The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
Alex Tiersky
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
Matthew C. Weed
Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation
November 12, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43612

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The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy

Summary
The Islamic State is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded
its control over areas of parts of Iraq and Syria since 2013. It threatens the governments of both
countries and potentially several other countries in the region, and has drawn a military response
from the international community. There is debate over the degree to which the Islamic State
organization might represent a direct terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland or to U.S. facilities and
personnel in the region.
The forerunner of the Islamic State (IS) was part of the insurgency against coalition forces in Iraq,
and the organization has in the years since the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq expanded its
control over significant areas of both Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State has thrived in the
disaffected Sunni tribal areas of Iraq and in the remote provinces of Syria torn by the civil war.
Since early 2014, Islamic State-led forces, supported by groups linked to ousted Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein and many Sunni Arab tribalists, have advanced along the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers, seizing multiple population centers including Mosul, one of Iraq’s largest cities. Since
then, IS forces have massacred Syrian adversaries and Iraqi civilians, often from ethnic or
religious minorities, and executed two American journalists who the group had captured while
they were working in Syria. Islamic State fighters also have come close to capturing a key
Kurdish enclave in northern Syria. The Islamic State’s tactics have drawn the ire of the
international community, increasing U.S. attention on Iraq’s political problems and on the civil
war in Syria.
On September 10, President Obama announced a series of actions intended to “degrade, and
ultimately destroy” the Islamic State organization. The United States is leading and seeking to
expand a multilateral coalition that is undertaking direct military action; providing advice,
training, and equipment for partner ground forces in Iraq and Syria; gathering and sharing
intelligence; and using financial measures against the Islamic State. The objective of these
measures is to progressively shrink the geographic and political space, manpower, and financial
resources available to the organization.
The U.S. effort to show progress against the Islamic State, and the recruitment of regional
partners, raises questions of whether the U.S. mission and commitment might expand. The
Administration has ruled out deploying combat forces to either Iraq or Syria, but it has not ruled
out providing forward aircraft controllers, additional military advisors, or other related ground
military assets. Some experts assert that coalition partners inside Iraq and Syria—Iraqi
government forces and select Syrian opposition groups—are too weak to defeat the Islamic State
and will eventually require help from U.S. combat troops. Several of the regional coalition
members apparently seek an expansion of the U.S.-led mission to include an effort to oust
President Bashar al Asad of Syria, arguing that the Islamic State cannot be defeated until the
Syrian political situation is altered.
For details on Islamic State operations in Iraq and U.S. policy toward Iraq since the 2003 U.S.
invasion, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, by Kenneth
Katzman. For further information on the Islamic State’s operations in Syria, see CRS Report
RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M.
Blanchard.

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Contents
The Islamic State ............................................................................................................................. 1
Background................................................................................................................................ 2
The Situation in Iraq ........................................................................................................................ 2
Iraq Government Alterations ..................................................................................................... 4
The Situation in Syria ...................................................................................................................... 5
U.S. Responses and Options ............................................................................................................ 7
U.S. Strategy .............................................................................................................................. 7
Strategy Evolution and Implementation .................................................................................... 8
Mission to Advise, Assist, Train, Target, Protect Personnel and Facilities, and
Gather Intelligence ........................................................................................................... 8
Airstrikes ........................................................................................................................... 10
Weapons Sales to Iraq ....................................................................................................... 10
Humanitarian Airdrops ...................................................................................................... 11
Building Up a Local Partner Force in Syria ...................................................................... 11
Combat Deployments? ...................................................................................................... 12
What Has the Strategy Achieved to Date? ............................................................................... 13
International Coalition ............................................................................................................. 14
Turkey ............................................................................................................................... 15
Saudi Arabia ...................................................................................................................... 16
Jordan ................................................................................................................................ 17
Europe and Other Allies .................................................................................................... 18
Iranian Involvement in the Iraq Crisis ............................................................................... 18
Selected Additional Issues Raised by the Crisis ............................................................................ 22
Authority for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State and the War Powers
Resolution ............................................................................................................................. 22
Humanitarian Impact and Response ........................................................................................ 23
Responses to Threats to U.S. Personnel, Facilities, and Citizens ............................................ 25
Possible Questions for Congressional Consideration .................................................................... 27

Figures
Figure 1. Iraq, Syria, and Regional Unrest .................................................................................... 20
Figure 2. Evolution of IS/ISIL and Extremist Groups in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014 .................... 21

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 28

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The Islamic State
The Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS) is a transnational
Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded its control over areas of
northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria since 2013, threatening the security of both countries
and drawing increased attention from the international community. The Islamic State has thrived
in the disaffected Sunni Muslim-inhabited areas of Iraq and in the remote provinces of Syria torn
by the civil war. The Islamic State’s tactics have drawn the ire of the international community,
increasing U.S. attention on Iraq’s political problems and on the civil war in Syria.
Although the Islamic State is considered a direct threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, it is
unclear if it currently poses a significant direct threat to U.S. homeland security. In September
2014, then-National Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen stated that the group poses
“a direct and significant threat to us—and to Iraqi and Syrian civilians—in the region and
potentially to us here at home.”1 Olsen said that the group’s “strategic goal is to establish an
Islamic caliphate through armed conflict with governments it considers apostate—including Iraq,
Syria, and the United States.” Olsen further said that “we have no credible information that ISIL
is planning to attack the U.S.,” and highlighted potential threats posed by foreign fighters with
Western passports. According to Olsen, U.S. counterterrorism officials “remain mindful of the
possibility that an ISIL-sympathizer—perhaps motivated by online propaganda—could conduct a
limited, self-directed attack here at home with no warning.” However, Olsen noted that, “In our
view, any threat to the U.S. homeland from these types of extremists is likely to be limited in
scope and scale.” A CIA spokesperson provided an updated estimate of the IS organization’s size
in September 2014, saying the group could muster 20,000 to 31,500 individuals. Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey told the Senate Armed Services Committee on
September 16 that two-thirds of the Islamic State organization’s personnel remain in Syria. U.S.
officials report that as many as 15,000 foreign fighters from 80 countries have travelled to Syria,
including more than 1,000 Europeans, and more than 100 U.S. citizens, with approximately 12
Americans believed to be currently fighting there.
Statements and media materials released by the Islamic State reflect an uncompromising,
exclusionary worldview and a relentless ambition. Statements by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and
Islamic State spokesman Abu Mohammed al Adnani feature sectarian calls for violence and
identify Shiites, non-Muslims, and unsupportive Sunnis as enemies in the group’s struggle to
establish “the Islamic State” and to revive their vision of “the caliphate.”2 The group describes
Iraqi Shiites derogatorily as “rejectionists” and “polytheists” and paints the Iraqi government as a
puppet of Iran. Similar ire is aimed at Syrian Alawites and the Asad government, although some
sources allege that operatives for the Islamic State and its antecedents have benefitted from
evolving financial and security arrangements with Damascus that started during the 2003-2011
U.S. military presence in Iraq.
In July 2012, Al Baghdadi warned U.S. leaders that “the mujahidin have set out to chase the
affiliates of your armies that have fled.... You will see them in your own country, God willing.

1 Remarks at the Brookings Institution by NCTC Director Matthew G. Olsen, September 3, 2014.
2 OSC Report GMP20130409405003, “ISI Emir Declares ISI, Al-Nusrah Front: ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,’”
translated from Ansar al Mujahideen Network, April 9, 2013.
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The war with you has just begun.”3 In January 2014, Al Baghdadi threatened the United States
directly, saying, “Know, O defender of the Cross, that a proxy war will not help you in the
Levant, just as it will not help you in Iraq. Soon, you will be in direct conflict—God permitting—
against your will.”4 English language propaganda and recruiting material released by the group in
connection with its recent executions of U.S. citizens James Foley and Stephen Sotloff suggest
the group is attempting to portray itself as responding to U.S. aggression, a posture adopted by its
predecessors and now rivals in Al Qaeda.
Background
The Islamic State’s ideological and organizational roots lie in the forces built and led by the late
Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq from 2002 through 2006—Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and
Jihad) and Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (aka Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I). Following
Zarqawi’s death at the hands of U.S. forces in June 2006, AQ-I leaders repackaged the group as a
coalition known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISI lost its two top leaders in 2010 and was
weakened, but not eliminated, by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Under the leadership of
Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’i (aka Abu Bakr al Baghdadi),5 ISI rebuilt its
capabilities. By early 2013, the group was conducting dozens of deadly attacks a month inside
Iraq. The precise nature of ISI’s relationship to Al Qaeda leaders from 2006 onward is unclear. In
recent months, Islamic State leaders have stated their view that their group “is not and has never
been an offshoot of Al Qaeda,”6 and that, given that they view themselves as a state and a
sovereign political entity, they have given leaders of the Al Qaeda organization deference rather
than pledges of obedience.
In April 2013, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced his intent to merge his forces in Iraq and Syria
with those of the Syria-based Jabhat al Nusra, under the name the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL/ISIS). Jabhat al Nusra and Al Qaeda leaders rejected the merger, underscoring
growing tensions among Sunni extremists in the region.
Additional analysis can be found in CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview
and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard; and CRS Report RS21968, Iraq:
Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, by Kenneth Katzman.
The Situation in Iraq
Many observers assessed that the Iraqi government was able to contain an IS-led insurrection in
Iraq’s Anbar Province that captured the city of Fallujah and parts of the provincial capital of
Ramadi in January 2014. Such forecasts were upended on June 10, 2014, when the Islamic State
captured the northern city of Mosul amid mass desertions by ISF officers and personnel.
According to one expert, about 60 out of 243 Iraqi army combat battalions could not be

3 OSC Report GMP20120721586002, “Islamic State of Iraq Amir Calls on Sunni Tribes to ‘Repent,’” July 21, 2012.
4 OSC Report TRR2014011980831299, “Al-Furqan Establishment Releases Audio Statement by ISIL Emir
Condemning ‘War’ Against Group,” translated from Al Minbar al I’lami Jihadist Forum, January 19, 2014.
5 Al Baghdadi reportedly was arrested and detained by U.S. forces in Iraq.
6 OSC Report TRN2014051234500562, “Al-Furqan Releases ISIL Al-Adnani’s Message Criticizing Al-Zawahiri,
Refusing to Leave Syria,” Twitter, May 11-12, 2014.
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accounted for.7 The Islamic State offensive was reportedly joined by Sunni tribal fighters, former
members of the late Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and military, and other Sunni residents.8 The
Sunni support for the offensive, despite reservations among many Sunnis about the Islamic
State’s brutal tactics against opponents and its intention to impose its version of Islamic law,
appeared to reflect broad Sunni dissatisfaction with the government of Prime Minister Nuri al
Maliki that was then in power.9
After taking Mosul, the IS-led fighters advanced to Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit and other cities,
and into Diyala Province, which has roughly equal numbers of Sunnis and Shiites. In the course
of the offensive, IS and allied fighters looted banks, freed prisoners, and reportedly captured a
substantial amount of U.S.-supplied military equipment, such as HMMWVs (“Humvees”) and
artillery equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) targeting systems.10 Islamic State–led
fighters captured the city of Tal Afar west of Mosul on June 16 and reached the outskirts of
Baqubah, capital of Diyala, about 38 miles northeast of Baghdad, by June 17. In mid-July, IS
members in Mosul expelled remaining Christians there from the city.11
Shiite militias mobilized to try to help the government prevent IS forces from reaching Baghdad.
The Iraqi capital is reportedly about 80% Shiite-inhabited, and many Shiites there and from
elsewhere volunteered for militia service—in part answering a call by Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric,
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani—to help the ISF. With support from these militias, the government
forces regrouped to some extent and stalled the Islamic State advance on the capital.
The ISF collapse in the north enabled the peshmerga (Kurdish militia) to capture Kirkuk and
large nearby oil fields abandoned by the ISF. The Kurds have long sought to control that oil-rich
region, which they claim is historic Kurdish territory, and to affiliate the province with their
autonomous region run by a Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). On July 11, peshmerga
reportedly seized control of two key oil fields near Kirkuk from a state-controlled company.
Many experts assert that the Kurds are unlikely to willingly return control of Kirkuk and related
areas to the central government.12 The peshmerga gains prompted renewed discussion among
KRG leaders about seeking outright independence from Iraq. In early July, KRG President
Masoud Barzani asked the KRG parliament to plan a referendum on independence.13 However,
Kurdish leaders subsequently stated that the crisis the KRG faces from the Islamic State
organization has caused KRG leaders to shelve the independence effort, at least temporarily. KRG
leaders probably view the independence issue primarily as leverage in disputes with Baghdad,
such as those over KRG oil exports and revenue-sharing.
The indirect benefits to the Kurds of the Islamic State offensive proved illusory when Islamic
State–led forces advanced into territory controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
and its peshmerga militia fighters in early August. In the face of superior Islamic State firepower,

7 Michael Knights in “Iraq’s Dire Situation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 17, 2014.
8 Tim Arango, “Uneasy Alliance Gives Insurgents an Edge in Iraq,” New York Times, June 19, 2014.
9 “Unlikely Allies Aid Militants in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2014.
10 Mitchell Prothero, “Iraqi Army Remains on Defensive as Extent of June Debacle Becomes Clearer,” McLatchey
Wire Service, July 14, 2014.
11 Alissa Rubin, “ISIS Expels Last Iraqi Christians from Mosul,” New York Times, July 19, 2014.
12 Author conversations with expert on the Iraqi Kurds, June-August 2014.
13 For more information on the Kurds and the potential for the Iraqi Kurds to declare independence, see CRS Insight
IN10105, The Kurds and Possible Iraqi Kurdish Independence, by Jim Zanotti and Kenneth Katzman.
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the relatively lightly armed Kurdish forces retreated from several towns inhabited mostly by
Christians and other Iraqi minorities, particularly the Yazidis. The Yazidis are mostly Kurdish
speaking and practice a mix of ancient religions, including Zoroastrianism, which held sway in
Iran before the advent of Islam.14 Fearing Islamic State threats to execute them if they did not
convert to Islam, an estimated 35,000–50,000 Yazidis fled to Sinjar Mountain.15 By August 8,
Islamic State–led fighters had also advanced to within about 40 miles of the KRG capital of Irbil,
causing some flight from the city, and heightening U.S. concern about the security of U.S.
diplomatic and military personnel there. Reports of human rights violations by the Islamic State
emerged, including murder, kidnappings, forced conversions, and physical and sexual assault.16
Islamic State–led forces captured Iraq’s largest dam, the Mosul Dam, as well, which Kurdish
leaders assert could have been damaged or used by the Islamic State to flood wide areas of
northern and central Iraq.
Subsequently, U.S. and allied efforts have helped the peshmerga reverse some Islamic State gains,
and have helped the ISF limit any further IS advances. Specifics results of U.S. strategy on
Islamic State control over territory is discussed below.
Iraq Government Alterations
The Islamic State advance also led to changes in Iraq’s leadership. Elections for the Iraqi Council
of Representatives (COR) were held on April 30, 2014, beginning the process of forming a new
government. By informal agreement, the COR speakership is held by a Sunni Arab; the largely
ceremonial presidency is held by a Kurd; and the powerful executive post of Prime Minister is
held by a Shiite Arab. Even before the Islamic State’s capture of Mosul, several Iraqi factions and
some within Prime Minister Maliki’s core coalition opposed a third Maliki term as Prime
Minister, despite the strong electoral performance of his “State of Law” bloc. After the Islamic
State capture of Mosul, senior Obama Administration officials publicly blamed Maliki for
pursuing sectarian politics that generated Sunni support for the Islamic State, and indicated he
needed to be replaced. 17
In July, the COR selected as COR Speaker Salim al Jabburi (a Sunni), and two deputies, and
veteran Kurdish figure Fouad Masoum as Iraq’s President. On August 11, in line with the
constitutional responsibilities of the president, Masoum formally asked Haydar al Abbadi, a 62-
year old member of Maliki’s Da’wa Party, to become Prime Minister-designate. Al Abbadi’s
selection attracted public support from U.S. officials as well as from senior figures in Iran,
causing support for Maliki’s initial challenge of the Abbadi designation to collapse. The
designation gave him 30 days (until September 10) to form and achieve parliamentary
confirmation for a new cabinet. His work program and all but two of his ministerial nominations
were approved by the COR on September 8, enabling Abbadi to assume the prime ministership.
The two powerful security posts of Interior and Defense Minister were not immediately filled, but
Abbadi achieved COR confirmation on October 18 of Mohammad Ghabban, who is linked to a

14 Ishaan Tharoor, “Who Are the Yazidis?” Washington Post, August 7, 2014.
15 UNOCHA, “Iraq: OCHA Flash Update: Iraq Crisis—Significant Displacement from Sinjar,” No. 2, August 4, 2014;
Assessment Capacities Project, “Humanitarian Implications of Violence in Northern and Central Iraq,” August 7, 2014.
16 UNAMI, Public Information Office, “UN Gravely Concerned About Situation in Northern Iraq; Calls for Urgent
Response,” August 7, 2014.
17 “Kerry Says U.S. Wants Iraqis to Find Inclusive Leadership,” Reuters, June 22, 2014.
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Shiite militia organization (Badr Organization), as Interior Minister. That selection could
potentially give many Iraqi Sunnis pause as to whether the Abbadi government will prove less
sectarian than that of Maliki. The same day, the COR confirmed Khalid al-Ubaydi, a Sunni ex-
military officer during Saddam’s rule, as Defense Minister, perhaps partly mitigating the Ghabban
nomination.
As part of his outreach to Sunnis, on September 10, 2014, in conjunction with a visit by Secretary
of State John Kerry, Abbadi proposed to recruit Sunnis to a new “national guard” force that would
protect Sunni-inhabited areas that might be taken back from Islamic State control. In early
November, Abbadi visited tribal leaders and other notables in overwhelmingly Sunni-inhabited
Anbar Province, much of which has been captured by Islamic State forces.
The Situation in Syria18
Since 2013, Islamic State fighters have used Syria both as a staging ground for attacks in Iraq and
as a parallel theater of operations.19 In early 2014, IS fighters reestablished control in most areas
of the northern Syrian province of Raqqah and reasserted themselves to the east in Dayr az Zawr,
a province rich in oil and gas resources bordering the Anbar region of Iraq. Since late 2013, the
Islamic State has controlled several oilfields in Dayr az Zawr and reportedly has drawn revenue
from oil sales to the Syrian government. With the proceeds, the group was able to maintain
operational independence from Al Qaeda’s leadership and pay competitive salaries to its fighters.
The Islamic State derived additional revenue in Syria by imposing taxes on local populations and
demanding a percentage of the funds involved in humanitarian and commercial operations in
areas under its control.20 The Islamic State also has operated north of Dayr az Zawr in Hasakah
province, establishing a connection to Iraq’s Nineveh province that it was apparently able to
exploit in its eventual advance towards Mosul.
IS gains in Iraq are likely to facilitate the flow of weapons and fighters into eastern Syria to the
Islamic State and other groups, both because of the publicity from these gains and because of the
supply lines they open. Captured U.S.-origin military equipment provided to Iraqi security forces
has appeared in photos reportedly taken in Syria and posted on social media outlets. Anecdotal
reporting suggests that the group relies on brutality and intimidation to manage communities
under its control, and in some areas partnerships with local armed groups appear to facilitate IS
control.
At some point, the Islamic State’s expanding theater of conflict could subject it to overextension.
IS gains may also motivate the Iraqi and Syrian governments to cooperate more closely in
seeking to counter the group, potentially altering the dynamics in both conflicts.
Further IS advances in Iraq could weaken the Syrian’s government’s ability to hold ground in
contested areas, as some Iraqi Shiite militants who had previously fought alongside Asad forces
return home to combat the IS.21 In mid-June 2014, Syrian forces conducted air strikes against IS-

18 Prepared by Carla Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs. For more information see CRS Report
RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
19 “Syria War Fueling Attacks by al Qaeda in Iraq, Officials Say,” New York Times, August 15, 2013.
20 “Sunni Fighters Gain as They Battle 2 Governments, and Other Rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014.
21 “Seeing Their Gains at Risk, Shiites Flock to Join Militias,” New York Times, June 13, 2014.
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held areas of Raqqah and Hasakah in coordination with the Iraqi government, according to the
London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.22 Syria later struck IS targets near a border
crossing between the two states and continues to conduct airstrikes on IS positions in Raqqah
province. IS fighters in late July and early August escalated attacks on government Army and Air
Force bases in northeastern Syria, capturing several, seizing armaments, and executing captured
Syrian military personnel.23
It is unclear what impact IS gains in Iraq would have outside of northeastern Syria. At least half
of Syria-based IS fighters are Syrian or Iraqi tribesmen, according to a Syrian IS defector.24 Like
other segments of the Syrian opposition, Syrian tribes have at times been reluctant to expand
hostilities against government forces beyond their own local areas.25 The Islamic State to date has
concentrated its forces in Syria’s northeast, and has largely avoided regular confrontations in the
country’s main urban areas in Syria’s western half. In early August, Syrian rebels who had
reportedly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State clashed with Lebanese Armed Forces for
control of the Lebanese town of Arsal, 13 km west of the Syrian border. However, some observers
note that there is no indication that the group coordinated its attack in advance with IS
leadership.26
Some ongoing IS operations in Syria are focused in Dayr az Zawr, as the group fights to
consolidate its supply lines to the city of Abu Kamal, a key node along the Syria-Iraq border.
Press and social media reports suggest that IS, by mid-July, had seized large sectors of the
provincial capital of Dayr az-Zawr, although some neighborhoods remain contested by the regime
and other rebel groups.27 Following the IS declaration of a caliphate, many local and tribal rebel
forces surrendered to the group and withdrew from their positions, further expanding the IS
presence in the Dayr az-Zawr countryside.28 Others resisted the Islamic State’s advance, and were
crushed. Any Iraqi or U.S. efforts to disrupt or sever IS supply lines through Abu Kamal or
between Dayr az Zawr and Mosul could benefit Syrian military and/or Nusra Front forces also
operating in the area. Islamic State fighters also remain engaged in operations against Syrian
Armed Forces southwest of Raqqah and against a range of armed Syrian opposition groups to the
northeast of Aleppo.
Syrian Kurdish fighters from the People’s Protection Units (known as the YPG) continue to clash
with IS fighters along the border with Iraq and Turkey.29 YPG forces in early August established
security corridors along the Iraqi border, enabling some refugees fleeing IS violence in Iraq to
cross into Kurdish-held areas of Syria, according to a Syrian Kurdish aid worker.30 The Islamic
State’s siege in September and October of the Syrian-Turkish border town of Kobane/Ayn al Arab
has drawn increasing regional and international attention. More than 150,000 residents of the area

22 “Syria Pounds ISIS Bases in Coordination with Iraq,” Daily Star, June 15, 2014.
23 Institute for the Study of War, “Syria Update: July 26-August 7, 2014.”
24 “Sunni Fighters Gain as They Battle 2 Governments and Other Rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014.
25 “The Tribal Factor in Syria’s Rebellion: A Survey of Armed Tribal Groups in Syria.” The Jamestown Foundation,
June 27, 2013.
26 Institute for the Study of War, “The Battle for Arsal,” August 7, 2013.
27 “Syria’s Allies Are Stretched by Widening War,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2014; “Resistance Emerges as ISIS
Consolidates in Deir az Zour,” July 15, 2014.
28 Institute for the Study of War, “ISIS Advances in Deir ez Zour,” July 5, 2014.
29 OSC Report EUR2014090645329482, September 6, 2014.
30 OSC Report EUR2014080850721279, August 8, 2014
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have been driven into Turkey by the fighting, and fears that Islamic State forces would massacre
the predominantly Kurdish defenders and remaining residents of the town have grown over time.
U.S. and coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria since September 23 have largely
focused on “degrading the capacity of (the Islamic State) at its core to project power, to command
itself, to sustain itself, to resource itself.” Subsequent U.S. and coalition strikes against IS forces
near and inside Kobane have destroyed some IS vehicles and personnel, but had not fully
reversed the group’s gains or broken the siege of the town as of October 22.
U.S. Responses and Options
As the Islamic State offensive in Iraq progressed and the group beheaded two American
journalists it had captured, the Obama Administration asserted that the Islamic State constitutes a
threat to U.S. interests that necessitates U.S. intervention.
U.S. Strategy
On September 10, 2014, following discussions at a NATO summit in Wales during September 4-
5, 2014, President Obama announced a U.S. strategy to counter the Islamic State. President
Obama stated that that the United States would seek to lead a multilateral coalition to try to
“degrade, and ultimately defeat” the Islamic State organization by progressively reducing the
geographic and political space, manpower, and financial resources available to it. Under the
strategy, different members of the coalition are undertaking varying measures, including direct
military action, support for partner ground forces in Iraq and Syria, intelligence gathering and
sharing, and financial measures. Among the major points President Obama announced on
September 10 were the following:31
• The U.S. intelligence community believes that thousands of foreigners have
joined the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria and that these fighters
could try to return to their home countries and carry out deadly attacks. The
group’s leaders have threatened the United States and its allies, but the United
States had not detected specific Islamic State plots against the U.S. homeland.
• U.S. strategy will not involve deployment of U.S. combat troops, but will rely on
strengthening local partners who are fighting Islamic State forces.
• The United States would expand airstrikes in Iraq (strikes began there on August
8) to help the ISF and the Kurdish peshmerga advance against IS-led forces, and
might also strike IS targets in Syria (an expansion subsequently undertaken).
• The United States would provide an additional 475 advisers (beyond the 300
deployed to that time), and will support Iraqi efforts to establish a “national
guard” to help Iraqi Sunni Arabs defend themselves from the Islamic State. (A
major expansion of the U.S. advice and training program for the ISF was
announced on November 7, as discussed further below.)
• The Administration would reiterate a request for Congress to give the
Administration authority to train and equip vetted Syrian rebel forces, which

31 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” September 10, 2014.
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would serve as the partner ground force of U.S. strategy in Syria. That authority
was since provided as part of the continuing appropriations resolution and is
likely to be revisited by Congress as part of full year appropriations or
authorization legislation.
• The United States would not coordinate any actions in Syria with the Asad
regime “that terrorizes its own people.”
• Working with international partners, the United States would increase efforts to
cut off Islamic State finances; improve intelligence on the group; strengthen anti-
terrorism defenses; counter the Islamic State’s “warped ideology”; and stem “the
flow of foreign fighters into and out of the Middle East.”
• The U.S.-led coalition would continue to provide humanitarian assistance to
those displaced by Islamic State offensives, including Sunni and Shiite Muslims
and Christians and members of other religious minorities.
Strategy Evolution and Implementation
U.S. strategy has evolved since September 10 to address events and differing conditions in Iraq
and Syria and the recruitment of coalition partners—some of which have different priorities than
those of the United States. In Iraq, the United States is working with welcoming, organized, and
recognized partners on the ground in the ISF and peshmerga. Syria, on the other hand, illuminates
several dilemmas for the Administration—Syrian opposition forces who have been fighting the
Islamic State welcome U.S. and coalition assistance in their campaign, but question why the
United States does not take military action against the Asad government or more robust action to
degrade IS capabilities in Syria. The Administration continues to pressure the Asad government
into negotiating with opposition groups and fulfilling its pledges with regard to chemical
weapons, while managing concerns that the full scale degradation of Islamic State forces in Syria
could produce the unintended consequence of either taking military pressure off the Asad regime
or helping other extremist groups such as the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra to advance.
The U.S. military operation that is implementing the strategy discussed below has been termed
“Operation Inherent Resolve.” Retired General John Allen serves as Special Presidential Envoy
for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs (Iraq and Iran), serves as General Allen’s deputy senior envoy with the
rank of Ambassador. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Lloyd Austin is
the lead U.S. officer with respect to implementing the military aspects of U.S. strategy.
Mission to Advise, Assist, Train, Target, Protect Personnel and Facilities, and
Gather Intelligence
President Obama stated on June 13, 2014, after the Islamic State capture of Mosul, that the Iraqi
government “needs additional support to break the momentum of extremist groups and bolster the
capabilities of Iraqi security forces.”32 Since then, about 3,100 U.S. military personnel have been
authorized by the President deploy to Iraq to advise and train Iraqi forces to protect U.S. facilities
and personnel, and to assist in targeting U.S. airstrikes there.

32 White House, “Statement by the President on Iraq,” June 13, 2014.
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Advisers.33 Of the 3,100 total military personnel authorized, a deployment of 1,500 advisers and
trainers were authorized by President Obama on November 7, at the request of the Iraqi
government. The additional deployments are contingent on congressional approval of a $1.618
billion funding request for an “Iraq Train and Equip Fund” The funding request is part of a
broader $5.6 billion request for the anti-ISF mission for FY2015. The Administration funding
request stipulates that 40% of the requested U.S. train and equip funds would not be expended
unless foreign contributions equal to 40% of the $1.618 billion are contributed (of which half that
contributed amount is to come from the Iraqi government).
The 1,500 additional personnel authorized on November 7 is to include 630 advisers to expand
the “advise-and-assist” mission being undertaken by the approximately 600 already there (of an
authorized number of 775, as of November 2014).34 The existing advise-and-assist mission
operates out of “Joint Operations Centers” in Baghdad (U.S.-ISF) and Irbil (U.S.-peshmerga), and
additional advisory, and additional centers will be established to provide advice to the ISF and
peshmerga at the brigade level. Part of the U.S. advisers’ task has been to assess the quality of the
ISF and other Iraqi forces. The advisers reportedly have concluded that only about half of all ISF
units are sufficiently capable for U.S. advisers to help them regain captured territory.35 The
definition of “capable,” according to U.S. officials, includes whether an ISF integrates both Sunni
and Shiite personnel.
Trainers. The November 7 announcement by President Obama stated that the United States and
its coalition partners would establish a training mission for the ISF and pershmerga, at several
sites around Iraq. Of the 1,500 U.S. personnel authorized on November 7, about 870 will be
trainers. DOD media indicated that trainings sites might be located in Anbar, Irbil, Diyala, and
Baghdad provinces, depending on the outcome of site surveys. 36A t these sites, a total of nine ISF
brigades (about 2,500 personnel) and three peshmerga brigades will be trained over a period of
about eight-ten months. The reported intent of the training is to prepare the Iraqi forces to go on
the offensive against Islamic State strongholds in Iraq as early as the spring of 2015, although
U.S. officials stress that the counter-offensive is being planned by Iraqi forces and will be carried
out on the Iraqis’ timetable.37
The U.S. trainers will be supplemented by coalition partners, according to DOD officials. These
officials say that about 700 trainers will be supplied by partner countries, such as Denmark which
pledged to supply 120 trainers on November 7.
One uncertain aspect of the training program involves pro-government Sunni fighters. According
to DOD announcements and statements on November 7, the training program might, subject to
further discussion, include Sunni tribal fighters “who are under the control of the Defense
Ministry.” This would appear to refer to the approximately 20,000 “Sons of Iraq” (also known as

33 Information from DOD press releases and press conference by DOD spokesman Adm. William Kirby. November 7,
2014.
34 Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “Iraqis Preapare ISIS Offensive, With U.S. Help.” New York Times, November 3,
2014.
35 Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised Iraqi Force,” New York Times, July
14, 2014.
36 Claudette Roulo. “President Authorizes Additional Troops for Counter-ISIL Effort. DOD News, November 7, 2014.
37 Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt. “Iraqis Preapare ISIS Offensive, With U.S. Help.” New York Times, November 3,
2014.
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Sahwa, or “Awakening” Fighters) who were recruited by the U.S. military during 2006-8 and
were later integrated into the formal Iraqi security force structure. Including the Sunni tribal
fighters in the training program—along with the Iraqi government establishment of a Sunni
“national guard”— appears to represent an effort to signal to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs that Sunnis—not
Shiites—will control security in areas recaptured from Islamic State forces.
Force and Facility Protectors. Of the 3,100 authorized U.S. military personnel for Iraq, about 820
military personnel are securing the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. facilities in Baghdad and Irbil.
Their mission is also to protect evacuation routes such as the international airport in Baghdad, and
to operate surveillance aircraft.
Airstrikes
As Islamic State fighters advanced on Irbil, on August 7, 2014, President Obama authorized
targeted airstrikes against Islamic State positions that pose a threat to U.S. personnel or facilities
or to alleviate humanitarian suffering caused by the Islamic State. On September 10, President
Obama announced that strikes would “go beyond protecting our own people and humanitarian
missions so that we’re hitting ISIL targets as Iraqi forces go on the offensive.”
It was subsequently reported that airstrikes would be conducted in Syria as well, in order to
weaken the Islamic State organization’s ability to support its forces in Iraq. U.S. combat aircraft
and armed unmanned aerial vehicles have conducted an average of about five strikes per day in
Iraq (since August 8) and Syria (since September 22), joined since September by coalition
partners as discussed below.
Weapons Sales to Iraq
Since the Islamic State–led capture of Mosul in June, the United States has announced sales of
over 5,000 additional HELLFIRE air-to-surface missiles to Baghdad. The Defense Department
announced on October 17, 2014 that Iraq has asked to buy another 800 of the missiles.
Deliveries of U.S.-made F-16s and Apaches, purchased in 2011 and 2012, are in their early
stages. The aircraft are being delivered in Tucson, Arizona, where Iraq’s pilots will train on the
system before taking them to Iraq. Three F-16s will be delivered in December 2014 and then one
per month will be delivered through May 2015, completing delivery of the first group of 8 out of
the 36 total that were ordered. The F-16s are being delivered in Arizona because their base in
Iraq, Balad Air Base, is besieged by Islamic State fighters.
The Administration is supplying mostly lighter weaponry and ammunition directly to the
peshmerga, through the Central Intelligence Agency.38 That channel is a means of adapting to a
general policy that requires all U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS, run by the Defense
Department) to be provided to a country’s central government. The ISF also has transferred some
of its U.S.-supplied weapons to the peshmerga, and the peshmerga, with U.S. assistance, has
retransferred some weapons and ammunition to Kurdish forces fighting Islamic State fighters in
Syria.39 Kurdish and U.S. officials have said that, as part of a long-term strategy to drive IS forces

38 Craig Whitlock and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Directly Arms Kurdish Forces,” Washington Post, August 12, 2014.
39 U.S. Central Command news release. “U.S. Resupplies Kurdish Forces Fighting ISIL Near Kobani.” October 20,
2014.
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back, the peshmerga will require heavy and long range weapons—in part to counter the Islamic
State’s use of captured U.S. weapons.40 Several other countries, such as Britain, Germany, and
France, have been supplying weaponry to the peshmerga.
Humanitarian Airdrops
During early August 2014, the U.S. military conducted airdrops of food and water to those
trapped on Sinjar Mountain. In late August, the U.S. military airdropped humanitarian aid to the
town of Amerli (in eastern Salahuddin Province), inhabited by ethnic Turkmen Shiite Muslims,
which was surrounded by ISIS fighters. In October, U.S. forces airdropped medical supplies as
well as weapons and ammunition to Kurdish fighters defending the city of Kobane in Syria from
an IS assault.
Building Up a Local Partner Force in Syria
Well before the President’s September 10 speech on an anti-Islamic State strategy, Administration
officials had asserted that countering the Islamic State will require dealing in some way with the
group’s branch in Syria. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey on
August 21 asserted that the group could not be defeated without accounting for its Syrian branch,
stating that the group “will have to be addressed on both sides of what is essentially at this point a
nonexistent border.”41 As noted above, the U.S. strategy against the Islamic State’s Syria branch
appears to center on supporting yet-to-be-vetted Syrians, some of whom may be fighting not only
the Islamic State but also Syrian government forces. On September 5, President Obama stated,
With respect to the situation on the ground in Syria, we will not be placing U.S. ground
troops to try to control the areas that are part of the conflict inside of Syria. I don’t think
that’s necessary for us to accomplish our goal. We are going to have to find effective
partners on the ground to push back against ISIL. And the moderate coalition there is one
that we can work with. We have experience working with many of them. They have been, to
some degree, outgunned and outmanned, and that’s why it’s important for us to work with
our friends and allies to support them more effectively.42
President Obama’s requests to Congress for authority and resources to train and equip vetted
members of the Syrian opposition in support of U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State
organization—reiterated in the President’s September 10 speech—reinvigorated congressional
debate on the subject. Some congressional committees acted to consider the President’s June 2014
request prior to the August congressional recess, and both houses of Congress considered a
revised Administration request in the context of the passage of H.J.Res. 124, the short-term
FY2015 continuing resolution, in September. The FY2015 continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 124,
P.L. 113-164) authorizes the Department of Defense through December 11, 2014, or until the
passage of a FY2015 defense authorization act to provide overt assistance, including training,
equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to vetted members of the Syrian opposition and other
vetted Syrians for select purposes. As enacted, H.J.Res. 124 contains a temporary authorization
for the training and equipping of vetted Syrians that differs from the Administration’s June and
September requests and from other pending legislation. When Congress returns, Members may be

40 Press briefing by the Director of Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. Gen. William Mayville. August 11, 2014.
41 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, August 21, 2014.
42 Remarks by President Obama at NATO Summit Press Conference, September 5, 2014.
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asked to re-endorse or consider changes to the train and equip authority granted in H.J.Res. 124
during consideration of full-year FY2015 appropriations or defense authorization legislation. For
more on this program and related legislation, see CRS Report R43727, Proposed Train and Equip
Authorities for Syria: In Brief, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Amy Belasco.43
Advocates of continued U.S. support for select opposition groups in Syria have argued that the
withdrawal or reduction of such assistance would bolster less cooperative or friendly groups.
Advocates have further argued that if the United States withdraws or reduces its support, then it
may “force” moderate groups to turn to extremist groups for funding and support—thereby
increasing the influence of extremists while reducing U.S. leverage.
Critics of continued or expanded U.S. support have argued that such assistance risks exacerbating
rivalry among opposition groups and reducing the credibility of groups and individuals seen to be
aligned with the United States. Critics of support proposals also have pointed to problems in
ensuring the identity and intentions of end users of provided support and the uses of U.S.-
provided materiel or training.
The purposes, content, and scope of any expanded U.S. or coalition assistance to armed
opposition groups also may be controversial among Syrians. President Obama has suggested that
U.S. engagement will remain focused “narrowly” on assisting Syrians in combatting the Islamic
State, while continuing “to look for opportunities” to support a political resolution to Syria’s
conflict.44 Some Syrian political and military opposition forces appear to resent such a narrow
focus and some have indicated they may insist on broader support for their anti-Asad goals as a
condition of working with a U.S.-backed coalition against the Islamic State.
Combat Deployments?
President Obama has repeatedly ruled out deploying ground combat troops to Iraq or Syria to
reverse Islamic State gains.45 However, comments by General Dempsey at a Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing on September 14, 2014 and since have presented a potentially more
complex picture of this issue.46 General Dempsey indicated he might recommend that U.S.
advisers in Iraq work directly with Iraqi and peshmerga forces on the battlefield, for example if
there were a decision to try to recapture Mosul from Islamic State forces. The November
expansion of the advisory mission beyond Baghdad and Irbil appears to represent a significant
step toward exercising this close advisory support mission, even though the advisors will not
work with the ISF below the brigade level. Still, General Dempsey and other Administration
officials have distinguished such “close combat advisory” missions from the introduction of U.S.
combat units that would conduct operations against Islamic State forces.

43 Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget_amendments.
44 The President said, “our attitude towards Asad continues to be that you know, through his actions, through using
chemical weapons on his own people, dropping barrel bombs that killed innocent children that he—he has foregone
legitimacy. But when it comes to our policy and the coalition that we're putting together, our focus specifically is on
ISIL. It’s narrowly on ISIL.” President Obama interview with NBC News Meet the Press, September 6, 2014.
45 White House, op. cit.
46 Senate Armed Services Committee. “Hearing on the U.S. Policy Towards Iraq, Syria, and ISIL,” September 14,
2014.
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What Has the Strategy Achieved to Date?
Experts and officials are debating the effectiveness of the strategy. The Administration has argued
that the strategy will time—measured in many months, not weeks—to reach its objectives. It
asserts that there are distinct achievements, to date. Administration critics argue that the strategy
lacks effective partners who can advance against Islamic State-held territory on the ground and
suffers from a basic contradiction in not confronting the regime of President Asad of Syria. These
critics assert that achieving stated Administration objectives require U.S. or other ground combat
troops and expansion of the mission to include pressuring Asad to accept a political solution.
Administration officials assert that the accomplishments of the strategy to date include:
• In Iraq, U.S.-led airstrikes halted the Islamic State advance on Irbil and enabled
the peshmerga and ISF to safely evacuate most of the Yazidi internally displaced
persons (IDPs) from Sinjar Mountain.47 In October, peshmerga forces recaptured
the town of Zumar and the border crossing into Syria at Rabia, among other
gains.
• In September, U.S. airstrikes helped peshmerga and ISF forces drive Islamic
State fighters from Mosul Dam, which the Islamic State purportedly could have
used to flood large parts of Iraq. Also that month, U.S. airstrikes facilitated
efforts by the ISF and Shiite militias to break an Islamic State siege of the Shiite-
inhabited town of Amerli.
• With intensive airstrikes and the airdrop of supplies and weaponry to defenders
in October, the United States and its partners helped prevent the predominantly
Kurdish-inhabited Syrian town of Kobane/Ayn al Arab from capture by Islamic
State forces. Still, that town remains an active battle site and the outcome is
uncertain.
• In October, the ISF recaptured the town of Jurf al-Sakhar, 40 miles south of
Baghdad, and have made some gains in Diyala Province, helping secure ISF
supply lines to northern Iraq. In November, the ISF claimed to have recaptured
most of the town of Baiji, potentially positioning the force to relieve the IS siege
of the large refinery outside the town.
• In November, DOD announced that a U.S. strike had targeted IS leadership in
Iraq, although it is not clear whether any senior IS leaders were killed or
wounded.
The November 7 announcement of an expanded training and advisory mission for Iraqi forces
appeared to reflect Administration optimism that additional U.S. inputs—coupled with the
success in replacing Prime Minister Maliki with a more inclusive successor—could produce
results. Others interpreted the announcement as an indication that the Administration assesses that
Iraqi forces remain highly deficient and require substantially more help. In comments related to
the November 7 announcement, President Obama stated:
What it [the expanded train and equip mission] signals is a new phase. What we knew was
that phase one was getting an Iraqi government that was inclusive and credible, and we now

47 DOD News release, “Obama Praises Success of Humanitarian Operations in Iraq,” August 14, 2014.
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have done that. And so now what we’ve done is rather than just try to halt ISIL’s
momentum, we’re now in a position to start going on some offense. The airstrikes have been
very effective in degrading ISIL’s capabilities and slowing the advance that they were
making. Now what we need is ground troops, Iraqi ground troops, that can start pushing
them back.48
Critics of the Administration strategy note some setbacks to the strategy as follows:
• That Islamic State forces have continued to gain control over territory in Iraq’s Al
Anbar province, including in October seizing the town of Al Hit and capturing or
encroaching on several ISF military bases in the province. Secretary of Defense
Hagel told journalists in October that “Anbar Province is in trouble. We know
that.”49
• Islamic State gains in Anbar have positioned Islamic State forces to approach
Baghdad and to undermine security in the city—as well as the crucial Baghdad
International Airport—through mortar barrages and infiltration by suicide and
other bombers. Experts say this encroachment might hinder ISF efforts to take
the offensive rather than react to Islamic State maneuvers. Others assert that the
ISF, while supported by Shiite militias and unlikely to lose Baghdad entirely,
might yet lose parts of the city.50
• There has been little evidence, to date, of a significant Iraqi Sunni shift to oppose
Islamic State forces directly or to comprehensively assist ISF units in anti-IS
operations. Many Sunnis continue to distrust the Baghdad government and its
reliance on Shiite militias. Others Sunnis apparently have been cowed by IS
massacres of Sunni tribalists and other Sunnis opposed to IS rule. In October,
Islamic State fighters reportedly killed more than 300 members of the Albu Nimr
tribe for resisting IS advances in western Iraq.
International Coalition
The outcomes of U.S. strategy might depend on the participation of other actors, both state and
non-state. U.S. officials have recruited a coalition of countries to help defeat the Islamic State, in
large part to build international legitimacy for a military campaign and enlist Sunni help with co-
religionists in Iraq and Syria. The Administration has sought—and received—a range of support
from international partners, including participation in airstrikes, assisting and training Iraqi
government and Iraqi Kurdish forces, arming and training moderate Syrian rebels, increasing
intelligence sharing, committing to curb the flow of fighters and resources to the Islamic State,
and providing financial support.51

48 President Obama’s comments on CBS “Face the Nation,” as quoted in Eric Schmitt. “Obstacles Limit Targets and
Pace of Strikes on ISIS.” New York Times, November 10, 2014.
49 Kirk Semple and Eric Schmitt. “Islamic State Keeps Up Pressure Near Baghdad as Iraqi Troops Stumble.” New York
Times, October 18, 2014.
50 Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised Iraqi Force,” New York Times, July
14, 2014.
51 For a summary of significant foreign contributions to the effort against the Islamic State, see Justine Drennan. “Who
Has Contributed the Most in the Coalition Against the Islamic State.” Foreign Policy, October 14, 2014.
http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/10/14/
whos_contributed_the_most_in_the_coalition_against_the_islamic_state?wp_login_redirect=0
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The State Department lists 60 countries as members of the “Coalition to Degrade and Defeat
ISIL.” Many of the countries participating have been involved since 2012 in response to the
evolving conflict in Syria. The participation of the various coalition members, and summaries of
some of their contributions are cited below.52
Those in the coalition that are participating in military operations in Iraq and Syria face
significant challenges. Past attempts at coordination have exposed rifts among regional countries,
prompting situations in which the common goal of supporting the Syrian opposition was not
enough to overcome other, competing priorities among ostensibly partner states.53 Relations
between Iraq’s government and the Sunni Arab Gulf states have been consistently strained in the
post-Saddam Hussein period, in part because Iraq’s government has been dominated by Shiite
factions politically close to Iran. Sunni Arab militaries have to date limited their airstrikes to Syria
in part because strikes in Iraq might be seen by their populations as empowering Shiite elements
in Iraq. The partner countries participating in airstrikes in Syria, according to CENTCOM, are:
Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Qatar reportedly participated in some of the first
coalition strikes in Syria in September. To date, Western and other non-Middle Eastern allies of
the United States, such as Australia, Britain, and France, are undertaking airstrikes in Iraq, and
not in Syria—perhaps reflecting a hesitancy among Western allies to be drawn into involvement
in Syria’s civil war in any way.
In Syria, Sunni coalition partners might assess that the U.S. focus on the Islamic State might not
be contributing to the Sunni partner primary objectives of weakening the Asad regime and its
supporters (Iran, Hezbollah, Russia). U.S. partners will likely base their calculations of the costs
and benefits of their military operations in Syria and/or Iraq on their perceptions of various
factors such as the urgency of acting directly, the soundness of U.S. strategy, the level of U.S.
commitment, and potential progress toward political solutions (particularly in Iraq) that are more
inclusive of Sunni Arabs or less conducive to Iranian strategic goals.
The following sections will discuss the role that selected partner countries are playing in the
coalition, and examine factors that could potentially constrain their participation.
Turkey54
U.S. strategic objectives regarding Turkey, a Sunni-majority country, in connection with efforts to
cooperate against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq appear to include:
• Avoiding attacks on or the destabilization of Turkey;

52 In February 2012, the Administration helped organize the Friends of Syria Group, a coalition of Western and
regional countries that met periodically to discuss ways to support the Syrian opposition, increase pressure on the Asad
government, and encourage a negotiated settlement between the two sides. The group last met in Saudi Arabia in late
August. The Friends of Syria “Core Group,” also known as the London 11, includes the United States, Egypt, France,
Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and the United Kingdom.
53 Sunni Arab Gulf states have faced internal divisions—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and UAE in March 2014 withdrew
their ambassadors from Qatar, accusing Doha of pursuing policies at odds with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
states. At a meeting of the GCC Foreign Ministers Council in late August 2014, some officials claimed to have made
progress in resolving outstanding issues among member states. See “Saudi, UAE and Bahrain Envoys’ Return ‘At Any
Time,’” Gulf Times, August 31, 2014.
54 Prepared by Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. For more background on Turkey’s dealings with Iraq
and Syria, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
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• Minimizing the use of Turkish territory by extremists; and
• Using Turkish territory and airspace and/or partnering with Turkish forces for
military purposes and to further strengthen and diversify Sunni support within the
anti-IS coalition.
Following the September 20, 2014, release by the Islamic State of 49 hostages associated with the
Turkish consulate in Mosul, Iraq,55 Turkish leaders have indicated willingness to consider deeper
participation in the anti-IS coalition.56 Turkey’s parliament voted on October 2, 2014, to approve
potential military operations in Syria and Iraq launched from Turkey by Turkish or foreign forces.
However, a complicated array of considerations arguably affects Turkish calculations regarding
direct military involvement or the furnishing of its territory or airspace for coalition use. This
includes Turkey’s role to this point in Syria’s protracted conflict, as well as Turkish parliamentary
elections scheduled for June 2015. For a detailed analysis of Turkey’s policy and actions on the
Islamic State issues, see CRS Report IN10164, Turkey-U.S. Cooperation Against the “Islamic
State”: A Unique Dynamic? , by Jim Zanotti.
Saudi Arabia57
Saudi Arabia first participated in coalition airstrikes against Islamic State targets in Syria on
September 22-23 and continues to participate in coalition airstrikes against Islamic State targets.
Most recently, U.S. military sources have reported Saudi fighter aircraft participation in airstrikes
on October 3, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13, and 19. Some reports suggest that a fighter aircraft contingent of
four to six Saudi F-15 aircraft are being used in these strikes, although U.S. and Saudi authorities
have not commented specifically on the number or types of Saudi aircraft or ordnance used in
these operations. Saudi Arabia also reportedly has agreed to host a U.S. training facility for vetted
Syrians as part of the congressionally endorsed program to develop a force to protect Syrians
from Islamic State attacks and support conditions that will lead to a negotiated settlement in
Syria’s civil war. Saudi Arabia also has made humanitarian contributions to support Syrian and
Iraqi citizens, including a $500 million donation in July 2014 to support displaced Iraqis.
Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah has called for international cooperation to combat violent extremist
groups in the Middle East, including the Islamic State. In August 2014, Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh
Abdelaziz bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al al Shaykh declared “the ideas of extremism ... and
terrorism” to be the “first enemies of Muslims,” and stated that all efforts to combat Al Qaeda and
the Islamic State were required and allowed because those groups “consider Muslims to be
infidels.” The statement, coupled with state crackdowns on clerics deviating from the
government’s anti-terrorism messaging, signal the kingdom’s desire to undercut claims by the
Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and their followers that support for the groups and their violent attacks is
religiously legitimate. In conjunction with the Saudi government’s expanded efforts to dissuade
Saudi citizens from supporting the Islamic State and other extremist groups, Saudi security
entities continue to arrest cells of individuals suspected of plotting attacks, recruiting, or
fundraising for some terrorist groups.

55 The release reportedly occurred in exchange for Turkey’s release of 180 Islamic State detainees.
56 Turkey already is reportedly allowing the use of its territory and airspace for humanitarian and logistical purposes,
and adopting additional measures to curb the flow of foreign fighters to Syria. Murat Yetkin, “Turkey joins anti-ISIL
coalition, opens İncirlik for logistics ops,” Hurriyet Daily News Online, September 10, 2014.
57 Prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
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Aside from training-related assistance, U.S. officials conceivably could seek intelligence and
diplomatic support from Saudi officials and may attempt to leverage the kingdom’s relationships
with Sunni Arab community leaders in western Iraq and eastern Syria in conjunction with efforts
to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist groups there. The kingdom’s vast financial
resources also could be brought to bear in support of displaced Syrian and Iraqi civilians, to
influence Iraqi and Syrian armed groups, or to contribute to the costs of U.S. or other countries’
military operations. The Syria-related “train and equip” authority authorized by Congress in
September 2014 authorizes the U.S. government to accept financial and material contributions for
an assistance or training program for vetted Syrians. Military bases in Saudi Arabia could
potentially be used in support of joint operations. However, the presence of foreign military
forces in the kingdom historically has been a politically controversial subject.
Jordan58
The Obama Administration considers the kingdom of Jordan to be an important part of the anti-
Islamic State coalition. Jordan is one of the signatories of the recently-issued Jeddah
Communiqué that expressed regional Arab states’ commitment to stand united against the threat
posed by all terrorism, including the Islamic State. Many Jordanians likely fear that an overt
Jordanian presence in Iraq would give the Islamic State or radicalized Jordanian citizens further
cause to target the kingdom.
The Jordanian Air Force has conducted strikes in both Iraq and Syria. In mid-October, Special
Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL General John Allen expressed the
Administration’s “support for the targeted airstrikes by the Jordanian Air Force in Syria.”59 Jordan
has approximately 85 combat aircraft, including at least 60 F-16s, and its fighters flew alongside
U.S. planes in striking the Islamic State’s front lines around the besieged Syrian city of Kobane.
However, it is unlikely that Jordanian contributions to any multilateral effort will consist of
ground forces.60
Jordan could make other contributions to U.S. efforts, such as intelligence sharing, continued
overt training of Iraq Special Forces, and possible clandestine training of Syrian rebels. Jordanian
intelligence was reportedly pivotal to the U.S. finding and killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the
Jordanian national who founded the Islamic State’s antecedent, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I). Several
media reports suggest that Jordanian Special Operations forces assisted U.S. troops in an
unsuccessful attempt to rescue American journalist James Foley, who had been held captive by
the Islamic State prior to his recent execution. Politically, Jordan has ties to Sunni tribes in
Western Iraq who could be valuable partners in the fight against the Islamic State. Currently,
approximately 1,700 U.S. military personnel are stationed in Jordan, presumably to bolster its
security.61

58 Prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. For more information, see CRS Report
RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
59 U.S. State Department Press Release, “Remarks to the Press on Countering ISIL,” October 15, 2014.
60 “Allies Vow Support, Offer Few Specifics,” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2014.
61 Elements of these forces include Patriot missile systems, fighter aircraft, and related support, command, control, and
communications personnel and systems.
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Europe and Other Allies62
On the sidelines of NATO’s Wales Summit, held on September 4-5, the United States and United
Kingdom (UK) co-chaired a discussion on the Islamic State. NATO member countries France,
Germany, Canada, Turkey, Italy, Poland, and Denmark, and observer state Australia, reportedly
joined the United States and UK in agreeing to coordinate efforts to fight the group.63 The alliance
as a whole did not commit to a substantive response beyond stating in the summit communique
that it would consider any future request from the Iraqi government to launch a training and
capacity-building mission for Iraqi security forces.64 NATO previously conducted a military
training mission in Iraq from 2008 to 2011.
France hosted a meeting of foreign ministers from 26 countries (including European and Middle
Eastern countries as well as Russia and China), the Arab League, European Union, and U.N. on
September 15 that produced further pledges to defeat the Islamic State and provide military
assistance to the Iraqi government. Subsequently, various European countries announced specific
military commitments and involvement in operations. The partner countries participating in
airstrikes in Iraq are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom. As noted above, Western partner countries—including Denmark, Germany,
Australia, and the United Kingdom—have pledged an estimated 700 total trainers plus additional
advisers to assist Iraqi forces. France, Germany, and the UK have been providing weapons to
Kurdish forces in Iraq, as well as non-lethal equipment and humanitarian aid.65 As in the United
States, other Western countries encounter more difficult legal and political questions in relation to
military action inside Syria.
Iranian Involvement in the Iraq Crisis
Apparently pursuing its own interests, Iran has been generally cooperating with U.S. policy in
Iraq, but the United States has ruled out formally bringing Iran into any U.S.-led anti-Islamic
State coalition. However, on Syria, the United States and Iran have generally been on opposite
sides: the United States supports Asad’s ouster in favor of a transition regime, whereas Iran is
materially supporting Asad’s efforts to remain in power. Iran apparently views expanded U.S.
efforts to provide support and training to Syrian opposition groups as a threat to its interests.
On Iraq, U.S. diplomats acknowledge that they have discussed the Islamic State crisis at margins
of recent talks on Iran’s nuclear program. Iran abandoned its longtime ally Maliki66 and helped
compel him to yield power in favor of Hayder Al Abbadi. The U.S. State Department has
consistently refuted assertions that the bilateral discussion on Iraq could provide Iran additional
leverage in the ongoing nuclear talks with the United States and its partner countries.67 However,
President Obama has acknowledged sending a letter in November 2014 to Iran’s Supreme Leader
Ali Khamene’i, the contents of which have not been released but which was said to focus on the

62 Prepared by Derek Mix, Analyst in European Affairs.
63 Sam Jones, “NATO States to Form Military Coalition to Fight ISIS,” Financial Times, September 5, 2014.
64 Julian Hale, “NATO Weights Training Mission to Iraq,” Defense News, September 12, 2014.
65 “Hollande Visits Iraq Ahead of Paris Conference on Fighting Islamic State,” RFI, September 12, 2014; Noah Barkin,
“Defending Arming of Kurds, Merkel Calls Islamic State a Threat to Europe,” Reuters, September 1, 2014; and UK
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Iraq: UK Government Response,” September 13, 2014.
66 Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Iran Dramatically Shifts Iraq Policy to Confront Islamic State,” Reuters, September 2, 2014.
67 Ibid.
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potential for further cooperation against the Islamic State if the issue of Iran’s nuclear program
were resolved.68
In actions that appear to further U.S. objectives in Iraq, Iran reportedly has been delivering arms
and ammunition to the ISF and the peshmerga. In early July, Iran returned to Iraq about a dozen
of the 100+ Iraqi combat aircraft that were flown to Iran at the start of the 1991 war between Iraq
and the United States-led coalition. Iranian pilots apparently also are flying the aircraft: in July
2014 Iran announced that one of its pilots had died in operations in Iraq.69 Iran reportedly has
provided weapons to Syrian Kurds fighting Islamic State forces in northern Syria.
Many observers remain skeptical that the United States could or should cooperate with Iran in
either Iraq or Syria. Iran helped establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States
during 2003-2011, and Iran reportedly has sent Islamic Revolutionary Guard-Qods Force (IRGC-
QF) personnel into Iraq to advise the Shiite militias fighting alongside the ISF. The participation
of the militias has increased tensions with Iraq’s Sunnis, including those who live in mostly
Shiite-inhabited Baghdad and in mixed provinces such as Diyala. Anecdotal reports indicate that
some Shiite militia fighters have carried out reprisals against Sunnis who the militias accuse of
supporting the Islamic State. Some of the Shiite militiamen who are fighting in Iraq had returned
from Syria, where they were helping President Asad against Sunni-led armed rebels. On Syria,
Iran continues to support Asad militarily, thereby countering U.S. efforts to compel Asad to yield
power to a transition regime.

68 Michael Singh. “What Obama’s Letter to Khamenei Says About U.S. Policy Toward Iran.” Wall Street Journal,
November 10, 2014.
69 “Iran News Agency Reports Death of Iranian Pilot in Iraq,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 5, 2014.
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Figure 1. Iraq, Syria, and Regional Unrest

Notes: Clash symbols in Syria and Iraq denote areas where recent clashes have occurred, not necessarily areas of current control.
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Figure 2. Evolution of IS/ISIL and Extremist Groups in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014


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Selected Additional Issues Raised by the Crisis
Authority for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State and
the War Powers Resolution70
The Obama Administration has asserted that the President has authority under existing
constitutional and statutory authority to conduct the current military campaign against the Islamic
State and other groups in Iraq and Syria. Some have questioned this assertion, and several
Members of Congress have introduced legislation that would specifically address the President’s
continued use of military force in this situation. The President’s uses of military force are subject
to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution (WPR; P.L. 93-148). In cases where the President
has introduced Armed Forces into active or imminent hostilities, the WPR requires termination of
the use of U.S. Armed Forces and withdrawal of those forces 60 days after a WPR report is
required, unless Congress (1) has declared war or authorized the action; (2) has extended the 60-
day period by law; or (3) cannot meet due to armed attack. The President can extend the deadline
for withdrawal for 30 days if he certifies that it is needed to effect a safe withdrawal.
The Obama Administration has stated that two enacted authorizations for use of military force
(AUMFs) authorize ongoing U.S. military strikes against the Islamic State and other groups in
Iraq and Syria.71 The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-40) targets those
who perpetrated and supported the 9/11 terrorist attacks, identified as Al Qaeda and the Taliban,
but the executive branch has interpreted the authorization to include targeting forces that are co-
belligerent with these two groups, so-called “associated forces.” The Islamic State organization,
whose antecedents had links to Al Qaeda, might fall within the definition of an associated force,
but a public split between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda in early 2014 calls this association into
question. The Obama Administration has stated that the Islamic State’s long ties to Al Qaeda, its
continuing connection to and support from elements within Al Qaeda, and similarity of its brutal
tactics and desire to establish an Islamic caliphate to those of Al Qaeda make the Islamic State
lawful targets under the 2001 AUMF.72 The President’s notifications to Congress of military
operations against IS forces and the Khorasan Group of Al Qaeda both state that the 2001 AUMF
authorizes such actions.73 Alternatively, it has been argued recently that the Islamic State might be
considered not as an associated force of Al Qaeda but instead as former part of Al Qaeda that has
now splintered from the original group.74 Under this interpretation, the Islamic State would fall

70 This section was prepared by Matthew Weed, Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation.
71 In his previous notifications to Congress of deployments and airstrikes against the Islamic State, however, the
President stated that he was taking military action based upon his powers as commander in chief and chief executive
under Article II of the Constitution.
72 See White House, press briefing by press secretary Josh Earnest, September 11, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2014/09/11/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-9112014.
73 Letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President pro tempore of the
Senate (War Powers Resolution Regarding Iraq), September 23, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq; letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of
the House of Representatives and President pro tempore of the Senate (War Powers Resolution Regarding Syria),
September 23, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-war-powers-resolution-
regarding-syria.
74 See Marty Lederman, “Tentative First Reactions to the 2001 AUMF Theory [updated],” Just Security, September 11,
2014, at http://justsecurity.org/14804/first-reactions-2001-aumf-theory/.
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among the original targets of the 2001 AUMF, and its associated forces could also be targeted,
potentially expanding the number of lawfully targeted co-belligerent groups operating in Iraq,
Syria, or elsewhere.
The 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (P.L. 107-243) authorizes force in
part to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by
Iraq.” The original authorization focused on the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the
destruction of suspected weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, threats long extinguished. The
recent successes of Islamic State–led forces in Iraq, however, and its ties to former supporters of
the Hussein regime, might be seen as falling within the broad 2002 AUMF authority to counter
the “threat posed by Iraq.” The Obama Administration, however, might consider 2002 AUMF
authority to extend to countering threats to Iraq as well, whether those threats exist within Iraq or
are located elsewhere. In the President’s September 23, 2014, notification to Congress concerning
airstrikes against IS forces in Iraq and Syria, the President cited the 2002 AUMF alongside the
2001 AUMF as authorizing strikes against IS forces. Such strikes are described largely in the
context of assisting Iraqi forces and “at the request of the Government of Iraq.”75
Although the President has stated that he possesses 2001 and 2002 AUMF authority for his
decision to conduct recent and future military actions against the Islamic State and other groups
in Iraq and Syria, Congress could determine that these authorizations do not apply. Many
observers and Members have argued that the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs are outdated and that their
authorities no longer apply to the current challenges posed both by the Islamic State and by the
global threat to the United States from terrorism in general. If Congress determines that the
existing AUMFs do not apply, it might assert that the President, pursuant to the War Powers
Resolution, must (1) withdraw U.S. Armed Forces from and (2) terminate hostilities in Iraq and
Syria within 60 days from the date when congressional notification of such actions was required
unless Congress enacts a new AUMF. Several Members of Congress have called for a new
AUMF specifically targeting the Islamic State and other groups in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, and
a number of legislative proposals have been introduced recently.76
Humanitarian Impact and Response77
Since January 2014, an urgent humanitarian crisis has unfolded in Iraq, with an estimated 5.3
million people in need of humanitarian and protection assistance. Of these, 1.9 million people are
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 1.5 million are in communities that are taking in the
displaced (host communities), 1.7 million are in areas under the control of armed groups or
impacted by the conflict, and .2 million are Syrian refugees.78 Close to half the newly displaced
are thought to be children. Particularly in conflict areas in northern and central Iraq, it is difficult

75 See letter from President Barack Obama to Speaker of the House of Representatives and President pro tempore of the
Senate (War Powers Resolution Regarding Iraq).
76 For a comparison of these proposals, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against the Islamic State: Comparison of Current Proposals in Brief, by Matthew C. Weed.
77 This section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.
78 In addition, there are reportedly more than 1.1 million Iraqis who were earlier displaced. Many had sought refuge in
Syria between 2003 and 2011 and are thought to remain displaced. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, there are also over 400,000 Iraqi refugees living in other countries (October 29, 2014.) Although this section
is focused primarily on the situation in Iraq, displacements and movement of populations in Iraq are intertwined with
the conflict in neighboring Syria.
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to monitor and track the mass and sometimes multiple displacements. Consequently, the actual
figures remain fluid and difficult to fully ascertain.
In January, June, and August of 2014, displacement increased significantly in Iraq as a result of
conflict. As of late October, of the 1.9 million IDPs, an estimated 850,000 are seeking shelter in
Iraq’s Kurdistan region, mainly in Dohuk governorate, while increased movements to central and
southern Iraq are straining the response capacities of host communities in these areas.79 All 18
governorates are hosting families fleeing violence. There are estimated to be over 700,000
displaced in the central region (with almost 400,000 in Anbar Governorate) and 200,000 in the
south. The needs of all IDPs in Iraq remain significant, while basic government social services
are limited and weak. In addition to winter preparedness, which includes the provision of shelter
and winterization kits, there continue to be urgent needs for food, water and sanitation, and health
services.80 With the large number of displaced children, emergency education support is also a
priority for the humanitarian community.
There are concerns about the rise in sectarian tensions across the country made worse by the
conflict situation and large numbers of IDPs. An estimated 3.6 million Iraqis reside in areas under
the control of IS and other armed groups, and of these, 2.2 million are thought to be trapped in
conflict-affected areas, These IDPs lack access to basic services and are considered to be in
urgent need of humanitarian assistance.81
National and international humanitarian efforts have been severely constrained in providing
assistance and protection to IDPs and others affected by the conflict due to ongoing fighting. In
August 2014, the United Nations declared a “Level 3 Emergency” for Iraq to help facilitate
mobilization of resources for the humanitarian response.82 With the Level 3 declaration, U.N. and
humanitarian partners continue to increase staffing and resources, and they are calling for
guarantees of safe and unhindered access of humanitarian staff and in the distribution of relief
supplies. As of October 10, 2014, 36 international actors, including the U.N. system, Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are
involved in the humanitarian operation. There are also approximately 70 national NGOs
registered with the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI) that are engaged in the relief
effort.
The U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) is facilitating the humanitarian response by the
U.N. Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and some partner organizations, as well as supporting
the coordination efforts of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA). UNOCHA launched a revised Strategic Response Plan (SRP) for Iraq in June,
requesting $312.1 million in international funding to include humanitarian support for the
significantly increased caseload of IDPs and a wider geographical focus.83 The SRP was revised

79 As of late October, 2014, Iraq is hosting more than 215,000 refugees from Syria, of which 209,000 are in the
Kurdistan region and much smaller numbers are dispersed elsewhere in Iraq, including approximately 4,500 in Anbar
province.
80 Assessment Capacities Project, “Humanitarian Implications of Violence in Northern and Central Iraq,” September 4,
2014.
81 UNOCHA, “Iraq Crisis: Situation Report No. 18,” October 25-31, 2014.
82 U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, Press Release, “U.N. Declares a ‘Level 3 Emergency’ for Iraq to Ensure More
Effective Humanitarian Response,” August 13, 2014.
83 A subset of the SRP for Iraq, “Iraq: Immediate Response Plan (IRP) for the IDP Crisis in the KR-I: 15 September –
15 November 2014) represented a joint effort by the Kurdistan Regional Government and U.N. humanitarian agencies
(continued...)
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in October 2014 and expanded to cover 2014 and 2015. It identifies total requirements of $2.2
billion for this period, of which $608 million in funding had been received as of mid-October.
Total U.S. government humanitarian funding to Iraq in FY2014 and FY2015 (as of October 31,
2014) is more than $202.2 million.84
Systemic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) have reportedly
been widespread by all parties to the conflict, including IS. UNOCHA estimates that 20,000
civilians have been killed or injured across Iraq in 2014.85 The U.N. Secretary-General issued a
statement on August 7, 2014, condemning the attacks in Iraq and the impact on vulnerable
minority communities.86 The members of the U.N. Security Council also issued a statement about
attacks directed against a civilian population and urged the parties to enable humanitarian access
and the delivery of assistance.87 Amid increasing reports of killings and kidnappings and gross
abuses of human rights, on October 31, the members of the Security Council again expressed
outrage and stressed accountability, noting that some of these acts may constitute war crimes and
crimes against humanity.”88
Responses to Threats to U.S. Personnel, Facilities, and Citizens89
The crisis has prompted the Administration to undertake a number of measures to ensure the
safety of its personnel in Iraq, including direct military action, relocation of personnel, and
deployment of additional protective assets. The Department of State has also repeatedly warned
U.S. citizens unaffiliated with the U.S. government of the threats to their security.
President Obama affirmed on August 9 that the protection of American diplomats and military
personnel in the city of Irbil was among the principal justifications for conducting targeted
airstrikes against ISIL in the area. He also asserted that the United States would “take action” in
response to any further threat to U.S. facilities or personnel.90
A number of diplomatic personnel had previously been moved to the Consulate General in Irbil
from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. On June 15, the Department of State announced that while
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad would remain open, a number of personnel would be “temporarily
relocated” to Consulate Generals in Basrah and Irbil as well as to Department of State facilities in
Amman, Jordan. The relocations were reportedly carried out by non-military means. The
announcement stated that a “substantial majority of the U.S. Embassy presence in Iraq” would
remain in place and that, with an expected addition of security personnel, the Embassy would be

(...continued)
to address urgent humanitarian response priorities ahead of the winter season in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
84 USAID, “Iraq—Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, October 31, 2014.
85 UNOCHA, 2014/2015 Iraq Strategic Response Plan, October 2014.
86 United Nations, New York, “Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Attacks on
Yezidis and Other Minority Groups in Iraq,” August 7, 2014.
87 U.N. Security Council, Press Statement on Iraq, SC/11515, IK/683, August 7, 2014.
88 U.N. Security Council, Press Statement on Iraq, SC/11625, IK/694, October 31, 2014.
89 Prepared by Alex Tiersky, Analyst in Foreign Affairs. For more information on this issue, see CRS Insight IN10090,
Crisis in Iraq: Securing U.S. Citizens, Personnel, and Facilities, by Alex Tiersky. This section was last updated on
August 15, 2014.
90 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on Iraq,” press release, August 9, 2014,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/09/statement-president-iraq.
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“fully equipped” to carry out “its national security mission.”91 On August 10, the Iraq Travel
Warning was updated to announce that “a limited number” of additional staff had been relocated
from the Embassy in Baghdad and the Consulate General in Erbil to the Consulate General in
Basrah as well as to Department of State facilities in Amman, Jordan.92 Despite these measures,
President Obama on August 9 affirmed that “we’re not moving our embassy anytime soon. We’re
not moving our consulate anytime soon.”93
Military assets and personnel have played a key role in securing U.S. diplomatic facilities and
personnel in Iraq. News reports suggested that roughly 200 Marine Corps guards and contractors
were in place at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad prior to the crisis to protect the Embassy.94 Since
the crisis began, the White House has announced three deployments to reinforce that number. On
June 16, the White House informed Congress that up to approximately 275 U.S. military
personnel were being dispatched to Iraq to assist with the temporary relocation of diplomatic
personnel, a deployment undertaken with the consent of the Government of Iraq.95 On June 30,
the White House announced the deployment of up to an additional 200 U.S. Armed Forces
personnel to provide increased security to the U.S. Embassy and its support facilities, as well as
to reinforce the Baghdad International Airport. According to the White House notification to
Congress, provided “consistent with” the War Powers Act, the deployed forces would be
accompanied by helicopters and unmanned drones. The force “is deploying for the purpose of
protecting U.S. citizens and property, if necessary, and is equipped for combat,” according to the
statement, and may/will “remain in Iraq until the security situation becomes such that it is no
longer needed.”96 The Department of Defense had also previously confirmed that it “has airlift
assets at the ready should State Department request them, as per normal interagency support
arrangements.”97 On September 2, 2014, the Administration announced that an additional 350
U.S. military personnel would deploy to Iraq for similar purposes.
The State Department has also communicated with U.S. citizens in Iraq about threats to their
safety. It posted on June 16 an “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens: Announcement of
Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,” which urged “U.S. citizens to avoid travel to Iraq because of
current safety and security concerns” and advised those concerned about their safety to “make
plans to depart by commercial means.” The statement emphasized that the Embassy should not be
contacted with requests for assistance with travel arrangements, and that the Embassy “does not
offer ‘protection’ services to individuals who feel unsafe.” While the Embassy remained open, the
statement said, Embassy services for U.S. citizens throughout Iraq would be limited due to the
security environment.98

91 Department of State Spokesperson, “Press Statement: Iraq,” press release, June 15, 2014.
92 Department of State, “Iraq Travel Warning,” updated August 10, 2014, http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/
english/alertswarnings/iraq-travel-warning.html.
93 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on Iraq,” press release, August 9, 2014,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/09/statement-president-iraq.
94 Dan Lamothe, “U.S. companies pulling contractors from Iraqi bases as security crumbles,” The Washington Post,
June 12, 2014.
95 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the Press Secretary on the War Powers Resolution
Report for Iraq,” press release, June 16, 2014.
96 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution Letter regarding
Iraq,” June 30, 2014.
97 “DOD Provides Security Help for Baghdad Diplomatic Facilities,” American Forces Press Service, June 15, 2014.
98 Department of State, “Emergency Message for U.S. Citizens: Announcement of Relocation of U.S. Embassy Staff,”
(continued...)
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A number of U.S. citizens working in various other capacities in Iraq have also been evacuated in
response to the crisis. For example, on June 12, the Department of State confirmed that a number
of U.S. citizen contract employees to the Iraqi Government, who were performing services in
connection with the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program in Iraq, were “temporarily relocated” by
their companies due to security concerns.99
Possible Questions for Congressional
Consideration100
What are overall U.S. priorities in the strategy against the Islamic State organization, and how are
these priorities shaping the U.S. response?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the strategy against the Islamic State? What successes
and failures of the strategy can you point to, to date? What factors could hinder the
implementation or effectiveness of the strategy?
With respect to Iraq, is it realistic and worthwhile for U.S. officials and lawmakers to act in
expectation that Iraq’s government can resolve or manage the country’s sectarian, ethnic, and
regional differences?
Please assess the range of Iraqi Sunni views of the Islamic State. With respect to Iraq, what
concrete steps has Prime Minister Haydar al-Abbadi taken to reduce Sunni Arab support for the
Islamic State? How have jihadist and tribal figures responded to the Islamic State’s declaration of
a caliphate in areas under its control?
With respect to Syria, to what extent, if any, is the long-term success of U.S. strategy dependent
on any changes in the composition of the Syrian government? How have various Syrian forces
reacted to U.S. and coalition airstrikes since September 2014? How has the Syrian government
responded, if at all?
How, if at all, should the effort against the Islamic State shape congressional consideration of
pending authorization and appropriations legislation for defense and foreign assistance?
To what extent do the Islamic State’s gains reflect its organizational capabilities? To what extent
to these gains reflect the weaknesses, divisions, or limitations of its adversaries?
To what extent and how is U.S. strategy assisting locally organized forces in areas under Islamic
State control, or in areas threatened by the Islamic State, who may effectively resist or disrupt the
group’s operations?

(...continued)
press release, June 16, 2014, http://iraq.usembassy.gov/em-06162014.html.
99 Department of State Deputy Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing, June 12, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/
2014/06/227573.htm#IRAQ.
100 Prepared by Christopher Blanchard and Jim Zanotti, Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs.
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To what extent do the interests of Iran and the United States conflict or coincide, with respect to
the Islamic State issue? To what extent, if any, do efforts by Iran to support Iraq’s government and
Shiite militia forces contradict or support those of the United States? Please answer with respect
to Iran’s policy of supporting the Asad regime in Syria?
What are the connections, if any, between this crisis and other key regional issues, such as
international diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program?
To what extent will the governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey support anti-Islamic
State entities in areas adjacent to their territory?
What might be the broader strategic implications of increased U.S. assistance to the Iraqi
government? What has been the reaction of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to
increased U.S. support for the Iraqi government, which the Gulf leaders assert is still aligned with
Iran? How has Iran responded, if at all?
How are Kurdish efforts to control Kirkuk and its energy resources likely to affect the security
situation in that area generally and in Iraq specifically? What is the likelihood that the Kurds will
implement a formal secession from Iraq in the near future? How should these considerations
affect U.S. policy toward the KRG?
Are changes to U.S. global counterterrorism policies and practices necessary in light of
developments related to the Islamic State?
What are the humanitarian implications of the crisis? Please discuss the situation for Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs), particularly those displaced in the last several months. What are the
most pressing assistance needs and priorities?
What are the challenges for an effective humanitarian response by the international community?
How would you assess the international humanitarian operation so far? What action is the U.S.
government taking in support of international humanitarian efforts?

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov, 7-0425
Christopher M. Blanchard
Alex Tiersky
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
atiersky@crs.loc.gov, 7-7367
Carla E. Humud
Matthew C. Weed
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation
chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314
mweed@crs.loc.gov, 7-4589


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