Intelligence Authorization Legislation for
FY2014 and FY2015: Provisions, Status,
Intelligence Community Framework
Anne Daugherty Miles
Analyst in Intelligence and National Security Policy
November 20, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43793
Intelligence Authorization Legislation for FY2014 and 2015: Provisions and Status
Summary
An Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Years (FY) 2014 and 2015 (H.R. 4681) was
considered in May 2014 and passed by the House but not by the Senate. Instead, both chambers
passed, and the President signed an IAA for FY2014 (P.L. 113-126) in July 2014. At this time, an
IAA for FY2015 (S. 2741) is under consideration by the Senate. If it passes, it will be referred to
the House. This report examines selected provisions in the legislation (those summarized below)
and provides an intelligence community framework in the Appendix.
Summary of Selected Legislative Provisions
IAA FY2014 (Enacted) and S. 2741 (Proposed)
Title
IAA FY2014 (P.L. 113-126)
IAA FY2015 (S. 2741)
I. Intelligence
Section 104 supports the Intelligence Advanced
Activities
Research Projects Activity.
III. General
Section 305 codifies provisions already in E.O.
Section 314 directs the DHS Under Secretary
Matters
12333 and gives responsibility for designating
for Intelligence and Analysis to report to
functional managers (the directors of CIA, NGA,
Congress regarding the advisability of including
NSA, and DIA) to the President.
the budget request for all intelligence activities
of each component that predominantly
Section 309 directs the heads of the DNI, CIA,
supports departmental missions in the
DIA, NSA, NRO, and NGA to undergo full
Homeland Security Intelligence Program.
financial audits beginning with FY2014 financial
statements.
Several provisions have to do with retention of
data on U.S. persons, and intelligence related
Section 314 directs the DNI to merge the
relationships with Ukraine, the Russian
Foreign Counterintelligence Program into the
Federation and North Korea.
General Defense Intelligence Program.
Section 321 requires that the Attorney General
provide the congressional intelligence committees
a listing of every opinion of the Office of Legal
Counsel that has been provided to an element of
the IC, whether classified or unclassified.
IV. Matters
Subtitles A and B change the appointment
Relating to
process for four key individuals, the Directors of
Elements of the
NSA and NRO and the Inspectors General of
IC
each agency, making all four presidential
appointments with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
V. Security
Section 501 requires continuous monitoring to
Clearance
determine eligibility for access to classified
Reform
information.
Section 504 requires the DNI to report to
Congress each year, through 2017, on the
reciprocal treatment of security clearances.
VI. Intelligence
Section 601 creates a new Section 2303A of Title
Community
5 of the United States Code, modeled on
Whistleblower
protections for FBI employees.
Protections
Committee
Contractor Responsibility Watch List
FIX-ITT (Financial Exchange and Intelligence
Report Language
Integration)
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Intelligence Authorization Legislation for FY2014 and 2015: Provisions and Status
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
IAAs for FY2014 and FY2015: Selected Legislative Provisions .................................................... 6
IAA for FY2014 (P.L. 113-126) ................................................................................................ 7
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) .............................................. 7
Functional Managers ........................................................................................................... 8
Financial Auditability .......................................................................................................... 9
Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP) Merged Into General Defense
Intelligence Program (GDIP) ......................................................................................... 10
Enhanced Oversight Measures .......................................................................................... 10
Insider Threats ................................................................................................................... 12
Security Clearance Reciprocity ......................................................................................... 14
Whistleblower Protections ................................................................................................ 15
Contractor Responsibility Watch List ............................................................................... 16
The House IAA for FY2014-2015 (H.R. 4681): Passed in the House..................................... 17
NSA/IG’s General Counsel ............................................................................................... 17
The Senate IAA for FY2015 (S. 2741): What’s New? ............................................................ 17
The Homeland Security Intelligence Program .................................................................. 17
Data on U.S. Persons ......................................................................................................... 18
Regional Issues .................................................................................................................. 18
FIX-ITT (Financial Exchange and Intelligence Integration) ............................................. 19
Figures
Figure A-1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence........................................................... 22
Tables
Table 1. Intelligence Authorizations, FY2000-FY2015 ................................................................... 5
Table 2. Intelligence Authorization Legislation, 113th Congress .................................................... 7
Table A-1. National and Military Intelligence Programs (NIP and MIP) ...................................... 26
Table A-2. Intelligence Community Components: NIP and MIP Funding Sources....................... 27
Appendixes
Appendix. Intelligence Community: In Brief ................................................................................ 20
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 27
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Intelligence Authorization Legislation for FY2014 and 2015: Provisions and Status
Congressional Research Service
Intelligence Authorization Legislation for FY2014 and 2015: Provisions and Status
Introduction
Permanent, continuing, day-to-day oversight of the U.S. intelligence community (IC) by the two
congressional intelligence committees will soon mark its 40th anniversary. The IC’s missions,
responsibilities, capabilities, size, and management have experienced dramatic changes over the
past four decades. The congressional oversight committees have played a significant role in
shaping these changes and continue to do so, particularly through their annual intelligence
authorization bills.
In recent years the IC has initiated a transformation from the agency-centric practices of the past
to an “intelligence enterprise”1established on a collaborative foundation of shared services,
mission-centric operations, and integrated mission management to confront its ever growing list
of challenges. The recently released National Intelligence Strategy 2014 lays out the strategic
environment and identifies the scale of what James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), terms the “pervasive and emerging threats:”2
While key nation states such as China, Russia, North Korea and Iran will continue to
challenge U.S. interests, global power is also becoming more diffuse. New alignments and
informal networks, outside of traditional power blocs and national governments, will
increasingly have significant impact in global affairs. Competition for scarce resources such
as food, water and energy is growing in importance as an intelligence issue as that
competition exacerbates instability, and the constant advancements and globalization of
technology will bring both benefits and challenges.
The challenge for this and future Congresses is to help shape intelligence priorities while a more
integrated IC adjusts to new budget realities. Congress has an important role in the oversight of
the agencies responsible for dealing with this altered intelligence environment, and the annual
authorization process represents one of the most important opportunities to exercise this role.
Intelligence authorization legislation does not guarantee effective interagency intelligence efforts,
but proponents of the oversight process maintain that authorization acts are the best lever that
Congress has to address the interagency effort.
Background
The “congressional intelligence committees,” as defined in 50 U.S.C. §401a (6), consist of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI). The intelligence committees were created in the 1970s to conduct
continuous and “vigilant legislative oversight” over the IC to assure (1) “that the appropriate
departments and agencies of the United States provide informed and timely intelligence necessary
for the executive and legislative branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and vital
1A term in vogue since 2010—associated with, and frequently used by, DNI James Clapper in reference to the IC. See
Tom Shorrock, “Clapper: Managing the Intelligence Enterprise,” Foreign Policy In Focus, (June 18, 2010), at
http://fpif.org/clapper_managing_the_intelligence_enterprise/. See also ODNI, National Intelligence Strategy 2014, p.
16, at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf.
2 ODNI, “DNI Unveils 2014 National Intelligence Strategy,” ODNI News Release No. 40-14, September 18, 2014, at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf.
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interests of the Nation,” and (2) “that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and
laws of the United States.”3 They operate behind closed doors, for the most part, overseeing the
most secret aspects of the U.S. government. The two intelligence committees are the repositories
of most intelligence shared with the Congress. Their secure office and hearing room spaces are
guarded around the clock by Capitol Hill police.4
One of the few windows into the activities of the two intelligence committees is their
authorization legislation and the committee reports that accompany them.5 They produce (but
don’t always pass) annual legislation that guides the activities of all seventeen U.S. intelligence
components—providing authorization for critical national security functions. All authorization
bills are important resource documents in terms of both money and manpower and the
intelligence bills are particularly important in this regard. (See the Appendix for an intelligence
framework that includes a list of IC components.)
Separate and distinct from one another, the authorization and appropriations processes determine
budget authority for agencies and programs. The authorization committees establish the necessity,
legitimacy, and intent of agencies and programs. In doing so, authorization is an oversight
function, communicating general guidance, leadership, priorities and providing legislation and
direction to agencies.
Appropriations committees determine funding levels for policies and programs previously
authorized. For the most part, the appropriations process provides specific details within the
general guidance and limitations given by authorizations. Cutting funds, adding funds, or
attaching provisions to funding are powerful ways to influence policy decisions. The funding
associated with intelligence is significant. For FY2014 alone, the aggregate amount (base and
supplemental) appropriated to the national and military intelligence programs totaled $67.9
billion.6
The complexity and range of activities the intelligence authorizing committees oversee covers a
wide range. According to a recent House Intelligence Committee report, current legislation:7
provides authorization for critical national security functions, including: CIA personnel and
their activities worldwide; tactical intelligence support to combat units in Afghanistan;
NSA’s electronic surveillance and cyber defense; global monitoring of foreign militaries,
weapons tests, and arms control treaties, including use of satellites and radars; real-time
analysis and reporting on political and economic events, such as current events in the Middle
3 S.Res. 400 §A.
4 These secure spaces are known as Secure Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs).
5 Other windows into committee operations include occasional open hearings such as the annual threat briefing by the
Director of National Intelligence, reports of committee investigations, and so on. See committee websites:
http://intelligence.house.gov and http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/.
6 For FY2014, the aggregate amount (base and supplemental) appropriated to the national and military intelligence
programs totaled $67.9 billion. (NIP $50.5 billion, MIP $17.4B billion) See Office of the DNI, “DNI Releases Budget
Figure for FY2014 National Intelligence Program,” News Release No. 43-14, October 30, 2014, at
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/. See also Department of Defense, “DOD Releases Military
Intelligence Program (MIP) Appropriated Top Line Budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014,” Release No: NR-550-14,
October 30, 2014, at http://www.defense.gov/releases/. See also CRS Report R42061, Intelligence Spending and
Appropriations: Issues for Congress, by Marshall C. Erwin and Amy Belasco.
7 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015,
report to accompany H.R. 4681, 113th Congress, 2d sess., H.Rept. 113-463, (Washington DC: GPO, 2014), p. 17.
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East and Eastern Europe; and research and technology to maintain the country’s
technological edge.
The authorizing legislation passed by the intelligence committees has particular power with the
IC agencies because the respective rules that established the intelligence committees provided
that, “no funds would be expended by national intelligence agencies unless such funds shall have
been previously authorized by a bill or joint resolution passed by the Senate [House] during the
same or preceding fiscal year to carry out such activity for such fiscal year.”8 In 1985, Section
504 of the National Security Act was tightened to require that appropriated funds available to an
intelligence agency could be obligated or expended for an intelligence or intelligence-related
activity only if “those funds were specifically authorized by the Congress for use for such
activities.”9 If and when intelligence authorization bills fail to pass, the IC relies on language in
appropriation bills that both authorizes and appropriates funds, until such time as an authorization
bill is passed.10
In terms of process, each year the House and Senate intelligence committees produce their
respective versions of the Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA). Each committee produces an
unclassified bill, an unclassified report, and a classified “Schedule of Authorizations” (also
known as the “Classified Annex,” or simply “the Annex”) that provide detailed guidance to the
nation’s intelligence agencies. The Annex contains a schedule of authorization budget numbers as
well as committee guidance and requirements that directly pertain to the classified material and
cannot be disclosed publicly.11 Committee reports state that the Annex “is incorporated by
reference in the Act and has the legal status of public law.”12 Both intelligence committees make
the Annex available for review by Members of their respective chambers, subject to appropriate
8 S.Res. 400, §12; H.Res. 658, §11(I). (Both resolutions provided an exception for continuing appropriations bills or
resolutions.) The extra power is because most agencies in the executive branch spend appropriated money free of the
restrictions imposed by Section 504. There is no statutory reason to prohibit them from spending appropriated funds—
especially if authorizing committees failed to pass authorization bills. See CRS Report R42098, Authorization of
Appropriations: Procedural and Legal Issues, by Jessica Tollestrup and Brian T. Yeh. The IC is careful to spend
money only if it both authorized and appropriated. See Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 4th Edition,
(Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), p. 7-8.
9 50 U.S.C. § 414(a)(1). The requirement for “specific authorization” was added to the National Security Act by the
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1986 (P.L. 99-169), §401(a). The report accompanying the House version of H.R.
2419 (which became P.L. 99-169) stated that “Specifically authorized is defined to mean that the activity and the
amounts to be spent for that activity have been identified in a formal budget request to the Congress and that Congress
has either authorized those funds to be appropriated and they have been appropriated, or, whether or not the funds have
been requested, the Congress has specifically authorized a particular activity, and authorized and appropriated funds for
that activity.” U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1986, Report to accompany H.R. 2419, 99th Congress, 1st sess., H.Rept. 99-106, Part 1, (Washington DC:
GPO, May 15, 1985), p. 8. A concern existed at the time that funds had been used by the Reagan Administration for
intelligence activities in Central America without appropriate congressional support or even awareness.
10 See, for example, language in P.L. 110-116: “SEC. 8084. Funds appropriated by this Act, or made available by the
transfer of funds in this Act, for intelligence activities are deemed to be specifically authorized by the Congress for
purposes of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. §414) during fiscal year 2008 until the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008.”
11 H.Rept. 113-463, p. 18.
12 See for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2015, report to accompany S. 2741, 113th Congress, 2nd sess., S.Rept. 113-233, (Washington DC: GPO, July 31,
2014), p. 1. There are many other important provisions included in the Classified Annex that accompanies the
intelligence legislation. Those provisions are not included in this report but are available for review by Members of
Congress in intelligence committee spaces.
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disclosure restrictions.13 Following passage of these bills,14 a conference committee is usually
convened to resolve the various differences between the House and Senate versions.
Despite the requirement for both an authorization and matching appropriation, in the years
following the 9/11 attacks the intelligence committees have sometimes found it difficult to
reconcile philosophical differences over important issues.15 In some years, IAAs failed to pass
one or both chambers before the beginning of the fiscal years they represented, were never passed
by one or both chambers, or were vetoed by the President. Table 1 illustrates this difficulty. The
table summarizes the legislation associated with the annual intelligence authorization bill over the
past fifteen years. IAAs for eight fiscal years (2000-05, 2012-13) were signed by the President
three months into the respective fiscal year. Three intelligence bills were never sent to the
President for signature (2006, 2007, and 2009) and two were vetoed (2001 and 2008). The IAA
for FY2010 was passed in October 2010, a week after FY2010 was over. The IAAs for FY2011
and FY2014 were passed just a few months prior to the end of their respective fiscal years.
According to media and academic accounts, and statements by Members16 in committee reports,
the reputations of the intelligence committees suffered during the six-year period when no
intelligence bills were passed.17 One year is not really a problem because many activities are
authorized on a semi-permanent basis and do not need to be reauthorized each fiscal year. The
absence of an authorization bill in a particular fiscal year does not mean that ongoing programs
cease to be authorized. Authorization bills may enact far reaching provisions that are essentially
timeless—reporting requirements that recur each year until repealed or suspended by another
authorization bill. In this case, however, no intelligence legislation was signed into law for six
years (December 2004 to October 2010, see Table 1).
During the years when there were no authorization bills, the appropriation committees had the de
facto ability to both authorize and appropriate. In addition, other authorizing committees with
intelligence-related oversight responsibilities began reestablishing their prerogatives in regard to
IC activities that fell into their areas of jurisdiction.18 Beginning in 2009, Intelligence Committee
leaders in both parties have dedicated themselves to getting intelligence authorization bills passed
on an annual basis. The combined efforts of SSCI Chairwoman Feinstein and HPSCI Chairman
Rogers have been particularly effective.19 Table 1 illustrates the fact that there has been an
13 See remarks by Rep. Michael Rogers, Congressional Record, November 21, 2013, p. H7335.
14 Per S.Res. 400 §3(b)(1), and by convention, the Senate’s version of the IAA is sequentially referred to the Senate
Armed Services Committee before it is voted on in the Senate.
15 For details, see CRS Report R40240, Intelligence Authorization Legislation: Status and Challenges, by Marshall C.
Erwin.
16 U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014, report to accompany H.R. 3381, 113th Congress, 1st sess., H.Rept. 113-277, (Washington DC: GPO, November
25, 2013), “Committee Statement and Views,” on p. 8, “For too many years, intelligence authorization negotiations
were the victim of partisan infighting and turf battles.”
17 See for example, Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber, Transforming U.S. Intelligence, (Washington DC: Georgetown
University Press, 200C). p. 245.
18 Other committees with jurisdictional claims to legislative engagement with the IC include the House and Senate
Armed Services, Appropriations, Judiciary, Homeland Security, Foreign Affairs/Foreign Relations, and Government
Reform/Operations committees.
19Senator Feinstein assumed chairmanship of the SSCI in January 2009 and Representative Rogers assumed HPSCI
chairmanship in 2011. For an example of their bipartisan/bicameral approach to intelligence oversight, see “Leaders of
Senate and House Intelligence Committees Praise Passage of 29th Intelligence Authorization Bill,” SSCI Press Release,
December 14th, 2011, at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=335622.
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intelligence bill every year since FY2010, although in several cases there have been considerable
lag times between the beginning of the fiscal year and bill passage. They have been successful in
getting IAAs passed in both chambers and signed by the President for every fiscal year since
2010. The IAA for FY2014 was signed into law on July 7, 2014. The IAA for FY2015 (S. 2741)
is currently on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders, No. 519.
Table 1. Intelligence Authorizations, FY2000-FY2015
FY Began
Presidential
Congress
Fiscal Year
House Bill
Senate Bill
(October)
Action Public
Law
106
2000
H.R. 1555
S. 1009
1999
12/3/1999
P.L. 106-120
106
2001
H.R. 4392
S. 2507
2000
11/13/2000
—
Vetoeda
106
2001
H.R. 5630
H.R. 5630
2000 12/27/2000
P.L.
106-567
Senate Passed
107
2002
H.R. 2883
S. 1428
2001
12/28/2001
P.L. 107-108
107
2003
H.R. 4628
S. 2506
2002
11/27/2002
P.L. 107-306
108
2004
H.R. 2417
S. 1025
2003
12/13/2003
P.L. 108-177
108
2005
H.R. 4548
S. 2386
2004
12/23/2004
P.L. 108-487
109
2006
H.R. 2475
S. 1803 Not
2005 Not
Requested —
Passed
109 2007
H.R.
5020
S. 3237 Not
2006 Not
Requested —
Not Passed
Passed
110
2007
H.R. 1196
S. 372
2006
Not Requested
—
110
2008
H.R. 2082
S. 1538
2007
3/8/2008
—
Vetoedb
110
2009
H.R. 5959
S. 2996 Not
2008 Not
Requested —
Passed
111
2010
H.R. 2701
S. 1494
2009
10/7/2010
P.L. 111-259
111
2011
H.R. 5161
S. 3611
—
—
—
112
2011
H.R. 754
S. 719
2010
6/8/2011
P.L. 112-18
112
2012
H.R. 1892
S. 1458
2011
1/3/2012
P.L. 112-97
112
2013
H.R. 5743
S. 3454
2012
1/14/2013
P.L. 112-277
113
2014
H.R. 3381
S. 1681
2013
7/7/2014
P.L. 113-126
113 2014-15
H.R.
4681 —
— — —
House Passed
113 2015
H.R.
4661 S. 2741
2014 Pending Pending
Introducedc
Pending
Source: CRS
Notes:
a. Veto message: Congressional Record-House, November 13, 2000, pp H11852-11853. Objectionable provision
removed, IAA for FY2001 passed by both chambers in December 2000.
b. Vote on March 11, 2008 to override the veto failed.
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c. H.R. 4661 was introduced as the IAA for FY2015 but never reported out of committee. H.R. 4681, an IAA
for FY2014 and FY2015, was subsequently introduced, reported and passed by the House. The Senate is
currently considering an IAA for FY2015. If passed it will be referred to the House for consideration. See Table
2 for further clarification.
IAAs for FY2014 and FY2015: Selected Legislative
Provisions
The Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 (P.L. 113-126) was passed
July 7, 2014. An IAA for FY2015 is pending. Understanding what has happened when in terms of
the IAAs for FY2014 and FY2015 is difficult because of sequencing issues and bill titles. Table 2
provides an overview of the intelligence legislation considered in the 113th Congress, with
accompanying reports and the dates of major actions. The following timeline may also be helpful:
• October 1, 2013: Fiscal Year 2014 began.
• November 12, 2013: The SSCI reported an IAA for FY2014 (S. 1681) out of committee
to the Senate, accompanied a day later by S.Rept. 113-120.
• November 25, 2013: The HPSCI reported an IAA for FY2014 (H.R. 3381) out of
committee to the House, accompanied by H.Rept. 113-277.
• May 15, 2014: The HPSCI introduced an IAA for FY2015 (H.R. 4661)
• May 20, 2014: The HPSCI introduced an IAA for both FY2014 and FY2015 (H.R. 4681).
• May 27, 2014: The HPSCI reported an IAA for FY2014 and FY2015 (H.R. 4681) to the
House, accompanied later by H.Rept. 113-463.
• May 30, 2014: The IAA for FY2014 and FY2015 (H.R. 4681) was passed by the House
and sent to the Senate for consideration.
• June 11 2014: Instead of considering H.R. 4681, the Senate passed the IAA for FY2014
(S. 1681) and sent it to the House.
• June 24, 2014: The House passed the IAA for FY2014 (S. 1681)
• July 7, 2014: The IAA for FY2014 (S. 1681) became P.L. 113-126.
• July 31, 2014: The SSCI reported an IAA for 2015 (S. 2741) to the Senate, accompanied
by S.Rept. 113-233. It has been placed on the Senate Calendar but not yet discussed on
the Senate.
• October 1, 2014: Fiscal Year 2015 began.
Passage of H.R. 4681 in the House in May authorized intelligence activities for FY2015. If S.
2741 passes the Senate, it will be sent to the House for consideration and a vote. Many House and
Senate differences have already been resolved in hopes of a smooth passage in both chambers.
This section examines selected provisions included in the IAA for FY2014 (P.L. 113-126), the
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House IAA for FY2014 and FY2015 (H.R. 4681), and the Senate’s pending version of the IAA
for FY2015 (S. 2741).
Table 2. Intelligence Authorization Legislation, 113th Congress
Congress Fiscal
House Bill
Senate Bill
Fiscal
Date
Public Law
Year
Year
Signed
Began
113
2014
H.R. 3381 H.Rept. 113-
S. 1681 S.Rept. 113-
Oct 2013
7/7/2014
P.L. 113-126
277 (Reported to House
120 (Reported to S.
11/25/2013) S.1681
11/12/2013; Passed in
passed in House
Senate 06/11/2014)
06/24/2014
113 2014
H.R. 4681 H.Rept. 113-
-- --
--
--
-15
463 (Reported to House
05/27/2014; Passed House
5/30/2014; Referred to
Senate 06/02/2014)
113
2015
H.R. 4661 (no report,
S. 2741 S.Rept. 113-
Oct 2014
--
--
introduced in H. May
233 (Reported to
15th, 2014, not reported
Senate 07/31/2014;
out of committee.)
Placed on Calendar
No. 519)
Source: CRS.
IAA for FY2014 (P.L. 113-126)
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA)
Provisions in Section 104 authorize additional appropriations and positions for advanced research
and development to remain available through September 2015. The advanced research and
development activity refers, in part, to the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity
(IARPA), the research and development arm of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI). IARPA is the IC’s version of the DOD’s Defense Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
Both IARPA and DARPA invest in high-risk, high-payoff research programs to tackle some of the
most difficult challenges of the agencies and disciplines in the defense establishment.20 According
to its Director, IARPA sees itself as “an agency that makes sure no important thing remains
undone because it doesn’t fit somebody’s mission.”21
According to the Senate Report accompanying the legislation, the committee continues to
strongly support the mission of the IARPA. It recommends that “IARPA’s mission should remain
a priority, even during the fiscal environment when research and development investment can
come under pressure. Its mission and work should be integral to the IC R&D [Research and
Development] strategic plan.”22 The report goes on to say, “Therefore, the Committee strongly
20 For more on IARPA, go to http://www.iarpa.gov.
21 Peter Highnam, IARPA Director, “Opening Remarks,” IARPA Day, College Park Marriott & Conference Center,
Hyattsville, Maryland, October 30th, 2014.
22 S.Rept. 113-120, p. 18.
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supports full preservation of the budget request for IARPA in FY2014 and encourages robust
investment by the IC in IARPA in FY2015.”23
Functional Managers
Section 305 codifies a section24 of E.O. 12333 that pertains to the DNI and “functional
managers,” and makes several changes. Several provisions appear to be designed to make the
Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) more directly accountable to the Congress—
especially in regard to their efforts to increase efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of their
government operations—because they bring the SSCI into the appointment process for these
individuals and increase their reporting requirements.
E.O. 12333 has been the foundational document in the IC since it was signed by President Reagan
in 1981. Section 305 codifies in statute the existing requirement in E.O.12333 to designate
functional managers for signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and
geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and other intelligence disciplines. At present, the functional
managers for SIGINT, HUMINT, GEOINT, and Measurement and Signals Intelligence
(MASINT) are the Director of the NSA, the Director CIA, and the Director of the NGA, and the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) respectively.
Duties of functional managers as described in E.O. 12333 may include:25
• developing and implementing strategic guidance, policies, and procedures for
activities related to a specific intelligence discipline or set of intelligence
activities;
• setting training and tradecraft standards;
• ensuring coordination within and across intelligence disciplines and IC elements
and with related non-intelligence activities;
• advising on the management of resources; policies and procedures; collection
capabilities and gaps; processing and dissemination of intelligence; technical
architectures; and other issues or activities determined by the Director.
Section 305 also gave responsibility for designating functional managers (that is, the directors of
the CIA, NSA, NGA and DIA) to the President. Under E.O. 12333, the functional managers were
designated by the DNI. The section codifies the existing responsibilities of the functional
managers to act as the principal adviser to the DNI for their respective intelligence function and
in the same capacity for the Secretary of Defense. It also establishes a new requirement for each
functional manager to report to Congress annually on the state of their function; this report is
scheduled to occur no later than two weeks after the President’s budget submission.
The reporting requirements in Section 306 call on each functional manager to identify those
programs, projects, and activities that comprise the intelligence discipline for which they are
23 Ibid., p. 21.
24 E.O. 12333, “U.S. Intelligence Activities,” 46 Federal Register 59941, (As amended by Executive Orders 13284
(2003), 13355 (2004) and 13470 (2008)), §1.3(b)(12)
25 Ibid.
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responsible and to report on resource issues and other matters relevant to the state of the function
such as “efforts to integrate such function with other intelligence disciplines or to establish
consistency in tradecraft and training; and technology developments.” This section represents an
effort to better integrate and coordinate two “pots” of intelligence money—“national” and
“military.”26 (Table A-2 in the Appendix contains funding sources and illustrates the fact that the
Directors of DIA, NGA, NRO and NSA manage several types of intelligence money.)
Financial Auditability
Section 309 directs the DNI and the Directors of the, CIA, DIA, NSA, National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO), and NGA to undergo full financial audits beginning with FY2014 financial
statements. Some background is useful on this provision because there is a very long history of
presidential and congressional oversight efforts to force the IC into compliance with federal
financial accounting standards. IAAs and committee reports have contained a multitude of
provisions along these lines since at least FY2002. The Senate Report accompanying the IAA for
FY2002 called for the financial statements of the NRO, NSA, CIA, DIA, and what is now the
NGA to be audited by a statutory Inspector General (IG) or independent public accounting firm
by March 1, 2005.27 In the Senate Report accompanying its IAA for FY2010, the SSCI noted the
following IC response:
The bottom line is that more than ten years after the President called for action, and more
than four years after the Committee anticipated receiving auditable statements, the five
agencies are still unable either to produce auditable financial statements or receive favorable
audit opinions on those that are auditable. The current projection for doing so is at least four
years away.28
The Senate Report goes on to urge the IC to get its accounts auditable and to establish an IC-wide
business enterprise architecture (BEA) and a consolidated financial statement for the National
Intelligence Program:
Accordingly, the April 2007 plan has now been superseded by the imperative to construct a
BEA, which makes the 2012 auditability timeline difficult or impossible to achieve for most
agencies. Nonetheless, the Committee strongly supports this BEA work, which, if successful,
will provide a stronger foundation for sustainable, financial auditability. Indeed, the
Committee has repeatedly called for a BEA over the last four years. Section 322 of this bill is
designed to empower the DNI’s fledgling BTO to produce this business systems architecture.
Finally, the Committee believes that both the Congress and the DNI would benefit from the
creation of a consolidated National Intelligence Program financial statement. Such a
statement would provide valuable macro-level data and, once established, offer insight into
financial trends within the Intelligence Community.29
26 For more on IC budget categories, see Appendix.
27 S.Rept. 107-63.
28 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Report
to accompany S. 1494, 111th Cong., 1st sess., July 21, 2009, S.Rept. 111-55, pp. 57-58.
29 Ibid. Provisions in the IAA for FY2010 amend 50 U.S. Code to include §3100 “Intelligence Community business
system transformation.”
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Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP) Merged Into General Defense
Intelligence Program (GDIP)
Section 314 directs the DNI to merge the Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP) into the
(GDIP). The Director of DIA is program manager for both programs. The FCIP designation was
an accounting tool to track money used solely for counter intelligence purposes. The GDIP and
other IC budget programs are included in the Appendix.
Enhanced Oversight Measures
Legal Opinions
Section 321 of the IAA for FY2014 focuses on the opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) in the Department of Justice (DOJ) concerning intelligence activities. The provision is
designed to increase the Committees’ ability to understand and question the legal reasoning
behind OLC opinions relevant to the Committees’ oversight functions. This section requires the
Attorney General to provide a listing of every opinion of the OLC that has been provided to an
element of the IC, whether classified or unclassified. Provisions were made for information
associated with covert action “findings”30 and information subject to “executive privilege.” The
Senate report explains these provisions in the following manner:31
While the Committee generally is kept apprised of the legal basis for U.S. intelligence
activities, as required by Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, neither
the Department nor the IC routinely advises the Committee of the existence of OLC opinions
that are relevant to the Committee’s oversight functions. This presents an impediment to the
Committee’s oversight function, as the Committee cannot request access to legal analysis
when it is not made aware that such analysis exists. Section 321 would ensure that the
Committee is aware of the existence of relevant OLC opinions so that it can obtain access to
the legal analysis set forth in these opinions through a process of accommodation with the
Executive branch.
Appointments
Title IV of P.L. 113-126 changes the appointment process for four key individuals, the Directors
of NSA and NRO and the Inspectors General (IGs) of these two agencies, making all four
presidential appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate.32 This is different from
30 “Finding” is a term that refers the requirement that a president put in writing when he or she determines that a covert
action is “important to national security.” The requirement goes back to December 1974, when Congress passed the
“Hughes-Ryan Amendment” to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, formalizing the regulation of covert actions,
primarily in reaction to President Nixon’s covert bombings in Cambodia. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment required that
any covert action be supported by a Presidential finding that the action was “important to the national security” and that
the President report “in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such [actions] to the appropriate committees of the
Congress—House and Senate Foreign Relations, House and Senate Armed Services and House and Senate
Appropriations.” (This grew to eight committees after the House and Senate intelligence committees were established.)
See P.L. 93-559, §659 “Limitation on Intelligence Activities,” December 30, 1974, enacting 22 U.S.C. § 2422. See also
William E. Conner, “Congressional Reform of Covert Action Oversight Following the Iran-Contra Affair,” Defense
Intelligence Journal 2 (1993), pp. 35, 41
31 S.Rept. 113-120, p. 7.
32 See also the Senate version of the IAA for FY2010 §432.
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provisions in E.O. 12333. In that document, the “relevant department or bureau head shall
provide recommendations and obtain the concurrence of the DNI” for the selection of most of the
IC agency directors33 with certain DOD exceptions.34
These appointment process provisions allow the Senate Intelligence Committee to take a more
active part in the selection of these four key individuals than it has in the past.35 The desire for a
greater role in the confirmation process for the Director of NSA has been fueled in the past year
by the numerous hearings concerning NSA surveillance procedures and privacy protections.
Confirmation of the NRO Director has been fueled by concerns associated with acquisition of
complex, expensive programs.36 Attention to the IGs of the NSA and NRO follow a similar
rationale.
IGs are an independent oversight tool throughout American government.37 The Inspector General
Act of 1978 (P.L 95-452) established a government-wide system of IGs, some appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate and others administratively appointed by the
heads of their respective Federal entities.38 IGs are authorized to ‘‘conduct and supervise audits
and investigations relating to the programs and operations’’ of the government and ‘‘to promote
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and ... to prevent and detect fraud
and abuse in, such programs and operations.”39 They also perform an important reporting function
by, ‘‘keeping the head of the establishment and the Congress fully and currently informed about
problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of ... programs and operations and the
necessity for and progress of corrective action.”40
Traditionally, the issue of IGs in the IC has focused on how independent from an agency director
they can and should be. Concerns have been raised over whether an overzealous IG might pose a
threat to agency operations.41 For example, while the CIA has had an Inspector General (IG) since
1952, it was only in 1989 that Congress enacted legislation mandating an “independent” IG at
33 E.O. 12333, §1.3 (d) Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office,
the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence
and Analysis, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the Director of the Office of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of the Treasury, and the Executive Assistant Director for the National Security Branch of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
34 Ibid., the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)); the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA); uniformed heads of the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps above
the rank of Major General or Rear Admiral; the Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for Intelligence; and the
Assistant Attorney General for National Security.
35 For a complete list of the positions over which the SSCI has exercised jurisdiction, see CRS Report RL30959,
Presidential Appointee Positions Requiring Senate Confirmation and Committees Handling Nominations, by
Christopher M. Davis and Jerry W. Mansfield.
36 E.O. 12333, §1.3 (d), pp. 9-10.
37 See CRS Report R43722, Offices of Inspectors General and Law Enforcement Authority: In Brief, by Wendy
Ginsberg.
38 See §8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, for those IGs who are administratively appointed,
generally for reasons associated with protecting national security.
39 Ibid., §2(1-3).
40 Ibid.
41 See Britt Snider, “Creating a Statutory IG at the CIA,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol . 44, no 5, (August 3rd, 2011), p. 1,
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no5/html/v44i5a02p.htm.
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CIA, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Before that, CIA IGs
were appointed by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.42
The IAA for FY2014 called for a completely independent ODNI IG appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to report directly to the DNI. To enhance the IG’s
independence within the ODNI, the IG may be removed only by the President, who must
communicate the reasons for the removal to the congressional intelligence committees.43 The IGs
of the CIA and Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the
Treasury are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.44 The IAA for
FY2014 extended this list to include the IGs at the NSA and NRO.
S.Res. 47045 was passed by the Senate on July 7, 2014 (in conjunction with the IAA for FY2014)
to amend the Committee’s charter legislation46 and implement these new appointment provisions.
The procedures in the Senate resolution point out the SSCI’s shared jurisdiction with other IC
oversight committees:
1) Assistant Attorney General for National Security: referred to the Judiciary Committee
and, if and when reported, to the SSCI. (This person heads the National Security Branch, an
FBI component of the IC.)
2) NSA Director, NSA/IG, NRO Director and NRO/IG:
a) If military and on active duty—referred to the SASC and, if and when reported, to the
SSCI.
b) If civilian—referred to the SSCI and, if and when reported, to the SASC.
Notice that in each case, only the primary committee with jurisdiction has the right of
refusal. The nomination proceeds forward, via the mechanism of sequential referral, only if
the primary committee reports it out of committee. If the secondary committee fails to report
the nomination after a specified time, the nomination is automatically discharged and placed
on the Senate’s Executive Calendar. In its report, the SSCI notes that it believes Senate
confirmation of these four positions will improve oversight and accountability and,
ultimately, the effectiveness of the agencies in question.
Insider Threats
Title V of P.L. 113-126 contains a number of provisions designed to improve security. Several
address the “insider threat problem” and speak to recommendations made by a presidential group
established to review intelligence and communications technologies. The insider threat problem
refers to efforts by individuals who work within the IC to purposefully leak classified data and
42 Ibid. See also 50 U.S.C. §403(q) and CIA Act of 1949 §17. The Director of the CIA was also the Director of Central
Intelligence at this time. For more, see Appendix.
43 S.Rept. 111-55, p. 32.
44 Ibid, p. 40.
45 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, S.Res. 470 - A resolution amending Senate Resolution 400
(94th Congress) to clarify the responsibility of committees of the Senate in the provision of the advice and consent of
the Senate to nominations to positions in the intelligence community, 113th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington DC: GPO,
July 7, 2014).
46 S.Res. 400
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sabotage networks. The problem assumed critical proportions in 2013, when Edward Snowden, a
contractor working inside NSA, released thousands of classified documents to the British
newspaper The Guardian. The Snowden leaks came on the heels of Army Private Manning’s
2010 release of thousands of classified documents to WikiLeaks.
In a short period of time, stealing secrets has gone from the laborious task of copying papers
taken surreptitiously from filing cabinets to the current age in which files can be
electronically copied onto thumb drives. Manning was said to have disguised his efforts by
downloading secrets onto compact discs made to look like pop music recordings.47
A presidential group headed by Richard Clarke issued a final report known by many as the Clarke
Report.48 Section 501, for example, reflects the Clarke Report’s recommendation (#38) to
establish a personnel continuous monitoring program for those with classified information access.
The HPSCI report language says ‘‘the IC might have caught Snowden sooner if it had
continuously evaluated the backgrounds of employees and contractors and if IC elements had
more effectively shared potentially derogatory information about employees and contractors with
each other.”49 According to the HPSCI, continuous evaluation “allows the IC to take advantage of
lawfully available and public information to detect warning signals that the current system of 5
year periodic investigation misses.”50
The insider threat problem is discussed in some detail in the SSCI Report. It notes that “initiatives
have been underway for years to deal with such contingencies, most recently the President’s
National Insider Threat Policy, signed in November 2012. However, the Committee is concerned
that this policy has not been fully implemented across the IC. The Committee supports
substantially enhancing and expediting efforts to deter the insider threat.”51
Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE)
In relation to protections against insider threats, the Senate report makes reference to the IC’s
information technology (IT) modernization effort—the IC Information Technology Enterprise (IC
ITE, pronounced “eyesight”)—and says that it “must provide the infrastructure to detect insider
threats earlier and more effectively. Robust counterintelligence data and analytic tools to monitor,
analyze and audit personnel behavior will be critical to this endeavor.”52 By way of explanation,
the goal of IC ITE is a secure and trusted IT environment. IC ITE services focus on providing a
common IC desktop, secure online collaboration tools, and secure common cloud architectures. If
all goes as planned, IC ITE will help the IC to pool IT resources, cut costs, increase data storage
capabilities, increase mission agility and efficiency and increase the ability to protect data.
47 Noah Bierman and Bryan Bender, “Leaks show U.S. intelligence vulnerability,” The Boston Globe, June 11, 2013, at
http:www.bostonglobe.com.
48 Richard A. Clarke et al, Report and Recommendations of The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies, (The White House: December 12, 2013), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf. See recommendations #37-#44.
49 H.Rept. 113-463, p. 18.
50 Ibid.
51 S.Rept. 113-120, p. 17.
52 Ibid.
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Security Clearance Reciprocity
In terms of the clearance process, provisions address the time and money associated with the
security investigation and adjudication process, and reciprocity of clearances between agencies.
Security clearance reciprocity refers to ongoing efforts to have “all security clearance background
investigations and determinations completed by an authorized investigative agency or authorized
adjudication agency ... accepted by all agencies.”53 Reports by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) and ODNI offer analysis which suggests that agencies may be reluctant to accept
the background investigations or security clearance determinations made by other agencies.54
The Senate Report accompanying S.1681 provides background information to clarify some of the
provisions associated with reciprocity—citing several problems associated with “out-of-scope”
determinations.55 Out-of-scope refers to the fact that an individual’s background investigation for
one IC agency may not adhere to the requirements of another IC agency for a variety of possible
reasons. For example, an out-of-scope determination may depend on factors associated with the
depth and breadth of the background investigation or the lack of a particular type of polygraph
examination. It may also be based on timing issues such as the time elapsed since the individual’s
initial investigation (or periodic update), a gap in his or her agency employment, or date of his or
her last polygraph examination. If agency requirements do not match on any or all criteria, there
may be an out-of-scope determination made by security personnel that overrides the reciprocity
requirement.56
The Senate Report points out that some agencies are inconsistent when it comes to applying out-
of-scope determinations—waiving inconsistencies for its own employees but not for employees
of other agencies. It also points out what may be inefficiencies and unnecessary costs associated
with the adjudication process.
The Committee understands that some agencies have denied security clearance reciprocity
for some IC personnel where an eligibility determination is out-of-scope, even when the
agency employs personnel whose eligibility determinations also are out of scope. In addition,
the Committee understands that some agencies have delayed employment of personnel who
have been determined to be eligible for access to classified information while the agency
adjudicates their suitability for employment. The Committee believes that both of these
practices inappropriately impede the movement of cleared personnel between agencies, often
at significant cost to the government.57
53 Mandated in P.L. 108-458, § 3001(d) the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004.
54 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Security Clearance Reform—
Upgrading the Gateway to the National Security Community, 110th Congress, 2nd sess., H.Rept. 110-916, Washington
DC: GPO, November 20, 2008); Testimony of Charles B. Sowell, Deputy Assistant Director for Special Security,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, for U.S. Congress, Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs,
Security Clearance Changes, hearings, 112th Congress, 2nd sess., June 21, 2012; and U.S. Government Accountability
Office, Personnel Security Clearance, Progress Has Been Made to Improve Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is
Needed to Sustain Momentum, GAO-11-65, November 2010, p. 27.
55 S.Rept. 113-120, p. 11.
56 CRS Report R43216, Security Clearance Process: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by Michelle D.
Christensen and Frederick M. Kaiser. See also CRS Report RL31988, Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy:
Issues for Congress, by Alfred Cumming (archived).
57 S.Rept. 113-120, p. 11.
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Section 501 requires the DNI, subject to the direction of the President, to ensure that the
background of each employee or officer and contractor of the IC is monitored continuously to
determine their eligibility for access to classified information; and secondly, to require IC
elements to share potentially derogatory security information concerning any employee that may
impact the eligibility of such individuals for a security clearance.
Section 504 requires the DNI to report to Congress each year, through 2017, on the reciprocal
treatment of security clearances, including: (1) the periods of time required by authorized
adjudicative agencies for accepting background investigations and determinations completed by
an authorized investigative entity or adjudicative agency; and (2) the total number of cases in
which a background investigation or determination completed by an authorized investigative
entity or adjudicative agency is, or is not, accepted by another agency.
Whistleblower Protections
Intelligence whistleblowers are generally IC employees or contractors who want to focus
attention on possible agency wrongdoings. Such individuals can face retaliation from their
employers for their disclosures, and the fear of such retaliation may deter whistleblowing. The IC
Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) of 1998 provides a process by which employees, or
contractor employees, of the DIA, NGA, NRO, and the NSA can report matters of “urgent
concern” to the intelligence committees of Congress.58 The act was augmented by Presidential
Policy Directive 19, signed by President Obama in 2012, which required IC agencies to provide
employees with protections from retaliation.
This issue is a particular concern for the IC because it does not want individuals leaking classified
information under the guise of “whistleblowing.” On the other hand, whistleblowing is an
important element of the oversight function, in that it helps overseers to identify “urgent
concerns,” defined as follows:59
• A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive Order, or
deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operations of an intelligence
activity involving classified information, but does not include differences of
opinion concerning public policy matters;
• A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, on an
issue of material fact relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an
intelligence activity; and/or
• An action, including a personnel action described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of
Title 5, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under section 7(c) of
the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, in response to an employee
reporting an urgent concern.
58 See IC Inspector General website, at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about-this-site/no-fear-act/whistleblower-
protection-laws.
59 “ICWPA Complaints,” DOD IG website, at http://www.dodig.mil/programs/whistleblower/icwpa.html.
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When NSA contractor Edward Snowden was asked why he didn’t go to the government first, he
cited the severe retaliation that previous IC whistleblowers experienced when they worked
through institutional channels without specific rights.60
Title VI of the P.L. 113-126 provides additional protections for IC whistleblowers against
reprisals. Section 602 includes due process protections, including the right, (1) to an independent
and impartial fact-finder; (2) for notice and the opportunity to be heard, including the opportunity
to present relevant evidence, including witness testimony; (3) to be represented by counsel; (4) to
receive a decision based on the record developed; and (5) to receive a decision within 180 days,
unless the employee and the agency agree to an extension, or the impartial fact-finder determines
in writing that a greater time period is needed in the interest of fairness or national security. An
employee is permitted to appeal the agency’s decision within 60 days of receiving it. Detailed
procedures for each stage of the process are included in the bill. Some whistleblower advocates
would like to see additional protections available to IC contractors as well.61
Section 604 states that the legislation affords no protections for certain terminations of
employment, if for example, the Director or agency head determines the termination to be in the
interest of the United States, determines that the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law
that authorize the termination of the employees’ employment cannot be invoked in a manner
consistent with national security and notifies Congress within five days of the termination.
Additional information on Title VI provisions is available in CRS Report R43765, Intelligence
Whistleblower Protections: In Brief, by Rodney M. Perry.
Contractor Responsibility Watch List
There are several additional provisions in the SSCI Report that refer to activities not specifically
mentioned in the unclassified bill but nonetheless include directive language.62 For example, the
SSCI Report includes a management-focused provision designed to enhance the procurement
process with a “Contractor Responsibility Watch List.”63 The committee wants the IC to have a
better sense of whether prospective vendors are debarred, suspended or listed on the federal
governments’ System for Awards Management (SAM), a Web-based system maintained by the
General Services Administration (GSA). The report cites the following concerns.64
[T]he IC does not have an IC-wide mechanism for identifying and tracking exploitative,
unscrupulous, suspended or debarred contractors to ensure the Community deals only with
vendors who are responsible in fulfilling their legal and contractual obligations. It is through
the sharing of such information that the IC can make informed decisions, ensure the
Community conducts business only with responsible contractors, prevent suspended and
60 Suzanna Andrews, et al., “The Snowden Saga: A Shadowland of Secrets and Light,” Vanity Fair, (May 2014): pp. 4-
5, at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2014/05/edward-snowden-politics-interview#.
61 See for example, Charles S. Cook, “Intel Contractors’ Whistleblower Rights are a work in Progress, Government
Executive,” August 30th, 2013, at http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2013/08/intel-contractors-whistleblower-rights-
are-work-progress/69026/.
62 While not in the legislation, as report language accompanying the bill, the Committee will expect the IC to comply.
Reports are written by staff and are directed to Members and staff outside the Committee to help everyone understand
committee actions and intentions. Congressional intent is clear and though nonbinding, most executive branch officials
agree that ignoring such provisions can be perilous.
63 S.Rept. 113-120, p. 16.
64 Ibid.
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debarred contractors from initiating or repeating business throughout the IC, and avoid
misuse or loss of potentially billions of dollars of taxpayer money.
The House IAA for FY2014-2015 (H.R. 4681): Passed in the House
On May 20, 2014, the House Intelligence Committee introduced The Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and 2015 (H.R. 4681, accompanied later by H.Rept. 113-463). On May
30, after several days of debate on the House floor, H.R. 4681 was passed by a vote of 345 to 5965
and sent to the Senate for consideration. Although this proposed legislation was not passed by the
Senate, it is worth noting a section built on FY2014 legislation that may end up in a final version
of FY2015 legislation.
NSA/IG’s General Counsel
Title IV of the IAA for FY2014 (passed in July 2014 as P.L. 113-126) made the NSA/IG subject
to the SSCI’s advice and consent. In this legislation, Title IV of H.R. 4681 proposed establishing
a General Counsel to the NSA IG, to be appointed by the NSA IG.
The proposed legislation requires and/or authorizes the General Counsel to do a number of things
(subject to various restrictions) to include the following.
• Prescribe professional rules of ethics and responsibilities for employees, officers,
and contractors of the NSA Inspector General.
• Subpoena the attendance and testimony of former NSA employees or NSA
contractors, former contractors, or former detailees.
• Report instances in which the DOD Secretary prohibited an audit or
investigation.
The Senate IAA for FY2015 (S. 2741): What’s New?
The Homeland Security Intelligence Program
Title III Section 314 is significant from an oversight perspective because it addresses shared
jurisdiction between the Intelligence and Homeland Security Committees. It directs the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
(USDHS/I&A) to report to Congress regarding: (1) the intelligence activity of DHS intelligence
components each fiscal year, (2) the advisability of including the budget request for all
intelligence activities of each component that predominantly supports departmental missions in
the Homeland Security Intelligence Program, and (3) a plan to enhance the coordination of
department-wide intelligence activities to achieve greater efficiencies in the performance of DHS
intelligence functions.
65 Roll no. 271.
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By way of explanation, DHS/I&A is an element of the IC and is funded with National
Intelligence Program (NIP) dollars.66 However, DHS has other intelligence activities that are
funded entirely with DHS money. Those activities support the DHS mission, as opposed to an IC-
wide mission (intelligence for the use of Customs only, for example). This DHS-only intelligence
money is called the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP). Because it is not part of the
NIP, it does not belong to the DNI; it belongs instead to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The
Department of Homeland Security is overseen by the Homeland Security Committees. This is a
case of shared jurisdiction over intelligence-related activities. For more on IC budget programs,
see the IC budget section in the Appendix.
Data on U.S. Persons
Section 306 deals with how long data on U.S. persons is retained if it is acquired without a court
order or without consent. (It does not apply if the data was acquired with a court order and with
consent.) It requires all IC elements to adopt Attorney General-approved procedures to prohibit
retention for a period in excess of five years of nonpublic telephone or electronic communications
to or from a U.S. person that are acquired without a court order and without the consent of a
person who is a party to the communication (including communications in electronic storage),
with some national security exceptions. The section also requires the head of an IC element
approving retention in excess of five years to certify to Congress, (1) the reasons extended
retention is necessary to protect U.S. national security, (2) the duration of the retention, the
particular information to be retained and, (3) the measures being taken to protect the privacy
interests of U.S. persons or persons located inside the United States.
Regional Issues
Two sections “express the sense of Congress” as it relates to the relationship between the U.S.
and Ukraine. Section 308 expresses the sense of Congress that, (1) cooperation between the
intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and Ukraine should be increased
to improve cybersecurity policies; and (2) the United States should improve extradition
procedures among the governments of the United States, Ukraine, and other countries from which
cybercriminals target U.S. citizens and entities. Section 315 expresses the sense of Congress that
the President, working with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), should provide the
government and armed forces of Ukraine with intelligence-sharing support. Furthermore, the
President should,
• initiate U.S.-Ukraine bilateral talks on cybersecurity threat and cybercrime
cooperation, with additional multilateral talks that include other law enforcement
partners such as Europol and Interpol;
• work to obtain a commitment from Ukraine to end the practice of ignoring
cybercrime directed at persons outside Ukraine and to work with the United
States and other allies to deter and convict known cybercriminals;
• establish a capacity-building program with Ukraine, which could include joint
intelligence efforts, U.S. law enforcement agents being sent to Ukraine to aid
66The USDHS/I&A is confirmed by the SSCI. See CRS Report RL30959, Presidential Appointee Positions Requiring
Senate Confirmation and Committees Handling Nominations, by Christopher M. Davis and Jerry W. Mansfield, p. 38.
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investigations, and agreements to connect U.S. and Ukrainian law enforcement
agencies through communications networks and hotlines; and
• maintain a scorecard with metrics to measure Ukraine’s responses to U.S.
requests for intelligence or law enforcement assistance.
Two sections refer to diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation. Section 309 is directed to the
Secretary of State. It requires the Department to ensure that every supervisory position at a U.S.
diplomatic facility in the Russian Federation is occupied by a U.S. citizen who is subject to and
has passed a thorough background check. It also directs the Secretary to submit to Congress a
plan to further reduce the reliance on locally employed staff in such facilities. Section 310
requires restricted access space to be included in each U.S. diplomatic facility that, after
enactment of this Act, is constructed in, or undergoes a construction upgrade in, the Russian
Federation, any country that shares a land border with the Russian Federation, or any country that
is a former member of the Soviet Union.
And finally, Section 316 refers to political prison camps in North Korea. It directs the DNI to
report to Congress regarding political prison camps in North Korea. It requires such report to
describe U.S. actions to support implementation of the recommendations of the U.N. Commission
of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including the
eventual establishment of a tribunal to hold individuals accountable for abuses.
FIX-ITT (Financial Exchange and Intelligence Integration)
The SSCI Report accompanying the FY2015 legislation directs the DNI to provide performance
assessments for a new initiative called “FIX-ITT” (Financial Exchange and Intelligence
Integration). The Committee “applauds” improvements made by the National Intelligence
Manager for Threat Finance and Transnational Organized Crime in response to language in the
FY2014 legislation.67 FIX-ITT is an ODNI integrating effort to bring all financial intelligence-
related activities spread across various IC agencies together to better understand, map, and disrupt
terrorist organizations, narco-trafficking networks, proliferation networks, organized crime, and
other threats.68
67 S.Rept. 113-120, p.7.
68 Ibid.
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Appendix. Intelligence Community: In Brief
The congressional intelligence committees oversee the activities of the seventeen components
that currently comprise the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). This confederation of agencies is
led and managed on a daily basis by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), with the
assistance of the leadership team within the Office of the DNI (ODNI) to include the Director of
Defense Intelligence (DDI).69 The core mission of ODNI is to lead the IC in intelligence
integration—synchronizing collection, analysis, and counterintelligence so that they are fused—
effectively operating as one team.70
The task of leading the IC is particularly challenging because the IC is spread across six separate
Cabinet departments and one independent agency within the executive branch. In fact, most
intelligence offices/agencies have a dual mission: (1) support to national-level intelligence related
activities managed by the DNI and (2) support to operational-level intelligence related activities
managed by their parent department.
An overview of the IC components, leadership structure, and the overarching budget aggregations
known as the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP),
provides some of the basic terminology necessary to understanding intelligence legislation.
Components
The IC, as defined in 50 U.S. Code §401a (4), consists of the following components:
• The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
• The Central Intelligence Agency.
• The National Security Agency.
• The Defense Intelligence Agency.
• The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
• The National Reconnaissance Office.
• Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized
national intelligence through reconnaissance programs.
• The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine
Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy.
• The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.
• The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
69 The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence or USD(I)) is called the Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI)
when he wears his ODNI “hat.”
70 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. National Intelligence: An Overview 2013, pp 1-2, at
http://www.dni.gov.
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• The elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the
analysis of intelligence information, including the Office of Intelligence of the
Coast Guard.
• Such other elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by
the President, or designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and
the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the IC.
Leadership Structure: the DNI and USD(I)
The Director of National Intelligence
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), referred to as the
Intelligence Reform Act or IRTPA, is widely considered to be the most significant legislation
affecting the IC since the National Security Act of 1947. Most notably, the IRTPA established the
position of DNI with more extensive authorities to coordinate the nation’s intelligence effort than
those formerly possessed by Directors of Central Intelligence (DCI).71 The 9/11 Commission
concluded that a central lesson that Congress and the Executive Branch drew from the 9/11
attacks was that there had been inadequate interagency coordination partially as a result of
separate statutory missions and administrative barriers.72 A number of reform measures were
passed—a great many of which were designed to more closely and effectively coordinate the
acquisition and dissemination of available intelligence. In terms of enhancing DNI’s authorities
over other IC leaders, the IRTPA focused particularly on personnel, tasking, acquisition and
budget.
The IRTPA divided the DCI’s three major responsibilities between two new positions—the
Director of the CIA (DCIA) and DNI—making the new DNI both community manager and
principal advisor to the President (and leaving leadership of the CIA to its director). The DNI
speaks for U.S. intelligence agencies, he briefs the President, has authority to develop the budget
for the national intelligence effort and manage appropriations made by Congress, and, to some
extent, can transfer personnel and funds from one agency to another. The ODNI, a staff of some
1,600 officials along with additional contract personnel, works to carry out the DNI’s
responsibilities. The President appoints the DNI with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The Office of the DNI
The ODNI carries out what it calls its “core” integration responsibilities with the help of several
statutory components within the ODNI to include the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),
the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), the National Counterintelligence Executive
(NCIX), and the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Figure A-1 illustrates the composition of
71 See Richard Best, “Leadership of the U.S. Intelligence Community: From DCI to DNI,” International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol 27, No. 2, (March, 2014): pp. 253-333, at http://www.tandfonline.com/.
72 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final Report, The 9/11 Commission Report
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), pp. 407-411; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community
Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 107th Congress, 2nd sess., S.Rept. 107-
351/H.Rept. 107-792, December 2002, pp. 33-117; U.S. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the U.S.
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005, pp. 311-350.
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the ODNI to include its core activities, “enabler,” and “oversight” offices. Enabler offices focus
on IC-wide concerns such as acquisition, budget, human capital, policy and strategy, and systems
and resource analysis. Oversight offices such as the General Counsel, Inspector General, and the
Civil Liberties and Privacy Protection Office focus on IC-wide activities such as compliance with
U.S. law, investigating allegations of fraud, waste and abuse, among other issues.73
Figure A-1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Source: “Organization,” at http://www.dni.gov.
73 “Organization,” under “About,” ODNI webpage, at http://www.dni.gov.
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The Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)/Director of Defense Intelligence
For reasons similar to those associated with the creation of the DNI, but by means of a different
statute,74 the position of Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (USD(I)) was established in
2003. The law divided the duties associated with the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, or ASD/C3I, into two positions—one
position responsible for managing the intelligence portfolio, and one position responsible for
supervising information systems across the DOD. The statute and DOD directives75 gave the
USD(I) significant authorities for the direction and control of intelligence agencies within the
DOD.
In May 2007, the Secretary of Defense and DNI formally agreed in a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) that the position would be “dual-hatted”—the incumbent acting as both the USD(I)
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI)
within the ODNI in order to improve the integration of national and military intelligence.76
According to the MOA, when acting as DDI, the incumbent reports directly to the DNI and serves
as his principal advisor regarding defense intelligence matters. James Clapper, DDI at the time,
said that the creation of the DDI position was a way to better “strengthen the relationship between
the DNI and the DOD … (and) to facilitate staff interaction and promote synchronization.”77 The
MOA did not alter the statutory responsibilities or authorities of either the Secretary of Defense or
the DNI.
The Intelligence Budget
Many authorities and responsibilities associated with the DNI and USD(I) make reference to the
national and military intelligence programs—known commonly as “the NIP and MIP.” The terms
NIP and MIP are fairly new, the former created by the IRTPA of 2004 Section 1074, and the latter
created by DOD Directive in 2005.78 Prior to the IRTPA, the NIP was known as the National
Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). The MIP represents the merger of two programs formerly
known as the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) Program and the Joint Military
Intelligence Program (JMIP).79
The DNI is most closely associated with the NIP and the USD(I) (in his role as DDI) is most
closely associated with the MIP. Together, they oversee a number of interagency activities
designed to facilitate the “seamless integration” of NIP and MIP intelligence efforts. Mutually
74 National Defense Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-314,§901).
75 The primary directive is Department of Defense Directive 5132.01, “Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(USD(I)),” November 23, 2005, pp. 2-7, posted on http://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5143_01.pdf.
76 Michael McConnell, DNI and Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, "Memorandum of Agreement," May 2007, See
DOD News Release No 637-07, May 24, 2007, “Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to be Dual-Hatted as
Director of Defense Intelligence.,” at http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=10918.
77 Ibid.
78 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Establishment of the Military Intelligence Program,” September 1,
2005. See also DOD Directive 5205.12, “Military Intelligence Program,” November 14, 2008 (certified current through
November 14, 2015), at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520512_2008_certifiedcurrent.pdf. (DODD
5205.12).
79 Elkins, p. 4-12.
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beneficial programs, for example, may receive both NIP and MIP resources.80 The NIP is
associated with national-level intelligence. Some NIP programs fall within the DOD, some do
not. Dr. Mark Lowenthal, former HPSCI Staff Director, describes the NIP as “programs that
either transcend the bounds of any one agency or are nondefense in nature.”81 50 U.S.C. §401a
(6) defines the term “National Intelligence Program” as:
[A]ll programs, projects, and activities of the IC, as well as any other programs of the IC
designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and the head of a United States
department or agency or by the President. Such term does not include programs, projects, or
activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and
conduct of tactical military operations by United States Armed Forces.
Both defense and nondefense NIP funds are determined and controlled by the DNI, from budget
development through execution. The NIP is often perceived as more complicated than the MIP
because it is an aggregation of fourteen programs that span the entire IC. NIP programs are
capabilities based. Cryptology, for example, is a capability that spans several IC components.
Each program within the NIP is headed by a Program Manager. These Program Managers
exercise daily direct control over their NIP resources. The DNI acts as an intermediary in the
budget process, between these managers, on the one side, and the President and Congress on the
other.82
In contrast, “the MIP” is only those defense dollars associated with the operational and tactical-
level activities of the military services. It all “belongs” to the Secretary of Defense.83 It refers to
service specific and DOD wide intelligence assets that are seen as “organic” to military units
(e.g., deployable SIGINT personnel and equipment or tactical reconnaissance aircraft).84
According to the MIP charter directive:85
The MIP consists of programs, projects, or activities that support the Secretary of Defense’s
intelligence, counterintelligence, and related intelligence responsibilities. This includes those
intelligence and counterintelligence programs, projects, or activities that provide capabilities
to meet warfighters’ operational and tactical requirements more effectively. The term
excludes capabilities associated with a weapons system whose primary mission is not
intelligence.
The MIP label is a tool that allows the USD(I) to collectively manage all the dispersed funds
associated with military intelligence support to the DOD “warfighters.” As its Program Executive,
the USD(I) as DDI:
[L]eads all Department of Defense actions involving the MIP, including issuing guidance,
coordinating its development and execution, and chairing groups to address programmatic
issues; and monitors the broader Battle Space Awareness Portfolio to achieve balance and
80 For information on specifics associated with NIP and MIP spending over time, see CRS Report R42061, Intelligence
Spending and Appropriations: Issues for Congress, by Marshall C. Erwin and Amy Belasco.
81 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 5th Edition, (Washington DC: Sage CQ Press, 2012), p. 52.
82 Elkins, p. 4-5.
83 See Robert Mirabello, “Budget and Resource Management,” Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies, Vol
20, No. 2, (Fall/Winter 2013), p. 68, at
http://www.afio.com/publications/MIRABELLO%20Pages%20from%20INTEL_FALLWINTER2013_Vol20_No2.pdf
84 Elkins, p. 4-11.
85 DOD Directive 5205.12 (3) (a).
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synergies from its panoply of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and
control complementary capabilities.86
MIP Component Managers are “the individual(s) assigned by either this Directive, the Secretary
of a Military Department, or the Commander, USSOCOM ... responsible for managing MIP
resources within his or her respective MIP Component in accordance with USD(I)” guidance and
policy.”87 The MIP components include the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military
Departments, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), DIA, NGA, NRO, and the
NSA/CSS.88
Table A-1 identifies four defense NIP programs: the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP);
General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP); National Geospatial-Intelligence Program (NGP);
and the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). Intelligence Authorization Legislation passed
in July 2014 merged the Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP) into the GDIP program.89
Table A-1 identifies eight nondefense NIP programs: the Central Intelligence Agency Program
(CIAP); the CIA’s Retirement and Disability System90 (CIARDS); the Office of the DNI91
(CMA); and the intelligence entities within the departments of Energy, Homeland Security,
Justice, State, and the Treasury.
Table A-1 identifies ten MIP programs: the DIA MIP, NGA MIP, NRO MIP, NSA/CSS MIP, OSD
MIP, USSOCOM MIP and service-specific MIP (Air Force MIP, Army MIP, Navy MIP, and
Marine Corps MIP). Of the nine Combatant Commands (COCOMs) only USSOCOM has its own
budget.92 The other COCOMs submit their budget requests through the military departments.
Table A-2 illustrates that six IC components have both MIP and NIP funding sources. The
directors of DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA are “dual-hatted” as Program Managers for their NIP
funds and Component Managers for their MIP funds. Exactly what goes into what budgetary pot
is not precise. Those decisions are guided by what is known as the NIP MIP “Rules of the
Road.”93
86 Mirabello, p. 68.
87 DOD Directive 5205.12 (3) (c).
88 DOD Directive 5205.12 (3) (b).
89 P.L. 113-126, §314.
90 CIARDS is a small fund that provides pension benefits to a selected group of the CIA’s workforce—particularly
those whose identities must be protected. Section 202 of the IAA for FY2014 amends the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act to expand the definition of "qualifying service" for purposes of designating CIA employees to
participate in a retirement system based on a period of service abroad that is hazardous to life or health, or that is
determined to be specialized because of security requirements, to include the service of CIA employees on detail to
another agency. Without this provision, such qualifying service had to be performed within the CIA. (The provision
made such qualifying detail service applicable to retired or deceased CIA officers.)
91 The CMA, also referred to as the Intelligence Community Management Account or ICMA, is an account name that
refers back to the IC Community Management Staff (CMS). The CMS supported the Director of Central Intelligence in
his role as community manager. When the position of DNI was established, much of the old CMS became the new
ODNI.
92 Elkins, p. 6-6. For more on COCOMs, see CRS Report R42077, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant
Commands: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
93 Michael Vickers, "Defense Intelligence Resources," PowerPoint Presentation to Armed Forces Communications and
Electronics Association (AFCEA), March 13, 2014, Slide 37.
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Table A-1. National and Military Intelligence Programs (NIP and MIP)
National Intelligence Program
Defense NIP:
Consolidated Cryptologic
Funds the signals intelligence (SIGINT) mission throughout the IC.
Program (CCP)
General Defense Intelligence
Funds wide range of national-level operations and intelligence
Program (GDIP)
infrastructure throughout the IC. The Foreign Counter Intelligence
Program (FCIP) merged with GDIP in IAA for FY2014.
National Geospatial-
Funds national-level geospatial-intelligence related activities throughout
Intelligence Program (NGP)
the IC.
National Reconnaissance
Funds national-level satellite reconnaissance activities of the National
Program (NRP)
Reconnaissance Office.
Nondefense NIP:
Central Intelligence Agency
Funds complete range of CIA activities.
Program (CIAP)
CIA Retirement and Disability
Funds pension benefits to a selected group of the CIA’s workforce—
Program (CIARDs)
particularly those whose identities must be protected.
Community Management
Funds the Office of the DNI.
Account (CMA)
NIP Programs associated with
Funds intelligence integration/analysis offices in each department in
Departments of Energy,
support of the DNI and IC mission.
Homeland Security, Justice
(within FBI and DEA), State
and the Treasury
Military Intelligence Program
DIA MIP
Tactical and joint general military intelligence and counter-intel activities
of DIA, military services and Combat Commands not covered by GDIP.
NGA MIP
Tactical military geospatial intelligence related activities of the NGA,
military services and Combat Commands not funded by the NGP.
NRO MIP
Tactical military air and space reconnaissance related activities of the
NRO not funded by the NRP.
NSA/CSS MIP
Tactical military SIGINT related activities of the NSA and CSS not funded
by the CCP.
OSD MIP
Office of the Secretary of Defense managed, defense-wide intelligence
programs not covered by the GDIP or DIA MIP.
U.S. Special Operations
Tactical military intelligence related activities and asset designed to
Command (USSOCOM) MIP
support USSOCOM missions not funded by the NIP.
Service Specific MIP:
Intelligence and related activities and assets of Services “organic” to
military combat units, or parts of joint/defense wide intelligence activities
USAF, USA, USN, USMC
or programs in which they participate. These activities are generally
within the scope of the Title 10 mission of the military departments to
organize, train, and equip forces for combat application.
Source: Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 4th Edition, (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014): Chapter 4 pp 1-
16.
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Table A-2. Intelligence Community Components: NIP and MIP Funding Sources
Component
MIP Sources
NIP Sources
CIA
CIAP
COCOMs (Except SOCOM)
DIA MIP
GDIP, NGP, CCP
DIA
DIA MIP
GDIP
DOE, DOJ, DOS, Treasury
Department Specific NIP
NGA
NGA MIP
NGP
NRO
NRO MIP
NRP
NSA
NSA MIP
CCP
ODNI
CMA
USDI
OSD MIP
USSOCOM
USSOCOM MIP
GDIP, NGP, CCP
Source: Dan Elkins, Managing Intelligence Resources, 4th Edition, (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014): Chapter 4 pp 1-
16.
Author Contact Information
Anne Daugherty Miles
Analyst in Intelligence and National Security Policy
amiles@crs.loc.gov, 7-7739
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