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Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions
Michael F. Martin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
September 15, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
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Summary
The release of all Burma’s political prisoners is one of the fundamental goals of U.S. policy.
Several of the laws imposing sanctions on Burma—including the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-61) and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-
Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-286)—require the release of all political prisoners
before the sanctions can be terminated. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-
76) requires the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) to “support programs for former political prisoners” in Burma, as well as “monitor the
number of political prisoners in Burma.”
Burma’s President Thein Sein pledged during a July 2013 trip to the United Kingdom to release
all “prisoners of conscience” in his country by the end of the year. Since his announcement, he
granted amnesties or pardons on seven occasions. While President Thein Sein has asserted that all
political prisoners have been freed, several Burmese organizations maintain that dozens of
political prisoners remain in jail and that new political prisoners continue to be arrested and
sentenced.
Hopes for a democratic government and national reconciliation in Burma depend on the release of
prisoners, including those associated with the country’s ethnic groups. Several ethnic-based
political parties have stated they will not participate in parliamentary elections until their
members are released. Also, prospects for stable ceasefires and lasting peace with various ethnic-
based militias may depend on the release of their members currently in detention.
Estimates of how many political prisoners are being detained in Burma vary. According to the
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), a nonprofit organization
dedicated to identifying and locating political prisoners in Burma, the Burmese government was
incarcerating 84 political prisoners as of the end of August.
Differences in estimates of the number of political prisoners in Burma can be attributed to two
main factors. First, Burma’s prison and judicial system is not transparent, making it difficult to
obtain accurate information. Second, there is no consensus on the definition of a “political
prisoner.” Some limit the definition of “political prisoner” to “prisoners of conscience”; others
include members of the ethnic militias as political prisoners. President Thein Sein established the
Political Prisoner Review Committee (PPRC) in February 2013 to identify all political prisoners
in Burma, but the committee reportedly has been unable to agree on a common definition.
The State Department is actively discussing the political prisoner issue with the Burmese
government, opposition political parties, and representatives of some ethnic groups. In these
discussions, U.S. officials emphasize the importance of the release of all political prisoners for
the further easing or removal of U.S. sanctions on Burma.
The status of Burma’s political prisoners is likely to figure prominently in any future
congressional consideration of U.S. policy in Burma. Congress may choose to examine the
political prisoner issue in Burma either separately or as part of a broader review of U.S. policy
towards Burma. Congress may also consider inserting in legislation—such as the FY2015
appropriations bills for the State Department (H.R. 5013 and S. 2499)—language pertaining to
the political prisoner issue in Burma. This report will be updated as circumstances require.
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Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Defining Political Prisoners ............................................................................................................. 2
Current Estimates ............................................................................................................................. 5
Political Prisoners Review Committee ............................................................................................ 6
Prisoner Releases ............................................................................................................................. 8
Most Recent Releases .............................................................................................................. 10
Conditional or Not? ................................................................................................................. 10
Continuing Arrest of Political Prisoners .................................................................................. 11
Political Prisoners, Parliamentary Elections, and National Reconciliation ................................... 13
U.S. Sanctions, Laws, and Political Prisoners ............................................................................... 14
U.S. Efforts Regarding Political Prisoners .................................................................................... 16
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 17
Tables
Table 1. Burma’s Announced Prisoner Releases .............................................................................. 9
Table 2. Specified Conditions for the Removal of U.S. Sanctions on Burma ............................... 15
Table A-1. Summary of Prisoner Releases by Thein Sein Government ........................................ 21
Appendixes
Appendix. Reverse Chronology of Prisoner Releases by Thein Sein Government ....................... 20
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 23
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Introduction
On July 15, 2013, Burma’s President Thein Sein gave a speech at Chatham House in London in
which he raised the issue of political prisoners, stating:
Thousands of prisoners have been freed. A special committee, comprised in part of former
prisoners, is working diligently to ensure that no one remains in prison due to his or her
political beliefs or actions. We are reviewing all cases. I guarantee to you that by the end of
this year there will be no prisoners of conscience in Myanmar.1
Since making this pledge, President Thein Sein has granted pardons or amnesties to a total of 258
political prisoners on seven separate occasions, the last taking place on January 2, 2014. That
same day, in a radio address, President Thein Sein said, “I would also like to inform all of you
that with the aim of national reconciliation together with the hard work of the Political Prisoner
Review Committee, and in keeping with my promise, all political prisoners have been freed by
the end of last year [emphasis added].2
However, several individuals and organizations quickly disputed the president’s assessment. Ye
Aung, a member of the Political Prisoners Review Committee (PPRC)3 created by President
Thein Sein, stated on December 31, 2013, that 35 political prisoners remained in prison because
of other charges than those included in the presidential pardon.4 Three weeks later, Ye Aung
claimed the number of remaining political prisoners to be 33.5 On January 3, 2014, the Kachin
National Organization (KIO) issued a statement calling for the release of two of its members still
in jail, and criticizing the Thein Sein government for “continuing to arrest and sentence fellow
Kachins for their political belief.”6 The European Burma Network, a coalition of Burmese
political action organizations in Europe, released a statement on January 16, 2014, indicating that
“around 33 political prisoners” remain in prison, more than 100 people are awaiting trial for their
political activities, and several hundred Rohingyas are being illegally detained.7
The status of Burma’s political prisoners is a critical issue for U.S. policy. The full removal of
many of the U.S. sanctions on Burma is contingent on certain conditions being met by the Thein
Sein government and the Burmese military, including the unconditional release of all political
prisoners. Moreover, no single issue may play a more pivotal role in Burma’s possible transition
to a free and democratic country than the release of its political prisoners. Several opposition
1 Thein Sein, “Myanmar’s Complex Transformation: Prospects and Challenges,” speech given at Chatham House,
London, United Kingdom, July 15, 2013.
2 President Office, “Committee for Scrutinizing the Remaining Political Prisoners Healthy Constitution Must Be
Amended from Time to Time to Address National, Economic, Social Needs of Society,” press release, January 2, 2014,
http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=briefing-room/news/2014/01/02/id-3135.
3 The committee is also frequently referred to as the Political Prisoner Scrutiny Committee, or PPSC.
4 “Thirty-five Political Prisoners Still in Jail Despite Amnesty for ‘Other Offenses,’” Eleven Myanmar, January 2,
2014.
5 Aye Myint San, “33 Political Prisoners Still in Jail, Says Committee,” Mizzima, January 21, 2014.
6 Kachin National Organization, “Kachin National Organization Demand Unconditional Release of All Kachin Political
Prisoners,” press release, January 3, 2014.
7 European Burma Network, “No End in Sight for Political Prisoners in Burma—Permanent Review Mechanism
Needed,” press release, January 16, 2014.
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parties and organizations have stated that they will not participate in parliamentary elections or
agree to a national ceasefire until their members are unconditionally freed from detention.
At present, there is no consensus on how many political prisoners there are in Burma. One major
reason is the lack of transparency of the records of Burma’s 42 prisons and 109 labor camps.
Another major reason for variation in estimates is the use of different definitions of political
prisoners. Moreover, reports of new political prisoners being arrested and detained periodically
appear in the press suggesting the number of political prisoners is a moving target.
State Department officials have held talks with senior officials of the Burmese government,
representatives of Burma’s leading opposition parties, and major ethnic groups in an effort to
move towards a shared understanding of the scope of the political prisoner situation in Burma.
Neither the White House nor the State Department has issued a comment on President Thein
Sein’s claimed fulfilment of his promise to release all political prisoners by the end of 2013.
The 113th Congress has demonstrated a continuing concern about Burma’s political prisoners. The
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (H.R. 3547, P.L. 113-76), enacted on January 17, 2014,
requires the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to
“support programs for former political prisoners” in Burma, as well as “monitor the number of
political prisoners in Burma.” The political prisoner issue was also raised in hearings held by the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in September and
December 2013.8
Defining Political Prisoners
As noted above, one major factor complicating the determination of the number of political
prisoners in Burma is a lack of agreement on the definition of a political prisoner. While the
concept of political prisoner has a long history, there is no international standard for defining
political prisoners. Prisoners detained for political reasons are afforded some protection by
international agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The State Department has a general
definition of political prisoner that it uses, but the Thein Sein government and other interested
parties have their own, differing definitions.
For Burma, one of the more critical issues in defining political prisoners is whether or not to
include individuals who have been detained for their alleged association with Burma’s ethnic-
based militias or their associated political parties. Because these militias periodically have been
involved in armed conflict with the Burmese military, some analysts exclude detainees allegedly
associated with the militias from their estimates of Burma’s political prisoners. In addition,
certain groups being detained or subjected to serious oppression by the Thein Sein government or
officials may also be considered “political prisoners.”
8 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, An Unclear Roadmap:
Burma’s Fragile Political Reforms and Growing Ethnic Strife, 113th Cong., 1st sess., September 19, 2013; and U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Oversight of U.S. Policy
Toward Burma, 113th Cong., 1st sess., December 4, 2013.
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President Thein Sein has consistently confined his definition to only include “prisoners of
conscience,” and has generally used that phrase when discussing the issue. He has repeatedly
stated that individuals who have committed criminal acts are not considered “prisoners of
conscience,” and are expected the serve out their prison sentences. However, in announcing a
prisoner amnesty in July 2013, he stated that individuals were released on “humanitarian grounds
and encouraging them to be able to serve the national interest.”9 This may indicate a willingness
to accept a broader definition in practice, especially if it serves to facilitate negotiations with
ethnic minority organizations seeking a nation-wide peace agreement and progress toward
national reconciliation.
The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), an independent
organization founded in 2000 by ex-political prisoners,10 and Human Rights Watch (HRW) use a
relatively broad definition of political prisoners. The AAPP(B) defines a political prisoner as
“anyone who is arrested because of his or her perceived or real involvement in or supporting role
in opposition movements with peaceful or resistance means.”11 Other groups, such as Amnesty
International (AI) and the International Crisis Group (ICG), seemingly prefer a narrower
definition that only includes so-called “prisoners of conscience.”
The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor considers someone a
political prisoner if:
1. the person is incarcerated in accordance with a law that is, on its face,
illegitimate; the law may be illegitimate if the defined offense either
impermissibly restricts the exercise of a human right; or is based on race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular group;
2. the person is incarcerated pursuant to a law that is on its face legitimate, where
the incarceration is based on false charges where the underlying motivation is
based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular group; or
3. the person is incarcerated for politically motivated acts, pursuant to a law that is
on its face legitimate, but who receives unduly harsh and disproportionate
treatment or punishment because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion,
or membership in a particular group; this definition generally does not include
those who, regardless of their motivation, have gone beyond advocacy and
dissent to commit acts of violence.12
In applying this definition, the State Department recognizes that being accused of violent acts and
committing violent acts are two different matters, and considers the circumstances pertaining to a
particular person when determining if she or he is to be considered a political prisoner.
The AAPP(B) rejects the limitation of political prisoners to “prisoners of conscience” for several
reasons. First, the AAPP(B) maintains that the Burmese government frequently detains political
9 “Amnesty Granted to 73 Prisoners,” New Light of Myanmar, July 24, 2013.
10 The AAPP(B) describes itself as being dedicated to identifying and locating political prisoners in Burma, and
providing support for the prisoners and their families.
11 AAPP(B), “The Recognition of Political Prisoners: Essential to Democratic and National Reconciliation Process,”
press release, November 9, 2011.
12 Definition provided to CRS by the State Department.
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dissidents with false allegations that they committed violent or nonpolitical crimes. Restricting
the definition to “prisoners of conscience” would exclude many political prisoners. Second, the
AAPP(B) maintains that the decision to participate in armed resistance against the Burmese
government should be “viewed with the backdrop of violent crimes committed by the state,
particularly against ethnic minorities.”13 In short, the AAPP(B) views armed struggle as a
reasonable form of political opposition given the severity of the violence perpetrated by the
Burmese military and police.
The distinction between “prisoners of conscience” and a broader definition of political prisoners
was highlighted by the sentence suspension of January 13, 2012. Only a few of the prisoners
released on that date were associated with the ethnic militias or their affiliated political parties.
Following his release, Min Ko Naing, a pro-democracy activist, stated that many political
activists associated with ethnic armed groups remained in custody.14 However, Home Affairs
Minister Lieutenant General Ko Ko told reporters that some dissidents remained in detention
because they had committed criminal acts or have links with the Taliban.15
The Political Prisoners Review Committee (PPRC, also known as the Political Prisoner Scrutiny
Committee) reportedly attempted to develop a consensus definition of political prisoners. Bo Kyi,
the Committee’s AAPP(B) representative, told the press in May 2013 that the 19 members have
agreed to a definition, but that the Thein Sein government had not formally adopted the
definition.16
On August 17 and 18, 2014, AAPP(B) and the FPPS held a workshop in Rangoon to discuss a
common definition of political prisoners and to open a discussion with the Thein Sein
government and Burma’s Union Parliament on the topic.17 Representatives of various Burmese
organizations and political parties, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
attended the workshop. According to press accounts, the draft definition would include anyone
arrested, detained, or imprisoned for their direct or indirect activities to promote human rights,
freedom, equality for minorities, and civil liberties, and/or were involved in anti-government
protests, demonstrations, assemblies, or publications.18 Following the workshop, a Member of
Parliament from Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) reportedly said that
the NLD would submit a proposed definition of political prisoner to the Union Parliament.19
The plight of two segments of Burmese society has also been raised in association with the issue
of political prisoners. First, local Burmese officials are notorious for corruption, and reportedly
frequently use their official power to detain people on falsified charges in order to confiscate
property or otherwise exact revenge on their opponents. In addition, officials have reportedly
used provisions in old and new laws to arrest and detain people protesting alleged violations of
their legal rights. These abuses of power by officials have been portrayed as creating a special
13 AAPP(B), “The Recognition of Political Prisoners: Essential to Democratic and National Reconciliation Process,”
press release, November 9, 2011.
14 “Burma’s Remaining Jailed Dissidents,” Irrawaddy, January 17, 2012.
15 Aye Aye Win, “Praise for Myanmar Release of Political Prisoners,” Associated Press, January 15, 2012.
16 “Burma Releases Political Prisoners Ahead of US State Visit,” Irrawaddy, May 17, 2013.
17 “Myanmar Still Seeks Definition of Political Prisoner,” Eleven Myanmar, August 18, 2014.
18 San Yamin Aung, “Definition of Political Prisoner Sought with Govt, Activists at Odds,” Irrawaddy, August 21,
2014.
19 “NLD Moving to Recognise Myanmar’s ‘Political Prisoners,’” Eleven Myanmar, August 20, 2014.
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group of “political prisoners.” Second, the Burmese government continues to single out the
Rohingyas, a predominately Muslim ethnic minority residing in northern Rakhine State along the
border with Bangladesh, and subject them to more extensive and invasive political repression.
According to the Burmese government, the Rohingyas are not Burmese citizens, but illegal
immigrants from Bangladesh and India. The Rohingyas are subjected to severe oppression,
including restrictions on movement, employment, education, and marriage.
Current Estimates
Different groups provide varying estimates of the number of political prisoners being detained in
Burma. AAPP(B)’s August 2014 report on political prisoners states, “By the end of August, 84
political prisoners were incarcerated in Burma, while approximately 122 individuals have been
charged for politically motivated actions and await trial.”20 Tun Kyi of the FPPS told reporters on
August 24, 2014, that more than 100 activists, including a number of farmers protesting land
seizures, have been recognized as political prisoners.21 The International Federation for Human
Rights (Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de L’Homme, or FIDH), and the
Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN-Burma) published a list of eight political
prisoners on July 15, 2014,22 and in a separate press statement reported that there were 69
political prisoners in Burmese jails as of July 10, 2014.23 The State Department’s “Burma 2013
Human Rights Report”24 states:
By year’s end [2013] one prominent group assisting political prisoners estimated that
between 34 and 70 political prisoners remained in detention. This number did not include
detainees in Rakhine State, whose numbers were estimated to be in the hundreds.
Amnesty International released a public statement on July 15, 2014, indicating that after a year,
President Thein Sein’s pledge to release all “prisoners of conscience in Myanmar” remained
unfulfilled.25 While the press statement does not provide a precise number of prisoners of
conscience in detention, it did state, “So far in 2014, at least 59 individuals have been charged
and 17 of them imprisoned under a range of laws which restrict the rights to freedom of
expression and peaceful assembly.”
The Thein Sein government has never publicly released an official estimate of the number of
political prisoners. Aung Thein, Deputy Minister of the President’s Office, told the Myanmar
Times on August 18, 2014, that 29 alleged political prisoners that were in prison before December
31, 2013, remain incarcerated because they “were found to have broken other penal codes.”26
20 Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), Monthly Chronology of July 2014, August 8, 2014.
21 “Protesting Farmers among over 100 Activists Recognised as Political Prisoners,” Eleven Myanmar, August 24,
2014.
22 International Federation for Human Rights, Who Are Burma’s Political Prisoners?, July 15, 2014.
23 International Federation for Human Rights, “Burma: Increased Number of Political Prisoners Calls for Renewed
International Presure,” press release, July 15, 2014.
24 Department of State, Burma 2013 Human Rights Report, February 27, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220182#wrapper.
25 Amnesty International, Myanmar: One Year On, President’s Promise to Release All Prisoners of Conscience
Remains Unfulfilled, ASA 16/014/2014, July 15, 2014.
26 Ye Mon and Lum Min Mang, “Government Denies Political Prisoners Remain Behind Bars,” Myanmar Times,
(continued...)
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Obtaining an accurate and current tally of the number of political prisoners in Burma is
complicated by the lack of transparency of Burma’s judicial and prison system. Burma has 42
prisons and 109 labor camps scattered across the country, with no publicly accessible records of
who is being detained and where they are being detained. To estimate the number of political
prisoners, groups rely on a network of sources to provide information concerning each of the
prisons and labor camps. The AAPP(B), for example, reports that it uses inside networks,
confidential sources, court trial files, recently released prisoners, and families of prisoners to
compile its list of political prisoners.27
Maintaining an accurate tally of the number of political prisoners is also difficult because the
Burmese government and military allegedly continue to arrest and detain new political prisoners,
or otherwise infringe on their civil liberties. According to the AAPP(B), the Thein Sein
government arrested 12 political activists, sentenced 21 other activists, and released two political
prisoners in July 2014.28
Political Prisoners Review Committee
On February 6, 2013, President Thein Sein announced plans to form a committee “to scrutinize
the remaining political prisoners serving their terms in prisons throughout the country so as to
grant them liberty.”29 The original 16-member Political Prisoners Review Committee (PPRC, also
known as the Political Prisoners Scrutiny Committee) was chaired by Union Minister Soe Thein,
and included representatives from opposition groups with a history of supporting the release of
political prisoners, such as the 1988 Generation Students Group, AAPP(B), and the National
League for Democracy (NLD). The committee met several times, but significant differences
emerged regarding the definition to be used and, by extension, the estimates of the number of
political prisoners in Burma. On May 8, 2013, President Thein Sein reconstituted the committee
with 19 members and Soe Thein remaining as chair. The committee reportedly continued to
disagree about the proper definition and number of political prisoners in detention in Burma.
Reports indicate that its members struggled to reach agreement on critical aspects of their
committee’s mandate. In addition, it is unclear what influence the committee’s recommendations
have had with President Thein Sein or Burma’s National Defence and Security Council (NDSC),
which has the constitutional authority to recommend prisoner amnesties to the President.30
(...continued)
August 18, 2014.
27 AAPP(B), “Political Prisoner List is Now 1,572—Location of 918 Confirmed and Documented,” press release,
December 23, 2011.
28 Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), Monthly Chronology of Burma’s Political Prisoners for July,
2014, August 8, 2014.
29 President Office, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, “Committee to be Formed to Grant Liberty to Remaining
Political Prisoners,” press release, February 6, 2013.
30 Section 204 of the constitution grants the NDSC the authority to recommend prisoner amnesties to the President.
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In his announcement to form the PPRC, President Thein Sein indicated that Union Minister Soe
Thane would be the committee chair, and that the other members of the committee would be
“representatives from government ministries, civil society organizations and some political
parties.” The other 15 members are notable for
the inclusion of representatives of three
Members of Political Prisoners Scrutiny
organizations known for their work to free
Committee
Burma’s political prisoners.
(members added on May 8, 2013, in italics)
• Soe Thane (aka Soe Thein) (Chair), Pyidaungzu
The State Department welcomed the
Minister, President Office
formation of the committee and pointed to its
• Brigadier General Kyaw Kyaw Tun, Police Chief,
creation as evidence that the Thein Sein
Deputy Minister, Ministry of Home Affairs
government is taking serious steps to address
• Tun Tun Oo, Deputy Chief Justice, Supreme Court
the political prisoner problem.31 Domestic and
of Burma
international human rights organizations also
• Aung Saw Win, Director General, Bureau of Special
supported the creation of the committee,
Investigation
although in some cases with some skepticism.
• Than Htay, Director General, Correctional
The committee first met on February 13, 2013,
Department
at the Myanmar Peace Center in Rangoon. It
• Sit Myaing, Myanmar National Human Rights
met several times since then, working on
Commission
developing a common definition of political
• U Kyi, Myanmar Red Cross
prisoners, compiling a list of possible political
• Bo Kyi, Assistance Association for Political
prisoners in detention, and drafting
Prisoners (Burma) (AAPP)
recommendations for President Thein Sein on
how to expedite the release of political
• Nyo Tun, League of Former Political Prisoners
(LFPP)
prisoners identified by the PPRC.
• Ye Aung, Former Political Prisoners Society (FPPS)
On May 8, 2013, President Thein Sein
• Thura (Zarganar), House of Media Entertainment
reconstituted the PPRC, expanding its
•
membership to 19 people (see text box,
Khun Tun Oo, Shan Nationalities Democratic Party
(SNLD)
“Members of Political Prisoners Scrutiny
Committee”).32 The decision to augment the
• Ko Ko Gyi, 88 Generation Students Group
membership of the committee reportedly was
• Nyan Win, National League for Democracy Party
not discussed with the original 16 members
(NLD)
before the President’s announcement.33
• Hla Maung Shwe, Myanmar Egress
Among the difficulties the group has faced is
• Win Naing, National Democratic Forces
developing a common definition of political
• Thein Nyunt, New National Democracy Party
prisoners. Sources indicate that some
• Kaung Myint Htut, Myanmar National Congress Party
committee members prefer a narrow definition
that would only include prisoners of
• Aung Thein, Deputy Minister, President’s Office
conscience, while other members support a
31 On February 11, 2013, the State Department issued a statement welcoming the formation of the committee, stating
that the Union Government “has taken an important step towards national reconciliation,” and that the State
Department looked forward “to supporting the implementation of this process.” (State Department, “Progress on
Political Prisoners in Burma,” press release, February 11, 2013.)
32 President Office, “Committee for Scrutinizing the Remaining Prisoners of Conscience Reconstituted,” Notification
No. 43/2013, May 8, 2013.
33 Naw Say Phaw Waa, “Activists Slam Reshuffle of Prisoner Body,” Myanmar Times, May 13, 2013.
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broader definition (see “Defining Political Prisoners”). On March 14, 2013, the FPPS gathered a
group of Burmese political activists and lawyers to discuss the definition of political prisoner. A
similar event was held in August 2014.
Another issue for the committee is its ability to work as a group. According to an FPPS
spokesperson, his organization had submitted a longer list of people to be released prior to the
April 23, 2013, amnesty, but the committee chose to ignore some of those on the list, and to
include a number of people not considered political prisoners by the FPPS.34 Prior to announcing
the amnesty, the committee members were reportedly asked to endorse the committee’s
recommendations, but several refused to do. The FPPS spokesperson stated that the committee’s
leadership was not interested in the views of the civil society organizations, and was using the
committee for political purposes, such as fostering better relations with the European Union.35
On December 31, 2013, the PPRC released a statement on its work to date that was printed in the
New Light of Myanmar on January 1, 2014.36 The statement recounts that the PPRC had met a
total of 12 times between its creation and December 21, 2013, and had submitted the names of
354 people to receive presidential amnesty—which is 33 more than the number of political
prisoner released during that time period (see Table 1 below). On January 14, 2014, the PPRC
announced that it would continue to meet because, in the words of one of its members, “there are
still political prisoners in Burma.”37 However, it has reportedly met twice since the beginning of
2014, despite repeated requests from AAPP(B) and FPPS for more meetings.
Prisoner Releases
Since his appointment in April 2011, President Thein Sein has granted amnesty to selected
prisoners on 17 separate occasions, the latest occurring on January 2, 2014 (see Table 1). In total,
the Thein Sein government has released an estimated 36,761 prisoners, of whom at least 1,165
were political prisoners, according to the AAPP(B).
Several of the prisoner releases have occurred near the time of a major political development
between Burma and the United States (see Appendix for details). In some cases, President Thein
Sein may have released prisoners in an effort to obtain a desired response from the U.S.
government or the international community. In other cases, the prisoners may have been released
in response to an action by the U.S. government. This pattern is reportedly causing some concern
at the State Department and by other observers as it may imply that the prisoners are being used
as political pawns.38
34 “Prisoner Release Draws Criticism from Activists,” Myanmar Times, April 24, 2013.
35 Ibid.
36 “Press Release on Work Progress Report of Committee for Scrutinizing the Remaining Political Prisoners,” New
Light of Myanmar, January 1, 2014.
37 Feliz Solomon, “'Not Finished Yet—Political Prisoner Committee to Continue,” Democratic Voice of Burma,
January 14, 2014.
38 For example, see “Myanmar Uses Prisoners as Pawns,” Bangkok Post, May 6, 2013; or Hanna Hindstrom, “Thein
Sein Using Political Prisoners as ‘Pawns,’” Democratic Voice of Burma, September 19, 2012.
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Table 1. Burma’s Announced Prisoner Releases
(In reverse chronological order)
Political
Prisoners
Prisoners
Percentage of
Government Date
Released
Released
Political Prisoners
Union Government
January 2, 2014
13,274
3
negligible
December 30, 2013
5 5 100.0%
(amnesty)
December 30, 2013
~100 16 ~16.0%
(pardon)
December 11, 2013
44
41
93.2%
November 15, 2013
69
66
95.7%
October 8, 2013
56
56
100.0%
July 23, 2013
73
68
93.2%
May 17, 2013
23
21
91.3%
April 23, 2013
93
69
74.2%
November 19, 2012
66
51
77.3%
November 15-16, 2012
452
0
0.0%
September 17, 2012
514
88
17.1%
July 3, 2012
46
25
54.3%
January 13, 2012
336
302
89.9%
January 2, 2012
651
34
5.2%
October 11, 2011
6,359
247
3.9%
May 16, 2011
14,600
73
0.5%
State Peace and
September 17, 2009
7,114
128
1.8%
Development Council
February 20, 2009
6,313
24
0.4%
September 23, 2008
9,002
10
0.1%
January 3, 2007
2,831
50
1.7%
July 6, 2005
334
253
75.7%
January 3, 2005
5,588
26
0.5%
December 13, 2004
5,070
21
0.4%
November 29, 2004
5,311
12
0.2%
November 18, 2004
3,937
28
0.7%
Sources: AAPP(B); Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (Altsean), Burma Bulletin, Issue 79, July 2013.
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Most Recent Releases
On December 30, 2013, President Thein Sein granted amnesty for five prisoners “on
humanitarian grounds” who were reportedly on the PPRC list of political prisoners,39 and issued
Order No. 51/2013, pardoning all persons who had been convicted, awaiting trial, or under
investigation as of December 31, 2013, for the following crimes:
• Violations of the Unlawful Association Act;
• Treason (Code of Criminal Procedure Article 122);
• Sedition (Code of Criminal Procedure Article 124(a));
• Violations of the Law to Safeguard the State from Danger of Subversive
Elements;
• Violations of the Peaceful Gathering and Peaceful Procession Law;
• “Harming public interests” (Code of Criminal Procedure Article 505); and
• Violations of the 1950 Emergency Act.40
An estimated 100 prisoners were released under Order No. 51/2013, of which 16 have been
identified as political prisoners by the AAPP(B).
On January 2, 2014, President Thein Sein issued Order No. 1/2014, commuting all death
sentences to life in prison, cutting all sentences of over 40 years to no more than 40 years, and
reducing all sentences of under 40 years by one-fourth of the proscribed term “with the aim of
honouring the 66th Anniversary Independence Day.”41 On January 6, 2014, the government-run
newspaper, The New Light of Myanmar, reported that 13,274 prisoners had been released under
Order No. 1/2014.42 According to the AAPP(B) and the FPPS, only 3 of the released prisoners
were political prisoners.43
Conditional or Not?
The use of Section 401 authority for some of the recent prisoner releases raises the issue of
possible conditions on the prisoners’ sentence suspension. Section 401 of Burma’s Code of
Criminal Procedure grants the president authority to suspend or remit sentences, with or without
conditions, as well as cancel the suspension or remission if the person in question fails to fulfill
the conditions for her or his release. As a result, a person released from detention under Section
401 may be required to serve out the rest of his or her suspended sentence if she or he is
convicted of another crime or fails to fulfill the conditions of her or his release. At least one
pardoned political prisoner, Nay Myo Zin, had been sentenced to serve the rest of his previous
39 “Amnesty Granted for Five Prisoners,” New Light of Myanmar, December 31, 2013.
40 “Order No. 51/2013—Pardon,” New Light of Myanmar, December 31, 2013.
41 President Office, “Order No. (1/2014)—Presidential Pardon,” January 2, 2014, published in the New Light of
Myanmar, January 3, 2014.
42 “13,274 Prisoners Released Under Pardon,” New Light of Myanmar, January 6, 2014.
43 Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Activists Say Political Prisoners Remain in Jail,” Myanmar Times, January 6, 2014.
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sentence (six years) after being convicted of a crime after his release, until he was granted a
second pardon in May 2013.44
Following their release on January 13, 2012, several former political prisoners indicated that they
had been provided unconditional pardons, but a few said that they were instructed to limit their
political activities. None of the prisoners released were placed under house arrest. However, Sithu
Zeya said to reporters that he was told that if he committed any crime, he would have to serve the
remainder of his 18-year sentence. “It is like we are being freed with leashes still attached to our
necks,” he reportedly said.45
The use of Section 401 may also suggest the possibility of some opposition to the release of
political prisoners within the Thein Sein government and/or within the Burmese military. Because
President Thein Sein based the sentence suspensions on Section 401, he did not need to obtain the
approval of Burma’s National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), a constitutional body with
significant power, consisting of Burma’s president; its two vice presidents; the speakers for each
chamber of its parliament; the commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief of defense
services; and the ministers of border affairs, defence, foreign affairs, and home affairs.46 President
Thein Sein may have decided to use Section 401 authority to avoid NDSC review, given the
reported fate of a previous proposed prisoner release.47
Continuing Arrest of Political Prisoners
While President Thein Sein claims that there are no political prisoners in Burma, his government
reportedly continues to arrest and detain new political prisoners for alleged illegal activities. As
previously mentioned, the AAPP(B) reports that as of the end of July around 114 people have
been detained and are awaiting trial for what it considers to be political actions. The Asian
Human Rights Commission (AHRC), a nonprofit nongovernmental organization located in Hong
Kong, is also tracking the detention of political prisoners in Burma. According to the AAPP(B)
and AHRC, many have been detained for violations of Section 505 of Burma’s Penal Code and/or
Section 18 of the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law of 2011—two of the laws
President Thein Sein identified in his pardon of December 30, 2013. To many observers, the
Union Government’s response to popular protests, as well as its arrest of several journalists, have
raised questions about the sincerity of its support of basic human rights, such as freedom of
speech and freedom of the press.
As the year 2013 ended, several prominent voices of opposition where arrested, detained and/or
sentenced for what were seemingly political reasons. For example, three people released under
44 Nay Moe Zin was released in January 2012, with six more years to serve on his sentence. He was originally
sentenced to 10 years in prison in August 2011 for breaking the Electronic Transactions Act, a law that is highly
criticized by free speech advocates. In May 2013, he chose to serve a three-month sentence for allegedly defaming a
police officer. The Ministry of Home Affairs subsequently decided to reinstate his previous sentence. (“Burma Cancels
Amnesty for Former Political Prisoner,” Irrawaddy, May 8, 2013)
45 “Burma Frees High-Profile Dissidents in Amnesty,” BBC, January 13, 2012.
46 Hla Hla Htay, “Myanmar Prisoner Release Delayed,” Agence France Press, November 14, 2011.
47 On January 2, 2012, President Thein Sein issued Presidential Order No. 1/2012, granting a partial amnesty to all
existing Burmese prisoners using authority granted by section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 Constitution. Amnesties granted
under section 204(a) are subject to the approval of the NDSC. That amnesty was reportedly delayed by NDSC for
nearly three months.
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the December 11, 2013, presidential amnesty – Aye Thein, Htin Kyaw, and Thein San—were
reportedly re-arrested within hours of their release for alleged violations of local offenses.48 The
Democratic Voice of Burma reported on November 29, 2013, that six activists were convicted for
violating Article 18 of the Peaceful Gathering and Peaceful Procession Law for organizing
unauthorized demonstrations in Pegu and Rangoon.49 Mizzima reported on December 2, 2013,
that nine activists against a copper mine in Letpadaung were also charged for violating Article 18
of the Peaceful Gathering and Peaceful Procession Law.50
Another prominent case is that of Naw Ohn Hla, who was sentenced in August 2013 to two years
in prison for organizing a demonstration without a permit, but was granted amnesty on November
15, 2013. Naw Ohn Hla is one of the leaders of the anti-copper mine demonstration Sagaing
Division. On December 11, 2013, lawyers for Naw Ohn Hla said that she was re-arrested on
November 29, 2013, for organizing another demonstration, and has subsequently been charged
with disturbing the peace in 2007 by publicly praying for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi.51
In 2014, the pattern of arresting, detaining, and trying demonstration organizers and journalists
continued. For example, Eleven Myanmar reported that Sein Than was sentenced by a court in
Latha Township in Yangon Division to four months in prison with hard labor on August 19, 2014,
for violating the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act.52 Sein Than helped organize a
march in March 2014 to protest what was considered inadequate compensation for land seized by
the Burmese military.
Htin Kyaw, the leader of the community-based Movement for Democracy Current Force,
according to Mizzima, was sentenced to one year with hard labor by a court in Dagon Seikkan
Township in Yangon Division on August 19, 2014, for the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful
Procession Act.53 The land rights activist has already been sentenced to seven and a half years in
prison by other courts for organizing demonstrations. He reportedly is awaiting trials in three
other townships on similar charges.
The Thein Sein government arrested and detained four journalists and the chief executive officer
(CEO) of the Burmese-language Unity Journal at the end of January 2014 for publishing a story
alleging that the Burmese military was constructing a secret chemical weapons facility in the
mountains of Magway Division.54 On July 10, 2014, the four journalists—Aung Thura, Lu Maw
Naing, Sithu Soe, and The Yazar Oo—and CEO Tin Hsan were sentenced to 10 years with hard
labor for violating the State Secrets Act. On July 12, Burmese police reportedly arrested about 50
journalists protesting the Unity Journal sentences for violating the Peaceful Assembly and
Peaceful Procession Act.55 The charges against the 50 journalists were supposedly dropped and
48 “Pardoned Prisoners Re-arrested within Hours, Says Activist Group,” Mizzima, December 11, 2013.
49 Shwe Aung, “Activists Convicted Under Article 18 in Rangoon, Pegu,” Democratic Voice of Burma, December 3,
2013.
50 Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), Monthly Chronology of Burma’s Political Prisoners for
December, 2013, January 13, 2014, http://www.aappb.org/AAPP_December_chronology_2013..pdf.
51 Kyaw Hsu Mon, “Burma Activist Naw Ohn Hla Faces ‘Religious Disturbance” Complaint,” Irrawaddy, December
11, 2013.
52 “Protest Leader Sentenced to Four Months with Hard Labour,” Mizzima, August 20, 2014.
53 “MDCF’s Founder Geta Another Year in Prison,” Eleven Myanmar, August 19, 2014.
54 Committee to Protect Journalists, “Burma Holds 4 Journalists for Chemical Weapons Report,” February 3, 2014. The
Thein Sein government and the Burmese military deny that they are constructing a chemical weapons factory.
55 Front Line Defenders, Burma - More than 50 Journalists Charged for Protesting the 10-year Prison Sentence of
(continued...)
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the Speakers of the two chambers of the Union Parliament have reportedly agreed to revise the
penal code to address the treatment of journalists.56
Political Prisoners, Parliamentary Elections, and
National Reconciliation
The release of political prisoners has potentially important implications for future parliamentary
elections and prospects for national reconciliation. The NLD’s decision to participate in the April
2012 parliamentary by-elections was apparently based in part on the October 11, 2011, amnesty,
which included 39 NLD members, according to the AAPP(B).57 At the same time, several
political parties (including the Chin National Party, the Mon National Democratic Front, the
Rakhine National Democratic Party, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), and
the Zomi National Congress) said they would not participate in the 2012 by-elections because
some of their members remained in detention.58 While the January 2012 and July 2013 prisoner
releases included a significant number of NLD members and people associated with ethnic
organizations, neither amnesty included members of political parties boycotting or barred from
the April by-election. Regardless of how the by-elections were conducted, some groups may
argue that future parliamentary elections would not be free and fair so long as some political
parties are unwilling to participate because of what they perceive to be the detention of their
members for political reasons.
The NLD decision to participate in the by-election gave rise to some tension with some ethnic
groups, who saw the move as an abandonment of solidarity among opposition groups. One of the
reasons the NLD and several ethnic political parties did not participate in the November 2010
elections that brought the Union Government into power was the continued detention of some of
their party leaders and members. Some ethnic groups who still had members in detention at the
time were unhappy with the NLD’s decision to participate in the by-elections. As such, Aung San
Suu Kyi and the NLD may be less able to play the role of intermediary in discussions between the
Burmese government and various ethnic groups to forge a path towards national reconciliation.
It is unclear how committed the Thein Sein government and Burma’s military, the Tatmadaw, are
pursuing national reconciliation at this time. According to some observers, the Thein Sein
government has made the signing of a nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) with the ethnic
militias a top priority, and may pardon some prisoners associated with the ethnic organizations to
obtain their support for the NCA. Other observers, however, contend that the talks could be
designed to provide the Tatmadaw with time to redeploy and rearm troops in the field and resume
(...continued)
Unity Weekly Journalists, July 15, 2014.
56 Yen Snaing, “Parliament Speakers Consider Revision of Penal Code for Journalists,” August 21, 2014.
57 Another factor in the NLD decision was the amendment of election laws to allow Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD
members to run for office.
58 Tun Tun, “Newly Formed Parties to Contest in Burmese By-Election,” Mizzima, November 17, 2011; and Wai Moe,
“NLD Decides to Re-Register, Compete in Coming Elections,” Irrawaddy, November 18, 2011. In June 2103, the Chin
National Party, Rakhine National Democratic Party, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), and 12
other ethnic parties agreed to form a united Federal Union Party for the 2015 elections. The Mon National Democratic
Front (renamed the Mon Democracy Party) and the Zomi National Congress also decided to participate in the 2015
elections, but as individual parties.
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a military campaign against the militias if the negotiations fail to result in an NCA. As such, it is
uncertain if the Thein Sein government would be willing to release alleged ethnic militia
members and supporters as part of the ceasefire negotiations.
U.S. Sanctions, Laws, and Political Prisoners
Burma’s detention of political prisoners was a major reason for the United States to impose
sanctions on Burma between 1988 and 2008.59 The Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-
382), which required the President to impose “such economic sanctions upon Burma as the
President determines appropriate,” was passed after Burma’s ruling military junta, the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC), refused to honor the results of May 1990 parliamentary
elections and detained Aung San Suu Kyi and many other opposition leaders. Similarly, the
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA) (P.L. 108-61) was passed after the SPDC
cracked down on opposition parties, and once again detained Aung San Suu Kyi and other
opposition leaders. The Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act
of 2008 (JADE Act) (P.L. 110-286) was passed after the violent suppression of the autumn 2007
popular protests and the subsequent arrest and imprisonment of many of the protest leaders,
including a number of Buddhist monks.
The release of all political prisoners is also one of the preconditions for the removal of many of
the U.S. sanctions on Burma (see Table 2).60 The economic sanctions required by Section 138 of
the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 are to remain in place until the President certifies to Congress
that certain conditions have been met, including “[p]risoners held for political reasons in Burma
have been released.” Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act of 1997 (Section 570, P.L. 104-208) authorizes the President to ban
new investments in Burma if “the Government of Burma has physically harmed, rearrested for
political acts [emphasis added] or exiled Daw Aung Suu Kyi or has committed large-scale
repression of or violence against the Democratic opposition.” The BFDA requires a ban on all
imports from Burma (including a ban on the products of certain Burmese companies), a freeze of
the assets of certain Burmese officials and U.S. opposition to “any loan or financial or technical
assistance to Burma” until certain conditions are met, including the release of “all political
prisoners.”61 Finally, the JADE Act bans the issuance of visas to certain Burmese officials and
their supporters, freezes the assets of certain Burmese officials and their supporters, and prohibits
the provision of financial services to certain Burmese officials and their supporters until specific
conditions have been met, including the unconditional release of all political prisoners.
The Burmese sanction laws, however, generally include provisions that allow for a presidential
waiver if the President determines that it is in the national interest of the United States. The ban
on new U.S. investments in Burma was waived on July 11, 2012. The BFDA import ban was
waived on November 15, 2012, by the State Department using presidential authority granted in
59 For more about the history of U.S. sanctions on Burma, see CRS Report R41336, U.S. Sanctions on Burma, by
Michael F. Martin.
60 For a description of the waiver provisions of U.S. sanctions on Burma, see CRS Report R41336, U.S. Sanctions on
Burma, by Michael F. Martin.
61 The general import ban and company-specific import ban in the BFDA lapsed in July 2013, when Congress did not
pass the required annual resolution to renew the trade restrictions. The other sanctions specified in the law remain in
effect.
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the BFDA. President Obama waived the financial sanctions in the JADE Act on August 6, 2013,
as part of Presidential Executive Order 13651. As a consequence, most of the sanctions tied to
political prisoners have been waived.
Table 2. Specified Conditions for the Removal of U.S. Sanctions on Burma
(Text extracted from relevant legislation unless otherwise noted; emphasis added)
Law Conditions
Section 138 of the
(1) Burma meets the certification requirements listed in Section 802(b) of the Narcotics
Customs and Trade Act
Control Act of 1986
of 1990
(2) The national government legal authority has been transferred to a civilian
government
(3) Martial law has been lifted in Burma
(4) Prisoners held for political reasons in Burma have been released.
Section 570 of the
President determines and certifies to Congress that the Government of Burma has not
Foreign Operations,
physical y harmed, rearrested for political acts, or exiled Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and
Export Financing, and
has not committed large-scale repression of or violence against the Democratic
Related Programs
Opposition.a
Appropriations Act of
1997
Burmese Freedom and
(A) The SPDC has made substantial and measurable progress to end violations of
Democracy Act of 2003
international y recognized human rights including rape, and the Secretary of State, after
consultation with the ILO Secretary General and relevant nongovernmental
organizations, reports to the appropriate congressional committeesb that the SPDC no
longer systematically violates workers’ rights, including the use of forced and child labor,
and conscription of child-soldiers.
(B) The SPDC has made measurable and substantial progress toward implementing a
democratic government, including—
(i) releasing all political prisoners;
(ii) al owing freedom of speech and the press;
(ii ) allowing freedom of association;
(iv) permitting the peaceful exercise of religion; and
(v) bringing to a conclusion an agreement between the SPEC and the democratic
forces led by the NLD and Burma’s ethnic nationalities on the transfer of power to
a civilian government accountable to the Burmese people through democratic
elections under the rule of law.
(C) Pursuant to Section 706(20 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
2003 (P.L. 107-228), Burma has not been designated as a country that has failed
demonstrably to make substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under international
counternarcotics agreements and to take other effective counternarcotics measures…
The Tom Lantos Block
(T)he President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committeesc
Burmese JADE (Junta’s
that the SPDC has—
Anti-Democratic Efforts)
Act of 2008
(1) Unconditionally released all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu
Kyi and other members of the National League for Democracy;
(2) Entered into a substantive dialogue with democratic forces led by the National
League for Democracy and the ethnic minorities of Burma on transitioning to
democratic government under the rule of law; and
(3) Allowed humanitarian access to populations affected by armed conflict in all regions
of Burma.
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Notes:
a. The law required the imposition of sanctions if the President determines and certifies to Congress that the
Government of Burma has committed these acts. It is assumed that removal requires a presidential
determination that the Government of Burma no longer commits these acts.
b. “Appropriate congressional committees” are Senate Appropriations Committee, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, House Appropriations Committee, and House Foreign Affairs Committee.
c. “Appropriate congressional committees” are Senate Finance Committee, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, House Ways and Means Committee, and House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Beyond the laws imposing sanctions on Burma, Congress has also enacted legislation addressing
the issue of political prisoners in Burma. Section 7043(b)(3)(A) of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2014 (H.R. 3547, P.L. 113-76) stipulates:
Not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the USAID Administrator, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
comprehensive strategy for the promotion of democracy and human rights in Burma, which
shall include support for civil society, former prisoners, monks, students, and democratic
parliamentarians [emphasis added].
The explanatory statement by the Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations regarding
the law elaborates further on the required support for former prisoners, stating:
In addition to programs specified in section 7043(b)(2) of this Act, the Department of State
and USAID shall support programs for former political prisoners (including health,
education, and vocational training activities); … and programs to monitor the number of
political prisoners in Burma.62
U.S. Efforts Regarding Political Prisoners
U.S. officials have consistently called for the release of all political prisoners in Burma. As
previously mentioned, President Obama spoke of the continued detention of prisoners of
conscience during his speech at the University of Yangon in November 2012. National Security
Advisor Tom Donilon stated in a presentation in Washington prior to the President’s trip to Burma
that
The President’s meetings—as well as his speech to the people of Burma—will also be an
opportunity to reaffirm the progress that still must be made. This includes the unconditional
release of remaining political prisoners [emphasis added], an end to ethnic conflicts, steps
to establish the rule of law, ending the use of child soldiers, and expanded access for
humanitarian assistance providers and human rights observers in conflict areas.63
In her testimony at a December 4, 2013, hearing on U.S. policy in Burma, held by the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, then-State Department
Senior Advisor on Burma Judith Cefkin stated:
62 “Explanatory Statement by Mr. Rogers of Kentucky, Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations regarding
the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment on H.R. 3547, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014,”
Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 160, No. 9 - Book II (January 15, 2014), p. H1169.
63 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “President Obama’s Asia Policy and Upcoming Trip to Asia,” press
release, November 15, 2012.
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We are committed to working with the government, Aung San Suu Kyi and political
opposition, and with civil society to fully implement commitments announced before
President Obama’s visit just a year ago. In particular, we are watching closely the
commitment to release all political prisoners by the end of the year.… We are committed to
assisting the reintegration of these heroic individuals back into society and ensuring that they
are released without conditions.64
In its report to Congress required by section 7043(b)(3)(A) of the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2014, the State Department indicated that it intends to continue to work with the PPRC “to
resolve remaining cases of prisoners convicted under repressive laws or for political activism.”65
The report also stated that the technical assistance programs would be established to “rehabilitate
released political prisoners so they can effectively resume their role promoting democratic
transition and human rights.”
Secretary Kerry reportedly raised the case of the five Unity Journal staffers in his meetings with
President Thein Sein and other senior Burmese officials during his August 2014 trip to Burma.66
The State Department has also raised the issue of political prisoners in Burma with other
governments. U.S. Ambassador to Burma Derek Mitchell traveled to China, Japan, and South
Korea following Secretary Clinton’s 2011 trip to Burma to discuss the status of U.S. policy
towards Burma during his time as U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma.
The issue of political prisoners was reportedly raised during his meetings on that trip. Similar
discussions have been held with other governments and the European Union. Following his visit
to Burma, British Foreign Secretary William Hague told reporters that EU sanctions on Burma
should not be lifted while political prisoners remain in detention.67
In addition to leading an international effort to press for the release of all political prisoners in
Burma, senior U.S. officials indicate that the State Department has also had talks with senior
Burmese officials, Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders, several opposition parties, and
representatives of some ethnic groups about compiling a complete and accurate list of political
prisoners currently in custody.68 One of the key factors in these discussions is finding a common
understanding of who is to be considered a political prisoner. Such discussions are reportedly
ongoing.
Issues for Congress
The continued detention of political prisoners in Burma—as well as the state of human rights in
general—are likely to figure prominently in congressional consideration of U.S. policy towards
Burma. In the coming months, Congress may decide to examine the status of the implementation
of existing U.S. sanctions on Burma. It may also assess the political prisoner issue, either in
64 Department of State, “Oversight of U.S. Policy Toward Burma: Testimony of Judith Beth Cefkin,” press release,
December 4, 2013.
65 Department of State, Strategy for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights in Burma, Ref: Sec. 7043(b)(3)(A)
of H.R. 3547, “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014,” April 21, 2014.
66 Michael R. Gordon, “Kerry Urges Myanmar to Stay on Path to Democracy, Despite Stumbles,” New York Times,
August 10, 2014.
67 Ba Kaung, “EU Sanctions Remain Until Burmese Prisoner Release: Hague,” Irrawaddy, January 6, 2012.
68 Interview with CRS, January 2012.
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isolation or as part of a broader consideration of human rights in Burma and sanctions policy.
Congress may take up legislation to amend or alter U.S. sanctions on Burma, depending on the
evolving conditions in the country. In addition, the Obama Administration may ask Congress for
additional funding for humanitarian programs in Burma to address the serious humanitarian needs
of Burma’s internally displaced people (IDPs), refugees, and other vulnerable populations.
Existing U.S. sanctions on Burma are based on several laws specifically focused on Burma, as
well as other laws that sanction nations that fail to comply with U.S. standards of conduct related
to specific issues. The changing political situation in Burma, including the status of political
prisoners, may warrant congressional consideration of whether existing sanctions should be
altered or removed. Similarly, the President has the authority—which he has used several times—
to waive or suspend some of the existing sanctions on Burma if he determines that the necessary
conditions have been met, or if he determines that doing so is in the national interest of the United
States. If the President were once again to exercise this executive authority, Congress may choose
to review the President’s determination.
Congress may also choose to monitor and evaluate the Obama Administration’s efforts to address
the political prisoner and human rights situation in Burma. As previously mentioned, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (H.R. 3547, P.L. 113-76) requires the Department of
State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) “support programs for former
political prisoners,” as well as “monitor the number of political prisoners in Burma.” A State
Department “Fact Sheet” on U.S. assistance to Burma released on August 8, 2014, specially
mentioned “rehabilitation and reintegration programs for released political prisoners.”69 Congress
may decide to use its oversight authority to check the Obama Administration’s compliance with
its legal obligations.
Taken together, information available to CRS suggests that the level of detail provided by the
Obama Administration to Congress about the conduct of U.S. policy toward Burma, including its
efforts to address the political prisoner problem, falls short of some Members’ expectations.70 The
JADE Act explicitly requires that the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma
“consult with Congress on policies relevant to Burma and the future and welfare of all the
Burmese people, including refugees.”71 However, the post of Special Representative and Policy
Coordinator has been vacant since June 2013.72 The nomination of a new Special Representative
and Policy Coordinator could provide Congress with an additional point of contact through which
to communicate with the Obama Administration on the conduct of U.S. policy in Burma.
Congress may choose to press President Obama to nominate a Special Representative and Policy
Coordinator. In addition, Congress may decide to consult with non-Administration sources and/or
hold hearings to ascertain the human rights situation in Burma, including the issue of political
prisoners.
Prior to Secretary Kerry’s August trip to Asia, which included two days in Burma, Members of
the House of Representatives and the Senate sent letters to Secretary Kerry expressing concern
69 Department of State, U.S. Assistance to Burma, August 8, 2014.
70 Based on CRS communications with Members of Congress and their staff.
71 JADE Act, Section 7(c)(4).
72 While the Special Representative position has been vacant, the State Department created the position of Senior
Advisor for Burma in March 2013. The first Senior Advisor was W. Patrick Murphy, and his successor in August 2013
was Judith Cefkin.
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about the conduct of U.S. policy toward Burma and indicating dissatisfaction with recent trends
in the country. The House letter to Secretary Kerry, which was signed by 72 members, observed,
among other things:
Political prisoners remain behind bars and those released still have sentences hanging over
their heads, despite President Thein Sein’s explicit commitment to President Obama and the
United States Congress that all such prisoner would be released.73
The letter also cites the “jailing and harsh sentences of 10 years of imprisonment with hard labor”
of the five Unity Journal journalists as evidence that “press freedoms have gone awry.” The letter
to Secretary Kerry from Senator Marco Rubio and Senator Mark Kirk also indicates that “[f]resh
arrests of journalists for simply doing their jobs … have sent a chill through the press corps.”74
Congress as a whole, the two chambers separately, or Members individually or collectively, may
decide to continue to press the Obama Administration and the State Department to address the
political prisoner issue with Burmese officials, as well as its implications for further political
reform in Burma.
Beyond its oversight function, Congress may decide that circumstances warrant consideration of
new legislation related to U.S. policy towards Burma. Section 7043(b) of P.L. 113-76 places new
requirements and restrictions on State Department Economic Support Funds in Burma, including
support for former political prisoners. It is also possible that the Obama Administration may
request Congress consider legislation to amend existing laws to facilitate adjustments in U.S.
policy.75
Congress may also be called upon to consider additional funding for assistance to Burma. For
FY2015, the Obama Administration requested $58.7 million for various projects inside Burma “to
promote national reconciliation, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; foster economic
opportunity; increase food security; and meet other basic human needs to enable Burma’s
population to contribute to and sustain reforms.”76
If it chooses, Congress could place conditions on the availability of assistance to Burma,
including requirements related to the identification and release of political prisoners. Neither the
House version of the FY2015 appropriations bill for the Department of State and foreign
operations, H.R. 5013, nor the Senate version, S. 2499, contain restrictions and conditions on the
use of appropriated funds for Burma, but none explicitly related to political prisoners.
73 Letter from 72 Members of the House of Representatives to John Kerry, Secretary of State, July 31, 2014.
74 Letter from Marco Rubio, Senator, and Mark Kirk, Senator, to John Kerry, Secretary of State, August 7, 2014.
75 The Obama Administration has previously asked Congress to amend Burmese sanctions law. The 112th Congress
passed P.L. 112-192, at the request of the Obama Administration. The law grants the President the authority to waive
U.S. opposition to international financial institution assistance to Burma required under Section 5 of the 2003 BFDA if
the President determines to do so is in the national interest of the United States.
76 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 32: Foreign Operations—Fiscal Year 2015, June
18, 2014.
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Appendix. Reverse Chronology of Prisoner Releases
by Thein Sein Government
Since his appointment in March 2011, President Thein Sein has granted pardons or amnesties to
prisoners in Burma on 17 separate occasions, resulting in the release of 36,761 prisoners, of
whom at least 1,165 were political prisoners, according to the AAPP(B). The following table
provides a quick summary of each of those prisoner releases in reverse chronological order.
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Table A-1. Summary of Prisoner Releases by Thein Sein Government
in reverse chronological order
Date and Type
Description
January 2, 2014
President Thein Sein issues Order No. 1/2014, commuting all death sentences to life
imprisonment, reducing al sentences of over 40 years to 40 years, and reducing al
Pardon
sentences under 40 years by 25%. The pardon results in the release of a reported 13, 274
prisoners, of which only 3 are considered political prisoners by the AAPP(B).
December 30, 2013
Using authority granted by Section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(i)
of Burma’s Criminal Procedure, President Thein Sein granted amnesty to five people, all of
Amnesty
which are considered political prisoners by the AAPP(B).
December 30, 2013
President Thein Sein issues Order No. 51/2013, pardoning al prisoners sentenced on or
before December 31, 2013, under seven specific laws (see “Most Recent Releases”
Pardon
above). An estimated 100 prisoners are released under the pardon, of which 16 have been
identified as political prisoners by the AAPP(B).
December 11, 2013
President Thein Sein granted amnesty to “41 prisoners who were in the list of the
committee for scrutinizing remaining political prisoners.” The amnesty was granted using
Amnesty
authority provided by Section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(i) of
Burma’s Criminal Procedure. Two of those released, however, were reportedly
rearrested within hours of their release. In addition to the 41 prisoners included in the
official amnesty announcement, three child soldiers were reportedly released from prison
on the same day. The amnesty announcement coincided with the opening of the 27th
Southeast Asian Games, which were being held in Burma.
November 15, 2013
Using authority granted by Section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(i)
of Burma’s Criminal Procedure, President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 69 people.
Amnesty
Among the released were nine activists who had organized demonstrations in support of
the Rohingyas in Rakhine State and an activist who had organized protests against the
expansion of the Letpadaung copper mine in Sagaing Division.
October 8, 2013
President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 56 prisoners using authority granted by Section
204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(i) of Burma’s Criminal Procedure.
Amnesty
Nearly half of those released—27 people—were reportedly alleged members of the
Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the militia associated with the Kachin Independence
Organization (KIO). Another 24 people were either alleged members of the Restorative
Council of the Shan State (RCSS) or its affiliated militia, the Shan State Army (SSA). Most
of the people granted amnesty had been convicted of violating Section 17(1) of Burma’s
Unlawful Associations Act, among other charges. Some observers think the release was
designed to promote progress in ongoing ceasefire talks with the KIO and the RCSS. The
amnesty announcement came just before Brunei formal y transferred the chair of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to Burma during the 23rd ASEAN
Summit held on October 8-10, 2013.
July 23, 2013
President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 73 prisoners using authority granted by Section
204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(a) of Burma’s Criminal Procedure.
Amnesty
Some sources considered all 73 of the released prisoners as political prisoners. According
to AAPP(B) and the FPPS, however, only 68 of those released were political prisoners,
including at least 30 people associated with Kachin Independence Army and the Shan State
Army–South. A week after the release, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs Brigadier
General Kyaw Zan Myint reportedly told the Union Parliament that the prisoners had
been granted a conditional release, and that they may have to serve out the remainder of
the sentence if they break the law in the future.
May 17, 2013
Four days before his historic trip to the United States in May 2013, President Thein Sein
granted amnesty to 23 prisoners, of whom 21 were considered political prisoners by the
Amnesty
AAPP(B). Among those released was Nay Myo Zin, who had been previously released, but
subsequently returned to prison to serve out the remaining six years of his sentence after
his arrest for insulting a police officer. Nay Myo Zin was the first ex-political prisoner re-
imprisoned after being granted amnesty.
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Date and Type
Description
April 23, 2013
President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 93 prisoners. According to AAPP(B), 69 of those
released were political prisoners. Also included among the 69 political prisoners were 40
Amnesty
“Shan rebel soldiers,” according to the opposition publication, Irrawaddy. The prisoner
release was announced the day after the European Union voted to terminate all its
sanctions on Burma, except for the arms embargo. In addition, the Political Prisoners
Review Committee reportedly recommended a number of people to be released, but
President Thein Sein apparently chose to release other individuals, raising questions about
the influence of the committee.
November 19, 2012
Using authority granted by section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(a)
of Burma’s Criminal Procedure, President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 66 prisoners on
Amnesty
November 19, 2012, during President Obama’s visit to Burma. The AAPP(B) identified 51
of those released as being political prisoners.
November 15-16, 2012
President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 452 prisoners using authority granted by section
204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(a) of Burma’s Criminal Procedure.
Amnesty
None of the prisoners released were identified as political prisoners by AAPP(B).
September 17, 2012
Shortly before President Thein Sein was scheduled to visit the United States to speak
before the United Nations General Assembly, he granted amnesty to 514 people. The
Amnesty
AAPP(B) identified 88 political prisoners among those released. According to some
observers, the prisoner release was intended to bolster the chances that the Obama
Administration would announce a further easing of sanctions during President Thein Sein’s
visit to the United States.
July 3, 2012
Using authority granted by section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 Constitution, President Thein
Sein granted amnesty to 46 domestic prisoners and 34 foreign nationals. The AAPP(B)
Amnesty
identified 25 of the domestic prisoners as political prisoners.
January 13, 2012
President Thein Sein suspended the sentences of 651 prisoners “who were serving their
appropriate prison terms” using authority granted by Section 401 of Burma’s Code of
Amnesty
Criminal Procedure. The AAPP(B) identified 302 political prisoners among the 336 people
released. The release came at the tail end of the fourth visit by U.S. Special Representative
and Policy Coordinator for Burma Derek Mitchell and a week after British Foreign
Minister William Hague’s first trip to Burma.
January 2, 2012
President Thein Sein issued Presidential Order No. 1/2012, granting a partial amnesty to
all existing Burmese prisoners “[a]s a gesture of hailing the 64th Anniversary Independence
Amnesty
Day and for the sake of State peace and stability.” The AAPP(B) considered 34 of the 651
people released as political prisoners.
October 11, 2011
President Thein Sein issued Order No. 49/2011, terminating the prisoner sentence for
6,359 individual y named persons, including 247 political prisoners.
Amnesty
May 16, 2011
President Thein Sein issued Order No. 28/2011, commuting al death sentences to life in
prison, and reduced all other sentences by one year in duration (exclusive of remission
Amnesty
days). As a result, 14,600 prisoners are released, but only 73 are identified as political
prisoners by the AAPP(B).
Source: CRS.
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Author Contact Information
Michael F. Martin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
mfmartin@crs.loc.gov, 7-2199
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