Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
November 4, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21922
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Summary
The capacity, transparency, legitimacy, and cohesiveness of Afghan governance are crucial to
Afghan stability as U.S.-led NATO forces exit Afghanistan by 2016. The size and capability of
the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late
2001. But, the government remains rife with corruption and ethnic and political tensions among
its major factions are ever present.
Hamid Karzai, who served as president since late 2001, was constitutionally term-limited and left
office when his successor, Ashraf Ghani, was inaugurated on September 29. The inauguration
represented a resolution of an election dispute that consumed Afghan and U.S. official attention
from April to September. The results of the April 5, 2014, first round of the election required a
June 14 runoff between Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and Ghani. The runoff increased ethnic tensions
between Pashtuns, Afghanistan’s largest group represented by Ghani, and the second-largest
group, the Tajiks, with whom Abdullah is identified. Amid accusations by Abdullah of a fraud-
inspired large increase in turnout between the two rounds, preliminary results released July 7
showed Ghani ahead 56% to 44%. Secretary of State John Kerry visited Afghanistan twice to
broker an agreement by the two candidates that tamped down threats by faction leaders loyal to
Abdullah to seize power by force. The two contenders agreed to a recount of all 23,000 ballot
boxes and to the formation of a post-election unity government under which the losing candidate
will become “Chief Executive Officer” (CEO) of the government. The CEO is to function as a
prime minister, pending a subsequent national deliberation over changing the constitution to
create a formal prime ministerial post. On September 21, the two candidates formally signed the
power-sharing agreement and Ghani was announced as election winner. Ghani was sworn in as
president on September 29 and immediately appointed Abdullah as CEO.
The resolution paved the way for the long-delayed signing of formal agreements to permit U.S.
and NATO deployments to a post-2014 international mission to train Afghan forces and conduct
counterterrorism operations. Since taking office, Ghani has signaled he will make curbing
governmental corruption and promoting women’s rights key priorities.
The election dispute was consequential because the constitution concentrates substantial power in
the presidency. However, Ghani’s authority will be constrained not only by the power-sharing
arrangement with Abdullah as well as by an informal power structure consisting of regional and
ethnic leaders. Faction leaders often maintain groups of armed fighters who often exercise
arbitrary administration of justice and commit human rights abuses.
International observers assert that there have been significant gains in civil society, women’s
rights, and media freedoms since 2001. Those gains have come despite the persistence of
traditional attitudes and Islamic conservatism in many parts of Afghanistan—attitudes that cause
the judicial and political system to tolerate child marriages and imprisonment of women who flee
domestic violence. Islamist influence and tradition has also frequently led to persecution of
converts from Islam to Christianity, and to curbs on the sale of alcohol and on Western-oriented
media programs. Afghan civil society activists, particularly women’s groups, assert that many of
these gains are at risk as international forces depart, especially should there be a reconciliation
agreement between the government and insurgent leaders. See also CRS Report RL30588,
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Contents
Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority and Politics ........................................................ 1
Afghan Ethnicities, Communities, and Their Relationships...................................................... 2
Pashtuns ............................................................................................................................... 2
Tajiks/Northern Alliance ..................................................................................................... 2
Hazaras ................................................................................................................................ 3
Uzbeks ................................................................................................................................. 4
Other Minorities .................................................................................................................. 4
The Role of Political Parties ...................................................................................................... 4
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape ............................................................................. 5
Constitution Gives Presidency Broad Powers ........................................................................... 6
Ghani-Abdullah Agreement Modifies Presidential Powers ................................................ 7
Presidential Advisory and Implementing Institutions ......................................................... 7
National Assembly (Parliament) Powers and Performance ....................................................... 8
Powers of the National Assembly ....................................................................................... 9
Politics of the National Assembly ..................................................................................... 10
The Judiciary and Rule of Law ......................................................................................... 12
The Informal Power Structure: Power Brokers and Faction Leaders ...................................... 14
Northern Alliance Commanders ........................................................................................ 15
Abdul Rashid Dostam: Uzbek Leader in Northern Afghanistan ....................................... 15
Atta Mohammad Noor: Balkh Province/Mazar-e-Sharif Potentate .................................. 16
Mohammed Mohaqiq: Hazara Stalwart ............................................................................ 16
Isma’il Khan: “Emir” of Herat/Western Afghanistan ........................................................ 16
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh: Helmand Province Power Broker ................................... 17
Karzai Family: Qandahar Province Stronghold ................................................................ 17
Ghul Agha Shirzai: Eastern Afghanistan/Nangarhar ......................................................... 18
Traditional Decision-Making Processes of the Informal Power Structure:
Jirgas and Shuras ........................................................................................................... 19
Emergent Power Centers: Civil Society and Independent Activists ........................................ 19
The Electoral Process and Recent Elections ............................................................................ 20
2004 Presidential Election ................................................................................................. 20
2005 Parliamentary Election ............................................................................................. 20
2009 Presidential Election ................................................................................................. 21
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections ................................................................... 22
2014 Presidential and Provincial Elections ....................................................................... 24
Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance .............................................................................. 31
Expanding Central Government Capacity ............................................................................... 32
Merit-Based Recruitment .................................................................................................. 32
The Afghan Budget Process .............................................................................................. 33
Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance ........................................................................... 34
The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) ............................................ 35
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils ................................................................. 36
District-Level Governance ................................................................................................ 37
Municipal and Village Level Authority ............................................................................. 37
Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption ............................................................. 38
High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism ............................................................ 38
Lower-Level Corruption.................................................................................................... 39
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Administration Views and Policy on Corruption .............................................................. 39
Kabul Bank Scandal .......................................................................................................... 43
Moves to Penalize Lack of Progress on Corruption .......................................................... 45
Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society ........................................................................... 46
Institution-Building: The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
(AIHRC) and Outside Human Rights Organizations ..................................................... 46
Religious Influence on Society: National Ulema Council ................................................ 47
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 48
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms ........................................................ 49
Harsh Punishments/Torture ............................................................................................... 50
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 50
Advancement of Women ................................................................................................... 51
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues .......................... 54
Effects of a Settlement with the Taliban .................................................................................. 55
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ............................................................................................. 58
Tables
Table 1. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations .............................................................................. 56
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 58
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 58
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Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority
and Politics
Afghanistan’s governing structure has historically consisted of a weak central government
unwilling or unable to enforce significant financial or administrative mandates on all of
Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic communities or on the 80% of Afghans who live in rural areas.
Ethnic and rural communities, many of which are divided by mountains and wide expanses, have
often looked to local faction leaders for their governance. At the same time, there has always been
a struggle between urban, educated “modernizers” and the rural, lesser-educated traditionalists
who adhere to a set of long-standing customs and practices. The Taliban government (1996-2001)
opposed modernization, but there has been substantial modernization and urbanization since the
Taliban were ousted—changes that might help Afghanistan remain stable after the international
involvement in Afghanistan ends.
At the national level, Afghanistan had few, if any, Western-style democratic institutions prior to
the international intervention that took place after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States. Under the constitution of 1964, King Zahir Shah was to be a constitutional monarch, and
an elected lower house and appointed upper house were set up. The parliament during that era
never succeeded in becoming a significant check on the king’s power, although the period from
1964 until the seizure of power by Mohammad Daoud in a 1973 military coup was considered a
flowering of Afghan democracy. The last lower house elections during that period were held in
1969. The parliament was suspended outright following the April 1978 Communist seizure of
power. The elected institutions and the 2004 adoption of a constitution were part of a post-Taliban
transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major Afghan
factions signed in Bonn, Germany, on December 5, 2001 (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the Taliban
had fallen. Hamid Karzai was the first directly elected Afghan President.
Since the fall of the Taliban, there has also been the growth of a civil society, largely made up of
educated Afghans, many of whom returned to Afghanistan from exile when the Taliban fell.
Organizations and groups addressing various issues, including women’s rights, law and justice,
media freedoms, economics and business issues, the environment, and others, have proliferated.
U.S. and international partner policy has been to try to empower these groups to check
government power and to entrench Afghan democracy.
These newly emerging interest groups have still not been able to displace—or even necessarily
substantially influence—the informal power structure of ethnic, regional, tribal, clan, village, and
district structures that exercise authority at all levels. At the local level, these structures governed
and secured Afghanistan until the late 1970s but were weakened by decades of subsequent war
and Taliban rule. Some traditional local authority figures fled or were killed; others were
displaced by mujahedin commanders, militia leaders, Taliban militants, and others. The local
power brokers who displaced some of the tribal structures are widely accused of selectively
applying Afghan law and of using their authority to enrich themselves. Some of the traditional
tribal councils, which are widely respected and highly conservative in orientation, remained
intact. Some of them continue to exercise their writ rather than accept the authority of the central
1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
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government or even local government appointees. Still other community authorities prefer to
accommodate local insurgents rather than help the government secure their areas.
Afghan Ethnicities, Communities, and Their Relationships
Even though many areas of Afghanistan, particularly urban areas, have modernized politically
and economically since the fall of the Taliban, patterns of political affiliation by family, clan,
tribe, village, ethnicity, region, and comradeship in past battles often supersede relationships
based on ideology or views. These traditional patterns have been evident in every post-Taliban
Afghan election, although some candidates have sought to advance specific programs and ideas.
Traditional patterns of affiliation are particularly pronounced in province-based campaigns, such
as those for provincial councils and the parliament, in which candidates can easily exploit clan
and familial relationships.
While Afghans continue to follow traditional patterns of affiliation, tensions between political and
ethnic groups and factions have generally been confined to the legitimate political process. There
have been very few incidents of ethnic-based violence since the fall of the Taliban, but jealousies
over relative economic and political positions of the different ethnic communities have
sporadically manifested as clashes or political disputes. All ethnic groups are represented at all
levels of the central government and each group has a large measure of control over how
government programs are implemented in their geographic regions. Although Afghanistan’s
President has the power to appoint provincial and district governors, in practice there is an
informal understanding not to appoint governors of a different ethnicity than the majority of
residents of particular provinces. The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG),
which submits recommendations to the presidency on local appointments, often consults notables
of a province on appointments. The major groups are discussed below.
Pashtuns
Ethnic Pashtuns (pronounced POSH-toons, sometimes referred to as Pathans—pah-TAHNS), as
the largest single ethnicity, have historically asserted a “right to rule” Afghanistan. The Pashtuns
speak Pashtu (or Pashto), but most in the government also speak Dari, a language akin to Persian.
Pashtuns are widely believed to constitute 42%-45% of the population. With few exceptions, it
has been a Pashtun holding the top governing position in Afghanistan. The sentiment of the “right
to rule” is particularly strong among Pashtuns of the Durrani tribal confederation, which
predominates in the south and is a rival to the Ghilzai confederation, which predominates in the
east. Former President Karzai is a Durrani Pashtun, and his cabinet and advisory circle has been
dominated by other Pashtuns, both Ghilzai and Durrani. His successor, Ashraf Ghani, is from a
prominent Ghilzai clan. The Taliban is composed almost completely of Pashtuns—and its leaders
are mostly Ghilzai Pashtuns—but the movement has opposed the post-2001 government on the
grounds that it has not enforced strict Islamic law and is supported by international forces. A table
on major Pashtun clans is provided below (see Table 1), as is a map showing the distribution of
Afghan ethnicities (see Figure 1).
Tajiks/Northern Alliance
Tajiks, who speak Dari, are the second-most numerous and second-most powerful community in
Afghanistan. Tajiks are an estimated 25% of the population. During the anti-Soviet war and
Taliban period, many Tajik leaders grouped around the prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad
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Shah Masoud and the Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society) mujahedin political party led by
Burhanuddin Rabbani (assassinated September 20, 2011). Masoud was revered because of his
success in preventing Soviet occupation forces from conquering the Panjshir Valley. During
Taliban rule, Tajik leaders formed the core of a broader, non-Pashtun dominated “Northern
Alliance” that is discussed in detail later. Masoud was killed by Al Qaeda supporters two days
before the September 11 attacks on the United States, possibly in conjunction with that plot. It
should be noted that some Tajik commanders during the anti-Soviet and anti-Taliban wars fought
with Pashtun parties including Hezb-i-Islami.
Tajiks have ruled Afghanistan on only a few occasions. Rabbani served as president of the
mujahedin government (1992-1996), and led briefly again during November-December 2001,
before Karzai became interim leader. The main political leader of the Northern Alliance is Dr.
Abdullah Abdullah, whose mother is Tajik and father is Pashtun. Abdullah, who is about 57 years
old, is identified politically as Tajik because he was a top aide to Masoud. Abdullah was
dismissed from his foreign minister post by Karzai in a March 2006 cabinet reshuffle. Abdullah
heads a private foundation named after Ahmad Shah Masoud. Abdullah emerged as Afghanistan’s
opposition leader after his unsuccessful run for president in the August 2009 election, propelling
him to front-running status in the 2014 presidential elections, as discussed below. As an
opposition leader, he has argued that the constitution should be changed to establish a
parliamentary system in which the National Assembly would select a powerful prime minister
that would serve as a check on the presidency. Abdullah’s advocacy of a prime ministerial post
could result from the election dispute-resolution agreement brokered by Secretary of State John
Kerry on July 12, 2014, as discussed further below. The April 5 first round of the presidential
election showed him garnering the most votes (about 45%) in the April 5 presidential election, but
he failed to exceed 50% and a runoff was required, which was won by Ashraf Ghani.
Karzai’s first vice president, Muhammad Fahim—who died in March 2014 of natural causes—
was a Tajik, as is Defense Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammedi. Another Tajik, Yunus Qanooni,
was speaker of the lower house of parliament during 2005-2011 and was made Vice President
after Fahim’s death.
Some Northern Alliance figures have emerged as competitors of Dr. Abdullah. Some did not join
his 10-party “National Coalition of Afghanistan” in December 2011. Ahmad Zia Masoud (Ahmad
Shah Masoud’s brother), for example, belongs to an opposition group called the National Front of
Afghanistan. It does not advocate a prime ministerial system but instead advocates
“federalism”—a high degree of autonomy for Afghan provinces, including appointment of
provincial governors by elected provincial councils. The National Front grouping also is more
skeptical of a peace agreement with the Taliban than is Dr. Abdullah.
Hazaras
The Hazara Shiite minority (about 10% of the population) has advanced economically and
politically since 2001, largely through pursuit of higher education and through entrepreneurship.
The Hazaras have historically been looked down upon by the Pashtuns, who have tended to
employ Hazaras as domestic workers and other lower and working class occupations. Observers
report that many Hazaras, including Hazara women, are earning degrees or pursuing training in
information technology, medical, and other highly skilled professions and that they are becoming
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dominant in many of these higher paying sectors of the Afghan economy.2 Hazaras are slightly
underrepresented in the ANSF officer corps (about 7%). One major Hazara figure is Mohammad
Mohaqiq, who was a prominent mujahedin commander during the Soviet occupation. Another is
Second Vice President Karim Khalili. Other prominent Hazaras include prominent anti-corruption
parliamentarian Ramazan Bashardost and the chairwoman of the Afghanistan Independent
Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), Sima Simar.
Possible envy of Hazara advancement could have been a factor in the December 6, 2011,
bombings of Hazaras in three cities, killing 60, while they were visiting their mosques to
celebrate the Shiite holy day of Ashura. Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi—
generally allied to the almost purely Pashtun Taliban—claimed responsibility. There are also
tensions between the Hazaras and the Tajiks, even though both oppose Pashtun dominance. A
clash took place between the two communities on September 9, 2012, when a car in a procession
of Tajiks commemorating the September 9, 2001, death of Ahmad Shah Masoud ran over a
Hazara bicyclist. The clash was said to reflect lingering Hazara resentment of Masoud’s 1993
offensive against then Hazara rivals during the 1992-1996 period of civil warfare.
Uzbeks
Uzbeks, like the Hazaras, are about 10% of the population. The Uzbek community is Sunni
Muslim and speaks a language akin to Turkish. Most Uzbeks speak Dari as well. The most well-
known Uzbek leader in Afghanistan is Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was allied with Soviet
occupation forces but later defected and helped bring down the Communist regime in Afghanistan
in April 1992. Like Dostam, many Uzbeks adopted the Soviet leftwing and secular ideology, and
the community prospered substantially from Soviet infrastructure built during the occupation
period. As noted below, the speaker of the lower house of parliament is an ethnic Uzbek.
Other Minorities3
There are several other religious and ethnic minorities in Afghanistan, members of which are
sometimes discriminated against or targeted for attacks. Northeastern provinces have a substantial
population of Isma’ilis, a Shiite Muslim sect often called “Seveners” (believers in the Seventh
Imam as the true Imam). They constitute about 5% of the population. Many Ismailis follow the
Agha Khan IV (Prince Qarim al-Husseini), who chairs the large Agha Khan Foundation that has
invested heavily in Afghanistan. An estimated 350 Sikh families and 30 Hindu families are
present as well, concentrated in the area of Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province. The Christian
community is estimated at between 500 and 8,000 persons, and the Bahai community, considered
heretic by Afghan Muslim clerics, is about 2,000.
The Role of Political Parties
Political parties are not a major feature in the Afghan political system. During the era of the
Soviet occupation and the 1992-1996 civil war, many of the mujahedin (Islamic insurgent
2 Richard Oppel Jr. and Abdul Waheed Wafa, “Hazara Minority Hustles to Head of the Class in Afghanistan,” New
York Times, January 4, 2010.
3 Some of this information is taken from the State Department International Religious Freedom Report for 2012,
released May 20, 2013, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/.
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fighters) parties were based on ethnicities, and were loyal to major ethnic and factional
commanders. The fact that these parties, such as Jamiat-Islami, the Uzbek group Junbush Melli
Islami Afghanistan, and the Pashtun Islamist party Hezb –i-Islami, were funded and armed by
outside powers contributed to a popular aversion to formal political parties in post-Taliban
Afghanistan. Since 2009, the party formation has strengthened somewhat but still not to the point
where parties are the main organizing institution for political participation.
Many hoped that post-Taliban Afghanistan would produce secular, pan-ethnic democratic parties.
That process has been halting. From the fall of the Taliban until 2009, 110 political parties were
established, but most of these parties were small and were formed by and centered on specific
personalities or ethnicities, rather than offering clear ideological platforms. Ethnic-based parties
do not portray themselves as such because Article 35 of the Afghan constitution bans parties
based on ethnicity or religious sect. A 2009 law required all parties to re-register by
demonstrating their support with 10,000 signatures spanning at least 22 provinces. That limited
the number of parties registered before the September 18, 2010, parliamentary election to only
five. A July 11, 2012, regulation eased registration rules somewhat by requiring parties to have
offices in at least 20 provinces to register, and 56 parties were registered by the end of 2013.
However, some assert that the development of idea-based parties has been hindered by the Single,
Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system that limits the ability of parties to determine those
candidates that are elected to parliamentary seats. In the 2010 parliamentary elections, only 31 out
of the 2,500 candidates ran as representing a particular political party.
Karzai never formed a party, nor has Ghani. However, many Karzai aides and supporters were
from the moderate faction of Hizb-e-Islami. The party, composed almost totally of ethnic
Pashtuns, is the only one of the mujahedin parties that is formally registered. Committed to
working within the political system, it is led by Minister of Economy Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal,
whose leadership was reaffirmed at a party conference in October 2012. The militant wing of
Hizb-e-Islam is loyal to pro-Taliban insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; it is called Hizb-e-
Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). Another mostly Pashtun party is Afghan Millat (Afghan Nation), headed
by Secretary-General Stana Gul Sherzad.
Since 2004, Abdullah has distanced himself from Jamiat Islami and formed several parties and
coalitions in an effort to broaden his appeal beyond the Tajik community. Some of his rivals in the
Tajik community have formed separate parties or have joined multi-ethnic parties focused on
increasing government accountability. One prominent secular, pan-ethnic party—the Rights and
Justice Party—was formed by ex-Interior Minister (now National Security Adviser) Mohammad
Hanif Atmar and other allies in October 2011. Another party, the Coalition for Reform and
Development, was formed in early 2012 to try to ensure that the 2014 elections would be fair.
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
U.S. policy has been to help expand the capacity of formal Afghan governing institutions.
However, the formal governing structure continues to compete with traditional power structures.
During Taliban rule (1996-2001), Afghanistan was run by a small, Qandahar-based group
(“Shura”) of Pashtun clerics loyal to Mullah Mohammad Umar, who remained there. No
parliament was functioning, and government offices were minimally staffed and lacked modern
equipment. There were no formal processes to review Mullah Omar’s decision, for example, to
host Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. The ouster of that government in late 2001 paved the way
for the success of a long-stalled U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government.
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In the formation of the first post-Taliban transition government, all sides viewed the United
Nations as a credible mediator because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. During the
1990s, a succession of U.N. mediators adopted proposals for a government to be selected by a
traditional assembly, or loya jirga, even though U.N.-mediated cease-fires between warring
factions did not hold. Non-U.N. initiatives made little progress, particularly the “Six Plus Two”
multilateral contact group that began meeting in 1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six
states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan).
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi resumed the
Afghan mediation efforts he had ended in frustration in October 1999. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1378 (November 14, 2001) called for a “central” role for the United Nations in
establishing a transitional administration. In November 2001, after the Taliban government
collapsed, the United Nations invited major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern
Alliance and that of the former King—but not the Taliban—to an international conference in
Bonn, Germany. There, on December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.”4 It was
endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). The agreement:
• authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security in Kabul,
and Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from the capital. Security
Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, and renewed yearly thereafter)
gave formal Security Council authorization for the international peacekeeping
force (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF);
• referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on counter
narcotics, crime, and terrorism; and
• applied the constitution of 1964 until a permanent constitution could be drafted.5
On December 5, 2011, there was an international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, marking
the 10th anniversary since the 2001 Bonn Conference. The meeting, in part, evaluated governance
progress in Afghanistan since the original convention.
Constitution Gives Presidency Broad Powers
A June 2002 “emergency” loya jirga—attended by 1,550 delegates (including about 200
women)—put a representative imprimatur on the transition. Subsequently, a 35-member
constitutional commission drafted a constitution, unveiling it in November 2003. It was debated
by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” from
December 13, 2003, to January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by prominent Islamic scholar and
former interim Afghan leader Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, approved the draft constitution.
The constitution set up a presidential system, with an elected president having relatively broad
powers and a separately elected National Assembly (parliament). The Tajik-dominated Northern
Alliance, which opposed centralized power that would likely favor Pashtuns, failed in its effort to
set up a system in which the parliament would select a prime minister to run the government. The
4 Text of Bonn agreement is at http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm.
5 The last pre-Karzai loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution.
Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies, but that gathering was widely viewed by
Afghans as illegitimate.
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faction achieved some limitations on presidential powers through assignment of major authorities
to the parliament. The Northern Alliance likely calculated that the post of elected president would
usually be won by a member of the more numerous Pashtun community, while the prime minister
post would likely go to a Tajik by informal agreement. The election system (a two round election
if no majority is achieved in the first round) strongly favors the likelihood the president will
always be an ethnic Pashtun.
The president serves a five-year term, with a two-term limit (Article 62). There are two vice
presidents. The president has broad powers. Under article 64, he has the power to appoint all
“high-ranking officials,” which includes not only cabinet ministers but also members of the
Supreme Court, judges, provincial governors and district governors, local security chiefs, and
members of supposedly independent commissions such as the Independent Election Commission
and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). The latter body was set up by
Article 58 to refer cases of human rights violations to “the legal authorities.” (See below for more
on this commission.) These appointments are constitutionally subject to confirmation by the
National Assembly. The president also is commander-in-chief of the Afghan armed forces. At the
CLJ, the opposition did not achieve the right of elected provincial and district councils to choose
their governors—an outcome the opposition continues to seek to reverse. The constitution made
former King Zahir Shah honorary “Father of the Nation,” a title that was not heritable; he died on
July 23, 2007.6
Ghani-Abdullah Agreement Modifies Presidential Powers
To implement the September 21, 2014, power-sharing agreement that resolved the presidential
election dispute, Ghani agreed to delegate some of his presidential powers to “Chief Executive
Officer” (CEO) of the government, Abdullah. Under the agreement, the CEO will share with
Ghani the responsibilities of making cabinet appointments, and he will chair ministerial meetings
to implement government decisions.
Presidential Advisory and Implementing Institutions
Presidential Advisors/Chiefs of Staff
A significant number of advisors work out of the presidential office. Virtually all of Karzai’s
closest advisers were Pashtuns. The most prominent advisor is the chief of staff. During 2011-
2014, that post was held by former Minister of Information and Culture Abdul Karim Kurram, a
member of the moderate wing of Hezb-e-Islami. He succeeded Mohammad Umar Daudzai,
another Hezb-e-Islami member, who was subsequently was appointed Afghanistan’s Ambassador
to Pakistan and then (August 2013) Interior Minister.
Similarly, Ghani is likely to rely on other Pashtuns as his closest advisors. After taking office, he
appointed Abdul Salam Rahimi as the new chief of staff. Rahimi is a former deputy finance
minister (deputy to Ghani when he was finance minister), who subsequently became head of one
of Afghanistan’s largest media groups, called Saba.
6 Text of constitution is at http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/ConstitutionAfghanistan.pdf.
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National Security Council
The National Security advisory staff is located in the presidential palace complex. During
Karzai’s presidency, this advisory body was heavily populated by ethnic Pashtuns but included
some figures from other ethnicities as well. This will likely remain the case under Ashraf Ghani,
although the power-sharing arrangement will likely include some Abdullah loyalists joining the
organization as well.
During his presidency, Karzai relied heavily on French-educated physician Zalmay Rassoul, a
Pashtun, who was National Security Adviser to Karzai until his appointment in 2010 as Foreign
Minister, and who was a major candidate for president in the April 5, 2014 election. His successor
in that post was Rangin Spanta, also a Pashtun, who was Foreign Minister during 2006-2010.
After his September 29, 2014, inauguration, Ghani appointed Mohammad Hanif Atmar as
national security adviser. The following day, Atmar was tasked to sign the bilateral security
agreement (BSA) with the United States on behalf of the Afghan government. The United States
required the BSA in order to maintain troops in Afghanistan after 2014.
Office of Administrative Affairs/General Administrative Office
An administrative unit that has attracted increasing international attention as a center of organized
policymaking is the Office of Administrative Affairs (OAA), referred to by some as the General
Administrative Office (GAO). Some experts say that the office, headed by a Hazara Shiite named
Sadiq Mudabir, is primarily administrative, and without any policy coordination role. However,
some Afghan observers say it has increasingly taken on a policymaking role by helping the
National Assembly draft laws and advising the president on what legislation to sign or to veto.7
The office also is purported to be taking on an informal judicial role by assessing the legitimacy
of citizen, group, and corporate petitions and forwarding those deemed legitimate to the
appropriate ministries for action.
The office is a holdover from the Communist era and contains many longtime bureaucrats.
During the 1990s, it may have had as many as 1,800 personnel, but it was trimmed during the
Karzai era to about 700 staff members. The operations of the unit are funded primarily by the
United Kingdom, but U.S. military and civilian officials have advised the office as well. In
October 2014, President Ghani reduced the staff of the OAA further—and some staff of his
presidential office—on the grounds that there was overlap between the two organizations.8
National Assembly (Parliament) Powers and Performance
The National Assembly outlined by the constitution consists of a 259 seat all-elected lower house
(Wolesi Jirga, House of the People, of which 10 seats are elected by Kuchi nomads) and a
selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). The upper house is selected as
follows: one-third, or 34 seats, appointed by the president (for a five-year term); one-third
appointed by the elected provincial councils (four-year term); and one-third appointed by elected
7 Author conversations with former Karzai National Security Council official. 2012-13.
8 Azam Ahmed. “New Afghan President Wastes No Time Putting Efficiency Over Ceremony.” New York Times,
October 22, 2014.
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district councils (for a three-year term). Of the president’s appointments, half (17) are mandated
to be women.9
Because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district
boundaries, formal elections for the 407 district councils have not been held to date. Each district
boundary is likely to be contentious because it will inevitably separate tribes and clans. Until
there are elected district councils, two-thirds of the Meshrano Jirga are selected by the provincial
councils for four-year terms. The lower house is mandated to be at least 28% female (68 women),
an average of two for each of the 34 provinces.
Powers of the National Assembly
The National Assembly has become the key formal institution for non-Pashtun ethnic groups and
political independents to oppose or influence the president. The Assembly was set up by the
constitution as a relatively powerful body that can, to some extent, check the powers of the
president, although many observers assert that it has been unable to break presidential authority.
The lower house has the power to vote no-confidence against ministers (Article 92)—based on a
proposal by 10% of the lower house membership (25 parliamentarians). Both the upper and lower
houses are required to pass laws. Under Article 98 of the constitution, the national budget is taken
up by the Meshrano Jirga first and then passed to the Wolesi Jirga for its consideration. The two
houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed by a
National Assembly “secretariat” that has about 275 Afghans employees and runs a research unit
and a library. There are 18 oversight committees. A USAID program called the Afghanistan
Parliamentary Assistance Project (APAP) helped build the National Assembly’s outreach,
communications, and information technology, and advised it on legislative reform and budgeting.
The National Assembly has often asserted institutional strength, in large part due to its
technocrats and independents. One of the Assembly’s first tasks was to review, and endorse,
amend, or void the presidential decrees issued prior to the formation of the National Assembly. In
March 2006, it achieved a vote to require the cabinet to be approved individually, rather than en
bloc, increasing opposition leverage. However, all but 5 of the first 25 nominees were confirmed.
In May 2006, the opposition within the lower house compelled changes to the nine-member
Supreme Court, the highest judicial body, including ousting 74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl
Hadi Shinwari as chief justice.
The process of confirming the second-term cabinet—in which many of Karzai’s nominees were
voted down in several nomination rounds during 2010—affirmed the Assembly’s institutional
strength. On August 4, 2012, it voted out Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak and Interior
Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammedi, ostensibly for failing to reduce corruption in their
ministries. Karzai abided by the vote, although he subsequently appointed and achieved
confirmation of Khan as defense minister. In January 2013, the lower house summoned 11
ministers to explain why they had executed only about 50% of their budgetary authority in 2012.
In mid-May 2013, the lower house questioned Finance Minister Omar Zakhilwal for alleging that
several parliamentarians were smuggling goods across Afghanistan’s borders, but it later voted
9 The size of the two bodies is slightly smaller than the size of the same two bodies provided for in the 1964
constitution (214 members in the Wolesi Jirga and 84 members in the Meshrano Jirga, of which one-third were
appointed by the King, one-third appointed by the provincial councils, and one-third directly elected.
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not to impeach him.10 In July 2013, the lower house voted no-confidence against Interior Minister
Ghulam Mujtaba Patang for security lapses around Afghanistan. Karzai at first opposed the move
but in late August 2013 relented and appointed Umar Daudzai (see above) as Interior Minister.
During 2014, despite the presidential election dispute, the National Assembly acted on several
pending laws. It adopted a commercial contracts law and a money laundering law. The lower
house has passed a value-added-tax law, a mining and minerals law, and an “access to
information” law.
Politics of the National Assembly
During his presidency, Karzai had the consistent support of about 70-90 mostly Pashtun members
of the lower house (Wolesi Jirga), many of whom are members of Hizb-e-Islami. Some Pashtun
assembly deputies follow Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, a prominent Pashtun Islamic conservative
mujahedin era party leader,11 or were from Karzai’s home province of Qandahar or neighboring
Helmand province. One pro-Karzai Pashtun who was reelected in 2010 is former militia leader
Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who led the Afghan component of the failed December 2001
assault on Osama bin Laden’s purported redoubt at Tora Bora. Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi, an Uzbek
who is perceived as weak, is not a Karzai acolyte but was selected lower house speaker in 2011 as
a compromise candidate. Many of the Pashtuns in the assembly are likely to support Ghani, but
the Tajiks are likely to support Abdullah—potentially polarizing the body.
Karzai had substantial support in the 102-seat upper house of the National Assembly, partly
because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third) to that body. Close allies have consistently
chaired the body, including Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, who led it from 2005 until 2010, and the
current chair, Fazl Hadi Muslim Yaar. Because it is composed of more elderly, established,
notable Afghans who are traditionalist in their political outlook, the upper house has tended to be
more Islamist conservative than the lower house, advocating a legal system that accords with
Islamic law, and restrictions on press and Westernized media broadcasts.
Karzai also used his bloc of appointments to the upper house to co-opt potential antagonists or
reward his friends. In 2006, he appointed Muhammad Fahim (see above) to the upper body,
although he resigned after a few months. In 2006, Karzai also named a key ally, former Helmand
Governor Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh, to the body. In February 2011, following the 2010
parliamentary elections, Karzai reappointed 18 incumbents and appointing 16 new members to
the body, including the mandated appointment of 17 women. It is not known whether Ghani, as
president, will follow Karzai’s appointment patterns after the 2015 parliamentary election, or the
degree to which Dr. Abdullah will be able to make appointments as well as CEO.
10 “Afghanistan’s Cycle of Corruption,” Thedailybeast.com, May 16, 2013.
11 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
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Hamid Karzai, Former President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2001-2014)
Hamid Karzai, born December 24, 1957, was selected to lead Afghanistan at the 2001 Bonn Conference because he
was a prominent Pashtun leader who had been involved in Taliban-era political talks among exiled Afghans and was
viewed as a compromiser rather than a “strongman.” His presidency was characterized by deteriorating relations with
the outside powers that have preserved Afghan stability and underwritten economic development, but also success in
including all ethnic and political factions in governance.
From Karz village in Qandahar Province, Karzai has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999,
when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai’s grandfather was head of the
consultative National Council during King Zahir Shah’s reign. He attended university in India and supported the
mujahidin party of Sibghatullah Mojadeddi during the anti-Soviet war. He was deputy foreign minister in the mujahidin
government of Rabbani during 1992-1995, but he resigned and supported the Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to
Rabbani. He did not serve formal y in the 1996-2001 Taliban regime. Karzai broke with the Taliban regime as its
excesses unfolded and he forged alliances with anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Karzai entered
Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported by U.S. Special
Forces. He became central to U.S. efforts after Pashtun commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001
without U.S. support and was captured and hung by the Taliban. Karzai was slightly injured by an errant U.S. bomb in
late 2001.
With heavy protection, Karzai survived several assassination attempts during his presidency, including rocket fire or
gunfire at or near his appearances. His wife, Dr. Zenat Karzai, is a gynecologist by profession but rarely appeared in
public. They have two children. He has stayed in Kabul since leaving office in a newly built house located near the
current presidential palace. He reportedly continues to hold meetings of Afghan notables and will likely continue to
play a role as an informal power broker.
Family Dealings
Controversy has surrounded his siblings for allegedly profiting from Karza’is presidency. His half-brother, Ahmad Wali
Karzai, was the most powerful political figure in Qandahar Province until his assassination on July 12, 2011. He was
key to President Karzai’s information network in Qandahar. Ahmad Wali was widely accused of being involved in or
tolerating narcotics trafficking, but reportedly also was a paid informant for the CIA; some of his property has been
used by U.S. Special Forces. After Ahmad Wali’s death, Karzai appointed another brother, Shah Wali Karzai, as
Popolzai chief. Shah Wali reputedly became involved in business dealings in Qandahar that have run him afoul of
another brother, Mahmoud Karzai. Their dispute centered around $50 million impounded by Shah Wali to complete
the large upscale housing development in Qandahar called Ayno Maina. The dispute was settled in September 2013
and the complex has been completed. Mahmoud is reportedly under U.S. Justice Department investigation for al eged
corruption involving other business interests in Qandahar and Kabul, including auto dealerships, a coal mine, a cement
factory, and his borrowings from Kabul Bank (see below). Another brother, Qayyum Karzai, served in parliament
during 2005-2008 but resigned in October 2008 and subsequently became involved in negotiations with Taliban
figures on a political settlement. Qayyum failed to get President Karzai’s support to run for president in 2014. Other
Karzai relatives have profited extensively from international contracts, including a $2.2 billion U.S. “Host Nation
Trucking” contract. The United States banned contracts to one such firm, Watan Risk Management, as of January 6,
2011; the firm is co-owned by two Karzai second cousins—Rashid and Rateb Popal. The Popal brothers reorganized
the company as Watan Group and this firm is the local partner of China National Petroleum Company on a $3 billion
investment, awarded in 2012, to develop oil fields in northern Afghanistan.
U.S.-Karzai Relations
Particularly in his last few years in office, Karzai periodically lashed out at what he characterized as infringements on
Afghan sovereignty in the form of some nighttime U.S.-led combat operations on private Afghan homes and prisoner
detentions. On April 4, 2010, Karzai suggested that Western meddling in Afghanistan was fueling support for the
Taliban as a legitimate resistance to foreign occupation. In October 2011, he said that Afghanistan would side with
Pakistan in the event of a war between Pakistan and the United States. During a March 2013 visit of Secretary of
Defense Hagel, Karzai said that Taliban attacks were helping the United States prolong its military presence in
Afghanistan. Some U.S. officials assert that his refusal to sign a negotiated Bilateral Security Agreement that would
keep some U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014 complicated planning for the post-2014 mission. Related differences
emerged in February 2014 over an Afghan release of 68 detainees the United States identified as major security
threats.
Source: Various press reporting and author conversations with Afghan officials. 2002-2014.
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The Judiciary and Rule of Law12
The Afghan constitution provides for an independent judiciary, led by a nine-member Supreme
Court. The members are appointed by the president, subject to confirmation by the lower house of
the National Assembly. Three judges serve for 10-year terms, three are appointed for seven years,
and three serve four-year terms. Two of those whose seats had expired were confirmed by the
Wolesi Jirga on December 25, 2013, but Chief Justice Abdul Salaam Azimi (whose term expired
in August 2010) and three other associates justices with expired terms continue to serve as “acting
justices.” As the highest body in the judiciary, the Supreme Court appoints judges at the
provincial and district level. In 2012, the Supreme Court swore in 181 judges, many of whom
were women, leaving only 38 out of Afghanistan’s 400-plus districts lacking an assigned judge.
International donors have helping the formal Afghan judicial system expand its capacity and
competence, particularly in urban areas. U.S. funding supports training and mentoring for Afghan
justice officials, direct assistance to the Afghan government to expand efforts on judicial security,
legal aid and public defense, gender justice and awareness, and expansion of justice in the
provinces. USAID’s “Rule of Law Stabilization Program” has trained over 700 Afghan judges
and expanded the Afghan Supreme Court’s training for new judges. Since July 2010, the U.S.
embassy has had a senior official heading a Rule of Law Directorate. Separate NATO efforts to
support rule of law in Afghanistan ceased operations in 2013.
However, there is broad agreement that the Afghan judicial system remains weak and its
independence is questionable. Judges and prosecutors are frequent targets of assassination,
particular in insecure areas of Afghanistan. And justice is often subjective, with powerful families
or factions often able to obtain the release from jail or non-prosecution of their members and
supporters. The Afghan government has completed few of the benchmarks for judicial reform
agreed at the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference and the “Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework” established at the Tokyo donor’s conference of July 8, 2012. On matters involving
interpreting the constitution, the Supreme Court has sparred with a rival institution, a
constitutionally mandated “Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation
of the Constitution (ICSIC).” The ICSIC consists of seven commissioners appointed by the
president, subject to confirmation by the lower house of the National Assembly. Some of the
progress and continued difficulties are discussed below:
• Criminal procedure code. The Tokyo Framework required enactment into law of
a criminal procedure code by the end of 2010—one of the 37 laws the Afghans
pledged at the Kabul Conference to enact. In January 2014, the Ministry of
Justice finalized 220 articles of a draft code—incorporating all criminal laws
enacted since 2001, including those on counter-terrorism, anti-corruption, anti-
money laundering, and anti-human trafficking. The National Assembly approved
the draft and then President Karzai signed it into law on February 23, 2014.
• Institutional structures and policies. The judiciary works closely with the Office
of the Attorney General, who is the highest ranking law enforcement officer in
Afghanistan. The position has been held by Mohammad Ishaq Aloko, a Pashtun,
since 2010. On October 13, 2012, the Wolesi Jirga adopted a law on the structure
and authority of the Attorney General’s Office. The Afghan government also has
12 Information on the judiciary can be found at http://supremecourt.gov.af/en/page/614/619#baha.
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pledged to align strategy toward the informal justice sector with the National
Justice Sector Strategy.
• Legal aid. The Tokyo Framework required improving legal aid services by the
end of 2011. A March 7, 2014, U.N. Secretary-General’s report on Afghanistan
said the Ministry of Justice had increased to 31 the number of legal aid offices
around the country. The offices are staffed by 101 legal aid lawyers.
• Facilitating return of illegally seized lands. The Afghan government committed
to do so in the Tokyo Framework partly to address the ability of well-connected
individuals to appropriated land—either through the legal process or through
force—for their homes and projects. USAID provided $56 million during
FY2005-FY2009 to facilitate property registration. An additional $140 million
was provided from FY2010 to FY2014 to inform citizens of land processes and
procedures and to establish a legal and regulatory framework for land
administration.
• De-politicizing the judiciary. The Tokyo Framework committed Afghanistan to
present donors with plans to depoliticize the judiciary and assure rule of law—
elements of a National Priority Program (NPP). In mid-October 2012, the EU
judged that not enough progress had been made, and about $26 million in EU aid
for judiciary reform was withheld.
Informal Justice System and Traditional Dispute Mechanisms
Because of insecurity and lack of trust of the formal justice sector, as many as 80% of cases are
decided in the informal justice system—particularly cases involving local property, familial or
local disputes, or personal status issues. The informal justice sector consists of local, informal
mechanisms (shuras, jirgas) that adjudicate disputes. In the informal sector, traditional practices
of dispute resolution to prevail, including the traditional Pashtun code of conduct known as
Pashtunwali. Some of these customs include traditional forms of apology (“nanawati” and
“shamana”) and compensation for wrongs done.13
While much of the informal justice system consists of shuras and jirgas, there is also a history of
Islamic courts operating in some provinces. These courts predate the accession of the Taliban, and
some reemerged after the international intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. Some experts believe
this informal Islamic court system could provide a stabilizing effect after 2014 by attracting the
trust of Afghans and drawing them away from informal justice mechanisms run by Taliban
insurgents.14
However, the informal justice system is dominated almost exclusively by males. For example,
some disputes, including over debts or other financial obligations, are resolved by families’
offering to make young girls available to marry older men from the family that is the counter-
party to the dispute. This practice is known as baad.
13 http://www.khyber.org/articles/2004/JirgaRestorativeJustice.shtml.
14 Casey Garret Johnson, “Afghan Islamic Courts: A Pre-Taliban System With Post-2014 Potential?,” At War, April 17,
2013.
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Some informal justice shuras take place in Taliban-controlled territory, and some Afghans may
prefer Taliban-run shuras when doing so means they will be judged by members of their own
tribe or tribal confederation. U.S. officials say they do not oppose the widespread use of the
informal justice sector as such, but they do oppose it when it is administered by Taliban members
because of the Taliban’s often extreme interpretations of Islamic law.
One concern is how deeply the international community should become involved in the informal
justice sector. U.S. programs have focused primarily on the formal justice system, but there has
been increasing attention to the informal system because its use is so prevalent.
USAID has implemented programs to link the formal and informal justice sector. As part of a
program begun in 2011, USAID has assisted local shuras (informal justice sector) in four districts
to establish a system to transmit their judicial rulings, in writing, to the district government. The
rule of law issue is discussed in CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice
Sector Assistance, by Liana Rosen and Kenneth Katzman.
The Informal Power Structure: Power Brokers and Faction Leaders
An informal power structure exists outside the formal governing institutions—consisting of
locally popular faction leaders with armed militia forces. Some observers refer to such figures as
“warlords.” This power structure is increasingly influential as international forces draw down,
because Afghan constituencies seek protection from a potential Taliban comeback. Karzai opted
to work relatively amicably with this informal power structure, maintaining that confronting
faction leaders outright would cause their followers to rebel. Many faction leaders operate in both
spheres—holding official governing positions while also exercising informal influence in their
home provinces.
Some question whether Ghani will follow Karzai’s policies of engaging faction leaders,
particularly those loyal to Abdullah. However, recognizing the ability of the faction leaders to
mobilize not only militias but also voters, Ghani’s first vice president is one of the most
prominent and controversial faction leaders: Abdul Rashid Dostam. Engagement of faction
leaders has often caused resentment among civil society activists and other Afghan modernizers.
A number of faction leaders own or have investments in Afghan security or other firms that have
won business from U.S. and other donors and fuel allegations of nepotism and other corruption.
Some argue that U.S. policy after 2007 further empowered local faction leaders and even created
new factions and militias. Local security initiatives, including the Afghan Local Police Program
and the Critical Infrastructure Police, have created new security organs that sometimes operate
outside the full control of central security authority. On the other hand, Northern Alliance leaders
maintain that the international community’s early dismantling of local power structures in favor
of a monopoly of central government control over armed force—which often targeted Northern
Alliance militias for demobilization—caused the security deterioration in 2006-2011.
In February 2007, both houses of parliament passed a law (officially titled the National
Reconciliation, General Amnesty, and National Stability Law) giving amnesty to faction leaders
and others who committed abuses during Afghanistan’s past wars. In December 2009, the Afghan
government published an amended version of the law—containing a provision giving victims the
right to seek redress for abuses—in the official gazette (a process known as “gazetting”), giving it
the force of law.
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Northern Alliance Commanders
As noted above, the first vice president during Karzai’s second term, Muhammad Fahim, died of
natural causes on March 9, 2014. His passing removed from the scene a figure who has served as
a significant bridge between Karzai and the Northern Alliance. Fahim, a Tajik from the Panjshir
Valley region, became military chief of the Northern Alliance after Ahmad Shah Masoud’s death.
His choice as vice president in 2009 was criticized by human rights and other groups. During
2002-2007, he reportedly withheld turning over some heavy weapons to U.N. disarmament
officials. He allegedly was involved in facilitating narcotics trafficking in northern Afghanistan,
according to a New York Times story of August 27, 2009. Other allegations suggest he engineered
property confiscations and other benefits to feed his and his faction’s business interests.
In September 2012, Fahim said that Northern Alliance fighters should reorganize after 2014 if
Afghan forces are unable to fend off the Taliban. His passing leaves the Northern Alliance
without an obvious figure to command an overarching Alliance militia, should it choose to revive
one. Some assert that Interior Minister Bismillah Khan could serve that function.
Abdul Rashid Dostam: Uzbek Leader in Northern Afghanistan
Prominent Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam—who was inaugurated as first vice president on
September 29—heads a political faction called Junbush Melli Islami Afghanistan (National
Islamic Movement of Afghanistan), although it is not a registered political party. A former
Communist ally of the Soviet occupying forces, Dostam joined the Northern Alliance against the
Taliban, bringing with him numerous armed partisans from his redoubt in northern Afghanistan
(Jowzjan, Faryab, Balkh, and Sar-i-Pol provinces). During the Soviet and Taliban years, he was
widely accused of human rights abuses of political opponents, but he is also known for lack of
emphasis on Islam and support for Western-style values, including alcohol consumption and
promotion of women. To try to reduce his influence in the north, in 2005 Karzai appointed him to
the post of chief military adviser—a largely ceremonial post.
Dostam’s support for Karzai in the 2009 election was key to Karzai’s victory because of Dostam’s
large following, and he apparently attracted many Uzbek votes to Ghani’s candidacy as well.
Dostam has been a rival figure of Balkh Province Governor Atta Mohammad Noor, who governs
a province inhabited by many Uzbeks. In 2011, Dostam joined with Karzai’s opposition in the
National Front of Afghanistan and Truth and Justice Party, discussed above.
Fueling concerns about Dostam’s vice presidency is the fact that he has had numerous feuds and
altercations with other Afghan figures. On February 4, 2008, Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s
villa in Kabul in response to reports that he attacked an ethnic Turkmen figure who had broken
with him. Dostam temporarily went into exile in Turkey in exchange for the dropping of the
charges.15 In June 2012, the Karzai government prosecuted Dostam for allegedly insisting the
China National Petroleum Co. (CNPC) hire Dostam loyalists on its oil development project in
northern Afghanistan. Dostam and his allies alleged that the prosecution was a Karzai effort to
favor Karzai’s relatives’ firm, Watan Group, which is the partner of CNPC on the project. In mid-
June 2013, about 50 of Dostam’s armed aides reportedly clashed with those of the deputy leader
of Junbush Melli, the governor of Jowzjan Province, for refusing Dostam’s plan to revive an
Uzbek militia.
15 CRS email conversation with a then-National Security aide to President Karzai, December 2008.
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Dostam’s reputation is further clouded by alleged past war crimes. On July 11, 2009, the New
York Times reported that allegations that Dostam had caused the death of several hundred Taliban
prisoners during the major combat phase of OEF (late 2001) were not investigated by the Bush
Administration. President Obama said any allegations of violations of laws of war need to be
investigated, responding to assertions that there was no investigation of the Dasht-e-Laili
massacre because Dostam was a U.S. ally.16 Dostam responded to Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty (which carried the story) that only 200 Taliban prisoners died and primarily because of
combat and disease, not intentional actions of his forces.
Atta Mohammad Noor: Balkh Province/Mazar-e-Sharif Potentate
Atta Mohammad Noor, another ethnic Tajik former mujahedin commander and Northern Alliance
figure, has been the governor of Balkh Province since 2005. The capital of that province is the
vibrant city of Mazar-e-Sharif, since 2005. Noor openly endorsed Dr. Abdullah in the 2009
presidential election and threatened to unleash his militia followers to help Abdullah seize power
unless the 2014 election is decided in Abdullah’s favor. Noor ceased any additional threats after
the September 21 signing of the power-sharing agreement between Ghani and Abdullah.
As a governor, Noor has kept Balkh Province secure, allowing Mazar-e-Sharif to become a major
trading hub. Mazar-e-Sharif is one of the four cities transitioned to Afghan security leadership in
June 2011. About 60% of the residents of the city have access to electricity 24 hours per day, a far
higher percentage than most other cities in Afghanistan, and higher even than Kabul. His critics
say that Noor exemplifies a local potentate, brokering local security and business arrangements
that enrich Noor and his allies while ensuring stability and prosperity.17 Some reports say that he
commands two private militias in the province that, in at least two districts (Chimtal and
Charbolak), outnumber official Afghan police, and which prompt complaints of land seizures and
other abuses primarily against the province’s Pashtuns.
Mohammed Mohaqiq: Hazara Stalwart
Another faction leader is Mohammad Mohaqiq, a Hazara leader. During the war against the
Soviet Union and then Taliban, Mohaqiq was a commander of Hazara fighters in and around
Bamiyan Province, and a major figure in the Hazara Shiite Islamist party Hezb-e-Wahdat (Unity
Party). The party was supported by Iran during those periods. Mohaqiq, a member of the lower
house of parliament, was the apparent target of an assassination attempt in mid-June 2013. In July
2012, Mohaqiq demanded Karzai fire the head of the Academy of Sciences for publishing a new
national almanac that Mohaqiq said overstated the percentage of Pashtuns in Afghanistan at 60%.
Karzai fired the Academy head and three others at that institution. Mohaqiq was on Dr.
Abdullah’s slate in the 2014 presidential election and strongly echoed Abdullah’s accusations that
Ghani won the election largely through systematic fraud.
Isma’il Khan: “Emir” of Herat/Western Afghanistan
Another Northern Alliance strongman that Karzai has sought to both engage and weaken is
prominent Tajik political leader and former Herat Governor Ismail Khan. Khan played a key role
16 This is the name of the area where the Taliban prisoners purportedly died and were buried in a mass grave.
17 Carlotta Gall, “In Afghanistan’s North, Ex-Warlord Offers Security,” New York Times, May 17, 2010.
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in the March 1979 killing of 50 Soviet advisors in western Afghanistan. Then a captain in the
Afghan military, the attack by military personnel loyal to Khan marked the start of the mujahedin
uprising that triggered the December 1979 Soviet invasion. In 1995, he was captured and
imprisoned by the Taliban but escaped. Khan is a religious conservative despite his Tajik
ethnicity, and has generally sought to limit women’s rights and influence in Herat province.
Often referred to as “Emir” (ruler) of the Herat area, Khan remains influential in western
Afghanistan. Khan apparently helped Karzai win Herat Province in the 2009 election and,
recognizing Khan’s ability to attract votes, Abdi Rab Rasoul Sayyaf put Khan on his ticket for the
2014 presidential elections. During the campaign period, Khan was uninjured in an attack on his
motorcade in Herat. A 2009 bombing there also missed him. Khan has been minister of energy
and water since 2006—Karzai appointed him at that time in part to take him away from his
political base in the west. Since 2010, Khan also has served on the High Peace Council, the body
overseeing reconciliation with Taliban leaders.
U.S. concerns about Khan’s continuing role as a faction leader—and a sign of the reemergence of
traditional authority forms—were reinforced in November 2012. Anticipating greater Taliban
strength after the international forces draw down at the end of 2014, Khan rallied thousands of his
followers in the desert outside Herat, calling on them to reactivate their networks to prepare for
possible eventual battle with the Taliban. As has Dostam, Khan reportedly has begun enlisting
new recruits for a reviving militia force. Karzai’s office criticized the gathering and Khan’s efforts
as contrary to government policy.18 In November 2010, Afghan television broadcast audio files
purporting to show Khan insisting that election officials alter the results of the September 2010
parliamentary elections.19
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh: Helmand Province Power Broker
One of the most influential Pashtun tribal leaders in southern Afghanistan is Sher Mohammad
Akhunzadeh. A close associate of Karzai when they were in exile in Quetta, Pakistan, during
Taliban rule, Karzai appointed him governor of Akhunzadeh’s home province of Helmand when
the Taliban government fell in late 2001. Akhunzadeh controls many loyalists in Helmand who
helped international forces secure the province during his governorship of the province. However,
his followers reportedly exercised power arbitrarily and engaged in illicit economic activity,
contributing to Britain’s demand that he be removed as a condition of Britain taking security
control of Helmand in 2005. Karzai reluctantly acceded to the demand. Akhunzadeh promoted
Karzai’s reelection in Helmand Province in the 2009 election. Akhunzadeh and his allies
apparently won a power struggle with then Helmand governor Ghulab Mangal, who is from
eastern Afghanistan, when Karzai replaced Mangal on September 20, 2012, despite widespread
praise for Mangal by U.S. officials. His relationship with Ghani is not known precisely.
Karzai Family: Qandahar Province Stronghold
Even though he is no longer president, Karzai and his clan will likely still be influential because
of their significant contacts and following in the clan’s home province of Qandahar. The province
has about 2 million people, of whom about half live in Qandahar city. In July 2011, Karzai’s half-
18 Graham Bowley, “Afghan Warlord’s Call to Arms Rattles Officials,” New York Times, November 13, 2012.
19 Joshua Partlow, “Audio Files Raise New Questions About Afghan Elections,” Washington Post, November 11, 2010.
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brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, was assassinated. He was chair of the Qandahar provincial council,
a post with relatively limited formal power, but he was more powerful than any appointed
governor of Qandahar and constituents and interest groups sought his interventions on their
behalf. Qandahar governance suffered an additional blow in July 2011 when the appointed mayor
of Qandahar city, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, was assassinated.
Following Ahmad Wali’s death, Karzai promoted another brother, Shah Wali Karzai, as head of
the Popolzai clan. Shah Wali at first lacked the acumen and clout of Ahmad Wali, but reports
since mid-2012 say he has become highly influential, while also becoming involved in significant
business dealings that continue to cast aspersions on the Karzai family. Also active in the
province is another Karzai brother, Qayyum, who has served in the National Assembly and is a
candidate to succeed his brother in the April 2014 election. The Karzai clan has consistently
overshadowed and marginalized the governors of the province, including the current governor,
Tooryalai Wesa, a Canadian-Afghan academic appointed in late 2008. Another Karzai relative,
Heshmat Karzai, was assassinated at his home in July 2014 by a visitor for unspecified reasons.
Another power center is Qandahar’s police chief, Colonel Abdul Razziq. He is perceived as
having increasing weight, as well as a reputation for corruption, including siphoning off customs
revenues at the key Spin Boldak crossing from Pakistan. He was appointed to his current post in
March 2011 after his predecessor was killed in an insurgent attack.
Ghul Agha Shirzai: Eastern Afghanistan/Nangarhar
A key gubernatorial appointment has been Ghul Agha Shirzai in Nangarhar. He is a Pashtun from
the powerful Barakzai clan based in Qandahar Province, previously serving as governor and
exercising influence in that province. Shirzai had considered running against Karzai in 2009 but
then opted not to run as part of a reported “deal” that yielded Shirzai unspecified political and
other benefits. He was a candidate for president in the 2014 election, but fared poorly in the April
5, 2014, first round.
In Nangarhar, Shirzai is generally viewed as an interloper. But, much as has Noor in Balkh,
Shirzai has exercised relatively effective leadership, particularly in curbing poppy cultivation
there. However, Shirzai is also widely accused of arbitrary action against political or other
opponents, and he reportedly does not remit all the customs duties collected at the Khyber
Pass/Torkham crossing to the central government. U.S. officials say that he has kept some of the
funds, and moves substantial funds around in cash rather than the Afghan banking system. He
was briefly questioned in July 2012 in Germany about several suitcases of cash he was carrying,
but was allowed to proceed. His supporters say he uses much of the funds—deposited in an
account called the “Shirzai Fund”—for the benefit of the province, not trusting that funds
remitted to Kabul would be spent in the province. Some allege that he has intervened in the
province’s judicial process to win freedom for Taliban suspects with whom he might have
commercial ties. Shirzai denies the allegations.20
20 Nathan Hodge, “U.S. Finds Graft by Favored Afghan Leader,” Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2012.
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Traditional Decision-Making Processes of the Informal Power Structure:
Jirgas and Shuras
The informal power structure has decision-making bodies and processes that do not approximate
Western-style democracy but yet have participatory and representative elements. Meetings called
shuras, or jirgas (consultative councils),21 often composed of designated notables, are key
mechanisms for making or endorsing authoritative decisions or dispensing justice. Some of these
mechanisms are practiced by Taliban insurgents in areas under their control or influence. On the
other hand, some see the traditional patterns as competing with and detracting from the
development of the post-Taliban formal power structure—a structure that, with Western guidance,
has generally tried to meet international standards of democratic governance.
At the national level, one traditional mechanism has carried over into the post-Taliban governing
structure. The convening of a loya jirga, an assembly usually consisting of about 1,500 delegates
from all over Afghanistan, has been used on several occasions. The Afghan constitution provides
for a constitutional loya jirga as the highest decision-making body, superseding government
decisions and even elections, and the constitution specifies the institutions that must be
represented at the constitutional loya jirga. If a constitutional jirga cannot be held or is blocked, a
traditional loya jirga can be convened by the president to discuss major issues, although it cannot
render binding decisions. In the post-Taliban period, traditional loya jirgas have been convened to
endorse Karzai’s leadership, to adopt a constitution, and to discuss a long-term defense
relationship with the United States. A special loya jirga, called a peace jirga, was held on June 2-
4, 2010, to review government plans to offer incentives for insurgent fighters to end their armed
struggle and rejoin society. Another loya jirga was held during November 16-19, 2011, to endorse
proposed Afghan government conditions on a Strategic Partnership Agreement between
Afghanistan and the United States (which subsequently was signed). Another loya jirga in
November 2013 approved a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) needed for some U.S. troops to
stay in Afghanistan after 2014, although that agreement remains unsigned pending inauguration
of a new Afghan leader.
Emergent Power Centers: Civil Society and Independent Activists
The fall of the Taliban and international intervention has enabled the emergence of new centers of
influence with the potential to sustain modernization. Civil society activists and “independents”
in the National Assembly and other institutions are a growing force in Afghan politics. Civil
society activists dominate the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) as well
as such private activists and watchdog groups as the Afghanistan Women’s Network, the Afghan
Anti-Corruption Network, Integrity Watch, Equality for Peace and Democracy, “Afghanistan
1400,” and the Afghanistan Analysis and Awareness (“A3”). Activists in these groups are familiar
with and have easy access to media outlets. Some own new media outlets, such as the Mohseni
family, which owns Moby Media (Tolo Television), Afghanistan’s most popular private TV
station. Independent newspapers, such as Eight Sobh (8 AM), have been established to advocate
for transparent government. The December 5, 2011, Bonn conference was preceded by meetings
(December 2-3, 2011, in Bonn) of Afghan civil society activists that were intended to help assess
the progress of Afghan governance and highlight the role of civil society in governance. On the
other hand, civil society activists continue to struggle against traditional faction leaders—many of
21 Shura is the term used by non-Pashtuns to characterize the traditional assembly concept. Jirga is the Pashtun term.
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whom often use their armed supporters to intimidate civil society activists or media outlets that
criticize them.
Among the most outspoken civil society activists in the 2005-2010 parliament, female activist
Malalai Joya (Farah Province) was a leading critic of war-era faction leaders. Ms. Fawzia Koofi,
at one time a deputy lower house speaker, remains in the Assembly and is an outspoken leader on
Afghan women’s rights. Others prominent women’s activists include Fauzia Gailani, who did not
win re-election to parliament in 2010; Shukria Barekzai, chairwoman of the lower house Defense
Committee during 2011; and Palwasha Hassan. Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister,
champions parliamentary powers and has highlighted official corruption. He ran for president in
the 2009 elections on an anti-corruption platform and drew an unexpectedly large amount of
votes. Bashardost was returned to parliament in the September 2010 election. Ahmad Nadery,
formerly a deputy chairman of the AIHRC, was fired from that post by Karzai for his criticism of
governmental corruption; Nadery went on to found the Free and Fair Election Forum of
Afghanistan, a key non-governmental election watchdog organization.
The Electoral Process and Recent Elections
Elections are widely considered a key harbinger of the durability and extent of Afghanistan’s
political development and a barometer for measuring the effects of factional, political, ethnic, and
sectarian rivalries. The 2009 presidential and provincial elections were the first post-Taliban
elections run by the Afghan government through its Afghanistan Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC). Both it and the September 2010 National Assembly elections were highly
flawed and the international community worked with Afghan leaders to reduce such flaws in the
2014 presidential and provincial election process. The 2014 process was initially deemed less
fraud-plagued than in 2009 or 2010, but ethnic and political disputes, as well as accusations of
fraud, produced yet another election-related crisis.
2004 Presidential Election
The first election for president was held on October 9, 2004. Turnout was about 80%. Hamid
Karzai won in the first round (55.4% of the vote) over 17 challengers and was sworn in in
December 2004. With the National Assembly not yet established, he ruled by decree during 2005.
Despite surrounding himself with Pashtuns in his inner circle, Karzai was credited for including
ethnic and political factions in high government positions. Ahmad Zia Masoud, brother of slain
Northern Alliance supreme military commander Ahmad Shah Masoud, served as first vice
president during Karzai’s first elected term.
2005 Parliamentary Election
Elections to establish the National Assembly and the provincial councils were held on September
18, 2005. The number of representatives varied by province, ranging from two (Panjshir
Province) to 33 (Kabul Province). Other examples include Herat (17 seats), Nangahar (14),
Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni (11 each). The National Assembly was first inaugurated on
December 19, 2005.
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2009 Presidential Election
The August 20, 2009, presidential election was plagued by assertions of a lack of credibility of
the Independent Election Commission (IEC), whose commissioners were selected by and
politically close to Karzai. A separate U.N.-appointed Elections Complaints Commission (ECC),
which reviews election complaints and validates candidacies, had somewhat more credibility than
the IEC because a 2005 election law provided for three ECC seats to be held by foreign nationals,
appointed by the head of U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan (UNAMA).22
The IEC set an August 20, 2009, election date—somewhat later than the April 21, 2009, date
mandated by Article 61 of the Constitution to allow at least 30 days before Karzai’s term expired
on May 22, 2009. Registration during added about 4.5 million new voters, bringing the total to
about 17 million. However, there were widespread reports of registration fraud, including the
selling of registration cards.
A total of 32 candidates entered the race, and 3,200 people competed for 420 provincial council
seats nationwide. About 80% of the provincial council candidates ran as independents, and one
party, Hezb-i-Islami, fielded multiple candidates in several provinces. About 200 women
competed for the 124 provincial council seats (30% of the total seats) reserved for women. In
Qandahar and Uruzgan, there were fewer women candidates than reserved seats. In Kabul
Province, 524 candidates competed for the 29 seats of the council.
Security was a major issue for all the international actors supporting the Afghan elections process.
In the first round, 800 out of 7,000 polling centers were deemed too unsafe to open. The
European Union, supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
and the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute sent observers. The
total cost of the Afghan elections in 2009 was about $300 million, of which the United States
contributed about $175 million and other donors contributed the remainder.23
Anti-Karzai Pashtuns failed to rally around the one major Pashtun who did run, Ashraf Ghani.
The Northern Alliance backed Dr. Abdullah, who ran with a little-known Hazara and a Pashtun as
his vice presidential picks. Taliban intimidation and voter apathy suppressed the total turnout to
about 5.8 million votes cast, or about a 35% turnout. Twenty-seven Afghans, mostly security
forces personnel, were killed on election day. Some observers said that female turnout was low
primarily because there were insufficient numbers of female poll workers to make women feel
comfortable voting.
Clouding the election substantially were the widespread fraud allegations coming from all sides.
The final, uncertified total was released on September 16, 2009, and showed Karzai at 54.6% and
Dr. Abdullah at 27.7%. Anti-corruption candidate Ramazan Bashardost, a Hazara, received 9%,
and Ashraf Ghani received 3%. However, on October 20, 2009, the ECC determined that about 1
million Karzai votes and about 200,000 Abdullah votes were fraudulent and were deducted. The
certified results therefore left Karzai short of the 50%+ needed to avoid a runoff. Karzai
acquiesced to a runoff against Dr. Abdullah, but Abdullah refused to participate on the grounds
that problems that plagued the first round were unresolved. On November 2, 2009, the IEC
declared Karzai the winner. The Obama Administration accepted the outcome on the grounds that
22 ECC website, http://www.ecc.org.af/en/.
23 Report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), September 9, 2010.
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the fraud had been investigated. The provincial council election results were not certified until
December 29, 2009. The council members took office in February 2010.
In the 2009 election, Karzai’s first vice presidential running mate was the Northern Alliance’s
primary military commander, Marshal Muhammad Fahim, another Tajik. Karim Khalili (a
Hazara) ran for another term as Karzai’s second vice president. Fahim died of natural causes on
March 9, 2014, and former parliament speaker Yunus Qanooni, another Northern Alliance figure,
was confirmed by the National Assembly on March 25, 2014, to serve out Fahim’s term.
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections
The split over the conduct of the 2009 presidential elections widened in the run-up to the
September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections. Mechanisms to prevent fraud were not fully
implemented and the results were disputed until July 2011, largely paralyzing the National
Assembly.
About $120 million was budgeted by the IEC for the parliamentary elections, of which at least
$50 million came from donor countries, giving donors leverage over when the election might take
place. The remaining $70 million was funds left over from the 2009 elections. Donors
temporarily held back the needed funds in an effort to pressure the IEC to demonstrate that it is
correcting the flaws identified in the 2009 election.
In February 2010 Karzai signed an election decree that superseded the 2005 election law and
govern the 2010 parliamentary election,24 even though the constitution requires that any new
election law (or decree) not be adopted less than one year prior to the election to which that law
will apply. Some of the provisions of the election decree—particularly the proposal to make the
ECC an all-Afghan body—alarmed some in the international community. In March 2010, Karzai
compromised with international critics and allowed the seating of two non-Afghans on the ECC.
The Wolesi Jirga voted against the election decree but the Meshrano Jirga did not act, thus
allowing the decree to stand.
Among other steps to correct the mistakes of the 2009 election, the Afghan Interior Ministry
instituted a national identity card system to curb voter registration fraud. However, observers say
that registration fraud still occurred. On April 17, 2010, Karzai appointed a new IEC head, Fazel
Ahmed Manawi, a Tajik, who drew praise from many factions for impartiality. The IEC also
barred 6,000 poll workers who served in the 2009 election from working the 2010 election.
On June 22, 2010, a final list of candidates was issued after all appeals and decisions on the
various disqualifications. It included 2,577 candidates, of which 406 were women. Sixty-two
candidates were invalidated by the ECC, mostly because they did not resign their government
positions, as required. Voter registration was conducted June 12-August 12. According to the IEC,
over 375,000 new voters were registered, and the number of eligible voters was 11.3 million.25
24 Joshua Partlow, “Afghanistan’s Government Seeks More Control Over Elections,” Washington Post, February 15,
2010.
25 The seat allocation per province was the same as it was in the 2005 parliamentary election: 33 seats up for election in
Kabul; 17 in Herat province; 14 in Nangarhar; 11 each in Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni; 9 in Badakhshan, Konduz, and
Faryab; 8 in Helmand; and 2 to 6 in the remaining provinces. Ten are reserved for Kuchis (nomads).
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On August 24, 2010, the IEC announced that 938 stations considered insecure would not open in
order to prevent so-called “ghost polling stations”—stations open but where no voters can go.
About 5.6 million votes were cast out of about 17 million eligible voters. Turnout was therefore
about 33%; a major issue suppressing turnout was security.
Preliminary results were announced on October 20, 2010, and final, IEC-certified results were
delayed until November 24, 2010, due to investigation of fraud complaints. Of the 5.6 million
votes cast, the ECC invalidated 1.3 million (about 25%) after investigations of fraud complaints.
Causes for invalidation most often included ballot boxes in which all votes were for one
candidate.
The results, as certified by the IEC, resulted in substantial controversy within Afghanistan and led
to a political crisis. The certified results were as follows.
• About 60% of the lower house (148 out of 249) winners were new members.
• Karzai’s number of core supporters in the lower house fell from about 90 to about
70, largely because fewer Pashtuns were elected compared to 2005. Some of
these Pashtuns were local militia commanders. Two ex-Taliban figures, Mullah
Salam Rocketi, and Musa Wardak, were defeated.
• A date of the inauguration of the new parliament was set for January 20, 2011, at
which time, under Afghan law, President Karzai would formally open the session.
The certified results triggered a major political crisis when several Pashtun candidates asserted
that they lost due to fraud. On December 28, 2010, at the instruction of the Supreme Court,
Karzai issued a decree empowering a special five-member tribunal to review fraud complaints.
The IEC and ECC, backed by UNAMA and the international community, asserted the tribunal
was not legitimate because the IEC and ECC are the only bodies under Afghan electoral law that
have jurisdiction over election results. Still, to give time for the tribunal to complete its review,
Karzai postponed the inauguration of the new parliament. After 213 of the certified winners
threatened to inaugurate themselves, Karzai inaugurated the body on January 26, 2011, but he
insisted that the tribunal continue its work. The lower house elected a compromise candidate,
Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi, from the Uzbek community, as speaker. The upper house was completed
as of February 19, 2011, when Karzai made his 34 appointments.
The crisis became acute on June 23, 2011, when the special tribunal ruled that 62 defeated
candidates be reinstated. On August 10, 2011, Karzai decreed that the special court does not have
jurisdiction to change election results, and on August 21, 2011, the IEC implemented elements of
a compromise by ruling that nine winners had won their seats through fraud and must be removed
(fewer than the 17 that UNAMA had urged). The newly declared winners were sworn in on
September 4, 2011, and the National Assembly resumed functioning shortly thereafter.
The exposure of widespread fraud in the 2009 and 2010 elections increased strains between
Karzai and the National Assembly. In the confirmation process of his post-2009 election cabinet,
National Assembly members objected to many of his nominees as having minimal qualifications
or as loyal to faction leaders. Karzai’s original list of 24 ministerial nominees (presented
December 19) was generally praised by the United States, but only 7 were confirmed. Another
five were confirmed on June 28, 2010, and on March 12, 2012, the Assembly confirmed most of
those ministers who were serving in an acting capacity as well as some new nominees.
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2014 Presidential and Provincial Elections26
U.S. officials and many Afghans were concerned that the 2009 presidential election fraud would
recur in the 2014 presidential elections, which occurred as international forces have been drawing
down. The international community asserted that another fraud-filled election would cloud
Afghanistan’s ability to govern beyond 2014. The international community generally avoided
holding the election to a standard of “free and fair:” Deputy Secretary of State William Burns said
in Kabul on May 11, 2013, that the election should be “transparent, credible, and inclusive.” The
April 5, 2014, first round appeared largely free of widespread fraud, but the June 14, 2014, runoff
was clouded by allegations, leveled particularly by Dr. Abdullah, of systematic fraud.
USAID has spent about $200 million to support the 2014 election process in Afghanistan,
including $95 million to support Afghan institutions directly and promote voter education and
election observer groups; $80 million in the form of a donation to U.N. Development Program
election support efforts (see below); and about $15 million to support civil society groups.
Timing of the Elections: April 5, 2014
Under the constitution, the presidential elections had to be held 30 to 60 days before the May 22,
2014, expiration of Karzai’s final term. On October 31, 2012, the IEC set the election date as
April 5, 2014, overruling Northern Alliance assertions that the election should be later to allow
for the northern part of the country—where support for non-Pashtun candidates is strong—to
thaw after the winter. Provincial elections were due in 2013, but the IEC set these elections
concurrent with the presidential elections because of the logistical difficulties and costs involved
in holding a separate election. There were also 420 provincial council seats up for election in
2014. The next parliamentary elections are expected to be held in 2015.
Election Process Milestones and Reforms
The July 8, 2012, “Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework” stipulated that Afghanistan
“develop, by early 2013, a comprehensive election timeline through 2015 for electoral
preparations and polling dates.”27 Aside from the setting of the election date, the key benchmarks
of election preparations and their status were as follows:
• Election-Related Dates. The IEC set a timeframe of September 16-October 6,
2013, as the deadline for candidate registration. That time frame was observed.
• Election Laws. Two laws to govern the 2014 election—one (IEC Structural Law)
to structure the IEC and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) and
another one to stipulate election procedures and policies (Electoral Law)—were
to be adopted within the first quarter of 2013. That deadline was not met.28 In
mid-April 2013, the National Assembly passed draft election laws that included
lower house provisions to deprive the president of sole discretion over IEC
26 For additional information on the upcoming elections and their implications, see International Crisis Group.
Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the 2014 Transition. October 8, 2012.
27 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/article/the-tokyo-declaration-partnership-for-self-reliance-in-afghanistan-
from-transition-to-transf.
28 USAID and State Department briefing for congressional staff, March 11, 2013.
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appointments and provide for two ECC officials to be non-nationals (as was the
case for the 2010 parliamentary election). Karzai insisted that the ECC be
replaced by an Afghan Supreme Court-run election tribunal and he returned the
draft unsigned (a veto). On May 22, 2013, the lower house passed another draft
Structural Law setting up an all-Afghan ECC. It and the Electoral Law then
passed the upper house. Karzai signed the Structural Law on July 17, 2013, and
the Electoral Law on July 20, 2013.
• IEC and ECC Membership and Powers. Acting under the newly signed
election laws, a committee of lawyers, human rights activists, the speakers of the
two chambers of the National Assembly, and judicial officials nominated IEC and
ECC candidates. On September 17, 2013, Karzai named the nine IEC
commissioners, including former Herat Governor Yusuf Nuristani, an ethnic
Tajik, as IEC chairman. He named three women as IEC commissioners. Karzai
subsequently named the five ECC members, of which one (Reeda Azimi) is
female. The chairman of the ECC is Sattar Saadat, a Pashtun. The ECC also had
102 provincial complaints commissioners, approved in February 2014. The ECC,
expanded its staff and capabilities after acquiring official standing by Afghan law,
has the power to investigate abuses of power—such as provincial officials’
interference in the process—and vet candidates. It removed some provincial
council candidates for various violations and prosecuted some local officials. The
IEC gets assistance from UNDP under a program called ELECT II (Legal and
Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow).
• Voter Registration, Voter Awareness, and Other Preparations. In accordance
with a January 2013 IEC decision, voter registration updating rand from late May
2013 until late March 2014. The IEC issued new voter registration cards to 3.4
million registrants, close to the 4 million goal. The government had decided in
November 2012 to issue 14 million biometric ID cards (“e-taskera”) by March
2014 to reduce voter fraud. But, this system was later deemed too difficult and
expensive ($115 million) to implement for the 2014 vote. It might apply to the
2015 parliamentary elections. Observers say the government promoted public
awareness of the election, including setting up a call center to answer questions;
700,000 calls were made to that center, according to the International Federation
of Electoral Systems (IFES) in mid-March 2014.
• Candidate Requirements. Presidential candidates were required to gather
100,000 valid voter signatures, and file an $18,000 deposit.
• Security. In February 2014, the IEC determined that about 6,800 polling centers
(out of 7,170 that were surveyed) could be secured sufficiently to open on
election day—far more than those that opened in the 2009 or 2010 elections.
• Observers. About 200 international observers were present on election day.
Organizations sent observers to the election, but they mostly deployed in Kabul
and in provincial capitals. A Taliban attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul in mid-
March 2014 killed one foreign national involved in the election observation
process, forcing his and other non-Afghan organizations to reassess their
missions. Several other attacks in Kabul, including against IEC offices, occurred
before the election. Afghan domestic observations groups fielded about 12,000
observers.
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• Efforts to Promote Women. The election laws passed by the National Assembly
in 2013 reduce to 20% from 25% the required percentage of women to be elected
to provincial and district councils (when district elections are held). Human rights
advocates say they fear that this provision could foreshadow eliminating similar
quotas for women in the National Assembly elections. Those who favored the
reduction argued that the 25% requirement was unfair because women can win
election with very few votes.
The voter registration process tried to improve female participation in the
election. About 30% of newly registering voters were women, which was in line
with UNAMA goals. A Ministry of Interior request to donors to fund the hiring of
13,000 female election security officers was approved in an effort to support
female turnout for the vote. However, 40 out of Afghanistan’s 407 districts did
not have female election staff because of security concerns. The efforts to
encourage female participation and other measures above apparently at least
partly satisfied S.Res. 151, adopted July 11, 2013, which urged the Secretary of
State to condition some U.S. aid on Afghan implementation of measures to
prevent fraud and to encourage women’s participation in the electoral process.
In part because of the developments discussed above, many expressed optimism that the election
would be more credible than the 2009 or 2010 votes. The “Free and Fair Election Foundation of
Afghanistan,”a domestic body, assembled 50 political parties to endorse demands for election
reform and oversee the unfolding election process. Several political parties, such as the National
Front, the National Coalition, the Truth and Justice Party, and Hizb-e-Islam, formed a
“Cooperation Council of Political Parties and Coalitions of Afghanistan” (CCPPCA) to ensure the
fairness of the election. On December 9, 2013, a delegation from the National Democratic
Institute expressed “guarded optimism” that the April 2014 elections would not be as marred by
fraud as were previous Afghan elections.
Candidate Field
There were several potential frontrunners in the contest. By the close of candidate registration on
October 6, 2013, 26 presidential tickets had registered (fewer than the 32 in 2009). In October
2013, the IEC disqualified 16 candidates, including the only woman (Khadija Ghaznawi), on the
basis of lack of valid signatures or citizenship issues. After an appeal period, the final candidate
list was announced by the IEC on November 20—restoring Daoud Sultanzoi’s candidacy. The
Taliban vowed to disrupt the election, but the leader of an allied insurgent group Hezb-e-Islami
Gulbuddin (HIG), Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, instructed his members inside Afghanistan to vote. For
the 420 provincial council seats, 2,713 candidates were approved to run, including 308 women.
The formal campaign period began on February 5, 2014.
The major approved presidential tickets, mostly following the tradition of balancing different
ethnicities, include those below. Any cabinet ministers who ran had to resign and be replaced by
acting ministers. Several purportedly credible opinion polls were published in late December
2013; Afghan polling was sparse in previous elections.29
29 Matthew Rosenberg. “Polling Comes to Afghanistan, Suggesting Limit to Sway of President Karzai.” New York
Times, December 28, 2013.
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Afghan presidential elections require 50%+ in the first round to avoid a runoff to be held two
weeks after a certified vote tally from the first round—which is to be issued about a month after
the vote, following a complaint evaluation period. Three candidates withdrew before the vote was
held, including Karzai’s brother, Qayyum, who reportedly bowed to his brother’s urging not to
run. All of the major candidates said they would, if elected, sign the Bilateral Security Accord
(BSA) with the United States, required to keep some U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014.
Additional information about the first round candidate field is as follows:
• Ashraf Ghani. Ghani’s reputation for affiliation with global organizations such as
the United Nations and the World Bank contributed in the perception in the 2009
election that Ghani is out of touch with average Afghans’ problems. However,
Ghani apparently was able to appeal to wide range of Pashtuns in 2014, and
running mate Abdul Rashid Dostam apparently delivered a large number of
Uzbek votes. The other Ghani running mate was former Justice Minister Sarwar
Danish, a Hazara Shiite who studied in Iran and won some Hazara votes.
• Dr. Abdullah. Dr. Abdullah campaigned not only in Northern Alliance
strongholds but also in Pashtun provinces, stressing there his Pashtun heritage on
his father’s side. His supporters, mainly in the north and west, also faced a more
permissive security environment to vote in than did Pashtuns. Abdullah’s first
vice presidential running mate was Hizb-e-Islam member Mohammad Khan (a
Pashtun) and his second vice presidential running mate is Mohammad Mohaqiq,
a Hazara faction leader discussed earlier. Opinion polls consistently showed him
to be a front runner.
• Zalmay Rassoul. Foreign Minister Rassoul was considered an early front-runner
because of his generally close relations with Karzai. However, polls in December
2013 put him behind Ghani and Abdullah, and final first round results tracked
with that polling. Rassoul attempted to win Northern Alliance votes by naming
Ahmad Zia Masoud, brother of Ahmad Shah Masoud, as first vice presidential
candidate. The other Rassoul running mate was Bamiyan governor Habiba
Sohrabi, an ethnic Hazara, who appeared to garner female support at campaign
rallies. (Two other females were vice-presidential candidates.)
• Qayyum Karzai. Despite President Karzai’s repeated statements that he did not
want his elder brother to run, Qayyum entered the race. He withdrew in early
March 2014 and endorsed Rassoul.
• Abdi Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Sayyaf’s candidacy concerned U.S. and international
officials because of his past ties to radical Islamist Arab volunteers in the anti-
Soviet war who ultimately formed Al Qaeda.30 As a parliamentarian, Sayyaf has
consistently opposed legislation codifying the rights of women or weakening the
authority of the Islamic clergy. One of his vice presidential running mates was
Ismail Khan, a faction leader discussed above. The ticket polled in the single
digits, which tracked with the first round vote count.
• Other candidates. Other approved candidates were considered by experts as
having little chance. They include Nangarhar governor Ghul Agha Shirzai;
30 Yaroslav Trofimov, “For President, Karzai Floats Islamist with Bin Ladin Tie,” Wall Street Journal, August 14,
2013.
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Daoud Sultanzoi, a former Communist and parliamentarian; Karzai adviser
Hedayat Amin Arsala; and Qotboddin Helal. Former Defense Minister Abdul
Rahim Wardak withdrew in mid-March 2014, and former King Zahir Shah’s
grandson Mohammad Nadir Naeem dropped out shortly thereafter.
Election Days and Controversy
According to IEC officials, turnout in the April 5, 2014, first round was over 7 million—60%
turnout. Violence on election day was relatively minor and did not deter most voters, many of
whom stood in long lines to vote. Seventeen ANSF were killed in nearly 300 total insurgent
attacks, but no voters apparently were killed that day. 1,000 polling centers did not open due to
anticipated violence. Some polling centers ran out of ballots because turnout was heavier than
expected, although voting hours were extended in order to allow for extra ballots to be provided.
After the April 5 first round, there were 870 fraud complaints deemed serious enough to have
potentially affected the outcome. However, the complaints were investigated and about 375,000
votes were deducted across the spectrum of candidates—compared to 1.2 million votes deducted
in 2009.
On May 15, 2014, the IEC announced certified results. The totals stayed relatively stable from
earlier, preliminary results: Dr. Abdullah at 44.9%; Ashraf Ghani at 31.5%; Zalmay Rassoul at
11.5%; Abdi Rab Rasoul Sayyaf at about 5%; Sherzai at about 1.5%; and the remaining four
candidates at or below about 1% each. On the basis of the results, the IEC announced that a
runoff between Abdullah and Ghani would be held on June 14.
Prior to the runoff, there were discussions among several candidates about a possible political
settlement that might avoid a runoff—which many feared would become a Pashtun vs. Tajik
ethnic power struggle. However, no political arrangement was reached and the runoff went
forward on June 14. Violence was somewhat more extensive in the runoff than in the first round,
and about 50 persons were killed around the country. Turnout was assessed at relatively the same
as it was in the first round (about 7 million votes cast). The IEC at first stated that certified results
would be ready by July 22, with a swearing in of a new president on August 2.
However, as informal results became known, the potential for a worst case scenario increased—
an outcome in which no candidate recognizes the election results and the political system breaks
down. With informal results showing him behind, Dr. Abdullah alleged that there was no clear
explanation for why turnout—particularly in the eastern provinces, where Ghani’s support is
strong—increased substantially in the second round. Ghani’s campaign asserted the increase in
turnout in that area was due to successful campaigning and voter turnout operations. Dr. Abdullah
subsequently accused IEC commissioners and election workers of committing systematic fraud to
favor of Ghani. He released purported taped phone conversations allegedly among IEC and other
officials purporting to discuss helping Ghani.31
In subsequent days, Abdullah broke off relations with the IEC and called on the U.N. Assistance
Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA) to become directly involved in the vote count. During June 20-
July 6, the two candidates’ camps attempted to reach agreement on the scope of a vote audit that
31 Azam Ahmed. “Afghan Candidate Says Phone Recordings Prove a Vote-Rigging Conspiracy.” New York Times,
June 23, 2014.
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might resolve the allegations. On June 21, 2014, Abdullah supporters in several cities
demonstrated against the vote count and certification process. To IEC’s release of preliminary
results on July 7, which showed Ghani winning with 56.44% to Abdullah’s 43.56%, triggered
calls by some Abdullah supporters for him to declare victory and set up a government. Some
armed factions supporting Abdullah reportedly began to seize government centers in three
provinces, and to threaten to storm such locations in Kabul, including the presidential palace.32
President Obama spoke by phone with Dr. Abdullah on July 8 and sent Secretary of State John
Kerry to Kabul to broker a resolution. On July 12, Secretary Kerry, Abdullah, and Ghani
announced an agreement at a joint press conference providing for:
• a recount of all 23,000 ballot boxes by Afghan election officials, with monitoring
from diplomats posted to various embassies in Afghanistan and other officials.
• the winner of the election would ask the losing candidate become or to name an
alternative figure to be “chief executive officer ” (CEO) of the government. The
position would evolve, after constitutional amendment, into a prime ministership
to ensure that the major communities share power.
The recount process began on July 17 but was interrupted several times over disagreements on
criteria to use to invalidate votes and distrust of certain officials involved in the recount. It was
completed by the end of August but results were withheld to allow time for the Abdullah and
Ghani camps to bridge their differences over the post-election power sharing arrangement. The
final count, apparently known to both camps, still reportedly showed Ghani winning by about
800,000 votes.33 By mid-September 2014, amid continued threats by Dr. Abdullah and his
supporters not to recognize a Ghani declared victory, the two camps approached agreement on
power-sharing.34 However, the dispute precluded Afghanistan from being represented at the
leadership level at the key September 4-5, 2014, NATO meeting to plan the post-2014
international security mission in Afghanistan.
On September 21, 1014, the crisis was apparently resolved when Ghani and Abdullah signed the
power-sharing agreement. The IEC simultaneously declared Ghani the election winner while
acknowledging that the audit did not necessarily resolve all fraud allegations. Ghani was
inaugurated President on September 29 and immediately issued a decree appointing Abdullah as
“CEO.” The following day, Afghanistan and the United States signed the Bilateral Security
Agreement (BSA).35 The power-sharing agreement provides for:36
• Ghani’s delegation of some presidential powers to Abdullah as CEO.
• The CEO will has powers approximating those of a Prime Minister. The CEO
will lead weekly meetings of a “Council of Ministers” (the ministers plus the
CEO and deputy CEOs) that will implement the strategic direction given it by the
32 Carlotta Gall and Matthew Rosenberg. “Anxious Moments for an Afghanistan on the Brink.” New York Times, July
15, 2014.
33 Pajhwok Afghan News Network. September 16, 2014.
34 Jason Straziuso. “Democracy? No, Afghans Say, After Vote Count Ends.” Associated Press, September 15, 2014.
35 Department of State by Senior State Department official, “Background Briefing on Afghanistan.” September 24,
2014.
36 The text of the power-sharing agreement is at http://www.tolonews.com/TOLOnews_photo/
National_Unity_Government_agreement.pdf.
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“cabinet” that is led by the President. The cabinet will consist of all ministers
plus the President, vice presidents, the CEO, deputy CEOs, and the chief advisor
to the president.
• The president and the CEO are to share powers to appoint ministers and other
government officials. However, some argue that this provision might be difficult
to implement because there are too few positions available for both Ghani and
Abdullah to reward their most loyal supporters who seek high-level jobs.
• Within two years, a loya jirga will convene to consider a constitutional
amendment to convert the CEO position to that of a formal Prime Minister.
However, to obtain a quorum at the loya jirga, district elections will need to be
held before that meeting is convened. District representatives are to be delegates
to any loya jirga that has constitutional standing.
Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah
On September 29, 2014, Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmedzai was inaugurated as President, and he appointed Dr. Abdul ah
Abdullah as CEO.
Ashraf Ghani, born in 1949, is from Lowgar Province. He is from a prominent tribe, belonging to the Ghilzai Pashtun
tribal confederation, that has supplied many past Afghan leaders, including the last Soviet-installed leader Dr.
Najibullah Ahmedzai. Ghani attended university at the American University of Beirut, and received a Ph.D. degree in
Cultural Anthropology from Columbia University. He joined the World Bank in 1991, where he helped several
various countries manage development and institutional transformation projects. During 2002-2004, he served as
Finance Minister in Karzai’s first cabinet, and was credited with extensive reforms and institution of the National
Solidarity Program of locally-driven economic development. He is married to Rula Ghani, and they have two children.
During 2004-2005, he served as chancel or of Kabul University. He subsequently founded the Institute for State
Effectiveness, which helps countries undergoing transition build institutions. After 2009, he served as an advisor to
Karzai on various initiatives, including institutional reform and relations with the U.S.-led coalition helping secure
Afghanistan. Since taking office, he has reportedly emphasized punctuality and tightly run meetings of high officials—
departing sharply from Karzai’s more free-flowing style. He has also announced various policy initiatives that are
discussed in the appropriate sections below.
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, born in 1960 in Kabul, is an eye doctor by training. His mother was an ethnic Tajik and his
father was a Pashtun from Qandahar. However, he is widely identified politically as a Tajik because he was a top aide
to legendary Tajik mujahedin commander and Northern Alliance military leader Ahmad Shah Masoud, who was
assassinated by Al Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks on the United States. During the Northern
Alliance’s political struggle against the Taliban during 1996-2001, Abdullah served as the Northern Alliance’s foreign
minister - Masoud’s international envoy. He served as Foreign Minister during 2001-2006, a time when the Northern
Alliance’s influence on Karzai was substantial. Karzai dismissed him in an early 2006 cabinet reshuffle.
As noted above, Abdullah lost the 2009 presidential election to Karzai, despite widespread confirmed allegations of
fraud in that vote. He subsequently became chief opposition leader in Afghanistan.
Sources: Various press reporting, author conversations with Afghan figures in Afghanistan and Washington, DC 2001-
2014.
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Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance37
All assessments indicate that there has been progress in the capacity of Afghan institutions,
particularly in performing such duties as managing national finances and providing services, but
that significant deficiencies remain. Many of the shortcomings in governance are attributed to all
of the political disputes, governmental corruption, nepotism and favoritism, and the lack of
trained or skilled workers. The U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement, signed in
Afghanistan on May 1, 2012, commits the United States (beyond 2014) to “support the Afghan
government in strengthening the capacity, self-reliance, and effectiveness of Afghan institutions
and their ability to deliver basic services.”
The Obama Administration has developed about 45 different metrics to assess progress in
building Afghan governance and security, as it was required to do (by September 23, 2009) under
P.L. 111-32, an FY2009 supplemental appropriation.38 UNAMA, headed in Kabul by Jan Kubis,
also evaluates Afghan governance according to numerous metrics. Afghan progress according to
these metrics is presented in various reports of the Secretary-General to the U.N. General
Assembly. In addition, the Tokyo Framework of Mutual Accountability, cited above, provides aid
incentives for Afghanistan (portions of $16 billion pledged through 2015) if it improves on
several measures including 39
• The holding of credible, inclusive, and transparent elections in 2014 and 2015.
• Improved access to justice, and respect for human rights, particularly for women
and children.
• Improved integrity of public financial management and the commercial banking
sector.
• Improved revenue systems and budget execution, including establishment of a
provincial budgeting policy.
The incentive structure of the Tokyo Framework is to raise the percentage of donor funds
channeled through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) as Afghan governance
improves. That fund gives money directly to Afghan ministries and thus gives the Afghan
government substantial discretion as compared to other donated funds.
In part to demonstrate that Afghanistan would uphold those commitments, a presidential
administrative reform decree issued July 26, 2012, required virtually every ministry and
government body to develop a work plan, complete unfinished tasks, file specified reports, or
carry out specified reforms.40 The final communique of the July 3, 2013, “senior officials”
37 Some information in this section is from the State Department report on human rights in Afghanistan for 2013,
February 27, 2014. Recommendations for U.S. policy and U.S. assistance with respect to issues discussed in this
section are contained in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff report: “Afghanistan in Transition: U.S.
Civilian Presence and Assistance Post-2014.” S.Prt. 113-29. October 27, 2014.
38 “Evaluating Progress in Afghanistan-Pakistan” Foreign Policy website, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/
09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
39 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/article/the-tokyo-declaration-partnership-for-self-reliance-in-afghanistan-
from-transition-to-transf.
40 Text of the decree “On the Execution of Content of the Historical Speech of June 21, 2012, in the Special Session of
the National Assembly. Provided to CRS by the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, DC, July 16, 2012.
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meeting in Kabul to review progress since the July 2012 Tokyo meeting presented mixed
findings:41 it strongly praised government progress on budget transparency, revenue growth, and
achieving Millenium Development Goals, including school enrollment and health care access.
However, the review noted varying degrees of progress on election reform, anti-corruption, and
local governance. It called for substantial improvement on other of the benchmarks, including
human rights and accountability for the Kabul Bank scandal (discussed below). The meeting did
not result in withholding of any aid. A meeting to assess progress in governance according to the
Tokyo Framework criterial is to be held in London in late November 2014.
Expanding Central Government Capacity
There appears to be a consensus that the capacity of the central government has increased
dramatically since 2001, but building capacity at provincial and district levels has proved far
more difficult. Afghan ministries have greatly increased their staffs, and most ministry offices in
Kabul, and many ministry offices in the provinces, have modern computers and communications.
There are about 500,000 Afghan government employees, although the majority of them are in the
security forces. A large proportion of the remainder work as teachers. Capacity building
underway—all with U.S. and other donor assistance—includes training additional civil servants
and instituting merit-based performance and hiring criteria. U.S. mentors and advisers have
served in virtually all of the Afghan ministries, including many serving under contract with
USAID. On several occasions, the United States has funded jobs fairs that have recruited some
new civil servants.
Still, the government has had trouble recruiting workers with sufficient skills. And many Afghan
government personnel are reluctant to serve in the provincial offices of the central government
ministries, particularly those provinces that are restive. Afghanistan has also wrestled with the
problem of international donors luring away Afghan talent with higher salaries. The July 20,
2010, Kabul donors conference addressed this issue by calling for a harmonized salary scale for
donor-funded salaries of Afghan government personnel. Discussions have been held between the
Afghan government and donors on this issue, with minor progress.
Merit-Based Recruitment
To increase its proficiency of government, during late 2010-early 2011, the Afghan government
instituted merit-based appointments for senior positions, such as deputy provincial governors and
district governors, and converted those positions to civil servants rather than political appointees.
After a halting start, this process has been accelerating. A U.N. report of March 7, 2014, states
that the 231 district governors (more than half of the 407 total number of district governors) were
appointed based on merit-based recruitment, but the number of deputy governors recruited under
this system has remained at 32 since January 2013. About half of the 34 provincial governors
were appointed based on merit. Merit-based recruitment implements the July 26, 2012,
administrative reform decree directing the Independent Directorate of Local Governance,
discussed below, to open all deputy provincial governorships to competition within two months.
41 http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/co-chairs-statement-tokyo-mutual-accountability-framework-tmaf-senior-officials-
meeting-kabul-afghanistan-3-july-2013.
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Since taking office, President Ghani has told his subordinates that he seeks to further increase the
use of merit-based recruitment. One of his first acts after taking office was to demand that each
ministry submit a list of its employees as well as their qualification for holding their posts.
The key institution that is deciding on merit-based appointments and standardizing job
descriptions, salaries, bonuses, and benefits is the Afghan Independent Administrative Reform
and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). The commission redefined more than 80,000 civil
servant job descriptions. In 2011, the National Assembly ratified a revised civil service law to
institute merit-based hiring and give the IARCSC a legal underpinning; it replaced a September
2005 civil service law.
Under a USAID program called the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan (CTAP), the United States
provided technical assistance to Afghan ministries and to the IARCSC. From January 2010 until
January 2011, USAID, under a February 2010 memorandum of understanding, gave $85 million
to programs run by the commission to support the training and development of Afghan civil
servants. One of the commission’s subordinate organizations is the Civil Service Training
Institute. In 2013, the Institute trained over 5,000 Afghan civil servants in management, computer
skills, English language proficiency, and finance and accounting. USAID has provided over $40
million to the CTAP program.
The international community has sponsored a $350 million five-year program (“Capacity-
Building for Results Program”) during 2012-2017 to enhance the Afghan government’s ability to
deliver services to its population through key ministries.42 USAID programs have assisted
employees of the state-owned Afghan power company (DABS) to manage Afghanistan’s power
grid and bill its customers and trained 250 Ministry of Mines personnel in geology to try to help
develop Afghanistan’s extractive industries sector.
Many Afghan civil service personnel undergo training in other countries. India has trained many
Afghan civil servants building on the cultural ties between the two countries. Japan, Singapore,
Germany, and others have also trained Afghan civil servants on good governance, anti-corruption,
and civil aviation. Some of these programs were conducted in partnership with the German
Federal Foreign Office and the Asia Foundation.
The Afghan Budget Process
The international efforts to build up the central government are reflected in the Afghan budget
process. At the July 3, 2013, senior officials meeting in Kabul, donors strongly praised the
government’s performance in establishing budget transparency. U.S. official reports assess the
Afghan government as increasingly able to execute parts of its budget, and say that some
ministries—particularly the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development—are able to deliver services relatively effectively.43 The Afghan government
disperses its own funds as well as those directly supplied by donor countries and organizations.
As of 2013, the Afghan budget year runs from December 21 to December 20 of each year. It now
longer begins on the Persian New Year (Nowruz). The 2014 budget was approved January 15,
2014, but Afghan officials say it is nearly $600 million short because of the economic uncertainty
42 http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P123845/afghanistan-capacity-blding-results-facility?lang=en.
43 http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Section_1230_Report_July_2013.pdf; http://www.defense.gov/pubs/
October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf.
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caused by the election dispute. Afghan officials seek donations to fill the shortfall, and say they
will adjust the 2015 budget downward to match new economic conditions.
U.S. reports continue to criticize the Afghan budget process for a high degree of centralization.
Once a budget is adopted by the full National Assembly (first the upper house and then the lower
house, and then signed by Karzai), the funds are allocated to central government ministries and
other central government entities. Some of the elected provincial councils, appointed provincial
governors, and district governors formulate local budget requirements and help shape the national
budget process, but no locality controls its own budget. These local organs do approve the
disbursement of funds by the central entities (called mustofiats, accounting offices in each of
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces).
The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework included as one of its benchmarks the
establishment of a provincial budgeting process that provides provincial input into the national
budget process. The July 3, 2013, senior officials meeting statement indicated that Afghanistan
needed to finalize and begin implementing a provincial budgeting policy. A draft provincial
budget policy issued in October 2013 built on several pilot programs put in place, including the
Provincial Budget Pilot (PBP) program that seeks to improve budgetary planning integration
between the national and provincial levels. On February 11, 2014, the Ministry of Finance
allocated $1 million to five provinces under the PBP program. Since taking office, President
Ghani has expressed his support for a decentralized budget process in which provinces will
formulate and execute planned budgets.
Still, the diversion of revenues received has caused financial problems for the government. All
revenue is, by law, to be remitted to the Afghan central government. However, local officials
sometimes seek to retain or divert locally collected revenues. That diversion has reportedly
increased in 2013 as governors of border provinces grow nervous about an economic downturn
after 2014. The diversion contributed to a 20% government revenue shortfall (compared to
government projections) in 2013 and to the budget shortfall experienced in 2014.
Many international development experts concur with the Afghan government that only through
direct funding will the Afghan government be able to develop the capacity and transparency to
govern and deliver services effectively. Although still wary of misuse, the United States has been
accommodating that view; nearly 50% of U.S. aid is provided directly—the target level that was
endorsed at the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference and the Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework. The percentages are up from 21% in FY2009. U.S. direct support is based on State
Department and USAID assessments of the ability of individual ministries to accurately and
transparently administer donated funds. Some SIGAR audit reports suggest that question the State
and USAID assessments and assert the potential for misuse of U.S. funds.
Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance
Since 2007, U.S. and allied policy has increasingly emphasized building local or “subnational”
governance. During 2009-2012, the Administration sent about 500 additional U.S. civilian
personnel from the State Department, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, and several other
agencies to advise Afghan ministries, and provincial and district administrations. That effort
raised the number of U.S. civilians in Afghanistan to about 1,330 by August 2011, of which
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nearly 400 were serving outside Kabul (up from 67 in early 2009). However, the Obama
Administration plans to reduce civilian personnel in Afghanistan by about 20% when the
transition to Afghan lead is completed in 2014.44
U.S. and partner country officials say that, despite a reluctance of central government personnel
to serve in outlying areas, Afghan local governance has expanded, particularly in areas considered
secure. Afghans have formed local councils, which in turn have built ties to appointed local
leaders in secure areas. However, forming these linkages has been slowed by centralized
decision-making processes; localities have their own governing bodies but the central government
ministries in the provincial capitals of each province actually implement national programs. Local
officials often disagree with the Kabul ministry representatives on priorities and implementation.
During his presidency, Karzai frequently complained that donor-run Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs) have preventing the Afghan government from expanding its own responsibilities
and capacity at the local level. There are PRTs in about 80% of Afghan provinces, and they have
far more funding and capability than the Afghan governor in those provinces. The Tokyo
Framework largely endorses those complaints by calling for the PRTs to be transferred to Afghan
control. The presidential administrative decree of July 26, 2012, provides for Afghan institutions
to begin taking over the roles of the PRTs, and, since mid-2012, the United States and partner
countries have been closing down PRTs and handing them over to Afghan control.
Some further enhancements to local governance await Afghan parliamentary action. The National
Assembly continues to deliberate several laws including a local government law, a municipality
law, and a provincial councils law.
The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)
In terms of local governance institution-building, a key institution was empowered in August
2007 when the responsibility for selecting local leaders (provincial governors and below) was
given to a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). That function was taken
out of the Interior Ministry. However, some international officials say that the IDLG served
primarily as an instrument for Karzai to mobilize voters. It is headed by Abdul Khaliq Farahi, a
former diplomat who was kidnapped in Peshawar, Pakistan, and held during 2008-2011 allegedly
by militants linked to Al Qaeda.
To address the difficulty in recruiting staff to work in outlying areas, the July 26, 2012, Karzai
administrative reform decree required the IDLG to fill open positions in the provinces within six
months, including in the ministry offices in each provincial capital. It also required a review of
provincial governors’ performance in combating corruption and improving governance.
The IDLG is an implementing partner for the District Delivery Program (DDP), which now
operates in at least 32 of the 407 districts of Afghanistan. The program was created to improve
government presence and service delivery at the district level, and has been funded by the United
States, Britain, Denmark, and France. The IDLG also gets assistance from the U.N. Development
Program’s (UNDP’s) Afghanistan Subnational Governance Program II (ASGP-II). That program
44 Karen DeYoung, “Plans For Big Civilian Force in Postwar Afghanistan to Be Cut,” Washington Post, December 6,
2012.
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provided $83.6 million to the IDLG from the European Community, Italy, Switzerland, and
Britain.
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils
Many believe that, even more than institutional expansion, the key to effective local governance
is the appointment of competent and incorruptible governors in all 34 Afghan provinces. U.N.,
U.S., and other international studies and reports all point to the beneficial effects (reduction in
narcotics trafficking, economic growth, lower violence) of some of the strong Afghan civilian
appointments at the provincial level. A key example of a successful gubernatorial appointment
was the March 2008 appointment of Gulab Mangal as Helmand governor. He drew praise from
the United States and the international community for taking actions that reduced poppy
cultivation in Helmand. However, he is from Laghman Province (eastern Afghanistan) and was
never fully accepted by the local power-brokers of the south, who successfully persuaded Karzai
to replace him in September 2012. Other governors, such as Ghul Agha Shirzai and Atta
Mohammad Noor (discussed above), are considered effective but have been criticized for
exercising excessive independence of central government authority.
Despite the international and Afghan emphasis on increasing merit-based appointments, about
half of the provincial governors continue to be political appointees. In September 2012, Karzai
shuffled 10 out of the 34 provincial governors (including Mangal), asserting that those taken out
of their positions had fallen short on improving governance or combating corruption. However,
many observers suspected the reshuffle was intended to place loyalists in key local positions
ahead of the 2014 election. Some of the ousted governors were assigned to different provinces.
Other than Helmand, the nine provinces where governors were changed include Wardak, Kabul,
Takhar, Faryab, Baghlan, Nimruz, Laghman, Lowgar, and Badghis. Since taking office, President
Ghani has told IDLG officials to set clear benchmarks for provincial governor appointments as
part of an effort to expand merit-based appointments and improve the efficiency of provincial
governors and mayors.
Provincial Councils
One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is
unclear. In most provinces, the provincial councils do not act as true local legislatures and are
weak compared to provincial governors’ offices. Legislation to expand the councils’ roles has
been under consideration by the National Assembly, but most recent versions of a provincial
councils law were stripped by the cabinet of provisions to assign to the councils supervisory
duties.
Perhaps the most significant role the provincial councils play is in choosing the upper house of
the National Assembly (Meshrano Jirga). In the absence of district councils (no elections held or
scheduled), the provincial councils elected in 2009 have chosen two-thirds (68 seats) of the 102-
seat body. Karzai appointed the remaining 34 seats in February 2011.
The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces were held on August 20, 2009,
concurrent with the presidential elections. The next provincial elections will be held concurrent
with the presidential election in April 2014. The first provincial council elections were held
concurrent with the parliamentary elections in September 2005.
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District-Level Governance
U.S. officials say there has been “measured progress” in developing effective district governance.
District governors are appointed by the president, at the recommendation of the IDLG, and more
than half of all district governors in place have been appointed based on merit, as noted above.
Some districts had no formal governance at all until the 2009 U.S. troop surge. Some of the
district governors in Helmand Province, including in Nawa and Now Zad districts, returned after
the U.S.-led expulsion of Taliban militants.
The difficulty plaguing the expansion of district governance, in addition to security issues, is lack
of resources. Many district governors have virtually no staff or vehicles. In about 40 districts, the
United States and partner countries have established District Support Teams (DSTs) to assist in
district-level governance and service delivery. However, like the PRTs, the DSTs are being turned
over to Afghan control as the transition to Afghan control proceeds.
District Councils
Another problem in establishing district level governance has been the fact that no elections for
district councils have been held due to boundary and logistical difficulties. The government had
planned to hold these elections along with the 2010 parliamentary elections, but that was not
accomplished and no date for these elections has been set. As a result, there is no one
authoritative district-level representative body, but rather a collection of groupings established by
donor programs. The Afghan government has agreed in principle to a roadmap leading to a single
district level body, but implementation has been slow.
Municipal and Village Level Authority
As are district governors, mayors of large municipalities are appointed. There are about 42
mayors nationwide, many with deputy mayors. Karzai pledged in his November 2009 inaugural
that “mayoral” elections would be held “for the purpose of better city management.” However, no
municipal elections have been held and none is scheduled. It is likely that these await passage of a
municipalities law, referenced above.
As noted throughout, there has traditionally been village-level governance by councils of tribal
elders and other notables. That structure remains, particularly in secure areas, while village
councils have been absent or only sporadically active in areas where there is combat. Numerous
councils were formed in areas where security was improved by the 2010 U.S. “troop surge.”
The IDLG and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), with advice from
India and other donors, also are empowering localities to decide on development priorities. The
MRRD has formed about 28,000 Community Development Councils (CDCs) nationwide to help
suggest priorities, and these bodies are eventually to all be elected.
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Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption45
The international community has sought not only to expand Afghan governing capacity but to
push for its reform, transparency, and oversight. Many Afghans have come to view the central
government as “predatory.” Reducing corruption in government constitutes several of the 17
benchmarks of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework which requires Afghanistan, in
general, to “enact and enforce the legal framework for fighting corruption.” Since taking office,
President Ghani has sought to demonstrate a commitment to combatting corruption by reviving
the largely stagnant issue of the Kabul Bank scandal, discussed below. He has also demanded that
ministries file with the presidential office paperwork on their procurement contracts.
Afghan officials have acknowledged that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan. However,
during Karzai’s presidency, Afghan law enforcement officials frequently refrained from—or were
prevented from—prosecuting officials for corruption, particularly those related to or aligned with
those in power. Some international officials also questioned Karzai’s attempts to blame Afghan
corruption on donor countries’ contracting with firms linked to faction leaders.
On the other hand, some say that U.S. policy on corruption has been inconsistent. Karzai
confirmed U.S. press reports in April 2013 saying that the Central Intelligence Agency continues
to provide cash payments directly to the Karzai government, through the Afghan National
Security Council, for purposes such as compensating faction leaders.46 Karzai said the payments
were relatively small, but U.S. and other experts say the payments circumvent standard controls
on U.S. foreign aid and help fuel Afghan corruption. Neither CIA nor other U.S. officials
confirmed or denied the reports, when asked by journalists.
High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism
At the upper levels of government, some observers asserted that Karzai deliberately tolerated
officials who are allegedly involved in illicit activity and supports their receipt of lucrative
contracts from donor countries, in exchange for their political support. Karzai’s brother,
Mahmoud, as discussed above, has apparently grown wealthy through various ventures,
purportedly by fostering the impression he can influence his brother. Some observers who have
served in Afghanistan say that Karzai appointed some provincial governors to “reward them” and
that these appointments have gone on to “prey” economically on the populations of that province.
Several high officials, despite very low official government salaries, have acquired ornate
properties in Kabul in part by appropriating private land in which the ownership was unclear. The
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported in May 2013 that
$50 million in stolen U.S. aid funds—which U.S. investigators discovered in an Afghan bank
account—was missing because the Afghan government did not implement U.S. requests to freeze
the account. The SIGAR issued an audit in January 2014 that asserted there was risk of misuse of
U.S. funds because of the Ministry of Public Health’s payment of salaries in cash and the possible
overpayment for commodities and services by the Ministry of Mines—overpayments that could
possibly be used to finance bribes or kickbacks.47
45 For more information, particularly on Rule of Law programs, see CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of
Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Rosen and Kenneth Katzman.
46 Matthew Rosenberg, “Karzai’s Office Gets Bags Full of C.I.A. Cash,” New York Times, April 29, 2013.
47 Matthew Rosenberg and Azam Ahmed. “Report Says Afghanistan Can’t Be Trusted to Prevent Misuse of U.S. Aid”
(continued...)
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On the other hand, accusations of corruption are often used as a political weapon. One former
official accused National Security Adviser Spanta of corruption after being fired from an Afghan
government position. An Afghan court ruled against the Afghan accuser on September 25, 2012,
and fined him $300. Some observers say that the National Assembly’s accusations of corruption
against Finance Minister Zakhilwal in May 2013 were intended to prompt him to release
additional funding to parliamentarians’ districts. He was not removed by the Assembly.
Lower-Level Corruption
Observers who follow the issue say that most of the governmental corruption takes place in the
course of performing mundane governmental functions, such as government processing of official
documents (e.g., passports, drivers’ licenses), in which processors demand bribes in exchange for
action.48 Other forms of corruption include Afghan security officials’ selling U.S./internationally
provided vehicles, fuel, and equipment to supplement their salaries. In other cases, local police or
border officials may siphon off customs revenues or demand extra payments to help guard the
U.S. or other militaries’ equipment shipments. Other examples include security commanders
placing “ghost employees” on official payrolls in order to pocket their salaries. Corruption is fed,
in part, by the fact that government workers receive very low salaries (about $200 per month, as
compared to the pay of typical contractors in Afghanistan that might pay as much as $6,500 per
month). Many observers say there is a cultural dimension to the corruption—that it is commonly
expected by relatives and friends that those Afghans who have achieved government positions
will protect those relations with appointments and contracts.
Administration Views and Policy on Corruption
There has been a consensus within the Obama Administration on the wide scope of the corruption
in Afghan government and the deleterious effect the corruption has on government popularity and
effectiveness. In 2010, the Administration debated the degree to which to press anti-corruption
issues with the Afghan government. In 2011, the Administration reportedly decided to prioritize
reducing low-level corruption instead of investigations of high-level Karzai allies.49 High level
investigations not only risked alienating Karzai, but were judged to potentially complicate efforts
to obtain the cooperation of Afghans who can help stabilize areas of the country. Some of these
Afghans are said to be paid by the CIA for information and other support, and the National
Security Council reportedly issued guidance to U.S. agencies to review this issue.50
Yet, U.S. and international officials believe that anti-corruption efforts must be pursued because
corruption is contributing to a souring of Western publics on the mission as well as causing some
Afghans to embrace Taliban insurgents. Obama Administration officials have credited Karzai
with allowing the United States and other donors to help develop oversight bodies to curb
corruption. At the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference—following onto the January 28, 2010,
(...continued)
New York Times, January 30, 2014.
48 Filkins, Dexter, “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government,” New York Times, January 2, 2009; Kevin Seiff,
“Greasing the Wheels in Kabul,” Washington Post, February 18, 2013.
49 Strobel, Warren and Marisa Taylor, “U.S. Won’t Pursue Karzai Allies in Anti-Corruption Campaign,” McClatchy
Newspapers, January 6, 2011.
50 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “A Subtler Takc to Fight Afghan Corruption,” Washington Post, September 13, 2010.
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London conference—the Afghan government finalized a National Anti-Corruption Strategy
(“Azimi report”) and committed to enacting 37 laws to curb corruption. Very few of these laws
have been enacted, although the Afghan cabinet has drafted new anti-corruption and auditing laws
and some regulations have been issued by presidential decree. The July 3, 2013, senior officials
meeting in Kabul determined that there was only minor progress on the anti-corruption
benchmarks of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. The anti-corruption institutions, and
some examples of their efforts, are discussed below.
• High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption. In August 2008, after reported
Bush Administration prodding, Afghanistan set up the “High Office of Oversight
and Anti-Corruption” (commonly referred to as the High Office of Oversight,
HOO). It was given the power to identify and refer corruption cases to state
prosecutors, and to catalogue the overseas assets of Afghan officials. In March
2010 Karzai, as promised at the January 28, 2010, international meeting on
Afghanistan in London, issued a decree giving the HOO power to investigate
corruption cases rather than just refer them to other offices. The July 26, 2012,
presidential administrative decree, discussed above, directed the HOO to, within
six months, assess “private institutions’ and government officials’ suspicious
wealth” and report those findings to the president’s office every two months. In
early 2013, the HOO established an anti-corruption committee within each
ministry to oversee implementation of anti-corruptions policies. USAID provided
the HOO $30 million total during FY2011-FY2013 to build capacity at the
central and provincial level. USAID pays for salaries of six HOO senior staff and
provides some information technology systems as well.
• Assets Declarations and Verifications. As of 2010, Afghan officials at many
levels of government are required to declare their assets. The July 20, 2010,
Kabul Conference communiqué51 included an Afghan pledge to verify and
publish these declarations annually, beginning in 2010. A SIGAR report of April
30, 2012, said that the government’s progress for verification of the declarations
“fall[s] short of U.S. expectations.” The July 3, 2013, senior officials meeting in
Kabul acknowledged that “progress” had been made on the declaration and
publication of assets, but that movement was minimal on verifying the
declarations. A March 2014 U.N. report said that the HOO had registered the
assets of nearly 3,000 government officials during the first three months of 2014
and completed asset verification for 33 of the highest ranking officials including
the president, vice presidents, minister, and governors.
• Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee
(MEC) to evaluate the government’s performance in combating corruption was
mandated by the Kabul conference communiqué to be established within three
months of the conference (by October 2010). The MEC, supported by UNDP,
was inaugurated on May 11, 2011. It was enshrined in a presidential decree and is
composed of three presidential nominees and three international nominees. It is
headed by Slovenian diplomat Drago Kos, and issues reports every six months.
• Major Crimes Task Force and Sensitive Investigations Unit. Since 2008, several
additional investigative bodies have been established under Ministry of Interior
51 Communiqué text at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/asia/21kabultext.html.
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authority. The most prominent is the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) tasked
with investigating public corruption, organized crime, and kidnapping. A
headquarters for the MCTF was inaugurated on February 25, 2010, and it has
been funded and mentored by the FBI, the DEA, the U.S. Marshal Service,
Britain’s Serious Crimes Organized Crime Agency, the Australian Federal Police,
EUPOL (European police training unit in Afghanistan), and the U.S.-led training
mission for Afghan forces. The MCTF has 169 investigators, according to U.S.
officials.
A related body is the Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU), run by several dozen
Afghan police officers, vetted and trained by the DEA.52 This body led the arrest
in August 2010 of a Karzai NSC aide, Mohammad Zia Salehi, on charges of
soliciting a bribe from the New Ansari Money Exchange in exchange for ending
a money-laundering investigation of the firm. Karzai acknowledged on August
22, 2010, that he intervened to obtain Salehi’s release. In November 2010, the
Attorney General’s office ended the prosecution.
• Anti-Corruption Unit and Anti-Corruption Tribunal. These investigative and
prosecution bodies were established by decree in 2009. Eleven judges have been
appointed to the tribunal, which is under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It
tries cases referred by an Anti-Corruption Unit of the Afghan Attorney General’s
office. However, of the approximately 2,000 cases investigated by the Anti-
Corruption Unit, only 28 officials have been convicted to date. The Department
of Justice suspended its training program for the Anti-Corruption Unit in early
2012 because of the unit’s “lack of seriousness,” according to the SIGAR report
of April 30, 2012. One of the laws pledged during the July 20, 2010, Kabul
conference would be enacted (by July 20, 2011) included one to legally empower
the Anti-Corruption Tribunal and the Major Crimes Task Force. That has not
been enacted by the National Assembly to date.
• Prosecutions and Investigations of High-Level Officials. The HOO head Ludin
said in July 2013 that his office had sent 190 cases of alleged high level official
corruption to the Attorney General’s office over the past two years, but had seen
few indictments follow. The Attorney General’s office has investigated at least 20
senior officials, but with virtually no convictions. Those investigated—but not
convicted—included Commerce Minister Amin Farhang (for allegedly
submitting inflated invoices for reimbursement); former Minister of Mines
Mohammad Ibrahim Adel (who reportedly accepted a $30 million bribe to award
a key mining project to a Chinese firm);53 and former Minister of the Hajj
Mohammad Siddiq Chakari (for allegedly accepting bribes to steer Hajj-related
travel business to certain foreign tourist agencies). Chakari fled to Britain.
• EITI. Relatedly, Afghanistan has signed up as a candidate to the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) which is intended to ensure that
contracting for Afghanistan’s mineral resources is free of corruption. Afghanistan
hopes to become fully EITI compliant by April 2012 and the July 3, 2013, senior
52 Ron Nordland and Mark Mazzetti, “Graft Dispute in Afghanistan Is Test for U.S.,” New York Times, August 24,
2010.
53 Joshua Partlow, “Afghanistan Investigating 5 Current and Former Cabinet Members,” Washington Post, November
24, 2009.
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officials meeting in Kabul commended Afghanistan’s progress toward EITI
compliance. The World Bank gave Afghanistan a three-year grant of $52 million
to manage its natural resources effectively.
• Salary Levels. The government has tried to raise salaries, particularly of security
forces, in order to reduce their inclination to solicit bribes. In November 2009,
the Afghan government announced an increase in police salaries (from $180 per
month to $240 per month). During his term as Interior Minister, Bismillah Khan
attempted to institute transparency and accountability in promotions and
assignments. However, the results of these initiatives remain unclear.
• Bulk Cash Transfers Out of Afghanistan. At the July 2010 Kabul conference, the
government pledged to adopt regulations and implement within one year policies
to govern the bulk transfers of cash outside the country. This was intended to
grapple with issues raised by reports, discussed below, of officials taking large
amounts of cash out of Afghanistan (an estimated $4.5 billion taken out in 2011).
U.S. officials say that large movements of cash are inevitable in Afghanistan
because only about 5% of the population use banks and 90% use informal cash
transfers (“hawala” system). The late Ambassador Holbrooke testified on July 28,
2010 (cited earlier), that the Afghan Central Bank has tried to control hawala
transfers; 475 hawalas have been licensed, to date, whereas none were licensed as
recently as 2009. In August 2010, Afghan and U.S. authorities began installing
U.S.-made currency counters at Kabul airport to track how officials had obtained
their cash (and ensure it did not come from donor aid funds).54 On March 19,
2012, Central Bank Governor Noorullah Delawari said the Bank had imposed a
$20,000 per person limit on cash transfers out of the country. However, a report
by the SIGAR issued December 11, 2012, found that the provided currency
counters at Kabul airport were not being used, nor were procedures to ensure that
notable Afghan figures were not taking large amounts of cash out of Afghanistan
being enforced. Other reports say that Afghans are taking significant amounts of
gold out of Afghanistan, possibly to hedge against instability.
• Customs Revenue Diversion. As noted above, some governors of border
provinces are siphoning off customs duties that are supposed to be remitted to the
central government. In December 2012, a commission created by Karzai
investigated the issue in 12 provinces and shut down some of these operations.
One scheme shut down was a surtax levied illegitimately at the Torkham Gate
(Khyber Pass) crossing by the provincial government of Ghul Agha Shirzai (see
above on Shirzai above).
• Auditing Capabilities. In September 2013, the Afghan National Assembly gave
official standing to a Supreme Audit Office, mandating it to undertake audits of
government institutions. The parliamentary empowerment met an Afghan pledge,
made at the 2010 Kabul conference, to enact an audit law to strengthen the
independence of the auditing institutions. The Supreme Audit Office, in
conjunction with the ministries of Justice and of Education, and citizen’s groups,
is implementing a U.N.-funded anti-corruption project called the “Afghanistan
Integrity Initiative.” The project is intended to strengthen the capacity of the
government to reduce corruption.
54 Greg Miller and Joshua Partlow, “Afghans, U.S. Aim to Plug Cash Drain,” Washington Post, August 21, 2010.
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• Legal Review. The Kabul conference communiqué committed the government to
establish a legal review committee, within six months, to review Afghan laws for
compliance with the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. Afghanistan ratified
the convention in August 2008.
• U.S. Defense Department Efforts. In 2009, a key U.S. military official, General
H.R. McMaster, formed several DOD task forces to focus on anti-corruption
(Shafafiyat, Task Force Spotlight, and Task Force 2010) from a U.S.
military/counter-insurgency perspective. These task forces, in part, reviewed U.S.
contracting strategies to enhance Afghan capacity and reduce the potential for
corruption. The Shafafiyat task force announced in February 2012 that it had
caused the restitution of $11.1 million, $25.4 million in fines, and $3.4 million in
seizures from allegedly fraudulent contractors, and led to disbarment or
suspension of more than 125 American, Afghan, and international workers for
alleged fraud.55 These task forces have wound down their work in conjunction
with the U.S. military drawdown from Afghanistan.
• Local Anti-Corruption Bodies. Some Afghans have taken it upon themselves to
oppose corruption at the local level. Volunteer local inspectors, sponsored
originally by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, are reported to monitor and report on
the quality of donor-funded, contractor implemented construction projects.
However, these and other “watchdog” groups do not have an official mandate,
and therefore their authority and ability to rectify inadequacies are limited.
Kabul Bank Scandal
The near-collapse of Kabul Bank—the main banking institution that was used to pay Afghan civil
servants and police—has been offered as a prime example of the adverse effects of corruption in
Afghanistan. The bank nearly collapsed in August 2010 after it reported large losses, primarily
from shareholder investments in Dubai properties, prompting a run on the bank and causing
Karzai to appoint a Central Bank official to run it. Afghan investigators confirmed that its losses
due to questionable loans totaled over $925 million. President Karzai’s elder brother Mahmoud
reportedly received large loans from the bank to buy his 7% stake in it. Another big shareholder
was Abdul Hussain Fahim, the brother of the late first vice president.
In response to the crisis, the United States and other donors refused to recapitalize the bank, but it
offered to finance an audit of Afghan banks, including Kabul Bank. The Finance Ministry decided
instead in November 2010 to hire its own auditor—a move that suggested to some that high
Afghan officials sought to hide the audit results. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
suspended its credit program for the Afghan government in November 2010, demanding that the
entire Afghan banking industry undergo an outside forensic audit and that those responsible be
held accountable. That held $70 million World Bank/Afghan Reconstruction Fund (ARTF) in
donor funds. Other donors followed suit and suspended as much as $1.8 billion in economic aid.
55 John Ryan, “Task Force Rooting Out Corruption in Afghanistan,” Army Times, February 20, 2012.
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The IMF—as a condition of resuming its credit program—insisted the bank be sold. The Central
Bank instead agreed to separate the bank’s performing from nonperforming assets and then
dissolve or restructure the bank.56 That plan was adopted in April 2011.
The “good bank” (part of the bank with deposits and which still functions) was financed by a
Central Bank loan of $825 million. It was renamed “New Kabul Bank.” The Afghan Finance
Ministry is paying back the loan—over eight years—with recovered assets and general
government revenues. Since early 2013, the Finance Ministry has sought to sell New Kabul Bank
but no qualified bidders have made acceptable offers and it remains state-owned.
The Afghan government, through its “Financial Dispute Resolution Commission,” continues to
try to recoup the lost funds. Of the estimated $925 million in losses, only about $150 million in
cash and $215 million in property (mostly luxury villas in Dubai) and other assets57 has been
recovered. About $300 million of the losses are judged unrecoverable because of a lack of
documentation. The MEC, discussed above, said in its September 28, 2013, report that none of
the $121 million owed to the bank by the Afghan company Gas Group had been recovered. The
Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework required Afghanistan to continue asset recovery and to
strengthen banking supervision though the Central Bank (Da Afghanistan Bank).
Attempting Accountability
The political fallout also produced some resolution. On January 15, 2011, the office of Afghan
Attorney General Ishaq Aloko announced an investigation into the near-collapse of the bank. The
investigating commission briefed reporters on its findings on May 30, 2011, placing much of the
blame on lax controls by the Central Bank and its governor, Abdul Qadir Fitrat. The government
commission also largely absolved Mahmoud Karzai of any wrongdoing, and named other key
figures, such as Dostam, as taking out $100,000 in unsecured loans. The following day, Central
Bank governor Fitrat disputed the commission’s conclusions. Fitrat subsequently fled to the
United States and resigned in June 2011.
In a step toward holding principals accountable, on June 30, 2011, the government announced the
arrest of two former Kabul Bank executives, Sherkhan Farnood and Khalilullah Frouzi, who
allegedly allowed the concessionary loans to the high-level Afghans and their relatives. However,
by late 2011, the detentions of the two had been relaxed and they were frequently sighted at
various public places in Kabul.58 On August 1, 2011, the Attorney General’s office sent the names
of about 15 people allegedly responsible for the scandal to Afghan courts for trial. On April 3,
2012, Karzai ordered a special prosecutor appointed and a special tribunal created to try those
involved. On June 2, 2012, 21 people were indicted by the special tribunal, including Farnood,
Frouzi, Fitrat, nine other government officials, and nine other bank employees who were
allegedly in positions to have known of the fraud. The trial of Farnood, Frouzi, and about 20
others allegedly involved began on November 10, 2012, under a three judge panel. All 21
defendants were found guilty, and Farnood and Frouzi received five-year sentences and financial
56 Ernesto Londono, “Afghan Officials Opt to Dissolve Bank Draped in Scandal,” Washington Post, March 27, 2011.
57 Joshua Partlow, “Afghan Bureaucrat Tasked With Recovering Millions in Bad Loans,” Washington Post, July 7,
2012. Afghanistan Plans to Sell Scandal-Scarred Kabul Bank in June, Bloomberg.com, April 11, 2012;
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf.
58 Matthew Rosenberg and Graham Bowley, “Intractable Afghan Graft Hampering U.S. Strategy,” New York Times,
March 8, 2012.
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penalties. The July 3, 2013, senior officials meeting in Kabul stated that “Participants
[Afghanistan participated in the meeting] agreed that continued efforts were needed” to hold
parties accountable in the Bank scandal.
Conclusions and Fallout
On November 27, 2012, the New York Times reported that the Central Bank’s audit of Kabul Bank
by Kroll Associates called Kabul Bank a virtual “Ponzi scheme” involving numerous deliberate
efforts to deceive the bank’s original auditors. Two days later, the Joint Evaluation and
Monitoring Committee, discussed above, released an 87-page report detailing how Bank funds
were smuggled out of the country surreptitiously and alleging high level Afghan government
input in deciding whom to hold accountable.59
The investigations, the recovery of some lost funds, and the forensic audits of the bank suggested
Afghanistan was moving to meet the IMF conditions for the restart of its credit program. In
November 2011, the IMF resumed its program by approving a $133 million loan to Afghanistan.
That move restored the flow of some previously blocked donor funds, including U.S.
contributions to the World Bank-run Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).
The IMF also has sought a timetable for another bank found by the Central Bank to be vulnerable
to collapse, Azizi Bank, to shore up its finances. Another Afghan entity suspected of corruption is
the New Ansari Money Exchange, a large money-trading operation. On February 18, 2011, the
Treasury Department designated New Ansari, and persons affiliated with it, as major money
laundering entities under the “Kingpin Act,” banning U.S. transactions with the designees.
On October 1, President Ghani ordered a review of the Kabul Bank scandal on the grounds that
those responsible had not been held accountable.
Moves to Penalize Lack of Progress on Corruption
Several of the required U.S. “metrics” of progress, cited above, involve Afghan progress against
corruption. In part because of reports that as much as $3 billion in funds had been allegedly
embezzled by Afghan officials over the past several years,60 an Administration certification of
progress against corruption was included as a condition of providing aid to Afghanistan in the
FY2011 continuing appropriations (P.L. 112-10). Aid conditionality based on Afghan
performance against corruption, on incorporation of women in the reconciliation process, and on
reports on progress on the Kabul Bank scandal was included in the FY2012 Consolidated
Appropriation (P.L. 112-74). No U.S. funding for Afghanistan has been permanently withheld
because of this or any other legislative certification requirement.
59 Matthew Rosenberg, “Audit Says Kabul Bank Began as “Ponzi Scheme,” New York Times, November 17, 2012;
Pamela Constable, “Report Cites Interference in Afghan Bank Probe,” Washington Post, November 29, 2012.
60 Rosenberg, Matthew, “Corruption Suspected in Airlift of Billions in Cash From Kabul,” Wall Street Journal, June
28, 2010.
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Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society61
Since 2001, U.S. policy has been to build capacity in human rights institutions in Afghanistan and
to promote civil society and political participation. As do previous years’ State Department
human rights reports, the report on Afghanistan for 2013 analyzed numerous human rights
deficiencies, attributing most of them to overall lack of security, loose control over the actions of
Afghan security forces, corruption, and cultural attitudes including discrimination against women.
Institution-Building: The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission (AIHRC) and Outside Human Rights Organizations
One of the institutional human rights developments since the fall of the Taliban has been the
establishment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). It is headed
by a woman, Sima Simar, a Hazara Shiite from Ghazni Province. It is an oversight body on
human rights practices but its members are appointed by the government and some believe it is
not independent. As an indication of government interference, in December 2011, Karzai
dismissed its deputy chairman Ahmad Nader Nadery for alleging abuses by Karzai allies. Nadery
later became head of another civil society watchdog organization, the Free and Fair Election
Foundation of Afghanistan, which was highly critical of Karzai and his allies for the 2009 and
2010 election fraud served as a watchdog group for the 2014 elections. In recent years, most of
the AIHRC budget of $7.5 million has been provided by European donors, Canada, Australia, and
the United Nations.62
In the course of the senior officials meeting in Kabul on July 3, 2013, donors criticized several of
Karzai’s 2013 appointments to the AIHRC. Some of the five appointees were reportedly linked to
Afghan faction leaders or had not demonstrated a commitment to upholding or enforcing
international standards of human rights.63 On a visit to Afghanistan in September 2013, U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights Navinathem Pillay failed to persuade Karzai to replace the
controversial AIHRC appointees.
Since 2002, there has been a proliferation of Afghan organizations that demand transparency
about human rights deficiencies. Prominent examples of Afghan NGO’s that monitor and agitate
for improved human rights practices include the Afghanistan Human Rights and Democracy
Organization, and the Equality for Peace and Democracy organization.
It is in part the work of these groups that has produced responses by the government.
Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (intelligence directorate but with arrest powers),
which has widely been accused of detainee abuse and torture, established in late 2011 a “human
rights unit” to investigate abuse allegations and train NDS staff not to conduct such abuses. In
2012, the Human Rights Support Unit of the Ministry of Justice conducted 12 human rights
training sessions for NDS and Afghan National Policy officers. In June 2012, the Interior
Ministry was tasked by the presidential office to report on prison conditions. On June 2, 2012,
61 Information in this section is primarily from Department of State. Human Rights Report for 2013: Afghanistan,
February 27, 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=
220386#wrapper.
62 Rod Nordland, “Critics Question Karzai Choices for Human Rights Panel,” New York Times, July 2, 2013.
63 Ron Nordland, “Donors Are Likely to Ask Karzai to Rethink Rights Panel Choices,” New York Times, July 3, 2013.
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Karzai ordered disarmed a local security unit whose members were accused of raping an 18-year
old woman in Konduz Province. On July 9, 2012, Afghan forces were sent to track down Taliban
militants who had executed a woman for adultery in Parwan Province.
Religious Influence on Society: National Ulema Council
Counterbalancing the influence of post-Taliban modern institutions such as the AIHRC are
traditional bodies such as the National Ulema Council. The Council consists of the 150 most
respected and widely followed clerics throughout Afghanistan, and represents a network of about
3,000 clerics nationwide. It has taken conservative positions on free expression and social
freedoms, such as the type of television and other media programs available on private media
outlets. Clerics sometimes ban performances by Afghan singers and other performers whose acts
the clerics consider inconsistent with conservative Islamic values. On the other hand, some rock
bands have been allowed to perform high profile shows since 2011. Because of the power of
Islamist conservatives, alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores,
although it is not banned for sale to non-Muslims.
In August 2010, 350 clerics linked to the Council voted to demand that Islamic law (Sharia) be
implemented (including such punishments as stoning, amputations, and lashings) in order to
better prevent crime. The government did not implement the recommendation, which would
require amending the Afghan constitution that does not implement Sharia. The Council’s March
2, 2012, backing of Sharia interpretations of the rights of women is discussed below in the section
on women’s rights.
The government (Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs) is also involved in regulating religious
practices. Of Afghanistan’s approximately 125,000 mosques, 6,000 are registered and funded by
the government. Clerics in these mosques are paid about $100 per month and, in return, are
expected to promote the government line. In April 2012, the Ministry decreed that it would fire
government-funded clerics who refuse to heed warnings and preach violence or incitement.
As an illustration of Afghanistan’s inherent Islamic conservatism, riots broke out in two
successive years over what some Afghans perceived as U.S. disrespect of Islam. On April 2,
2011, hundreds of Afghans rioted in the normally quiet (and non-Pashtun) city of Mazar-e-Sharif
to protest the burning of a Quran by a Florida pastor a few weeks earlier. The rioters stormed the
U.N. compound in the city and killed at least 12 people, including 7 U.N workers. A more serious
eruption occurred in late February 2012 over the mistaken U.S. discarding of Qurans used by
detainees at Bagram Airfield. Riots and protests occurred in several cities, including the normally
peaceful and pro-U.S. north. The public reaction to the Quran burning was more intense than it
was following the March 11, 2012, killing of 16 Afghans allegedly by a U.S. soldier, Robert
Bales, who is in U.S. military custody. On September 17, 2012, several hundred Afghans rioted
outside a U.S. training facility east of Kabul city to protest a video produced in the United States
(“Innocence of Muslims”) that mocks the Prophet Muhammad. Afghan police protected the
facility from assault from the crowd.
These perceived U.S. slights may account for some of the killings of U.S. military personnel by
Afghan security forces over the past few years. The so-called “green on blue” attacks have caused
tensions between Afghan forces and their U.S. mentors, and prompted U.S. commanders to
impose counter-measures that potentially complicate the U.S. effort to accelerate the transition to
Afghan security before the end of 2014.
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Religious Freedom
The International Religious Freedom report for 2013 did not alter U.S. assessments of religious
freedom in Afghanistan from that in previous years’ reports. The constitution and government do,
to some extent, restrict religious freedom.64 Members of minority religions, including Christians,
Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination, but members of these communities
sometimes serve at high levels. Karzai has had a Hindu as an economic advisor and one member
of the Sikh community serves in the Meshrano Jirga. In September 2013, Karzai, by decree,
created a special parliamentary seat allocation for a Sikh and a Hindu. There are four Isma’ilis in
the National Assembly, elected without a quota. Baha’is fare worse than members of some of the
other minorities because the Afghan Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of
blasphemy in May 2007. There are no public Christian churches and four synagogues, although
the synagogues are not used because there is only one Afghan national who is Jewish. There are
three active gurdwaras (Sikh places of worship) and five Hindu mandirs (temples). Buddhist
foreigners are free to worship in Hindu temples.
One major case that drew international criticism was a January 2008 death sentence, imposed in a
quick trial, against young journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
criticizing Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20 years in
prison, a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He was pardoned by Karzai and
released in September 2009.
The Hazaras and other Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. Afghan Shiite leaders appreciated the July 2009 enactment and “gazetting”
of a “Shiite Personal Status Law” that gave Afghan Shiites the same degree of recognition as the
Sunni majority, and provided a legal framework for Shiite family law issues. Afghan Shiites are
able to celebrate their holidays openly and some have held high positions, but some Pashtuns
have become resentful of the open celebrations and some clashes have resulted. The former
Minister of Justice, Sarwar Danesh, was the first Hazara Shiite to hold that post. In June 2012,
Karzai denounced a book published by the Afghanistan Academy of Science that portrayed
Hazaras as un-Islamic. In November 2012, Pashtun students at four universities in Kabul attacked
Hazara students who were trying to commemorate the Shiite day of mourning (Ashura),
prompting the temporary closing of the universities. The clashes occurred even though Shiite
public observance of the holy month of Muharram has progressively expanded.
Afghan Christians can worship in small congregations in private homes, but several conversion
cases have earned international attention. An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to
Christianity 16 years ago while working for a Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned
and faced a potential death penalty trial for apostasy—his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing
international pressure, Karzai prevailed on Kabul court authorities to release him (March 29,
2006). His release came the same day the House passed a bill (H.Res. 736) calling on protections
for Afghan converts. In May 2010, the Afghan government suspended the operations of two
Christian-affiliated international relief groups claiming the groups were attempting to promote
Christianity among Afghans, an assertion denied by the groups (Church World Service and
Norwegian Church Aid). In May 2010, amputee Said Musa was imprisoned for converting to
Christianity from Islam, an offense under Afghan law that leaves it open for Afghan courts to
apply a death sentence under Islamic law (Shariah). The arrest came days after the local Noorin
64 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=222323#wrapper.
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TV station broadcast a show on Afghan Christians engaging in their rituals. Following diplomatic
engagement by governments and human rights groups, Musa was released on February 24, 2011,
and he obtained asylum in Italy.
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms
Afghanistan’s conservative traditions have caused some backsliding in recent years on media
freedoms. Since 2001, numerous television channels, newspapers, and other media forms have
been established, giving Afghanistan one of the freest presses in the region. Media has expanded
to the point where the government, in 2012, began a process of launching a communications
satellite to help with broadcast speed and breadth of dissemination. However, a Mass Media Law
adopted in 2009 gave independence to the official media outlets but also contained a number of
content restrictions and required that new newspapers and electronic media be licensed by the
government. The Ministry of Information and Culture is drafting a new media law to replace it,
although its drafts contained provisions that drew opposition from human rights groups in and
outside Afghanistan.
According to the State Department reports on human rights, there continue to be intimidation and
sometimes violence against journalists who criticize the central government or powerful local
leaders, and some news organizations and newspapers have occasionally been closed for incorrect
or derogatory reporting on high officials. In October 2012, the Afghan government threatened to
expel the staff of the International Crisis Group because of a report it issued that warned that
Afghanistan might slide into civil war if the 2014 presidential elections are not free and fair. In
August 2014, Karzai expelled New York Times journalist Matthew Rosenberg for reporting on
alternative scenarios should the presidential election dispute not be resolved. About one week
after taking office, President Ghani revoked Rosenberg’s exclusion from the country.
USAID programs have trained investigative journalists to do more reporting on official
corruption and other issues. The United States has provided funding and advice to an Afghan
Government Media Information Center that the Afghan government uses to communicate with
the public. U.S. advisers ended their work there in December 2011.
Separately, Islamic conservatives on the Ulema Council and in the National Assembly, as well as
prominent clerics such as Shiite Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, have sometimes asserted control over
media content. This has been an attempt to curb the popularity of such networks as Tolo
Television. With the Ulema Council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of Information and
Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on Tolo on the grounds that they are too risqué,
although the programs were restored in August 2008 under a compromise that brought in Islamic-
oriented programs from Turkey. In June 2011, pressure from the Ulema Council caused Tolo to
remove a soap opera called “Forbidden Love.” Tolo has also aired programs about official
corruption. In April 2013, Karzai reportedly agreed with a call by the Ulema Council to ban
programs considered “vulgar, obscene, or un-Islamic.”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s “Radio Azadi” service for Afghanistan has distributed 20,000
solar powered radios to poor (and usually illiterate) Afghans to improve their access to
information. In general, the government does not restrict access to the Internet, but it does ban
access to pornographic websites.
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Harsh Punishments/Torture
The State Department and UNAMA reports cite widespread examples of torture, rape, and other
abuses by officials, security forces, detention center authorities, and police.65 In September 2011,
U.S. and partner transfers of prisoners to some Afghan facilities were suspended because of
alleged torture by Afghan prison authorities. UNAMA visits Afghan-run detention facilities to
monitor implementation of presidential decree No. 129 preventing torture and ill-treatment of
detainees. UNAMA provided assistance for the redrafting of 173 prison-related operational
directives. As of the end of 2013, 114 such revised directives were issued, although there continue
to be concerns about new incidents of alleged torture and ill-treatment.
In 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing the death penalty after a four-year moratorium. It
executed 15 criminals that year. In August 2010, the issue of stoning to death as a punishment
arose when Taliban insurgents ordered a young couple who had eloped stoned to death in a
Taliban-controlled area of Konduz Province. Although the punishment was not meted out by the
government, it was reported that many residents of the couple’s village supported the punishment.
On September 27, 2014, two days before leaving office, President Karzai signed an execution
order for five men convicted of gang rape, ignoring calls to stay the execution because of
concerns over whether they got a fair trial. President Ghani went forward with the execution on
October 8, to the condemnation of the United Nations and some European officials. The Ministry
of Women’s Affairs applauded the execution as “a historic lesson to those who might resort to
such crimes.”
Human Trafficking
Afghanistan was placed in Tier 2 in the State Department Trafficking in Persons Report for 2014,
issued in June 201466 That is an improvement from its “Tier 2: Watch List” rating of the four prior
years. In 2013, Afghanistan was given a waiver for an automatic downgrade to Tier 3 (the
downgrade is automatic after a country is “watch-listed” for three consecutive years). The waiver
was based on the government’s writing of a plan that, if implemented, would qualify as a
significant effort to comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The
Afghan government is assessed in the 2014 report as not complying with minimum standards for
eliminating trafficking. However, in contrast to prior years, it is assessed as making significant
efforts to comply.
The State Department report says that women from China, some countries in Africa, Iran, and
some countries in Central Asia are being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation,
although, according to the report, trafficking within Afghanistan is more prevalent than
trafficking across its borders. The report asserts that some families knowingly sell their children
for forced prostitution, including for bacha baazi, a practice in which wealthy men use groups of
young boys for social and sexual entertainment. The report added that some members of the
Afghan National Security Forces have sexually abused boys as part of the bacha baazi practice.
65 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, “Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody:
One Year On,” January 2013, at http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VsBL0S5b37o%3d&tabid=
12254&language=en-US.
66 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/226845.pdf.
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Other reports say that many women have resorted to prostitution, despite the risk of social and
religious ostracism or punishment, to cope with economic hardship.67
Advancement of Women
Women and women’s groups are a large component of the burgeoning of civil society in post-
Taliban Afghanistan. Freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban
with their elections to the parliament and their service at many levels of government. The Afghan
government pursues a policy of promoting equality for women under its National Action Plan for
Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework requires
Afghanistan to implement the NAPWA and all of its past commitments and laws to strengthen the
rights of women and provide services to them.
President Ghani has signaled his strong support for women’s rights by highlighting in his
inaugural speech the support he has received from his wife, Rula Ghani. Some in the audience
reportedly gasped at the reference, because Afghan culture considers it taboo to mention wives
and female family members in public. Some Afghan conservatives have criticized Ghani because
Mrs. Ghani was a Christian whom he met while studying at university in Beirut in the 1970s, and
some Afghan clerics allege that there is no public record of her converting to Islam.68
The major institutional development since 2001 was the formation in 2002 of a Ministry of
Women’s Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights. It is headed by Husn Banu Ghazanfar.
Its primary function is to promote public awareness of relevant laws and regulations concerning
women’s rights. It plays a key role in trying to protect women from domestic abuse by overseeing
the running of as many as 29 women’s shelters across Afghanistan. Women’s rights groups in
Afghanistan expressed outrage over a June 2012 statement by Afghanistan’s justice minister that
the shelters encourage “immorality and prostitution.” The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of
2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry
of Women’s Affairs. Those monies were donated to the Ministry from Economic Support Funds
(ESF) accounts controlled by USAID. The United States has continued to fund the Ministry since
AFSA expired, although with less than $15 million per year.
One of the most prominent civil society groups operating in post-Taliban Afghanistan is the
Afghanistan Women’s Network. It has at least 3,000 members and its leaders say that 75
nongovernmental organizations work under its auspices. In addition, the AIHRC and outside
Afghan human rights groups focus extensively on rights for Afghan women.
Among the most notable accomplishments since 2001, women are performing jobs that were
rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996. The civil service is 19%
female, although that is down from 24% in 2004 and below the 30% target level set in the Tokyo
Mutual Accountability Framework. Women serve in the police force and military, and the first
Afghan female pilots arrived for training in the United States in July 2011. There are over 150
female judges, up from 50 in 2003, and nearly 500 female journalists working nationwide.
Women constitute over one-third of the seats of the nationwide Community Development
67 Azam Ahmed, “An Afghan City’s Economic Success Extends to Its Sex Trade,” New York Times, April 18, 2013.
68 Declan Walsh and Rod Nordland. “Jolting Some, Afghan Leader Brings Wife into the Picture.” New York Times,
October 15, 2014.
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Councils (CDCs, discussed above), and each CDC is required to have two women in its executive
bodies.
Women are legally permitted to drive, and press reports say an increasing number of Afghan
women, although mainly in Kabul and other main cities, are learning how to drive and exercising
that privilege. The wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and
fewer women are wearing it than was the case a few years ago. In November 2010, the
government opened a USAID-funded women-only park in Kabul called “Women’s Garden”
where women can go, without male escort, and undertake fitness and job training activities.
Some groups, such as Human Rights Watch, report backsliding on women’s rights since 2008,69
although the State Department human rights report for 2012 says that the situation of women in
Afghanistan improved “marginally” during 2012. Numerous abuses, such as denial of educational
and employment opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative
traditions. This is particularly prevalent in rural areas, and less so in larger urban areas. Along
with the assertion of authority of conservative Islamic institutions, on March 2, 2012, the Ulema
Council issued a pronouncement saying women should be forced to wear the veil and be
forbidden from traveling without a male chaperone. The pronouncement did reiterate support for
the rights of women to inherit and own property, and to choose their marital partners. On March
6, 2012, Karzai endorsed the Ulema Council statement.
Among the most widespread abuses reported:
• More than 70% of marriages in Afghanistan are forced, despite laws banning the
practice, and a majority of brides are younger than the legal marriage age of 16.
• The practice of baad, in which women are given away to marry someone from
another clan to settle a dispute, remains prevalent.
• There is no law specifically banning sexual harassment, and women are routinely
jailed for zina—a term meaning adultery, and a crime under the penal code, and
that includes running away from home, defying family choice of a spouse,
eloping, or fleeing domestic violence. These incarcerations are despite the fact
that running away from home is not a crime under the penal code. That code is
often relatively lenient towards males—a man convicted of “honor killing” (of a
wife who commits adultery) cannot be sentenced to more than two years in
prison. One case that received substantial attention in December 2011 involved a
woman who was jailed for having a child outside wedlock even though the child
was a product of rape.
• Women’s rights activists have been assassinated on several occasions. On
December 10, 2012, the head of the Women’s Affairs Ministry department in
Laghman Province was gunned down. Her predecessor in that post was killed by
a bomb planted in her car four months earlier. A prominent women’s rights
activist and author, Sushmita Banerjee, a citizen of India, was abducted by
Taliban militants from her home in Paktika province and found killed. Two
Taliban suspects were subsequently arrested.
69 “We Have the Promises of the World: Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, December 2009,
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/hrw_report_2009.pdf.
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In an effort to prevent these abuses, on August 6, 2009, Karzai issued, as a decree, the
“Elimination of Violence Against Women” (EVAW) law that makes many of the practices above
unlawful. Partly as a result of the decree, prosecutions of abuses against women are increasingly
obtaining convictions. A “High Commission for the Elimination of Violence Against Women” has
been established to oversee implementation of the EVAW, and provincial offices of the
commission have been established in all but two provinces, according to the March 7, 2014, U.N.
report. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs is working with local authorities in 11 provinces to
improve implementation of the decree.
On the other hand, despite the EVAW decree, only a small percentage of reports of violence
against women are registered with the judicial system, and about one-third of those proceed to
trial.70 The number of women jailed for “moral crimes” has increased by 50% since 2011. Efforts
by the National Assembly to enact the EVAW in December 2010 and in May 2013 failed due to
opposition from Islamic conservatives who do not want to limit the ability of male elders to
decide family issues. On May 22, 2013, about 200 male Islamist students demonstrated in Kabul
demanding repeal of the EVAW decree outright.
Women in Key Positions
Despite conservative attitudes, women have moved into prominent positions in all areas of
Afghan governance, although with periodic setbacks. Three female ministers were in the 2004-
2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa
Balkhi (Ministry for Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Ministry of Youth). Karzai
named three women to cabinet posts on January 9, 2010, including Afzali (to Labor and Social
Affairs). Of the three, only Afzali was immediately confirmed; the other two (Minister of Health
and Minister of Women’s Affairs) were kept on in acting capacities and confirmed in subsequent
years. Afghanistan has one female ambassador and Karzai has a female deputy chief of staff,
Homaira Ludin-Etemadi. In the December 16, 2009, nomination list, Karzai proposed a woman to
head a new Ministry of Literacy, but parliament did not vote on this nomination because it had
not yet acted to approve formation of the ministry. In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former
minister of women’s affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly
by Hazaras.
One woman (Masooda Jalal) ran in the 2004 presidential election, and two ran for president in the
August 20, 2009, election. In the latter, each received less than one-half of 1%. As noted above,
one woman filed to run for president in 2014, but her candidacy was disqualified by the IEC
apparently for an insufficient number of nominating signatures. Three women, including Sohrabi,
are vice presidential candidates in the April 2014 election.
In the National Assembly, the constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the
upper house and 68 of the 249 seats in the lower house of parliament. There were 69 women
elected in the 2010 parliamentary elections, one more than the quota. (400 women ran for those
seats—about 16% of all candidates.) The target ratio is ensured by reserving an average of two
seats per province (34 provinces) for women—the top two female vote getters per province.
(Kabul province reserves 9 female seats.) There are 28 women in the upper house, substantially
70 Alissa Rubin, “Slow Gains in Justice for Afghan Women,” New York Times, December 12, 2012,
http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Qy9mDiEa5Rw%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US.
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more than the minimum number. However, some NGOs and other groups believe that the women
elected by the quota system are not viewed as equally legitimate parliamentarians.
About 300 women were delegates to the 1,600-person “peace jirga” that was held during June 2-
4, 2010, which endorsed an Afghan plan to reintegrate insurgents who want to end their fight. The
High Peace Council to oversee the reconciliation process, which met for the first time on October
10, 2010, has 9 women out of 70 members, although these women report that their views are not
taken into account to any significant extent in the Council. At U.S. and other country urging, a
woman was part of the official Afghan delegation to the major international conference on
Afghanistan in Bonn on December 5, 2011; she was selected at a meeting of civil society activists
in Bonn, a day before the major conference began.
U.S. and International Posture on Women’s Rights
U.S. officials say that its policy is to promote women’s rights in Afghanistan rigorously. The
Administration has and is following its “Strategy for Assistance to Women in Afghanistan, 2010-
2013.”71 U.S. officials said aid allocations are geared toward that strategy. Specific earmarks for
use of U.S. funds for women’s and girls’ programs in Afghanistan are contained in recent annual
appropriations, and these earmarks have grown steadily. The United States provided $159 million
to programs for Afghan women in FY2009, slightly more than the $150 million earmarked, and
about $225 million for FY2010, more than the $175 earmarked.72 For FY2010, assistance for
women was provided in the following “pillars” of the U.S. Strategy: health ($87 million);
education ($31 million); economy, work, and poverty ($54.6 million); legal protection and human
rights ($12 million); and leadership and political participation ($43 million). Total U.S. funding
for women’s programs for Afghanistan were similar for FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013. Among
the funding streams has been U.S. Ambassador small grants to support gender equality (FY2009-
FY2012), which was used to help finance over 830,000 microloans to women during 2004-2011
for the establishment of 175,000 small businesses, according to an SRAP report released
November 2011. These strategy pillars, and specific programs funded by them, are discussed in
annual State Department reports on U.S. aid to women and girls.
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues
U.S. funding for democracy, governance, and rule of law programs has grown, in line with the
Obama Administration strategy for Afghanistan. During FY2002-FY2012, USAID spent about
$1.5 billion on democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights, and elections support. For
FY2013, the ESF amounts provided for democracy and governance are $578.2 million, including
• $447.2 million for good governance,
• $31.5 million for rule of law and human rights (not including INCLE),
• $64.3 million for political competition and consensus-building, and
• $35.2 million for civil society.
71 A draft of this strategy document was provided to CRS by the State Department, April 21, 2011.
72 For prior years, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman, in the section on aid to Afghanistan, year by year.
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For FY2014, the Administration has requested $1.665 billion in ESF and $475 in INCLE funding
for Afghanistan—the broad accounts from which democracy, governance, and rule of law
funding—as well as funding for a wide range of other functions—are drawn. For tables on U.S.
aid to Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security,
and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Effects of a Settlement with the Taliban
A major U.S. and Afghan initiative—to reach a conflict-ending settlement with the Taliban—is
likely to affect all of the issues discussed in this paper were it to be realized. Afghan politics,
elections, the performance of the government, and the human rights situation could all be affected
significantly by a deal with the Taliban. Many in the international community, including within
the Obama Administration, initially withheld endorsement of the concept, asserting reconciliation
might result in the incorporation into the Afghan political system of insurgent leaders who retain
ties to Al Qaeda and will roll back freedoms. The minority communities in the north, women,
intellectuals, and others remain skeptical of reconciliation on similar grounds. Most Taliban
insurgents are highly conservative Islamists who oppose the advancement of women and women
have been a target of attacks by Taliban supporters, including attacks on girls’ schools and athletic
facilities. If the Taliban is given major ministry positions, seats in parliament, or even tacit control
over territory as part of any deal, the movement would be in position to assert its ideology.
To respond to those fears, Afghan and U.S. officials say that the outcome of a settlement would
require the Taliban to drop at least some of its demands that (1) foreign troops leave Afghanistan;
(2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted; and (3) Islamic law be imposed. This issue is
covered in greater depth in CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Table 1. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Confederations Location
Example
Durrani
Mainly southern Afghanistan:
Qandahar, Helmand, Zabol, Uruzgan,
Nimruz
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
former head of the Independent Directorate of
(Zirak branch
Local Governance; Mul ah Bradar, the top aide to
of Durrani
Mullah Umar, captured in Pakistan in Feb. 2010.
Pashtun)
Two-thirds of Qandahar’s provincial government
posts held by Zirak Durrani Pashtuns
Alikozai
Qandahar
Mullah Naqibullah (deceased, former anti-Taliban
faction leader in Qandahar)
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai (Governor, Nangarhar Province)
Achakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Abdul Razziq, Police Chief, Qandahar Province
Alozai
Helmand (Musa Qala district)
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh (former Helmand
governor); Hajji Zahir, former governor of Marjah
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in charge of Qandahar
after the fall of the Taliban in November 2001
Ghilzai
Eastern Afghanistan: Paktia, Paktika,
Khost, Nangarhar, Kunar
Ahmadzai
Mohammed Najibullah (pres. 1986-1992); Ashraf
Ghani, Karzai adviser, Finance Minister 2002-2004
Hotak
Mullah Umar, but hails from Uruzgan, which is
dominated by Durranis
Taraki
Nur Mohammed Taraki (leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti
Hafizullah Amin (leader September-December
1979); Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, founder of Hezb-e-
Islami (Gulbuddin), former mujahedin party leader
now anti-Karzai insurgent.
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran; Insurgent leader Jalaluddin
Haqqani
Kodai
Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of Helmand Province)
Orkazai
Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former Supreme Court Chief
Justice
Mandezai
Sangu Khel
Sipah
Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak (Defense Minister)
(Pashtu-speaking
non-Pashtun)
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat
Zaka khel
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Clan/Tribal
Confederations Location
Example
Jawaki
Adam khel
Malikdin, etc
Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul
Akozais
Malizais
Loezais
Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash
Akorai
Terai
Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar
Baizai
Alimzai
Uthmanzais
Khawazais
Wazirs
Mainly in Waziristan
Darwesh khel
Bannu
Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, information research specialist, CRS.
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities
Source: 2003, National Geographic Society, http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted
by Amber Wilhelm, graphics specialist, Publishing and Editorial Resources Section, CRS.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of
Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, information research specialist, CRS.
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