Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for
Syria: In Brief
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Amy Belasco
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
October 27, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43727

Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

Summary
The FY2015 continuing appropriations resolution (H.J.Res. 124, P.L. 113-164, CR), enacted on
September 19, 2014, authorizes the Department of Defense through December 11, 2014, or until
the passage of a FY2015 defense authorization act, to provide overt assistance, including training,
equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to vetted members of the Syrian opposition and other
vetted Syrians for select purposes. The current CR does not include any dedicated funding for this
activity but authorizes DOD to submit reprogramming requests to the four congressional defense
committees to transfer funds made available by the act.
In order to continue any related programs beyond the expiration of the CR, Congress would have
to extend the authority or include an amended version of it in new legislation.
The provision was enacted in response to President Obama’s request for authority to begin such a
program as part of U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in
Syria and to set the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria’s civil war.
This report reviews the authority granted in H.J.Res. 124 and explores similarities and differences
among the H.J.Res. 124 authority, the President’s requests, and other proposals that may be
considered by Congress, including during anticipated consideration of FY2015 full-year
appropriations or defense authorization (H.R. 4435/S. 2410) legislation.
For more information on the Islamic State crisis and U.S. policy, see CRS Report R43612, The
“Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman et al., and CRS Report RL33487,
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
For analysis of proposals related to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force relative to the
Islamic State, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
the Islamic State: Comparison of Current Proposals in Brief, by Matthew C. Weed.

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Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview of Proposals .............................................................................................................. 2
Policy Questions and Potential Implications ................................................................................... 3
Political-Military Context .......................................................................................................... 4
Measuring “Effectiveness” ........................................................................................................ 5
Elements of the Debate .................................................................................................................... 7
Does the President “need” authority from Congress to provide “train and equip”
assistance? .............................................................................................................................. 7
What are the differences between the enacted authority, the President’s requests, and
other proposals? ............................................................................................................................ 8
Scope of Authority ..................................................................................................................... 9
Stated Purposes of U.S. Assistance ......................................................................................... 10
Defending Syrian Civilians from Attacks ......................................................................... 10
“Securing” vs. “Stabilizing” Opposition-held Territory and Facilitating the
Provision of Essential Services ...................................................................................... 11
Promoting the Conditions for a Negotiated Settlement to End the Conflict
in Syria ........................................................................................................................... 11
Sunset Provisions..................................................................................................................... 11
Implications of Different Funding Sources and Directives ..................................................... 11
Definitions of Vetting Requirements ....................................................................................... 12
Required Interagency Process ................................................................................................. 13
Advance Notification and Reporting of Oversight Information to Congress .......................... 13
Terms Related to Authorization for the Use of Military Force ................................................ 14

Tables
Table 1. Comparison of Select “Train and Equip” Proposals for Vetted Syrians .......................... 16

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 24

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Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

Introduction
Congress and the President have debated proposals for the provision of U.S. assistance to the
Syrian opposition since the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in 2011. Members of Congress have
articulated varying views on the potential purposes, scope, risks, and rewards of such assistance.
The executive branch, with the support of Congress, has provided overt non-lethal assistance to
unarmed and armed groups in Syria, in addition to providing humanitarian assistance in Syria and
in neighboring countries. U.S. assistance and weaponry also reportedly has been provided to
select Syrian opposition groups under covert action authorities.1 Until mid-2014, President
Obama and some Members of Congress were opposed to the overt provision of U.S. military
training or equipment to opposition forces reportedly in part because of concerns about its
effectiveness.
The President’s stance was altered by the failure in early 2014 of United Nations-backed
negotiations aimed at ending the Syrian civil war and the mid-2014 offensive in Iraq by the
extremist group known as the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL or ISIS). In the
Administration’s June 2014 amended request for war funding, President Obama requested
authority and funding from Congress to begin a so-called “train and equip” program for vetted
Syrians for the following purposes:
• “defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime, facilitating the
provision of essential services, and stabilizing territory controlled by the
opposition;
• defending the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the
threats posed by terrorists in Syria; and,
• promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.”
The President amended the request in September to reflect new goals for combatting the Islamic
State.
As enacted, H.J.Res. 124 (P.L. 113-164, “the CR”) contains a temporary authorization for the
training and equipping of vetted Syrians that differs from the Administration’s June and
September requests. The CR’s provisions expire no later than December 11, 2014. After the
November midterm elections, Members are likely to debate whether to re-endorse or consider
changes to the “train and equip” authority granted in H.J.Res. 124 during consideration of full-
year FY2015 appropriations or defense authorization legislation.
Congress may consider revisions to the current temporary “train and equip” authority based on
other versions proposed by the Administration in September, the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) in S. 2410, and the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) in its markup of
H.R. 4870. These revisions could be included in either the final version of the National Defense

1 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said in a September 2013 hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that the Administration was taking steps to provide arms to some Syrian rebels under covert action authorities.
Secretary Hagel said, “it was June of this year that the president made the decision to support lethal assistance to the
opposition. As you all know, we have been very supportive with hundreds of millions of dollars of nonlethal
assistance.…This is, as you know, a covert action. And, as Secretary Kerry noted, probably to [go] into much more
detail would—would require a closed or classified hearing.”
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Authorization Act or a subsequent CR or final defense appropriations act that Congress may act
on after returning from its recess.
Differences between H.J.Res. 124 and elements of these proposals illustrate five key questions
that Members of Congress may consider when debating any proposed revisions to the CR’s Syria
language.
• How, if at all, should the purposes of the initiative be redefined?
• How long should the authority last?
• How should the “train and assist” initiative be paid for? Should caps, account
specifications, or dedicated funding be considered? With what tradeoffs?
• Should currently required advance notification and reporting requirements be
retained, expanded, or withdrawn?
• Should the Department of Defense be required to seek State Department
concurrence with the program rather than coordination?

Chronology of “Train and Equip” Proposals
•
In 2013, legislation was introduced in both houses of Congress (H.R. 1327, S. 617, and S. 960) and considered by
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (S. 960) that would have provided authority to provide training and
assistance to armed elements of the Syrian opposition, subject to certain conditions.
•
In June 2014, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the FY2015 defense authorization
bill, S. 2410, which would have provided a comparable, conditional authority, and, later that month, the Obama
Administration requested related so-cal ed “train and equip” authority and funding as part of its Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) request to Congress for FY2015.
•
Senate Appropriations Committee members debated and approved a version of “train and equip” authority for
Syrians in July 2014 in their reported version of the FY2015 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 4870 RS). The
Senate Appropriations Committee considered and rejected a proposed amendment that would have stripped the
authority and funding for the Syria program from the bill. The House-enacted version of the bill does not include
such authority.
•
In September, the Obama Administration revised its OCO request to Congress to reflect its new goal of
“degrading and defeating” the “Islamic State” organization in Iraq and Syria.
•
On September 15, Representative Howard “Buck” McKeon, who is Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee, introduced an amendment (hereinafter the McKeon Amendment) to the FY2015 continuing
resolution (H.J.Res. 124) that represented a counterproposal to the President’s revised request for assistance
authority. The House adopted the amendment (H.Amdt.1141) by a vote of 273 to 156 on September 17, and the
Senate enacted the amended bill by a vote of 78 to 22 on September 18. The amendment text is included as
Section 149 of H.J.Res.124.
Overview of Proposals
There are several key differences between the recently enacted temporary authority in the current
CR, other proposals already considered by Congress, and the President’s September 2014 request.
Compared to the authority granted by the CR:
• The SAC-reported version of the FY2015 Department of Defense Appropriations
Act (H.R. 4870) would broaden the purposes of assisting and protecting Syrians
from Islamic State forces to include defending the Syrians from government
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Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

attacks, stabilizing rather than securing opposition held areas and facilitating the
provision of essential services in opposition held areas. The SAC language is
similar to the Administration’s request.
• The SAC version would also limit funds for a “train and equip” program to up to
$500 million in the OCO-designated Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide
account. The funding provision in H.J.Res. 124 has no funding cap and permits
DOD to request transfers from any OCO-designated account.
• Both the SAC and SASC versions include additional vetting criteria to those in
H.J.Res.124, which are designed to ensure aid recipients are not members of
select terrorist and extremist groups. The SAC and SASC versions also seek to
ensure that the ideology and political goals of U.S. aid recipients are compatible
with U.S. stated preferences for a pluralistic, democratic, and civilian-led Syria.
• The SASC- and SAC-reported bills (and the Administration’s request) require
that the State Department “concur” (i.e., agree) with DOD on assistance whereas
H.J.Res.124 requires that the Department of Defense “coordinate” with the State
Department.
• H.J.Res.124 and the SAC version would require 15-day advance notification
before providing assistance whereas the SASC proposal would require
congressional notification of assistance after the fact. H.J.Res.124 also requires
an implementation plan, a presidential strategy, and progress reporting every 90
days, which are not included in other proposals.
• Both H.J.Res.124 and the SAC proposal state that their provisions shall not be
“construed to constitute a specific statutory authorization for the introduction of
the United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein
hostilities are clearly indicated by the circumstances.” The SASC version does
not contain a statement regarding the authorization of U.S. military force.
• Both the SASC and the SAC version provide authority longer than H.J.Res.124
under which the current authority expires on December 11, 2014 (when the CR
ends) or upon enactment of the FY2015 NDAA, whichever comes first. The SAC
proposed authority would extend to the end of FY2015 or the adoption of the
FY2015 NDAA, whichever comes first. The SASC version would provide the
authority through December 31, 2018.
Policy Questions and Potential Implications
The different purposes of assistance described in H.J. 124 and other pending “train and equip”
proposals have strategic implications for U.S. involvement in Syria, and may have different
potential effects on stated U.S. goals. As such, Members of Congress may wish to consider a
number of basic policy questions when considering proposals to extend or modify the “train and
equip” authority authorized under H.J.Res. 124:
• For what purposes, if any, should the United States train and equip Syrians? How
might the short and long term goals of the United States and those of Syrians
align or conflict?
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• What should the content of any such U.S. training and equipment be? What, if
anything, should not be provided? How might the “train and equip” mission
expand in size, geographic scope, or cost depending on different scenarios? What
risks might such expansion pose?
• Who should receive such U.S. training and assistance? How should they be
identified and vetted? What criteria should Congress insist upon for the vetting of
participants?
• How much training and equipment will be sufficient to accomplish stated U.S.
objectives or achieve the stated purposes of authorizing language? How much
might this level of effort cost and how long might it take to reach these goals?
• How should such a program be funded? Through base budget funding or
overseas contingency operations funding? How long should authority for such a
program be available and on what terms? What effects might an expanded
duration or cost for such a program have on other defense or foreign assistance
priorities? Is there sufficient public support for a potentially longstanding
commitment?
• How should Congress conduct oversight of such a program? Should advance
notification of assistance be provided to congressional committees or Congress as
a whole or after-the-fact notification at certain intervals? How should success be
defined and assessed? Which committees should be involved in reviewing
program reporting and spending notifications?
• How effective have other “train and equip” programs been in other contexts?
What lessons learned from those efforts should be applied to a Syria-related
effort?
Political-Military Context
Current political-military conditions in Syria may pose challenges for U.S. efforts to train and
equip vetted Syrians for U.S.-defined purposes. Most armed opposition groups have sought U.S.
and other third-party assistance since the outbreak of conflict for the expressed purpose of
toppling the government of Bashar al Asad and replacing it with various Islamist or secular
alternatives. The CR provision does not authorize assistance for this purpose and identifies the
Islamic State organization rather than the Syrian government as the entity from which Syrians
should be protected. President Obama has suggested that U.S. engagement will remain focused
“narrowly” on assisting Syrians in combatting the Islamic State, while continuing “to look for
opportunities” to support a political resolution to Syria’s conflict.2 In an interview with London-
based newspaper Al Aharq Al Awsat, U.S. anti-IS coalition leader General John Allen reportedly
responded to a question about whether Syrian units being trained to fight the Islamic State would
be “those who will later fight the regime’s armed forces” by saying:

2 The President said, “our attitude towards Asad continues to be that you know, through his actions, through using
chemical weapons on his own people, dropping barrel bombs that killed innocent children that he—he has foregone
legitimacy. But when it comes to our policy and the coalition that we're putting together, our focus specifically is on
ISIL. It’s narrowly on ISIL.” President Obama interview with NBC News Meet the Press, September 6, 2014.
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No. What we would like to see is for the FSA and the forces that we will ultimately generate,
train and equip to become the credible force that the Assad government ultimately has to
acknowledge and recognize. There is not going to be a military solution here [in Syria]. We
have to create so much credibility within the moderate Syrian opposition at a political level
... that they earn their spot at the table when the time comes for the political solution. Now,
there could be FSA elements that ultimately clash with the regime, that may well be the case,
as they seek to defend themselves and those areas that they dominate and as they seek to
defend their families and their ways of life ... it could be an outcome. But the intent is not to
create a field force to liberate Damascus—that is not the intent. The intent is that in the
political outcome, they [the moderate Syrian opposition] must be a prominent—perhaps the
preeminent voice—at the table to ultimately contribute to the political outcome that we
seek.3
Some Syrian political and military opposition forces appear to resent such a narrow focus and
some have indicated they may insist on broader support for their anti-Asad goals as a condition of
working with a U.S.-backed coalition against the Islamic State.
Nevertheless, the CR provision does envision the use of U.S. training and equipment to promote
undefined “conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.” Most parties
assume such a settlement would include some changes to the leadership or structure of the Syrian
government. Administration officials have not publicly described mechanisms under
consideration for ensuring that U.S. training and assistance is used for congressionally defined
purposes and not for others. It is not clear how the Administration intends to direct types and
amounts of assistance in order to achieve discrete security-related goals along with the inherently
political goal of promoting conditions conducive to a negotiated conflict settlement. Insofar as
this political goal may be dependent on variables outside of U.S. control, it may be more difficult
to assess whether given levels and types of assistance are “enough” to achieve it.
Measuring “Effectiveness”
As in past cases involving the provision of U.S. security assistance, different observers may
define “success” and “effectiveness” differently based on their perspectives and priorities about
the proper purposes and scope of assistance. For example, in the current Syria case observers
differ over whether a training program should train and equip vetted fighters to offensively attack
Islamic State forces or pro-Asad forces or whether it should focus on enabling Syrians to better
defend against Islamic State or government attacks.
There are no direct recent analogues to the type of overt and broadly defined “train and equip”
program for vetted Syrians authorized under H.J.Res.124. Most current “train and equip”
authorities are far more limited in scope and funding, and targeted to government security forces.
Independent evaluations of some recent U.S. security assistance programs suggest that even when
measured against broadly stated purposes and objectives, these types of programs can face
significant difficulties in implementation or show questionable results.4

3 Min al Oraibi, “Exclusive: General Allen discusses coalition plans for defeating ISIS as regional tour starts,” Al Sharq
al Awsat (UK), October 25, 2014.
4 See the work of the Special Inspectors General for Afghanistan and Iraq Reconstruction on respective efforts to train
and equip security forces in those countries. See also, RAND, “How Successful Are U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity in
Developing Countries? A Framework to Assess the Global Train and Equip ‘1206’ Program,” Jennifer D. P. Moroney,
Beth Grill, Joe Hogler, Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, Christopher Paul, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
(continued...)
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Programs with some partial similarities in context and content to the Syria program authorized
under H.J.Res.124 include the following:
• Congress debated and imposed limits on the purposes and scope of covert U.S.
assistance programs to so-called resistance movements in Angola, Afghanistan,
Cambodia, and Nicaragua during the 1980s and early 1990s.5 While these efforts
occurred in similarly complex conflict settings, they were perceived to be part of
a global U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War. Their relative successes and
failures remain the subject of ongoing study and debate.
• In 1998, Congress authorized the drawdown of Department of Defense goods and
services for Iraqi opposition groups, but did not authorize sustained or direct U.S.
training or the transfer of weaponry.6 A subsequent Department of Defense
training program for so-called Free Iraqi Forces in early 2003 trained a small
number of recruits to facilitate U.S. civil-military operations in Iraq.7
• The Sudan Peace Act (P.L. 107-245, October 21, 2002) authorized President
George W. Bush “to provide increased assistance to the areas of Sudan that are
not controlled by the Government of Sudan to prepare the population for peace
and democratic governance, including support for civil administration,
communications infrastructure, education, health, and agriculture.” In support of
these purposes, the act authorized to be appropriated $100 million in fiscal years
2003, 2004, and 2005 “to remain available until expended.” Some recipients of
U.S. assistance authorized by the act held both civilian and military leadership
positions in the South Sudanese opposition.
• The U.S. government has provided overt training and equipment to Palestinian
security forces for strictly defined purposes using foreign affairs authorities and
funds, but participants in those programs are members of official Palestinian
Authority security bodies rather than individuals unaffiliated or not currently
affiliated with official government institutions.8
• The Obama Administration notified Congress of a drawdown of up to $25
million in U.S. government goods and services for Libyan forces in 2011, but
Congress did not act to expressly authorize U.S. military engagement in a “train
and equip” program for Libyan opposition members.

(...continued)
2011.
5 See Raymond Copson and Robert Sutter, “Support for Third World Resistance Movements: Changing Priorities,” in
Congressional Research Service, Congress and Foreign Policy, 1990, p. 77-107.
6 The Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998) gave President Clinton the authority to provide up to $97
million worth of defense articles and services to designated Iraqi opposition groups. A designation procedure and
criteria for identifying eligible groups was also prescribed by the act in Section 5, stating that only those organizations
that (1) include a broad spectrum of Iraqi individuals, groups, or both, opposed to the Saddam Hussein regime; and (2)
are committed to democratic values, to respect for human rights, to peaceful relations with Iraq’s neighbors, to
maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, and to fostering cooperation among democratic opponents of the Saddam
Hussein regime” would be eligible for such assistance.
7 See Army Maj. Gen. David Barno, Briefing on Free Iraqi Forces, Department of Defense, March 14, 2003.
8 See CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti.
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Members of Congress may want to consider some of the policy questions that were debated
during consideration of these programs and efforts in any upcoming debate about the purposes,
scope, and duration of the new “train and equip” assistance program for vetted Syrians. In
particular, Members of Congress may wish to consider:9
• the net effects of the introduction of outside arms and training in previous cases
on the prospects for conflict settlement, the duration and intensity of violence,
U.S. national security goals, and humanitarian conditions;
• the potential tradeoffs and dilemmas associated with the pursuit of specific short-
term security or counterterrorism objectives alongside longer term political goals
and the promotion of human rights and democratic governance;
• the challenges U.S. policy makers have faced in ensuring the reliability and
integrity of recipients of U.S. assistance in past cases and the implications of
those challenges for efforts to design vetting and oversight measures;
• the contributions of past cases to debates about the roles and responsibilities of
the executive branch and Congress in defining the purposes, terms, scope, and
duration of U.S. security assistance abroad; and,
• the regional security and global strategic implications of the provision,
modulation, and termination of U.S. training and equipment in analogous cases.
Elements of the Debate
Does the President “need” authority from Congress to provide
“train and equip” assistance?
The “train and equip” authority granted in H.J.Res. 124 is set to expire by December 11, 2014, at
the latest. According to the Administration and the House Armed Services Committee, there are
no other existing legal authorities that would allow such overt “train and equip” assistance to be
provided to non-government actors in Syria in the current context.10 Therefore, in order to
continue any related programs beyond the expiration of the CR, Congress would have to extend
the authority or include an amended version of it in new legislation.

9 For a fuller discussion of similar thematic questions that can be applied to Syria and other cases where the United
States may seek to partner with non-state entities, see Larry Hanauer and Stephanie Pezard, Security Cooperation
Amidst Political Uncertainty: An Agenda for Future Research, RAND International Security and Defense Policy
Center, WR-1052-IRD, July 2014.
10 Prior to the passage of H.J.Res. 124, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel told the Senate Armed Services Committee
on September 16, 2014 that the Department of Defense did not have the authority to conduct a “train and equip”
mission for vetted Syrians. On September 15, Representative Mac Thornberry presented a statement from House
Armed Services Committee Chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon, the author of the McKeon Amendment, before the
House Rules Committee. Thornberry said that, according to McKeon, the provision of specific authority in response to
the President’s request was necessary, because “none of the existing Department of Defense authorities in law fit the
conditions requested by the President—to “train and equip” non-government entities fighting in non-U.S. led
operations.”
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Almost all existing Department of Defense authorities to provide overt security assistance to U.S.
partners abroad require that such assistance be provided on a government-to-government basis.
Exceptions include activities authorized by Section 1208 of the FY2005 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 108-375) as amended, which authorizes the provision of up to $50
million in U.S. assistance to “foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals” that assist or
facilitate U.S.-led counterterrorism-related special operations. An existing authority such as
Section 1208 would require U.S. leadership of operations and would not provide corresponding
funding authority sufficient to support the scope of activities envisioned under the
Administration’s request.
As discussed below, the Administration’s stated purposes for the requested authority extend
beyond strict counterterrorism purposes. Moreover, given the range of public views on the Syria
conflict, and the fact that the authority is without precedent in the Syria context and may have
profound implications for regional and global security, the executive branch may desire broad
congressional support for its plans.
With regard to the provision of nonlethal assistance, including to armed groups, the State
Department sought and obtained new authority notwithstanding other provisions of law
restricting the provision of U.S. assistance in Syria and to Syrians. Section 7041(i) of Division K
of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3547/P.L.113-76) significantly expanded
the Administration’s authority to provide nonlethal assistance in Syria for certain purposes using
the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account. Such assistance had been restricted by a series of
preexisting provisions of law (including some terrorism-related provisions) that required the
President to assert emergency and contingency authorities to provide such assistance to the Syrian
opposition and communities in Syria. It is unclear whether further authorization beyond that
enacted in H.J.Res.124 may be required for the purposes of the proposed “train and equip”
program for Syrians.
What are the differences between the enacted
authority, the President’s requests, and other
proposals?
The authority enacted in H.J.Res. 124, the President’s requests, and other proposals under
consideration in Congress would authorize and fund assistance to vetted Syrian opposition
elements and other vetted Syrians for different purposes and on different terms (see Table 1
below). The most substantive differences relate to:
• the scope of authorities granted/sought;
• the stated purposes of assistance;
• sunset provisions for the authority;
• limits on the availability or sources of funds to carry out any granted authorities;
• definitions of vetting requirements;
• required interagency processes;
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• terms related to authorization for the use of military force; and
• terms for the notification and reporting of oversight information to Congress.
Scope of Authority
The Administration requested authority from Congress in September 2014 “to provide assistance,
including the provision of defense articles and defense services, to, appropriately vetted elements
of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups or individuals.” H.J.Res.
124 authorizes the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, “to provide
assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment” to the same entities.
It is unclear whether the specific illustrative description in H.J.Res.124 of what U.S. assistance
may include was intended to be broader or more restrictive than the Administration’s request for
authority to provide assistance including “defense articles and services.” The latter is a term most
closely associated with existing U.S. law governing the sale of U.S.-origin weaponry and the
provision of security assistance abroad.11 The former could be construed to be a subset of the
latter, or vice versa, but H.J.Res.124 as enacted does not further define those terms.
The report (H.Rept.113-600) accompanying the resolution providing for consideration of
H.J.Res.124 refers in general terms to authorizing the executive branch to “train and equip
appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian
groups or individuals.” In a statement to the House Rules Committee on September 15,
Representative Mac Thornberry defined “sustainment” as potentially including ammunition and
tactical intelligence information for any trained forces. It is possible that sustainment could be
construed to include other types of assistance as well, such as the provision of food, water, and
logistical support.
In its budget justification for funds provided for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF),
“sustainment” is defined broadly to include not only individual equipment and logistical support
but also pay of military and civilian personnel:
“requirements to support the ANA, AAF, and SMW, by providing clothing, individual
equipment, medical supplies, replacement equipment, and operational sustainment services,
communications and intelligence as well as pay and incentive programs.”12
If this definition were adopted, “sustainment” could include the full array of support services
from food, water, and logistical support to personnel pay.
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel told the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 16,
2014, that the Administration seeks to provide a “package of assistance” that would “initially…
consist of small arms, vehicles, and basic equipment like communications, as well as tactical and
strategic training.” According to Secretary Hagel, “As these forces prove their effectiveness on
the battlefield, we would be prepared to provide increasingly sophisticated types of assistance to
the most trusted commanders and capable forces.”

11 See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, Sections 644(d) and 644(f); and, 22 U.S.C. 2403(d) and (f).
12 Department of Defense, “Justification for FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Afghanistan Security
Forces Fund (ASFF), June 2014, p. 6; http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/budgetmaterials/
fy15/ABE//asff.pdf.
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The SASC-reported version of the FY2015 defense authorization bill would authorize the
provision of “equipment, supplies, training, and defense services.”
An amendment adopted as part of the House-passed version of the FY2015 defense
appropriations bill (H.R.4870) would prohibit the use of funds made available in the act to
“transfer man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to any entity in Syria.”
Other proposals previously introduced and considered also sought to define the types of
assistance that could be provided and to place conditions or restrictions on the transfer of certain
weapons systems to Syrians (S.960, H.R. 1327).
Stated Purposes of U.S. Assistance
Programs designed for different purposes may present different potential risks and rewards. An
assistance program explicitly intended not only to defend Syrians from attack, but also to assist in
the stabilization of and provision of essential services in territory under opposition control may be
of much broader scope, cost, or duration than a program intended to defend Syrians from attack
by one specified group and/or secure territory under opposition control. Moreover, the scope of
opposition-held territory may conceivably expand or contract to include more or less of Syria
than at present, with follow-on effects for potential costs to the United States.
Following the enactment of the CR by Congress, some Syrian opposition forces and their U.S.
supporters have stated their preference for a broader scope of U.S. assistance and military
intervention. However, other Syrian groups may reject deeper U.S. involvement and prefer that
the United States focus any assistance on toppling the Asad government rather than pursuing
counterterrorism, security, stability, and/or quality of life concerns.
In light of these dynamics, Members of Congress may wish to consider whether to broaden or
further limit the purposes of U.S. assistance as stated in the current CR by modifying language
addressing the topics below.
Defending Syrian Civilians from Attacks
As noted above (see “Introduction”) the Administration’s September 2014 request for authority
envisioned a broader protection purpose for U.S. assistance relative to the CR. Specifically, the
Administration requested authority to provide assistance to vetted Syrians in order to defend
Syrian civilians against attacks by two potential adversaries—the Islamic State and the
government of Bashar al Asad, though without explicitly prioritizing assistance for protection
from one adversary vs. the other. President Obama and Administration officials have since
indicated that U.S. assistance will be provided in line with a so-called “ISIL-first strategy,” and
press reports citing unnamed U.S. officials indicate that defensive rather than offensive training
and equipment is to be provided under the program.13 H.J.Res.124 does not specify the kinds of
attacks that Syrians should be trained or equipped to defend against.

13 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Syrians to be trained to defend territory, not take ground from jihadists, officials say,”
Washington Post, October 22, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
10

Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

“Securing” vs. “Stabilizing” Opposition-held Territory and Facilitating the
Provision of Essential Services
As enacted, H.J.Res.124 states a more limited purpose for assistance with regard to opposition-
controlled territory than the Administration’s requests. Unlike the President’s proposal,
H.J.Res.124 does not authorize assistance to “stabilize” opposition-held territory or to facilitate
the provision of essential services. Instead it authorizes assistance for “securing territory
controlled by the opposition.” Both “stabilizing” territory and facilitating the provision of
services in opposition-held areas could be interpreted as longer-term, costlier, and more involved
commitments than “securing” territory.
Promoting the Conditions for a Negotiated Settlement to End the Conflict
in Syria
While both H.J.Res. 124 and the President’s proposal include the same goal of providing
assistance that will promote conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria,
neither defines those conditions. In broad terms, the Administration argues that pressure must be
brought to bear on the government of Bashar al Asad in order to convince its leaders to negotiate
a settlement to the conflict that would result in their departure from office. Administration
officials have not publicly described the precise nature of such intended pressure, the specific
terms of its application, or potential measures of its success in achieving its related strategic ends.
The Administration’s requests and H.J.Res.124 do not explicitly state that the departure of Bashar
al Asad or members of his government is an essential condition for a negotiated settlement.
Sunset Provisions
The authority granted in H.J.Res.124 will expire on December 11, 2014, or upon the enactment of
the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), whichever is earlier. The NDAA
would presumably include a “sunset” provision specifying whether the new authority would be
available for FY2015 or a longer period of time. In addition Congress also must determine the
amount and source of funding available for FY2015 (see “Implications of Different Funding
Sources ” below) in either another continuing resolution or enactment of a full-year FY2015
defense appropriations act. Providing a longer authorization could be interpreted as a signal of
stronger congressional support for the Administration’s plan to train vetted Syrians over a period
of multiple years.
The SAC-reported version of the FY2015 defense appropriations bill would provide “train and
equip” authority for vetted Syrians through the passage of FY2015 NDAA or September 30,
2015, whichever is earlier.
The Administration’s June 2014 request sought “train and equip” authority for vetted Syrians
through December 31, 2018. The SASC-reported version of the FY2015 NDAA would provide
such authority through that date.
Implications of Different Funding Sources and Directives
H.J.Res.124 does not place a dollar limit on the cost of the authorized program. Instead, it
authorizes the Department of Defense to submit reprogramming requests to the four
Congressional Research Service
11

Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

congressional defense committees to re-direct funds from any OCO-designated Department of
Defense accounts, including both Operation and Maintenance and Procurement accounts, to
support the “train and equip” program. To obtain funds, the Department of Defense must submit
reprogramming requests that in turn must be approved in writing by the four congressional
defense committees (Armed Services and Appropriations) under Department of Defense
regulations. Thus, H.J. Res. 124 provides the four congressional defense committees an
opportunity to approve or disapprove particular proposals.
Whether a separate source of funding is available for train and equip efforts or funds for the
program are drawn from within existing accounts may signal the level of congressional support
for the program and have implications for the Administration’s continued commitment to it. In its
initial request in June 2014, the Administration presented the Syria “train and equip” program as a
component of its broader request for $4 billion in OCO-designated Department of Defense
Operation and Maintenance funds for a new “Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund” category
within the Operation and maintenance (O&M), Defense-wide account. Unlike other O&M funds,
however, these funds would be available to be obligated for three years rather than one year. The
Administration’s budget justification material suggested that $500 million would be allocated for
an assistance program for vetted Syrians, for which specific authority was sought.
In its version of the FY2015 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 4870, reported in July 2014, the
Senate Appropriations Committee set a $500 million cap on the Syria-specific “train and equip”
program to be drawn from the OCO-designated “Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide”
account. Unlike the Administration’s original proposal, this funding structure could require the
Department of Defense to make trade-off decisions concerning the new train and equip program
relative to other priorities under that specific account.
The Administration’s September 2014 request for authority did not seek specific funding and did
not make reference to any specific spending limit, although Administration officials signaled that
$500 million remained its estimate for the initial cost of the program. It sought authority for the
Department of Defense to use any OCO-designated Operation and Maintenance funds for any of
the services or defense agencies made available by H.J.Res.124 or any other act enacted during
the period of the authority in order to implement the proposed program. This provision would
require trade-offs within existing resources but would permit DOD to draw on a larger pool of
funds for the program. The Administration’s request would not have required reprogramming
requests to congressional defense committees.
Definitions of Vetting Requirements
H.J.Res.124 defines “appropriately vetted” to mean that, “at a minimum” the executive branch
will conduct assessments of proposed recipients’ associations with: “terrorist groups, Shia militias
aligned with or supporting the Government of Syria, and groups associated with the Government
of Iran. Such groups include, but are not limited to, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL), Jabhat al Nusrah, Ahrar al Sham, and other al-Qaeda related groups, and Hezbollah.”
The Administration’s June and September 2014 requests envisioned vetting of Syrians, but did
not include definitions of vetting procedures or vetting criteria. Presumably, this would give the
Department of Defense additional leeway in selecting participants. As mentioned above, the
SASC- and SAC-reported versions of the FY2015 defense authorization and appropriations bills
include more expansive vetting criteria than H.J.Res. 124.
Congressional Research Service
12

Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

The SASC-reported NDAA would require vetting to preclude the involvement of U.S.-designated
terrorists and would authorize assistance to individuals who reject terrorism; support U.S.
counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts; oppose sectarian violence and revenge killings;
seek “a peaceful, pluralistic, and democratic Syria that respects the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of all its citizens”; and are committed to civilian rule, civilian control of the military,
and the rule of law.
Similarly, the SAC-reported defense appropriations bill would exclude designated terrorists and
require that vetting assess recipients’ commitment to the rule of law, opposition to sectarian
violence, and commitment to a peaceful and democratic Syria under civilian rule. The SAC-
reported bill also would require the Syria program’s compliance with Section 8056 of the bill,
which prohibits the provision of assistance to “members of a unit of a foreign security force if the
Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of
human rights.” The prohibition could be waived under “extraordinary” circumstances, but would
require detailed reporting to the congressional defense and appropriations committees.
The authority granted in H.J.Res. 124 does not include specific human rights vetting
requirements.
Required Interagency Process
In line with the Administration’s September 2014 request, H.J.Res.124 grants authority to the
Secretary of Defense to carry out authorized activities to provide assistance to vetted Syrians for
stated purposes.
Whereas H.J.Res.124 requires the Secretary of Defense to coordinate with the Secretary of State
in implementation and reporting to Congress, the Administration’s request would have required
the concurrence (i.e., approval) of the Secretary of State for the use of the proposed authority.
Coordination is presumably a less constraining direction than concurrence. In other more limited
train and equip authorities for government security forces, Congress has typically required
“concurrence” rather than “coordination” of programs. Nevertheless, in practice, the Secretary of
Defense might seek and obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State and other leading
officials prior to the initiation of the authorized program.
The SASC- and SAC-reported versions of the FY2015 defense authorization and appropriations
bills also would require the concurrence of the Secretary of State.
Advance Notification and Reporting of Oversight Information
to Congress
H.J.Res.124 requires more reporting to Congress both prior to the use of any “train and equip”
authority and once such authority is in use than other proposed versions. Specifically, in addition
to requiring a 15-day advance notice of the intended provision of authorized assistance,
H.J.Res.124 requires the submission of both an implementation plan and an overarching strategy
describing how the assistance program relates to other U.S. objectives and activities. The four
congressional defense committees also would receive reprogramming requests in advance that
would have to be approved according to DOD regulations.
Congressional Research Service
13

Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

H.J.Res.124 requires the Administration to report to Congress on procedures and criteria for
vetting at least 15 days prior to the first provision of authorized assistance. It further requires
reporting every 90 days on the progress of authorized assistance, to include any changes in
program operations (which presumably would include changes to vetting procedures) and any
misuse of U.S. assistance. Under H.J.Res.124, the House and Senate Committees on Armed
Services, Foreign Affairs/Relations, Intelligence, and Appropriations will receive the
implementation plan, presidential strategy, and progress reports.
The Administration’s September request would have required the Secretary of Defense to provide
the four congressional defense committees “15 days prior to initiating a program to transfer
defense articles or provide defense services” a report describing “the details and objectives of
such program, including the goals of the program, a concept of operations, the amount of
assistance to be provided, the cooperation of partner nations, the number of United States Armed
Forces personnel involved, and other relevant details.”
The SASC-reported FY2015 NDAA would require notice of assistance provided and foreign
contributions accepted after the fact to “appropriate committees of Congress,” defined as the
Armed Services, Appropriations, and Foreign Relations/Affairs Committees of the House and
Senate.
The SAC-reported version of the FY2015 defense appropriations bill would require the Secretary
of Defense to provide 15 days prior to initiating a program to transfer defense articles or provide
defense services a report to the congressional defense committees describing the details and
objectives of the program, including its goals, a concept of operations, the amount of assistance to
be provided, the cooperation of partner nations, the number of United States Armed Forces
personnel involved, and other relevant details.
Terms Related to Authorization for the Use of Military Force
For analysis of proposals related to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force relative to the
Islamic State, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
the Islamic State: Comparison of Current Proposals in Brief, by Matthew C. Weed.
Because the Obama Administration argues that it already has constitutional and statutory
authority for the use of force in Iraq and Syria (e.g., the President’s commander in chief and
foreign affairs powers under the Constitution, and the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for the Use
of Military Force against Al Qaeda and in Iraq, or AUMFs),14 as of October, it had not requested
additional authorization for the use of force in support of its plans to degrade and destroy the
Islamic State organization or other terrorist entities in those countries. Several Members of
Congress have introduced proposals to authorize the use of military force against the Islamic
State, and the Obama Administration has said it would welcome specific authorization from
Congress but believes that the President already has the authority he needs.
H.J.Res.124 states that nothing in its terms should be construed to constitute a statutory
authorization for the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into “hostilities” or circumstances that

14 See Letters from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate, War Powers Resolution Regarding Syria and Iraq, September 23, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
14

Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

could be considered “hostilities” as defined pursuant to the War Powers Resolution.15 A similar
formulation is included in the SAC-reported version of the FY2015 defense appropriations bill.
During the 2011 debate over the authorization of U.S. military operations in Libya, the Obama
Administration argued that U.S. military operations did not constitute “hostilities” for specific
reasons. Some Members of Congress disagreed with the Administration’s arguments.
The House-passed version of the FY2015 defense appropriations bill states “Nothing in this Act
shall be construed as authorizing the use of force against Syria or Iran.”
Related provisions in these bills and others are described in more detail in the table below.

15 See CRS Report R42699, The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Eight Years, by Richard F. Grimmett; and CRS
Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and
Legal Implications, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Matthew C. Weed.
Congressional Research Service
15

Table 1. Comparison of Select “Train and Equip” Proposals for Vetted Syrians
Senate
Appropriations
Senate Armed
Committee-
House-
Services
House-Passed
Reported FY2015
Passed
Committee-
FY2015
Defense
FY2015
Reported FY2015
Defense
Appropriations
Revised
NDAA (H.R.
NDAA (Section
Appropriation
FY2015 OCO
(Section 9015 of H.R.
Administration
H.J.Res. 124/ P.L.113-

4435)
1209 of S. 2410)
(H.R. 4870)
Request
4870)
Request for CR
164
Authority
None
Secretary of Defense
None “Notwithstanding
any
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of
Secretary of Defense
with concurrence of
other provision of
authorized, with
Defense authorized, authorized “in
Secretary of State
law,” Secretary of
concurrence of
with concurrence
coordination with the
authorized “to provide
Defense authorized,
Secretary of State, “to
of Secretary of
Secretary of State to
equipment, supplies,
with concurrence of
provide assistance,
State, “to provide
provide assistance,
training, and defense
Secretary of State,
including the provision
assistance, including
including training,
services to assist vetted
“to provide
of defense articles and
the provision of
equipment, supplies, and
elements of the Syrian
assistance, including
defense services, to
defense articles and
sustainment, to
opposition”
the provision of
appropriately vetted
defense services, to
appropriately vetted
defense articles and
elements of the Syrian
appropriately
elements of the Syrian
defense services, to
opposition and other
vetted elements of
opposition and other
appropriately vetted
appropriately vetted
the Syrian
appropriately vetted
elements of the
Syrian groups or
opposition and
Syrian groups and
Syrian opposition and
individuals”
other appropriately
individuals”
other appropriately
vetted Syrian
vetted Syrian groups
groups or
or individuals”
individuals”
Interagency
None
“The Secretary of
None. Authority
requires
Authority requires
Authority requires
Authority requires
Process
Defense shall obtain
“concurrence” of
“concurrence” of
“concurrence” of
“coordination with the
the concurrence of the
Secretary of State.
Secretary of State.
Secretary of State.
Secretary of State” in
Secretary of State
general terms and on
before providing
submission of required
assistance” pursuant to
assistance plan and
authority.
required progress
reports.
CRS-16

Senate
Appropriations
Senate Armed
Committee-
House-
Services
House-Passed
Reported FY2015
Passed
Committee-
FY2015
Defense
FY2015
Reported FY2015
Defense
Appropriations
Revised
NDAA (H.R.
NDAA (Section
Appropriation
FY2015 OCO
(Section 9015 of H.R.
Administration
H.J.Res. 124/ P.L.113-

4435)
1209 of S. 2410)
(H.R. 4870)
Request
4870)
Request for CR
164
Purpose
None
“(1) Defending the
None
“(1) Defending the
“(1) Defending the
“(1) Defending the
“(1) Defending the Syrian
Syrian people from
Syrian people from
Syrian people from
Syrian people from
people from attacks by
attacks by the Syrian
attacks by the Syrian
attacks by the Syrian
attacks by the
the Islamic State of Iraq
regime.
regime, facilitating the regime, facilitating the
Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL), and
provision of essential
provision of essential
and the Levant and
securing territory
(2) Protecting the
services, and
services, and stabilizing
the Syrian regime,
controlled by the
United States, its
stabilizing territory
territory control ed by
facilitating the
opposition;
friends and allies, and
controlled by the
the opposition;
provision of
the Syrian people from
opposition;
essential services,
(2) Protecting the United
the threats posed by
(2) Protecting the
and stabilizing
States, its friends and
terrorists in Syria.
(2) Defending the
United States, its friends territory control ed allies, and the Syrian
United States, its
and allies, and the Syrian
people from the threats
(3) Promoting the
by the opposition;
friends and allies, and
people from threats
posed by terrorists in
conditions for a
the Syrian people
posed by terrorists in
(2) Protecting the
Syria;
negotiated settlement
from the threats
Syria;
United States, its
to end the conflict in
posed by terrorists in
friends and allies,
(3) Promoting the
Syria.”
Syria; and
(3) Promoting the
and the Syrian
conditions for a
conditions for a
people from the
negotiated settlement to
(3) Promoting the
negotiated settlement
threats posed by
end the conflict in Syria.”
conditions for a
to end the conflict in
terrorists in Syria;
negotiated settlement Syria.”
to end the conflict in
(3) Promoting the
Syria.”
conditions for a
negotiated
settlement to end
the conflict in Syria”
CRS-17

Senate
Appropriations
Senate Armed
Committee-
House-
Services
House-Passed
Reported FY2015
Passed
Committee-
FY2015
Defense
FY2015
Reported FY2015
Defense
Appropriations
Revised
NDAA (H.R.
NDAA (Section
Appropriation
FY2015 OCO
(Section 9015 of H.R.
Administration
H.J.Res. 124/ P.L.113-

4435)
1209 of S. 2410)
(H.R. 4870)
Request
4870)
Request for CR
164
Vetting
None Defines
vetted None None
“the
term
None
“the term ‘appropriately
Definitions
elements as “units of
`appropriately vetted’ as
vetted’ means, with
the Free Syrian Army
used in this section shall
respect to elements of
and the Supreme
be construed to mean,
the Syrian opposition and
Military Council, and
at a minimum,
other Syrian groups and
other Syrian forces,
assessments of possible
individuals, at a minimum,
groups, or individuals
recipients for
assessments of such
opposed to the Syrian
associations with
elements, groups, and
regime” determined by
terrorist groups,
individuals for
the USG not to be U.S.
commitment to the rule
associations with terrorist
designated terrorists;
of law, opposition to
groups, Shia militias
and who reject
sectarian violence,
aligned with or supporting
terrorism, support
commitment to a
the Government of Syria,
counterterrorism and
peaceful and democratic
and groups associated
nonproliferation
Syria under civilian rule,
with the Government of
efforts; oppose
and compliance with
Iran, Such groups include,
sectarian violence and
section 8056 of this
but are not limited to, the
revenge killings; seek “a
Act.”
Islamic State of Iraq and
peaceful, pluralistic, and
the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat al
democratic Syria that
Nusrah, Ahrar al Sham,
respects the human
and other al-Qaeda
rights and fundamental
related groups, and
freedoms of all its
Hezbollah.”
citizens,” and are
committed to civilian
rule, civilian control of
the military, and the
rule of law.
CRS-18

Senate
Appropriations
Senate Armed
Committee-
House-
Services
House-Passed
Reported FY2015
Passed
Committee-
FY2015
Defense
FY2015
Reported FY2015
Defense
Appropriations
Revised
NDAA (H.R.
NDAA (Section
Appropriation
FY2015 OCO
(Section 9015 of H.R.
Administration
H.J.Res. 124/ P.L.113-

4435)
1209 of S. 2410)
(H.R. 4870)
Request
4870)
Request for CR
164
Conditions on
None None
Section
10010.
None
None
None
Requires reporting 15
Eligible
None of the
days prior to transfer on
Defense
funds made
plans for end-use
Articles or
available by this
monitoring and, inter alia,
Services
Act may be
details on intended “types
obligated or
of training, equipment,
expended to
and supplies to be
transfer man-
provided”
portable air
defense systems
(MANPADS) to
any entity in
Syria.
Sunset
None
December 31, 2018
None
December 31, 2018
The earlier of passage
The earlier of
The earlier of CR end
Provisions
of FY2015 NDAA or
passage of FY2015
date or passage of FY2015
September 30, 2015
NDAA or
NDAA.
September 30,
2015.
Funding
NA NA
None OCO-designated
OCO-designated
Any OCO-
Authorizes
Source
‘Operation and
`Operation and
designated
reprogramming of any
Maintenance,
Maintenance, Defense-
Department of
OCO-designated
Counterterrorism
wide’ Account
Defense Operation
Department of Defense
Partnerships Fund’
and Maintenance
funds made available
proposed account
funds made
pursuant to H.J.Res.124
available by
H.J.Res.124 or any
other act.
Availability of
NA
NA
None
Three-year Funding
One-year Funding
One-year Funding
Varies by Source Account
Funds
CRS-19

Senate
Appropriations
Senate Armed
Committee-
House-
Services
House-Passed
Reported FY2015
Passed
Committee-
FY2015
Defense
FY2015
Reported FY2015
Defense
Appropriations
Revised
NDAA (H.R.
NDAA (Section
Appropriation
FY2015 OCO
(Section 9015 of H.R.
Administration
H.J.Res. 124/ P.L.113-

4435)
1209 of S. 2410)
(H.R. 4870)
Request
4870)
Request for CR
164
Spending
None None
None None.

$500 million cap, drawn
None Depends
on
Amount Limit
from within OCO-
reprogrammings
Notional $500 million designated `Operation
approved by four
figure in text
and Maintenance,
congressional defense
accompanying
Defense-wide’ Account
committees.
Counterterrorism
Partnerships
Fund/Syria Regional
Stabilization Initiative
request.
Foreign
None Authorizes
acceptance
None Authorizes Authorizes acceptance
Authorizes
Authorizes acceptance
Contributions
of contributions from
acceptance of
of contributions,
acceptance of
and retention of
and provision of
contributions from
including in-kind
contributions,
contributions, including
assistance to foreign
and provision of
assistance, from foreign
including in-kind
in-kind assistance, from
governments.
assistance to foreign
governments.
assistance, from
foreign governments.
governments.
foreign
Foreign contributions
Requires notification of
governments.
Requires notification of
may be used “until
Foreign contributions
congressional defense
congressional defense
expended.”
may be used “until
committees prior to
Requires
committees prior to
expended.”
obligation of foreign
notification of
obligation of foreign
contributions.
congressional
contributions.
defense committees
prior to obligation
Requires contributions to
of foreign
be OCO-designated
contributions.

BCA
None None
None Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Exemption
CRS-20

Senate
Appropriations
Senate Armed
Committee-
House-
Services
House-Passed
Reported FY2015
Passed
Committee-
FY2015
Defense
FY2015
Reported FY2015
Defense
Appropriations
Revised
NDAA (H.R.
NDAA (Section
Appropriation
FY2015 OCO
(Section 9015 of H.R.
Administration
H.J.Res. 124/ P.L.113-

4435)
1209 of S. 2410)
(H.R. 4870)
Request
4870)
Request for CR
164
Notification
None
Requires notice of
None
None
15 days prior to
15 days prior to
15 days prior to providing
Requirements
assistance provided and
initiating a program to
initiating a program
authorized assistance “to
foreign contributions
transfer defense articles
to transfer defense
vetted recipients for the
accepted to
or provide defense
articles or provide
first time” the Secretary
“appropriate
services as authorized
defense services as
of Defense “in
committees of
by this section, the
authorized by this
coordination with the
Congress” defined as
Secretary of Defense
section, the
Secretary of State” shall
Armed Services,
shall provide the
Secretary of
submit a report describing
Appropriations, and
congressional defense
Defense shall
the assistance plan,
Foreign
committees with a
provide the
vetting requirements and
Relations/Affairs
report describing the
congressional
procedures; and end-use
Committees.
details and objectives of
defense committees monitoring plans.
such program, including
with a report
the goals of the
describing the
Requires the President to
program, a concept of
details and
submit a report to
operations, the amount
objectives of such
appropriate congressional
of assistance to be
program, including
committees and House
provided, the
the goals of the
and Senate leadership on
cooperation of partner
program, a concept
“how such assistance fits
nations, the number of
of operations, the
within a larger regional
United States Armed
amount of
strategy,” to include
Forces personnel
assistance to be
reporting on goals and
involved, and other
provided, the
objectives, concept of
relevant details.
cooperation of
operations, roles and
partner nations, the
contributions of partners,
number of United
and the number of U.S.
States Armed
Armed Forces personnel
Forces personnel
deployed.
involved, and other
relevant details.
CRS-22

Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

Author Contact Information

Christopher M. Blanchard
Amy Belasco
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
abelasco@crs.loc.gov, 7-7627

Congressional Research Service
24