Vice President Biden is
expected to discuss energy issues and other economic matters when he chairs the second meeting
of the U.S.-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) to be held in Washington, DC on
January 5-6, 2015. A presidential meeting is planned for January 6, 2015.
Outside the economic realm, U.S.-Mexican relations span a wide range of issues, including
border security and migration. U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has continued under the Mérida
Initiative framework, with emphasis on judicial reform, violence prevention, and securing
Mexico’s southern border. These efforts have taken on more urgency in recent months as Mexico
has struggled to investigate and punish those responsible for several high-profile cases involving
allegations of serious human rights abuses perpetrated by security forces. The Peña Nieto
government is working with U.S. and Central American officials to address the surge in Central
American child migrants crossing through its territory, but has urged U.S. policy makers not to
militarize the U.S.-Mexico border.
The U.S. Congress has maintained long-standing interest in a broad range of issues dealing with
Mexico, a country with whom the United States shares a nearly 2,000-mile border and more than
$500 billion in annual trade. Security issues had generally overtaken migration and trade matters
since 2008 as a result of Mexico receiving U.S. foreign assistance through the Mérida Initiative,
but in 2014 migration again moved to the top of the bilateral agenda. Relations received a boost
in October 2014 with the release of U.S. marine Sergeant Andrew Tahmooressi, whom Mexico
had charged with weapons possession in April, prompting U.S. congressional action.60 The
58 Tania L. Montalvo, “A 20 Años del EZLN, Indígenas Siguen en la Pobreza,” Animal Politico, January 2, 2014.
59 Oportunidades is Mexico’s main antipoverty program. It provides cash transfers to 6.5 million families in poverty
who demonstrate that they regularly attend medical appointments and can certify that their children attend school.
60 Miriam Dominguez, “Se Triplica Cifra de Niños Migrantes Asegurados,” El Universal, October 15, 2014.
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
14
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
potential for greater energy cooperation with Mexico has emerged as a new issue of interest,
while water disputes in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas have remained an area of contention.
Some U.S. policy makers have been frustrated at Mexico’s failure to predictably and fully make
its target annual water deliveries in the Rio Grande Valley, as agreed upon in a 1944 U.S.-Mexico
treaty.61
Some bilateral issues may require immediate congressional action in order to advance, while
others may lend themselves more to long-term oversight. For example, migration and border
security cooperation could be substantially overhauled should Congress enact comprehensive
immigration reform. Congress continues to weigh in on current trade and water disputes. At the
same time, Congress is considering continued funding for the Mérida Initiative and related
domestic initiatives aimed at combating transnational crime and strengthening the rule of law in
Mexico that are well underway. Congressional concerns about improving human rights conditions
and the rule of law in Mexico lend themselves to long-term oversight, but have also taken on
some urgency given recent events.
Security and U.S. Assistance through the Mérida Initiative62
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation increased significantly during the Felipe Calderón
Administration (2006-2012) as a result of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime
assistance package for Mexico and Central America first funded in FY2008. Whereas U.S.
assistance, which totaled $2.5 billion between FY2008 and FY2015, initially focused on training
and equipping Mexican counterdrug forces, it now places more emphasis on addressing the weak
institutions and underlying societal problems that have allowed the drug trade to flourish in
Mexico. The Mérida strategy now focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups, (2)
institutionalizing the rule of law, (3) creating a 21st century border, and (4) building strong and
resilient communities. As of October 2014, some $1.3 billion in Mérida assistance had been
delivered to Mexico. While the U.S. government initially struggled to deliver equipment in a
timely fashion, both governments have continued to struggle to fulfill their domestic pledges
under the Mérida Initiative. The U.S. government promised to combat weapons trafficking,
money laundering, and drug demand; Mexico promised to combat corruption.
(...continued)
60 Members of Congress visited Mr. Tahmooressi, wrote letters to the U.S. and Mexican governments on his behalf,
and held a hearing urging his release. See: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, Sergeant Andrew Tahmooressi: Our Marine in Mexican Custody, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., Oct. 1, 2014.
61 See: CRS Report R43312, U.S.-Mexico Water Sharing: Background and Recent Developments, by Nicole T. Carter,
Clare Ribando Seelke, and Daniel T. Shedd.
62 For further information, see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and
Beyond.
Congressional Research Service
15
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Table 2. FY2008–FY2015 Mérida Funding for Mexico
($ in millions)
FY2014 FY2015 Account
Account FY2008 FY2009
FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 (est.)
(est.)
Totals
ESF 20.0 15.0 15.0a 18.0 33.3 32.1 46.1 46.0 225.5
INCLE 263.5 406.0 365.0 117.0 248.5 195.1 148.1 148.1 1,891.3
FMF 116.5 299.0 5.3 8.0 N/Ab
N/A N/A N/A 428.8
Total 400.0 720.0 385.3 143.0 281.8 227.2 194.2 194.0 2,545.6
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2008-FY2015.
Notes: ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; INCLE=International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement.
a. $6 million was later reprogrammed for global climate change efforts by the State Department.
b. Beginning in FY2012, FMF assistance is not included as part of the Mérida Initiative.
During President Obama’s trip to Mexico in May 2013, he and President Peña Nieto reaffirmed
their commitments to the Mérida Initiative’s four pillar strategy. In August 2013, the U.S. and
Mexican governments then agreed to focus on justice sector reform; efforts against money
laundering; police and corrections professionalization at the federal and state level; border
security, both northern (see: “Modernizing the U.S.-Mexico Border”) and southern (see: “Dealing
with Central American Migration, Including Unaccompanied Children”) and piloting approaches
to address root causes of violence. Mexico’s Interior Ministry is now the primary entity through
which Mérida Initiative training and equipment requests are coordinated and intelligence is
channeled. After initial delays in 2013, more than $468 million in new Mérida Initiative-funded
projects have been approved since Peña Nieto took office. The Mexican government has
requested increased assistance for judicial reform, border security, and prevention efforts, but
limited U.S. involvement in some law enforcement and intelligence operations.
As previously mentioned, although Peña Nieto has adopted a more low-profile public relations
approach to his security policies than Calderón, his government’s operational approach has
remained similar. Mexico has continued to arrest top and mid-level leaders of criminal
organizations and to share intelligence with the United States. U.S. intelligence and efforts under
pillar one of the Mérida Initiative have helped Mexico develop the capacity to track and detain a
series of high-profile criminal leaders, including leaders from the Gulf, Júarez, and Beltrán Leyva
organizations in October 2014. The challenge now for both governments is to ensure that those
criminals are brought to justice.
As a result of recent high-profile human rights cases, the Peña Nieto government has been faulted
for failing to advance state and municipal-level police reforms and for not investigating and
punishing human rights abuses committed by government officials. Some have urged the U.S.
government to stop funding Mexico’s military-led approach to public security.63 Others
recommend increasing U.S. support for judicial and police reform (particularly accountability and
anti-corruption programs) under pillar two of the Mérida Initiative.64 Many others recommend
63 Christy Thornton, “Stop Arms Sales to Pressure Mexico,” New York Times, December 2, 2014.
64 Maureen Meyer and Jenny Johnson, The Disappearance of 43 Mexican Students: WOLA & LAWG Analysis,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
16
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
working with the private sector and nongovernmental organizations to strengthen communities
under pillar four as has been done in Monterey, Ciudad Juárez, and Tijuana.
The 113th Congress held hearings65 examining how the Mérida Initiative is being adjusted to align
with the Peña Nieto government’s priorities. Congressional consultation will be needed should
the State Department seek to reprogram some of the funding in the pipeline for Mérida, or seek
new funding to align with new priorities that may emerge. Congress provided $79 million above
the Administration’s request for efforts to secure Mexico’s southern border and other judicial
sector programs in the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R.
83). This is likely to heighten the Mérida Initiative’s focus on those areas. There is also funding in
that bill for additional forensics aid to Mexico.
Possible areas for oversight may include the results of the Mérida Initiative thus far, how the State
Department is measuring the efficacy of Mérida programs, and how coordination is advancing
with the Peña Nieto government.
Human Rights and Judicial Reform66
Congress has expressed ongoing concerns about human rights conditions in Mexico. These
concerns have intensified as U.S. security assistance to Mexico has increased under the Mérida
Initiative. Congress has continued monitoring adherence to the “Leahy” vetting requirements that
must be met under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 as amended (22 U.S.C. 2378d)67
and annual Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations68 in order for Mexican security forces69
to receive U.S. support.70 Congress has also conditioned U.S. assistance to the Mexican military
and police on compliance with certain human rights standards, while simultaneously providing
funding to support human rights training for security forces and to protect groups vulnerable to
human rights abuses (such as the press and human rights defenders). Congress has periodically
withheld aid pending concerns about human rights and other issues.71 The primary goal of these
(...continued)
Washington Office on Latin America and Latin America Working Group, December 4, 2014.
65 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Global
Narcotics Affairs, Security Cooperation with Mexico: Examining the Next Steps in the U.S.-Mexico Security
Relationship, 113th Cong., 1st sess., June 18, 2013.
66 See: CRS Report R43001, Supporting Criminal Justice System Reform in Mexico: The U.S. Role, by Clare Ribando
Seelke.
67 The codified Leahy law (22 U.S.C. 2378d) prohibits the furnishing of assistance authorized by the FAA and the
Arms Export Control Act, as amended, (AECA) to any foreign security force unit that is credibly believed to have
committed a gross violation of human rights.
68 A provision in the annual DOD appropriations legislation prohibits the use of DOD funds to support any training
program involving a unit of a foreign security or police force if the unit has committed a gross violation of human
rights. P.L. 113-76 expands that prohibition to cover DOD equipment assistance programs as well.
69 There is no FAA definition for the term “security force.” DOD defines the term as “duly constituted military,
paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state.” (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, DOD
Joint Publication 1-02, http://www.dtic.mil.)
70 CRS Report R43361, “Leahy Law” Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview, coordinated
by Nina M. Serafino.
71 Jonathan Broder, “Citing Oversight Concerns, Leahy Holds Up Aid to Mexico,” CQ Roll Call, August 1, 2013. This
hold remains in place. CRS electronic correspondence with State Department official, December 3, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
17
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
efforts has been to ensure that U.S.-funded anticrime efforts are carried out in a way that respects
human rights and strengthens the rule of law in Mexico.
U.S. assistance to Mexico has increasingly focused on supporting the Mexican government’s
efforts to reform its corrupt and inefficient judicial system, both as a means to make anticrime
efforts more effective and to strengthen the rule of law in Mexico. Congress has targeted money
to support Mexico’s transition from an inquisitorial justice system to an oral, adversarial, and
accusatory system that should strengthen human rights protections for victims and the accused.
Congress has also increased funding for rule of law (ROL) programs in Mexico and expressed
support for future ROL funding (H.Rept. 113-185).72 With $68 million of that funding, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) expanded its program to support judicial reform
from seven to twenty states. U.S. policy makers are likely to follow how the Peña Nieto
government ensures that the unified code of criminal procedure enacted earlier this year hastens
judicial reform at the federal and state levels.
Human rights groups initially expressed satisfaction that President Peña Nieto had adopted a pro-
human rights discourse and promulgated a law requiring state support for crime victims and their
families.73 They also welcomed the historic April 2014 approval of reforms to the military code of
justice requiring cases of military abuses against civilians to be tried in civilian courts. However,
even before the high-profile incidents in Tlatlaya and Iguala, they criticized the government’s
lack of concrete efforts to promote and protect human rights.74
Some have therefore urged U.S. policy makers to closely monitor the Peña Nieto government’s
compliance with conditions on Mérida assistance and to continue rigorous vetting of Mexican
individuals and units slated to receive U.S. training and equipment.75 How the Peña Nieto
government moves to improve the ability of Mexico’s civilian institutions to investigate and
prosecute cases of human rights abuses by security forces, enhance enforcement of prohibitions
against torture and other mistreatment, and strengthen protection for human rights defenders, the
media, and other vulnerable groups is likely to be closely scrutinized.
Congress may choose to augment Mérida Initiative funding for human rights programs, such as
ongoing training programs for military and police, or newer efforts, such as support for human
rights organizations. Human rights conditions in Mexico, as well as compliance with conditions
on Mérida assistance, are also likely to continue to be important oversight issues. The State
Department submitted a report in September 2014 that met the statutory requirements for funding
provided by the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76) that was on hold to be
released. The FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R. 83)
includes several human rights provisions regarding aid to Mexico. Those provisions withhold
72 See also: U.S. Congress, Majority Staff Report, Judicial and Police Reforms in Mexico: Essential Building Blocks
for a Lawful Society, prepared for Sen. John Kerry, Chairman, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 112th
Cong., 2nd sess., July 9, 2012, S. Prt. 112-36.
73 Human Rights Watch, Letter to President Enrique Peña Nieto, December 11, 2012.
74 José Miguel Vivanco, Mexico: President’s Disappointing First Year on Human Rights, Human Rights Watch,
November 26, 2013.
75 Restrictions on certain aid to Mexico’s military and police have been included in each of the Mérida appropriations
measures since P.L. 110-252. See CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and
Beyond.
Congressional Research Service
18
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
15% of assistance to the Mexican military and police until the State Department reports that
progress has been made in meeting certain human rights conditions.76
U.S. policymakers may question how the Peña Nieto Administration is moving to punish past
human rights abuses, how it intends to prevent new abuses from occurring, and how the police
and judicial reforms being implemented are bolstering human rights protections.
Trade, NAFTA, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)77
The United States and Mexico have a strong economic and trade relationship that has been
bolstered over the past 20 years through NAFTA. Since 1994, NAFTA has removed virtually all
tariff and non-tariff trade and investment barriers among partner countries and provided a rules-
based mechanism to govern North American trade. Most economic studies show that the net
economic effects of NAFTA on the United States and Mexico has been small but positive, though
there have been adjustment costs to some sectors within both countries. Further complicating
assessments of NAFTA’s benefits, not all trade-related job gains and losses since NAFTA can be
entirely attributed to the agreement. Numerous other factors have affected trade trends, such as
Mexico’s trade liberalization efforts, economic conditions, and currency fluctuations. Some
speculate that NAFTA may have accelerated the ongoing trade and investment trends that were
already taking place. Nevertheless, U.S.-Mexico trade increased rapidly since NAFTA, with U.S.
exports to Mexico increasing 313% and imports from Mexico increasing 444% since the
agreement’s entry into force.
Mexico is the United States’ third-largest trading partner, while the United States is, by far,
Mexico’s largest trading partner. Mexico ranks third as a source of U.S. imports, after China and
Canada, and second, after Canada, as an export market for U.S. goods and services. Leading U.S.
imports from Mexico in 2013 included: motor vehicles ($40.1 billion), motor vehicle parts ($35.2
billion), oil and gas ($32.0 billion), computer equipment ($15.0 billion), and audio and video
equipment ($13.8 billion). Leading U.S. exports to Mexico in 2013 included: motor vehicle parts
($21.1 billion), petroleum and coal products ($19.3 billion), computer equipment ($14.8 billion),
semiconductors and other electronic components ($13.0 billion), and chemicals ($10.1 billion).
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is also an integral part of the bilateral economic relationship. The
stock of U.S. FDI increased from $17.0 billion in 1994 to $101.5 billion in 2013. Mexican FDI in
the United States is much lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, but has also increased in recent
years. In 2013, the stock of Mexican FDI in the United States totaled $17.6 billion.
The United States and Mexico have had several trade disputes over the years, most of which have
been resolved. These issues have involved trade in sugar, trucking, product labeling, and tomato
imports from Mexico. The most recent dispute involves U.S. sugar imports from Mexico. In
76 The funds will remain on hold until the Secretary of State reports in writing to the Committees on Appropriations
that the Mexican government is: 1) investigating and prosecuting violations of human rights in civilian courts; 2)
enforcing prohibitions against torture and the use of testimony obtained through torture; 3) ensuring that police and
military officers promptly transfer detainees to the custody of civilian judicial authorities, in accordance with Mexican
law, and are cooperating with such authorities in such cases; and 4) searching for the victims of forced disappearances
and is investigating and prosecuting those responsible for such crimes.
77 This section draws from CRS Report R42965, NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects, by M. Angeles Villarreal
and Ian F. Fergusson and CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications,
by M. Angeles Villarreal.
Congressional Research Service
19
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
August 2014, the Department of Commerce announced a preliminary subsidy ruling on sugar
imports from Mexico in which U.S. government investigations found reasonable evidence to
suggest that Mexican sugar was entering the United States at less than fair value. A final ruling
was expected in 2015 unless the U.S. and Mexican governments reached a settlement before then.
The two governments reached a preliminary agreement on October 27 to suspend the U.S.
investigations. As part of that agreement, the quantity of imported sugar from Mexico is to be
limited at prices that are subject to minimum reference levels. A final agreement must still be
signed to resolve the issue.78
Another major bilateral trade issue concerns a 14-year U.S. effort to comply with NAFTA
trucking provisions that would allow Mexican trucks that meet U.S. safety standards to operate in
the United States. The Obama Administration’s 3-year pilot program granting authority for
Mexican carriers to temporarily operate in the United States ended on October 14, 2014. The
Department of Transportation subsequently announced that the U.S. government would give the
Mexican carriers participating in the program permanent permission to operate in the United
States, pending final reports on the program from an advisory committee and the Transportation
Department’s Inspector General.79
The United States and Mexico are both participating in the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) agreement, a proposed free trade agreement among 12 countries.80 A TPP
would likely enhance the economic links Mexico already has with the United States and Canada
under NAFTA. This could include further reduction of barriers to trade and the negotiation of key
issues in areas such as agriculture, intellectual property rights protection, government
procurement, regulatory cohesion, and others. While a TPP would not render NAFTA obsolete, it
could, if approved, update some of the rules governing North American trade.
The Obama Administration has engaged in bilateral efforts, both with Canada and Mexico, to
increase North American regulatory cooperation, maintain border security while facilitating
legitimate trade and travel, promote economic competitiveness, and pursue energy integration.
The aforementioned U.S.-Mexico HLED, launched on September 20, 2013, is a bilateral initiative
to advance economic and commercial priorities through annual meetings at the Cabinet level that
also includes leaders from the public and private sectors. Other bilateral efforts with Mexico
include the High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council (HLRCC) launched in February 2012 to
help align regulatory principles. In addition, the two countries have a bilateral initiative for
improving border management under the Declaration Concerning Twenty-first Center Border
Management that was announced in 2010 as part of pillar three of the Mérida Initiative (see
“Modernizing the U.S.-Mexico Border”). That initiative in particular aims to reduce wait times
along the U.S.-Mexico border, which currently result in an estimated $8 billion in losses for the
U.S. economy each year.81
78 See: CRS Report IN10178, Proposed Suspension Agreements Would End Dispute with Mexico over Sugar Trade, by
Mark A. McMinimy.
79 Oliver Patton, FMCSA Ends Cross-Border Pilot, Grants Authority to Mexican Carriers, HDT Truckinginfo, October
14, 2014.
80 The twelve countries involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations include the United States,
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. See: CRS
Report R42694, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ian F.
Fergusson.
81 Testimony of Christopher Wilson, Senior Associate, Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
20
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Congress is likely to continue monitoring trade disputes, how a potential TPP could affect
NAFTA, NAFTA’s institutions (the North American Development Bank and the Border
Environment Cooperation Commission), and how the United States, Mexico, and Canada might
work bilaterally and trilaterally to advance North American competitiveness.
Experts have proposed ideas that Congress might consider to make North American industries
more competitive and hasten regional integration. Some proposals that have emerged include
calls for rethinking the current trade relationship under NAFTA by broadening the scope of North
American integration and cooperation. One idea, for example, is to develop a North American
Investment Fund.82 Others include better coordinating and financing border infrastructure
projects, harmonizing regulations, establishing one common customs approval process for all
three countries, building human capital, and fostering technology transfers and innovation.83
In the trade realm, potential questions for congressional consideration include how U.S.-Mexican
trade and economic ties can be deepened, how efficiency on the border can be improved without
compromising security, and how weaknesses in NAFTA can be addressed.
Migration and Border Issues
Mexico-U.S. Immigration Issues
Immigration policy has been a subject of congressional concern over many decades, with much of
the debate focused on how to prevent unauthorized migration. Mexico’s status as the largest
source of U.S. migrants and a continental neighbor means that U.S. migration policies—including
stepped up border and interior enforcement—have primarily affected Mexicans.84 As a result,
immigration is a central issue in U.S.-Mexican relations.
Since 1986, the United States has taken a number of steps to tighten border security and
strengthen immigration enforcement,85 while also legalizing about 3 million people. Yet, the Pew
Research Center reports that the number of unauthorized immigrants in the United States has
grown from about 3.2 million in 1986 to about 11.2 million in 2012. At a broad level, today’s
immigration debate is focused on additional steps to strengthen immigration enforcement and
border security, potential legalization provisions for certain unauthorized immigrants, and
possible changes to the rules governing lawful immigration flows. An overarching question is
whether these three issues should be considered together as “comprehensive immigration reform
(CIR) or whether they should be taken up separately (sometimes referred to as “piecemeal
(...continued)
Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce with Mexico at America's Southern Border, 113th Cong., 1st sess.,
December 9, 2013.
82 See Robert A. Pastor, The North American Idea, A Vision of a Continental Future, Oxford University Press, 2011.
83 Council on Foreign Relations, North America: Time for a New Focus, Independent Task Force Report no. 71,
October 2014, available at: http://www.cfr.org/north-america/north-america/p33536.
84 Mexicans are by far the largest group of immigrants in the United States, accounting for about 12 million people in
2012, or 30% of all current U.S. immigrants. (About half of Mexican immigrants are unauthorized, representing about
58% of the U.S. unauthorized population. See Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Net Migration
from Mexico Falls to Zero—and Perhaps Less, Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, DC, May 3, 2012. See CRS Report
R42560, Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends, coordinated by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
85 For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry.
Congressional Research Service
21
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
reform”). During the 113th Congress, the Senate passed CIR legislation (S. 744), while House
committees reported a series of discrete bills, some of which focused on border security.86
Since the mid-2000s, successive Mexican governments have supported efforts to enact
comprehensive immigration reform in the United States, while being careful not to appear to be
infringing upon U.S. congressional authority to make and enforce immigration laws. The
Mexican government has pledged to enforce legal emigration, increase security along its northern
and southern borders, and create opportunities for workers in Mexico so that fewer individuals
will emigrate. Mexico has aggressively combated transmigration by unauthorized migrants
crossing Mexico bound for the United States and worked with U.S. law enforcement to combat
alien smuggling and human trafficking. Due to a number of factors, illegal emigration from
Mexico is estimated to be at a 40-year low.87 Still, corruption remains endemic within Mexico’s
National Migration Institute (the entity within the Interior Ministry that enforces immigration
laws).88 Mexico’s southern border also continues to be porous and insecure.
President Peña Nieto, like former President Calderón, has not promised Mexicans that he can
affect immigration reform efforts in the U.S. Congress or influence the Obama Administration.
Both leaders saw how former President Vicente Fox’s failure to secure a bilateral immigration
accord with the United States in 2001 proved to be a major blow to his Administration.
Nevertheless, Peña Nieto has pledged his full support for efforts to enact comprehensive
immigration reform, and is likely to continue Mexico’s efforts to improve border security and
enforce its migration policies to combat illegal transmigration from Central America. On
November 20, 2014, the Mexican Foreign Ministry issued a statement welcoming President
Obama’s executive action on immigration;89 some 3 million of the estimated 5.2 million
unauthorized immigrants who could qualify for the programs Obama announced are Mexican.90
Nevertheless, several migration-related issues have concerned the Mexican government. Mexico
has protested the alleged excessive use of force by U.S. agents on the border; defended the rights
of Mexican migrants in the United States, regardless of their status; and challenged certain state
laws against illegal immigration. Record numbers of removals (deportations) under the Obama
Administration, as well as certain removal procedures, such as the treatment of unaccompanied
Mexican minors and removals that release migrants into violent border regions at night, have
been issues of concern.91 Recent increases in Mexicans from some regions seeking asylum in the
United States due to threats of violence in their communities and a rise in Central American
migrants in transit through Mexico has been a concern of both governments. Emigrants from
86 See: CRS Report R43320, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 113th Congress, coordinated by Andorra Bruno.
87 Researchers attribute this decline to the U.S. recession, stepped-up U.S. border security and interior enforcement,
increasing abuses of migrants by smugglers and transnational criminal organizations, and expanding job opportunities
in Mexico, among other factors. Jeffrey Passel, D'Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Net Migration from Mexico
Falls to Zero—And Perhaps Less, Pew Hispanic Center, 2012, available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/
PHC-04-23a-Mexican-Migration.pdf. That trend has since continued.
88 Edward Fox, “Figures Show Corruption Rife in Mexico’s Migration Agency,” Insight Crime, January 9, 2013.
89 See: CRS Report R43798, The Obama Administration’s November 2014 Immigration Initiatives: Questions and
Answers, by Kate M. Manuel.
90 Ellen Patten and Jeffrey S. Passel, How Obama’s Executive Action will Impact Immigrants, by Birth Country, Pew
Research Center, November 21, 2014.
91 See, for example, Adam Isacson, Maureen Meyer, and Ashley Davis, Border Security and Migration: A Report from
Arizona, WOLA, December 5, 2013, http://www.wola.org/publications/border_security_and_migration.
Congressional Research Service
22
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Mexico and Central America have increasingly become victims of kidnapping and abuses by
organized crime, sometimes in collusion with corrupt Mexican officials.92
Dealing with Central American Migration, Including Unaccompanied
Children93
As migration patterns between the United States and Mexico have changed, many U.S. policy
makers have begun to view Mexico as a partner that has an important role to play in securing its
southern border and combating Central American transmigration through its territory. In this
emerging role, the Mexican government actively collaborates with U.S. law enforcement agencies
to combat alien smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal migration by third country nationals.
Mexico reportedly apprehended more than 15,795 minors between January and August 2014,
compared to 9,727 in all of 2013, with enforcement in recent months focused on railway routes
that some migrants have used to cross Mexican territory into southern Texas.94
While some have praised Mexico for increasing its migration enforcement, others have criticized
the Mexican government for failing to grant Central Americans –particularly unaccompanied
minors–asylum and for failing to punish and purge those who have committed abuses against
migrants from within its agencies.
With U.S. support through the Mérida Initiative (see “Security and U.S. Assistance through the
Mérida Initiative”), the Mexican government started implementing a southern border security
plan in 2013. Mexico’s plan includes the establishment of 12 naval bases on the country’s rivers
and three security cordons that stretch more than 100 miles north of the Mexico-Guatemala and
Mexico-Belize borders.95 Total State Department support for mobile Non-Intrusive Inspection
Equipment and related equipment and training for Mexico’s southern border strategy is likely to
reach at least $86.6 million. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has also provided training to
troops patrolling the border, communications equipment, and support for the development of
Mexico’s air mobility and surveillance capabilities. This assistance may be expanded given the
inclusion of $79 million above the Administration’s request for border security and other judicial
sector programs in the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R.
83).
Modernizing the U.S.-Mexico Border
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is charged
with facilitating the flow of people, commerce, and trade through U.S. ports of entry while
securing the border against threats. While enforcement efforts at the southwest border tend to
focus on illegal migration and cross border crime, commercial trade crossing the border also
poses a potential risk to the United States. Since NAFTA took effect, U.S.-Mexico trade has
92 Latin American Working Group, Perilous Journey: Kidnapping and Violence Against Migrants in Transit Through
Mexico, October 2013, available at http://www.lawg.org/component/content/article/1267/1267.
93 See: CRS Report R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations,
coordinated by Peter J. Meyer.
94 Miriam Dominguez, “Se Triplica Cifra de Niños Migrantes Asegurados,” El Universal, October 15, 2014.
95 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “INL Assistance for
Mexico’s Southern Border Strategy,” fact sheet, June 2014.
Congressional Research Service
23
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
dramatically increased, while investments in port infrastructure and staffing of customs officials
along the border have not, until recently, been made. Particularly since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, there have been significant delays and unpredictable wait times at the U.S.-
Mexico border. Concerns about those delays has increased in recent years, since roughly 80% of
U.S.-Mexico trade must pass through a port of entry (POE) along the Southwest border, often
more than once, as manufacturing processes between the two countries have become highly
integrated. In 2013, for example, there were more than 5 million commercial crossings in 2013.
On May 19, 2010, the United States and Mexico declared their intent to collaborate on enhancing
the U.S.-Mexican border as part of pillar three of the Mérida Initiative.96 A Twenty-First Century
Border Bilateral Executive Steering Committee (ESC) has met six times since then to develop bi-
national action plans and oversee implementation of those plans. The plans are focused on setting
measurable goals within broad objectives: coordinating infrastructure development, expanding
trusted traveler and shipment programs, establishing pilot projects for cargo pre-clearance,
improving cross-border commerce and ties, and bolstering information sharing among law
enforcement agencies. In October 2014, the U.S. and Mexican governments reported that their
efforts had resulted in a reduction in wait times at San Isidro from two to three hours to 30
minutes, the opening of the first railroad crossing in 100 years, and the mutual recognition of each
country’s respective trusted shipper program.97
Figure 3. Snapshot of the U.S.-Mexico Border
Source: CRS Graphics.
96 The White House, “Declaration by The Government Of The United States Of America and The Government Of The
United Mexican States Concerning Twenty-First Century Border Management,” press release, May 19, 2010. As
mentioned, U.S. - Mexican security cooperation along the border did not begin with the Mérida Initiative. This ESC is
one of the most recent developments in the bilateral cooperation.
97 U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, “Mexico and U.S. Meet to Advance Expedited Transit of Persons and Goods across
the Border through Improved Border Security,” press release, October 22, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
24
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Congress authorized a pilot program in the FY2013 appropriations bill that permitted CBP to
enter into public-private partnerships (PPPs) with certain localities and permitted the private
sector to fund improvements in border facilities and port services.98 Enacted on January 17, 2014,
the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76) extended the pilot programs and
provided funding for additional customs inspectors and infrastructure at the U.S.-Mexico border.
As part of this broader debate about immigration policy and border issues, one question that may
arise is the degree to which U.S. immigration policy should treat Mexico as a “special case” on
certain immigration questions given the sheer size of the bilateral flow of migrants and Mexico’s
status as America’s continental neighbor.99
As Congress carries out its oversight function, questions that may arise include: How well is
Mexico fulfilling its pledges to increase security along its northern and southern borders and to
enforce its immigration laws? What is Mexico doing to address Central American migration
through its territory? What is the current level of bilateral cooperation on border security and
immigration and border matters, and how might that cooperation be improved? How well are the
U.S. and Mexican governments balancing security and trade concerns along the U.S.-Mexico
border?
Mexico’s Energy Reforms100
The future of oil and natural gas production in Mexico is of importance for Mexico’s economic
growth, as well as for U.S. energy security. Mexico’s state oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos
(Pemex), has struggled to counter declining oil production and reserves. Despite its challenges,
Mexico remains a top U.S. crude oil supplier. Due to an inability to meet rising demand, Mexico
has significantly increased natural gas imports from the United States. Still, gas shortages have
hindered the country’s economic performance and caused electricity costs to rise.
U.S. policy makers are closely monitoring the implementation of the historic December 2013
constitutional reforms and August 2014 implementing laws that allow Pemex to partner with
international companies to boost production. Hailed by many analysts as the most significant
economic reform undertaken by Mexico since its entrance into NAFTA in 1994, the energy
reforms are expected to boost investment, growth, and eventually oil and gas production in the
country. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) has estimated that the recently-
enacted energy reforms could boost Mexico’s long-term oil production potential to 3.7 million
barrels per day (b/d) by 2040. That estimate is 75% higher than the EIA’s 2013 forecast for
Mexico’s long-term oil production that was issued prior to the enactment of energy reforms.101
The reforms also opened Mexico’s electricity sector to private generators.102 If power sector
98 See Section 560 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, FY2013 (P.L. 113-6, Div. D). The
FY2013 pilot program permitted five such partnerships in Dallas, TX; Houston, TX; and Miami, FL and land POEs in
El Paso, TX and Laredo/McAllen, TX.
99 For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R42560, Mexican Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends.
100 For background on Mexico’s recently enacted energy reforms, see CRS Report R43313, Mexico’s Oil and Gas
Sector: Background, Reform Efforts, and Implications for the United States, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
101 EIA, “Energy Reform Could Increase Mexico’s Long-term Oil Production by 75%,” press release, August 25, 2014.
102 Lisa Viscidi and Paul Shortell, A Brighter Future for Mexico: The Promise and Challenge of Electricity Reform,
Inter-American Dialogue, June 2014, http://www.thedialogue.org/uploads/IAD9603_MexicanEnergyFINAL.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
25
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
reforms reduce Mexico’s electricity costs, then Mexico’s manufacturing sector, which is highly
integrated with U.S. industry, should become more competitive.
Mexico’s 2013/2014 energy reforms were designed to transform Pemex into a “productive state
enterprise” with more autonomy and lower taxes, but made it subject to competition with private
investors. They created different types of contracts for private companies interested in investing
in Mexico, including production-sharing and licensing; allowed companies to post reserves for
accounting purposes; established a sovereign wealth fund; and created new regulators. In August,
Mexico’s Secretariat of Energy announced the results of “Round Zero,” which defines the
exploratory and production areas that Pemex can retain. Pemex may partner with private
companies to exploit those areas. The first round of public bidding is to be held in 2015.
The opening of Mexico’s oil and natural gas sector to foreign investors poses significant changes
in the U.S.-Mexico energy relationship that may have advantages and disadvantages for both
sides. Reversing Mexico’s production decline would add more oil to the global market and
enhance U.S. energy security. U.S. companies able to enter the Mexican upstream sector are
likely to benefit from the opening of Mexican resources to foreign investment. Opportunities for
infrastructure development, oil services companies, and downstream industries are also likely to
open up. This would be true for both the oil and natural gas sectors, but U.S. natural gas exporters
to Mexico might, over the long term, potentially lose some of their market share.
Opportunities may also exist for greater U.S.-Mexican energy cooperation. The first leases have
already been awarded in the Gulf under the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Agreement that was
approved by Congress in December 2013 (H.J.Res. 59/P.L. 113-67).103 Bilateral efforts to ensure
that hydrocarbon resources are developed without unduly damaging the environment could
expand, possibly through collaboration between Mexican entities and U.S. federal or state
regulatory entities. In terms of capacity-building, the University of Texas system has recently
expanded educational exchanges and training opportunities for Mexicans working in the
petroleum sector. Other U.S. universities could follow suit. Others have also urged the United
States and Mexico to work together to provide oil and natural gas resources to help reduce energy
costs in Central America.
Analysts have urged the United States to offer more technical assistance to Mexico - particularly
in deep water and shale oil exploration, to clarify rules for oil and gas swaps, and to ensure that
new cross-border pipelines are approved expeditiously.104 On June 24, 2014, the House approved
legislation (H.R. 3301), which sought to ensure the continued development of natural gas
infrastructure and exports to Mexico. Those provisions were integrated into H.R. 2, which the
House passed on September 18, 2014.
Oversight questions may focus on how the Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement is being
implemented; the extent to which Mexico is developing independent and capable energy sector
regulators, particularly for deep water drilling; and the fairness of the terms Mexico offers to
private companies interested in investing in its hydrocarbons industry.
103 “BOEM awards leases in US-Mexico transboundary area to ExxonMobil,” Oil & Gas Journal, May 30, 2014.
104 David L. Goldwyn et al., Mexico’s Energy Reform: Ready to Launch, Atlantic Council, August 2014.
Congressional Research Service
26
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Water Sharing105
Management of shared water resources is significant for U.S. and Mexican interests in the border
region, as well as a contributing factor to the level of cooperation or tension between the two
countries. Multiple rivers cross or form the U.S.-Mexico border. The two principal rivers are the
Colorado River, which is predominantly in the United States but passes through Mexico on its
way to the Gulf of California; and the Rio Grande, which forms the U.S.-Mexico border in Texas.
These rivers are covered by long-standing international water sharing agreements. Starting in
1906, agreements emerged to allocate the Rio Grande’s water between the two countries. In 1944,
the two countries entered into a comprehensive water treaty, the “Utilization of Waters of the
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande” (Treaty).106 The 1944 Treaty reconfigured an
existing entity into the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC),107 which is
responsible for managing water in accordance with the Treaty and resolving water-sharing
disputes through amendments, called “minutes.” Recent experiences of international water
management in the two basins have contrasted, with advances in cooperation in the Colorado
River basin and increased tensions in the Rio Grande basin.
Colorado River
The Colorado River flows through seven U.S. states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) and into Mexico before emptying into the Gulf of California.
Some 97% of the basin is in the United States.108 The 1944 Treaty requires that the United States
provide Mexico with 1.5 million acre-feet (AF) of Colorado River water annually,109 roughly 10%
of the river’s average annual flow. Binational disputes have arisen over water quantity, quality,
and conservation.
Recent U.S.-Mexico water sharing discussions have coalesced around the need for better
management and conservation of both the Colorado River itself and the Colorado River Delta. As
a result, both governments, along with state officials and conservation groups from both
countries, worked with the IBWC to develop an agreement that would allocate water to Mexico
based on whether there is a surplus or drought and allow for joint investments to create greater
environmental protection, as well as greater water conservation (i.e., ability to store water) for
Mexico. These discussions culminated in the signing of Minute 319 on November 20, 2012.
105 See CRS Report R43312, U.S.-Mexico Water Sharing: Background and Recent Developments, by Nicole T. Carter,
Clare Ribando Seelke, and Daniel T. Shedd.
106 Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and
Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 (hereinafter Treaty).
107 The IBWC is an international body consisting of a United States and a Mexican section, which are overseen by the
State Department and Mexico’s Foreign Ministry, respectively.
108 When the 1994 Treaty was signed, Colorado River flows were estimated at 16.8 million acre-feet (AF) per year;
current flows are closer to 14.4 million AF annually. “U.S., Mexico: The Decline of the Colorado River,” Stratfor
Global Intelligence, May 13, 2013.
109 Treaty, supra note 80, art. 10.
Congressional Research Service
27
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Rio Grande
While Colorado River Basin relations have been increasingly collaborative, the delivery of water
from Mexico to the United States in the Rio Grande basin has been a source of tension. The Rio
Grande is divided into two basins: the western El Paso-Juárez Rio Grande basin and the eastern
basin, which encompasses an area from Ft. Quitman to the Gulf of Mexico. For that eastern
portion of the basin, under article 4 of the 1944 Treaty, Mexico’s water delivery from designated
tributaries must average at least 350,000 AF per year, measured in five-year cycles.110 If Mexico
fails to meet its delivery obligations for a five-year cycle because of “extraordinary drought”—a
term not defined in the Treaty—it must make up the deficiency during the next five-year cycle.
As both the U.S. and Mexican portions of the basin experienced drought conditions in 2011-2012,
deliveries from Mexico per the 1944 Treaty slowed, raising concerns in Texas about the
predictability of water deliveries. The current delivery cycle started October 25, 2010, and will
end October 24, 2015. Mexican interests maintain that “extraordinary drought” conditions
hampered deliveries in the early part of this cycle but have since picked up. Texas interests assert
that the drought has eased in the Mexican portion of the basin and deliveries should increase so
the cycle can end with no water debt; they also are pursuing more predictability of future
deliveries (i.e., they would like Mexico to maintain deliveries at the target annual delivery rate).
The concern is that low deliveries, as occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s, reduce water
available for agriculture and communities in the U.S. counties along the Texas-Mexico border.
Historically, Mexico met its deliveries within the five-year cycles until the 1994 to 2003 drought.
During that drought, Mexico accrued a water debt through two water cycles. Diffusion of tensions
over the debt was the result of presidential intervention, negotiation of Minutes under the 1944
Treaty, and investments in improved water efficiency; hurricane-induced wet conditions cleared
the water debt in 2005.111
The U.S. and Mexican sections of the IBWC have met regularly since late 2012 to discuss
Mexico’s water deliveries; bilateral discussions since May 2013 also have involved high-level
State Department and Mexican government officials. Among the outcomes has been an exchange
of technical data to assist in options for future water management in the basin. Mexico delivered
more than the 350,000 AF during the third year of the cycle.112 Technical and diplomatic
discussions continued to occur in 2014 as well, and, although not yet publically reflected in
official IBWC water accounting, State Department officials maintain that Mexico is likely to have
nearly met the annual target in the fourth year of the cycle which ended in October 2014.113 If this
is the case and Mexico delivers the annual target amount in the last year of the cycle, Mexico
would have more than 200,000 AF in water debt at the end of the cycle due to its failure to make
up for the low deliveries in the early years of the cycle.
110 The 1944 Treaty also establishes Mexico’s right to two-thirds of the flows that feed into the Rio Grande from the six
major tributaries that enter from Mexico (Id. art. 4(A)(c)), and the United States’ right to all flows from Rio Grande
tributaries in the United States side and one-third from the six Mexican tributaries (Id. art. 4(B)).
111 Ibid.
112 Letter from Edward Drusina, IBWC Commissioner, to various Senators and Representatives, October 23, 2013.
113 Electronic correspondence with State Department official, November 21, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
28
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
During the 113th Congress, Members wrote letters to the Administration and introduced
legislation related to the Rio Grande water dispute.114 On January 17, 2014, President Obama
signed the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act into law (P.L. 113-76). The Joint
Explanatory statement accompanying the Act required the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the IBWC Commissioner, to report to the appropriate congressional committees within 60 days of
the measure’s enactment on actions taken to ensure that the water deficits owed by Mexico to the
United States do not increase and that allocations comply with existing bilateral water treaties. On
February 7, 2014, President Obama signed the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79). Section
12310 of the Act required the State Department to submit a report within 120 days of the bill’s
enactment on efforts by Mexico to meet its Rio Grande Treaty deliveries. On February 5, 2014,
the State Department submitted one report to meet both those requirements, which predicted that,
barring any unforeseen circumstances, Mexico would meet its 2014 delivery target.115 The
FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R. 83) requires a report
within 45 days of the bill’s enactment on whether mechanisms discussed in the Act have been
developed to ensure that Mexico is making its water deliveries. It also carried forward the
aforementioned annual reporting requirement included in P.L. 113-79 on the status of Mexico’s
deliveries.
In addition to proposed legislation, questions that Congress may confront related to the Rio
Grande basin include what are the most effective mechanisms and approaches for achieving a
Mexican water delivery regime that provides more benefit to Texas water users, and whether
interventions and investment like those employed to manage the previous water debt would be
necessary or effective. For the Colorado River basin, issues before Congress may be largely
related to oversight of the impacts and implementation of Minute 319.
Outlook
As Enrique Peña Nieto begins his third year in office, many questions remain about Mexico’s
future. To what extent will the economic reforms that have been enacted actually be implemented
and how long will it take for Mexicans to see benefits from the reforms? How will President Peña
Nieto regain Mexicans’ trust in his ability to strengthen the rule of law and tackle corruption?
As the 2015 mid-term elections approach, Mexicans will be increasingly concerned about
whether President Peña Nieto and the PRI have delivered on their promises to reduce crime and
bolster economic growth. Will the Peña Nieto government be able to reduce violent crimes that
affect average citizens, such as kidnapping and extortion, while still combating organized crime?
Will security forces be able to combat crime in a way that respects human rights?
Answers to some of these questions will depend largely upon the actions of President Peña Nieto
himself, others will depend upon external factors, while still others will be decided by a mix of
domestic and external factors. For example, many feel Mexico would benefit immensely if
certain immigration reforms were enacted in the United States, but there is little that the Peña
114 Letter from Reps. Cuellar, Gallego, Hinojosa, O’Rourke, and Vela, to the Honorable U.S. President Barack Obama,
April 11, 2013.
115 U.S. Department of State, Report to the Congress on Actions Taken to Ensure that the Water Deficits Owed by
Mexico to the United States do Not Increase and That Allocations Comply with the Treaty for the Utilization of Waters
of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande of 1944, February 5, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
29
Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations
Nieto government can do to support their enactment beyond pledging to reduce illegal emigration
and bolster border security. In contrast, Enrique Peña Nieto’s domestic policies can have a
significant impact on security and economic conditions in Mexico, as well as bilateral efforts in
those areas.
Mexico and U.S.-Mexican relations are experiencing a time of transition. This transition may
bring about advances in some areas of the bilateral relationship, while setbacks may occur in
others. Analysts are hopeful, for example, that even as bilateral attention focuses more on trade
and energy than in the recent past, intense U.S.-Mexican security cooperation can continue.
Throughout this process, the 114th Congress is likely to closely monitor conditions in Mexico, as
well as U.S.-Mexican cooperation on key issues as part of its legislative and oversight capacities.
Author Contact Information
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
Acknowledgments
Nicole Carter, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy, contributed to the section on Water Sharing.
Key Policy Staff
Area of Expertise
Name
Phone
Email
Border Security and Immigration
Lisa Seghetti
7-4669
lseghetti@crs.loc.gov
Enforcement
Immigration Policy
Andorra Bruno
7-7865
abruno@crs.loc.gov
Immigration- Legal Issues
Kate Manuel
7-4477
kmanuel@crs.loc.gov
Mexican Drug Trafficking
June S. Beittel
7-0613
jbeittel@crs.loc.gov
Organizations (DTOs)
DTOs in the United States/Spillover
Kristin Finklea
7-6259
kfinklea@crs.loc.gov
Violence
Firearms Trafficking
William Krouse
7-2225
wkrouse@crs.loc.gov
Economics Relations and Trade
Angeles Villarreal
7-0321
avillarreal@crs.loc.gov
Mexican Trucks in the United States
John Frittelli
7-7033
jfrittelli@crs.loc.gov
U.S.-Mexico Energy Issues
Michael Ratner
7-9529
mratner@crs.loc.gov
U.S.-Mexico Transboundary
Curry L. Hagerty
7-7738
chagerty@crs.loc.gov
Hydrocarbons Agreement
Water Issues
Nicole T. Carter
7-0854
ncarter@crs.loc.gov
Congressional Research Service
30