Unemployment Compensation and Exhaustion of Benefits
The cornerstone of an unemployed worker's income support is the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC)1 program, which may provide income support through the payment of UC benefits. The underlying framework of the UC system is contained in the Social Security Act. Title III of the act authorizes grants to states for the administration of state UC laws, Title IX authorizes the various components of the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF), and Title XII authorizes advances or loans to insolvent state UC programs. UC is financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA).
The federal government funds federal and state UC program administration, the federal share (50% under permanent law) of Extended Benefit (EB) payments, and federal loans to insolvent state UC programs. States fund regular state UC benefits and the state share (50%) of EB payments. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, as amended) temporarily provided for 100% federal funding of EB from February 22, 2009, through December 31, 2013.
UC Benefits and Duration
Workers who lose their jobs face serious long-term economic implications. In general, they face a substantially reduced probability of full-time employment and an increased probability of part-time employment. Those workers who find new full-time employment on average experience significantly decreased earnings relative to what they earned before they lost employment.
The UC program pays benefits to workers in covered employment who become involuntarily unemployed for economic reasons or other good cause and meet state-established eligibility rules. The UC program generally does not provide UC benefits to the self-employed, to those who are unable to work, or to those who do not have a recent earnings history. States usually disqualify claimants who lost their jobs because of inability to work or unavailability for work, who voluntarily quit without good cause, who were discharged for job-related misconduct, or who refused suitable work without good cause.
This temporary unemployment insurance benefit is designed to be sufficient to meet an unemployed worker's basic obligations until the worker finds a new position. Generally, benefits are based on wages for covered work over a 12-month period. The entitlement formula varies by state, typically requiring a substantial work history and replacing up to 50% of workers' wages. Generally, the maximum benefit amount is capped (often half of the average wage in the state or less), which lowered the average national replacement rate to 33% of the average weekly wage in the first quarter of 2014.
Maximum weekly benefit amounts in January 2014 ranged from $133 (Puerto Rico) to $679 (Massachusetts) and, in states that provide dependents' allowances, up to $1,019 (Massachusetts). In June 2014, the average weekly benefit was $314. Benefits are available for up to 26 weeks in most states (30 weeks in Massachusetts; 28 weeks in Montana; eight other states have maximum durations that are fewer than 26 weeks).2 The average regular UC benefit duration in June 2014 was 16.6 weeks, with less than half (43%) of all beneficiaries exhausting their regular benefits. In June 2014, approximately 2.4 million unemployed workers received regular state UC benefits in a given week. In 2013, on average, 26% of all U.S. unemployed workers received regular state unemployment benefits (when all extended unemployment benefits were included, that percentage increased to 40%).
Generally, the UC recipiency rate (the ratio of unemployed receiving UC benefits to all unemployed) rises during economic recessions (as workers with strong labor market experience are laid off) and falls during economic expansions (as new entrants to the labor market begin to comprise a greater proportion of the unemployed).3
Monitoring Search, Generosity of Unemployment Benefits, and Disincentives to Find Work
The difficulty in monitoring job search intensity creates the risk the unemployed will abuse a system designed to alleviate the worst financial aspects of job loss. Although most economists would agree that UC benefits create some disincentives to find work quickly, these disincentives are somewhat balanced by a relatively low replacement rate of wages by UC benefits and a recognition that proper allocation of human resources and human capital requires adequate job search time.4
The job search behavior of the unemployed can be influenced by changing the timing, generosity, and duration of UC benefits. Higher benefit levels and easier program requirements for benefits will cause recipients to be less willing to accept jobs and may alleviate some of the social stigma from being unemployed.5 The availability of benefits may create a disincentive to search for and accept reemployment, increasing unemployment and unemployment duration.6 Economic research has suggested that this disincentive effect is relatively small and not a particularly large contributor to the high unemployment rates found during economic recessions.7
UC Benefit Exhaustion
The limited duration of UC benefits (generally 26 weeks)8 will result in some unemployed individuals exhausting their UC benefits before finding work or voluntarily leaving the labor force for other reasons such as retirement, disability, family care, or education. Empirical research suggests that workers who exhaust benefits search at similar or higher levels of intensity as workers who find employment before benefit exhaustion.9 All state programs attempt to identify potential benefit exhaustees through a state-specific profiling system. Workers who are identified as likely to become unemployed long term may be offered intensive employment services.10
Figure 1 displays UC beneficiaries as the monthly rate of UC benefit exhaustees since 1979 and as a percentage of all unemployed workers (the "recipiency rate"). The proportion of UC recipients who exhaust their benefits varies according to economic conditions, state benefit duration formulas, and the composition of the labor force. Some evidence suggests that an aging work force may have increased the proportion of unemployed workers who are long-term unemployed; at the same time, this aging work force may also have contributed to the decrease in the overall unemployment rate.11
Recessions
Determination of a Recession
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)—not the federal government—declares when a recession began.12 A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in measures of real gross domestic product (GDP), real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.13 A recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends as the economy reaches its trough. Between a trough and a peak, the economy is in an expansion.
Most Recent Recession Began December 2007 and Ended June 2009
The NBER maintains a time line of the U.S. business cycle. This chronology identifies the dates of peaks and troughs that frame economic recessions or expansions. According to the NBER, a peak was reached in December 2007, marking the end of the expansion that began in November 2001 and the beginning of the recession that ended in June 2009.
Recessions from 1980 to Present
Since 1980, there have been five separate periods that the NBER has identified as recessions: January 1980-July 1980; July 1981-November 1982; July 1990-March 1991; March 2001-November 2001; and December 2007-June 2009.
Federal Programs of Extended Unemployment Compensation
The UC program's two main objectives are to provide temporary and partial wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed workers and to stabilize the economy during recessions.14 These objectives are reflected in the current UC program's funding and benefit structure. When the economy grows, UC program revenue rises through increased tax revenues while UC program spending falls because fewer workers are unemployed and receive benefits. The effect of collecting more taxes while decreasing spending on benefits dampens demand in the economy. This also creates a surplus or "cushion" of available funds for the UC program to draw upon during a recession. In a recession, UC tax revenue falls and UC program spending rises as more workers lose their jobs and receive UC benefits. The increased amount of UC payments to unemployed workers dampens the economic effect of lost earnings by injecting additional funds into the economy.
In response to economic recessions, the federal government sometimes has augmented the regular UC benefit with both permanent (the Extended Benefit program) and temporary extensions (including the Emergency Unemployment Compensation of 2008 program) of the duration of unemployment benefits.
Extended Benefit Program (Determined at the State Level)
The Extended Benefit (EB) program was established by the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (EUCA), P.L. 91-373 (26 U.S.C. 3304, note). EUCA may extend receipt of unemployment benefits (EB) at the state level if certain economic situations exist within the state. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, P.L. 97-35, among other items, amended the EUCA to require that claimants have worked at least 20 weeks of full-time insured employment or the equivalent in insured wages.
The EB program is triggered when a state's insured unemployment rate (IUR)15 or total unemployment rate (TUR)16 reaches certain levels. All states must pay up to 13 weeks of EB if the IUR for the previous 13 weeks is at least 5% and is 120% of the average of the rates for the same 13-week period in each of the 2 previous years. There are two other optional thresholds that states may choose. (States may choose one, two, or neither of the additional options.) If the state has chosen the option, it would provide the following:
- Option 1: an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's IUR is at least 6%, regardless of previous years' averages.
- Option 2: an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's TUR is at least 6.5% and at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years; an additional 20 weeks of benefits if the TUR is at least 8% and at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years.
The EB program imposes additional restrictions on individual eligibility for benefits. It requires that a worker be actively searching and available for work. Furthermore, the worker may not receive benefits if he or she refused an offer of suitable work. Finally, claimants must have recorded at least 20 weeks of full-time insured employment or the equivalent in insured wages during their base period (the four quarters of earnings used to determine UC benefit eligibility).
EB Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
As amended, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, also known as ARRA or the 2009 stimulus package, signed into law on February 17, 2009) contained several provisions affecting EB. Among these provisions was a temporary change increasing the federal share to 100% in the cost-sharing agreement for EB from February 22, 2009, through December 31, 2013. (The permanent funding arrangement is 50% federal funding and 50% state funding.) ARRA also provided a supplemental $25 weekly benefit from February 22, 2009, through June 5, 2010, for recipients of unemployment benefits, including EB. Finally, ARRA also allowed states, at their option, to temporarily change the eligibility requirements for the EB program to expand the number of persons eligible for EB.17
Temporary EB Trigger Modifications in P.L. 111-312
Beginning on December 17, 2011, P.L. 111-312 made some temporary changes to certain triggers in the EB program. P.L. 111-312, as amended, allowed states to temporarily use lookback calculations based on three years of unemployment rate data (rather than the permanent law lookback of two years of data) as part of their mandatory IUR and optional TUR triggers if states would otherwise trigger off of or not be on an EB period. Using a two-year versus a three-year EB trigger lookback was a significant adjustment because some states would have otherwise triggered off of their EB periods despite high, sustained—but not increasing—unemployment rates.
States implemented the lookback changes individually by amending their state UC laws. These state law changes had to be constructed in such a way that if the two-year lookback was functioning and the state would have an active EB program, no action would be taken. But if a two-year lookback was not sufficient to trigger on to an EB period, then the state would have been able to use a three-year lookback. This temporary option to use three-year EB trigger lookbacks expired the week ending on or before December 31, 2013.
Temporary Federal Extensions of Unemployment Benefits: Congressional Intervention in Recessions
During most economic recessions in recent history, Congress has created federal temporary programs of extended unemployment compensation. In total, Congress acted eight times—in 1958, 1961, 1971, 1974, 1982, 1991, 2002, and 2008—to establish these temporary programs of extended UC benefits.18 These programs extended the time an individual might claim UC benefits (ranging from an additional 6 weeks to 63 weeks) and had expiration dates. Some extensions took into account state economic conditions; many temporary programs considered the state's total TUR, IUR, or both.
Historically, these programs started operation after the trough of a recession had passed (i.e., after the recession had officially ended) for several reasons. One is that the exact date of the recession is not known until months after that recession has started. NBER often announces a recession has begun three or more months after what is later determined to be its official start. Another cause of this lag in response time is that often the severity of the recession and its impact on unemployment levels do not become apparent until several quarters after the recession begins.
The 1958 and 1961 programs were proposed and enacted after the trough of those recessions but before the unemployment rate had peaked. The 1971 program was enacted after the end of the recession in November 1970. Both the 1974 and 1982 programs became effective toward the end of those recessions. The 1991 program was enacted eight months after the 1990-1991 recession trough but eight months before the unemployment rate peaked. Likewise, the 2002 program was enacted after the recession had ended but before the unemployment rate peaked. The Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program of 2008 was enacted seven months after the most recent recession began.19
Table A-1 in the Appendix briefly summarizes these temporary programs20 as well as the permanently authorized EB program. The 1982 Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) and 1991 Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) programs had extremely complicated—and changing—benefit triggers. Table A-2 and Table A-3 provide detailed information on benefit triggers for those two temporary programs. Table A-4 provides information on the EUC08 program benefits and triggers.
Temporary Extended UC Benefits as Economic Stimulus
In the 110th Congress, congressional and popular debate examined the relative efficacy of expanding UC benefits and duration compared with other potential economic stimuli. Job loss means that many of the unemployed are severely cash constrained and would be expected to rapidly spend any increase in benefits that they may receive. The certainty of this behavior is very high, and this is the underlying reasoning why some economists consider temporary unemployment benefits a fairly effective economic stimulus.21 For example, in his January 22, 2009, congressional testimony, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) stated that increasing the value or duration of UC benefits may be one of the more effective economic stimulus plans.22 Mark Zandi of Moody's Economy.com estimated multiplier effects for several different policy options, including extending unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits had one of the highest estimated effects (1.64, where all proposed interventions ranged from 0.25 to 1.73).23
Others pointed out that increasing either the value or length of UC benefits may, however, discourage recipients from searching for work and accepting less desirable jobs or that their spouses might forestall seeking additional work.24 A rationale for making any extension in unemployment benefits temporary would be to mitigate disincentives to work, as the extension would expire once the economy improves and cyclical unemployment declines.
Assessing the Labor Market: Determining When to Intervene
Various measures are typically used to assess the state of the labor market.25 These measures may include statistics that are absolute measures, such as employment and unemployment levels, as well as relative measures, such as the insured unemployment rate and the total unemployment rate.
A vigorous debate on how to determine when the federal government should intervene by extending unemployment benefits has been active for decades. Generally, this debate has examined the efficacy of using the IUR or TUR as a trigger for extending unemployment benefits. The debate also has examined whether the intervention should be at a national or state level. Serious consideration of other measures of the labor market has become increasingly common. In particular, the increase in the number of unemployed from the previous year has emerged in several proposals as a new trigger for a nationwide extension of unemployment benefits.
Improving the UC System as an Automatic Stabilizer
The President's 2010 budget proposal suggested changes to the UC system through the modification of the EB program to make the program more responsive to changing economic conditions.26 Although little information was provided as to the specifics of the legislation, the broad description echoes the recommendations of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation first published in 1994.27 The President's 2011 (and subsequent) budget proposals did not have similar suggestions.
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation's 1994 Findings and Recommendations for the EB Program
The Advisory Council stated that the changing demographics of the work force—coupled with state funding problems—had led to a decline in UC recipients. This had, in turn, caused the IUR to be a less reliable indicator of economic conditions at the state level and thus reduced the likelihood that the EB program would be active in the states during economic recessions. The Advisory Council also found that the temporary federal extensions of unemployment benefits have been "extremely inefficient" as they have been neither well timed nor well targeted.
The Advisory Council generally supported that the EB program use a state TUR of 6.5% as an indicator of economic conditions meriting an active EB program.28 It also suggested that any indicator not use historical comparisons or thresholds (e.g., 110% of previous year's level), which the Advisory Council labeled as "not helpful" because the threshold triggers caused the activation of the EB program to occur later and deactivate earlier than what the Advisory Council believed was appropriate.29
Finally, the Advisory Council suggested raising the FUTA tax base from $7,000 to $8,500 to raise the additional funds needed for this suggested change. The President's 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 budget proposals included measures that would have increased the federal unemployment tax base to $15,000 while lowering the tax rate.
Using the Insured Unemployment Rate Versus Total Unemployment Rate
The Federal-State Extended Benefit Program, created by P.L. 91-373, originally assessed the labor market through both IURs and TURs and included both national- and state-level triggers for extended UC benefits. The EB's federal trigger30 was eliminated by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-499). That act also required that the IUR measure no longer include those who had exhausted benefits or who were receiving EB. This effectively made the IUR statistic a less generous measure of unemployment as it counted only the recently unemployed.
Since the adoption of the permanent EB program in 1970, there has been considerable debate concerning the relative merits of the IUR versus the TUR as an EB trigger. The IUR is defined as the 13-week moving average of continuing regular UC claims divided by the average number of individuals in UC-covered employment. This means the IUR itself is an output of the UC program.
Because calculation of the IUR is based upon the number of individuals currently receiving UC benefits, each state's IUR depends on various noneconomic factors, including state eligibility rules and administrative practices. Thus, the IUR is not a precise reflection of the health of a state's economy.
In comparison, the TUR is defined as the number of all unemployed individuals actively seeking work divided by the size of the civilian labor force. The TUR represents a larger population than the IUR because it counts as unemployed all those who are out of work and actively looking for work, on layoff, or waiting to start a new job within 30 days.
National, State, and Sub-State Triggers
A perennial question concerns the appropriate level at which to measure changes in unemployment. Generally this debate has centered on the EB program and whether the EB trigger should be based on national, regional, state, or sub-state data. At the beginning of the most recent recession (but before the recession had been identified), the debate on the EB triggers was expanded to question what measure should be used if a new temporary extension of UC benefits were enacted. In particular, should Congress act as it has in the most recent recessions and create a nationwide extension of UC benefits with a nod to higher unemployment states through an additional "high-unemployment" trigger? Or would it be more appropriate and a better use of scarce resources to target only those states with current economic difficulties?
In the most recent recession, Congress first created a temporary program that did not target states based upon state unemployment rates (P.L. 110-252). Eventually, Congress expanded the temporary program and targeted much of the expansion of benefits to the unemployed in states that had higher levels of unemployment (first in P.L. 110-449 and then again in P.L. 111-92).
The argument in favor of a national trigger is that the definition of a recession is national in scope and the federal government's interest in reversing an economic decline is national as well. However, recessions have often been primarily regional in impact. Thus, a national trigger can result in the payment of extended benefits to individuals in states that do not face unusually weak labor markets.
There have also been proposals to create regional and sub-state level triggers. The logic behind the regional or sub-state trigger is that it might improve the targeting of benefits because state boundaries are often of little relevance to the workings of labor markets. Considerable labor market differences may exist between urban and rural areas within a state or among urban areas within a state. Furthermore, some labor markets are located in more than one state. A statewide trigger can deny benefits to areas facing severe labor market problems because other regions of the state are not facing the same conditions.
There are a variety of arguments against regional and sub-state triggers. It would be difficult to define appropriate regional or sub-state boundaries, and it is unclear whether these newly defined regions would be any less arbitrary than current state boundaries. In addition, there are significant obstacles to be overcome in the financing and administration of an EB program on the basis of regional or sub-state areas because the state has always been the operational unit for UC. Concern also exists regarding the accuracy and availability of regional or sub-state data and the costs of data improvements that would be needed.31
Increases in Unemployment of at Least 1 Million Unemployed as Compared with the Same Month in the Previous Year
In the 110th Congress, debate moved away from using the IUR or TUR as a trigger for a national program. Serious consideration of other measures of the labor market has become increasingly common. In particular, the increase in the number of unemployed from the previous year emerged in several proposals for new triggers in a nationwide extension in unemployment benefits.
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 4934, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 2008, was introduced on January 15, 2008. This bill would have extended UC benefits for up to 26 weeks when the number of unemployed persons 16 years of age or older increased by at least 1 million individuals as compared with the same month in the previous year.
Table A-5 in the Appendix provides information on the timing of the recessions, changes in unemployment of at least 1 million compared with same month in the previous year, and federal enactment of the temporary extensions of benefits. During this period, the temporary extensions of unemployment benefits take effect between 4 months and 14 months after the onset of the recession. The first changes in unemployment compared with the same month in the previous year of at least 1 million occur between 3 months and 5 months after the onset of the recession. Therefore, if the "1 million" trigger had been in place in the past, the extension of UC benefits would have been triggered between 8 months and 12 months earlier than actually occurred.
Figure 2 provides a graphical presentation on the changing levels of unemployment since 1979 and the corresponding unemployment rates for each year. Figure 2 uses different numerical scales for changes in unemployment levels and for the unemployment rate. Because the correspondence between these two scales was determined by page size rather than by a particular reason, readers should not place any significance in the two lines crossing each other. The scale for the changes in unemployment levels compared with same month in the previous year is located on the left-hand y-axis. The scale for the unemployment rate is located on the right-hand y-axis.
Other Measures: Changes in UC Benefits Exhaustions and Changes in Long-Term Unemployment
Beyond the IUR, TUR, and changes in the total number of unemployed, several other measures of unemployment are often used in assessing the severity of employment conditions. These measures include the number of unemployed workers who exhaust UC benefits and the number of workers who have been unemployed for more than 26 weeks (i.e., long-term unemployed).
Figure 3 shows the change in the number of workers who exhaust UC benefits. That is, Figure 3 shows the change in the number of UC beneficiaries who have been unemployed for longer than the number of weeks for which UC benefits are available to them. Figure 4 shows another measure of the severity of unemployment, the change in the number of workers (regardless of whether they received UC benefits) who have been unemployed for more than 26 weeks. Generally, both the changes in the number of exhaustees and the changes in the number of long-term unemployed peak after a recession's end.
Congressional Interest in "Paying for Temporary Benefits"
Increases in Revenues or Decreases in Expenditures Related to Temporary Unemployment Benefit Legislation
Debate in Congress has included substantial interest in whether benefit extension legislation should include measures to "pay for" the proposals and be subject to House and Senate PAYGO requirements or whether these extensions should be considered "emergency" measures and exempt from the PAYGO requirements.32 With the exceptions of P.L. 111-92, P.L. 112-78, and P.L. 112-96, all laws that created, extended, or altered the EUC08 program were treated as emergency expenditures or part of larger appropriation legislation.
Historical comparisons with previous extensions of temporary unemployment benefits are difficult because of differing internal House and Senate PAYGO rules that have changed over time.33 Table A-6 in the Appendix lists all public laws that have created or altered these temporary unemployment benefit programs. The second column lists all decreases in federal expenditures or increases in federal tax revenues that are related to unemployment benefits within these laws. The last column includes explanatory notes that may put the laws into better context within this particular discussion.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) identified 11 laws that included reduced expenditures or increased revenues related to temporary unemployment benefits.34 Five laws increased the federal unemployment tax (FUTA) on employers. One law increased income tax on unemployment benefits received by individuals. Two laws increased the estimated withholding requirements for certain corporate income taxes. One law began to require interest payments from states for federal loans to allow states to continue to provide regular UC benefits to their workers. P.L. 112-78 required new fees be paid when certain new federally guaranteed mortgages were issued. P.L. 111-92 expanded the EUC08 program from two to four tiers (from a potential maximum duration of 33 weeks to 53 weeks) but did not extend the authorization of the program. The law included a 1.5-year extension of the FUTA surtax. P.L. 112-96 did not declare the temporary benefits to be emergency spending and did include some offsets, including the auction of spectrum licenses and increased contributions to federal retirement plans.
Some of the other laws did have reduced expenditures or increased revenues but are not included in this tally because (1) they were part of large appropriation bills and generally not subject to PAYGO rules, or (2) CRS was unable to directly link these measures to any type of unemployment benefits. CRS did not attempt to identify whether these reductions in expenditures or increases in revenues fully offset the expected costs of the changes in expenditures on temporary unemployment benefits.
Congressional Interest in the "Maximum Length of Total UI [Unemployment Insurance] Benefits over Time"
Debate in Congress has included substantial interest in whether the total number of weeks of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits available to workers is overly generous as compared with previous recessions. Table A-7 in the Appendix lists the total number of potential maximum available weeks of unemployment benefits available to the unemployed since 1935.
At the height of the EUC08 program, the potential maximum number of weeks of all unemployment benefits (UC + EB + EUC08) reached 99 weeks. This maximum was available to states (if state economic conditions and state laws met the availability requirements) from December 2009 through August 2012.
In comparison, the next-highest maximum potential duration of unemployment benefits was during the Temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (TEUC) program in 2002 and 2003, when up to a total of 72 weeks of unemployment insurance (UC + EB + TEUC) was available in some states. This maximum was available to states (if state economic conditions and state laws met the availability requirements) from March 2002 through December 2003.
Appendix. Related Tables
|
Program |
Public Law |
Dates |
Duration of Benefits |
Trigger Mechanism |
Financing Authority |
|
Temporary Unemployment Compensation (TUC) |
P.L. 85-441 |
[Reachback to June 1957] |
Lesser of 50% of the regular UC benefit entitlement or 13 weeks |
None |
Interest free loans to state accounts; if a state failed to repay loan by Jan. 1, 1963, the FUTA tax in the state was raised to repay the loan |
|
Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation (TEUC) |
P.L. 87-6 |
[Reachback to June 1960] |
Lesser of 50% of the regular UC benefit entitlement or 13 weeks |
None |
FUTA funds |
|
Federal-State Extended Benefit Act of 1970 (EB) |
P.L. 91-373 |
Permanently authorized |
Lesser of 50% of the regular UC benefit entitlement or 13 weeks |
National: |
50% state SUTA funds; |
|
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (Magnuson Act) |
P.L. 92-224 and |
Jan. 1972-Mar. 1973 |
Lesser of 50% of the regular UC benefit entitlement or 13 weeks |
National: |
Federal FUTA funds and general revenue. |
|
Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) |
Jan. 1975-Jan. 1978 |
(Varied) Provided up to 26 weeks of benefits |
National: |
Federal FUTA funds for benefits paid before Apr. 1977; federal general revenue for benefits paid on or after Apr. 1, 1977 |
|
|
Amendments to Federal-State Extended Benefit Act (EB) |
Permanently authorized |
P.L. 96-499 tightened search and refusal of work requirements; |
National EB trigger eliminated; |
50% state SUTA funds and 50% federal FUTA funds |
|
|
Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) |
P.L. 97-248, |
[Reachback to June 1982] |
Varied; see Table A-2 |
Varied; see Table A-2 |
Federal FUTA funds and general revenue |
|
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) |
P.L. 102-164, |
[Reachback to Feb. 1991] Nov.1991-Apr. 1994 |
Varied; see Table A-3. [Note: Supersedes rather than supplements the EB program. Governors had the option of triggering "off" EB benefits.] |
Introduced "average" IUR, a 13-week comparison measure. Varied. See Table A-3. |
Federal FUTA funds for benefits paid before July 5, 1992, and after October 2, 1993; with certain exceptions, federal general revenue for benefits paid on or after July 5, 1992, but before Oct. 3, 1993 |
|
Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation |
[Reachback to Mar. 2001] |
TEUC: Up to 13 weeks. |
TEUC was available nationally; |
Federal FUTA funds |
|
|
Emergency Unemployment Compensation of 2008 (EUC08) |
P.L. 110-252, |
[Reachback to May 2007] |
Varied, see Table A-4 |
Tier I of EUC08 is nationally available. |
Federal FUTA funds; benefits after February 17, 2009, were paid by general revenue |
Source: CRS.
|
Public Law |
Benefit Tiers |
Dates in Effect |
|
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (P.L. 97-248), signed Sept. 2, 1982 |
10 weeks: EB activated in state after June 1, 1982 |
Sept. 12, 1982-Jan. 8, 1983 |
|
Surface Transportation Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-424), signed 1/6/1983 |
16 weeks: IUR of 6% or higher |
Jan. 9, 1983-Mar. 31, 1983 |
|
Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21), signed Apr. 20, 1983 |
First FSC payments on Apr. 1, 1983, or later: |
Apr. 1, 1983-Oct. 18, 1983 |
|
Federal Supplemental Compensation Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-135), signed Oct. 24, 1983 |
FSC first payments on Oct. 19, 1983, or later: |
Oct. 19, 1983-Mar. 31, 1985 |
Source: CRS.
|
Public Law |
Benefit Tiers |
Dates in Effect (first claim date) |
|
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act (P.L. 102-164), signed Nov. 15, 1991 |
20 weeks: States with TUR of 9.5% or higher or IUR of 5% or higher |
Superseded by P.L. 102-182 |
|
Termination of Application of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 to Czechoslovakia and Hungary (P.L. 102-182), signed Dec. 4, 1991; and Emergency Unemployment Benefits Extension (P.L. 102-244), signed Feb. 7, 1992. |
Claims filed before June 14, 1992 |
Nov. 17, 1991-July 3, 1992 |
|
|
26 weeks: States with TUR of 9% or higher or IUR of 5% or higher |
June 14, 1992-Mar. 6, 1993 |
|
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993 (P.L. 103-6), signed Mar. 4, 1993 |
Claims filed before Sept. 12, 1993 |
Mar. 7, 1993-Oct. 2, 1993 |
|
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993 (P.L. 103-152), signed Nov. 25, 1993 |
13 weeks: States with TUR of 9% or higher or IUR of 5% or higher |
Oct. 3, 1993-Feb. 5, 1994 |
Source: CRS.
|
|
Benefit Tiers and Availability |
Dates in Effect and Financing |
|
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, Title IV Emergency Unemployment Compensation (P.L. 110-252), signed June 30, 2008 |
13 weeks (all states) |
July 6, 2008-Mar. 28, 2009 |
|
Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-449), signed Nov. 21, 2008 |
Tier I: 20 weeks (all states) |
Nov. 23, 2008-Mar. 28, 2009 |
|
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), signed Feb. 17, 2009 |
Same as above |
Feb. 22, 2009-Dec. 26, 2009 |
|
Worker, Homeowner, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-92), signed Nov. 6, 2009 |
Tier I: 20 weeks (all states) |
Nov. 8, 2009-Dec. 26, 2009 |
|
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-118), signed Dec. 19, 2009 |
Same as above |
Dec. 27, 2009-Feb. 27, 2010 |
|
|
Same as above |
Feb. 28, 2010-Apr. 3, 2010 |
|
The Continuing Extension Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-157), signed Apr. 15, 2010 |
Same as above |
Apr. 4, 2010 (retroactive)-May 29, 2010 |
|
The Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-205), signed July 22, 2010 |
Same as above |
May 30, 2010 (retroactive)-Nov. 27, 2010 |
|
The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312), signed Dec. 17, 2010 |
Same as above |
Nov. 28, 2010 (retroactive)-Dec. 31, 2011 |
|
The Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-78), signed Dec. 23, 2011 |
Same as above |
Jan. 1, 2012-Feb. 18, 2012 |
|
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), signed Feb. 22, 2012 |
Tier I: 20 weeks (all states) |
Feb. 19, 2012-May 26, 2012 |
|
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), signed Feb. 22, 2012 |
Tier I: 20 weeks (all states) |
May 27, 2012-Sept. 1, 2012 |
|
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), signed Feb. 22, 2012 |
Tier I: 14 weeks (all states) Note: no phase down |
Sept. 2, 2012-Dec. 29, 2012 |
|
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240), signed Jan. 2, 2013 |
Same as above |
Dec. 29, 2012 (retroactive)-Dec. 28, 2013 Funded by general fund of the Treasury |
Source: CRS.
Table A-5. Timing of Recessions, 12-Month Change of at Least 1 Million Unemployed, and Extended Unemployment Benefits, 1990-2013
|
1980 Recession |
1981-1982 Recession |
1990-1991 Recession |
2001 Recession |
2007 Recession |
||||||
|
No Temporary Federal Extension |
Months after Recession Begins |
P.L. 97-248, FSC Benefits |
Months after Recession Begins |
P.L. 102-164, EUC Benefits |
Months after Recession Begins |
P.L. 107-147, TEUC Benefits |
Months after Recession Begins |
P.L. 110-252, EUC08 Benefits |
Months after Recession Begins |
|
|
Date began |
January 1980 |
— |
July 1981 |
— |
July 1990 |
— |
March 2001 |
— |
December 2007 |
— |
|
First 12-month increase in unemployment of at least 1 million |
April 1980 |
3 |
November 1981 |
4 |
November 1990 |
4 |
August 2001 |
5 |
March 2008 |
3 |
|
Congress first enacts extension |
Nonea |
NA |
August 1982 |
13 |
August 1991 |
13 |
February 2002 |
11 |
June 2008 |
6 |
|
Program becomes active |
None |
NA |
September 1982 |
14 |
16 |
March 2002 |
12 |
July 2008 |
7 |
|
|
End recession |
July 1980 |
6 |
November 1982 |
16 |
March 1991 |
8 |
November 2001 |
8 |
June 2009 |
18 |
|
Last change of at least 1 million more unemployed |
March 1981 |
14 |
April 1983 |
21 |
September 1992 |
17 |
September 2002 |
20 |
May 2010 |
17 |
|
Authorization ended (does not include phaseout) |
NA |
NA |
March 1985 |
44 |
February 1994 |
42 |
January 2004 |
34 |
December 2013 |
72 |
Source: CRS. Timing of recessions from NBER, http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. Estimated increases of one million unemployed use data from DOL BLS's Current Population Survey, http://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm.
a. The individual eligibility for the federal-state EB program was tightened by P.L. 96-499. The federal EB trigger was eliminated and the calculation of IUR was altered to be less generous by P.L. 97-35.
b. H.R. 3201 was passed on August 2, 1991; the President signed the bill (P.L. 102-107) but did not declare an emergency; thus, no benefits were available. Congress sent S. 1722 to the President, who vetoed it on October 1, 1991. For a statement on the reasons for the veto, see http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=20097.
c. Although P.L. 102-164 was signed into law on November 15, 1991, it was immediately superseded by two other laws: P.L. 102-182, signed 12/4/1991, and P.L. 102-244, signed February 7, 1992. P.L. 102-182 authorized benefit periods of 20 and 13 weeks depending on state economic conditions; P.L. 102-244 authorized an additional 13 weeks for each tier.
|
Public Law |
Revenue Increases or Expenditure Decreases Related to Unemployment Benefits |
Notes |
|
Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958, (P.L. 85-441) |
None |
This was a loan to the states for an additional 13 weeks of temporary state unemployment benefits. Loan had to be repaid. |
|
Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961, (P.L. 87-6) |
Temporary Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) increase of 0.4% for 1962 and 0.25% for 1963 |
|
|
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1971, (P.L. 92-224) |
None |
|
|
[No title] (P.L. 92-329) |
An increase in FUTA tax from 3.2% to 3.28% in 1973 |
|
|
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-572) |
None |
|
|
Tax Reduction Act (P.L. 94-12) |
None |
Large bill with many tax reductions. |
|
Emergency Compensation and Special Unemployment Assistance Extension Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-45), signed June 30, 1975. |
None |
|
|
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-19), signed Apr. 12, 1977. |
None |
|
|
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 |
Large bill; offsets included: Increased FUTA wage base of individual annual earnings paid by employers from $6,000 to $7,000. Increased gross FUTA tax from 3.4% to 3.5% (employers in states with approved UI laws continued to receive 2.7% credit against FUTA tax so net tax is 0.8%); effective date: Jan. 1, 1983. Increased gross FUTA tax from 3.5% to 6.2% (this included a permanent tax of 0.6% plus a an extension of a temporary 0.2% surtax that was to continue until all general revenue advances to EUCA were repaid; the offset for state employers increased to 5.4% so net FUTA tax remained at 0.8% until all general revenue advances to EUC have been rapid and then dropped to 0.6%); state experience rating schedules were required to have a maximum rate of at least 5.4%; effective date: Jan. 1, 1985, but 5-year phase-in period. Reduced income thresholds limiting inclusion of state and federal UI benefits in adjusted gross income to $12,000 (from $20,000) for single taxpayers and to $18,000 (from $25,000) for married taxpayers filing jointly (waived estimated tax penalties for 1982 attributed to this change); effective for benefits paid on or after Jan. 1, 1982 |
|
|
Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 |
Large bill; none |
Unable to identify UC specific offsets. However, bill revised the authorization of Highway appropriations, which included increased fuel taxes. |
|
Social Security Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-21) |
Required states to pay interest, when due, as a condition for all the State's employers to continue to receive offset credit against the FUTA tax and for the State to continue to receive grants for administration; effective date: Apr. 1, 1983. |
The "cap" on automatic FUTA credit reductions (available if certain solvency requirements are met) which was scheduled to expire at the end of CY1987, was made permanent. |
|
Federal Supplemental Compensation Extension of 1983 (P.L. 98-118) |
None |
|
|
Federal Supplemental Compensation Amendments of 1983 (P.L. 98-135) |
None |
Study to examine how to prevent retirees and prisoners from receiving unemployment compensation. |
|
[No title] (P.L. 99-15) |
None |
|
|
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-107) |
None |
For EUC to be implemented, the President had to submit to Congress a separate declaration of a budget emergency that, in effect, would have allowed off-budget financing. Although the President signed the legislation into law, he did not issue the emergency declaration and thus the new program was inoperative. |
|
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-164) |
Among other financing provisions: extension of 0.2% FUTA surtax for one additional year (through 1996); making estimated tax payment conform more closely to a taxpayers' liability; making permanent the tax refund offset program for collecting non-tax debts owed to the federal government; and improving the collection of guaranteed student loans in default. |
Superseded by P.L. 102-182. |
|
Termination of Application of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 to Czechoslovakia and Hungary (P.L. 102-182) |
None |
|
|
To increase the number of weeks for which benefits are payable under the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, and for other purposes |
Amended Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provisions to provide for a temporary increase in the amount of certain corporate estimated tax payments, by setting the applicable percentage for such annualized payments at 95% of the tax liability for each of 1993 through 1996 (rather than 94% for 1993 and 1994, and 95% in 1995 and 1996). |
|
|
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992 (P.L. 102-318) |
Amended the IRC to extend by one year, through Dec. 31, 1996, a phaseout of personal exemptions for certain high income taxpayers. Revised IRC requirements for corporate estimated tax payments. Required large corporations to base their estimated tax payments on an increased percentage of their current year tax liability as follows: (1) 97% for taxable years beginning after June 30, 1992, and before 1997 (rather than 95% or 93%, determined on an actual or annual basis); and (2) 91% for taxable years beginning in 1997 and thereafter (rather than 90%). |
|
|
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993 (P.L. 103-6) |
None |
|
|
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993 (P.L. 103-152) |
None |
|
|
Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 |
None |
|
|
[No title] (P.L. 108-1), signed Jan. 8, 2003. |
None |
|
|
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 2003 (P.L. 108-26) |
None |
|
|
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, Title IV Emergency Unemployment Compensation (P.L. 110-252) |
None |
|
|
Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-449) |
None |
|
|
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 |
None |
|
|
Worker, Homeowner, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-92) |
Extended 0.2% FUTA surtax an additional 1.5 years (through June 2011) |
|
|
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2010 |
None |
Large bill, EUC08 funding was declared emergency spending. |
|
The Temporary Extension Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-144) |
None |
|
|
The Continuing Extension Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-157) |
None |
|
|
The Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-205) |
None |
|
|
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) |
None |
|
|
The Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-78) |
Required the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to require each government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) (the Federal National Mortgage Association [Fannie Mae] and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation [Freddie Mac]) to charge a guarantee fee in connection with any guarantee of the timely payment of principal and interests on securities, notes, and other obligations based on or backed by mortgages on residential real properties designed principally for the occupancy of from one to four families. |
|
|
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96) |
Large bill, EUC08 was not declared emergency spending. The bill included offsets; for example, the auction of spectrum licenses and increased federal retirement contributions. |
|
|
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240) |
None |
Source: CRS.
Notes: Some of these laws reduced expenditures or increased revenues, but (1) they were part of large appropriation bills and generally not subject to PAYGO rules or (2) CRS was unable to directly link these measures to any type of unemployment benefits.
CRS did not attempt to identify whether these reductions in expenditures or increases in revenues fully offset the expected costs of the changes in expenditures on temporary unemployment benefits.
|
Dates |
Permanent Programs |
Temporary Programsa |
Total Weeks of Unemployment Benefits (Regular, Extended, and Temporary Benefits Programs) |
|||
|
Regular Unemployment Benefitsa |
Extended Benefit (EB) Programb |
Program Name |
Duration of Program Benefits |
|||
|
Aug. 14, 1935-Present (first regular unemployment benefit check sent out Aug. 17, 1936) |
Up to 26 weeks |
Up to 26 weeks (in the absence of temporary programs that provide additional weeks of benefits) |
||||
|
June 23, 1958-June 30, 1959 |
Up to 26 weeks |
Temporary Unemployment Compensation (TUC) |
Up to 13 weeks |
Up to 39 weeks |
||
|
Apr. 8, 1961-June 30, 1962 |
Up to 26 weeks |
Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation (TEUC) |
Up to 13 weeks |
Up to 39 weeks |
||
|
Oct. 10, 1970-Mar. 6, 2001 (P.L 91-373 enacted Aug. 10, 1970; national-level trigger available after Jan. 1, 1972; states given from Oct. 10, 1970 to Jan. 1, 1972, to include state-level EB trigger in state programs, although many states acted sooner) |
Up to 26 weeks |
EB Program Created. Up to 13 weeks of EB benefits if either national- or state-level triggers are reachedc |
Up to 39 weeks (in the absence of temporary programs that provide additional weeks of benefits) |
|||
|
Jan. 30, 1972-Mar. 31, 1973 |
Up to 26 weeks |
Up to 13 weeks of EB benefits if either national- or state-level triggers are reached c |
Temporary Compensation (TC) (P.L. 92-224, P.L. 92-329) |
Up to 13 weeks |
Up to 52 weeks |
|
|
Jan. 1, 1975-Feb. 1, 1978 |
Up to 26 weeks |
Up to 13 weeks of EB benefits if either national- or state-level triggers are reached c |
Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) |
Jan. 1975-Mar. 1975 Mar. 1975-Mar. 1977 Apr. 1977-Feb. 1978 |
Up to 13 weeks Up to 26 weeks Up to 13 weeks |
Up to 52 weeks Up to 65 weeks Up to 52 weeks |
|
Sept. 12, 1982-June 30, 1985 |
Up to 26 weeks |
Up to 13 weeks of EB benefits if state-level triggers reached (EB national trigger was eliminated in 1981)c |
Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) |
Sept. 1982-Dec. 1982 Jan. 1983-Mar. 1983 Apr. 1983-June 1985 |
Up to 10 weekse Up to 16 weekse Up to 14 weekse |
Up to 49 weeks Up to 55 weeks Up to 53 weeks |
|
Nov. 17, 1991-Apr. 30, 1994 |
Up to 26 weeks |
Up to 13 weeks of EB benefits if state-level triggers reached (national trigger eliminated in 1981)c |
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) Note: EUC benefits were reduced by any EB benefits received |
Nov. 1991-Feb. 1992 Feb. 1992-June 1992 June 1992-Sept. 1993 Sept. 1993-Oct. 1993 Oct. 1993-Apr. 1994 |
Up to 20 weekse Up to 33 weekse Up to 26 weekse Up to 15 weekse Up to 13 weekse |
Up to 46 weeks Up to 59 weeks Up to 52 weeks Up to 41weeks Up to 39 weeks |
|
Mar. 7, 1993-Present |
Up to 26 weeks |
New, Optional TUR Trigger Provides up to 20 Weeks of EB Benefits (P.L. 102-318). In states without the optional TUR trigger, EB benefits remain capped at 13 weeksd |
Up to 46 weeks in states that have adopted optional TUR trigger (in the absence of temporary programs providing additional weeks of benefits) |
|||
|
Mar. 9, 2002-Dec. 31, 2003 |
Up to 26 weeks |
Up to 20 weeks in states that have adopted optional TUR trigger,d otherwise up to 13 weeks (state may opt to trigger off EB if the state is on TEUC) |
Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation (TEUC) |
Up to 72 weeks |
||
|
July 2008-Present |
Up to 26 weeks |
Up to 20 weeks in states that have adopted optional TUR triggerd,g otherwise up to 13 weeks |
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 2008 (EUC08) |
July 2008-Nov. 2008 Nov. 2008-Nov. 2009 Nov. 2009-Feb. 2012 Feb. 2012-May 2012 June 2012-Aug. 2012 Sept. 2012-Dec. 2013 |
Up to 13 weeks Up to 33 weekse |
Up to 59 weeks Up to 79 weeks Up to 99 weeksg Up to 99 weeksg Up to 99 weeksg,i Up to 93 weeksg |
Sources: The information is from the U.S. Department of Labor, "Chronology of Federal Unemployment Compensation Laws" and "Special Extended Benefit Programs." Both documents are available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/laws.asp#FederalLegislation.
a. In 1940, only one state paid up to 26 weeks of regular unemployment benefits and 13 states paid no more than a maximum of 15 weeks of benefits. By 1950, 13 states paid up to 26 weeks of benefits. By 1960, 32 states paid up to 26 weeks of benefits and 9 states paid more than 26 weeks of benefits (these states generally paid around 30 weeks of benefits). During the 1990s, most states that had previously paid more than 26 weeks of benefits reduced the maximum number of available weeks to 26 as a result of state trust fund insolvency and the introduction of the EB program in the 1970s. Source: July 9, 2009, e-mail from Jerry Hildebrand, Chief of the Division of Legislation, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. Beginning in 2011, several states enacted legislation to decrease the maximum number of weeks of regular state UC benefits. Until recently, all states paid at least up to 26 weeks of UC benefits to eligible, unemployed individuals. (Montana pays up to 28 weeks of benefits and Massachusetts pays up to 30 weeks of benefits.) For details and enactment dates of state duration changes, see CRS Report R41859, Unemployment Insurance: Consequences of Changes in State Unemployment Compensation Laws, by [author name scrubbed].
b. The permanent EB program and certain temporary programs use unemployment rate thresholds, or "triggers," to determine whether the programs should be activated either at the state or national levels, depending on the program and the historical time period. The two unemployment rate triggers that have been used are the IUR and the TUR. The IUR is the number of unemployment insurance beneficiaries divided by the number of workers covered by unemployment insurance. The TUR is the number of unemployed workers (i.e., actively seeking work) divided by the total number of workers (employed and unemployed).
c. The EB program initially had both national and state-level triggers. EB was activated nationwide twice: (1) from February 23, 1975 through July 2, 1977; and (2) from July 20, 1980 through January 24, 1981. During periods when EB was not available nationally, the EB state-level trigger requirements sometimes caused EB to be unavailable in states with persistently high unemployment. The state-level trigger requirements were therefore suspended seven times between October 1972 and December 1976. Revisions to the EB program in 1981 kept the maximum number of available weeks at 13 but eliminated the national-level trigger. The 1981 revisions also established more restrictive criteria for activating EB at the state level through two provisions: (1) raising IUR thresholds that states need to reach to trigger onto EB, and (2) modifying the IUR calculation in a way that results in lower state IURs (specifically, eliminating EB claimants from the definition of unemployment insurance beneficiaries in the numerator of the IUR calculation). The 1981 changes to the EB program also added a second, optional trigger for 13 weeks of benefits that states could adopt, effective for weeks after September 25, 1982.
d. The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992 (P.L. 102-318) allowed states to make EB more widely available by adopting a third, optional trigger that would provide for 13 or 20 additional weeks of benefits depending on the state's TUR. Some, although not all, states cross the EB program's TUR trigger thresholds before crossing the program's IUR trigger. This is because of differences among states in unemployment insurance coverage (for example, the number of non-insured self-employed workers in the state) and also differences in states' eligibility rules and administrative practices that can limit the number of unemployment beneficiaries (the numerator in the IUR calculation, see table note b).
e. The figure shown is the maximum number of benefit weeks that were available under the program during the given time period. Certain temporary programs, however, used benefit "tiers" to provide more benefit weeks to states with relatively higher unemployment rates than to states with relatively lower unemployment rates. For example, the FSC program provided up to five different tiers of benefit durations within a single time period. The FSC and TEUC programs, besides linking the number of benefit weeks to state unemployment rates, also linked the number of available benefit weeks in a state to whether or not the state's EB program had triggered on. The EUC08 program provided a single tier of benefits when it was first became effective in July 2008; this was expanded to two tiers of benefits in November 2008 and to four tiers of benefits in November 2009.
f. The TEUC program also provided an additional 13-26 weeks of benefits to certain unemployed airline employees.
g. P.L. 111-312 made technical changes to certain triggers in the EB program. P.L. 111-312 allowed states to temporarily use lookback calculations based on three years of unemployment rate data (rather than the permanent law lookback of two years of data) as part of their mandatory IUR and optional TUR triggers if states would otherwise trigger off or not be on a period of extended benefits. This authorization for this option was extended by P.L. 112-78, P.L. 112-96, and P.L. 112-240. The authorization expired on the week ending on or before December 31, 2013.
h. Beginning in 2011, several states enacted legislation to decrease the maximum number of weeks of regular state UC benefits. Changes in UC benefit duration have consequences for the duration of federal unemployment benefits that may be available to unemployed workers. State UC benefit duration is an underlying factor in the calculation of duration for additional federal unemployment benefits. Thus, the reduction of the maximum duration of regular UC benefits reduces the number of weeks available to unemployed workers in the federal extended unemployment programs. See CRS Report R41859, Unemployment Insurance: Consequences of Changes in State Unemployment Compensation Laws, by [author name scrubbed], for a list of these states and estimates of the impact of the reductions on total potential weeks of unemployment insurance.
i. P.L. 112-96 capped the maximum number of weeks to not exceed 99.