U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and
the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2015
Appropriations

Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
September 10, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43577


U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

Summary
Geographic proximity has forged strong linkages between the United States and the nations of
Latin America and the Caribbean, with critical U.S. interests encompassing economic, political,
and security concerns. U.S. policy makers have emphasized different strategic interests in the
region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to advancing
democracy and open markets since the 1990s. Current U.S. policy is designed to promote
economic and social opportunity, ensure citizen security, strengthen effective democratic
institutions, and secure a clean energy future. As part of broader efforts to advance these
priorities, the United States provides Latin American and Caribbean nations with substantial
amounts of foreign assistance.
Trends in Assistance
Since 1946, the United States has provided over $160 billion (constant 2012 dollars) in assistance
to the region. Funding levels have fluctuated over time, however, according to regional trends and
U.S. policy initiatives. U.S. assistance spiked during the 1960s under President Kennedy’s
Alliance for Progress, and then declined in the 1970s before spiking again during the Central
American conflicts of the 1980s. After another decline during the 1990s, assistance remained on a
generally upward trajectory through the first decade of this century, reaching its most recent peak
in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Aid levels for Latin America and the Caribbean
have fallen in each of the past four fiscal years, however, as Congress has sought to trim the
foreign aid budget and countries have been seen to require less assistance.
FY2015 Obama Administration Request
The Obama Administration’s FY2015 foreign aid budget request would continue the recent
downward trend in assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. The Administration has
requested some $1.3 billion to be provided through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), which is 10% below the FY2014 estimate and 27% lower
than the amount provided in FY2012—the last year before budget sequestration took effect.
Under the request, the balance of U.S. assistance would shift toward development aid and away
from security aid, as each of the four major U.S. security initiatives would see cuts. Aid levels for
Colombia, Haiti, and Mexico would decline, but they would continue to be the top three
recipients in the region, accounting for 52% of all U.S. aid to Latin America and the Caribbean.
Congressional Action
In recent years, the annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
appropriations measure has been the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews
U.S. assistance and influences executive branch policy. The House and Senate Appropriations
Committees reported out their respective bills (H.R. 5013 and S. 2499) in June 2014. While total
foreign aid funding in the House bill is 0.6% lower than the Administration’s request, total
foreign aid funding in the Senate bill is 5.3% above the request. It is unclear how much foreign
assistance each of the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would receive under the two
bills, however, since, for the most part, appropriations levels for individual countries and
programs are not specified in the bills or the accompanying reports (H.Rept. 113-499 and S.Rept.
113-195). Nevertheless, congressional priorities appear to differ from those of the Administration
in certain respects. Both bills would provide additional assistance for democracy promotion in
Congressional Research Service

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

certain countries, conservation in the Brazilian Amazon, and efforts to stem the flow of
unaccompanied alien children (UAC) from Central America. Moreover, the House bill rejects the
Administration’s proposed cuts to security initiatives in the region.


Congressional Research Service

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean ...................................................... 2
FY2015 Foreign Assistance Request for Latin America and the Caribbean .................................... 4
Foreign Aid Categories and Accounts ....................................................................................... 4
Major Country and Regional Programs ..................................................................................... 7
Legislative Action .......................................................................................................................... 10
Potential Issues for Congressional Consideration.......................................................................... 11
Policy Priorities and Budget Constraints ................................................................................. 11
Inter-Agency and International Donor Coordination............................................................... 13
Political Will and Program Sustainability ............................................................................... 15

Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2012 ......................... 3
Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Aid Category: FY2011-
FY2015 ......................................................................................................................................... 6

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Foreign Aid Account:
FY2011-F Y2015 .......................................................................................................................... 5
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Country or Regional
Program: FY2011-FY2015 ........................................................................................................... 9

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 16
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 17

Congressional Research Service

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

Introduction
Foreign assistance is one of the tools the United States has employed to advance U.S. interests in
Latin America and the Caribbean, with the focus and funding levels of aid programs changing
along with broader U.S. policy goals.1 Current aid programs reflect the diversity of the countries
in the region. Some countries receive the full range of U.S. assistance as they continue to struggle
with political, socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others, which have made major strides in
democratic governance and economic and social development, no longer receive traditional U.S.
development assistance but continue to receive some support for security challenges, such as
combating transnational organized crime. Although U.S. relations with the nations of Latin
America and the Caribbean have increasingly become less defined by the provision of assistance
as a result of this progress, foreign aid continues to play an important role in advancing U.S.
policy in the region.
Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance to the region and conducts oversight of
aid programs and the executive branch agencies charged with managing them. Current efforts to
reduce budget deficits in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis and U.S. recession
have triggered closer examination of competing budget priorities. Congress has identified foreign
assistance as a potential area for spending cuts, placing greater scrutiny on the efficiency and
effectiveness of U.S. aid programs.
This report, which will be updated to track legislative developments, provides an overview of
U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It examines historical and recent trends in aid
to the region as well as the Obama Administration’s FY2015 request for State Department and
U.S Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered assistance. It also tracks
congressional action on foreign aid appropriations for Latin America and the Caribbean in
FY2015, and raises questions Congress may consider as it appropriates funding for the region.
Report Notes
In order to more accurately compare the Administration’s FY2015 foreign assistance request to previous years’
appropriations, aid figures in this report (except where otherwise indicated) refer only to bilateral assistance that is
managed by the State Department or USAID and is requested for individual countries or regional programs. While
this represents the majority of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, it is important to note that there
are several other sources of U.S. aid to the region.
Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean receive U.S. assistance through State Department and USAID-
managed foreign aid accounts such as International Disaster Assistance (IDA), Migration and Refugee Assistance
(MRA), Transition Initiatives (TI), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Likewise, some nations receive assistance
from U.S. agencies such as the Department of Defense, the Inter-American Foundation, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, and the Peace Corps. Since foreign assistance provided through these accounts and agencies is not
requested for individual countries, and country-level figures are not publical y available until after the fiscal year has
passed, these accounts and agencies are excluded from this analysis.

1 For more information on U.S. policy in the region, see CRS Report R42956, Latin America and the Caribbean: Key
Issues for the 113th Congress
, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan.
Congressional Research Service
1

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the
Caribbean

The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean, and has provided the region over $160 billion in constant 2012
dollars (or nearly $77 billion in historical, non-inflation-adjusted, dollars) since 1946.2 U.S.
assistance to the region spiked in the early 1960s following the introduction of President
Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and
Cuban influence in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period
of decline, U.S. assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power
by the leftist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United States provided
considerable support to the Contras, who sought to overthrow the Sandinista government, and to
Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-
1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American conflicts
(see Figure 1).
U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase once again in the
late 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through the past decade. The higher
levels of assistance were partially the result of increased spending on humanitarian and
development assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided
extensive humanitarian and reconstruction aid to several countries in Central America. The
establishment of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003 and the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2004 provided a number of countries in the region
with new sources of U.S. assistance.3 More recently, the United States provided significant
amounts of assistance to Haiti in the aftermath of its massive January 2010 earthquake.
Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S.
assistance through 2010. Beginning with President Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000,
successive Administrations and Congresses have provided substantial amounts of foreign aid to
Colombia and its Andean neighbors in support of “Plan Colombia”—a Colombian government
initiative to combat drug trafficking, end its long-running internal armed conflict, and foster
development. Spending on counternarcotics and security assistance received another boost in
FY2008 when President George W. Bush joined with his Mexican counterpart to announce the
Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance for Mexico and Central
America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama Administration split the Central America portion
of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and
created a similar program for the countries of the Caribbean known as the Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative (CBSI).

2 These figures include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies. U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30, 2012,
accessed May 2014.
3 For more information on PEPFAR and the MCC, see CRS Report R42776, The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR): Funding Issues After a Decade of Implementation, FY2004-FY2013
, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther; and
CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation, by Curt Tarnoff.
Congressional Research Service
2

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2012
Obligations in bil ions of constant 2012 U.S. dol ars
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Military Assistance
Economic Assistance

Source: USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945–September 30,
2012
, accessed in May 2014.
Notes: Includes aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies.
After more than a decade of generally increasing aid levels, U.S. assistance to Latin America and
the Caribbean has again begun to decline. This is partially the result of reductions in the overall
U.S. foreign assistance budget. The Administration and Congress have sought to reduce budget
deficits in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis and U.S. recession, and have
identified foreign assistance as a potential area for spending cuts. U.S. aid to Latin America and
the Caribbean has decreased each year since FY2010, and spending caps and across-the-board
cuts that were included in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), as amended, could place
downward pressure on the aid budget for the foreseeable future.4
The recent decline in U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean also reflects changes in
the region. As a result of stronger economic growth and the implementation of more effective
social policies, the percentage of people living in poverty in Latin America fell from 44% in 2002
to 28% in 2012.5 Likewise, electoral democracy has been consolidated in the region; every

4 For more information, see CRS Report R42994, The Budget Control Act, Sequestration, and the Foreign Affairs
Budget: Background and Possible Impacts
, by Susan B. Epstein.
5 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the
Caribbean
, December 2013.
Congressional Research Service
3

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

country except Cuba now has a democratically elected government (although some elections have
been controversial). These changes have allowed the U.S. government to concentrate its resources
in fewer countries and sectors. For example, USAID closed its mission in Panama in 2012
following the country’s graduation from foreign assistance, and the agency has largely
transitioned out of providing support for family planning and elections administration as
governments throughout the region have demonstrated their ability to finance and carry out such
activities on their own.6 Some Latin American nations, such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and
Uruguay, have even begun providing foreign aid to other countries. The United States has
partnered with these nations through so-called “trilateral cooperation” initiatives to jointly plan
and fund development and security assistance efforts in third countries. Other countries, such as
Bolivia and Ecuador, have demonstrated less interest in working with the United States, leading
to significant reductions in U.S. assistance and the closure of USAID missions. As a result of
these developments in the region and competing U.S. foreign policy priorities elsewhere in the
world, U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean as a proportion of total U.S. foreign
assistance dropped from 11.8% in FY2004 to 7.6% in FY2014.7
FY2015 Foreign Assistance Request for Latin
America and the Caribbean8

As the region has evolved and the U.S. government has sought to cut expenditures, the Obama
Administration and Congress have dedicated fewer resources to Latin America and the
Caribbean. U.S. assistance to the region has declined each year since FY2010, and would
continue to decline under the Administration’s foreign aid budget request for FY2015. The
Administration has requested $1.3 billion for the region, which is 10% ($149 million) below the
FY2014 estimate and 27% lower than the amount provided in FY2012—the last year before
budget sequestration took effect (see Table 1).
Foreign Aid Categories and Accounts9
The Administration’s FY2015 foreign aid request for Latin America and the Caribbean would
shift the emphasis of U.S. assistance efforts, as nearly 40% ($528 million) would go toward
development and humanitarian assistance programs—up from 31% in 2014 (see Figure 2).
Development assistance seeks to foster sustainable broad-based economic progress and social
stability in developing nations. Such funding is often used for long-term projects in the areas of
democracy promotion, economic reform, basic education, human health, and environmental
protection. This assistance is provided primarily through the Development Assistance (DA) and
Global Health Programs (GHP) accounts, which would receive $282 million and $233 million,
respectively, under the Administration’s FY2015 request. In terms of humanitarian assistance, the

6 Mark Feierstein, “A New Approach for a Changing Hemisphere,” USAID Frontlines, March/April 2012.
7 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Years FY2006 and
FY2015
.
8 Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from: U.S. Department of State, Congressional
Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Appendix 3: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2015
, April 2014,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/224070.pdf.
9 For more information on the various foreign aid accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report R40213,
Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, by Curt Tarnoff and Marian L. Lawson.
Congressional Research Service
4

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

Administration has requested $13 million through the Food for Peace (P.L. 480) account to
address immediate food security needs.
While funding provided through the GHP and P.L. 480 accounts would remain relatively stable,
the FY2015 request includes nearly 28% ($63 million) more DA funding than the FY2014
estimate for the region. This is partially due to the Administration’s decision to request funding
through the DA account in FY2015 for some programs that are currently being funded through
the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account. It also reflects increased development support for
countries struggling with drug trafficking and violence, such as El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Peru.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Foreign Aid Account:
FY2011-F Y2015
Appropriations in thousands of U.S. dol ars
FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015
% Change
(estimate)
(request)
FY2014-
Account
FY2015
DA
361,463 333,785 305,945 219,520 282,390
+28.6%
GHP
130,977 104,509 78,948 68,791 65,541
-4.7%
(USAID)
GHP
(State)
203,323 182,236 173,496 162,443 167,444
+3.1%
P.L.
480 94,951 38,173 40,526 13,000 13,000

ESF
435,130 465,541 447,503 456,159 392,876
-13.9%
INCLE 506,220 593,270 550,942 467,131 332,000
-28.9%
NADR 25,200 20,530 14,992 14,485 12,563
-13.3%
IMET
14,458 14,597 12,892 13,896 13,770
-0.9%
FMF
84,477 70,885 59,226 60,215 47,100
-21.8%
Total
1,856,199 1,823,526 1,684,470 1,475,640 1,326,684
-10.1%
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Years 2013-2015.
Notes: DA=Development Assistance; GHP=Global Health Programs; P.L. 480=Food For Peace; ESF=Economic
Support Fund; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation Anti-
terrorism, Demining, and Related programs; IMET=International Military Education and Training; and
FMF=Foreign Military Financing.
About 30% ($393 million) of the Administration’s FY2015 request for the region would be
provided through the ESF account, which has as its primary purpose the promotion of special
U.S. political, economic, or security interests. In practice, the ESF account generally funds
programs that are designed to promote political and economic stability, and are often
indistinguishable from those funded through the regular development and humanitarian assistance
accounts. The Administration’s FY2015 ESF request for the region is 14% lower than the
FY2014 estimate. As noted above, this change is partially the result of the Administration
requesting funding for ongoing programs under the DA account instead of the ESF account. It
also reflects declining aid for Colombia and Haiti, which had received elevated levels of
assistance for several years.
Congressional Research Service
5

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

The remaining 30% ($405 million) of the Administration’s FY2015 request for Latin America and
the Caribbean would support security assistance programs. This includes $332 million under the
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, which supports
counternarcotics and civilian law enforcement efforts as well as projects designed to strengthen
justice sector institutions. It also includes $13 million requested under the Nonproliferation, Anti-
terrorism, De-mining, and Related programs (NADR) account, which funds efforts to counter
global threats such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Additionally,
$61 million has been requested under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International
Military Education and Training (IMET) accounts to provide equipment and personnel training to
Latin American and Caribbean militaries.
Funding provided to the region through each of the security assistance accounts would decline
under the FY2015 request. The biggest cuts fall under the INCLE account, however, with funding
decreasing by 29% ($135 million) compared to the FY2014 estimate. This decline is almost
entirely the result of cuts to the four major U.S. security programs in the region: Plan Colombia,
the Mérida Initiative for Mexico, the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and
the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Aid Category:
FY2011-FY2015
As a percentage of total U.S. assistance appropriated for the region
100%
Military
90%
80%
Civilian Security
70%
60%
50%
Political/Strategic
40%
Humanitarian
30%
20%
Development
10%
0%
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014 (est.)
FY2015 (req.)
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Years 2013-2015.
Notes: “Military” includes FMF & IMET; “Civilian Security” includes INCLE & NADR; “Political/Strategic”
includes ESF; “Humanitarian” includes P.L. 480; and “Development” includes DA & GHP.
Congressional Research Service
6

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

Major Country and Regional Programs10
Under the Administration’s FY2015 request, U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean
would continue to be heavily concentrated in a few countries. Although the request would cut aid
to Colombia, Haiti, and Mexico, those three countries would continue to be the top regional
recipients of U.S. foreign aid, and would together account for more than 52% of U.S. assistance
for Latin America and the Caribbean. Some of these funding reductions would be reinvested in
the region’s mid-sized aid programs in Peru, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador (see Table
2
).
As noted above, Colombia has received significant amounts of U.S. aid to support
counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts since FY2000.11 U.S. assistance to Colombia has
been on a downward trajectory in recent years, however, as the security situation in Colombia has
improved, the country has taken ownership of programs, and the United States has shifted the
emphasis of its assistance away from costly military equipment toward economic and social
development efforts. Under the Administration’s FY2015 request, Colombia would receive nearly
$281 million to support drug eradication and interdiction; alternative development; land
restitution; the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; efforts to promote human
rights and improve access to justice; programs to protect and provide services to vulnerable
groups such as internally displaced persons, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous populations; and
environmental resiliency initiatives. Although U.S. assistance to Colombia would fall by 14%
($44 million) compared to the FY2014 estimate, Colombia would continue to receive more aid
than any other country in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The United States has provided high levels of aid to Haiti for many years as a result of the
country’s significant humanitarian and development challenges.12 U.S. assistance to Haiti
increased significantly after the country was struck by a massive earthquake in January 2010, but
has gradually declined from those elevated levels. The Administration’s FY2015 request includes
$274 million to help the Haitian government develop transparent and accountable institutions;
provide energy, shelter, and other infrastructure; increase access to health and education services;
and implement a comprehensive food security strategy. The country would receive 6% ($16
million) less than it is expected to receive in FY2014. Administration officials maintain that less
funding is needed in FY2015 since assistance appropriated in previous years remains in the
pipeline.13
Although, historically, Mexico had not been a major recipient of U.S. assistance, it began
receiving large amounts of aid through the anticrime and counterdrug program known as the
Mérida Initiative in FY2008.14 The Administration’s FY2015 request includes $137 million to

10 For detailed information on the programs funded by U.S. assistance in each Latin American and Caribbean country,
see U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Appendix 3: Foreign
Operations, Fiscal Year 2015
, April 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/224070.pdf.
11 For more information, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional
Interest
, by June S. Beittel and CRS Report R42982, Peace Talks in Colombia, by June S. Beittel.
12 For more information, see CRS Report R42559, Haiti under President Martelly: Current Conditions and
Congressional Concerns
, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
13 “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on President Obama’s Proposed Fiscal 2015 Budget Request for
the State Department,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, March 13, 2014.
14 For more information, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
Congressional Research Service
7

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

continue supporting the Mexican government’s efforts to combat transnational criminal
organizations, reform rule of law institutions, implement crime and violence prevention
programs; strengthen border security; and foster low carbon development. The request continues
a downward trend in aid to Mexico, cutting assistance to the country by nearly 34% ($70 million)
compared to the FY2014 estimate. Administration officials assert that while Mexico remains a top
priority, less funding is needed in FY2015 since funding from previous years has yet to be
expended.15
Despite the overall decline in funding for Latin America and the Caribbean in the
Administration’s FY2015 foreign aid request, Peru would receive a 25% ($19 million) increase
in U.S. assistance.16 Under the request, the United States would provide $94 million to Peru,
primarily to support counternarcotics efforts such as eradication, interdiction, and alternative
development. Some funds would also be used to support environmental programs designed to
protect the Amazon Rainforest and help communities adapt to the effects of global climate
change. The Peruvian government has significantly increased the amount of its own funding it
dedicates to counternarcotics and development efforts, and the Administration has requested an
increase in U.S. assistance for Peru in FY2015 in order to take advantage of the country’s
commitment to shared goals.
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are all part of the northern triangle of Central America
that has long struggled with major development challenges and has experienced high levels of
crime and violence in recent years.17 Each of the countries would receive additional bilateral aid
under the FY2015 request; U.S. assistance to El Salvador would increase by 24% ($5 million) to
$28 million, U.S. assistance to Guatemala would increase by 18% ($12 million) to $77 million,
and U.S. assistance to Honduras would increase by 15% ($6 million) to $48 million. Most of the
funding for these countries would be split between efforts to strengthen justice and security sector
institutions and traditional development activities in areas such as agriculture, basic education,
and economic reform. Administration officials maintain “a more balanced approach” is needed in
Central America, and they are adjusting U.S. strategy to “focus equally on governance, prosperity,
and security.”18
In addition to bilateral assistance for individual countries, the Administration’s FY2015 foreign
aid request includes $295 million for five regional programs administered by the State
Department and USAID. The State Department’s Western Hemisphere Regional program would
receive the majority of the funds, accounting for 14% ($190 million) of all assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean. This assistance would primarily fund two regional security
initiatives: the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Caribbean

15 “House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Holds Hearing on
President Obama’s Proposed Fiscal 2015 Budget Request for the State Department,” CQ Congressional Transcripts,
March 12, 2014.
16 For more information, see CRS Report R42523, Peru: Overview of Political and Economic Conditions and Relations
with the United States
, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
17 For more information, see CRS Report RS21655, El Salvador: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S.
Relations
, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R42580, Guatemala: Political, Security, and Socio-Economic
Conditions and U.S. Relations
, by Maureen Taft-Morales; and CRS Report RL34027, Honduras: Background and U.S.
Relations
, by Peter J. Meyer.
18 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Advancing U.S.
Interests in the Western Hemisphere: The FY 2015 Foreign Affairs Budget
, Prepared Statement of Roberta S. Jacobson,
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., April 9, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
8

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).19 Both initiatives are designed to strengthen governments’
capacities to combat threats from drug trafficking and organized crime, strengthen rule of law
institutions, and address social problems such as poverty and inequality. Compared to the FY2014
estimate, funding for CARSI would be cut by 20% ($32 million) to $130 million, and CBSI
would be cut by 11% ($7 million) to $57 million in FY2015. Despite these cuts, the
Administration maintains that the FY2015 request continues to make citizen security the highest
U.S. priority in the Western Hemisphere.
Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Country or Regional
Program: FY2011-FY2015
(In thousands of U.S. dollars)
FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014
FY2015
% Change
(estimate)
(request)
FY2014-

FY2015
Argentina
897
1,038 765 590
590

Bahamas
201 190 164 180
200 +11.1%
Belize
410 687 1,012 1,180
1,005
-14.8%
Bolivia 41,915
28,827
5,171
0
0

Brazil
23,321 18,038 15,185 13,865
3,365
-75.7%
Chile
1,321 1,155 1,038 1,100
1,050
-4.5%
Colombia
453,218 384,288 359,754 324,817
280,626
-13.6%
Costa
Rica
743 1,112 1,624 1,750
1,600
-8.6%
Cuba
20,000 20,000 19,283 20,000
20,000

Dominican
Republic 36,996 23,129 26,407 25,178
25,708
+2.1%
Ecuador
24,254 22,869 18,846
810
360
-55.6%
El
Salvador
29,778 29,183 27,566 22,281
27,600
+23.9%
Guatemala
110,161 84,474 80,779 65,249
77,107
+18.2%
Guyana
16,911 10,864 9,150 6,936
6,936

Haiti
380,261 351,829 332,540 290,510
274,313
-5.6%
Honduras
56,017 57,040 51,980 41,850
48,176
+15.1%
Jamaica
7,589 6,700 7,061 6,700
6,100
-9.0%
Mexico
178,145 329,680 265,064 206,590
136,910
-33.7%
Nicaragua
24,065 12,301 8,599 7,600
8,200
+7.9%
Panama
2,984 3,252 3,449 3,035
4,015
+32.3%
Paraguay
6,806 3,773 6,041 6,460
8,433
+30.5%
Peru
96,581 79,129 98,634 74,735
93,555
+25.2%
Suriname
251 239 213 225
200
-11.1%
Trinidad
and
Tobago 253 175 167 180
200 +11.1%

19 For more information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and
Policy Issues for Congress
, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
Congressional Research Service
9

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014
FY2015
% Change
(estimate)
(request)
FY2014-

FY2015
Uruguay
989 539 427 450
500 +11.1%
Venezuela
5,000 6,000 5,786 4,298
5,000
+16.3%
Barbados and
32,337 33,176 32,248 25,581
32,981
+28.9%
Eastern Caribbean
USAID Central
28,562 32,089 33,065 32,491
31,992
-1.5%
America Regional
USAID South
9,819 16,000 13,072 16,500
5,500
-66.7%
America Regional
USAID Latin
52,835 44,900 38,089 32,050
34,524
+7.7%
America and
Caribbean Regional
State Western
213,579 220,850 221,291 242,449
189,938
-21.7%
Hemisphere
Regional
[CARSI]
[101,508]
[135,000]
[145,619]
[161,500]
[130,000]
-19.5%
[CBSI]
[77,367]
[64,000]
[60,296]
[63,500]
[56,500]
-11.0%
Total
1,856,199 1,823,526 1,684,470 1,475,640
1,326,684
-10.1%
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Years 2013-2015.
Notes: CARSI and CBSI are funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
Legislative Action
Congress has begun considering the Administration’s FY2015 foreign aid request. Since Congress
has not enacted a foreign assistance authorization measure since FY1985, annual Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bills tend to serve as the primary
legislative vehicles through which Congress reviews U.S. assistance and influences executive
branch foreign policy. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its bill (S. 2499) on
June 19, 2014. It includes $36.4 million for foreign aid globally, which is 5.3% ($1.9 billion)
above the Administration’s request. The House Committee on Appropriations reported its bill
(H.R. 5013) on June 27, 2014. It includes $34.4 billion for foreign aid globally, which is 0.6%
($200 million) below the Administration’s request.
It is unclear how much assistance the measures would provide for Latin America and the
Caribbean since, for the most part, appropriations levels for individual countries and programs are
not specified in the bills or the accompanying reports (H.Rept. 113-499 and S.Rept. 113-195).20
Nevertheless, both of the reports express concerns over conditions in the region and note the
committees’ intentions to provide assistance levels above the Administration's request in certain
instances. The House report, for example, rejects nearly all of the Administration’s proposed cuts
to security programs in the region:

20 For more information, see CRS Report R43569, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2015 Budget
and Appropriations
, by Susan B. Epstein, Alex Tiersky, and Marian L. Lawson.
Congressional Research Service
10

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

To address concerns about instability in Latin America, the Committee recommendation
rejects proposed reductions in the request for assistance to Colombia, Mexico, Central
America, and the Caribbean Basin. The committee believes it is critical to continue robust
support for counternarcotics and law enforcement efforts, programs that promote economic
growth and trade, as well as assistance for rule of law and judicial reform activities in the
region, in order to fight drug trafficking and violent crime before it reaches the borders of the
United States.
Both measures would appropriate funding to address the increased number of unaccompanied
alien children (UAC) arriving at the U.S. border. While the Senate bill would provide $100
million to address the root causes pushing children to leave Central America and support
reintegration programs, the House bill would provide $120 million to help secure the Mexico-
Guatemala border and to combat alien smuggling and human trafficking. The Administration did
not request any funding to address the surge in unaccompanied minors in its FY2015 budget
proposal. It did, however, submit an emergency FY2014 supplemental appropriations request to
Congress on July 8, 2014, which proposed $300 million for programs in Central America.21
There are several other areas where congressional and Administration priorities appear to differ.
For example, the House bill would provide $10 million above the Administration’s request for
democracy programs in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The Senate bill would also
place more emphasis on democracy promotion, as it includes $3 million above the
Administration’s request for National Endowment for Democracy (NED) programs in Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela. While the Obama Administration has not requested any funding for
environmental programs in Brazil, the House and Senate bills would provide $10.5 million and
$10 million, respectively, for conservation programs in the Brazilian Amazon. Moreover, the
Senate bill would provide at least $5 million less than the Administration requested for programs
in Cuba; the House bill would fully fund the Administration’s $20 million request for the country.
Potential Issues for Congressional Consideration
As Congress debates FY2015 foreign assistance appropriations legislation, there are a number of
issues it may take into consideration. These include policy priorities and budget constraints,
coordination of aid efforts, and the sustainability of U.S. assistance programs.
Policy Priorities and Budget Constraints
As Congress debates foreign aid legislation, Members may consider how U.S. policy priorities in
the Western Hemisphere compare to U.S. priorities elsewhere in the world as well as the relative
merits of various U.S priorities within the region. According to Administration officials, “the
Western Hemisphere is a vitally important region for the United States. It is home to robust
democracies and our closest trading partners. The Americas are at the center of the world’s new
energy map and many countries are becoming increasingly relevant on the global stage.”22 As

21 For more information, see CRS Report R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy
Considerations
, coordinated by Peter J. Meyer
22 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Advancing U.S.
Interests in the Western Hemisphere: The FY 2015 Foreign Affairs Budget
, Prepared Statement of Roberta S. Jacobson,
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., April 9, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
11

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

noted above, however, the Administration’s FY2015 budget request cuts aid to the region by 10%
compared to the FY2014 estimate. Aid to Latin America and the Caribbean would also fall in
relative terms, declining from 7.6% of all U.S. assistance in FY2014 to 6.8% in FY2015.23 When
questioned by Members of Congress about the declining levels of assistance for the region,
Administration officials have noted shifting circumstances, such as improvements in Colombia,
as well as tradeoffs that need to be made in the overall budget allocation process.24
The Obama Administration’s framework for U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean
centers on four priorities: promoting economic and social opportunity, ensuring citizen security,
strengthening effective institutions of democratic governance, and securing a clean energy future.
The Administration maintains that “U.S. assistance in the region responds directly to U.S. policy
priorities, particularly citizen security concerns that directly impact U.S. security.”25 As noted
above, the emphasis of the Administration’s FY2015 foreign aid budget request for Latin America
and the Caribbean would shift slightly toward development assistance and away from security
assistance, as compared to the FY2014 estimate. Given constraints on the overall aid budget,
some Members of Congress have criticized the Administration for dedicating some funding to
clean energy and climate change mitigation programs, maintaining the assistance would be better
spent supporting security efforts.26
As U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean has declined, Administration officials
have emphasized other forms of engagement to advance U.S. policy priorities. For example, the
Administration is currently focused on concluding the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)27 trade
negotiations, which include countries such as Chile, Mexico, and Peru. Many other countries in
the region benefit from trade preference programs like the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).28 The Administration has also emphasized
initiatives such as 100,000 Strong in the Americas, which is designed to increase the number of
Latin American students studying in the United States and the number of U.S. students studying
in Latin America, and Connecting the Americas 2022, which is designed to ensure universal
access to reliable, clean, and affordable electricity.29 To date, few U.S. government resources have
been dedicated to initiatives such as these, which rely on private sector funding.
Some questions Members of Congress might consider include:

23 Ibid.
24 Testimony of Secretary of State John Kerry, “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on President
Obama’s Proposed Fiscal 2015 Budget Request for International Affairs,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, April 8,
2014.
25 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Appendix 3: Foreign
Operations, Fiscal Year 2015
, April 2014, p.626.
26 “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on President Obama’s Proposed Fiscal 2015 Budget Request for
the State Department,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, March 13, 2014.
27 For more information on TPP, see CRS Report R42694, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and
Issues for Congress
, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson.
28 For more information on GSP, see CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences: Background and
Renewal Debate
, by Vivian C. Jones.
29 Secretary of State John Kerry, “Remarks: Secretary of State John Kerry at 44th Annual Washington Conference of
the Americas,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, May 7, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
12

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

• How do U.S. policy priorities in the Western Hemisphere compare to U.S.
priorities elsewhere in the world, and are U.S. priorities properly reflected in the
FY2015 aid request?
• Does the FY2015 request adequately reflect U.S. interests and objectives in Latin
America and the Caribbean, and is the request balanced appropriately among
these myriad interests and objectives?
• What are the potential effects of the Administration’s proposed cuts on political,
economic, and security conditions in the region?
• How might the Administration’s proposed cuts in assistance affect U.S. bilateral
relations and influence in the region?
• If additional cuts are to be made to foreign aid to the region in FY2015 beyond
the Administration’s request, which areas can be identified for reduction with the
least harm to U.S. interests or objectives?
• Are there other forms of engagement the U.S. government could use to advance
its policy priorities in Latin America and the Caribbean, and should more
resources be dedicated to those initiatives as U.S. relations with the region
become less defined by the provision of foreign assistance?
Inter-Agency and International Donor Coordination30
As Congress seeks to maximize the impact of scarce foreign assistance funds, it may consider
resource coordination, both among U.S. government agencies as well as with international
donors. U.S. foreign assistance is currently split among a variety of different government
agencies. Although the State Department and USAID continue to manage the majority of
assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean, the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) has
grown. In FY2012 (the most recent year for which data are available), DOD provided nearly $283
million to the region through U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command. While most
of these resources were dedicated to counternarcotics assistance, DOD also provided some
humanitarian assistance and other forms of security aid.31 Several other agencies, such as the
Inter-American Foundation (IAF), the MCC, and the Peace Corps, also provide aid to the region.
A 2012 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the State Department,
USAID, and DOD are not fully aware of each other’s assistance efforts, and, consequently, the
potential exists for unnecessary overlap. GAO maintains that while there are some initiatives
underway to improve the situation, and ad hoc arrangements exist in certain cases, there is no
formal framework for readily sharing information across the three agencies.32 With better
coordination, the various U.S. agencies providing assistance may be able to ensure that their
efforts are complementary and thereby increase the potential impact of their programs.

30 For a more detailed examination of donor coordination issues, see CRS Report R41185, Foreign Aid: International
Donor Coordination of Development Assistance
, by Marian L. Lawson.
31 U.S. Department of Defense, Section 1209 of the NDAA for FY 2008 (P.L. 110-181) Report to Congress on Foreign-
Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Year 2012
, May 2013.
32 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations
and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts
, GAO-12-359, February 2012, pp. 26-27,
available at http://gao.gov/assets/590/588334.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
13

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

Congress might also consider the advantages and disadvantages of closer coordination with other
international donors. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean received $10.1 billion in official
development assistance33 disbursements in 2012 (the most recent year for which data are
available). The United States provided about $2 billion (20%) of the total while other major
bilateral donors34 provided $4.6 billion (46%) and multilateral organizations provided $3.4 billion
(34%).35 Some studies that have attempted to map programs being carried out in the region by the
various donors have found a lack of coordination, including programs that duplicate efforts or
support conflicting goals.36 Closer coordination could enable the various donors to focus on
specific countries or sectors, ensure that their efforts are complementary, and use their limited
funds for foreign assistance more efficiently. Such coordination could be difficult, however, as it
is unclear which country or organization might lead the effort and donors may disagree on the
division of labor. Moreover, foreign assistance often has strategic objectives in addition to
development goals. While donors may be able to carry out aid programs more efficiently by
focusing on certain sectors or countries, doing so could negatively affect their strategic interests.
In recent years, the United States has begun working with countries in the region that have been
successful in overcoming their domestic development challenges to provide assistance to third
countries. The United States has signed trilateral cooperation agreements with Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, and Uruguay, which are designed to provide the U.S. government and its development
partners with access to new solutions and expertise, and multiply the impact of that expertise by
combining best practices with larger scale financial resources.37 The Administration’s FY2015
foreign aid request includes $2 million to work with the Brazilian Development Agency and
implement joint projects designed to improve food security in countries such as Haiti, Honduras,
and Mozambique. The FY2015 foreign aid request also includes $1 million to support Colombian
efforts to provide training and other security support to countries in Central America and the
Caribbean.38 Efforts such as these could build the capacities of U.S. partners to take on more
responsibility for regional stability and development. Critics assert that providing assistance
through foreign governments raises serious oversight concerns, as doing so could potentially lead
to U.S. funds being used to support activities that would otherwise be prohibited.39

33 The OECD defines official development assistance as “grants or loans to developing countries and to multilateral
agencies which are (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as
the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In
addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are
excluded.”
34 After the United States, the largest bilateral donors to the region in 2012 were France ($1.4 billion), Canada ($860
million), Germany ($845 million), Norway ($367 million), and Spain ($275 million).
35 “OECD International Development Statistics, ODA Official Development Assistance: Disbursements” OECD
iLibrary
, accessed May 2014.
36 See, for example: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA),
Mapeo de las Intervenciones de Seguridad Ciudadana en Centroamérica Financiadas por la Cooperación
Internacional
, June 2011.
37 P. Adriana Hayes, “In Development, Three Heads are Better than One,” USAID Frontlines, March/April 2012;
USAID, “United States and Colombia Partner to Advance Development in Latin America,” Press Release, June 1,
2012; and USAID, “U.S. and Uruguay Partner with Paraguay to Strengthen Governance and Promote Inclusive
Economic Development,” Press Release, January 16, 2014.
38 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Appendix 3: Foreign
Operations, Fiscal Year 2015
, April 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/224070.pdf.
39 Adam Isacson et al., Time to Listen: Trends in U.S. Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, Joint
Publication of the Center for International Policy, Latin American Working Group Education Fund, and Washington
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
14

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

Some questions Members of Congress might consider include:
• Are there U.S. agencies that have comparative advantages in providing certain
types of assistance?
• Do the intended roles of the various U.S. agencies providing foreign assistance
need to be clarified?
• Are additional mechanisms to encourage inter-agency coordination necessary?
• Are there certain types of assistance programs that the United States has a
comparative advantage in providing?
• Are there countries or development sectors of lower strategic importance that
other donors would be willing to support if the United States concentrated its
efforts elsewhere?
• How might building the foreign assistance capacities of regional partners affect
the short-term and long-term interests of the United States?
• Are there controls in place to ensure that U.S. funds provided through partner
nations are used in accordance with U.S. law?
Political Will and Program Sustainability
When considering foreign assistance levels for Latin American and Caribbean nations, Congress
might examine the issues of political will and program sustainability. According to the State
Department’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the United States
should “assess and monitor host nations’ political will to make the reforms necessary to make
effective use of U.S. assistance to ensure our assistance is being targeted where it can have the
most impact.”40 Unless partner nations are willing to implement complementary reforms and take
ownership and sustain programs as aid is reduced and withdrawn, the results of U.S. assistance
will likely be limited and short-lived.
The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have a mixed record in terms of demonstrating
political will and ensuring program sustainability. The Colombian government, which has
benefitted from high levels of U.S. assistance for more than a decade, has undertaken numerous
reforms and raised revenue. As a result, the United States is able to carry out a managed transition
of its assistance programs in the country in which aid is slowly reduced as Colombia takes over
financial and technical responsibility. Similarly, USAID has closed its mission in Panama, and
has withdrawn from a number of development sectors in other Latin American countries because
partner nations have developed the capacity to manage and fund the programs on their own.41

(...continued)
Office on Latin America, September 2013, pp. 22-26,
http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Regional%20Security/Time%20to%20Listen/Time%20to%20Lis
ten.pdf.
40 U.S. Department of State and USAID, Leading through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review
, 2010, p.154, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf.
41 Mark Feierstein, “A New Approach for a Changing Hemisphere,” USAID Frontlines, March/April 2012.
Congressional Research Service
15

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean

Despite these successes, numerous GAO reports indicate that political will has often been lacking
in the region, especially with regard to raising sufficient government revenue to sustain efforts
initiated with U.S. support. A 2003 study of U.S. democracy programs in six Latin American
nations found “cases in which U.S.-funded training programs, computer systems, and police
equipment had languished for lack of resources after U.S. support ended.”42 A 2010 study of
counternarcotics programs found that several countries in the region were unable to use U.S.-
provided boats for patrol or interdiction operations due to a lack of funding for fuel and
maintenance.43 Even Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)-funded projects, in which
assistance is contingent on partner nation actions, have run into problems with program
sustainability. A 2011 study of the MCC compact in Honduras found that the lifespan of roads
built to improve small farmers’ access to markets may be relatively limited, as the municipalities
where they were constructed lack the equipment, expertise, and funding for road maintenance.44
As Members of Congress consider foreign aid appropriations for Latin American and Caribbean
countries, they might consider questions such as:
• Does the country have the capacity to maintain the equipment that is to be
provided?
• Is there a plan for the host country to eventually take on financial and operational
responsibility for the assistance program?
• How much assistance will be necessary over what time frame in order to build
the host nation’s technical and financial capacity to sustain these efforts?
• Has the country demonstrated the political will to implement necessary fiscal and
policy reforms?
• Will U.S. assistance be complemented with host nation resources or through
public-private partnerships?
• Should U.S. assistance be contingent upon host nation reforms or financing?

Author Contact Information
Peter J. Meyer
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
pmeyer@crs.loc.gov, 7-5474

42 GAO, U.S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin American Countries Have Yielded Modest Results, GAO-03-358,
March 2003, p. 4, available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/157413.pdf.
43 GAO, International Programs Face Significant Challenges Reducing the Supply of Illegal Drugs but Support Broad
U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives
, GAO-10-921, July 21, 2010, p. 6, available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125042.pdf.
44 GAO, Compacts in Cape Verde and Honduras Achieved Reduced Targets, GAO-11-728, July 2011, p. 103, available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321708.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
16

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean


Acknowledgments
This report draws from CRS Report R42582, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean:
Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations,
which was co-authored by Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin
American Affairs.
Congressional Research Service
17