Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
November 19, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21513

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Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
Kuwait has been pivotal to U.S. efforts to secure the Persian Gulf region because of its
willingness to cooperate with U.S. strategy and military operations in the region, its location close
to both Iran and Iraq, and its role as the object of past Iraqi aggression. Kuwait arguably became
even more central to the U.S. ability to project power in the northern Persian Gulf when all U.S.
combat troops left in Iraq in 2011. Kuwait has helped Iraq reintegrate into the Arab world; it is
supporting U.S. efforts to contain Iranian power and enforce Iran sanctions; and it is procuring
missile defense technology that furthers the U.S. goal of a GCC-wide missile defense network.
Still, as demonstrated by the Amir’s May 2014 visit to Iran, Kuwait maintains relatively normal
economic and political relations with Iran so as not to provoke the Islamic Republic.
Kuwait is supporting U.S.-led efforts to defeat the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria by
placing its airbases and other military facilities at the disposal of the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State
coalition—even though Kuwait is not itself participating in coalition military operations against
the group. Yet, U.S.-Kuwait differences have emerged over what U.S. officials say is Kuwait’s
inability to stanch the flow of private Kuwaiti funds to extremist Islamist groups fighting in Syria.
Kuwait’s government supports the Sunni-led rebellion in Syria with humanitarian aid only.
On other regional issues, Kuwait generally acts in partnership with its allies in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC). In March 2011, Kuwait sent naval forces as a largely symbolic
participation in GCC military intervention to help Bahrain’s government suppress an uprising by
the majority Shiite population. Kuwait’s leadership, along with that of Saudi Arabia and UAE,
sees the Muslim Brotherhood organization as a domestic threat, and all three countries supported
the Egyptian military’s July 2013 removal of elected president and senior Muslim Brotherhood
leader Mohammad Morsi from power. Kuwait has tended to defer to GCC leader Saudi Arabia
and other GCC states in offering proposals to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, while
expressing residual resentment of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) officials for
supporting Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait.
Domestically, Kuwait’s political system was in turmoil during 2006-2013, initially manifesting as
parliamentary opposition to Sabah family political dominance but later broadening to visible
public unrest in 2012-2013. Disputes over the ruling family’s power and privileges produced
repeated constitutional dissolutions of the all-elected National Assembly and new elections, the
latest of which were held on July 27, 2013. The July 2013 elections produced a pro-government
Assembly more amenable to working with the ruling family, ushering in a period of renewed
legislative and governmental action on long-standing issues and an end to most public protest.
Yet, the ruling family has not necessarily eliminated the causes of the unrest. Kuwait remains a
relatively wealthy society, where most citizens do not want to risk their economic well-being to
try to bring about the downfall of Al Sabah rule. The government has reduced unrest by
implementing budgets replete with subsidies and salary increases, and undertaking some
repressive measures such as imprisoning or revoking the citizenship of social media critics for
“insulting the Amir.” These measures have tarnished Kuwait’s reputation as the most politically
progressive of the GCC states. The years of political paralysis also has contributed to economic
stagnation relative to Kuwait’s more economically vibrant Gulf neighbors such as Qatar and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE).

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Contents
Government and Political Reform ................................................................................................... 1
Government Structure................................................................................................................ 1
The Elected National Assembly ................................................................................................ 1
Assembly Authorities .......................................................................................................... 2
Political Factions in and Outside the National Assembly ................................................... 2
Post-2006 Political Crises: Assembly Suspensions and Elections ............................................ 3
Elections During 2006 - 2009 ............................................................................................. 3
Arab Uprisings Intensify Kuwait’s Political Crisis ............................................................. 4
2012-2013: Frequent Elections and Demonstrations .......................................................... 5
U.S. Responses and Implications for U.S. Interests ............................................................ 8
Broader Human Rights Issues ................................................................................................... 9
Women’s Rights .................................................................................................................. 9
Trafficking in Persons ......................................................................................................... 9
Status of “Stateless Persons“ (Bidoons) .............................................................................. 9
Freedom of Expression and Media Freedoms ................................................................... 10
Labor Rights ...................................................................................................................... 11
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 11
U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Defense Cooperation .......................................................................... 11
Cooperation During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War ............................................................ 12
Liberation of Kuwait/Operation Desert Storm .................................................................. 12
U.S.-Kuwait Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) ..................................................... 12
Supporting the U.S. Ousting of Saddam and Stabilization Mission: 2003-11 .................. 13
Cooperation Post-U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 ...................................................... 14
U.S. Security Assistance .......................................................................................................... 15
Major U.S. Arms Sales to Kuwait ..................................................................................... 16
International Military Education and Training (IMET)..................................................... 17
Foreign Policy Issues ..................................................................................................................... 17
Resolving Residual Bilateral Issues With Iraq ........................................................................ 18
Residual Issues from the 1990 Iraqi Invasion and Occupation ......................................... 18
Iran ........................................................................................................................................... 20
Arab-Israeli Dispute ................................................................................................................ 21
Actions on 2011 Uprisings in the Region ................................................................................ 22
Performance on Countering Terrorism Financing/Islamic State Donations ............................ 23
Kuwaiti Economic Policy .............................................................................................................. 25

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Kuwait................................................................................................................ 27

Tables
Table 1. Composition of the National Assembly: 2008–2013 ......................................................... 8
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Kuwait and Purposes ..................................................................................... 17
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Table 3. Some Basic Facts ............................................................................................................. 26

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 27

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Government and Political Reform1
Kuwait’s optimism after the 2003 fall of its nemesis, Saddam Hussein, soured after the January
15, 2006, death of Amir (ruler) Jabir Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Since then, Kuwait has lurched
from one political crisis to the next, producing a sense of economic and political stagnation. At
the time of Amir Jabir’s death, his successor, Shaykh Sa’ad bin Abdullah Al Sabah, was very ill
(he later died), and a brief succession dispute among rival branches of the ruling Al Sabah family
ensued. It was resolved with then Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah, the
younger brother of the late Amir, succeeding him on January 29, 2006. Shaykh Sabah is about 83
years old. The succession dispute was unprecedented in Kuwait and the broader Gulf region for
the first involvement of an elected legislature in replacing a leader.
Although the leadership question was resolved, it produced a suspension of the tacit agreement to
alternate succession between the Jabir and Salem branches of the family. Amir Sabah appointed
two members of his Jabir branch as Crown Prince/heir apparent and as prime minister (Shaykh
Nawwaf al-Ahmad Al Sabah and Shaykh Nasser al Muhammad al-Ahmad Al Sabah
respectively). Tensions between the two branches of the family have since simmered.
Government Structure
Under Kuwait’s 1962 constitution, the Amir is the head of state and ruler of Kuwait. He serves as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, appoints all judges, and has the power to suspend the
National Assembly for limited periods of time. The Amirs can be as involved in or detached from
day-to-day governance as he chooses; Amir Sabah tends to be more directly involved in
governance than was his predecessor.
The Amir appoints a Prime Minister, as head of government, who in turn appoints a cabinet. The
Prime Minister has always been a member of the Sabah family, and until 2003 the Prime Minister
and Crown Prince/heir apparent posts were held by a single person. Some in the Sabah family
argue that the Prime Minister and Crown Prince positions should again be combined because the
National Assembly is not constitutionally able to question the Crown Prince. In typical Kuwaiti
cabinets, three out of four deputy prime ministers are members of the family, as are the Defense
Minister, Foreign Minister, Interior Minister, and at least a few other ministers. The Prime
Minister is Shaykh Jabir al-Mubarak Al Sabah, who took office in December 4, 2011, and was
reappointed following the July 2013 elections. The cabinet has 28 ministers, plus a Central Bank
governor. Shaykh Nawwaf, mentioned above, remains Crown Prince/heir apparent.
The Elected National Assembly
The National Assembly, established by Kuwait’s November 1962 constitution, is the longest-
serving all-elected body among the Gulf monarchies. Fifty seats are elected, and up to 16
members of the cabinet serve in the Assembly ex-officio. The government has expanded the

1 Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2013 (released
February 27, 2014), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=
220363#wrapper; the International Religious Freedom Report for 2013 (June 19, 2014), andhttp://www.state.gov/j/drl/
rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=222299#wrapper; and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2014
(July 2014), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/226847.pdf
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electorate gradually: in the 1990s, the government extended the vote to sons of naturalized
Kuwaitis and Kuwaitis naturalized for at least 20 years (as opposed to 30) years. The prohibition
on female suffrage began to break in May 2004, after the government submitted to the Assembly
a bill to give women the same rights to vote and run as men. (A government attempt in May 1999
to institute female suffrage by decree was vetoed by the Assembly.) In May 2005, then Prime
Minister Shaykh Sabah (now Amir) pressed the Assembly to adopt the government bill, which it
did on May 16, 2005 (35-23); the bill was effective as of the 2006 National Assembly elections.
In recent elections, about 400,000 Kuwaitis have been eligible to vote.
Assembly Authorities
Although Kuwait’s constitution enshrines the hereditary monarchy, the Kuwait National
Assembly has more scope of authority than any legislative or consultative body in the Persian
Gulf. It can introduce legislation as well as vote on government-introduced legislation. The
Assembly does not confirm cabinet nominees (individually or en bloc), but it can, by simple
majority, remove individual ministers in a vote of “no confidence.” When the Assembly takes that
step, it generally does so after parliamentary questioning of that minister, referred to as “grilling.”
The Assembly can vote no confidence in the prime minister by voting “inability to cooperate with
the government,” and it can veto government decrees issued during periods of Assembly
suspension. Amirs of Kuwait have, on several occasions (1976-1981, 1986-1992, 2003, 2006,
2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012), used their constitutional authority to dissolve the Assembly when it
grilled or threatened to grill government ministers. Suspension of the Assembly mandates new
elections within 60 days.
Those opposing the government have tended to seek greater authority for the Assembly and a
limitation of the powers of the government and by extension, limitations of the political and
economic power of the Al Sabah. The opposition, in general, seeks a constitutional monarchy in
which the Assembly, or an elected majority faction within the Assembly, names a Prime Minister
who in turn assembles a cabinet. The governmental infighting provided rationale and additional
political space for various youth and other reform-oriented groups inspired by the 2011 Arab
uprisings to support activist parliamentarians’ efforts to limit the ruling family’s powers.
Political Factions in and Outside the National Assembly
Political parties are still not permitted, but factions are organized and compete in Assembly
elections as “currents,” “trends,” or “political societies.” Many of these factions meet and plan
their strategies at a parallel Kuwaiti tradition called diwaniyyas—informal social gatherings, held
at night, held by elites of all political ideologies and backgrounds. There are a growing number of
diwaniyyas organized by women. Factions in Kuwait, both in and outside the National Assembly,
are often fluid, but in general they group as follows:
The “Opposition”
• “Liberals.” Highly educated elites who tend to form the core of the opposition to
the government. Many of the liberals had been part of Arab nationalist
movements in the 1960s and 1970s, and in many cases have studied abroad. In
prior years they had operated under the banner “Kuwait Democratic Forum.”
Some liberal Kuwaitis often side with the government.
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• Sunni Islamists. They are generally opposed to the government. Within this broad
category, there are two major groupings: those linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood, and harder line Sunnis called Salafists. Those linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood have often operated under a banner called the Islamic Constitutional
Movement (ICM).
• Youths and Intellectuals. The broader opposition, outside the National Assembly,
the opposition includes youth and intellectuals, many of whom have become
more active since the Arab uprisings began in early 2011 but have been active in
Kuwait far longer than that. Since 2008, these groups have sometimes organized
during election campaigns to support liberal deputies, using such names as the
“Orange Movement” or “Fifth Fence.”
Government Supporters
• “Tribalists.” Generally less educated but who dominate two out of the five
electoral districts and tend to support the government, although not universally.
At times, some tribalists in the Assembly have grouped into a faction widely
referred to as “service deputies”—Assembly members primarily focused on
steering government largesse and patronage to their constituents.
• Shiites. Most in the Assembly are Islamists, assembled in a bloc called the
National Islamic Alliance. They tend to side with the government, perhaps out of
greater concern about Sunni Islamists.
• Women. When in the Assembly, female deputies, both Shiite and Sunni, have
tended to align with the government.
Post-2006 Political Crises: Assembly Suspensions and Elections
The constant disputes between the Al Sabah and oppositionists in the Assembly during 2006-2013
manifested as repeated Assembly suspensions and subsequent elections. None of these actions has
resolved fundamental differences over the power balance between the executive and the
legislature.
Elections During 2006 - 2009
• Five months after becoming leader, Amir Sabah suspended the Assembly in May
2006 when 29 opposition members demanded to question the Prime Minister
over the government’s refusal to reduce the number of electoral districts to five
(from 25). The opposition wanted the larger districts to make it more difficult to
influence the outcome through “vote buying” or tribal politics.
• June 29, 2006 election. In this election, the opposition, which attracted youth
support under the “Orange” banner, won 34 out of the 50 seats. The election was
the first in which women could vote or run, but none of the 27 women candidates
won. After the election, the Amir accepted demands to reduce the number of
electoral districts to five and a law to implement that change, as of the next
election, took effect.
• May 17, 2008 Election. The disputes between the opposition and the government
produced another crisis in March 2008 when the Assembly insisted on pay raises
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for state employees to help them cope with spiraling inflation. The government
refused, the cabinet resigned, and the Amir dissolved the Assembly and set new
elections for May 17, 2008. Sunni Islamists and conservative tribal leaders won a
total of 24 seats—an increase of 4 and their allies—the so-called “liberals”—won
seven seats. Shiites increased their representation by one, to a total of five seats.
Pro-government and other independent tribalists held the remaining 14 seats. As
in the 2006 election, none of the 27 female candidates was elected. In November
2008, the cabinet resigned when three Sunni Assembly deputies requested to
question the Prime Minister about corruption and the visit of a radical Iranian
Shiite cleric, but the Amir did not suspend the Assembly.
• May 16, 2009 Election. The power struggle between the government and
opposition deputies flared anew in March 2009 when the Assembly insisted on
questioning the Prime Minister on his handling of the global financial crisis and
alleged misuse of public funds. On March 19, 2009, the Amir suspended the
Assembly, triggering elections held on May 16, 2009. Turnout was relatively
light at about 55% of the 385,000 eligible voters, and produced more than 20 new
parliamentarians, including four women—the first women to be elected. They
included Masouma Mubarak (a Shiite); Rola Dashti (who was narrowly defeated
in 2006); and two professors. In December 2009, Assembly members questioned
Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser for corruption in the earlier 2008 elections,
marking the first time in the Gulf region that a head of government appeared
before an elected body. On December 17, 2009, a new election was avoided
when deputies voted 35-13 to express confidence in him, but he only narrowly
survived a no-confidence vote on January 5, 2011 (22 of the 50 Assembly
deputies supported the motion). 2
Arab Uprisings Intensify Kuwait’s Political Crisis
The Arab uprisings that began in early 2011 affected Kuwait by broadening the opposition
beyond the National Assembly and other elites. In late January 2011, opposition deputies,
supported by youths calling themselves the “Fifth Fence,” demanded Interior Minister Jabir al-
Khalid Al Sabah resign for failing to prevent the alleged torturing to death of a man in custody.
He acceded to that demand in advance of a February 8, 2011 protest. In March 2011, a Shiite
parliamentarian requested a “grilling” of the Foreign Minister about Kuwait’s sending of naval
forces as part of the GCC military intervention to support Bahrain’s government—a decision
many Kuwaiti Shiites opposed as unjustly supporting the Sunni monarchy of Bahrain. To head off
the questioning, the cabinet resigned, and Prime Minister Nasser formed a new cabinet on May 8,
2011 (the seventh cabinet formed by Shaykh Nasser after he became Prime Minister).
The government came under renewed popular pressure in September 2011 following reports that
two of Kuwait’s largest banks had deposited at least $92 million into the accounts of several
parliamentarians. The payments implied that the government had sought to buy the loyalty of
parliamentarians. Thousands of Kuwait protesters took to the streets on September 21 and
September 23, 2011 to call for the resignation of the Prime Minister. Probably as a direct response
to the allegations, on September 25, 2011, the cabinet adopted an anti-corruption draft law. The

2 “Kuwait’s Prime Minister Survives Parliament Vote.” Al Jazeera TV, January 5, 2011; Kristin Smith Diwan, “Kuwait:
Too Much Politics, or Not Enough?,” Foreign Policy online, January 10, 2011.
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protests were accompanied by strikes in the oil industry and the state-run banking and health care
industry in September 2011. However, these job actions did not appear directly related to the
political disputes, but rather to disputes over pay, benefits, and working conditions.
2012-2013: Frequent Elections and Demonstrations
With protests in the streets continuing, in October 2011 opposition Assembly deputies boycotted
committee meetings, and moderate liberals joined opposition deputies to give the opposition
enough votes for a successful no-confidence motion against the prime minister. On November 16,
2011, oppositionists in and outside the Assembly, including the Fifth Fence, forced their way into
the Assembly building and demanded Prime Minister Nasser’s resignation. On November 28,
2011, he did so. The Amir subsequently appointed another royal family member, then-Defense
Minister Shaykh Jabir al-Mubarak Al Sabah, as Prime Minister. He was sworn in, but without
first naming a new cabinet, on December 4, 2011. Two days later, on December 6, 2011, he
recommended—and Amir Sabah concurred—dissolution of the National Assembly and new
elections. New Assembly elections were set for February 2, 2012 (within the constitutionally
mandated 60 days).
• February 2, 2012, Election. In the run up to the vote, 20 opposition deputies
announced they would compete as one “Opposition Bloc.” Youth leaders
announced they would back opposition deputies who would push for a fully
elected government in which the prime minister is selected by the Assembly, not
the ruling family; legalization of political parties; and election law changes. Such
announcements affirmed the assertions of the royal family that calling new
elections would empower oppositionists—liberal and Islamist—sympathetic to
the 2011 Arab uprisings. However, refusing to call a new election would have
portrayed the government as attempting to cover up alleged corruption. As shown
in Table 1 below, groups opposed to the government won at least 32 of the 50
seats. Islamist groups increased their influence markedly, but liberals lost
support. None of the 19 women who ran was elected. Turnout was about 62%,
slightly higher than the 2009 election. A leading opposition figure, Ahmad al-
Sadun, a previous speaker (1985-1999), returned to that post when the Assembly
convened in February 2012, replacing the pro-government Jassim Al-Khurafi, a
major figure in Kuwait’s merchant community.
• The government formed after the election was again headed by Prime Minister
Shaykh Jabir al-Mubarak Al Sabah. He appointed 10 new ministers and retained
the remainder. None was female. The government refused opposition demands to
appoint oppositionists to at least nine cabinet positions, appointing only four such
ministers. The Prime Minister was grilled by the Assembly on March 28, 2012,
but opponents did not file a vote of no-confidence motion. With the Assembly
insisting on “grilling” the Interior Minister, on June 18, 2012, the Amir exercised
his prerogative under Article 106 of the constitution to suspend the Assembly for
one month—a temporary suspension renewable for another two months (but with
the concurrence of the Assembly). The suspension extended almost to the holy
month of Ramadan, at which time the Assembly is not in session anyway,
essentially closing the Assembly until October 2012.
• December 1, 2012 (Second Election in 2012) Triggered by Court Decision. On
June 20, 2012, Kuwait’s constitutional court ruled that the December 2011
Assembly suspension was not conducted in accordance with the constitution
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because a new cabinet had not been sworn in before the Amir’s suspension was
ordered. The court reinstated the May 2009 Assembly reinstated, but it did not
meet at all. On October 8, 2012, after the constitutional court ruled against the
government’s request to revisit the number of election districts, the Amir
disbanded the National Assembly and set new elections for December 1, 2012.
• The Amir simultaneously issued a decree altering the election law to allow voters
in each district to vote for only one candidate—not the four per district in prior
law. The Amir’s decree was seen by the opposition as an effort to complicate
opposition efforts to forge alliances in each district. On October 21, 2012, an
unprecedented demonstration of an estimated 50,000-150,000 Kuwaitis was held.
It was suppressed by security forces, who injured some, and arrested several
parliamentarians and even some younger members of the Sabah family who were
demonstrating. A demonstration on October 31, 2012, calling for the freeing of
outspoken oppositionist Musallam al-Barrak, a former parliamentarian who was
arrested on October 15, 2012, for allegedly “insulting the Amir.” On November
2, 2012, the government announced it would enforce an October 2012 ban on
gatherings of over 20 persons.
• The government went forward with the December 1, 2012 vote, under the Amir’s
revised election rules. Turnout was about 40%. Because the opposition boycotted
the vote, the election produced an overwhelmingly “pro-government” Assembly
on the strength of the seventeen pro-government Shiites elected—including five
Islamist Shiites of the National Islamic Alliance. The number of Shiites was
double that in any prior Assembly. Three females, including Masouma Mubarak,
were elected. Some Sunni Islamists were elected, but—with the exception of two
in the Salafi grouping—they were generally not affiliated with Sunni Islamist
political societies that have been in the Assembly for decades. On December 5,
2012, the Amir asked Prime Minister Shaykh Jabir Mubarak to form a new
cabinet. The opposition continued demonstrating to try to force change on the Al
Sabah, and demonstrations became a regular occurrence.
• July 27, 2013: Another Court-Triggered Election. Even though the December 1,
2012 election took place, the Amir’s election decree remained under opposition
legal challenge. On June 16, 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Amir’s
decree that each person would vote for only one candidate (reduced from four)
was constitutional, but the court dissolved the Assembly on the basis of improper
technicalities in the Amir’s election decree. The government subsequently set
new elections (the sixth election in five years) for July 27, 2013.
• A total of 418 candidates registered, of which 8 were female. The turnout was
just over half the electorate. Because some opposition societies, including those
linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, boycotted, the vote produced a decidedly pro-
government Assembly. The Muslim Brotherhood opposition was absent and only
a few Salafi Islamists were elected. Pro-government deputies in the Assembly
include a broad range of groups and reflected successful government outreach to
the tribalists, and cooptation of many liberals. Shiite deputies number eight—
close to the long term average number in the Assembly. The National Assembly
speaker is Marzuq al-Ghanim, the nephew of former speaker al-Khurafi.
• A cabinet was named on August 4, 2013, with Shaykh Jabir continuing as Prime
Minister. Among significant changes, Shaykh Khalid al-Hamad Al Sabah was
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promoted to first deputy prime minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. A former
head of domestic intelligence (National Security Bureau), Shaykh Mohammad
Khalid Al Sabah, was made Minister of Interior. Lieutenant General Khalid Al
Jarrah Al Sabah, formerly chief of staff of the Kuwaiti army, entered the
government as Minister of Defense. The cabinet included two Shiites and two
females (former Assembly deputy Rola Dashti as Minister of State for Planning
and for National Assembly Affairs and Thikra al-Rashidi as Minister of Social
Affairs and Labor). However, on January 7, 2014, possibly to garner support
from Islamists in Kuwait, he replaced the two female ministers with only one—
Hind al-Sabih, taking over both their portfolios. He replaced a member of the
ruling family (Shaykh Salem Abd al-Aziz Al Sabah) as Finance Minister with
Anas al-Salih, who is well known to the business community. He replaced the
Minister of Oil with Ali al-Umair, a Salafist parliamentarian (one of two
parliamentarians in the cabinet). He reduced the number of Shiite cabinet
members to one—Yasser Abul as Minister of Housing. Housing registers as a
major issue among Kuwaitis. The reshuffle brought the total Islamists in the
cabinet to four, from two—but all are from the Salafist faction and not the
Muslim Brotherhood.
Since the election, there have few major public demonstrations. Opposition demands remain
confined to calls for a constitutional monarchy, in which the elected parliament selects the
cabinet. However, the government has continued to arrest opposition activists who criticize the
Amir on social media, as discussed below. Some unrest returned in June–July 2014 following a
June 11, 2014, speech by opposition leader/former parliamentarian Musallam al-Barrak,
mentioned above, alleging embezzlement by senior government officials. The speech drew
thousands of opposition supporters. Barrak was arrested on July 2 for allegedly “insulting the
judiciary,” sparking five days of rallies by pro-Barrak oppositionist demanding his release.
Government security forces suppressed the demonstrations with tear gas. Barrak was released on
bail on July 7.
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Table 1. Composition of the National Assembly: 2008–2013
Post
Post-2008
Post-Feb. 2012
December
Post July
Ideology/Affiliation
Election Post-2009
Vote Vote
2012 Vote
2103 Vote
Sunni Islamist (Muslim Brotherhood
24 14 23 4
3

and Salafi, including tribalists.
general y opposes the government)
(all Salafi, no
Muslim
Brotherhood)
Liberals (general y opposition)
7
8
5
1
9
Popular Action Bloc (generally
0 2 4 0
0
opposition)
Shi te (general y pro-government)
5
9
7
17
8
Sunni Independents (includes
14 17 11 28
30
tribalists, pro-business deputies and
women). General y pro-government
Women (general y pro-government)
0 4 0 3
2
Included in categories above
Source: CRS, based on articles and analysis from various observers.
Note: Some members of the National Assembly might span several different categories and several sources
often disagree on precise categorizations of the members of the Assembly.
U.S. Responses and Implications for U.S. Interests
Despite the government’s use of security forces to end protests and its arrests of critics, there has
been no evident alteration of the U.S.-Kuwait relationship. On October 23, 2012—following the
large protest discussed above—the State Department said the United States “call[s] on all sides to
exercise restraint,” and criticized the government’s ban on large public gatherings. The official
statements following President Obama’s meeting with Amir Sabah at the White House on
September 13, 2013, did not indicate that the political situation in Kuwait was discussed in
depth.3
U.S. democracy programs in Kuwait continue. These programs, funded from the Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and other U.S. assistance accounts, included discussions with
Kuwaiti leaders, public diplomacy, building civil society, enhancing the capabilities of
independent Kuwaiti media, promoting women’s rights, and providing a broad spectrum of
educational opportunities.

3 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/13/remarks-president-obama-and-amir-sabah-al-sabah-kuwait-
after-bilateral-m.
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Broader Human Rights Issues4
On broader human rights issues, the latest State Department Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 2013, released February 27, 2014, largely reiterated the criticisms of previous
reports. It identifies the key human rights problems as limitations on citizens’ rights to change
their government, restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly, limitations on workers’ rights,
and trafficking in persons within the foreign worker population. There has been broad criticism of
Kuwait’s recent practice of revoking citizenship of perceived critics, as discussed below. In May
2011, Kuwait took over Syria’s bid for a seat on the U.N. Human Rights Council.
Women’s Rights
Women enjoy more rights and freedoms in Kuwait than in virtually any other GCC state, as
exemplified by their running and winning election to the National Assembly and service at all
levels of Kuwait’s government. In September 2012, the Higher Judicial Council appointed seven
women as public prosecutors. Women in Kuwait can drive, unlike their counterparts in
neighboring Saudi Arabia, and many women own businesses. There are several nongovernmental
organizations run by Kuwaiti women, such as the Kuwait Women’s Cultural and Social Society,
that are dedicated to improving rights for women and to agitating on several different issues
unrelated to gender.
Still, Kuwait remains a traditional society and Islamists who want to limit women’s rights have
substantial influence. The law does not specifically prohibit domestic violence, although courts
try such cases as assault. Kuwaiti women who marry non-Kuwaiti men cannot give their spouses
or children Kuwaiti citizenship. Numerous international reports assert that violence particularly
against expatriate women working in domestic service roles, is frequent. Some expatriate women
have also been subjected to nonpayment of wages and withholding of passports.5
Trafficking in Persons
Kuwait was, for the seventh year in a row, designated by the State Department’s Trafficking in
Persons report for 2014 (issued July 2014, cited earlier) in “Tier Three” (worst level). The
designation has been maintained because, according to the 2014 report, Kuwait was “not making
sufficient efforts” to comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Kuwait
adopted an anti-trafficking law in March 2013, but it has not demonstrated significant efforts to
prosecute and convict trafficking offenders and there is no lead national anti-trafficking
coordinating body.
Status of “Stateless Persons“ (Bidoons)
Non-Gulf Arabs and Asians, and about 100,000—140,000 stateless residents (known as
“bidoons”—the Arabic word for “without”) continue to face discrimination. The government
asserts that the bidoons deliberately destroyed evidence of another nationality in order to obtain

4 Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2013 (released
February 27, 2014), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper, and the Human Rights
Watch World Report for 2014. Released January 2014.
5 Fahim, Kareem. “Away From Home, Fleeing Domestic Life.” New York Times, August 2, 2010.
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generous social benefits in Kuwait. Despite that suspicion, in October 2010 the government
promised to implement a plan to resolve the legal and economic status of the bidoons. In March
2011, the government set up a “Central System for Remedying the Status of Illegal Residents,”
with a mandate to resolve the status of the bidoons within five years. A separate decree approved
provision of some government services and subsidies to bidoons.
During 2011-2014, the government has granted citizenship to several hundred bidoons each year.
In March 2013, security forces used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse bidoons demonstrating
for greater rights. That demonstrating might have sparked One bill that was enactment by the
National Assembly on March 20, 2013, of legislation giving about 4,000 “bidoons” (stateless
residents, discussed below) citizenship. In November 2014, the government announced a plan to
obtain for tens of thousands of bidoons “economic citizenship in the Union of the Comoros. The
bidoons would be allowed to remain physically in Kuwait, but would not get Kuwaiti citizenship;
human rights groups called the plan far from an acceptable solution to the bidoon issue.
Freedom of Expression and Media Freedoms
Official press censorship ended in 1992, fostering the growth of a vibrant press, but successive
State Department human rights reports have asserted that the government does not always respect
the constitutional provisions for freedom of speech and the press. By law, newspaper publishers
must be licensed by the Ministry of Information. And, the government has made increasing use of
existing and new laws to act against opponents—including revoking their citizenship—who use
newspapers and social media to criticize the government and mobilize demonstrations.
Kuwait’s penal code (Article 25) provides for up to five years in jail for “objecting to the rights
and authorities of the Amir or faulting him”—wording that sometimes takes varying forms in
charging documents and other official announcements. The Constitutional Court rejected a
challenged to Article 25 in December 2013. In 2013, cases were brought against at least 29
Kuwaitis who allegedly criticized the Amir or the government on social media platforms. Five
persons charged with “faulting the Amir” were acquitted in February 2013, but in July 2013 an
appeals court overturned the conviction of three former Assembly deputies on that charge. The
same court upheld a 20 month sentence of Sarra al-Darees for Twitter messages “tarnishing the
Amir’s authority.” In mid-April 2013, Musallam al-Barrak, mentioned earlier, was sentenced to
five years in prison for insulting the Amir, but his sentence was overturned in May 2013. In
November 2013, a Kuwaiti court sentenced a Kuwaiti man to five years in prison for a Twitter
comment about Sunni and Shiite theology.
The government also has sought to silence media that expose internal discussions among the
royal family. On April 20, 2014, a judge ordered two newspapers (Al Watan and Alam al Yawm)
closed for two weeks for disobeying a court-ordered news blackout on a videotape purporting to
show former senior officials plotting to try to remove the Amir from office.6 In June 2014, the
government ordered the same two papers to stop publishing for five days over the same issue.
Thus far in 2014, the government has revoked the citizenship of 33 people, all for criticizing the
government on social media and through other media outlets. One whose citizenship was revoked
is Ahmad Jabir al-Shammari, owner of Alam al-Yawm newspaper, discussed above, and a
television station. Others whose citizenship have been revoked on similar grounds include an

6 “Kuwait Papers Closed for Violating “Plot” Blackout.” BBC News, April 20, 2014.
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Islamist former member of the National Assembly, Abdullah al-Barghash, and Saad al-Ajmi, an
opposition spokesman.
Labor Rights
The law protects the right of workers to form and join unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain
collectively, but contains significant restrictions. The government allows one trade union per
occupation, but the only legal trade federation is the Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF).
Foreign workers, with the exception of domestic workers, are allowed to join unions, and the
government has tended not to impede strikes. On October 10, 2011, about 3,000 customs officers
went on strike demanding higher wages and better working conditions; the action caused a
temporary halt to Kuwaiti oil exports. On October 26, 2011, the government criticized the strikes
as “tantamount to attacks on the state’s status, sovereignty, its interests, and its citizens,” and
“cannot be tolerated.” In early 2012, strikes briefly grounded state-owned Kuwait Airways, and
there have been occasional small strikes since.
Religious Freedom
The State Department religious freedom report for 2013 (released June 19, 2014), cited earlier,
did not alter its assessment of the government’s respect for religious freedom from that of
previous years. Shiite Muslims (about 30% of Kuwait’s population) continue to report official
discrimination, including limited access to religious education and the perceived government
unwillingness to permit the building of new Shiite mosques. Of Kuwait’s Shiite population, about
half are Arab Shiites, some of whom are originally from the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia,
and half are or Persian origin. Unlike in Bahrain, Shiites are well represented in the police force
and the military/security apparatus, although they generally are not offered leadership positions in
those institutions. In 2012, the Kuwaiti ministry that oversees houses of worship began
monitoring Shiite mourning houses known as Husseiniyas, but it also began providing state funds
to Shiite mosques, as it does for Sunni mosques. In June 2012, the Amir refused to sign (vetoed) a
National Assembly bill stipulating the death penalty for those who curse the major figures and
symbols of Islam, including the Quran.
Kuwait has seven officially recognized Christian churches to serve the approximately 450,000
Christians (mostly foreign residents) in Kuwait. However, Islamists in the National Assembly
have sometimes sought to prevent the building of new churches in Kuwait.7 Members of religions
not sanctioned in the Quran—including about 400 Baha’i’s, 100,000 Buddhists, 600,000 Hindus,
and 10,000 Sikhs—are mostly non-citizens working in Kuwait and have not been allowed to
operate official places of worship. They have been permitted to worship in their homes. There are
a few hundred Christians and some Baha’i’s among the citizenry.
U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Defense Cooperation
Kuwait was not strategically or politically close to the United States until the Iran-Iraq War
(1980-1988). Kuwait’s government was a pivotal partner of the United States in that war as well

7 Middle East Media Research Institute. “In Kuwait, Public Debate Over Demand to Demolish Churches,” April 10,
2012.
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as through two subsequent Gulf wars: the 1991 Persian Gulf War to liberate Kuwait from Iraq’s
occupation, and the 2003 U.S.-led war to oust Saddam Hussein. In all three of these Gulf wars,
Kuwait’s security was directly at stake. In 2014, Kuwait has joined the U.S.-led coalition
attempting to defeat the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria by placing its defense
facilities at the disposal of U.S. and coalition partner forces. Kuwait did not contribute forces to
the U.S.-led stabilization operations in post-Taliban Afghanistan or post-Saddam Iraq, and is not
conducting military operations against the Islamic State.
Recognizing Kuwait’s consistent and multi-faceted cooperation with the United States, on April
1, 2004, the Bush Administration designated Kuwait as a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a
designation held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain). Afghanistan obtained that designation in
2012. The designation opens Kuwait to buy the same U.S. equipment that is sold to U.S. allies in
NATO.
Cooperation During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War
Kuwait and the United States first grew politically and militarily close during the Iran-Iraq War
because of its spillover to Kuwait. Through intimidation, Iran sought to compel Kuwait not to
support Iraq in that war. Iran fired at and struck some Kuwaiti oil facilities, including the Al
Ahmadi terminal, with Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles. In 1987-1988, the United States
established a U.S. naval escort and tanker reflagging program to protect Kuwaiti and international
shipping from Iranian naval attacks (Operation Earnest Will). As part of the skirmishes between
the United States and Iran in the course of that operation, Iran attacked a Kuwaiti oil installation
(Sea Island terminal).
Liberation of Kuwait/Operation Desert Storm
Believing incorrectly that Saddam Hussein would reward Kuwait for assisting Iraq financially
and logistically during the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait’s leaders were shaken by the August 2, 1990,
Iraqi invasion. Iraq’s public justification was an accusation that Kuwait was overproducing oil
and thereby harming Iraq’s ability to repay its debts and recover economically from the long war
with Iran. However, most experts believe that the invasion was a result of Saddam’s intent to
dominate the Persian Gulf politically, economically, and militarily. Iraq’s occupation lasted until a
U.S.-led coalition forces of nearly 500,000 expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in “Operation
Desert Storm” (January 16, 1991 - February 28, 1991). Kuwait’s leaders, who spent the
occupation period in Saudi Arabia, were restored to power in Kuwait and eventually restored the
all-elected National Assembly. Kuwait contributed financially to the 1991 war—it paid $16.059
billion to offset the U.S. incremental costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
U.S.-Kuwait Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
The U.S.-led expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait led to a deepening of the U.S.-Kuwait
security relationship, the cornerstone of which was a broad 10-year Defense Cooperation
Agreement (DCA) signed on September 19, 1991 for an initial 10-year period. The DCA remains
in effect.8 Although the text is classified, the pact reportedly provides for mutual discussions in

8 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/13/remarks-president-obama-and-amir-sabah-al-sabah-kuwait-
after-bilateral-m.
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the event of a crisis; joint military exercises; U.S. evaluation of, advice to, and training of Kuwaiti
forces; U.S. arms sales; prepositioning of U.S. military equipment; and U.S. access to a range of
Kuwaiti facilities.
These facilities used by the United States military under the DCA have included Ali al-Salem Air
Base; Shaykh Jabir Air Base; the main U.S. headquarters in Kuwait at Camp Arifjan (40 miles
south of Kuwait City); a desert training base and firing range called Camp Buehring, far out in the
desert, near the border with Saudi Arabia; and a naval facility called Camp Patriot.9 Under the
DCA, enough U.S. armor to outfit at least one brigade is pre-positioned in at Camp Arifjan; the
equipment pre-positioned there was used for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and returned after the U.S.
mission in Iraq ended. (U.S. forces vacated Camp Doha, the headquarters for U.S. forces in
Kuwait during the 1990s and former site for pre-positioned tanks, in December 2005.) The DCA
includes a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) provides that U.S. forces in Kuwait be subject to
U.S. rather than Kuwaiti law—a common feature of such arrangements.
Kuwait’s cooperation under the DCA was pivotal to U.S. and allied efforts to contain Saddam
Hussein after the 1991 war. U.S. forces used Kuwaiti facilities to conduct containment operations,
including the 1992-2003 enforcement of a “no fly zone” over southern Iraq (Operation Southern
Watch). This operation involved 1,000 U.S. Air Force personnel in Kuwait, mostly at Kuwait air
bases. As a deterrent to Iraq, as noted above, the United States prepositioned armor in Kuwait,
there were generally about 4,000 or more U.S. troops stationed in Kuwait at any given time
during the 1990s. Kuwait contributed about $200 million per year for U.S. military costs of these
containment operations, according to U.S. observers.10 Kuwait also funded two-thirds of the $51
million per year U.N. budget for the 1991-2003 Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) that
monitored the Iraq-Kuwait border. Kuwait hosted an additional 5,000 U.S. forces during the
major combat phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, which ousted the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Supporting the U.S. Ousting of Saddam and Stabilization Mission: 2003-11
Because Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, Kuwait enthusiastically supported the George W.
Bush Administration’s decision to militarily overthrow Saddam Hussein (Operation Iraqi
Freedom [OIF]). It hosted the vast bulk of the U.S. invasion force of about 250,000 forces, as
well as the other coalition troops that entered Iraq. To secure that force, Kuwait closed off its
entire northern half for weeks before the invasion. It also allowed U.S. use of two air bases, its
international airport, and sea ports; and provided $266 million in burden sharing support to the
combat, including base support, personnel support, and supplies such as food and fuel.
In order to promote Iraqi stability after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Kuwait took a number of
major steps: it built a water line into Iraq, and it ran a humanitarian operation center (HOC) that
gave over $550 million in assistance to Iraqis from 2003-2011. A Kuwaiti company, First Kuwaiti
General Trading and Contracting, was lead contractor on the large U.S. embassy in Iraq that
opened in January 2009. On April 22, 2008, Kuwait hosted a regional conference on Iraq’s
stability, which included the United States, Iran, and other neighboring countries.

9 Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute. p. 27.
10 Author conversation with U.S. military official in the Kuwait. February 2014.
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According to Defense Department budget documents, Kuwait contributed about $210 million per
year in similar in-kind support to help defray the costs incurred by the U.S. military personnel
that rotated through Kuwait into or out of Iraq for operations in Iraq. In FY2012, Kuwait
contributed $350 million for these purposes, as stipulated in the FY2012 Consolidated
Appropriation (P.L. 112-74). During 2003-2011, there was an average of 25,000 U.S. troops
based in Kuwaiti facilities, not including those rotating into Iraq at a given time. These U.S.
forces in Kuwait provided logistical and other support to the U.S. forces moving into or out of
Iraq.
Cooperation Post-U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq in 2011
Kuwait served as the key exit route for U.S. troops as they withdrew from Iraq. The United States
and Iraq had discussed retaining 3,000-15,000 U.S. troops in Iraq beyond 2011 to continue
training Iraqi forces. However, Iraq and the United States were unable to agree on a legal status
framework for retaining U.S. troops, and the last U.S. troops left Iraq on December 18, 2011.
There reportedly was discussion within the Administration that, because no U.S. troops were
remaining in Iraq after 2011, the United States might build up forces in Kuwait to potentially be
able to intervene in Iraq or to confront Iran.11 However, following the withdrawal the numbers of
U.S. forces in Kuwait were not increased substantially, although the mix of forces did change.
Then Defense Secretary Leon Panetta noted, in a trip to Kuwait in December 2012, that there
were about 13,500 U.S. troops in Kuwait,12 and U.S. force levels in Kuwait have remained at that
level since. This U.S. force level is higher than that positioned in Kuwait during the 1990s but
lower than the 25,000 there for the 2003-2011 period of U.S. military involvement in Iraq. It also
constitutes more than a third of the 35,000 U.S. forces in the Gulf. Tthe forces stationed in
Kuwait include some combat troops, not purely support forces, as was the case prior to 2011.13
Cooperation Against the Islamic State Organization
The enhanced mix of U.S. forces in Kuwait indicates that the United States wanted to retain at
least some combat power in close proximity to both Iraq and Iran. Unexpectedly, the need for
U.S. forces to return to Iraq has arisen, although not in the form of ground combat units. U.S.
advisers and other forces to train Iraqi units—some of which might be first transiting through
Kuwait—have been sent to Kuwait to counter major gains in Iraq by the Islamic State
organization. At a meeting between the United States and the GCC countries in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia on September 11, 2014, Kuwait formally joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic
State. Four GCC countries—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar—have flown air strike or air
support missions against Islamic State forces in Syria. Kuwait has not militarily participated in
anti-Islamic State operations in either Iraq or in Syria, but it has placed its military facilities at the
disposal of the United States and several coalition partners flying strikes against the Islamic State
in Iraq. Two coalition countries, other than the United States, that Kuwait has allowed to base

11 http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2011/me_iraq1201_09_26.asp; Thom Shanker and Steven Lee
Myers. “U.S. Is Planning Buildup in Gulf After Iraq Exit.” New York Times, October 30, 2011; Pauline Jelinek,
“Kuwait, U.S. Still Talking About Troop Plan.” Associated Press, November 7, 2011.
12 Thom Shanker. “In Kuwait, Panetta Affirms U.S. Commitment to Middle East. New York Times, December 11,
2012.
13 Michelle Tan. “15,000 in Kuwait, At Least For Now.” Army Times, January 16, 2012.
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reconnaissance and combat aircraft in Kuwait include Canada and Italy.14 Since U.S.-led military
operations in Iraq began in August 2014, Kuwait has contributed an additional $10 million to help
Iraqi victims of abuses by advancing Islamic State forces. In part because of sectarian
demographics, Islamic State forces have advanced no further east or south than Baghdad and do
not appear able to potentially advance to the border with Kuwait.
Kuwait’s Defense Cooperation with GCC Allies
Kuwait is also cooperating with U.S. efforts to improve the defense capabilities of the GCC as a
whole. As noted below, Kuwait has purchased missile defense equipment that supports U.S.
efforts to forge a joint GCC missile defense network for the Gulf. Kuwaiti naval forces participate
in U.S.-led mine clearing exercises in the Persian Gulf—exercises apparently intended to signal
to Iran the strength of a U.S.-led coalition to contain Iran.
At the GCC summit in Kuwait during December 10-11, 2013, Kuwait and the other GCC states
announced intent to form a GCC joint military command. The decision reportedly reflected a
view among some of the GCC leaders that the Obama Administration might be reluctant to use
force or threaten force in the event of another crisis in the Gulf. Those apparent concerns have
been reflected in an April 2014 GCC decision to recruit additional manpower from Jordan and
Morocco, and a separate Kuwaiti decision in April 2014 to set up an office in Pakistan to recruit
Pakistani trainers for Kuwait soldiers.15
Still, the GCC decision on joint military command was consistent with Obama Administration
efforts to augment Gulf security by forging greater coordination and interoperability of equipment
among the GCC states. That U.S. policy was supported by December 16, 2013, Presidential
Determination authorizing U.S. defense sales to the GCC as a whole.
Possibly signaling that Kuwait wants to be fully integrated into long term security structures,
including with other U.S. partners, it was reported in December 2011 that NATO discussed with
Kuwait opening a center in Kuwait City as part of the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)”
initiated in 2004. Kuwait joined the ICI in December 2004. The NATO center in Kuwait did not
open, in part because the ICI has languished as NATO member states face significant financial
constraints.
U.S. Security Assistance
The United States continues to bolster Kuwait’s defense capabilities to promote interoperability
with U.S. forces should a regional contingency arise. U.S. officials say that the U.S.-Kuwait
defense relationship, enhanced in recent years by small amounts of U.S. assistance shown in
Table 2 below, has improved the quality of the Kuwaiti military, particularly the Air Force.
Kuwait receives very small amounts of U.S. assistance, if any, because of its ability to fund its
own security requirements. Kuwait has been mainly a donor to U.S. operations rather than a
recipient of U.S. funds. As a result of Kuwaiti recruitment efforts, its military has now nearly
regained its pre-Iraq invasion strength of 17,000. In 2008, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)

14 “Kuwait Plays Uneasy Host as Canadian Jets Join Anti-ISIS Campaign.” Canada Television News, October 29,
2014.
15 Middle East Media Research Institute. April 22, 2014.
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established in Kuwait a permanent platform for “full spectrum operations” in 27 countries in the
region—among its objectives is to help Kuwait establish a more capable navy.
Major U.S. Arms Sales to Kuwait
U.S. arms sales have sought to enhance Kuwait’s capability. U.S. sales to Kuwait are intended to
comport with the overall goals of the “Gulf Security Dialogue” program designed to contain Iran
by enhancing the individual and joint capabilities of the Gulf states. Kuwait is not eligible to
receive U.S. excess defense articles. Major post-1991 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) include the
following:
• Patriot Missile Defense System: In 1992, Kuwait bought five Patriot anti-missile
fire units, including 25 launchers and 210 Patriot missiles, valued at about $800
million. Delivery was completed by 1998. Some of them were used to intercept
Iraqi short-range missiles launched at Kuwait in the 2003 war. In 2007, Kuwait
also bought 80 PAC-3 (Patriot) missiles and 60 PAC-2 missiles and upgrades,
valued at about $1.3 billion. In August 2010, the Administration notified
Congress of the potential sale to Kuwait of 209 Patriot “Guidance Enhanced
Missile-T” (GEM-T) missiles valued at $900 million. The prime contractor for
that system is Raytheon. On July 20, 2012, the Administration notified a potential
sale of 60 Patriot Advanced Capability (“PAC-3”) missiles and 20 Patriot
launching stations, plus associated equipment. The total value of the sale could
reach $4.2 billion. On December 31, 2013, DOD said Lockheed Martin would
deliver 14 of the missiles and seven launcher modification kits by June 30, 2016.
There has been no announcement whether Kuwait might buy the more
sophisticated missile defense system called the Theater High Altitude Air
Defense (THAAD) system that the United States has sold to UAE and Qatar.
• Combat Aircraft. The core of Kuwait’s fleet of combat aircraft are 40 FA-18
combat aircraft Kuwait bought in 1992. On December 4, 2013, DSCA notified a
possible sale to Kuwait of technical support to its U.S.-made F-18s for an
estimated cost of about $150 million. Kuwait is said to be considering adding
more FA-18 aircraft, although it is evaluating and might instead order the Rafale
or the Typhoon. The latter two combat aircraft are made by European
manufacturers.
• Tanks. In 1993, Kuwait bought 218 M1A2 tanks at a value of $1.9 billion.
Delivery was completed in 1998.
• Apache Helicopters. In September 2002, Kuwait ordered 16 AH-64 (Apache)
helicopters equipped with the Longbow fire-control system, valued at about $940
million.
• Air-to-Air Missiles. In 2008, Kuwait bought 120 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium
Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), along with equipment and services, with
a total value of $178 million. On February 27, 2012, the Administration notified
Congress of a potential sale of 80 AIM-9X-2 SIDEWINDER missiles, and
associated parts and support, with an estimated value of $105 million. The sale, if
completed, would help Kuwait modernize its fighter aircraft and enhance
interoperability with U.S. aircraft.
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• DSCA announced on June 30, 2014, that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
would build a Kuwait Armed Forces Hospital in Kuwait at a cost to Kuwait of
$1.7 billion.
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
As noted in Table 2 below, in recent years Kuwait has received very small amounts of funding
under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. That funding has been
provided primarily to qualify Kuwait for a discount in the rate it pays for Kuwait-funded trainees
to participate in U.S. programs. Kuwaiti military students in the United States study intelligence,
pilot training, and other disciplines. In FY2010, Kuwait spent about $9.7 million to provide such
education for 216 Kuwaiti military students. There has been no U.S. assistance to Kuwait since
FY2010.
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Kuwait and Purposes
(dollars in thousands)
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10

International
- 19 14 0
10
Military Training
and Education
(IMET).
Non-Proliferation,
628 1,025 0
0
0
Anti-Terrorism,
De-Mining and
Related (NADR).
Foreign Policy Issues
After the United States, Kuwait’s most important alliance is with the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), which consists of fellow Gulf monarchies. In May 2012, Saudi Arabia proposed a close
political union among the GCC states—a proposal opposed by several GCC states, including
Kuwait, and not adopted. Kuwait has a much longer and more extensive experience with elections
and parliamentary process than does Saudi Arabia or the other GCC states, and most Kuwaitis are
perceived as fearful of forfeiting their democratic tradition were there to be a GCC political
union. The issue was discussed again at the annual GCC summit on December 10-11, 2013, in
Kuwait, but continued Kuwait, Omani, and other opposition to the union concept led to a less
sweeping GCC announcement to form the joint military command referenced earlier. Kuwait
hosted a summit of Afro-Arab countries in November 2013 and hosted an Arab League summit
meeting in March 2014.
As noted, until the 1980s, the United States and Kuwait were not close allies. A U.S. consulate
was opened in Kuwait in October 1951; it was elevated to an embassy upon Kuwait’s
independence from Britain in 1961. Kuwait was the first Gulf state to establish relations with the
Soviet Union in the 1960s, perhaps reflecting the influence on Kuwaiti politics of many relatively
left-wing figures who were attracted to the ideologies of Gamal Abd al-Nasser of Egypt and his
patron, the Soviet Union.
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As allies since the Iran-Iraq War, the United States and Kuwait now cooperate on a broad range of
regional and international issues. Regional issues were the main focus of discussions between the
Amir and President Obama on September 13, 2013, according to the White House statement
issued after the meeting. The U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait is Douglas Silliman.
Resolving Residual Bilateral Issues With Iraq
Even though Iraq has not posed an existential threat to Kuwait since Saddam was ousted, Iraq’s
stability and the bilateral Iraq-Kuwait relationship remain paramount Kuwaiti foreign policy
concerns. Kuwait has tried to build political ties to all Iraqi factions in order to ensure there is no
repeat of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or any Iraqi Shiite-led violence such as that which
occurred in the 1980s. The Islamic State capture of substantial territory in Iraq has reportedly
caused substantial concern in Kuwait because instability in Iraq might threaten the carefully-
constructed set of post-Saddam understandings that Kuwait and Iraq have established. On July
18, 2008, Kuwait named its first ambassador to Iraq since the 1990 Iraqi invasion—Ali al
Momen, a retired general and a Shiite Muslim.
Residual Issues from the 1990 Iraqi Invasion and Occupation
The Kuwait-Iraq relationship remains colored by the August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion. Iraq-Kuwait
relations were frozen during the rest of Saddam Hussein’s rule, and Kuwait and the other GCC
states have been wary of the post-Saddam Iraqi governments that were dominated by Shiite
Muslims. The potential for a major breakthrough in Iraq-Kuwait relations occurred on January
12, 2011, when then Prime Minister Nasser became the first Kuwait Prime Minister to visit Iraq
since the Iraqi invasion. That visit occurred a few days after Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki
said that Iraq’s former ambitions against Kuwait “have gone forever and will never return
again.”16 Maliki made his first visit to Kuwait on February 16, 2011.
Later in 2011, some mutual suspicions briefly resurfaced. On July 23, 2011, Iraqi
parliamentarians called on Kuwait to suspend construction for its Mubarak the Great port because
it would impinge on Iraq’s attempts to expand its access to the Persian Gulf at the tip of the Faw
peninsula. Other Iraqi parliamentarians alleged that Kuwait was slant drilling in the area and
therefore stealing oil from Iraq. The disputes were reminiscent of the arguments made by Saddam
Hussein to try to justify his invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
These recriminations quieted, helping resolve some issues during a March 15, 2012, Maliki visit
to Kuwait. That visit paved the way for Amir Sabah’s attendance at the March 27-29, 2012, Arab
League summit in Baghdad—an event Iraq considered crucial to its efforts to return to the Arab
fold after decades of isolation. In August 2012, the Iraqi government said “Iraq will end all
pending issues with Kuwait before the start of [2013].” The Iraqi statement appeared to be an
Iraqi effort to garner support for the U.N. Security Council to remove any remaining “Chapter 7”
(of the U.N. Charter) mandates on Iraq stemming from the 1990 invasion. Kuwait’s Prime
Minister Jaber visited Iraq on June 12, 2013, and reached agreement on taking some of the
bilateral issues involving missing Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti property out of the Chapter 7 supervision
of the United Nations and replacing them with alternative mechanisms, as discussed below.

16 “No Claim on Sovereign Kuwait, Iraqi Ambitions Gone Forever.” Arab Times (Kuwait). January 9, 2011.
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Issues Still Outstanding Between Iraq and Kuwait
Reparations Payments Continue. Kuwait has not dropped its insistence on full U.N.-supervised
reparations by Iraq for damages caused from the 1990 invasion. Iraq wants the reparations issue
closed out to cease the deduction of 5% of all its revenue that is used to pay compensation to the
victims of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. To date, the U.N. Compensation Commission (UNCC)
created by the post-Desert Storm U.N. resolutions has paid out over $38 billion to over 100
governments, encompassing nearly 1.5 million claimants. However, about $13.6 billion is still
owed to Kuwaiti claimants, and the U.N. Secretary General’s December 14, 2012, report says it
expects to complete the compensation process by April 2015. On December 15, 2010, the U.N.
Security Council passed three resolutions—1956, 1957, and 1958 that ended Saddam-era
sanctions against Iraq, but the resolutions did not fully end the “Chapter 7” U.N. mandate on Iraq
and continued the 5% automatic revenue deductions.
Missing Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti National Archives. The U.N. resolutions adopted December 15,
2010, also continued the effort, required under post-1991 war U.N. resolutions (most notably
687), to resolve the fate of the 605 Kuwaitis and third party nationals missing and presumed dead
from the 1991 war, as well as that of the missing Kuwaiti national archives. A special U.N. envoy,
Gennady Tarasov, was U.N. High-Level Coordinator for these issues. In September 2011 and in
June 2012, Iraq called for an end to the mandate of Tarasov and for Iraq and Kuwait to pursue the
issue bilaterally. Tarasov retired on December 31, 2012, and the U.N. Secretary General
appointed Victor Poliakov to assume Tarasov’s duties. The June 16, 2013, visit of the Kuwaiti
Prime Minister to Iraq—which followed progress on border demarcations issues discussed
below—resulted in an Iraq-Kuwait joint recommendation to remove these issues of missing
property and persons from the Chapter 7 U.N. mandate, a recommendation that was endorsed in
the U.N. Secretary General’s report of June 17, 2013. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2107 of
June 27, 2013, formally abolished the High-Level Coordinator mandate and transferred the
continuing supervision of these issues to the U.N. Assistance Mission—Iraq (UNAMI)—under
Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter (which does not carry enforcement mechanisms as those adopted
under Chapter VII).
The search process has resulted in finding the remains of 236 Kuwaitis. The cases of 369
Kuwaitis remain unresolved. In 2010, Kuwait made a $1 million grant to the Iraqi Ministry of
Human Rights, which is the lead Iraqi agency trying to determine the fate of the Kuwaitis. A
Tripartite Commission on the issue (Kuwait, Iraq, International Committee of the Red Cross) met
on May 18, 2011, for the first time in many years. To date, more than 10,000 trenches have been
dug to search for remains and jailed members of the Saddam regime have been interviewed.
However, the December 14, 2012, and June 17, 2013, U.N. reports on these issues said no
progress has been made recently, although some excavations were undertaken in Iraq in 2013.
As far as the Kuwaiti National Archives, U.N. reports on December 14, 2012, and June 17, 2013,
say there has been no progress locating the archives. However, Annex I to the June 17, 2013,
report (U.N. document S/2013/357) contains a list of all the Kuwaiti property returned to Kuwait
by Iraq since 2002. Most recently, in June 2012, Iraq did return to Kuwait numerous boxes of
recovered tapes from Kuwait’s state radio, as well as books belonging to Kuwait University, and
keys to Kuwait’s Central Bank.
Kuwait-Iraq Border. Disputes over the Iraq-Kuwait border have also been mostly resolved. Under
post-1991 Gulf War U.N. Security Council Resolution 833, the Council accepted the U.N.-
demarcated border between them. Kuwait has sought that the post-Saddam government in Iraq
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formally acknowledge its commitments under the resolution to pay some of the costs of border
markings and signs. In July 2010, Kuwait gave preliminary approval to open a special border
crossing into Iraq that would facilitate the work of international oil companies working in Iraq.
And, as a consequence of the March 15, 2012, Maliki visit to Kuwait, Iraq agreed to pay its
portion of the costs of maintaining the border markings. The issue of the sea border markings and
related issues was resolved in early 2013.
Other Outstanding Bilateral Disputes/Iraqi Airways. Among other residual issues from the
Saddam era, in 2004, Kuwait reportedly pledged to forgive a substantial portion of the $25 billion
Saddam era debt, but it has not written off the debt to date. Another major dispute concerned
Kuwait Airways’ lawsuits alleging that Iraq owed Kuwait $1.2 billion for planes and parts stolen
during the Iraqi invasion; the actions led to the long-term impoundment of Iraqi Airways jets. The
March 15, 2012, Maliki visit resolved the issue with agreement for Iraq to pay Kuwait $300
million in compensation, and to invest $200 million in an Iraq-Kuwait joint venture to form a
small new airline. Subsequent to the visit, Iraq-Kuwait direct flights resumed. In November 2013,
Kuwait’s national airline, Kuwait Airways, made its first flight to Iraq (Najaf) since the 1990 Iraqi
invasion.
Remaining Threat from Iraqi Extremist Groups. Even though Iraq and Kuwait have improved
relations substantially, Kuwaiti leaders say they remain wary of extremist groups in Iraq. The
December 1983 bombings of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait and an attempted
assassination of the Amir in May 1985 were attributed to the Iran-inspired Iraqi Da’wa (Islamic
Call) Party, composed of Shiites. Seventeen Da’wa activists were arrested for those attacks, and
Da’wa activists hijacked a Kuwait Airlines plane in 1987. Da’wa is the party that Maliki heads,
although the party no longer has a militia wing. The Prime Minister-designate of Iraq, Haydar al-
Abbadi, who as of August 2014 is likely to succeed Maliki, also is a senior Da’wa member.
In July 2011, the Iran-supported militia of Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr rocketed Kuwait’s
embassy in Iraq and caused Kuwait to temporarily bring its diplomats back to Kuwait. Also that
month, another Iraqi Shiite militia, Khata’ib Hezbollah, threatened to attack workers building the
Mubarak the Great port (named after a past ruler) on Bubiyan Island. These and other Iraqi Shiite
militias continue to operate in southern Iraq, although they are said to be entering the political
process in Iraq and de-emphasizing their armed wings.
At the same time, Kuwait has become alarmed at the offensive by the Islamic State, which is
composed of Sunnis but is radical in its ideology. Following the Islamic State’s capture of the
large city of Mosul in June 2014, Kuwait announced a full military alert. As noted above, Kuwait
has joined the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition, even as some of its citizens apparently raise
funds for the Sunni-led Syria rebellion and might be aiding the Islamic State financially.
Iran
For years after the 1990 Iraqi invasion, Kuwait supported Iran as a counterweight to Saddam
Hussein. Kuwait often hosted pro-Iranian Iraqi Shiite oppositionists against Saddam, even though
these same Shiite groups had conducted attacks in Kuwait in the 1980s. Since Saddam’s fall,
Kuwait has, through defense cooperation discussed above, joined U.S. efforts to contain Iran and
protect itself. The Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-QF) of Iran is
the IRGC unit that supports pro-Iranian movements and conducts espionage in neighboring and
other foreign countries. Qods Force activity in Kuwait suggests that Iran has sought to pressure
Kuwait or to promote dissent among Kuwait’s Shiite minority. In May 2010, Kuwait confirmed
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that it had arrested some Kuwaiti civil servants and stateless residents for allegedly working on
behalf of the Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran in
a plot to blow up Kuwaiti energy facilities.17 In March 2011, a Kuwait court sentenced two
Iranians and a Kuwaiti to death in the alleged plot. Kuwait expelled three Iranian diplomats, and
Iran expelled three Kuwaiti diplomats in response. The sentences were commuted to life in prison
on May 28, 2012. In May 2011, the two countries agreed to return their respective ambassadors.
In November 2011, Iran arrested several individuals in Iran who it alleged were “Kuwaiti spies.”
Kuwait also has cooperated with the growing global consensus to sanction Iran. This cooperation
has come despite the comments by the Amir in November 2009 endorsing Iran’s right to purely
peaceful nuclear energy. In July 2010, a U.S. law, P.L. 111-195 (the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010) was enacted that would penalize firms
that supply gasoline to Iran. One Kuwaiti gasoline trading firm, Kuwait’s Independent Petroleum
Group, was reported to be a supplier of gasoline to Iran,18 although it says it stopped doing so as
of September 2010.
At the same time, Kuwait has sought to engage Iran at times when Iran tries to allay GCC
suspicions. Like the other Gulf states, Kuwait hosted visiting Iranian officials following the
November 2013 interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the six negotiating powers. Amir
Sabah went somewhat further than the other GCC leaders in welcoming the apparent changed
Iranian approach by visiting Iran during June 1-2, 2014. His visit included a meeting with Iran’s
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, as well as elected President Hassan Rouhani.
Arab-Israeli Dispute
For many years after the Iraqi invasion, the positions taken by countries and factions on how to
deal with the Iraqi invasion determined Kuwait’s foreign relations. Kuwait was more critical than
were the other Gulf states of the late Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat because he had opposed war
to liberate Kuwait from Iraq. Kuwait expelled about 450,000 Palestinian workers after liberation,
viewing them as disloyal. Kuwait subsequently maintained ties and gave financial support to
Arafat’s Palestinian antagonist, Hamas. Kuwait’s relations with Jordan were strained for many
years because of then leader King Hussein’s opposition to a U.S.-led war to expel Iraqi forces
from Kuwait.
In part because of Kuwait’s past antagonism to the mainstream Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) that still largely leads the Palestinian Authority (PA), Kuwait has not been a major
mediator in intra-Palestinian disputes. Nor has it publicly advanced its own proposals for
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. In line with the positions of the other GCC and Arab
states, Kuwait supports U.N. recognition of the State of Palestine, requested formally by PA
President Mahmoud Abbas at the U.N. General Assembly meetings in September 2011.
During the period of active Gulf-Israel negotiations (1992-1997), Kuwait attended multilateral
working group peace talks with Israel—sessions on arms control, water resources, refugees, and
other issues that were begun as part of the “Oslo Accords” process between Israel and the
Palestinians. However, Kuwait did not host any sessions of the multilaterals. In 1994, Kuwait was

17 “Iran Spy Cell Dismantled in Kuwait.” Associated Press, May 6, 2010; “Iran Cell Planned Attacks in Kuwait,
Minister Says. Reuters, April 21, 2011.
18 http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11788115&Itemid=105.
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key in persuading the other Gulf monarchies to cease enforcement of the secondary (trade with
firms that deal with Israel) and tertiary (trade with firms that do business with blacklisted firms)
Arab boycotts of Israel. However, Kuwait did not, as did Qatar and Oman, subsequently
exchange trade offices with Israel and therefore Kuwait retained the “primary Arab boycott” (on
direct trade with Israel). On the other hand, potentially signaling the Kuwait might join other
GCC states such as UAE in cultivating private ties to Israel, Kuwait’s Foreign Minister Shaykh
Sabah al-Khalid al-Hamad Al Sabah visited the Old City of Jerusalem in September 2014. The
Kuwaiti government denied it represented a trip to Israel, stating that the Old City is a part of
Palestine that is occupied. The visit required at least the tacit cooperation of Israeli authorities.
Other press reports indicate that Kuwait Airways might organize visits by Kuwaiti tourists to
Jerusalem.
Actions on 2011 Uprisings in the Region
Kuwait has generally acted in concert with—although not always as assertively as—other GCC
states on regional issues such as those that have stemmed from recent uprisings in the Middle
East.
Bahrain. Of all the countries affected by “Arab spring” uprisings, Kuwait has the most direct
stake in the outcome in Bahrain, a GCC ally. Kuwait sent a naval unit to support the March 14,
2011, intervention of the GCC’s “Peninsula Shield” unit to assist Bahraini security forces. The
nearly 2,000 GCC ground forces that entered Bahrain were Saudi troops and UAE police. The
Kuwaiti naval unit departed Bahraini waters in July 2011 following the end of the state of
emergency there. The GCC intervention was at odds with U.S. policy to support dialogue
between Bahrain’s government and protesters, and Kuwait’s involvement came despite opposition
from Kuwaiti Shiites, who have largely sympathized with Bahrain’s Shiites.
Libya. Kuwait supported the Arab League position in favor of U.N.-mandated intervention to
protect civilians but, initially, it stopped short of recognizing the Transitional National Council
(TNC) as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people (an action that Qatar and the UAE
took). In April 2011, it pledged about $177 million in financial aid to the TNC. Kuwait did not
contribute any air or other forces to the NATO coalition that conducted strikes in support of anti-
Qadhafi rebels. It recognized the TNC as the sole legitimate representative after the fall of Tripoli
in August 2011.
Yemen. Kuwait joined its GCC allies in developing and implementing a plan for a peaceful
transition of power in Yemen. That effort bore fruit with the departure of President Ali Abdullah
Saleh in January 2012 and the subsequent presidential elections in March 2012.
Syria. As noted above, Kuwait is hosting coalition air operations against Islamic State forces in
Syria. However, as do the other GCC states, Kuwait views the ouster of Syria’s President Bashar
Al Assad, an ally of Iran, as perhaps an even higher priority than combatting the Islamic State.
The GCC countries voted with other Arab League countries to suspend Syria’s membership in the
League in November 2011, and the GCC states closed their embassies in Damascus in April 2012.
The Kuwaiti government has been a major donor of humanitarian aid to victims of the civil war
in Syria, but it has not provided government funds to the armed rebels. Kuwait has hosted two
major donors’ conferences (January 30, 2013, and January 15, 2014) at which Kuwait has
pledged a total of $600 million in humanitarian aid ($300 million at each conference. The funds
were composed overwhelmingly of donations to nine U.N. agencies and to the International
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Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Of the Kuwaiti government’s pledges, about $70 million
was channeled through Kuwaiti agencies such as the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic
Development and the Kuwait Red Crescent Society. At the same time, as discussed below under
“Countering Terrorism Financing,” U.S. officials have stated that the Kuwaiti government has not
done enough to curb private donations by wealthy Kuwaitis to extremist rebel groups in Syria.
Egypt. Kuwait has adopted a position on Egypt similar to that of Saudi Arabia and UAE, but at
odds with Qatar. Qatar was the major Gulf financial benefactor of Egypt during the presidency of
Muslim Brotherhood senior figure Mohammad Morsi. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE assert
that the Brotherhood in Egypt supports Muslim Brotherhood oppositionists in the Gulf states,
including Kuwait. After Morsi was deposed by the Egyptian military on July 3, 2013, Kuwait
contributed $2 billion in loans and oil grants19 to a Saudi-brokered $12 billion financial package
to assist the beleaguered Egyptian economy. Kuwaiti leaders also have criticized U.S. cuts in aid
to Egypt since the Morsi ouster, as reportedly discussed during the September 2013 White House
meeting between the Amir and President Obama. However, Kuwait did not join Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, and UAE in withdrawing their ambassadors from Qatar over the Egypt/Muslim
Brotherhood dispute. The rift was resolved in November 2014 when Qatar signed an agreement
to increase cooperation with the other GCC states on foreign policy issues and the three GCC
states returned their ambassadors to Doha.
Kuwait has also made arrests of Egyptians in Kuwait for political activities. In April 2011, just
after President Hosni Mubarak was overthrown, security officers arrested and deported 21
Egyptian nationals resident in Kuwait for attending meetings in support of Egyptian opposition
figure Dr. Mohammad El Baradei. In August 2011, in line with Kuwait’s stance against the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Kuwaiti authorities said they would deport nine pro-Morsi
demonstrators who had been protesting outside the Egyptian embassy in Kuwait.
Other Assistance. In July 2011, Kuwait contributed $1 million to help relieve the effects of
drought in Somalia. In November 2013, Kuwait donated $10 million in relief aid to the
Philippines following a destructive typhoon there.
Performance on Countering Terrorism Financing/Islamic State
Donations20
The Obama Administration and outside experts have been increasingly critical of Kuwait for
failing to halt private Kuwaiti donations to Islamic extremist groups in Syria.21 According to press
reports, Kuwaiti donors and donor aggregators use social media and other methods to collect
funds for such Syrian factions as Al Nusra Front, which the U.S. government has designated as a
terrorist organization.22 The total amounts of such Kuwaiti donations to Syrian rebel groups is not
known, but the private donor effort reportedly has been highly organized, operating under such
slogans as “Syria Calls,” launched by a group called the “Union of Kuwaiti Campaigns to

19 “Kuwait Offers Egypt $4B Aid, Fuel Package.” Associated Press, July 10, 2013.
20 Some information in this section is taken from the State Department country report on terrorism for 2013, released
April 30, 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224823.htm.
21 Joby Warrick, “Wealthy Donors Influence Syria War,” Washington Post, June 16, 2013.
22 Ben Hubbard. “Donors’ Funds Add Wild Card to War in Syria.” New York Times, November 13, 2013.
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Support Syria.” The donors involved purportedly do not consider the Syrian rebel factions as
“terrorists” to which funds should be denied.
U.S. officials reportedly have urged the Kuwaiti government to try to stop this financial flow.
Treasury Department Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen said
publicly on March 4, 2014, that the appointment of a leading Kuwaiti donor to Al Nusra, Nayef
al-Ajmi, as Minister of Justice and Minister of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf), was “a step in the
wrong direction.”23 Subsequent to those comments, Ajmi resigned his government posts.24 On
August 6, 2014, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two Ajmi tribe members and one
other Kuwaiti, under Executive Order 13224 sanctioning support for international terrorism. The
three sanctioned were Shafi Sultan al-Ajmi, Hajjaj al-Ajmi, and Abd al-Rahman al-Anizi.25
Hajjah al-Ajmi and another Kuwaiti, Hamid Hamad Al Ali, were sanctioned by the United
Nations Security Council for allegedly providing financial support to the Al Nusra Front. In a
speech on October 23, 2014, Cohen reiterated his earlier criticism, saying Kuwait (and Qatar)
were still “permissive jurisdictions” for terrorism financing.26 Earlier, on August 17, 2014, the
United Nations Security Council On Much earlier, in June 2008, the Treasury Department froze
the assets of one of these charities—the Islamic Heritage Restoration Society—for alleged links
to Al Qaeda, under E.O. 13224.
The government has taken some steps to accommodate U.S. views on this issue. In May 2014, the
Ministry of Social Affairs warned Kuwaiti citizens that the campaigns are unauthorized and
violate Kuwait law on financial donations. Kuwait law limits fundraising to only authorized
charity organizations, including the Social Reform Society, Islamic Heritage Restoration Society,
Direct Aid, Sheikh Abdullah al-Nuri Charitable Society, Prisoners Solidarity Society, Sunna
Sciences Society, Kuwait Relief, Al-Najat Charitable Society, Good Tidings Charity, and Patients
Helping Fund Society. The State Department report on global terrorism for 2013, cited above,
credited Kuwait with passing, in May 2013, comprehensive money laundering and anti-terrorism
financing legislation in 2013. According to the State Department report, the 2013 laws correct
significant deficiencies an earlier 2002 law that had hampered Kuwaiti prosecutions of terrorism-
related crimes. The 2013 laws also created a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), which will
investigate terrorism financing and money laundering and prescribe a jail term of up to 15 years
for those convicted of funding terrorist organizations. Kuwait is a member of the Middle East
North Africa Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the 2013 laws adopted apparently were the
product of an action plan Kuwait developed with the FATF to address Kuwait’s weaknesses on
the issue. In August 2014, Kuwait arrested three of its citizens suspected of funneling funds to
extremist groups.
Previous State Department terrorism reports have also praised Kuwait’s programs to encourage
moderation in Islam in Kuwait. There appeared to be no significant attacks attributed to terrorist
organizations in Kuwait in 2013 or thus far in 2014. On November 27, 2011, security services
arrested three Kuwaiti military officials on suspicion of links with a terrorist cell plotting to attack
locations in Bahrain and Qatar.

23 Department of the Treasury. Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen
before the Center for New American Security on “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing.” March 4, 2014.
24 Karen DeYoung. “Kuwait Cabinet Minister Resigns After Allegations.” May 13, 2014.
25 Treasury Department, Office of the Press Secretary. August 6, 2014.
26 Remarks by Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen. “Attacking ISIL’s Financial
Foundation.” October 23, 2014.
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In April 2011 Kuwait introduced biometric fingerprinting at Kuwait International Airport and has
since extended that system to land and sea entry points. The NADR funds shown above have
been used, in large part, to assist Kuwait with counterterrorism efforts, border control, and export
controls.
Kuwait has long sought the return of two prisoners held at the U.S. facility in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, under accusation of belonging to Al Qaeda. Amir Sabah reportedly raised the issue with
President Obama during their September 13, 2013, White House meeting. Kuwait has built a
rehabilitation center for the two, Fayez al Kandari and Fawzi al-Udah, to reintegrate them into
society after they are returned. On November 5, 2014, Fawzi al-Udah was released from
Guantanamo and returned to Kuwait. Al Kandari remains in Guantanamo.
Kuwaiti Economic Policy
In part because of the political disputes and unrest since 2006, Kuwait has underinvested in
capital infrastructure and overspent on public sector salaries and subsidies, according to the IMF
and other observers. Delayed spending on capital infrastructure projects has created an image of
stagnation, particularly compared to the more vibrant GCC states Qatar and UAE. This
impression has been augmented by a lag in foreign direct investment in Kuwait relative to other
GCC states. Only $800 million has been invested in Kuwait in the past 10 years. In contrast, in
the same time period, $10 billion was invested in Bahrain, $73 billion in UAE, and $130 billion
in Saudi Arabia.27
Recent Kuwaiti budgets appeared intended to calm or avoid unrest rather than to set Kuwait up
for long-term growth. As an example, in mid-2013, the National Assembly passed a law
obligating the government to pay $2.5 billion in debts owed by Kuwaitis as a result of the 2008
financial crisis. Total subsidies cost the government about $17.7 billion annually. Observers say
that the government benefits, if continued at current rates, are likely to put Kuwait’s budget into
deficit during 2017-2020. In October 2013 Prime Minister Jaber said the subsidies system had
produced a “welfare state” and was “unsustainable,” and he pledged to work to reduce them.
Kuwait’s finances are likely to suffer further with the drop in oil prices in late 2014 from over
$100 per barrel to about $75 per barrel—Kuwait’s budget is based on a “break even” price of $75
per barrel.
Compounding economic uncertainty, in late October 2014, Saudi Arabia closed an offshore oil
field (Khafji) that it shares with Kuwait. The field produces 280,000 barrels per day, split between
the two countries. The dispute might spill over into other disputes over production in their shared
“neutral zone,” one of whose fields is operated by Chevron Corp. The neutral zone is the only
place in either Saudi Arabia or Kuwait where foreign oil companies are permitted to have equity
in oil fields.
On the other hand, Kuwait has a large sovereign wealth fund, managed by the Kuwait Investment
Authority, with holdings estimated at about $550 billion as of mid-2014, which presumably
would help Kuwait mitigate budgetary shortfalls in future years.28 The National Assembly passed

27 “Kuwait in Crisis As Ruling Family Splits, MP’s Rebel.” Reuters, June 7, 2011.
28 Jamal Hussein. “Kuwait Needs Better Resource Utilization to Close Gap.” Gulf News, July 21, 2014; “Oil Price
Slide Hits Kuwait Government Income.” Naharnet, October 17, 2014.
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some legislation, which took effect September 2010, to privatize major sectors of the Kuwait
economy. In January 2014, the National Assembly approved legislation to privatize Kuwait
Airways.
Political disputes have also prevented movement on several major potential drivers of future
growth, the most prominent of which is Project Kuwait. The project, backed by the Kuwaiti
government, would open Kuwait’s northern oil fields to foreign investment to generate about
500,000 barrels per day of extra production. The Assembly has blocked the $8.5 billion project
for over a decade because of concerns about Kuwait’s sovereignty, and observers say no
compromise is in sight. A project to build a fourth oil refinery, estimated to cost $8 billion, also
has not advanced.
The 2008 financial crisis, coupled with the political infighting, earlier caused Kuwait to shelve a
joint venture with Dow Chemical to form the largest maker of polyethylene. On December 29,
2008, the government cancelled the venture, which was to have required a Kuwaiti investment of
$7.5 billion by state-run Petrochemical Industries Co.- Kuwait. Dow reportedly had planned to
use the proceeds of the investment to fund its purchase of the Rohm and Haas chemical firm,
although that deal ultimately went through anyway. In May 2013, an arbitrator decided in favor of
Dow Chemical, ordering the Petrochemical Industries Co.-Kuwait to pay Dow $2.2 billion in
damages for severing the venture.
The state-owned oil industry still accounts for 75% of government income and 90% of export
earnings. The United States imports about 250,000 barrels per day in crude oil from Kuwait
(about 3% of U.S. oil imports). Total U.S. exports to Kuwait were about $2.6 billion in 2013, the
same as the few preceding years, consisting mostly of automobiles, industrial equipment, and
foodstuffs. Total U.S. imports from Kuwait in 2013 were about $12.6 billion, of which almost all
was crude oil and other petroleum products. Figures for the first half of 2014 show a slight
increase in both exports to Kuwait and imports from Kuwait compared to 2013.
Like other Gulf states, Kuwait sees peaceful uses of nuclear energy as important to its economy,
although doing so always raises fears among some in the United States, Israel, and elsewhere
about the ultimate intentions of developing a nuclear program. Kuwait is cooperating with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure international oversight of any nuclear
work in Kuwait.
In 1994, Kuwait became a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In
February 2004, the United States and Kuwait signed a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA), often viewed as a prelude to a free trade agreement (FTA), which Kuwait has
said it seeks. Kuwait gave $500 million worth of oil to U.S. states affected by Hurricane Katrina.
Table 3. Some Basic Facts
Leadership
Amir: Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Crown Prince/heir
apparent: Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Prime Minister:
Shaykh Jabir al-Mubarak Al Sabah
Population
About 2.7 million, of which 1.2 million are citizens.
GDP (purchasing power parity, PPP)
$166 billion (2013)
Religions
Muslim 85% (Sunni 70%, Shi te 30%); other (Christian, Hindu, Parsi)
15%
GDP per capita (PPP)
$42,000/yr. (2013)
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GDP growth rate
2.3% (2013)
Inflation 2.8%
(2012)
Oil (proven reserves)
102 billion barrels (7% of world proven reserves)
Oil exports
2.15 million barrels per day (mbd)
Sources: CRS; CIA, The World Factbook reports; IMF.

Figure 1. Map of Kuwait

Source: Graphic created by CRS. Boundaries and cities generated by Hannah Fischer using data from
Department of State, Esri, and Google Maps (al 2013).

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

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