CRS Insights
U.S. Citizens Kidnapped by the Islamic State
John W. Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security (jrollins@crs.loc.gov, 7-5529)
Liana Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics (lrosen@crs.loc.gov, 7-6177)
October 17, 2014 (IN10167)
Overview
On October 3, 2014, the terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, or alternatively, Islamic State
in Iraq and the Levant, ISIL, or Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS) threatened to kill a third U.S.
citizen whom it had kidnapped, Abdul-Rahman Kassig (previously Peter Kassig). While releasing some
Western hostages for ransom, the Islamic State has beheaded others, including two U.S. citizens,
James Foley and Steven Sotloff, and two British citizens, David Haines and Alan Henning. The group
posted videos of the murders online, generating debate about the U.S. government's role and
capabilities for freeing hostages.
In light of these beheadings, some policy makers have called for a reevaluation of U.S. policy on
international kidnapping responses. Questions include whether it is effective and properly coordinated
and implemented, should be abandoned or modified to allow for exceptions and flexibility, or could
benefit from enhancements to improve global adherence.
Scope
The beheadings appear to be driven by a variety of underlying motives. Reports describe the group as
inclined toward graphic and public forms of violence for purposes of intimidation, recruiting, and
fundraising. Reports also suggest that the Islamic State may kill some hostages when it fails to obtain
ransom payments. Foley's family, for example, disclosed that the Islamic State demanded a ransom of
100 million euros ($132 million). For its part, the Islamic State claims to have carried out the
beheadings in retaliation against U.S. military intervention in the region.
The Islamic State may be inspiring others to conduct kidnappings and beheadings. In September, a
French citizen, Herve Gourdel, was kidnapped and murdered by a group in Algeria that has claimed IS
allegiance. Two Germans are being held for ransom in the Philippines by another group that supports
the Islamic State. Some policy makers are concerned that individuals in the United States may also be
inspired by the Islamic State's tactics. Meanwhile, Nusra Front, Al Qaeda's Syria-based affiliate, released
U.S. citizen Peter Curtis (reportedly without payment of a ransom).
It is likely that more U.S. citizens are being held hostage by terrorist groups in the region, including
Austin Tice, who has been missing in Syria since 2012. The State Department has identified at least 72
U.S. citizens kidnapped by international terrorists between 2005 and 2013; actual numbers may be
higher.
In congressional testimony in September, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey stated
that:
We are deeply concerned about the safety and security of American citizens worldwide, and ISIL and
other foreign terrorist organizations may continue to try to capture American hostages in an attempt to
force the U.S. government and people into making concessions that would only strengthen ISIL and
further its terrorist operations.
U.S. Policy and Questions for Congress
A central issue to U.S. responses to the recent IS kidnappings involving U.S. citizens is the "no
concessions" policy. According to this policy, the U.S. government will seek the safe return of its

citizens, but rules out any "acts of concession" to kidnappers, including the "benefits of ransom,
prisoner releases, [or] policy changes." Moreover, ransom payments to terrorists could be a violation of
U.S. criminal law, and, in some cases, a violation of U.S. and U.N. counterterrorism sanctions.
In March 2014, Under Secretary of the Treasury David Cohen reiterated the U.S. government's
justification for its "no concessions" policy:
Refusing to pay ransoms or to accede to other terrorist demands is the surest way to convince
potential hostage-takers that they will not be rewarded for their crime.... Although this may appear to
be cold-hearted and is often agonizingly difficult to sustain in practice, plain logic and long experience
demonstrate that this policy has led to fewer Americans being taken hostage....
Earlier, in a 2012 discussion of international kidnapping for ransom, Cohen described several alternative
responses to terrorist hostage situations, including conducting rescue operations and applying targeted
financial sanctions against kidnappers. The Obama Administration acknowledged that the U.S. military
attempted in July to rescue Foley and others held captive by the Islamic State. In September, the
Treasury Department designated for financial sanction two IS members, one of whom reportedly
oversaw an IS prison facility where foreign hostages may have been held.
At the international level, some observers describe a lack of coherence and consistency in handling
hostage cases. Although the United Kingdom adheres to a "no concessions" policy, reports suggest that
several other European governments have paid large ransoms to terrorist groups, including IS and Al
Qaeda affiliates. While defending the "no concessions" policy, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel also
acknowledged in congressional testimony that there remains room for improvement in U.S. responses
to kidnappings: "I think we could and should maybe revisit ... some of these practices," he said.
In Congress, questions about U.S. policy on kidnapping have arisen during recent hearings focused on
the Islamic State. Moreover, there is a long history of legislative debate on kidnapping policy and
existing statutes on kidnapping and terrorist financing (e.g., 18 U.S.C. Ch. 55, 18 U.S.C. 2339A-C, and
22 U.S.C. 2656f). As policy makers continue to consider these issues, key questions include:
To what extent is the U.S. government responsible for the safe return of U.S. citizens held
hostage by the Islamic State? Are U.S. government agencies sufficiently coordinated to address
international kidnapping events?
Has the "no concessions" policy been successful in deterring the Islamic State from targeting and
seizing U.S. citizens as hostages? Are there circumstances in which exceptions to the "no
concessions" policy may be warranted?
To what extent are ransom payments a primary source of IS financing? What are the challenges
associated with U.S. government efforts to track, block, and ultimately confiscate or retrieve
ransom payments?
To what extent are other nations' practices consistent with the U.S. "no concessions" policy?
What options do U.S. policy makers have to deter foreign governments from financing terrorist
groups, including the Islamic State, through the payment of ransom demands?