WTO Doha Round: Implications for U.S.
Agriculture
Randy Schnepf
Specialist in Agricultural Policy
October 10, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22927
WTO Doha Round: Implications for U.S. Agriculture
Summary
The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, launched in November 2001, has been at an
impasse since 2009 and presently shows no signs of restarting, despite an interim agreement
reached at the December 2013 Bali Ministerial.
The goal of the Doha Round’s agriculture negotiations is to make progress simultaneously across
the three pillars of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) 1994 Agricultural Agreement—
domestic support, market access, and export competition—by building on the specific terms and
conditions established during the previous Uruguay Round of negotiations. Negotiators have
attempted to maintain a balance across the three pillars by simultaneously achieving concessions
from exporters and importers alike in the form of tighter spending limits on trade-distorting
domestic support; elimination of export subsidies and new disciplines on other forms of export
competition; and expansion of market access by lowering tariffs, increasing quota commitments,
and limiting the use of import safeguards and other trade barriers. However, as a concession to
poorer WTO member countries, the degree of new conditions is to be less stringent for
developing than for developed nations.
Substantial progress had been made by 2008 in narrowing differences in Doha Round negotiating
positions. As a result, a “modalities framework” (i.e., specific formulas and timetables for
reducing trade-distorting farm support, tariffs, and export subsidies, and for opening import
markets) was released in December 2008, in an attempt to lock in the status of negotiated
concessions, while adding detail to outstanding issues as a basis for further, more specific talks.
By 2009, outstanding differences had been reduced to a short list of contentious issues, including
designating additional products as sensitive coupled with establishing new tariff quotas,
designating developing country products as special and thus exempt from tariff reductions, and
allowing developing countries to raise tariffs temporarily to deal with import surges or price
declines. However, these differences proved sufficient to deadlock the negotiations.
From the U.S. perspective, a successful Doha agreement (under the current negotiating text)
would significantly lower allowable spending limits for certain types of U.S. domestic support
and eliminate export subsidies, while allowing U.S. agricultural products wider access to foreign
markets. Any assessment of the potential effect of the new domestic support programs authorized
by the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) is very preliminary at this time. Many of the new programs
have yet to be fully implemented; thus producer participation is uncertain and program outlays
hinge on future market conditions. For example, under a relatively high price environment, as
existed during the 2010-2013 period, U.S. program outlays could easily fall within proposed
Doha Round limits with no or only modest changes. However, if market prices were to decline
substantially below support levels for an extended period, then outlays could escalate rapidly and
threaten to exceed the proposed spending limits.
A concern of U.S. trade negotiators, Congress, and commodity groups is whether the draft
modalities include too many exceptions for foreign importers (in terms of their ability to restrict
imports) to ensure that an adequate balance will be achieved between U.S. domestic policy
concessions and potential U.S. export gains. This report reviews the current status of agricultural
negotiations and the modalities framework for domestic support, market access, and export
subsidies, as well as the potential implications of a Doha Round agreement for U.S. agriculture.
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WTO Doha Round: Implications for U.S. Agriculture
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Domestic Support ............................................................................................................................ 2
Tighter Spending Limits in Aggregate, and for Specific Products ............................................ 2
U.S., Japan, and EU Agree on Tighter AMS Bounds .......................................................... 3
Proposed OTDS and Total Amber Box Limits .................................................................... 4
Proposed Product-Specific Amber Box Limits ................................................................... 5
Proposed De Minimis Exclusion Limits .............................................................................. 5
Proposed Blue Box Limits .................................................................................................. 6
Green Box Outlays Remain Unbound ................................................................................. 6
U.S. Domestic Support for Cotton Subject to Extra Scrutiny ................................................... 6
Market Access .................................................................................................................................. 7
Formula Tariff Cuts ................................................................................................................... 7
Deviations from Formula Cuts .................................................................................................. 8
Sensitive Products ............................................................................................................... 8
Special Products .................................................................................................................. 8
Safeguards ................................................................................................................................. 8
Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG) ................................................................................. 9
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) ................................................................................. 9
Implications for the United States ............................................................................................. 9
Export Competition ....................................................................................................................... 10
Export Subsidies ...................................................................................................................... 10
Export Financing ..................................................................................................................... 10
International Food Aid ............................................................................................................. 10
Implications for the United States ........................................................................................... 10
Status of the Doha Round Negotiations ......................................................................................... 11
Negotiations Reach an Impasse in 2009 .................................................................................. 12
The 2013 Bali Agreement ........................................................................................................ 12
The Role of Congress .................................................................................................................... 13
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Domestic Support: Average Annual Outlays Compared with WTO
Commitments—Current and Proposed ......................................................................................... 3
Table 2. Proposed Doha Round Tiered Formula Tariff Cuts ............................................................ 7
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 13
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WTO Doha Round: Implications for U.S. Agriculture
Introduction
As part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations that successfully culminated in
the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, WTO members agreed to
initiate new negotiations for continuing the agricultural trade reform process before the end of the
implementation period (i.e., by the end of 1999).1 At a November 2001 Ministerial Conference in
Doha, Qatar, the new round of multilateral negotiations—referred to as the Doha Development
Agenda (DDA) or simply the Doha Round—was initiated.2 The Doha Round’s work program
covers 20 areas of trade, which can be summarized into four broad categories of trade reform:
agriculture, non-agriculture market access (NAMA), rules, and services.3 By early 2008,
substantial progress had been made in the Doha Round negotiations in narrowing or resolving
differences in negotiating positions. However, talks have been deadlocked (and moribund) since
2009, when a WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva failed to resolve differences.
An important goal of the Doha Round negotiations is to liberalize trade in goods and services,
including agricultural products. With respect to agriculture, new disciplines are being negotiated
in three broad areas—domestic agricultural support programs, export competition, and market
access—referred to as the three pillars of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, negotiated in 1994.
The Doha Round negotiations have attempted to maintain a balance across the three pillars by
simultaneously achieving concessions from exporters and importers alike in the form of tighter
spending limits on trade-distorting domestic support; elimination of export subsidies and new
disciplines on other forms of export competition; and expansion of market access by lowering
tariffs, increasing quota commitments, and limiting the use of import safeguards and other trade
barriers.
The concessions already tabled as part of ongoing Doha Round negotiations are substantial and
would likely have important implications for U.S. farm policy—they would significantly lower
allowable spending limits for certain types of U.S. domestic support and eliminate export
subsidies, while allowing U.S. agricultural products wider access to foreign markets.
This report focuses on the current set of Doha Round proposals—referred to as the draft
“modalities” (i.e., specific formulas and timetables for reducing trade-distorting farm support,
tariffs, and export subsidies, and for opening import markets)—that relate to agriculture. The
draft modalities represent the general terms of agreement that would likely be part of a final
agreement if such a resolution were to occur. This report briefly considers what they might mean
for U.S. domestic support programs in terms of compliance with proposed spending limits.4 The
final section of this report briefly summarizes the status of Doha Round negotiations and
activities in 2014.
1 These talks began in early 2000 under the original mandate of Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture; for more
information see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negoti_e.htm.
2 WTO, The Doha Round, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm.
3 See CRS Report RL32060, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda.
4 “Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture,” TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, Committee on Agriculture, WTO, December 6, 2008.
For a lay overview of the modalities, see “Unofficial Guide to the Revised Draft Modalities—Agriculture,” Information
and Media Relations Division, WTO, corrected December 9, 2008.
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Domestic Support
The WTO categorizes domestic support programs by the degree to which they distort price
formation in agricultural markets. A traffic light analogy is used to identify different limits and
restrictions for the various program categories based on the severity of distortion.5 In particular,
WTO member countries have agreed to specific spending limits on the most highly market-
distorting domestic programs—such programs are counted under the aggregate measure of
support (AMS) and placed in the amber box. Member countries are allowed the ability to
intervene in national agricultural policy by shifting their support to certain categories that are
exempt from restrictions such as the green box. In addition, certain market-distorting programs
are exempted from spending disciplines under special circumstances—the blue box contains
market-distorting but production-limiting programs, while the de minimis exclusions (one at the
individual product level, the other at the aggregate level) comprise market-distorting policies that
are deemed benign because spending outlays are small relative to a country’s overall agricultural
sector.
In general, WTO trade negotiations have emphasized tightening spending limits on the most
highly market-distorting domestic programs, while capping and reducing spending under the blue
box and de minimis exclusions. Green box spending is presently unlimited and would remain so
under the current negotiation proposals contained in the draft modalities.
Tighter Spending Limits in Aggregate, and for Specific Products
The current draft modalities propose cutting trade distorting domestic support simultaneously
across three levels (see Table 1 for details).
• First, spending limits for each category—amber box, blue box, and the two de
minimis exclusions—would be reduced substantially.
• Second, within each of these categories additional constraints would apply to
support for any individual product (i.e., product-specific limits).
• Third, a global spending limit—referred to as the overall trade-distorting
domestic support (OTDS)—encompassing the four categories of amber box, blue
box, and the two de minimis exclusions would be established at a level
substantially smaller than the sum of their limits.
• In addition, the qualifications needed for exemption status in the green box have
been tightened.
Under a successful Doha Round agreement, the United States would have to address any
inconsistencies between its WTO commitments and current U.S. farm policy authorized by the
2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79).
5 For more information on the AMS and AMS-exempt programs see CRS Report RL32916, Agriculture in the WTO:
Policy Commitments Made Under the Agreement on Agriculture.
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Table 1. U.S. Domestic Support: Average Annual Outlays Compared with WTO
Commitments—Current and Proposed
Avg. Annual Outlaysa
Current
WTO
Doha Round Proposed
($US Billions)
Annual Limits
Annual Limitsb
1995-
2006-
2009-
$US
$US
Category
2005
2008
2011
Status
billion
Status
billion
Overall Trade-
Unbound
Distorting Support
(due to
(OTDS) $16.1
$11.8
$11.6
blue box)
$48.2c
Bound (cut of 70%)
$14.5
Amber box
U.S.
total
(bound total AMS)
$10.7
$6.8
$4.3
AMS limitd $19.1 Bound (cut of 60%)
$7.6
No
per-
Amber box (bound
product
Capped: avg. support
per-product AMS)
Varies
Varies
Varies
limit —
of 1995-2000
Variese
Blue box (total)
$0.6
$0.0
$0.0
Unbound
—
Bound: 2.5% of TVPf $4.9
Blue box
Bound: 110% or
(product specific)
—
—
—
None —
120% of 2002-07 avg.
—
De Minimis: non-
Bound:
5%
product specific
$4.4
$4.9
$6.9
of TVP
$9.7
Bound: 2.5% of TVPe $4.9
De Minimis:
Bound:
5%
product specific
$0.3
$0.4
$0.4
of SCVP
Varies
Bound: 2.5% of TVPe $4.9
Unbound
but
tighter
Green Box
$55.6
$79.5 $116.3
Unbound — qualifying criteria
—
Source: “Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture,” TN/AG/W/4/ Rev.4, WTO, Dec. 6, 2008. U.S. outlays are
from official U.S. notifications of domestic support outlays as submitted to the WTO.
Definitions:
AMS—aggregate measure of (trade-distorting domestic) support defined in Agreement on Agriculture.
OTDS—overal trade-distorting domestic support = amber box + blue box + de minimis exclusions.
SCVP—total value of agricultural production for a specific commodity.
TVP—total value of agricultural production for all commodities.
a. Data are assembled by CRS from official U.S. notifications of domestic support.
b. These figures are specific to the United States. The level and timing of proposed reductions in domestic
support commitments vary across both category and WTO member status (e.g., developed versus
developing country). See source for more information.
c. Assumes a value of $9.7 billion each for the two de minimus exemptions and the blue box, plus the $19.1
billion amber box limit.
d. Each country has a separate Bound identified in its country schedule.
e. Per-product outlays and bounds vary by product, but sum to TVP. U.S. calculations apply the proportionate
average product-specific AMS from the 1995-2004 period to the total AMS for 1995-2000.
f.
Based on the average annual TVP for the 1995-2000 period or $194.1 billion; (2.5% of TVP = $4.85 billion).
U.S., Japan, and EU Agree on Tighter AMS Bounds
The United States, European Union (EU) and Japan have accounted for 85% of global domestic
support outlays during the 1995-2010 period, according to WTO notifications data. To achieve
any agreement imposing new domestic support limits, it is imperative that these three nations be
in agreement. As a result, much of the early discussion on overall trade-distorting support
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(OTDS) and amber box limits involved finding a mutual balance in reduction commitments for
these three nations.
As part of the July 2008 negotiations, the United States accepted a proposed reduction in its
annual OTDS to $14.5 billion—compared with the current bound of $48.2 billion and conditional
upon other countries expanding their offers of market access for U.S. farm exports. The U.S.
OTDS limit of $14.5 billion is substantially lower than the sum of $22.3 billion for the proposed
limits for U.S. amber box of $7.6 billion, blue box of $4.9 billion, and the two de minimis
exclusions (product- and non-product) of $4.9 billion each. Thus, while U.S. program outlays
under any one of these latter categories may achieve its specific box limit, the cumulative total
(i.e., the OTDS) must be well below the sum of their separate totals. In other words, the OTDS
limit represents a serious constraint (as intended) on potential domestic support spending. The EU
and Japan accepted similar conditions.6
As with the OTDS limits, the $7.6 billion limit for U.S. amber box total annual outlays was
mutually negotiated by the United States and represents a 60% reduction from the current $19.1
billion ceiling. The EU and Japan accepted comparable reductions in their amber box spending.7
The spending limits for the blue box and de minimis exclusions for all developed countries would
be halved—that is, lowered from 5% of the value of agricultural production to a 2.5% share. In
addition, the data years used in the calculation would be frozen to the average value of production
for the 1995-2000 period, thus producing a blue box limit of $4.85 billion for the United States.
Similarly, the proposed limit on the commodity-specific de minimis exclusion would be based on
2.5% of the product-specific value of production for the 1995-2000 period, but using the
proportionate average product-specific AMS from the 1995-2004 period.8
Proposed OTDS and Total Amber Box Limits
Based on the historical period averages presented in the three columns of Table 1 under the Sub-
title “Average Outlays”—1995-2005, 2006-2008, and 2009-2011—it appears that recent U.S.
program outlays would have complied with the proposed limits for both OTDS ($11.6 billion
average annual OTDS during 2009-2011 versus a proposed $14.5 billion limit) and the overall
amber box limit ($4.3 billion versus $7.6 billion). However, the most recent U.S. notifications are
for the year 2011, which still represents 2008 farm bill programs, many of which were repealed
by the 2014 farm bill. Many of the new programs authorized by the 2014 farm bill have yet to be
fully implemented and participation levels are uncertain.9 In addition, the potential degree of
changes to U.S. farm policy needed to comply with a Doha Round agreement under the terms
described in Table 1 would likely hinge on market conditions.
6 The proposal represents a 70% reduction in the potential OTDS (i.e., the sum of amber and blue boxes and the two de
minimis exclusions) for the United States. Both the EU and Japan agreed to slightly larger reductions in their OTDS
limit—the EU accepted a proposed 80% reduction from 110.3 billion euros to 22.06 billion; while Japan’s potential
OTDS would be reduced by 75%.
7 The EU would accept a 70% reduction in its amber box limit (from 67.16 billion euros to 20.1 billion), while Japan
accepted a proposed 60% cut from its current 3,972.9 billion yen limit.
8 For details on U.S. product-specific blue box limits, see Annex A of the “Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture,”
TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, WTO, December 6, 2008.
9 CRS Report R43448, Farm Commodity Provisions in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79) and CRS Report R43494,
Crop Insurance Provisions in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79).
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Under a relatively high price environment as existed during the 2010-2013 period, U.S. program
outlays could easily fall within the proposed limits with no or only modest changes. However, if
market prices were to decline substantially below support levels for an extended period, then
program outlays could escalate rapidly and threaten to exceed spending limits for the OTDS,
amber box, and de minimis exclusions.10 Some policy analysts also have expressed concern that
price guarantees set by statute under the new Price Loss Coverage (PLC) program and used as
minimums in the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) program could lead to larger-than-expected
outlays if market prices were to weaken substantially in the future.11 For example, based on
market conditions as of May 2014, USDA estimates combined PLC and ARC outlays at $10.1
billion in crop year 2015 and $10.9 billion in 2016, compared with the proposed lower U.S.
amber box ceiling of $7.6 billion.12
The repeal of the dairy product price support program by the 2014 farm bill freed up substantial
space for new program spending under both the current and proposed limits, and should make it
easier to comply with a smaller amber box ceiling. During the 2009-2011 period, the dairy
product price support program accounted for $2.8 billion of the $4.3 billion in annual U.S.
product-specific amber box notifications. In contrast, the U.S. sugar price support program was
left unchanged by the 2014 farm bill and continues to account for $1.3 billion in annual amber
box outlays.
Proposed Product-Specific Amber Box Limits
The proposed product-specific amber box limits could result in some unanticipated difficulties for
certain crops under certain situations—particularly when a large harvest combines with low
prices to generate large combined payments under marketing loan benefits and income support
programs.
Proposed De Minimis Exclusion Limits
As seen from the historical data for 2009-2011 in Table 1, non-commodity-specific de minimis
outlays of $6.9 billion would be well in excess of the proposed lower limit of $4.85 billion under
the Doha draft modalities. This category of U.S. program outlays has seen considerable growth in
recent years, driven largely by growth in U.S. crop insurance premium subsidies, which
accounted for $5.9 billion of the $6.9 billion in non-commodity-specific de minimis outlays
during 2009-2011. The 2014 farm bill further expands federal support for crop insurance
programs—CBO estimates that total premium subsidies will increase as a result. Crop insurance
premium are a function of both risk and crop value; in other words, both premiums and premium
subsidies will fluctuate with participation and with market conditions.
10 As implied by prices projected by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), September 2014 U.S.
Crop Price Update, FAPRI-MU Report #05-14, September 2014.
11 For example, see V. H. Smith, The 2014 Agricultural Act: U.S. Farm Policy in the Context of the 1994 Marrakesh
Agreement and the Doha Round, Issue Paper No. 52, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development
(ICTSD), Geneva, Switzerland, June 2014; or Carl Zulauf, “Market Distortion and Farm Program Design: A Case
Examination of the Proposed Farm Price Support Programs,” farmdoc daily, June 7, 2013.
12 “Final Rule: Agriculture Risk Coverage and Price Loss Coverage Programs,” Federal Register, vol. 79, no. 187,
September 26, 2014.
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Proposed Blue Box Limits
Under the draft modalities, blue box criteria would be expanded to include payments that do not
require any production, but are based on a fixed amount of historical production—for example,
U.S. counter-cyclical payments (CCP) of the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246) that were previously
categorized as amber box would have potentially fit under this definition.13 USDA could
potentially notify both ARC and PLC of the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) as blue box programs,
although their projected outlays (cited above) might make it a tight, if not impossible fit under a
low-price scenario.
Under PLC, a producer receives a payment on 85% of base acres when the annual national
average farm price is below the statutorily set reference price for a program crop. The payment is
proportional to a farm’s historical base acres and yield, and the difference between the reference
price and the annual farm price. Similarly, under the county-level agricultural risk coverage
program (ARC-CO), a producer does not have to actually plant the crop to receive a payment—
all program payments are triggered at the county level, not the farm, and any payments are made
on 85% of historical base acres, not actual planted acres.14 Hence payments under both PLC and
ARC-CO are generally decoupled from planted acreage and actual yield but not price.15 However,
it remains to be seen how such program payments will be notified by the United States.
Green Box Outlays Remain Unbound
U.S. green box notifications have seen substantial growth over the years—from $46 billion in
1995 to $125 billion in 2011. However, there are no current or proposed limits on green box
outlays.
U.S. Domestic Support for Cotton Subject to Extra Scrutiny
A noteworthy change that could have potential implications for U.S. farm policy is that trade-
distorting domestic support for cotton would be subject to greater cuts (82%) than for the rest of
the agricultural sector (60%) under the proposed Doha modalities—largely due to the heightened
visibility associated with the WTO cotton dispute settlement case.16 CRS estimates that the
resultant product-specific amber box limit for upland cotton would be approximately $200
million per year under the more severe reduction of 82%.17
The 2014 farm bill eliminated the previous income support programs (DP and CCP) for cotton,
while retaining the marketing loan program that triggers payments when market prices drop
below support levels (which were reduced in the 2014 farm bill). The income support programs
were replaced with an insurance program, called the stacked income protection program (STAX),
13 CCP outlays were notified as non-commodity-specific amber box by USDA. The CCP program was repealed by the
2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79).
14 An exception would be “generic” base acres—i.e., historical cotton base acres that are no longer linked to cotton
programs but become eligible for program payments if planted to “covered” program crops—which potentially
recouple producer behavior and program payments.
15 For more information, see CRS Report R43448, Farm Commodity Provisions in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79).
16 CRS Report R43336, Status of the WTO Brazil-U.S. Cotton Case.
17 Based on data available from U.S. domestic support notifications to the WTO.
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that uses a county-level, within-year, market-based revenue guarantee.18 Although determined at
the county level, indemnities are coupled to planted acres (as they are for other crop insurance
products). STAX premiums are subsidized at an 80% rate. This premium subsidy could be
notified as product-specific amber box, thus making them vulnerable to any significant reduction
in cotton-specific AMS limits. Premium subsidies for upland cotton under traditional crop
insurance policies were $554 million in 2012, $447 million in 2013, and $472 million in 2014.
Because cotton is singled out for separate treatment, it would also have an accelerated reduction
to the cap for its product-specific blue box. The cap is reduced to one-third of the normal limit.
However, the severe reduction in cotton’s blue box cap appears to be less relevant than the
reduction to cotton’s amber box limit, since no cotton programs are obvious candidates for
notification as blue box outlays.
Market Access
Formula Tariff Cuts
The main approach to cutting tariffs in the draft modalities agreement is a tiered approach based
on the principle that higher tariffs merit larger cuts. Developed country tariff cuts would range
from 50% to 70%, but subject to an overall 54% minimum average cut (Table 2). The cuts are
made from legally “bound rates” which could be substantially higher than rates actually applied
(most countries apply tariff rates that are well below their bound levels). The range for
developing countries would be two-thirds of the equivalent tier for developed countries (ranging
from 33.3% to 46.7%), subject to a maximum average cut of 36%. Least-developed countries and
so-called small and vulnerable economies would be exempt from any tariff cuts. Recent new
members of the WTO also would be exempt from new market access commitments.
Table 2. Proposed Doha Round Tiered Formula Tariff Cuts
Developed Countries
Developing Countries
Tier
Current tariff
Reduction
Current tariff
Reduction
Bottom 0%
to
≤ 20%
50%
0% to < 30%
33.3%
Lower Middle
> 20% to ≤ 50%
57%
> 30% to < 80%
38%
Upper Middle
> 50% to ≤ 75%
64%
> 80% to < 130%
42.7%
Top
> 75%
70%
> 130%
46.7%
Average cut
Minimum 54%
Maximum 36%
Source: “Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture,” TN/AG/W/4/ Rev.4, WTO, Dec. 6, 2008.
18 See CRS Report R43494, Crop Insurance Provisions in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79).
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Deviations from Formula Cuts
A limited number of products would have smaller tariff cuts because of flexibilities that are
provided for in the draft text. In particular, there are two primary designations: sensitive products
(available to all countries) and special products (available to developing countries).
Sensitive Products
All countries (developed and developing) can declare certain products as “sensitive” to shield
them from the full impact of general tariff cuts. In return they must let in an additional quota of
imports at a lower tariff. Developed countries can designate up to 4% of products (as measured
by tariff lines) as sensitive and would apply tariff cuts that are one-third, one-half, or two-thirds
of the modalities-proposed formula tariff cut. (Canada and Japan are demanding up to 6% and
8%, respectively.) Developing countries can designate up to 5.3% of products as sensitive.
Countries that choose to designate products as sensitive would have to “pay” for the designation
with expanded market access under a tariff quota (where quantities inside the quota are charged a
lower or no duty and the above-quota tariff is determined according to the reduction formula).
The larger the deviation from the modalities-proposed formula cut, the greater would be the
amount of in-quota market access. For example, countries that reduce the normal tariff cut by
one-third must admit a quota of 3% of domestic consumption. Similarly, a 3.5% quota
accompanies a reduction of half of the normal tariff cut, and a 4% quota accompanies a reduction
of two-thirds. In addition, sensitive products with tariffs above 100% must increase their quota by
an additional 0.5% of domestic consumption. The United States indicated that developed
countries could exercise the option of designating a higher number of tariff lines (i.e., greater than
4%) as sensitive products only if they agree to a proportionately substantial increase in market
access.19 There is disagreement over whether new products can be designated as sensitive, or only
those products which already have a tariff-rate quota.
Special Products
Developing countries can designate up to 12% of tariff-line farm products as “special” for reasons
of food and livelihood security or rural development. Up to 5% of these can be exempt from any
tariff cuts, while the other portion may receive lower tariff cuts. However, the average tariff cut
on all special products must be 11%. Recent new members are granted higher rates.
Safeguards
The draft modalities identify two types of safeguards that are available to temporarily protect
importing countries from unexpected surges in imports—Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG)
and Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM).
19 Inside U.S. Trade, “U.S. Push For Change On Sensitive Farm Products Meets Resistance,” October 23, 2009.
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Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG)
The SSG was part of the 1994 WTO Agreement on Agriculture. An SSG permits a country to
reimpose or raise tariffs if, because of an import surge, certain price or quantity triggers are met.
The draft modalities specify that an SSG may not raise tariffs above the pre-Doha “bound rate.”
Further, for developed countries the number of products eligible for SSG would be reduced to 1%
of product tariff lines and would be eliminated after seven years. Tariff quota expansion rules
apply if the product has been declared sensitive (see above). Developing countries could apply
the SSG to not more than 2.5% of their tariff lines, although this number is expanded to 5% for
small and vulnerable countries.
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM)
The SSM is a controversial proposed new safeguard mechanism that could be used by developing
countries to temporarily protect producers of special products when imports surged.
Disagreement over the size of surge in import volume needed to trigger an SSM, as well as the
size of the temporary SSM tariff, is a primary factor behind the current impasse of the Doha
Round. India and China proposed a modality for the SSM that would allow developing countries
to impose tariffs 15% above bound rates if imports surged 10% above average trade levels. The
U.S. counterproposal was for a higher SSM trigger of 40% above average trade levels, and tariff
increases that would not exceed existing bound rates. According to USTR, the modality proposed
by India and China would reduce existing market access, thus offsetting potential market access
gains under proposed tariff cut modalities. For example, USTR estimated that a 10% trigger
would have enabled China to invoke the SSM in eight of the ten years during the 1998 to 2007
period for soybeans, and India to restrict trade in six out of the nine years (1999 to 2007) for palm
oil.
Due to the controversy surrounding the proposed SSM, the chair of the agriculture negotiating
group issued a separate paper (TN/AG/W/7) on December 6, 2008, in which he tentatively
offered the following SSM modalities:
• if imports rise by at least 40% above the previous three-year average, then tariffs
could rise above the bound rate by an additional 12 percentage points; and
• if imports rise by at least 20% but less than 40% above their previous three-year
average, then tariffs could rise above the bound rate by an additional 8
percentage points.
In addition, the side paper proposes possible disciplines to avoid the SSM being triggered
frequently and frivolously, with more leniency proposed for small and vulnerable countries.
Implications for the United States
In general, U.S. agricultural exports would gain greater market access under the terms of the
existing draft text, primarily in other developed countries; however, the extent of access gains
depends on the scope of exceptions granted under sensitive and special product flexibilities, as
well as the proposed SSM. A study of the tiered formula suggests that its application would
reduce the average applied agricultural tariff faced by U.S. agricultural exporters from 18.7% to
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9.1% in the absence of sensitive and special product flexibilities, and from 18.7% to 13.2% when
such flexibilities are in effect.20 Although the sensitive product designation would limit the
market access opportunities somewhat, the number of such products would be limited. Also, the
higher tariff protection afforded by sensitive product status is partially offset by new or expanded
quotas access.
Export Competition
Export Subsidies
The draft modalities on export competition would have required developed countries to eliminate
export subsidies by 2013; developing countries would have until 2016. All existing WTO
commitments concerning food aid, technical and financial assistance in aid programs to improve
agricultural productivity and infrastructure, and financing of commercial imports of basic foods
would be unaffected by the elimination of export subsidies.
Export Financing
Government-supported export financing would be disciplined to avoid hidden subsidies and
ensure the programs operate on commercial terms. Proposed conditions include limiting the
repayment period to a maximum of 180 days and ensuring that they are self-financing—that is,
returns must cover all costs. Export financing includes direct financing support (direct credits,
refinancing, or interest rate support); export credit insurance or reinsurance and export credit
guarantees; government-to-government credit agreements; and other forms of government
support such as deferred invoicing and foreign exchange risk hedging.
International Food Aid
All food aid transactions would be needs-driven; fully in grant form; not tied directly or indirectly
to commercial exports of agricultural or other products; and not linked to market development
objectives. Countries would refrain from providing in-kind food aid which could have an adverse
impact on local production or could potentially displace commercial sales. Food aid (cash or in-
kind) provided during an emergency would be put in a Safe Box and be subject to more lenient
disciplines. Monetization (sale for cash) of in-kind food aid would be subject to stricter
disciplines.
Implications for the United States
Export Subsidies
The United States has the second-largest level of permissible export subsidies under current WTO
limits; however, over the past decade it has used a declining share of permissible export subsidies,
20 Implications for the United States of the May 2008 Draft Agricultural Modalities, by David Blandford, David
Laborde, and Will Martin, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), June 2008.
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including none since 2010. Elimination of agricultural export subsidies has been a long-standing
objective of U.S. trade policy. The two most recent farm bills eliminated the last two major U.S.
direct export subsidy programs for agricultural products—the 2008 farm bill repealed legislative
authority for the Export Enhancement Program (EEP), historically the largest U.S. agricultural
export subsidy program, while the 2014 farm bill repealed authority for the Dairy Export
Incentive Program (DEIP), a much smaller export subsidy program that had been re-authorized in
the 2008 farm bill.
Export Credit Guarantees
The United States has traditionally been the world’s leading user of export credit guarantees. In
regard to proposed new Doha Round disciplines on export financing, the United States has
already made substantial changes in its export credit guarantee programs in response to an
adverse decision in a WTO cotton case.21 The intermediate export credit guarantee program
(GSM-103) and the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program (SCGP) were eliminated. For the shorter-
term GSM-102 export credit guarantee program, a risk-based interest rate determination was
established, a 1% cap on origination fees was lifted, and the maximum tenor (i.e., loan period)
was shortened first to 24 months and finally to 18 months. To meet requirements laid out in the
draft modalities, the tenor for GSM-102 short-term guarantees would have to be limited to six
months (i.e., 180 days).
International Food Aid22
The United States is among the world’s leading food aid donors. Average annual spending on
U.S. international food aid programs—including Food for Peace Title II and the McGovern-Dole
International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Programs—averaged approximately $2.2
billion during the decade FY2002 to FY2011. U.S. international food aid has undergone
significant reform under the past two farm bills. Conforming to the proposed Doha Round
modalities could entail further changes in U.S. programs, including greater emphasis on local in-
country purchases rather than shipments of U.S. products, and stricter, more transparent controls
on monetization.
Status of the Doha Round Negotiations
By early 2008, substantial progress had been made in the Doha Round negotiations in narrowing
or resolving differences in negotiating positions. However, a special 2008 WTO negotiating
session failed to narrow the gap on the most contentious issues. A “modalities framework” was
released in December 2008, in an attempt to lock in the status of current negotiated concessions,
while adding detail to outstanding issues as a basis for further, more specific talks.23
21 For more information, see CRS Report R43336, Status of the WTO Brazil-U.S. Cotton Case.
22 For details on U.S. international food aid programs, see CRS Report R41072, International Food Aid Programs:
Background and Issues.
23 The WTO glossary defines modality as a way to proceed. In WTO negotiations, modalities set broad outlines—such
as formulas or approaches for tariff reductions—for final commitments. See WTO glossary at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/glossary_e/modality_e.htm.
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Negotiations Reach an Impasse in 2009
At a 2009 WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva, ministers once again failed to resolve
differences. Since the 2009 impasse, world leaders have continued to call for completion of the
Doha Round. The chairman of the agriculture negotiating group issued a report in March 2010
identifying outstanding agricultural negotiating issues.24 These included how complex tariffs
could be expressed in simpler forms (e.g., as ad valorem rates); the special safeguard mechanism
that would allow developing countries to levy temporary additional duties if imports surged or
prices declined; and rules governing the establishment of new import quotas for “sensitive”
products.
Despite several high-level endorsements, the future of the Doha Round is still uncertain. U.S.
trade negotiators, Members of Congress, and commodity groups have expressed concern over
whether an adequate balance could be achieved between U.S. domestic policy concessions and
potential U.S. export gains. In particular, many have expressed skepticism about the draft
modalities text for agriculture—especially regarding the many exceptions for foreign importers—
and want to see more market access for U.S. agricultural products, particularly from large,
economically advanced, developing countries. The United States, in particular, has insisted on
greater access to the markets of larger developing countries like Brazil, India, China, and South
Africa. These countries, however, have shown little inclination as yet to make additional
concessions.
As a negotiating strategy, the United States has stressed the importance of bilateral negotiations to
advance the round. However, that approach has been met with some resistance from the more
economically advanced, developing countries such as India, Brazil, China, and South Africa, who
insist that the United States cannot look to drastically change what is now on the table (i.e., the
draft modalities text) through bilateral negotiations.25
The 2013 Bali Agreement
In an effort to advance the stalled trade talks, ministers at the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO’s) Ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia, December 3-7, 2013, adopted the so-
called Bali Package—a series of decisions aimed at streamlining trade (referred to as trade
facilitation), improving use of tariff rate quotas (TRQs), and allowing developing countries more
options for providing food security.26 These issues were chosen, in large part, because it was
thought that general agreement had already been reached on them within the earlier Doha Round
agricultural negotiations, thus leaving little to be resolved at the Bali Ministerial and giving the
talks the best chance of making some progress. As a result, the Bali Package covers only a small
fraction of the Doha Round mandate and leaves the more difficult trade topics for future
negotiations.
24 WTO, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Negotiating Group on Agriculture, “Report by the Chairman,
H.E. Mr. David Walker, to the Trade Negotiating Committee for the Purpose of the TNC stocktaking exercise,” March
22, 2010, viewed at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negoti_tnc_22march10_e.htm.
25 Inside U.S. Trade, “Doha Talks May Not Ramp Up Before Fall; U.S. Wants Bilaterals,”, June 26, 2009, viewed at
http://www.insidetrade.com/secure/display.asp?dn=INSIDETRADE-27-25-17&f=wto2002.ask.
26 CRS Report R43592, Agriculture in the WTO Bali Ministerial Agreement.
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The Bali Package represents the first multilateral trade deal in nearly two decades; however,
implementation of the agreement is proving difficult. The first major implementation step under
the Bali Agreement was a July 31, 2014, deadline for the WTO’s General Council to approve a
protocol to incorporate the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) into the text of the WTO’s legal
agreements. Then, WTO members would begin to address a so-called post-Bali agenda which
would include drafting a work program by the end of 2014 to conclude the Doha Round.
However, ahead of the July 31 deadline and in apparent direct violation of the agreement that had
been reached in December 2013, India proposed delaying the approval of the TFA protocol until a
permanent solution was reached on the issue of food stockholding programs. Ultimately, the
WTO members failed to resolve the impasse ahead of the July 31 deadline. As a result, both
implementation of the Bali Package, as well as new talks on the Doha work program, have come
to a halt and the international trade policy community appears to be once again at an impasse.
The relevant WTO committees—including the Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC), which is
tasked with the overall Doha Round trade talks—and negotiating groups are to continue to hold
consultations on these issues in late 2014 and into 2015 in search of resolution.
The Role of Congress
As one of the world’s largest trading countries—for both agricultural and nonagricultural
products—the United States has a major stake in negotiations on trade rules and disciplines. The
U.S. Congress will continue to seek to influence and monitor ongoing trade agreement
negotiations, including multilateral negotiations within the context of the WTO, to ensure that
U.S. agricultural, food industry, and consumer interests are reflected in their outcomes.
Author Contact Information
Randy Schnepf
Specialist in Agricultural Policy
rschnepf@crs.loc.gov, 7-4277
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