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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current
Conditions and Congressional Concerns
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
December 11, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns
Summary
Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic. Since the fall of the Duvalier
dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to overcome its centuries-long legacy of
authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment. Economic and social stability
improved considerably, and many analysts believed Haiti was turning a corner toward sustainable
development when it was set back by a massive earthquake in January 2010 that devastated much
of the capital of Port-au-Prince. Although it is recovering, poverty remains massive and deep, and
economic disparity is wide: Haiti remains the poorest country in the western hemisphere.
Haiti is in a political crisis as the expiration date for terms of most of the Haitian legislature
approaches. In the fourth year of President Michel Martelly’s five-year term, Congress and the
donor community have expressed growing concern about his commitment to the democratic
process due to his government’s failure to hold legislative elections almost three years overdue.
Haiti took some steps to move the process forward, but the Senate has failed to pass the necessary
electoral law amendments. Saying they lack confidence in the provisional electoral council (CEP)
that is to oversee the elections, some opposition members refuse to vote for the bill. Several major
opposition parties are boycotting the elections. Thousands of protesters have called for Martelly’s
resignation. If the elections do not occur before January 12, 2015, the parliament will lack a
quorum, and Martelly could rule by decree, increasing already-high political tensions. On
December 9, a commission appointed by Martelly called for the CEP and the prime minister to
resign and a consensus government to be formed.
Haiti is a key foreign assistance priority for the Obama Administration in Latin American and the
Caribbean. Haiti’s developmental needs and priorities are many. The Haitian government and the
international donor community are implementing a 10-year recovery plan focusing on territorial,
economic, social, and institutional rebuilding. An outbreak of cholera in late 2010 has swept
across most of the country and further complicated assistance efforts. Progress has been made in
developing democratic institutions, although, as evident in the current crisis, they remain weak.
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been in Haiti to help restore
order since the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government in 2004. The
mission has helped facilitate elections, combat gangs and drug trafficking with the Haitian
National Police, and played a key role in emergency responses to natural disasters. Nonetheless,
popular protests have called for MINUSTAH’s withdrawal because of sexual abuse by some of its
forces and scientific findings that its troops apparently introduced cholera to the country. In 2013
the U.N. said it would not compensate cholera victims, citing diplomatic immunity. Victims have
filed a class action suit against the U.N. in U.S. federal court.
The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes,
continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other concerns include the
cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and
human trafficking; and alleviating poverty. Congress shares these concerns. The immediate
priority is that a resolution to the elections impasse be reached quickly: concerns are high that
further delays and Martelly ruling by decree will heighten political tensions and instability.
Current legislation related to Haiti includes P.L. 113-76, P.L. 113-162, H.R. 83, H.R. 1525, H.R.
3163, H.Res. 61, H.Res. 224, H.Res. 443, S. 1548, and S. 2853.
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Contents
Political Background ....................................................................................................................... 1
Haitian Democratic History in Brief ......................................................................................... 1
The 2010-2011 Election of President Martelly and a new Parliament ................................ 4
Adoption of Constitutional Reforms ................................................................................... 5
Overdue Elections Process Moves in Fits and Starts .......................................................... 5
President Martelly’s Administration .......................................................................................... 8
Stability and the Investigation of Former Heads of State ........................................................ 12
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) ............................................... 12
Haiti’s Development Challenges and Socioeconomic Conditions ................................................. 15
Cholera Epidemic .................................................................................................................... 17
Strategies for Haiti’s Reconstruction and International Assistance ............................................... 18
Reconstruction Efforts ............................................................................................................. 18
Relations with Donors ............................................................................................................. 20
Coordination of Foreign Assistance .................................................................................. 20
Potential for Mining .......................................................................................................... 22
U.S. Policy Objectives and Assistance .......................................................................................... 23
U.S. Assistance to Haiti ........................................................................................................... 23
Temporary Protected Status ..................................................................................................... 24
Congressional Response and Concerns ......................................................................................... 27
Post-Earthquake Reconstruction.............................................................................................. 28
Transparency and Accountability of the Haitian Government ................................................ 31
Respect for Human Rights ....................................................................................................... 32
Concerns over Haitians and People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic ........ 33
Investigations of Duvalier and Aristide for Human Rights Violations .............................. 36
Curbing Violence against Women ..................................................................................... 38
Security and the Debate over Reestablishing the Haitian Army .............................................. 38
Counternarcotics ...................................................................................................................... 40
Trade Preferences for Haiti ...................................................................................................... 41
Legislation in the 113th Congress ................................................................................................... 42
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Haiti ..................................................................................................................... 1
Figure 2. U. S. Government Post-Earthquake Assistance in Haiti ................................................. 27
Figure 3. Total Post-Earthquake USG Funding to Haiti Summary ................................................ 29
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Haiti Fiscal Years 2010 to 2014 ......................................................... 26
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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 44
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Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns
Figure 1. Map of Haiti
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
Political Background
Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic; Haiti occupies the western
third of the island. Since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has struggled to
overcome its centuries-long legacy of authoritarianism, extreme poverty, and underdevelopment.
While significant progress has been made in improving governance, democratic institutions
remain weak. Poverty remains massive and deep, and economic disparity is wide. In proximity to
the United States, and with such a chronically unstable political environment and fragile
economy, Haiti has been a constant policy issue for the United States. The U.S. Congress views
the stability of the nation with great concern and evidenced a commitment to improving
conditions there.
Haitian Democratic History in Brief
Haiti has been struggling to build and strengthen democratic institutions for 25 years, ever since
massive popular protests and international pressure forced dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier to
abandon his rule and flee the country in 1986. Known as “Baby Doc,” Duvalier came to power in
1971, succeeding his father, Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier, who had ruled since 1957. Their 29-
year dictatorship was marked by repression and corruption. Hoping to reverse almost 200 years of
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mostly violent and authoritarian rule, Haitians overwhelmingly approved a new constitution
creating a democratic government in 1987.
De facto military rule, coups, and thwarted attempts at democratic elections continued until a
provisional civilian government conducted what were widely heralded as Haiti’s first free and fair
elections in 1990, in which Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former Catholic priest, was elected
president. In 1991, the Haitian military overthrew Aristide in a coup, just eight months after he
was inaugurated. Aristide went into exile in the United States. Three years later, under the threat
of a U.S. military intervention, the military finally bowed to international pressure and allowed
Aristide to finish his term. Aristide returned to Haiti in 1994 under the protection of some 20,000
U.S. troops, who transferred responsibility to a United Nations mission in 1995. With U.S.
assistance, President Aristide disbanded the army and began to train a professional civilian police
force.
In 1996 Haitians saw their first transfer of power between two democratically elected presidents
in Haitian history when Aristide was succeeded by René Préval.1 Five years later, in 2001,
Aristide was reelected, and there was another peaceful transfer of power. Political conflict
embroiled Aristide and the opposition, however, and led to the collapse of his government in
2004, and Aristide again went into exile, eventually ending up in South Africa. An interim
government followed, from 2004 to 2006. Charges of corruption against Aristide, dissolution of
the parliament by Préval in his first term, questions regarding the interim government’s
legitimacy, and flawed elections under all of them contributed to their inability to establish a fully
accepted or functioning government. Nonetheless, with the support of the United Nations
Stabilization Mission for Haiti (MINUSTAH)—which arrived in Haiti in 2004—and other
donors, security conditions improved, reform of the country’s police force began, and elections
were held in 2006.
As a result of those elections the Parliament, which had not been fully functional since the
collapse of the Aristide government in 2004, was reestablished, and René Préval began his second
five-year term as president of Haiti. During his first three years in office, Préval established
relative internal political stability and oversaw a period of economic growth. In 2007, the Préval
Administration published its Poverty Reduction Strategy, a key step in meeting International
Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements for debt relief. International donors pledged more than $1.5
billion in economic assistance to Haiti.
In the long term, democratization in Haiti has contributed to the slow strengthening of
government capacity and transparency. From 2004 to 2009, Haiti made what the IMF and others
called “remarkable progress” toward political stability and economic stabilization.2 With much
international support, the government conducted democratic presidential and parliamentary
elections and enacted wide-ranging reforms, especially in economic governance. Elected
1 Jean Bertrand Aristide served as President in Haiti from February through September 1991; 1994-1996; and 2001-
2004. René Préval served as President from 1996-2001; and 2006-2011. The Haitian constitution limits presidents to
two nonconsecutive terms.
2 Ugo Fasano, “Haiti’s Economic, Political Turnaround,” IMF Survey Magazine: Countries & Regions, September 17,
2007; and World Bank, “Haiti Country Brief,” September 2008, at http://go.worldbank.org/55NM6XlVQ0. See also,
“Remarks by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon at a High-Level Donor Conference on Haiti (as released
by the UN),” and “Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, in the U.N. Security Council (as released by the US Mission to the U.N. in New York),” Federal News
Service, April 21, 2009.
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governments have developed long-term development plans resulting in international technical and
financial assistance. They have developed national budgets and made them public. The number of
employees in bloated state enterprises has been reduced. The government carried out the fiscal
management and transparency reforms necessary to qualify for debt relief from multilateral and
some bilateral creditors under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in 2009.
Human rights violations have been drastically reduced. Although crime and violence continued to
undermine Haitian development, security improved significantly enough during this period that
the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was shifting the focus of its
biggest contingent from security to development.3
Haiti’s fragile stability has been repeatedly shaken, however, if not by political problems, then by
climatic ones. During this same period of relative stability, a worsening food crisis led to violent
protests and the removal of Haiti’s prime minister in 2008. U.N. officials said political opponents
and armed gangs infiltrated the protests and fired at U.N. peacekeepers in an effort to weaken the
government. Without a prime minister, Haiti could not sign certain agreements with foreign
donors or implement programs to address the crisis for over four months. There were some 19
political parties in the legislature competing for influence and positioning themselves for
legislative and presidential elections, further complicating governability.
And then a devastating earthquake struck the nation in January 2010, ravaging the Haitian capital
of Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas.4 Political stability was especially uncertain after the
disaster, due to the loss of many political figures and government officials and massive damage to
government infrastructure. Some 17% of the country’s civil service were killed, and the
presidential palace, the parliament building, and 28 of 29 ministry buildings were destroyed.5
Along with the buildings, government records were destroyed; reestablishing and expanding
transparency in government spending has been particularly challenging.
After yet another controversial election cycle, Peasant Response party candidate Michel Martelly,
one of Haiti’s most popular entertainers, was sworn into office as Haiti’s new president on May
14, 2011 for a five-year term. When outgoing President René Préval, of the Unity party, gave him
the presidential sash it was the first time in Haitian history that a peaceful, democratic transfer of
power occurred between presidents of opposing parties. Much of his term to date has been
characterized by gridlock between the executive and legislative branches.
There is still much to be accomplished in the democratization of Haiti. Some parts of the
government are not fully independent, the judicial system is weak, and corruption and political
violence still threaten the nation’s stability. Haitian governance capacities, already limited, were
considerably diminished by the earthquake. President Martelly said that “all problems we are
facing today result from the weakness of our institutions,” and called on the international
community to keep helping Haiti strengthen its institutions. 6 Much of the Haitian public
perceives progress in reconstruction and distribution of over $9 billion in pledged international
assistance as much too slow, adding to mounting public frustration with international donors and
3 Jonathan M. Katz, “Largest UN force in Haiti to focus on development,” Associated Press, April 25, 2009.
4 For more information on the earthquake, see CRS Report R41023, Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response, by Rhoda
Margesson and Maureen Taft-Morales.
5 U.S. Dept. of State & U.S. AID, FY2010 Haiti Supplemental Budget Justification, p.4.
6 Text of report by Haitian Radio Vision 2000 on 30 April, “Haitian President Returns, Calls for Unity, Seeks
Strengthening of Institutions,” BBC Monitoring Americas, May 1, 2012.
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the government. The government’s failure to hold elections that are several years overdue is
contributing to unrest and public calls for Martelly’s resignation.
The 2010-2011 Election of President Martelly and a new Parliament7
The president, senators, and deputies are elected to serve five-year terms. The constitution limits
presidents to two nonconsecutive terms. There are no term limits for the legislature, although
turnover for its members has been high. The first round of both the presidential and legislative
elections took place on November 28, 2010. According to the Haitian constitution, if no candidate
receives an absolute majority of the vote, a runoff vote between the top two candidates is held for
presidential and Chamber of Deputies seats. For Senate seats, candidates who lack an absolute
majority but have at least 20% more votes than the next candidate are declared the winner.
President Préval was completing his second nonconsecutive term, the maximum allowed by the
Haitian constitution. Nineteen candidates vied to succeed him in the first round. Like most
previous elections in Haiti, this one centered more on personalities than on parties or issues. A
group of Haitian journalists, the Public Policy Intervention Group, with the support of the
National Democratic Institute and the Commission on Presidential Debates, tried to encourage
more substantive discussions among the presidential candidates by holding a series of debates
that were broadcast nationwide. All 19 presidential candidates participated.
The first round produced contested results involving the governing party’s candidate, and
politically motivated violence. After the Haitian government accepted the recommendations of
international observers, the dispute was resolved and the vote went to a second round between
Mirlande Manigat, a professor of constitutional law and former first lady, and Michel Martelly.
Martelly, a famous Haitian kompa dance musician known for his bawdy performances, and called
“Sweet Micky,” was popular with young voters. Martelly, also a businessman, had personal
financial issues. He defaulted on over $1 million in loans and had three properties in Florida go
into foreclosure, raising questions about his financial management skills.8 Although Martelly won
68% of the votes cast in the March 20, 2011, elections, turnout was low, so those votes
constituted the support of only 15% of all registered voters. Martelly, age 50, was inaugurated on
May 14, 2011 for a five-year term ending in 2016.
The legislative offices up for election included the entire 99-member Chamber of Deputies, and
11 of 30 Senate seats. The results of the second round of voting for legislative seats were
contentious. Charges of fraud led to violent demonstrations across the country resulting in the
deaths of at least two people, including the director of a hospital that was set on fire.
The legislature sworn in on April 25, 2011, was incomplete: at that time the results in 19 districts
had been challenged. International observers reported that the final results released by the
provisional electoral council (CEP) for those districts had been changed to favor candidates
associated with then-President Préval’s Inité (Unity) coalition, and demanded that all 19 results be
annulled. The CEP reviewed the cases and endorsed 15 of the 19 original results; the government
published the official results; and those 15 legislators were able to take their seats. It appears that
7 For more in-depth discussion of the 2011 presidential and legislative elections, see CRS Report R41689, Haiti’s
National Elections: Issues, Concerns, and Outcome, by Maureen Taft-Morales
8 Frances Robles, “Haiti candidate Martelly lost three S. Florida properties to foreclosure,” Miami Herald, March 7,
2011.
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the four remaining disputed seats in the chamber of deputies will be voted on in the next
elections. The Inité coalition captured a majority in both houses of the legislature, so President
Martelly had to negotiate with them to get his proposals passed.
Adoption of Constitutional Reforms
The new legislature began to work before Martelly was sworn in, including adopting
constitutional reforms that had been passed under the previous legislature, in hopes of getting
them to take effect quickly. Constitutional amendments passed by two consecutive legislatures go
into effect when the next president takes office. Controversy arose around the status of these
amendments as well.
The amendments were in a state of constitutional limbo for about a year. To become law, bills
passed by the legislature must be published by the executive branch. The wording of the
amendments sent to be published by the outgoing Préval Administration differed from that
actually passed by the legislature, according to the State Department, so the amendments did not
become law. In June 2011, Martelly stopped the altered version from being printed, and there was
debate over whether the original version should be printed, or the process started anew.
In June 2012, the Martelly Administration finally published the constitutional amendments that
had been passed by two legislatures.9 These allowed Haitians with dual citizenship to vote and
hold many government positions, including cabinet positions. This had been a sore point for
Haitians in the diaspora who wanted to be able to vote, or return and serve in the government.
Those with dual citizenship will still be prohibited from becoming president, prime minister, or
members of either chamber of the legislature. Martelly said that leaders of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches had agreed to publish the corrected amendments, cooperation he
described as a great step forward in Haiti’s democratic process.10
The amendments also included a streamlined process for creating a permanent electoral council to
replace the previous method of nine sectors of government civil society naming the CEP, as had
been stipulated in the 1987 constitution. Under the reformed constitution, the three branches of
government—executive, judicial, and legislative—each name three members of the CEP. Despite
that new process, forming an electoral council has been fraught with disputes and is a key reason
why Haiti has still not held long-overdue elections.
Overdue Elections Process: Delays and Disputes over CEP, Electoral Law
An electoral council is the entity responsible for setting dates for and organizing new elections.
President Martelly fired the members of the previous CEP in December 2011. He did not begin to
form a new electoral council until June 2012, even though one-third of the Senate seats expired
on May 8, 2012. Elections to replace those legislators should have taken place by January 2012 at
the latest, according to Haitian law. They have yet to be held, and local elections for municipal
councils, town delegates, and other posts are also long overdue.
9 Le Moniteur, Journal Officiel de la Republique d’Haiti, June 19, 2012, p. 17.
10 Joseph Guyler Delva, “Haiti Constitutional Amendments Finally Take Effect,” Reuters, June 19, 2012.
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Because the Senate has had only 20 members since May 2012, it has been more difficult to meet
the 16-member quorum needed to conduct business, including naming its representatives to the
CEP. The Inité party lost four Senators and some of its clout in that chamber. President Martelly’s
Peasant Response party had no members in the Senate, and he lost about four allies there; which
may explain in part why his Administration has had such difficulty dealing with the Senate.
The government failed to meet the minister’s pledge that the elections would be held by the end
of 2012; instead the process became contentious, progressed in fits and starts, and contributed to
political tensions. Thousands of Haitians have taken to the streets since then to protest the failure
to hold elections and to call for Martelly’s resignation.
Additional concern has been raised over the Martelly Administration’s decision to replace most of
the 120 mayors elected in 2006, whose terms have expired, with government appointees.
According to the then-U.N. Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti,
Michel Forst, this decision “was met with bafflement and incomprehension on the part of the
national and international communities.”11
The executive, legislative, and judicial branches, each responsible for naming three members of
the electoral council, finally agreed on a mechanism outside the established procedure with the
help of a mediating ecumenical group, and named a council, called the Transitional College of the
Permanent Electoral Council (TC/CEP) in April 2013. This was to be a transitional council, until
elections established a full parliament, which would then help constitute a permanent council.
The parliament also took steps forward in 2013, passing a political party law and an electoral law.
The latter resolved a major issue. President Martelly had argued that another third of the Senate’s
terms were due to expire in January 2014, raising concerns that the legislature would become
unable to function and Martelly would rule by decree. The electoral law set those Senators’ terms
as ending in January 2015, so the parliament could still function while elections were supposed to
be organized and held. Another concession made by Martelly was that those mayors and other
local officials who he appointed are prohibited from running for office in the upcoming elections.
The law also said the overdue Senate and municipal elections would be held at the same time.
By early 2014, organizing new elections became even more complex. Terms for another third of
the Senate as well as the entire 99-seat chamber of deputies are due to expire in January 2015,
and elections needed to be held for those posts as well.
The El Rancho Accord and Renewed Gridlock. The Catholic Church’s new Haitian Cardinal,
Chibly Langlois, led a new round of dialogues to discuss election plans in early 2014. Many
political parties, parliamentarians and representatives of civil society participated. Lavalas,
former President Aristide’s party, briefly participated as “observers.” Several major opposition
parties, including Lavalas and Inite, ultimately rejected the process as “a sham” and chose not to
sign the emerging agreement, known as the El Rancho Accord.12 The March 2014 agreement
proposed that all the overdue elections be held on October 26, 2014, and that the TC/CEP
organize them. The agreement has not gone into effect because the Senate has not passed an
electoral law amended by the chamber of deputies to incorporate the accord’s provisions.
11 Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, U.N. General Assembly
Human Rights Council, report A/HRC/22/65, February 7, 2013, p. 5.
12 Kim Ives, “Haiti: Battle over who will Umpire the Next Elections,” Global Research, May 1, 2014.
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The executive branch accuses six Senators of refusing to allow a vote on the amended electoral
law, and hence blocking elections. The Martelly Administration also says it has made concessions
to the opposition, including making changes to an earlier CEP and the cabinet.
Opposing parliamentarians, including the six senators, argue that the selection of the TC/CEP by
the three branches of government favors the executive branch. Senate President Simon Desras
called for the CEP to be chosen according to the 1987 constitution,13 but, as mentioned above (see
“Adoption of Constitutional Reforms”), the 2010 reforms passed by the legislature changed that
procedure.
On May 6, Martelly announced he was forming a new CEP and that one of the executive branch
appointees was Frizto Canton, the lawyer then defending former dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier
against charges of human rights abuses and embezzlement.14 Human rights groups raised
concerns over the appointment, especially after the National Unity Party, founded by Francois
“Papa Doc” Duvalier was revived in April 2014, and said it would field candidates at all levels
when elections are held.15 Martelly has appointed other Duvalierists to government posts. Critics
charge that “many of the networks of corruption [Duvalier] put in place are still operating
today.”16
Four major opposition parties say they lack confidence in the CEP because it was not created by
political consensus and that they will boycott elections organized by this CEP. The opposition
maintains that the Martelly administration’s actions are resulting in a process that will favor
Martelly’s party in the legislative and municipal elections, as well as in the presidential elections
due to take place in 2015.
As of mid-January 2015, the Haitian parliament will no longer be able to meet a quorum and pass
any legislation. Unless a compromise is reached, such as an agreement to extend the legislature’s
term, President Martelly will begin to rule by decree. Martelly has said he will call elections as
soon as that happens. But as thousands of protesters take to the street, pressure is mounting for a
resolution to the impasse before then.
Haitian Presidential Commission Calls for Consensus Government. On November 28,
President Martelly created a commission of 11 prominent ex-officials and religious leaders to
help resolve the stalemate over elections. On December 9, the commission called for the prime
minister to resign and a consensus government to be formed. It also called for the electoral
council to resign.
But the president of Haiti’s chamber of deputies, Jacques Stevenson Timoléon, said that “The
solution to the crisis has to come through the institutions of this country.”17 He has therefore
reached out to the president of the Haitian Senate to help find a solution within the government
process to the crisis, and rejected the presidential commission’s recommendations. Timoléon said
13 Ibid.
14 Trenton Daniel, “Haiti leader names group to oversee elections,” AP, May 6, 2014.
15 Evens Sanon And Trenton Daniel, “Old Duvalier party plans to run in Haiti election,” AP, April 24, 2014.
16 Clarens Renois, “Hundreds at Funeral for Former Haiti Dictator ‘Baby Doc’,” AFP, October 11, 2014.
17 Jacqueline Charles, “Haiti parliament leaders seek common position out of political crisis,” Miami Herald, Dec. 10,
2014.
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that one option would be to lower the Senate’s quorum so that the six senators blocking passage
of the amended electoral law could not continue to do so.
Two U.S. envoys, Counselor Thomas Shannon and Haiti Special Coordinator Thomas C. Adams,
reportedly traveled to Haiti on December 11 to discuss the crisis with Haiti’s political leaders.18
2015 Presidential Elections on the Horizon. Even once a date for elections is finally
established, a difficult process remains ahead: electoral council personnel are largely
inexperienced in elections work, and an internal procedure must be established. Experts say that
an absolute minimum of six months are needed to organize any of these elections. While having
multiple elections at once might be more economical, it would also be very complex, and would
probably take longer to organize. The election date will now need to be pushed well into 2015.
If elections are called in the remaining weeks of December or January 2015, the six-month
organizing period would mean that elections would not be held until at least June 2015. That
would be overlapping with the time needed to organize the next presidential elections, due in
November 2015, setting up the situation for more complexity and controversy.
Martelly’s prime minister, Laurent Lamothe, has said that he is not a candidate for the presidency,
but some analysts say he has been behaving like a candidate, raising his profile at well-publicized
events.19According to Haitian law, the Senate must certify that candidates for president have not
misused government funds before they can run for office. According to the Miami Herald, the
current Senate, in which Martelly’s party has no representatives, is not likely to support
Lamothe’s certification, “leaving opponents and some supporters of President Michel Martelly to
see delaying the October 26 elections until next year as key. Martelly will rule by decree,
practically guaranteeing that Lamothe will get the needed clearance. Opponents believe the delay
would lead to Martelly’s downfall.” Martelly has not said who he would support for president.
(Martelly cannot run for reelection next year: the Haitian constitution limits presidents to two
nonconsecutive terms.) In response to the presidential commission’s call for his resignation,
Lamothe said he would resign if asked to do so by President Martelly.20
That the election process has been contentious is not surprising. As Haiti has been making its
transition from a legacy of authoritarian rule to a democratic government, elections have usually
been a source of increased political tensions and instability in the short term. It is important to
note, however, that in the long term elected governments in Haiti have contributed to the gradual
strengthening of government capacity and transparency. Still, in the present circumstances, the
international community has expressed concern that continual delays have exacerbated political
polarization and threatened stability, and are continuing to urge a resolution to the political crisis.
President Martelly’s Administration
During most of Martelly’s first year in office, Haiti was without a prime minister, which severely
limited the government’s ability to act and the international community’s ability to move forward
18 Ibid.
19 Jacqueline Charles, “Borrowing from Hillary Clinton, Haiti Prime Minister raises profile,” Miami Herald, July 24,
2014.
20 Stephanie Ruhle and Ezra Fieser, “Haiti Prime Minister Says He’s Willing to Resign if Asked,” Bloomberg, Dec. 10,
2014.
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with reconstruction efforts. Martelly was not able to form a government for almost five months
because of disputes with a parliament dominated by the opposition Inité coalition over his first
two nominees for prime minister. Dr. Garry Conille, a senior U.N. development specialist and
former aide to then-U.N. Special Envoy to Haiti Bill Clinton, was confirmed as prime minister on
October 4, 2011. Conille lasted only four months in the position, after which he was reportedly
pressured by President Martelly to resign in part because of disagreements over an investigation
of $300 million-$500 million in post-earthquake contracts linked to Martelly and former Prime
Minister Jean-Max Bellerive. Bellerive, now an adviser to Martelly, and also his cousin, said he
was the victim of a smear campaign.21
Authorities in the Dominican Republic are also investigating corruption allegations linked to
President Martelly. According to Dominican journalist Nuria Piera, a company owned by
Dominican Senator Felix Bautista was awarded a $350 million contract for reconstruction work
in Haiti, despite not meeting Haitian procurement requirements. Bautista allegedly gave over $2.5
million to President Martelly before and after he won the election. Martelly has denied the
charges.22
After the first prime minister resigned, another three months went by before a new prime minister
was confirmed. Laurent Lamothe, Martelly’s foreign affairs minister and a former
telecommunications executive, was named prime minister in May 2012. Parliament approved his
cabinet and government plan soon thereafter. The cabinet included two new posts: one minister to
address poverty and another to support farmers.23
Because Martelly and much of his team—reportedly mostly childhood friends—lack political or
management experience, many observers are concerned about the president’s ability to carry out
his promises of free and compulsory education, job creation, agricultural development, and
strengthened rule of law. That political inexperience may have contributed to the gridlock and
animosity between Martelly’s administration and the parliament that have characterized Haitian
politics since he took office. His justice minister resigned after police violated the immunity
legislators have and arrested a legislator who had allegedly escaped from jail. Legislators
responded by blocking many of Martelly’s legislative proposals, and opening an investigation
into whether he held U.S. citizenship, which would make him ineligible for office.
International donors, including the United States, have been working with the Haitian government
at all levels to rebuild government infrastructure, support the development of transparency and
accountability within government institutions, and broaden and strengthen the provision of public
services. International assistance continues to professionalize and strengthen the Haitian National
Police force and reform other elements of Haiti’s weak judicial system. Donors also are training
Haiti’s public sector workforce so that it will eventually be able to coordinate and carry out
development programs. In late 2011, the Haitian government adopted a “Roadmap for the Rule of
Law,” created with support from MINUSTAH, outlining short-, middle-, and long-term actions to
develop and guarantee the rule of law in Haiti.
21 Associated Press, “Martelly denies Kickback in Construction Firm Scandal,” Jamaica Gleaner, April 4, 2012.
22 Associated Press, “Martelly denies Kickback in Construction Firm Scandal,” op. cit., and “DR-Haiti Contracts
Scandal,” Caribbean Update, May 1, 2012.
23 Associated Press, “Haiti’s New Prime Minister Says New Mining Legislation being Drafted to Benefit Country,”
Washington Post, May 15, 2012.
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Martelly began several other initiatives during his first year. He inaugurated a housing loan
program and appointed advisers to an earthquake recovery panel. He launched a free education
initiative being funded through taxes on phone calls and wired remittances from abroad. Critics
express concern that the fund lacks transparency and a clear policy.24 In May 2012 the
government launched a program in which it transfers cash credits of up to $20 a month to mothers
who keep their children in school. The program initially was to benefit 100,000 families in four of
Port-au-Prince’s poorest neighborhoods, and then extend nation-wide by year’s end.25
In May 2012 the president also launched two health initiatives in the government’s Office of
Workers’ Compensation Insurance, Illness, and Maternity. He opened a new physiotherapy
department, supported by the French Red Cross. He also announced a pilot program that will give
about 500 workers, including 100 in the informal sector, free health insurance cards facilitating
access to health care. Martelly stated that “we are fighting for all of Haiti to fully enjoy its right to
health by the end of my term.”26
President Martelly named three members to the Supreme Court, including its president. The latter
post had been vacant for six years. According to the State Department, this is the first time in over
25 years that Haiti has those three branches of government in place.27 As mentioned above,
Martelly, the legislature, and the court finally agreed on the nine new electoral council members
needed to organize overdue elections in April 2013. The publication of the constitutional
amendments was supposed to have made that process easier to accomplish. The amendments also
created a high council to conduct administrative management of the judicial branch, and a
constitutional court to resolve disputes between the executive branch and the parliament. The
amendments also require that at least 30% of government posts be held by women.28
In July 2012 Prime Minister Lamothe visited Washington, DC, meeting with then- Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton. Clinton noted that she had made Haiti “a foreign policy priority” when she
came into office, and has been committed to “building the capacity of the Haitian government and
the Haitian society so they can have the means and the experience and the expertise to solve their
own problems.”29 Lamothe said progress had been made toward that end, as Haiti was building its
capacity to collect its own revenues through taxes and custom duties, among other programs.
Lamothe said the Haitian government had made improving the fight against corruption its
“number one priority,” along with education and reducing extreme poverty. In his last report
before resigning in March 2013, the U.N. human rights expert, Michel Forst, acknowledged
progress made against corruption, but also expressed serious concerns. Forst praised the Haitian
government’s commitment to building police and judicial capacity for investigating transnational
crimes, corruption, and political crimes, and the allocation of both human and financial resources
24 Jacqueline Charles, “Martelly marks 100 days in Haiti with little progress,” Miami Herald, August 22, 2011.
25 “Haiti to Pay Mothers School Incentives via Mobile,” BBC News, May 28, 2012.
26 Caribbean Journal staff, “Haiti’s Martelly Opens Therapy Centre, Launches Insurance Card Initiative,” Caribbean
Journal, May 29, 2012.
27 Cheryl Mills, Haiti—Two Years Post Earthquake: What You May Not Know, U.S. Department of State, Dipnote:
U.S. Dept. of State Official Blog, January 9, 2012, http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/
haiti_two_years_post_earthquake.
28 Joseph Guyler Delva, “Haiti Constitutional Amendments Finally Take Effect,” Reuters, June 19, 2012.
29 “U.S. Department of the [sic] State” [transcript of joint press conference], FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database,
July 24, 2012.
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to two anti-corruption units. He also said, however, that he was “struck by the corrosive effect
that corruption has had on [Haiti’s] judicial institutions …” and that “corruption remains rife at all
levels.”30 Some progress has been made on that front, however. By the end of 2013, the Martelly
Administration had detained or indicted over 90 people, including government officials.
The U.N. human rights expert also voiced concern over the politicization of the judiciary and the
national police under the Martelly Administration, stating that “the practice of appointing or
removing judges to advance partisan or political ends … continues unabated.” U.N. Secretary
General Ban Ki-Moon echoed that concern, adding that institutional politicization and frequent
Cabinet changes hindered the efforts of MINUSTAH and other international donors to build
capacity within those institutions.31 Human rights expert Forst also criticized the Martelly
Administration for making arbitrary and illegal arrests and for threatening journalists.
The international community is increasing pressure on the Martelly administration to end the
political impasse that donors and other analysts believe is inhibiting development and threatening
stability. The outgoing head of MINUSTAH said in February 2013 that, in addition to the
government’s failure to organize elections, its failure to address vast unemployment also needed
to be addressed as soon as possible. “They have a work force of 4.2 million people and in formal
jobs they have only 200,000,” said Mariano Fernandez, adding that “... this is a permanent source
of instability.”32
Throughout much of President Martelly’s five-year term, Congress and the donor community
have expressed concern about his commitment to the democratic process. Members on both sides
of the aisle have expressed dismay that if the Haitian government does not soon hold elections
already two years overdue, Martelly might rule by decree. At a House Foreign Affairs Committee
(HFAC) hearing on Haiti on October 9, 2013, they added that the failure to hold legislative and
municipal elections could affect U.S. assistance to Haiti.
Martelly visited Washington in February 2014, meeting with President Obama, Secretary of State
Kerry, and Members of Congress. Encouraging continuing progress towards elections appeared to
be on the agenda of all of his meetings. Nine months later, elections are still not scheduled, and
the international community continues to press for them. Before a meeting with Prime Minister
Lamothe in Washington in October, Secretary of State John Kerry said, “the unwillingness to
allow the people to be able to have this vote – really challenges the overall growth and
development progress of the country. You need to have a fully functioning government.”33
30 Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti, Michel Forst,op. cit., p. 7.
31 Ibid., pp. 6-7, and Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, U.N.
Security Council report S/2013/139, March 8, 2013, p. 16.
32 “Elections, jobs critical for Haiti’s current and future stability, says outgoing UN envoy,” M2 Presswire, February 1,
2013.
33 State Department Press Releases and Documents, “Remarks with Haitian Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe before
Their Meeting,” Oct. 10, 2014.
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Stability and the Investigation of Former Heads of State; Death of
Duvalier
A potentially destabilizing factor over the last four years has been the reappearance on the scene
of two of Haiti’s most divisive leaders shortly before Martelly’s election and the possibility of
trials for both of them. Former dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier returned unexpectedly
from 25 years in exile on January 16, 2011. Two days later, the Haitian government under
President Préval formally charged him with corruption and embezzlement. Private citizens filed
charges of human rights violations against Duvalier for abuses they allege they suffered under his
15-year regime. Duvalier died of a heart attack on October 4, 2014. The Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights said that investigations into abuses committed during his
regime by Duvalier associates must continue after Duvalier’s death.34
After Duvalier’s return, former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in exile since his government
collapsed in the face of political conflict in 2001, then said that he would also like to return. He
did so, with a Haitian government-issued passport, on March 18, 2011, two days before the
second round elections. Reportedly greeted by thousands of supporters, Aristide did not directly
support any candidate, and has kept a low profile since his arrival. President Préval, once an
Aristide protégé, had long said Aristide was free to return, but that he should be prepared to face
corruption and other charges as well. For details on the status of charges against both Aristide and
Duvalier, see “Investigations of the late Duvalier and Aristide for Human Rights Violations”
below. The investigation into the murder of reporter Jean Dominique, in which Aristide associates
were named as suspects, is also discussed there.
It is a significant accomplishment that Haiti, long characterized by impunity for its leaders, has
brought charges against its former dictator, and is questioning another former head of state. The
judicial system is not considered independent, though, and various U.N. officials have criticized
the Martelly administration for interfering in the judicial system for political purposes. Trying
Duvalier or, now, his associates, and/or Aristide could be a severe strain on Haiti’s weak judicial
system. Both Duvalier and Aristide were seen as highly polarizing figures able to stir up unrest.
Aristide has said that his Lavalas party plans to participate in upcoming elections. President
Martelly met privately with Aristide in September 2013, as one of a series of meetings with
political party leaders.35 Before his death, Duvalier opened offices for his former political party
and said that his party would field candidates as well.
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH)
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been in Haiti to help restore
order for ten years, since the collapse of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government.
Armed rebellion and diminished international support for Aristide led him to flee into exile in
February 2004. An international force authorized by the U.N. arrived shortly after his departure,
and was replaced by MINUSTAH in June 2004. MINUSTAH worked closely with the interim
34 “UN Urges Continued Probe on Violations during Baby Doc’s Rule in Haiti,” RTT News, Oct. 7, 2014.
35 AP, September 18, 2013.
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government from 2004 to 2006, when, after several delays, elections were held. The mission
continued to work closely with the Préval Administration. Although some Haitians call for the
removal of foreign troops, former President Préval supported the mission’s presence, saying that
he would “not adopt a falsely nationalist position,” and that MINUSTAH should stay until Haiti is
ready to assume responsibility for security.36 More recently, popular protests have called for
MINUSTAH’s removal because of allegations of its role in introducing cholera to the country,
and sexual abuse by some of its forces. Although critical of some aspects of MINUSTAH,
President Martelly nonetheless advocates extending MINUSTAH’s term to help maintain stability
and to assist in the reconstruction effort. He has called for its eventual replacement with a revived
Haitian army. The U.N. Security Council and international donors call instead for a continued
strengthening of the Haitian National Police.
MINUSTAH’s mandate includes three basic components: (1) to help create a secure and stable
environment; (2) to support the political process by fostering effective democratic governance
and institutional development, supporting government efforts to promote national dialogue and
reconciliation and to organize elections; and (3) to support government and nongovernmental
efforts to promote and protect human rights, as well as to monitor and report on the human rights
situation. MINUSTAH has played a key role in emergency responses to natural disasters,
including facilitating the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance. As part of its work, the
mission has also conducted campaigns to combat gangs and drug-trafficking with the Haitian
police.
MINUSTAH’s current troop strength is 7,767 total uniformed personnel, consisting of 4,975
troops and 2,449 police. Nineteen countries contribute military personnel, and 42 countries
supply police personnel. They are supported by 343 international civilian personnel; 1,168 local
civilian staff; and 128 United Nations volunteers. The mission’s budget for this year (July 1,
2014-June 30, 2015) is about $500 million. MINUSTAH’s current authorization runs through
October 15, 2015. The U.N. has been gradually reducing MINUSTAH’s number of troops since
2012. The resolution just passed in October 2014 will maintain U.N. police at the same level, but
reduce military personnel by more than half, to a maximum of 2,370 military personnel. The
Group of Friends of Haiti (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Guatemala, Peru,
the United States, and Uruguay) expressed concern during the U.N.’s debate that reducing the
size of the military contingent before elections are held could hinder MINUSTAH’s ability to
respond to a crisis and that decisions regarding withdrawing MINUSTAH should be based on
conditions on the ground, not just budgetary factors.37 The European Union stated that while
overall security had improved, the number of demonstrations accompanied by violence had
doubled.
In addition to emphasizing the importance of holding elections, speakers also stressed the role
economic disparity plays in instability. The European Union stated that demonstrations with a
socioeconomic angle had increased by 30 percent, and that “there continue to be grave social and
economic inequalities that represent a real threat to Haiti’s stability and security.” The Group of
Friends stated that:
security, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and development are interdependent
and reinforce stability. We therefore underscore the importance of systematically addressing
36 “Haiti: MlNUSTAH to Stay on for 2 to 3 Years,” Latinnews Daily, March 13, 2006.
37 U.N. Security Council, 7262nd meeting, Sept. 11, 2014, New York, S/PV.7262.
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the issues of unemployment, education and the delivery of basic social services, and of
ensuring the economic and political empowerment of women.
The Security Council agreed to maintain troops close to the current level at least until March, and
that the Security Council could change the force level at any time if warranted.
MINUSTAH and Cholera. MINUSTAH and the U.N. have been widely criticized for not
responding strongly enough to an outbreak of cholera in October 2010, the first such outbreak in
at least a century in Haiti. A team of researchers from France and Haiti conducted an investigation
at the request of the Haitian government. They reported that their findings “strongly suggest that
contamination of the Artibonite [River in Haiti] and 1[sic] of its tributaries downstream from a
[MINUSTAH] military camp triggered the epidemic,” noting that there was “an exact correlation
in time and places between the arrival of a Nepalese battalion from an area experiencing a cholera
outbreak and the appearance of the first cases in [the nearby town of] Meille a few days after.”38
Other studies have come to the same conclusion. While the authors of the study caution that the
findings are not definitive, they and others have suggested that “to avoid actual contamination or
suspicion happening again, it will be important to rigorously ensure that the sewage of military
camps is handled properly.”
The U.N. has been under increasing pressure to take full responsibility for introduction of the
disease. Over 5,000 cholera victims or relatives of victims have filed legal claims against the
U.N., demanding reparations, a public apology, and a nationwide response including “medical
treatment for current and future victims, and clean water and sanitation infrastructure.”39 The
U.N. announced in early 2013, however, that it would not compensate cholera victims, claiming
diplomatic immunity.
The Boston-based Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti filed a class action suit against the
U.N. on behalf of victims in a U.S. federal court in October 2013, seeking establishment by the
U.N. of a standing claims commission to address claims for harm, and compensation for victims,
including remediation of Haiti’s waterways, provision of adequate sanitation, and “$2.2 billion
that the Haitian government requires to eradicate cholera.” Many Haitians’ mistrust of the U.N.
has manifested itself in protests and strained relations between MINUSTAH and the population
for which it is there to help provide protection and stability.
MINUSTAH and Charges of Sexual Abuse. Charges of sexual abuse by MINUSTAH personnel
have also fueled anti-MINUSTAH sentiment. The U.N. has a zero tolerance policy toward sexual
abuse and exploitation.40 In the case of peacekeepers, the U.N. is responsible for investigating
charges against police personnel, but the sending country is responsible for investigating charges
against its military personnel. The U.N. returns alleged perpetrators to their home country for
punishment. Five MINUSTAH peacekeepers from Uruguay were sent home in 2011, to be tried
on charges of sexually abusing an 18-year-old man at a U.N. base while filming it on a cellphone.
38 Renaud Piarroux et al., “Understanding the Cholera Epidemic, Haiti,” Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, July
2011, http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1707.110059.
39 Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, Over 5,000 Haitian Cholera Victims Sue UN, Seeking Justice, press
release, November 8, 2011, http://ijdh.org/archives/22789.
40 For additional information, see CRS Report RL33700, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by
Marjorie Ann Browne, section entitled, “Prince Zeid Report (2005).”
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According to the U.N., among 11 substantiated cases in 2012 were at least two cases of sexual
exploitation of children by U.N. police.41 The investigations led to three members of a Pakistani
police unit being convicted of raping a 14-year-old boy in one of the cases. The trial took place in
March 2012 in Haiti but was conducted by a Pakistani military tribunal, which dismissed the men
from the military and sentenced them to one year in prison. The unit had eight cases pending for
2014 as of September 1. 42
Haiti’s Development Challenges and Socioeconomic
Conditions
Long before the earthquake struck, Haiti was a country socially and ecologically at risk,
possessing some of the lowest socioeconomic indicators in the world,43 and in an acute
environmental crisis. Following several hurricanes that hit Haiti in 2008, the president of the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Luis Moreno, called Haiti the most fragile of IDB’s
member countries, saying that no other nation in Latin America and the Caribbean is as
vulnerable to economic shocks and natural disasters as is Haiti.
Plagued by chronic political instability and frequent natural disasters, Haiti is the poorest country
in the Western Hemisphere. Haiti’s poverty is massive and deep. There is extreme economic
disparity between a small privileged class and the majority of the population. Over half the
population (54%) of 10 million people lives in extreme poverty, living on less than $1 a day;
about 80% live on $2 or less a day, according to the World Bank.44 Poverty among the rural
population is even more widespread: 69% of rural dwellers live on less than $1 a day, and 86%
live on less than $2 a day.
Hunger is also widespread: 81% of the national population and 87% of the rural population do not
get the minimum daily ration of food defined by the World Health Organization. In remote parts
of Haiti, children have been dying of malnutrition.45 Food security worsened throughout Haiti
following Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in 2012, which destroyed about 70% of Haiti’s crops.
Some 1.5 million people live in severe food insecurity in rural areas affected by the storms. As
many as 450,000 people were at risk of severe acute malnutrition, including at least 4,000
children less than five years of age.46
Over 40 years, from the late 1960s until the early 2000s, Haiti’s per capita real GDP declined by
30%. By around 20007, Haiti began making some macroeconomic progress: the Haitian economy
was growing for three years prior to the earthquake, and the government had improved
41 U.N. News Centre, Haiti: U.N. opens probe into cases of alleged child sexual exploitation, January 23, 2012,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41008&Cr=haiti&Cr1=.
42 U.N. Conduct and Discipline Unit, “Statistics: Status of Investigations (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse),
MINUSTAH,” accessed November 18, 2014, http://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/
StatusofInvestigationsSexualExploitationandAbuse.aspx.
43 World Bank, Country Report: Haiti, 2010, http://go.worldbank.org/GBXI5JKM50.
44 World Bank, Haiti Overview, 2014, accessed Feb. 4, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview.
45 “Rural Haitian Children Starving,” Associated Press, November 21, 2008.
46 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Haiti: Emergency Revision of the 2012 Consolidated
Appeal—Needs arising from the impact of Hurricane Sandy,” November 10, 2012, pp. 1, 8.
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management of its resources. In order to reach its Millennium Development Goal of eradicating
extreme poverty and hunger by 2015, Haiti’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would have to grow
3.5% per year, a goal the IMF says Haiti is not considered likely to achieve. Therefore, economic
growth, even if it is greater than population growth, is not expected to be enough to reduce
poverty; programs specifically targeted at poverty reduction are needed as well.
The global economic crisis led to a drop of about 10% in remittances from Haitians abroad,
which amounted to about $1.65 billion in 2008, more than a fourth of Haiti’s annual income.47
Damage and losses caused by the 2010 earthquake were estimated to be $7.8 billion, an amount
greater than Haiti’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009.48 Haiti’s GDP contracted by slightly
more than 5% in 2010, but grew by 5.6% in 2011. Growth fell again, to 2.8% in 2012, slowed by
hurricanes, drought, and “delays in implementing key public investment projects.”49 In 2013 GDP
growth reached 3.8%.50
The likelihood that economic growth will contribute to the reduction of poverty in Haiti is further
reduced by its enormous income distribution gap. Haiti has the second-largest income disparity in
the world. Over 68% of the total national income accrues to the wealthiest 20% of the population,
while less than 1.5% of Haiti’s national income is accumulated by the poorest 20% of the
population. When the level of inequality is as high as Haiti's, according to the World Bank, the
capacity of economic growth to reduce poverty “approaches zero.”51
In 2009, Haiti passed a minimum wage law. The law mandated increases in wages in two phases.
In 2010, the minimum wage rose from about $1.75 per day to $3.75 per day, and in October 2012,
it increased to $5.00 per day. The average daily wage for textile assembly workers is $5.25, above
the new minimum wage, so some manufacturers said that they would have to raise wages
proportionally. Despite the wage increase, the fundamental inequality of Haitian society remains
basically unchanged.
The Haitian government and international donors have focused efforts on manufacturing and
agricultural production; both were initially making a steady recovery. But agriculture faces
significant limitations in Haiti, with all but 2% of the forest cover deforested,52 85% of the
watersheds degraded, little or no rural infrastructure, and limited access to credit. Hurricane
Sandy caused further loss of agricultural land; the U.N. estimated that an addition $40 million
would be needed to address the new needs arising from that storm. High rates of unemployment,
income inequality, and poverty continue to be serious roadblocks to overall economic
development.
Nonetheless, U.S Ambassador Pamela White said earlier this year that Haiti had made much
progress, including: “Tens of thousands of Haitian farmers have higher incomes, ... exports to the
47 Mike Blanchfield, “In recession, Haitians abroad send less money home,” Canwest News Service, March 17, 2009.
48 Government of Haiti, “Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and sectoral needs,” March
2010, p.6.
49 International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2012 Article IV Consultation with Haiti,
Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 13/41, April 2, 2013, p.1.
50 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Haiti, Feb. 4, 2014, p. 5.
51 World Bank, “Income Distribution, Inequality, and Those Left Behind,” in Global Economic Prospects 2007:
Managing the Next Wave of Globalization, p. 83. December 1, 2006.
52 World Bank, Country Report: Haiti, 2010, http://go.worldbank.org/GBXI5JKM50.
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United States are up 41 percent since 2010 thanks to job creation in the manufacturing
sector…[c]rime rates are down, and security is improved.” She said that “Haiti has made the
transition to a period of building and long-term development.”53
Cholera Epidemic
Cholera broke out in October 2010, in what may be the first such outbreak ever in Haiti. There is
evidence linking the outbreak to inadequate sanitation facilities at a MINUSTAH camp (see “The
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)” above). Because Haitians had not
been exposed to it previously and lacked immunity, and Haiti lacks adequate sewage and
sanitation facilities, the waterborne disease spread quickly. Less than two years later, according to
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Haiti had the highest number of cholera
cases in the world.54 Over 705,000 people have been treated, with many cases believed to go
unreported. Over 8,600 people have died because of cholera.55 The number of new cases has
decreased over time, but spikes during the rainy season, when flooding spreads the disease.
President Martelly authorized a cholera vaccination program that began in April 2012. (The
previous government declined a pilot vaccination program, arguing that vaccinating only a
portion of the population would incite tensions among those not vaccinated.) The pilot program
inoculated only about 1% of the population: 90,000-100,000 people in some of the poorest areas
of Port-au-Prince and in the rural Artibonite River Valley. Partners in Health (PIH), a Boston-
based nongovernmental organization, which has worked in Haiti for decades, and its Haitian
partner in the pilot program, GHESKIO, say the program’s success led the Haitian Ministry of
Health to conduct targeted immunization campaigns in other parts of the country. About 300,000
more vaccinations were planned for late 2014. The vaccination is 60% to 85% effective and costs
$3.70 per patient for the two-dose treatment.56 “[T]here is zero funding available” for the Haitian
government’s $3 million plan to vaccinate 300,000 people in 2015, however, according to Senior
U.N. Coordinator for the Cholera Response in Haiti Pedro Medrano.57
Other, immediate, small-scale preventive measures include building latrines and distributing soap,
bleach, and water-purification tablets. Treatment includes oral rehydration salts, antibiotics, and
IV fluids. The United States has spent over $95 million for such preventive measures, and
supporting staff and supplies for 45 cholera treatment centers and 117 oral rehydration posts, and
working with the Haitian Ministry of Health to set up a national system for tracking the disease.
But most observers say cholera will persist in Haiti until nationwide water and sanitation systems
are developed. This would cost approximately $800 million to $1.1 billion, according to the New
York Times.58 Haiti’s first wastewater treatment site was opened in the fall of 2011. A study
53 Pamela White, Ambassador to Haiti, “Still Committed to Haiti,” New York Times, January 20, 2014.
54 Associated Press, “CDC Study Shows Haiti Cholera has Changed, Experts Say It Suggests Disease Becoming
Endemic,” Washington Post, May 3, 2012.
55 U.N. OCHA, “Haiti: Cholera vaccines for 200,000 people,” August 14, 2014.
56 Ibid; Partners in Health, Cholera, Next Steps, May 30, 2012, Cholera, PIH’s Response, February12, 2013,
http://www.pih.org/pages/cholera, and Three Years in, the Fight against Haiti’s Cholera Epidemic Continues, October
21, 2013; and Richard Knox, “WHO Calls for Emergency Stockpile of Cholera Vaccine,” NPR, August 17, 2012.
57 “‘Haiti cannot wait 40 years’ to eliminate cholera, warns UN envoy as response lags,” UN News Centre, November
13, 2014.
58 Deborah Sontag, “In Haiti, Global Failures on a Cholera Epidemic,” New York Times, March 31, 2012.
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released by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention indicated that the strain of
cholera in Haiti is changing as survivors develop some immunity to the original strain. This could
be an indication that the disease is becoming endemic in Haiti.59
The number of total cases and deaths began to decline in 2012. Nonetheless, some critics assert
that the international response to the epidemic has been inadequate, and warn that the closing of
cholera treatment centers is reducing the country’s ability to respond to the disease and
contributed to an increase in the mortality rate in late 2012.60 The U.N. also expressed concern,
noting that, “the number of international actors engaged in cholera responses [in Haiti] has
declined from 120 in 2011 to 43 in 2013, while national capacity has not increased by any
comparable degree,” causing a significant gap in quality treatment coverage. The number of
donors has decreased as well.61
In 2012 the U.N. announced an effort to raise over $2 billion for a 10-year cholera eradication
plan, to which it will contribute $23 million, or about 1% of what it says is needed. Of the total
amount, about $450 million is needed for the first two years. The U.N. says less than half of that
($209 million) had been “mobilized” as of December 2013. In late 2014, the senior U.N.
coordinator for the cholera response in Haiti warned that, at the current “disappointing” rate of
funding, “it would take more than 40 years to get the funds needed for Haitians to gain the same
access as its regional neighbours” to basic health, water and sanitations systems.”62 Medrano
suggested that with better funding cholera could be eliminated from Haiti in about a decade.
“Like Ebola,” he said, “cholera feeds on weak public health systems, and requires a sustained
response.… The donor community has to do better.”
Strategies for Haiti’s Reconstruction and
International Assistance63
Reconstruction Efforts
Prior to the earthquake in 2010, the United Nations had already designated Haiti as one of the 50
least developed countries in the world, facing greater risk than other countries of failing to
emerge from poverty, and therefore needing the highest degree of attention from the international
community.64
59 Associated Press, “CDC Study Shows Haiti Cholera has Changed, Experts say it Suggests Disease Becoming
Endemic,” Washington Post, May 3, 2012.
60 Center for Economic and Policy Research, “Pressure Builds on UN to Take Responsibility as Choler Still Far From
‘Under Control’,” January 11, 2013.
61 U.N., “UN Fact Sheet: Combatting Cholera in Haiti,” Dec. 2013, p. 7; and Jan. 2014 (updated Feb. 2014), p. 7.
62 “’Haiti cannot wait 40 years’ to eliminate cholera, warns UN envoy as response lags,” op cit.
63 For further information, see CRS Report RL34029, Haiti’s Development Needs and a Statistical Overview of
Conditions of Poverty, by Maureen Taft-Morales and Demond Alexander Drummer; for background on the 2004-2007
strategy, see CRS Report RL33156, Haiti: International Assistance Strategy for the Interim Government and
Congressional Concerns, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
64 United Nations Office for Least Developed Countries. Facts about Least Developed Countries (LDCs) available at
http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/Publications/Factsheet.pdf, January 15, 2010.
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After the earthquake, the Haitian government established a framework for reconstruction in the
10-year recovery plan, Action Plan for the Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti,
with four areas of concentration:65
• Territorial building, including creating centers of economic growth to support
settlement of displaced populations around the country and to make Port-au-
Prince less congested, developing infrastructure to promote growth, and
managing land tenure;
• Economic rebuilding, including modernizing the agricultural sector for both
export and food security, promoting manufacturing and tourism, and providing
access to electricity;
• Social rebuilding, prioritizing building education and health systems; and
• Institutional rebuilding, focusing on making government institutions
operational again and able to manage reconstruction, and strengthening
governmental authority while also decentralizing basic services, and creating a
social safety net for the poorest population.
Some of the overarching goals of the plan are including environmental factors and risk and
disaster management in all recovery and reconstruction activities; actively providing employment
and vocational training; and providing assistance to the population affected by the earthquake
while hastening recovery efforts with an eye to reducing dependence on foreign aid.
Some analysts emphasize that the Haitian government and civil society must be partners in
designing any development strategy if they are to succeed and be sustainable. They also warn that
job creation and other development efforts must occur not only in the cities, but also in rural
areas, to reduce urban migration, dependence on imported food, and environmental degradation.
As mentioned above, economic growth alone is unlikely to reduce poverty in Haiti. Therefore, the
Haitian government and many in the international donor community maintain that donors must
continue to make a long-term commitment to Haitian development. Furthermore, in order to
reduce poverty across the board, some observers say that development strategies must specifically
target improving the living conditions of the poor and address the inequities and prejudices that
have contributed to Haiti’s enormous income disparity.66
The Haitian government, the Obama Administration, other international donors, and other
observers have all stated the need for improved accountability of all donor assistance to Haiti, to
improve aid effectiveness and reduce the potential for corruption. Recent Haitian governments
have made major progress in reducing corruption, increasing transparency, and improving fiscal
management. These improvements qualified Haiti for Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)
debt relief in 2009. To ensure transparency further, the U.S. Agency for International
Development has helped Haiti establish an online system to monitor both donor pledges and
spending and implementation of assistance.
65 Republic of Haiti, “Action Plan for the Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti,” March 2010, available at
http://www.haitisantodomingo2010.org/hsd2010/content/documents.
66 See for example, Robert Maguire, “Paul Collier’s Report on Economic Security in Haiti,” March 2009. Focal Point,
Vol. 8, Issue 2.
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Relations with Donors
Since Haiti’s developmental needs and priorities are many, and deeply intertwined, the Haitian
government and the international donor community are implementing an assistance strategy that
attempts to address these many needs simultaneously. The challenge is to accomplish short-term
projects that will boost public and investor confidence, while also pursuing long-term
development plans to improve living conditions for Haiti’s vast poor population. The challenge
has been made more daunting by developments such as rising food and gasoline prices world-
wide, internal political crises, and, of course, the lingering damage done by the earthquake and
other natural disasters.
The Haitian government has criticized the donor community for not dispersing funds quickly
enough. Some international donors complain that the instability generated first by the elections
process, then by the prolonged lack of a prime minister, the ongoing gridlock between the Haitian
executive and legislative branches and the inability to organize elections hinder reconstruction
efforts as well.
There are other frustrations on the part of both donors and the Haitian government regarding
foreign assistance. The Haitian government is frustrated that U.S. and other foreign aid is
provided primarily through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) rather than directly to the
government. Donors are worried about the lack of Haitian capacity to design and implement
programs, as well as corruption. The donor community has grown extremely frustrated at the lack
of coordination and the inability or unwillingness of various government actors to seek consensus
on development priorities and plans, such as elections that are now more than a year overdue. The
State Department’s Special Coordinator for Haiti, Thomas Adams, warned that, “Haiti will lose
international support if it is seen as undemocratic,” by failing to address corruption, human rights
violations, or government accountability through elections.67 At a House Foreign Affairs
Committee (HFAC) hearing on Haiti on October 9, 2013, Members on both sides of the aisle
suggested that the failure to hold legislative elections already two years overdue then could affect
U.S. assistance to Haiti. Since then, the Haitian government and the opposition have occasionally
reached consensus only to fall back into gridlock. The United States and other donors continue to
press all sides to reach an agreement and move forward on elections now three years overdue.
They are not likely to take place until mid-2015 at the earliest, when it will also be time to
prepare for the next presidential elections.
Coordination of Foreign Assistance
The Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) was created after the earthquake to
coordinate foreign aid and reconstruction activities. It was co-chaired by the Government of Haiti
and the UN Special Envoy to Haiti, former President Bill Clinton. Its 18-month mandate expired
in October 2011 without the establishment of the Haitian-run Haitian Development Authority,
which was to take its place. (Clinton’s mandate as Special Envoy expired January 31, 2013, and
was not extended.) While there has been criticism that the IHRC was not approving and
distributing aid effectively, there has also been widespread concern that the Haitian government is
not ready to assume full control of the process either. The government’s nascent institutions,
which had limited capacity before the earthquake, were set back severely by the earthquake’s
67 U.S. Institute of Peace, “Haiti’s Election Conundrum: Fraught but Necessary?,” March 27, 2013.
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destruction. The president asked the legislature to pass an extension of the IHRC while an
alternative mechanism was developed; it failed to do so. In the meantime, the 12 largest
international donors continued to coordinate among themselves and with the Haitian government.
The Haitian government presented to the donor community a plan for the coordination of foreign
aid, the Framework for Coordination of Foreign Aid for Haitian Development (Cadre de
Coordination de l’aide Externe au Developpement d’Haiti, CAED) in November 2012. Headed
by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Planning and External Cooperation, it will have an
international committee that is supposed to meet at least twice a year, a national committee that is
supposed to meet four to six times a year, and working groups to address various development
priorities such as education, employment, energy, extreme poverty, and rule of law. Although
some parts of the framework have begun to function, the government is seeking donor funds to
support the CAED. In February 2013, donors told the government they would not attend a CAED
international committee meeting because it still had no plans or date for elections. Coordinating
aid and funding the CAED have been made more difficult by the political gridlock between the
Haitian executive and legislative branches.
Outlook Regarding Haitian Development
Despite the economic and social problems currently existing in Haiti and the comprehensive and
complex challenges facing the country, Haiti could become a middle-income country, according
to the State Department’s Special Coordinator for Haiti, Thomas Adams. Such a transition could
take about 30 years, even with good economic growth, Adams said, and would require continued
development of “credible democratic institutions” and private investment, in addition to support
from the international donor community.68
Statements by U.N. officials and other donors indicate growing frustration with the ongoing
political stalemate in Haiti, however. Political polarization is inhibiting the capacity building
needed to strengthen democratic institutions, keeping away private investment, they say, and
contributing to donor fatigue. As discussed earlier, donors and other analysts say that unless some
sort of national consensus is reached on a legislative agenda and development priorities, Haiti’s
reconstruction will continue to be stalled, and stability and security threatened.69
Prior to the earthquake, prominent analysts noted with optimism the progress Haiti had made and
its potential for sustainable development. In the wake of the damage wrought by the earthquake,
Haiti must recover from the enormous losses suffered and build on the advances and advantages
pointed out by these analysts.
The U.N. Security Council noted in 2009 that the country had made significant improvements in
security and judicial reform, although it still needed to contend with widespread poverty and
susceptibility to natural disasters. The two governments preceding the Martelly government (the
Préval and the preceding interim government) also made progress toward goals outlined in Haiti‘s
international assistance strategy, including improved macroeconomic management, procurement
68 Associated Press, “Haiti Faces 30-Year Climb to Middle Income Status,” Jamaica Observer, May 28, 2012.
69 See “Overdue Elections Process Grows Contentious,” “President Martelly’s Administration,” above; and
International Crisis Group, “Governing Haiti: Time for National Consensus,” Latin America and Caribbean Report no.
46, February 4, 2013; and “Gridlock in Haiti; Our Opinion: Political infighting threatens to paralyze the recovery
without elections,” Miami Herald editorial, April 3, 2013.
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processes, and fiscal transparency; increased voter registration; and jobs creation. The
government had also made progress in providing broader access to clean water and other
services.70
The U.N. secretary-general also had commissioned a report, which recommended a strategy to
move Haiti beyond recovery to economic security.71 Although published in 2009, many of its
findings still apply to a post-earthquake Haiti. According to the U.N. report, “the opportunities for
[economic development in] Haiti are far more favorable than those of the ‘fragile states’ with
which it is habitually grouped.” The report’s author, economist Paul Collier, is known for his
book, The Bottom Billion, which explores why there is poverty and how it can be reduced.
Among his reasons for optimism regarding Haiti: Haiti is part of a peaceful and prosperous
region, not a conflictive one; and while political divisions and limited capacity make governing
difficult, Collier believed that Haiti’s leadership at the time was “good by the standards of most
post-conflict situations … [exhibiting] integrity, experience and ability, and a deep concern with
the maintenance of social peace.” The U.N. report recommended that modest and focused actions
be taken to build economic security on the foundation of social stability that has been built in
Haiti in recent years. Because that stability was—and remains—fragile, the report advised that
such actions should be taken immediately and should focus on strengthening security by creating
jobs, especially in the garment and agricultural sectors; providing basic services; enhancing food
security; and fostering environmental sustainability. These strategies remain part of the post-
earthquake approach to development.
Collier and other analysts note that Haiti has an important resource in the 1.5 million Haitians
living abroad, for their remittances sent back home, technical skills, and political lobbying. The
efforts of Haitian Americans and others lobbying on Haiti’s behalf led to another advantage Haiti
has: the most advantageous access to the U.S. market for apparel of any country, through the
HOPE II Act (the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act, P.L.
110-246; see “Trade Preferences for Haiti” section below). Supporters say the HOPE Act
provides jobs and stimulates the Haitian economy. Critics worry that it exploits Haitians as a
source of cheap labor for foreign manufacturers, and hurts the agricultural economy by drawing
more people away from farming.
Potential for Mining
U.S. and Canadian companies have conducted exploratory drilling in Haiti, reporting a potential
$20 billion worth of gold, copper, and silver below Haiti’s northeastern mountains.72 While
discoveries of such mineral wealth have led to economic booms in many countries, they also
bring risks such as environmental contamination, health problems, and displacement of
communities. And like many poor countries that could use the revenue from mineral extraction,
Haiti does not have the government infrastructure to enforce laws that would regulate mining—
reportedly, the last time gold was mined there was in the 1500s. The Préval government
negotiated the agreement with the only company that has full concessions; the terms of that
70 “Haiti: U.N. Council Mission reports strides in security, worrisome poverty,” States News Service, March 19, 2009.
71 Paul Collier, “Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security, A Report for the Secretary-General of the
United Nations,” January 2009, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org.
72 Figures and dates in this paragraph from: Associated Press, “Haiti’s New Prime Minister Says New Mining
Legislation being Drafted to Benefit Country,” Washington Post, May 15, 2012; and Martha Mendoza, “Gold! Haiti
Hopes Ore Find Will Spur Mining Boom,” Associated Press, May 12, 2012.
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agreement would return to Haiti $1 out of every $2 of profits, a high return. Prime Minister
Lamothe said the government is already drafting mining legislation to establish royalties paid to
the government and safeguards for citizens and the environment in mining areas.
U.S. Policy Objectives and Assistance
Obama Administration officials have said that Haiti is a key foreign policy priority and the
Administration’s top priority in the Latin America and Caribbean region in terms of bilateral
foreign assistance.73 Haiti continues to be allotted more funds than any other country in the
hemisphere, except for Colombia.
In its FY2014 budget request, the Administration stated that since 2011, “Haiti has experienced a
period of relative stability as well as modest economic and social improvements that will foster
long-term, sustainable development.” In its FY2015 budget request, the Administration noted that
“despite these positive developments, the pace of much needed progress is still hindered by weak
public institutions, conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, lack of
accountability, and insufficient state capacity to provide basic services.”74
The Administration says that current U.S. assistance programs are emphasizing country
leadership and ownership, and strengthening local institutions, so that Haiti can “further chart its
own development and promote sustainability.” To spur greater progress, the Administration says
Haiti “needs to enact key laws to improve its investment climate, enact the new Criminal Code
…and enact an anti-corruption law.”
Other concerns for U.S. policy regarding Haiti include the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid;
protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking; addressing Haitian
migration; and alleviating poverty. The United States and other members of the international
community continue to support efforts to hold free and fair elections in Haiti in the belief that in
the long run they will contribute to improved governance and, eventually, improved services to
Haitian citizens and greater stability, which will allow for increased development. Congress has
given bipartisan support to this policy approach.
U.S. Assistance to Haiti
The Obama Administration’s request for FY2015 assistance for Haiti is approximately $274
million. This represents about a $16 million decrease from FY2014 funding. (See Table 1.)
U.S. assistance to Haiti focuses on the four key sectors outlined in the Action Plan for
Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti, with funding directed towards infrastructure
and energy projects, governance and rule-of-law programs, programs for health and other basic
services, and food and economic security programs. Many of the latter type of programs are
73 “U.S. Department of the [sic] State” [transcript of joint press conference], FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database,
July 24, 2012; and briefings, conversations with State Dept. and USAID officials, February 22, 2011, June 22, 2012;
refers to combined State Dept. and USAID funding; U.S. Dept. of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign
Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives, Fiscal Year 2014, p. 667.
74 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives:
Fiscal Year 2014, p. 667; Fiscal Year 2015, p. 666.
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carried out under the President’s Feed the Future initiative, which aims to implement a country-
led comprehensive food security strategy to reduce hunger and increase farmers’ incomes. The
Administration’s approach is detailed in its “Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy toward
Renewal and Economic Opportunity.” Figure 2 shows the distribution of reconstruction and
development spending by type of program.
The FY2015 foreign aid appropriations bills (H.R. 5013 and S. 2499) would condition aid to
Haiti. The House version would prohibit assistance to the central government of Haiti until the
Secretary of State certifies that Haiti “is taking steps” to hold free and fair parliamentary elections
and to seat a new Haitian Parliament. The Senate version would prohibit aid until those elections
were held and a new Parliament seated. Both would further condition aid on the Haitian
government’s respecting judicial independence; combating corruption; and improving governance
and financial transparency. The Senate version would also require that the government be
selecting judges in a transparent manner and making reforms to improve the investment climate.
Both bills would also prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for Haiti except as provided
through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations, but would
allow Haiti to purchase defense articles and services under the Arms Export Control Act for its
Coast Guard.
Temporary Protected Status75 and Haitian Family Reunification
Parole Program
Over the years, after various domestic crises, Haitians repeatedly sought Temporary Protected
Status (TPS), which would allow them to remain in the United States without threat of
deportation for a specific amount of time. The Haitian government and others argued that the
return of deportees would contribute to instability and be a further drain on already inadequate
services, and that Haiti depends on the remittances those in the United States send back to Haiti.
Opponents of TPS argued that granting it could encourage a wave of new immigrants. After
2010’s devastating earthquake, the United States granted TPS to Haitians living in the United
States at the time of the disaster. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet
Napolitano has extended TPS on a yearly basis, and allowed eligible Haitians who came to the
United States up to one year after the earthquake to be granted TPS. The policy of interdicting
Haitian migrants on the high seas and returning them to Haiti continues.
U.S. citizens or permanent residents may apply for a residency visa, or green card, on behalf of
relatives living in Haiti. Currently, over 100,000 Haitians must wait—some for as long as 12
years—to join family members in the United States, even though they have already been
approved by the U.S. government to do so, because of annual caps on such visas. Beginning in
early 2015, DHS will begin to implement the Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program.
Because this program will expedite reunification only for those scheduled to receive their entry
visas within two years, only a small portion of all Haitians approved for residency will benefit
from the program. DHS also warned Haitians against trying to enter the United States illegally,
stating that only people living in Haiti would be eligible to participate in the reunification
program.76
75 For further information, see CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem.
76 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “DHS to Implement Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program,”
(continued...)
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Congressional Response and Concerns
There has been bipartisan support in Congress to assist Haiti both before and since the
earthquake. In the years preceding the earthquake, Congress passed several bills, in addition to
appropriations bills, to support Haiti. This included a series of trade preferences for Haiti, which
are described in more detail below. Another issue of concern to Congress has been efforts to
ensure that free, fair, and safe elections are held in Haiti. As mentioned above (see “Overdue
Elections Process: Delays and Disputes over CEP, Electoral Law”), one-third of the Haitian
Senate seats expired on May 8, 2012. Elections for those seats and for municipal councils, town
delegates, and other posts, which are also long overdue, have yet to be scheduled. At a House
Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) hearing on Haiti on October 9, 2013, Members on both sides
of the aisle suggested that the failure to hold legislative elections already two years overdue could
affect U.S. assistance to Haiti.
Other congressional concerns include post-earthquake reconstruction; transparency and
accountability of the Haitian government; respect for human rights, particularly for women;
security issues, including Martelly’s proposal to reconstitute the Haitian army; and
counternarcotics efforts.
A more recent concern is the consequences for Haiti of a September 2013 court ruling in the
Dominican Republic (D.R.) that could retroactively strip some 200,000 Dominicans, mostly of
Haitian descent, of citizenship. Tensions between the two nations could also stall efforts to
develop a bilateral free-trade agreement initiated by the D.R. last year.
Congress passed the Assessing Progress in Haiti Act of 2013; it was signed into law in August
2014. It directs the Secretary of State to report to Congress within 120 days, and every six months
thereafter through September 30, 2016, on the status of specific aspects of post-earthquake
recovery and development efforts in Haiti.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, prohibits assistance to the central government of
Haiti until the Secretary of State certifies that Haiti has held free and fair parliamentary elections,
is respecting judicial independence, and is taking effective steps to combat corruption and
improve governance. The bill also prohibits the obligation or expenditure of funds for Haiti
except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations; but allows Haiti to purchase defense articles and services under the Arms Export
Control Act for its Coast Guard.
Congress would ease the condition on assistance to the central government of Haiti in the
FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act. The bill would prohibit such
aid until the Secretary of State certifies that Haiti “is taking steps” to hold free and fair
parliamentary elections and to seat a new Haitian Parliament, rather than extending the FY2014
condition that prohibited aid to the government until elections have been held. The bill would
place other conditions aid to Haiti as well. See “Legislation in the 113th Congress” below.
(...continued)
Washington, DC, October 17, 2014; and Erick Eckholm, “Obama Administration to Expedite Reunification for Some
Haitians,” New York Times, October 17, 2014.
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Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Haiti Fiscal Years 2010 to 2014
FY2010 Actual
FY2010
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
FY2015
Increase / Decrease
($ in thousands)
Actual Base
Actual Supp
Actual Base
Actual
Actual
Estimate
Request
FY2014 to FY2015
TOTAL
504,738
907,660
380,261
351,829
332,540 290,510 274,313
-16,197
Economic Support Fund
160,750 760,000 131,000
148,281
135,985 119,477 110,000
-9,477
Foreign Military Financing
1,600 - 1,597
-
1,519 1,600 800
-800
Global Health Programs - State
121,240 - 156,240
141,240
129,865 124,013 124,013
-
Global Health Programs - USAID
22,800 - 26,946
25,000
25,017 25,200 25,200
-
International Military Education
and Training
92
-
220
224
208 220 300
80
International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement
21,107
147,660
19,420
19,420
17,448 12,000 6,000
-6,000
P.L. 113-480 Title II
177,149 - 44,838
17,664
22,498 8,000 8,000
-
Sources: U.S. Department of State, “Budget by Year-Haiti,” February 11, 2014 (FY2010-FY2011), Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2014, Foreign Operations,
Annex: Regional Perspectives, p.667 (FY2012, FY2014); Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2015, Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives, p.666 (FY2013-15).
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Figure 2. U. S. Government Post-Earthquake Assistance in Haiti
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, September 30, 2014.
Notes: As of September 30, 2014. Funding reported as disbursed by the various account managers in the Office
of Foreign Assistance Haiti, budget for fiscal years 2010 (Base & Supplemental), 2011, 2012, 2013.
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Post-Earthquake Reconstruction
In the aftermath of the earthquake, Congress appropriated $2.9 billion for aid to Haiti in the 2010
supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 111-212).77 This included $1.6 billion for relief efforts, $1.1
billion for reconstruction, and $147 million for diplomatic operations. Since then, Congress has
expressed concern about the pace and effectiveness of U.S. aid to Haiti. According to the U.N.
Special Envoy for Haiti’s office, of the approximately $1.2 billion the United States pledged at
the 2010 donors conference for aid to Haiti, 19% had been disbursed as of March 2012, and about
33% as of December 2012. All donors had pledged about $6.4 billion, and disbursed just over
45% of that as of March 2012, and disbursed 56% of it by the end of 2012.78
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on USAID funding for post-
earthquake reconstruction in Haiti.79 GAO concluded that “the majority of supplemental funding
ha[d] not been obligated and disbursed” as of March 31, 2013. The report said that USAID had
obligated 45 percent and disbursed 31 percent of the $651 million allocated in the FY2010
Supplemental Appropriations Act for bilateral earthquake reconstruction activities. These figures
refer only to Economic Support Funds (ESF) provided in the FY2010 supplemental. The
supplemental required the State Department to submit five reports to Congress. GAO criticized
the State Department for “incomplete and not timely” reports, noting that only four reports were
submitted, and that they lacked some of the information specifically requested by the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, such as a description, by goal and objective, and an assessment of
the progress of U.S. programs. The State Department countered that it provides information to
Congress through other means as well, such as in-person briefings, according to GAO.
Looking at the broader range of funding available for Haiti, USAID and the State Department
report that 100% of the $1.3 billion allotted for humanitarian relief assistance, and 54% of the
$2.4 billion allotted for recovery, reconstruction and development assistance had been distributed
as of September 30, 2013.80 The recovery, reconstruction and development assistance includes the
amount pledged at the U.N. recovery conference (and appropriated through the FY2010
supplemental appropriations bill), plus other appropriated fiscal year funds (base FY2010,
FY2011, and FY2012). (It does not include USAID prior year funds reallocated to meet urgent
Haitian recovery and reconstruction needs.) Using these figures, the Administration calculates
that it has disbursed 70% of funding available for Haiti. (See Figure 3 below.)
77 For further details, see CRS Report R41232, FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and
Other Programs, coordinated by Amy Belasco, and CRS Report R41023, Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response, by
Rhoda Margesson and Maureen Taft-Morales.
78 Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, “New York conference recovery pledge status and modalities as of [March
2012; December 2012] in USD millions,” http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/download/International_Assistance/6-ny-
pledge-status.pdf. According to discussions with the State Dept., figures for the U.S. in the Special Envoy’s December
2012 table were as of September 30, 2012, and USG calculations for that date showed a disbursal rate of 46%. The
Special Envoy’s office is closed, and therefore no longer tracking these numbers.
79 GAO, Report GAO-13-558, “Haiti Reconstruction: USIAD Infrastructure Projects Have Had Mixed Results and
Face Sustainability Challenges,” June 2013; this paragraph, pp. 8-10.
80 USAID, Dept. of State, “Total Post-Earthquake USG Funding to Haiti Summary, All Accounts—As of September
30, 2013” (table), revised Feb. 11, 2014.
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Figure 3. Total Post-Earthquake USG Funding to Haiti Summary
Al Accounts as of September 30, 2014
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, September 30, 2014.
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While Haiti is making some progress in its overall recovery effort, enormous challenges remain.
International donors responded to the earthquake with a massive humanitarian effort. Most of the
rubble created by the earthquake has been removed and three-fourths of those living in tent
shelters have left the camps.81 Nevertheless, many criticize the pace and methods of the recovery
process regarding displaced persons. About 61,000 of those who left the camps were forcibly
evicted, and about 78,000 live on private land under threat of eviction, with the U.N. expressing
concern about the human rights violations involved in such expulsions.82 Various 2014 estimates
on the number of people still living in tent shelters range from 147,000 to 280,000. The latter
figure is from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which
estimates there are another 200,000 people living with host families or in internal settlements, for
a total of 480,000 internally displaced persons.
The Caracol Industrial Park. A major element of U.S. aid to Haiti has been the development of
the Caracol Industrial Park in Haiti’s northern region. Although the region was not hit by the
earthquake, the project is part of an effort—begun before the earthquake—to “decentralize”
development, stimulating the economy and creating jobs outside of overcrowded Port-au-Prince.
The Obama Administration says the Caracol park is supposed to create 20,000 permanent jobs
initially, with the potential for up to 65,000 jobs; as of October 2012 then-Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton said about 1,000 Haitians were employed there.83 U.S. Ambassador
White said that jobs at the park “will double this year, to 5,000.”84
The Caracol Industrial Park has generated much controversy. According to the New York Times,
State Department officials acknowledged that they did not conduct a full inquiry into allegations
of labor and criminal law violations by Sae-A in Guatemala before choosing the company to
anchor the park.85 Environmentalists, who had marked Caracol Bay to become Haiti’s first marine
protected area, were reportedly “shocked” to learn an industrial park would be built next to it.
U.S. consultants who helped pick the site said they had not conducted an environmental analysis
before recommending the site, the Times reported, and in a follow-up study said the site posed a
high environmental risk and that, even if wastewater were treated the bay would be endangered,
and the U.S.-financed power plant would have “a ‘strongly negative’ impact on air quality.” Civil
society groups argue that the park, built on some of Haiti’s rare arable land, displaced farmers and
promotes manufacturing at the expense of agriculture.86
A Haitian government website defended the park, saying Sae-A’s Guatemalan branch took
corrective action, and that the U.S. Department of Labor has led several delegations to review the
81 Dept. of State, Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, “Fast Facts on the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti:
Rubble,” and “Fast Facts on the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti: Shelter and Housing,” January 16, 2013.
82 Oxfam, Salt in the Wound: The Urgent Need to Prevent Forced Evictions from Camps in Haiti, December 10, 2012,
p. 3; and The Caribbean Journal, “Haiti: UN ‘Concerned’ over Forced Evictions of Displaced Persons,” March 12,
2013.
83 Dept. of State, Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, “Fast Facts on the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti: Caracol
Industrial Park,” January 16, 2013; and Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the Caracol Industrial Park Opening
Ceremony,” October 22, 2012.
84Pamela White, op.cit.
85 Deborah Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken,” New York Times, July 5, 2012.
86 Briefing with Camille Chalmers, Executive Director of the Haitian Advocacy Platform for an Alternative
Development, May 22, 2012.
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manufacturer’s compliance with labor law.87 The Ministry of Economy and Finances said that
“environmental protection activity” was already underway, including development of a modern
wastewater treatment plant, and that “complementary alternative energy sources” were also being
pursued. As for the agricultural issues, the government said the farmers were given compensation
packages, including title to farmland elsewhere, and a U.S.-sponsored training program would
help local residents gain skills for new job opportunities.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported mixed results for U.S. funding at
Caracol, which includes $170 million for a power plant and port to support the Industrial Park.88
USAID completed the first phase of the power plant with less funding than allocated, and in time
to supply the park’s first tenant with power. GAO reports that the Caracol Industrial Park, the
power plant, and the port are interdependent, that “each must be completed and remain viable for
the others to succeed.” Yet port construction is at least two years behind schedule, and USAID
funding will be insufficient to pay for most of the projected costs, leaving a cost gap of $117 to
$189 million. GAO said it was unclear whether the government of Haiti could find a private
company willing to fund the rest of the port costs.
Two recent reports criticized labor practices in Haitian factories, including at the U.S.-funded
Caracol Industrial Park, alleging widespread underpayment of workers and unsafe working
conditions at many of them.89
Transparency and Accountability of the Haitian Government
As part of its concern about the effectiveness of U.S. aid to Haiti, Congress has supported efforts
over the years to improve the transparency and accountability of the Haitian government’s
spending. Congress prohibited certain aid to the central government of any country that does not
meet minimum standards of fiscal transparency through the foreign assistance appropriations act
for 2012 (P.L. 112-74). While acknowledging Haiti’s progress toward fiscal transparency, the
State Department reported that Haiti did not meet those minimum standards, but waived the
restriction on the basis of national interest. In its memorandum of justification, the Department
argued that, “Without assistance and support, Haiti could become a haven for criminal
activities…. Without sufficient job creation, Haiti could become a greater source of refugee
flows….”90
The Justification noted progress made, such as the government’s routine posting of budgetary,
public finance and investment documents and legislation online, public discussions of the draft
national budget for the first time, the increasing role of the parliament in budget oversight, and
the adoption of an integrated financial management system to track expenditures in one central
87 Administrator, “Fact Check- The New York Times: Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken,” Parc Industriel
de Caracol, July 6, 2012, http://www.ute.gouv.ht/caracol/en/news/3-newsflash/174-fact-check-the-new-york-times-
earthquake-relief-where-haiti-wasnt-broken.
88 GAO, Report GAO-13-558, “Haiti Reconstruction: USIAD Infrastructure Projects Have Had Mixed Results and
Face Sustainability Challenges,” June 2013.
89 Better Work Haiti, Better Work Haiti: Garment Industry, 7th Biannual Synthesis Report Under the HOPE II
Legislation, International Labour Organization and International Finance Corporation, Oct. 16, 2013; and Worker
Rights Consortium, Stealing from the Poor: Wage Theft in the Haitian Apparel Industry, Oct. 15, 2013.
90 U.S. Dept. of State, Action Memo for Deputy Secretary Nides, Haiti—Fiscal Transparency National Interest Waiver
Request and Determination of Progress, undated (2012, probably August-October).
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database. Some of Haiti’s transparency shortcomings include the failure to identify natural
resource revenues in the budget; inadequate access to contracting procedures for investors trying
to engage in public procurement; extra-budgetary spending; and the lack of skill within the
Supreme Audit Authority to carry out its oversight of public enterprises.
Respect for Human Rights
Congress has long advocated for the respect for human rights in Haiti, which has improved
dramatically under civilian democratic government. The government is no longer an agent of
officially sanctioned and executed violations of human rights. Nonetheless, many problems
remain. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Human Rights report from 2013:
The most serious impediments to human rights involved weak democratic governance in the
country; the near absence of the rule of law, exacerbated by a judicial system vulnerable to
political influence, and chronic, severe corruption in all branches of government.
Basic human rights problems included some arbitrary and unlawful killings by government
officials; excessive use of force against suspects and protesters; overcrowding and poor
sanitation in prisons; prolonged pretrial detention; an inefficient, unreliable, and inconsistent
judiciary subject to significant outside and personal influence; rape, other violence, and
societal discrimination against women; child abuse; social marginalization of minority
communities; and human trafficking. Allegations continued of sexual exploitation and abuse
by members of … MINUSTAH. Violence and crime within camps for approximately
369,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) remained a problem.
Other human rights problems included torture and excessive use of force against suspects
and prisoners; overcrowding and poor sanitation in prisons; prolonged pretrial detention; an
inefficient, unreliable, and inconsistent judiciary subject to significant outside and personal
influence; rape, other violence, and societal discrimination against women; child abuse; and
human trafficking. In addition there were multiple incidents of mob violence and vigilante
retribution against both government security forces and ordinary citizens, including setting
houses on fire, burning police stations, throwing rocks, beheadings, and lynchings.91
The U.N. Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, made a
blunt assessment of the current state of human rights in Haiti in his final address before the U.N.’s
Human Rights Council. Before stepping down from the position he said, “I cannot, and I do not
want to hide from you my anxiety and disappointment regarding developments in the fields of the
rule of law and human rights….”92 Saying that “impunity reigns,” the human rights expert said,
“It is inconceivable that, under the rule of law, those responsible for enforcing the law feel
authorized not to respect the law and that such behavior goes unanswered by the judicial system.”
Forst strongly criticized the nomination of magistrates for political ends, citing the case in which
he said the current Minister of Justice appointed a judge especially for the purpose of ordering the
release of Calixte Valentin, a presidential adviser being held in preventive detention on a murder
91 U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Haiti, May 24, 2012,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186522.
92 “Departing UN official blasts Haiti’s human rights record in open letter,” AP, March 28, 2013; “Michel Forst vide
son sac,” Le Nouvelliste, March 27, 2013, at http://lenouvelliste.com/article4.php?newsid=115004, author’s translation;
U.N. Office at Geneva, “Council Holds Interactive Dialogue with Independent Experts on the Situation of Human
Rights in Cote d’Ivoire and in Haiti,” March 19, 2013.
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charge. His statement bemoaned threats against journalists, arbitrary and illegal arrests, and the
failure to implement identified solutions that would improve conditions in the Haitian prison—
which he said “remains a cruel, inhuman and degrading place.” He expressed his wish that the
Martelly administration take up the work of the Ministry of Justice under President Préval in the
revision of the penal code. Forst applauded the strong efforts of the Préval and Martelly
administrations in strengthening the police, with international support, and the renewed public
confidence in the police. He noted persisting problems however, commenting that the case of a
person tortured to death in a police station in a Port-au-Prince suburb was not an isolated incident.
The human rights specialist also noted positive developments in human rights, including the role
played by the Office of Citizen Protection, Haiti’s human rights ombudsman, in promoting
respect for human rights, and a strong civil society with professional human rights organizations
advocating for issues such as women’s rights and food security. Forst also praised the
appointment of a Minister for Human Rights and the Fight against Extreme Poverty.
An aide to the Prime Minister, George Henry Honorat, was killed March 23, 2013, in a drive-by
shooting. Motives are not known, but Honorat was also the editor in chief for a weekly
newspaper, Haiti Progres, and was secretary general of the Popular National Party that opposed
the Duvalier regimes.
Concerns over Haitians and People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican
Republic93
A September 2013 court ruling in the Dominican Republic caused enormous controversy because
it could deny citizenship to some 200,000 Dominican-born people, mostly of Haitian descent,
making them stateless. The Dominican Republic’s 1929 constitution adhered to the principle that
citizenship was determined by place of birth. The country’s 2010 constitution excluded from
citizenship “those born to…foreigners who are in transit or reside illegally in Dominican
territory.” For decades, Haitians have been brought into the Dominican Republic to work in sugar
fields and, more recently, construction.
The Dominican Constitutional Court ruled that the 2010 definition must be applied retroactively.
It also reinterpreted the provision in the 1929 constitution which excluded from citizenship
children born to foreigners “in transit,” so that it excluded all those born to undocumented
foreigners. (Previously, the “in transit” clause had mostly been applied to members of the
diplomatic corps or others in the country for a limited, defined period.) The decision stripped a
29-year old Dominican-born woman of Haitian descent of her citizenship, and denied citizenship
to her Dominican-born children. The Court also ordered Dominican authorities to conduct an
audit of birth records to identify similar cases of people formally registered as Dominicans since
1929, saying they would no longer qualify for citizenship under the new constitution. The
decision cannot be appealed.
Dominican authorities argue that such people will not be stateless, because they will qualify as
Haitian citizens or will be given a path to Dominican citizenship. The Haitian constitution grants
citizenship to children born of a Haitian parent, but does not address second and third generations
descended from Haitian citizens. There are thousands more who will not be on Dominican
93 For more information, see CRS Report R41482, Dominican Republic: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare
Ribando Seelke.
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registries because for decades, Dominican officials have denied birth certificates and other
documents to many Dominican-born people of, or perceived to be of, Haitian descent.
The ruling has heightened tensions with Haiti. With the possibility that the Dominican Republic
could render thousands of second and third generation Dominicans of Haitian descent stateless
and deport them to Haiti, the potential impact on Haiti could be enormous. Haiti has limited
resources to deal effectively with an influx of that size of possible deportees who were not born in
Haiti, and have little or no ties to Haiti. The Haitian government initially recalled its ambassador
from the Dominican Republic in response to the Court ruling. Relations were further strained
when the Dominican Republic repatriated over 200 Haitians in November, after the murder of an
elderly Dominican couple in a border town, which locals blamed on Haitians. The Dominican
government has said it will suspend deportations for the time being. Nonetheless, some activists
have criticized the Martelly Administration for not speaking out strongly enough against the
Court decision.94
Haitian and Dominican officials held talks in January 2014. The Dominican government said it
would not negotiate the Court decision or how it plans to implement it. According to a press
report, Haiti recognized Dominican sovereignty on migration policy and the Dominican
government assured Haiti that “concrete measures will be taken to safeguard the basic rights of
people of Haitian descent” living in the country. 95
But Haitians also advocated at the talks for better treatment of Haitian migrant workers in the
Dominican Republic, long a subject of human rights concerns. The U.S. Department of Labor
issued a report in September 2013 citing evidence of violations of labor law in the Dominican
sugar sector such as payments below minimum wage, 12-hour work days and 7-day work weeks,
lack of potable water, absence of safety equipment, child labor, and forced labor.96 Haiti also
asked for better treatment of its students in the Dominican Republic.
Further talks on February 3 led to agreement on several immigration issues, according to the
Dominican government, including a new type of Dominican visa for workers.97 The Dominican
Republic reviewed its rules and practices related to Haitian students. The Haitian government
reportedly reaffirmed its commitment to expedite the issuance of passports and national civil
registration cards at border posts and in consulates in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican
Republic says it provided details of how it will implement its “National Plan for regularization of
foreigners.”
Dominican President Danilo Medina issued a decree in November 2013, outlining the plan as a
special naturalization process for undocumented “foreigners” and their children born in the
94 Jacqueline Charles, “U.S. expresses ‘deep concern’ over Dominican court citizenship ruling,” Miami Herald, Dec.
18, 2013.
95 Ezra Fieser, “Can Haiti and Dominican Republic repair relations after citizenship ruling?,” Christian Science
Monitor, Jan. 8, 2014.
96 U.S. Dept. of Labor, “US Labor Department issues report on labor concerns in Dominican sugar sector, announces
$10 million project in agriculture,” New Release 13-1979-NAT, Sept. 27, 2013.
9797 Embajada de la Republica Dominicana, Wash., DC, letter summarizing meeting of 2/3/2014, EDW-0076-14, Feb.
4, 2014.
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Dominican Republic who currently lack any documentation. The decree said that those who do
not choose to seek eligibility can request repatriation or will face deportation.98
The Dominican government says it is trying to normalize a complicated immigration system. But
U.N. and Organization of American States (OAS) agencies, foreign leaders, and human rights
groups have challenged the decision’s legitimacy, concerned that it violates international human
rights obligations to which the D.R. is party. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) concluded that the Constitutional Court’s ruling “implies an arbitrary deprivation of
nationality” and “has a discriminatory effect, given that it primarily impacts Dominicans of
Haitian descent…”99 The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) “condemn[ed] the abhorrent and
discriminatory ruling,” and said it was “especially repugnant that the ruling ignores the 2005
judgment made by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights that the Dominican Republic
adapt its immigration laws and practices in accordance with the provision of the American
Convention on Human Rights.”100 CARICOM then suspended the D.R.’s request for membership.
The Obama Administration did not publicly address the Dominican Court ruling until almost
three months after it was issued, in mid-December 2013. It then said it had “deep concern” about
the ruling’s impact on the status of people of Haitian descent born in the Dominican Republic.101
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that the ruling places hundreds of thousands
of Dominican born persons, most of whom are of Haitian descent, at risk of statelessness (see
H.Res. 443 in Legislation in the 113th Congress below).
In May 2014, the Dominican Congress passed a bill proposed by President Medina setting up a
system to grant citizenship to Dominican-born children of immigrants. The law created different
categories, depending on whether people have documents proving they were born in the country.
According to the Dominican government, those with birth certificates that are “irregular” because
of their parents’ lack of immigration status will have their certificates legalized and will be
confirmed as Dominican citizens. People without documents had 90 days to prove they were born
in the Dominican Republic and register with the government; after two years of residency they
could then apply for citizenship.102 Critics say the law continues to discriminate against people
without documents. 103
On November 14, 2014, the Dominican Republic withdrew its membership in the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. The Inter-American Court found that the Dominican Republic
discriminates against Dominicans of Haitian descent and gave the government six months to
invalidate the ruling of the Constitutional Court. The Dominican government charged that the
findings were “unacceptable and “biased.”104
98 Manuel Jimenez, “Dominican government gives details of naturalization plan for ‘foreigners’,” Reuters, Nov. 30,
2013.
99Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “IACHR Wraps Up Visit to the
Dominican Republic,” press release, December 2013.
100 CARICOM Secretariat, “CARICOM Statement on Developments in the Aftermath of the Ruling of the
Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic on Nationality,” press release 265/2013, Nov. 26, 2013.
101 Jacqueline Charles, Dec. 18, 2013, op.cit.
102 Embajada de la Republica Dominicana, “Dominican National Congress Approves Historic Citizenship Legislation,”
press release, Wash., DC, May 21, 2014.
103BBC News, “Dominican Republic lawmakers pass citizenship bill,” May 22, 2014.
104 Panky Corcino, Danica Coto, “Dominican Republic Quits OAS’s human rights court,” AP, Nov. 4, 2014.
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Investigations of the late Duvalier and Aristide for Human Rights Violations
Legal proceedings against both the late former dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier and
former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide have posed extremely challenging tests of Haiti’s judicial
system, and its ability to prosecute human rights abuses and other crimes. As mentioned above,
about a third of U.S. assistance to Haiti supports governance and rule-of-law programs, which
include judicial reform and strengthening.
Duvalier died at age 63 in Haiti on October 4, 2014. After he had unexpectedly returned from
exile in 2011, private citizens filed charges of human rights violations against him for abuses they
allege they suffered under his 15-year regime. In 2012 a judge ruled that Duvalier could be tried
for corruption, but that a statute of limitations would prevent him from being tried for any murder
claims. Upon appeal, however, a three-judge panel reversed that decision in February 2013. The
Appellate Court ruled that Duvalier could be charged with crimes against humanity—such as
political torture, disappearances and murder—for which there is no statute of limitations under
international law. Haitian human rights lawyer Pierre Esperance called the decision
“monumental.” Duvalier’s defense attorney Fritzo Canton said the judicial panel acted under the
influence of “extreme leftist human rights organizations.”105
After Duvalier’s return, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights offered to help Haitian
authorities prosecute crimes committed during Duvalier’s rule.106 U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon called on the international community to continue to work with the Haitian government to
bring about systemic rule-of-law reform, saying that
…the return of Jean-Claude Duvalier has brought the country’s turbulent history of State-
sponsored violence to the fore. It is of vital importance that the Haitian authorities pursue all
legal and judicial avenues in this matter. The prosecution of those responsible for crimes
against their own people will deliver a clear message to the people of Haiti that there can be
no impunity. It will also be incumbent upon the incoming Administration to build on the
achievements of the Préval presidency, which put an end to State-sponsored political
violence and allowed Haitians to enjoy freedom of association and expression.107
Duvalier repeatedly failed to appear in court, then, under threat of arrest from the judge, appeared
in court on February 28, 2013, much to the astonishment of many observers. When asked about
murders, political imprisonment, summary execution, and forced exile under his government, the
former dictator replied that “Murders exist in all countries; I did not intervene in the activities of
the police.”108 Initially, Duvalier was not allowed to leave Haiti, but in December 2012 the
Martelly government re-issued his diplomatic passport.109 He remained in the country, and was
President Martelly’s guest at official government ceremonies.
105 George Rodriguez, “Victims rejoice at Haitian judges’ Decision to allow charges of human rights violations against
former dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier,” Noticen, Sept. 18, 2014.
106 United Nations Radio, UN offers to help Haitian authorities prosecute Duvalier, February 1, 2011,
http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/detail/112772.html.
107 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, March
24, 2011, S/2011/183, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d9448d32.html, paragraphs 81-82.
108 “Haiti-Duvalier: Everything that was said at the hearing of 28 February,” HaitiLibre.com, March 2, 2013.
109 Trenton Daniel, “Attorney: Haiti’s ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier hospitalized,” Associated Press, March 4, 2013.
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After Duvalier’s death, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called it
“essential” that legal proceedings and investigations against people associated with Duvalier
continue.110
Former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide is also facing charges since his return in March 2011. A
small group of people has filed a complaint against Aristide, alleging they were physically abused
and used to raise money when they were children in the care of Aristide’s Fanmi se Lavi
organization, created in the late 1980s to house and educate homeless children. A prosecutor
questioned Aristide in January 2013. Now a court must decide whether to dismiss the case or
refer it to a judge to decide whether to file formal charges.
In May 2013 Aristide testified before a judge regarding an investigation into the murder of
prominent Haitian journalist Jean Dominique in 2000. Thousands of supporters followed his
motorcade through the capital. Earlier in the year, former President Rene Préval, who was in
office at the time of the murder, also testified in the case. Both men were once friends of
Dominique. At the time of his death Dominique was seen as a possible presidential candidate;
Aristide was already preparing to run for a second term. Several people allegedly involved in the
assassination and witnesses have been killed or disappeared over the years.111 Dominique’s
widow, Michele Montas, is a former journalist and U.N. spokeswoman. She says, “The
investigation has led to people close to the high levels of the Lavalas Family party that Aristide
headed….I am sure he knows who did it.” In January 2014 a Haitian appellate judge
recommended that nine people be charged for their alleged roles in Dominique’s murder. The
investigative report alleged that a former Lavalas senator was the mastermind behind the crime
and that several others involved belonged to Aristide’s Lavalas Family party as well.112 It is now
up to the Court of Appeals to accept or reject the judge’s report.
The government has an ongoing investigation into corruption, money laundering, and drug
trafficking charges against Aristide. A judge issued an arrest warrant for Aristide in August 2014,
after which protesters blocked access to Aristide’s home. The same judges placed Aristide under
house arrest on September 9, 2014. Some in the opposition claim the judge is close to President
Martelly. According to IHS Global Insight, Aristides’s house arrest “is likely to strengthen
opposition claims of persecution…[and] reduces the likelihood of a compromise agreement that
would allow a second candidate registration process and the participation of opposition parties” in
the overdue elections.113
Because the judicial system is not fully independent, the attitudes of the president could have a
large impact on any judicial process. As a candidate, Martelly called for clemency for the former
leaders, saying that, “If I come to power, I would like all the former presidents to become my
advisors in order to profit from their experience.”114 He also said he was “ready” to work with
110 “UN Urges Continued Probe on Violations during Baby Doc’s Rule in Haiti,” RTT News, Oct. 7, 2014.
111 Susana Ferreira, “Ex-Haiti leader Aristide Testifies on Assassination; Statement to aid Investigation into
Journalists’s Death,” Chicago Tribune.
112 “International press freedom group urges Haiti’s government to act in case of slain journalist,” AP Newswire, Jan.
21, 2014.
113 Arthur Dhont, “Arrest of former Haitian president likely to increase risk of rioting and disorder in Port-au-Prince,”
IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, Sept. 10, 2014.
114 Clarens Renois, “Haiti politicians hope for reconciliation,” Agence France Presse, January 21, 2011,
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/01/21/11/haiti-politicians-hope-reconciliation.
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officials who had served under the Duvalier regimes, 115 and adult children of Duvalierists hold
high positions in his government.116 Since becoming president, Martelly repeated the possibility
that he would pardon Duvalier, citing a need for national reconciliation.117 He retracted at least
one of those statements, and Prime Minister Lamothe stated that the Haitian state was not
pursuing a pardon for Duvalier.118
The U.N.’s Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kyung-wha Kang, in a visit to Port-
au-Prince in July 2011, urged the creation of a truth commission, which she said would help
promote national reconciliation in Haiti.
The U.N. expert on human rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, called the appearance of former president
Jean-Claude Duvalier before the Haitian courts a victory for the rule of law. He also said that
despite assurances “at the highest level of State” that the executive branch would not interfere in
the judicial proceedings, that “that unfortunately was not the case.”119
Curbing Violence against Women
Some Members of Congress have expressed special concern about violence against women in
Haiti. Discrimination against women has been practiced in Haiti throughout its history. The
widespread nature and Haitian society’s tolerance of this sexual discrimination, says the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, “has in turn fueled brutal acts of violence and abuse
towards women on a regular basis.”
Gender-based or sexual violence against women and girls has been described by many sources for
many years as common and under-reported in Haiti. The most prevalent forms of this violence are
domestic abuse, rape—sometimes as a political weapon—and childhood slavery. Violence against
women has also included murder. Haitian girls and women in the poor majority are at particular
risk of violence. The issue gained new attention after the earthquake, when women in tent camps
became especially vulnerable to gender-based violence. Haitian government enforcement of or
adherence to its obligations to protect rights that would protect women and girls from gender-
based or sexual violence in particular is weak and inadequate.
The Martelly Administration has dramatically increased the budget of the Ministry for Women’s
Affairs and Rights, which is responsible for developing national equality policies and the
advancement of women. The FY2012 budget for the Ministry was US$40.76 million, an increase
of 828.2% (from 0.17% of the government’s budget in FY2011 to 1.41% in FY2012).
Security and the Debate over Reestablishing the Haitian Army
For years, Congress has expressed concern over citizen security in Haiti. Congress has supported
various U.N. missions in Haiti, and the professionalization and strengthening of the Haitian
National Police force and other elements of Haiti’s judicial system in order to improve security
115 “Haitian candidate open to including Duvalier officials,” Agence France Presse, March 2, 2011.
116 Jacqueline Charles, “The Case against Haiti’s ‘Baby Doc’,” Miami Herald, February 27, 2013.
117 Niko Price, “Haitian Leader Could Pardon Duvalier,” Associated Press, January 27, 2012.
118 Statement at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Statesmen’s Forum, April 18, 2013.
119 “Michel Forst vide son sac,” op.cit.
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conditions in Haiti. In what proved to be a very controversial move, President Martelly proposed
recreating the Haitian army to replace MINUSTAH in a few years. The army, which committed
gross violations of human rights over decades, according to numerous reports by the State
Department, the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, and
others, and carried out numerous coups, was disbanded by President Aristide in 1995.
Martelly’s initial plan called for creation of a 3,500-member army120 to be built over three and a
half years, at a cost of approximately $95 million, including $15 million to compensate former
soldiers who were discharged.121 In January 2012 Martelly reportedly acknowledged that a new
army wasn’t realistic, but also pledged to build a new Haitian security force of 3,000-5,000
members. It was not clear what difference there was between an army and a new security force.122
Martelly is proceeding with steps for re-creating a military force, although on a smaller scale for
now. Ecuador trained 41 Haitian military recruits – 30 soldiers, 10 engineers, and one officer – in
2013, who will now work on engineering projects such as road repair, and will report to the
Defense Ministry. According to a press report, Defense Minister Jean-Rodolphe Joazile said the
troops “won’t carry weapons for now but could carry handguns, in three to four years, if either
the recruits pay for the weapon themselves or the government receives financing to do so.”123
While some observers express concern over such steps, others say they are token gestures to
address Martelly’s campaign promise to reinstate the army. State Department officials have said
that there has been virtually no funding of the Defense Ministry to carry out larger plans.
Former members of the Haitian army and would-be soldiers have protested in favor of
reestablishing the army, and in 2012 occupied 10 old military bases. About 50 such protestors,
wearing fatigues and some bearing arms, disrupted a session of parliament in April 2012 to voice
their demands. After months of inaction, and under pressure from the U.N., the Haitian
government closed the occupied bases and arrested dozens of pro-army protesters—including two
U.S. citizens—after a march turned violent in May 2012.124
Under Haitian law, Parliament is supposed to approve recreating the force, which it has not done.
The majority Inité coalition said the government cannot afford an army, and should further
develop the Haitian National Police, which MINUSTAH is already training to assume its
functions.125 The United States and other international donors support reform and capacity
building in the police force as the best means of continuing to improve citizen security. Others
have also suggested establishing civilian corps to carry out disaster response and other duties
Martelly is proposing for the army.
A U.N. Security Council mission to Haiti lamented the slow pace of police strengthening and
worried that it could foster pro-army sentiments:
120 “Haiti president wants to start recruiting new army,” Agence France Presse, September 28, 2011.
121 “Martelly moves ahead with plan to restore army,” Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report, RC-11-
10, October 2011, p. 16.
122 Niko Price, “Haitian Leader Could Pardon Duvalier,” Associated Press, January 27, 2012.
123Trenton Daniel, “Haiti takes step closer to restoring abolished army as trainees return to repair roads,” Associated
Press, Sept. 17, 2013. See also, “Haiti Takes Steps to Rebuild its Army,” VOA, Sept. 17, 2013.
124 Associated Press, “Mass. Man Jailed in Haiti Could Face Three Years behind Bars,” CBS Boston, May 24, 2012,
http://boston.cbslocal.com/2012/05/24/mass-man-jailed-in-haiti-could-face-three-years-behind-bars/. The two men are
Jason William Petrie of Ohio, and Steven Parker Shaw of Massachusetts. If convicted of conspiracy charges, the two
could face up to three years in prison according to a Haitian prosecutor.
125 Ibid.
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Although the performance of the Haitian National Police has been slowly improving … it
still lacks the quantity and quality of personnel necessary to assume full responsibility for
internal security…. The pace of recruitment, vetting and training, however, has been
unsatisfactory. The mission was informed that the start of training for the next group of
cadets was delayed owing to funding shortfalls and other administrative difficulties. The
mission heard accounts that the slower-than-expected pace of development of the Haitian
police risks fuelling support among certain Haitian sectors for the near-term creation of a
national army.126
Some 2,000 new officers were graduated from the police academy in 2012 and 2013. The HNP
now has about 11,000 officers.
Counternarcotics
Haiti is a transit point for cocaine being shipped by both sea and air from South America, and for
marijuana coming from Jamaica to the United States, Canada, Europe, and other Caribbean
countries. Some drugs are also sent through Haiti by land to the Dominican Republic. Weak
institutions, poorly protected borders and coastlines, and widespread corruption are conditions
that make Haiti attractive to drug traffickers and make it difficult for Haiti to combat trafficking.
Nonetheless, the Haitian government has committed itself to combating narcotics trafficking in
recent years. According to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report (INCSR) published in March 2013, the Martelly Administration is planning to strengthen
the Haitian National Police to make them more effective in counternarcotics efforts, approving a
new five-year development plan for the Haitian National Police (HNP) which will expand the
counternarcotics unit to 200 officers.127 The Obama Administration worked with other donors to
update the development plan for the Haitian Coast Guard, and coordinate international efforts.
Although corruption is a widespread problem, the State Department reports that the government
does not encourage or facilitate distribution of illicit drugs or the laundering of drug trafficking
profits, and has fully staffed the HNP Inspectorate General at the upper leadership level for the
first time in its 17-year history. Low pay and widespread poverty make low-level police and other
officials vulnerable to bribery, however. The State Department has noted in the past that Haitian
law enforcement officials cannot investigate allegations that some legislators may be involved in
illicit activities because the constitution provides them with blanket immunity. The 2013 INCSR
adds that “… resource shortages, a lack of expertise, and insufficient political will represent
substantial obstacles to anti-corruption efforts.”
Since 2008, Congress has included counternarcotics funds for Haiti in regional initiatives in
addition to bilateral funding—first through the Merida Initiative, and then through the Caribbean
Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The Merida aid package aimed to “combat drug trafficking and
related violence and organized crime.”128 Although the Merida Initiative initially included Central
America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, its main focus was Mexico. CBSI, launched by the
126 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Security Council Mission to Haiti, 13-16 February 2012, S/2012/534, July 11,
2012, p. 3.
127 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. I, Drug and Chemical Control,
“Haiti,” March 5, 2013.
128 U.S. Department of State, The Merida Initiative, U.S.-SICA Dialogue on Security, December 11-12, 2008,
Washington, DC, December 2008, p. 3, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB861.pdf.
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Obama Administration in 2010, is a regional security effort by the United States and Caribbean
nations aiming to reduce illicit trafficking, advance public safety and security, and promote social
justice.129 U.S. counternarcotics programs in Haiti aim to enhance the professionalism and
capability of the Haitian National Police. Such support ranges from providing police cadets with
food and uniforms, to training in community-oriented policing and investigation methodology, to
renovation of an operating base for the police’s counternarcotics unit, joint enforcement
operations, and support of five Haitian Coast Guard vessels.130 In its 2013 report the
Administration concludes that, “despite progress, the tempo of drug enforcement actions in Haiti
remains stubbornly low.”
Trade Preferences for Haiti
Congress passed several bills, before and after the earthquake, to provide trade preferences for
Haiti. In 2006 Congress passed the HOPE Act, or the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through
Partnership Encouragement Act (P.L. 109-432, Title V), providing trade preferences for U.S.
imports of Haitian apparel. The act allows duty-free entry to specified apparel articles 50% of
which were made and/or assembled in Haiti, the United States, or a country that is either a
beneficiary of a U.S. trade preference program, or party to a U.S. free trade agreement (for the
first three years; the percentage became higher after that). The act requires ongoing Haitian
compliance with certain conditions, including making progress toward establishing a market-
based economy, the rule of law, elimination of trade barriers, economic policies to reduce poverty,
a system to combat corruption, and protection of internationally recognized worker rights. It also
stipulates that Haiti not engage in activities that undermine U.S. national security or foreign
policy interests, or in gross violations of human rights.
Those trade preferences were expanded in 2008 with passage of the second HOPE Act as part of
the 2008 farm bill (Title XV, P.L. 110-246), in response to a food crisis and then-President
Préval’s calls for increased U.S. investment in Haiti.131 HOPE II, as it is commonly referred to,
extended tariff preferences through 2018, simplified the act’s rules, extended the types of fabric
eligible for duty-free status, and permitted qualifying apparel to be shipped from the Dominican
Republic as well as from Haiti. The act mandated creation of a program to monitor labor
conditions in the apparel sector, and of a Labor Ombudsman to ensure the sector complies with
internationally recognized worker rights.
Congress again amended the HOPE Act after the 2010 earthquake. Through the HELP, or Haiti
Economic Lift Program Act (P.L. 111-171), Congress made the HOPE trade preferences more
flexible and expansive, and extended them through September 2020. Supporters of these trade
preferences maintain that they will encourage foreign investment and create jobs. Others argue
that while the textile manufacturing sector may create jobs, some of the new industrial parks are
being built on arable land and putting more farmers out of jobs, and that the manufacturing sector
is being supported at the expense of the agricultural sector.132
129 U.S. Department of State, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cbsi/, undated, after
November 10, 2011, June 22, 2012.
130 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. I, Drug and Chemical Control,
March 2012, pp. 247-250, and March 5, 2013.
131 For more information see CRS Report RL34687, The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act, by J. F. Hornbeck.
132 Briefing with Camille Chalmers, Executive Director of the Haitian Advocacy Platform for an Alternative
(continued...)
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In October 2013, two reports by nongovernmental organizations criticized labor practices in
Haitian factories, alleging widespread underpayment of workers and unsafe working conditions at
many of them.133
Legislation in the 113th Congress
P.L. 113-76 / H.R. 3547. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, prohibits assistance to the
central government of Haiti until the Secretary of State certifies that Haiti has held free and fair
parliamentary elections, is respecting judicial independence, and is taking effective steps to
combat corruption and improve governance. The bill also prohibits the obligation or expenditure
of funds for Haiti except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the
Committees on Appropriations; but allows Haiti to purchase defense articles and services under
the Arms Export Control Act for its Coast Guard. Signed into law January 17, 2014.
P.L. 113-162/ H.R. 1749/S. 1104. The Assessing Progress in Haiti Act would measure the
progress of recovery and development efforts in Haiti following the earthquake of January 12,
2010. It directs the Secretary of State to coordinate and transmit to Congress a three-year strategy
for Haiti that identifies constraints to economic growth and to consolidation of democratic
government institutions; includes an action plan that outlines policy tools, technical assistance,
and resources for addressing the highest priority constraints; and identifies specific steps and
benchmarks for providing direct assistance to the Haitian government. The act also requires the
Secretary of State to report to Congress annually through December 31, 2017, on the status of
specific aspects of post-earthquake recovery and development efforts in Haiti. Signed into law
August 8, 2014.
H.R. 83. The FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act would condition
aid to Haiti. It would prohibit assistance to the central government of Haiti until the Secretary of
State certifies that Haiti “is taking steps” to hold free and fair parliamentary elections and to seat
a new Haitian Parliament. It would further condition aid on the Haitian government’s respecting
judicial independence and selecting judges in a transparent manner; combating corruption; and
improving governance and financial transparency. The bill would also prohibit the obligation or
expenditure of funds for Haiti except as provided through the regular notification procedures of
the Committees on Appropriations. It would allow Haiti to purchase defense articles and services
under the Arms Export Control Act for its Coast Guard.
H.R. 1525. Save America Comprehensive Immigration Act of 2013, would amend the
Immigration and Nationality Act with (among other things), Title XI, Haitian Parity, to adjust the
status of certain Haitian nationals present in the United States for at least one year to permanent
resident status, at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, under certain conditions.
It would also amend the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 (8 U.S.C. 1255 note)
regarding Determinations with Respect to Children, and New Applications and Motions to
Reopen. It would also express the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of Homeland Security
(...continued)
Development, May 22, 2012.
133 Better Work Haiti, Better Work Haiti: Garment Industry, 7th Biannual Synthesis Report Under the HOPE II
Legislation, International Labour Organization and International Finance Corporation, Oct. 16, 2013; and Worker
Rights Consortium, Stealing from the Poor: Wage Theft in the Haitian Apparel Industry, Oct. 15, 2013.
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should be more liberal with respect to Haiti in deciding whether to designate that country for
temporary protected status. Introduced April 12, 2013, referred to House Committees on
Judiciary; Homeland Security; Oversight and Government Reform; referred to Subcommittee on
Immigration and Border Security April 30, 2013.
H.R. 3163. Sec. 314 of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform ASAP Act of 2013, would
amend the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 (8 U.S.C. 1255 note) to clarify
determinations with respect to children, new applications and motions to reopen application for
adjustment of status. Referred to the Committees on the Judiciary, Homeland Security, Armed
Services, Foreign Affairs, Natural Resources, Ways and Means, Education and the Workforce,
Oversight and Government Reform, and House Administration, for a period to be subsequently
determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the
jurisdiction of the committee concerned. Referred to House Subcommittee on Immigration and
Border Security October 15, 2013.
H.Res. 31. Would recognize the anniversary of the tragic earthquake in Haiti on January 12,
2010, honoring those who lost their lives, and expressing continued solidarity with the Haitian
people. Introduced January15, 2013, referred to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere February 25, 2013.
H.Res. 61. Would express the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States should
work with the Government of Haiti to address gender-based violence against women and
children. Introduced February 6, 2013; referred to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
the Western Hemisphere on February 25, 2013.
H.Res. 224. Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that a “Haitian-American
Heritage Month” should be established in recognition of the contributions of the Haitian people to
the history and culture of the United States. Introduced, referred to House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform May 17, 2013.
H.Res. 443. Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the September 23,
2013, decision of the Dominican Republic Constitutional Court that places hundreds of thousands
of Dominican born persons at risk of statelessness. Noting that the majority of individuals that are
subject to this ruling are of Haitian descent, would resolve that it is the unequivocal policy of the
United States to promote the right to nationality without arbitrary deprivation by any state as
articulated in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights. Introduced December
12, 2013, referred to House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere January 10, 2014.
H.Res. 474. Honoring the 210th anniversary of Haiti’s independence. Introduced, referred to
House Committee on Foreign Affairs February 5, 2014. Referred to the Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere February 27, 2014.
S. 1548. Haiti and Armenia Reforestation Act of 2013 would authorize the President to provide
assistance to the Governments of Haiti [and Armenia] to reverse the effects of deforestation and
restore within 20 years the extent of forest levels in Haiti and Armenia] in existence during the
year 1990, and for other purposes. Introduced, referred to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
September 25, 2013.
S. 2853. Accelerating Action in Maternal and Child Health Act of 2014 would accelerate action in
each of the priority countries listed in this act to combat the leading causes of maternal, newborn,
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and child mortality and strengthen the capability of the United States to be an effective leader in
maternal, newborn, and child health and in a broader effort to end maternal, newborn, and child
deaths worldwide. It would require the United States to establish a pilot program for innovative
financing mechanisms to deliver maternal, newborn, and child health interventions in such
countries. It was introduced September 18, 2014, read twice, and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations.
S.Res. 12. Would recognize the third anniversary of the tragic earthquake in Haiti on January 12,
2010, honoring those who lost their lives in that earthquake, and expressing continued solidarity
with the people of Haiti. Introduced January 24, 2013; agreed to in Senate with an amendment
and an amended preamble by Unanimous Consent on March 11, 2013.
Author Contact Information
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
mtmorales@crs.loc.gov, 7-7659
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