Latin America and the Caribbean:
Key Issues for the 113th Congress
Mark P. Sullivan, Coordinator
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
August 29, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42956
Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress
Summary
Geographic proximity has ensured strong linkages between the United States and the Latin
American and Caribbean region, with diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and
security concerns. U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration has focused on
four priorities: promoting economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security;
strengthening effective democratic institutions; and securing a clean energy future. There has
been substantial continuity in U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration,
which has pursued some of the same basic policy approaches as the Bush Administration.
Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has made several significant policy changes, including
an overall emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility.
U.S. policy toward the region is conducted in the context of a Latin America that is becoming
increasingly independent from the United States. The region has diversified its economic and
diplomatic ties with countries outside the region. Over the past few years, several Latin American
regional organizations have been established that do not include the United States, including the
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) designed to boost regional
integration and cooperation. While to some extent CELAC’s establishment reflects declining U.S.
influence in Latin America, the United States still remains very much engaged in the region
bilaterally and multilaterally. A looming challenge for the United States, however, is how to deal
with the next Summit of the Americas, scheduled to be hosted by Panama in May 2015. Panama
has indicated that it will invite Cuba to the summit. Cuba had expressed interest in attending the
sixth summit in 2012 in Colombia, but ultimately was not invited to attend. The United States and
Canada had expressed opposition to Cuba’s participation. Previous summits have been limited to
the hemisphere’s 34 democratically elected leaders.
Congress plays an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Legislative and
oversight attention to the region during the 113th Congress has focused on such issues as U.S.
support to countries contending with drug trafficking and transnational crime, including Mexico
and Central American and Caribbean countries; continued counternarcotics and security support
to Colombia as it moves toward a potential peace agreement; and continued support to Haiti as it
continues to recover from the 2010 earthquake. Hearings on the region have covered these issues
as well as a variety of other topics, including overall U.S. interests and policy in the Western
Hemisphere; energy issues; U.S. foreign aid to the region; challenges to democracy, including
media freedom, the rule of law, and political unrest in Venezuela; concerns about Iranian
activities in the region; U.S. relations with such countries as Brazil, Mexico, and the Dominican
Republic; and the surge of unaccompanied minors from Central America.
Legislative action to date in the 113th Congress has included a measure directing the Secretary of
State to develop a strategy for adoption of proposed reforms at the Organization of American
States (P.L. 113-41); approval of the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement (a
provision in P.L. 113-67); the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79), with provisions modifying the U.S.
cotton program related to a trade dispute with Brazil and requiring State Department reports on a
U.S.-Mexico water dispute in the Rio Grande Basin; omnibus appropriations legislation for
FY2013 (P.L. 113-6) and FY2014 (P.L. 113-76), which included foreign aid appropriations with
numerous provisions on Latin America; and a measure requiring an annual report through 2017
on the status of post-earthquake recovery and development efforts in Haiti (P.L. 113-162).
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Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress
Other legislative action has included Senate approval of comprehensive immigration reform, S.
744; approval of a resolution on Haiti’s recovery and reconstruction, S.Res. 12; approval of three
resolutions on the political and human rights situation in Venezuela—S.Res. 213, H.Res. 488, and
S.Res. 365; and House approval of legislation to impose targeted sanctions on individuals in
Venezuela, H.R. 4587 (the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also approved a Venezuela
sanctions bill, S. 2142, that could be considered by the Senate).
In other pending appropriations legislation, the House approved an FY2014 supplemental
appropriations bill, H.R. 5230, on August 1, 2014, that would reprogram up to $40 million in
FY2014 appropriations to support repatriation and reintegration activities in Central America. In
contrast, a Senate bill, S. 2648, introduced in July 2014, would provide $300 million in FY2014
supplemental appropriations to address the issue of unaccompanied minors from Central America.
Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported out foreign aid appropriations
measures in June 2014, H.R. 5013 and S. 2499. Both bills would provide funding and conditions
for U.S. assistance to the region, and both include funding to address the surge in unaccompanied
minors from Central America. On July 16, 2014, the House passed its version of the FY2015
Financial Services and General Government appropriations measure, H.R. 5016, with a provision
that would prohibit any funding to allow people-to-people travel to Cuba.
This report provides an overview of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean,
including the Obama Administration’s priorities; examines changes in the region’s economic and
political environment that affect U.S. relations with the region; and analyzes U.S. policy toward
the region. The report then examines congressional interests in Latin America, looking at selected
regional and country issues. Appendices provide U.S.-Latin America trade statistics and links to
hearings focused on Latin America.
For additional information and access to over 30 CRS reports on the region, see the CRS Issues in
Focus webpage on “Latin America and the Caribbean.”
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Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress
Contents
U.S. Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean ..................................................................... 1
Four Priorities for the Region .................................................................................................... 1
Economic and Social Opportunity ...................................................................................... 2
Citizen Security ................................................................................................................... 3
Democratic Governance ...................................................................................................... 4
Clean Energy Future ............................................................................................................ 4
Latin America’s Economic and Political Environment ............................................................. 5
A Changed Region .............................................................................................................. 5
Latin America’s Increasing Independence ........................................................................ 10
Continuity and Change in U.S. Policy ..................................................................................... 12
Congress and Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean..................................................... 14
Regional Issues ........................................................................................................................ 16
U.S. Foreign Aid................................................................................................................ 16
Migration Issues ................................................................................................................ 17
Trade Policy ...................................................................................................................... 19
Drug Policy ....................................................................................................................... 20
Terrorism Issues ................................................................................................................ 22
Organization of American States ....................................................................................... 23
Selected Country and Sub-Regional Issues ............................................................................. 24
Argentina ........................................................................................................................... 24
Brazil ................................................................................................................................. 25
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) ...................................................................... 26
Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) .................................................... 27
Colombia ........................................................................................................................... 28
Cuba .................................................................................................................................. 29
Haiti ................................................................................................................................... 31
Mexico ............................................................................................................................... 32
Venezuela .......................................................................................................................... 34
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean ........................................................................ 9
Tables
Table A-1. U. S. Imports from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 2007-2013 ................... 36
Table A-2. U.S. Exports to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), 2007-2013 ........................ 37
Appendixes
Appendix A. U.S. Trade with Latin America and the Caribbean, 2007-2013 ............................... 36
Appendix B. Hearings in the 113th Congress ................................................................................. 38
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Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 40
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 40
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Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress
U.S. Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean
U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere are diverse, and include economic, political, security,
and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages between
the United States and the region, with the United States being the major trading partner and
largest source of foreign investment for many countries. Free trade agreements (FTAs) have
augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries in the region. Latin American nations,
primarily Mexico and Venezuela, supply the United States with almost one-third of its imported
crude oil. The Western Hemisphere is also the largest source of U.S. immigration, both legal and
illegal, with geographic proximity and economic conditions being major factors driving migration
trends. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key
component of U.S. relations with the region and a major interest of Congress for some three
decades, and in recent years has included close security cooperation with Mexico, Central
America, and the Caribbean to combat drug trafficking and related violence. With the exception
of Cuba, the region has made enormous strides in terms of democratic political development over
the past three decades, but the rise of undemocratic practices in several countries, especially
Venezuela, has been a U.S. concern. The United States has often taken the lead in responding to
natural disasters in the region, as was demonstrated once again in the aftermath of Haiti’s
catastrophic 2010 earthquake.
Four Priorities for the Region
The Obama Administration has set forth a broad framework for U.S. policy toward Latin America
and the Caribbean centered on four pillars or priorities:
• promoting economic and social opportunity;
• ensuring citizen security;
• strengthening effective institutions of democratic governance; and
• securing a clean energy future.
The State Department maintains that these policy “priorities are based on the premise that the
United States has a vital interest in contributing to the building of stable, prosperous, and
democratic nations” in the hemisphere that can play an important role in dealing with global
challenges.1 The Obama Administration has stressed that its policy approach toward the region is
one that emphasizes partnership and shared responsibility, with policy conducted on the basis of
mutual respect through engagement and dialogue.2 President Obama reemphasized the theme of
equal partnership at the sixth Summit of the Americas in April 2012 when he said that “in the
Americas there are no senior or junior partners, we’re simply partners.”3 In remarks at the June
1 U.S. Department of State, Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs,
“U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Look Ahead,” January 6, 2011.
2 Ibid.; and U.S. Department of State, Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs, “U.S. Foreign Policy in the Obama Era,” October 9, 2010. The same general policy approach has continued
under current Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Secretary Roberta Jacobson, who was
confirmed by the Senate in March 2012.
3 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks of President Barack Obama—As Prepared for Delivery—
(continued...)
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2012 Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly meeting in Bolivia, Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson reiterated the commitment
of the United States to work with hemispheric nations “in the spirit of genuine and equal
partnership to advance liberty and prosperity for all the citizens of the hemisphere.”4
In a November 2013 OAS address, Secretary of State John Kerry asserted that “the era of the
Monroe Doctrine is over.”5 Secretary Kerry emphasized the importance of the United States
working with other hemispheric nations as equal partners to promote and protect democracy,
security, and peace; to advance prosperity though development, poverty alleviation, and improved
social inclusion; and to address the challenges posed by climate change. Secretary of State Kerry
stated, “the relationship that we seek and that we have worked hard to foster is not about a United
States declaration about how and when it will intervene in the affairs of other American states. It’s
about all of our countries viewing one another as equals, sharing responsibilities, cooperating on
security issues, and adhering not to doctrine, but to the decisions that we make as partners to
advance the values and the interests that we share.”6
Assistant Secretary of State Jacobson reiterated in a December 2013 address in Miami, FL, that
“the administration is committed to sustained, productive engagement in the Americas.” She
emphasized that the various partnership initiatives between the United States and Latin America
involve U.S. officials sitting down with regional counterparts to understand their priorities and
needs and discussing the ways in which the United States might support them.7
Economic and Social Opportunity
The policy priority of expanding economic opportunity focuses on one of the key problems facing
Latin America: lingering poverty and inequality. At the end of 2013, an estimated 164 million
people in Latin America were living in poverty—almost 28% of the region’s population—while
66 million people or 11.5% were living in extreme poverty or indigence. These statistics reflect a
significant improvement from 2002, when almost 44% of the region’s population lived in
poverty.8 Moreover, the statistics show an improvement from 2009, when the region faced an
uptick in poverty because of the global financial crisis.
In addition to traditional U.S. development assistance programs focusing on health and education,
expanding economic opportunity also has involved several innovative programs and initiatives.
The Pathways to Prosperity Initiative, initially launched in 2008, is designed to help countries
(...continued)
Summit of the Americas Opening Plenary,” April 14, 2012.
4 U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta S. Jacobson,
“Remarks to the 42nd OAS General Assembly,” June 4, 2012.
5 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State John Kerry, “Remarks on U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere,”
November 18, 2013. In an address to Congress in December1823, President James Monroe warned European powers
not to interfere in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. This policy eventually became known as the Monroe Doctrine
and emerged in the early 1900s as a foundation of U.S. foreign policy.
6 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State John Kerry, “Remarks on U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere,”
November 18, 2013.
7 U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, “The Americas: Our Shared
Challenges,” December 13, 2013.
8 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America 2013, Briefing
paper, November 2013.
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learn from each other’s experiences through the exchange of best practices and collaboration in
order to empower small business, facilitate trade and regional competitiveness, build a modern
and inclusive workforce, and encourage green sustainable business practices.9 The Organization
of American States’ Inter-American Social Protection Network began in 2009 with U.S.
support to facilitate an exchange of information on policies, experiences, programs, and best
practices in order to reduce social disparities and inequality and reduce extreme poverty.10
President Obama launched the 100,000 Strong in the Americas initiative in 2011 to increase the
number of Latin American students studying in the United States as well as to increase the
number of U.S. students studying in countries throughout the hemisphere.11 As part of the Obama
Administration’s Feed the Future Initiative to combat global hunger and advance food security,
three countries in the Americas—Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras—receive targeted funding for
the development of poor rural areas aimed at helping vulnerable populations escape hunger and
poverty.12
At the sixth Summit of the Americas held in Colombia in April 2012, President Obama
announced several initiatives to expand economic opportunity. The Small Business Network of
the Americas (SBNA) is an initiative designed to help small businesses participate in
international trade by linking national networks of small business support centers.13 The
Women’s Entrepreneurship in the Americas (WEAmericas) program is a public-private
partnership designed to increase women’s economic participation and address barriers to women
starting and expanding small and medium enterprises.14 The Innovation Fund of the Americas,
launched by USAID, is an initiative to help finance lower cost and more effective solutions to
difficult development challenges.15
Citizen Security
The policy priority of advancing citizen security reflects one of the most important concerns
among Latin Americans. High levels of crime and violence, often associated with drug
trafficking, are a significant problem in many countries. The Central America-Mexico corridor is
the route for 90% of illicit drugs from South America entering the United States,16 while murder
9 U.S. Department of State, “Pathways to Prosperity in the Americas, Fact Sheet,” March 17, 2014, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2014/223740.htm; also see the website of the Pathways initiative, available at
http://www.pathways-caminos.org/en/Home.html
10 U.S. Department of State, “Inter-American Social Protection Network, Fact Sheet,” April 23, 2013, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2013/208096.htm; also the website of the Inter-American Social Protection Network
at http://www.socialprotectionet.org/
11 U.S. Department of State, “100,000 Strong in the Americas, Fact Sheet,” September 13, 2013, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2013/214201.htm; also see the 100,000 Strong in the Americas website, launched in
May 2014, available at http://www.100kstrongamericas.org/
12 See the website of Feed the Future, The U.S. Government’s Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, available at
http://www.feedthefuture.gov/
13 U.S. Department of State, “Small Business Network of the Americas,” Fact Sheet, August 26, 2013, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2013/213495.htm
14 U.S. Department of State, “Women’s Entrepreneurship in the Americas (WEAmericas),” Fact Sheet, October 16,
2012, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/10/199202.htm
15 USAID, “Innovation Fund of the Americas,” Fact Sheet, December 4, 2013, available at http://www.usaid.gov/news-
information/fact-sheets/innovation-fund-americas
16 U.S. Department of State, 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 1, March 2014, p. 9.
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rates in several Central American and Caribbean countries are among the highest in the world and
drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has risen to unprecedented levels.
U.S. support in this area includes a series of partnerships to help countries combat drug
trafficking and organized crime such as the Mérida Initiative for Mexico, the Central America
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
The Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) aligns U.S. assistance with the follow
up strategy to Plan Colombia that is designed to develop a functioning state presence in remote,
but strategically important, areas.
While these programs only began in the last few years, U.S. support to counter drug trafficking
and production in the region has been a key focus of U.S. policy toward the region for more than
30 years. The most significant U.S. support program was Plan Colombia, begun in FY2000,
which helped the Andean country combat both drug-trafficking and terrorist groups financed by
the drug trade.
Democratic Governance
The policy priority of strengthening democratic governance has the goal of building on progress
that the region has made over the past three decades, not only in terms of regular free and fair
elections, but also in terms of respect for political rights and civil liberties. Despite this progress,
many countries in the region still face considerable challenges (see “Latin America’s Economic
and Political Environment” below). The United States provides foreign aid to support the rule of
law and human rights, good governance, political competition, and consensus-building and civil
society. Improving and strengthening democratic governance includes support to improve the
capacity of state institutions to address citizens’ needs through responsive legislative, judicial, law
enforcement, and penal institutions, as well as support to nongovernmental organizations working
on democracy and human rights issues. It also includes defending press freedoms and democratic
rights, such as free and fair elections and the protection of minority rights.
U.S. officials have continued to speak out about human rights abuses in countries such as Cuba
and Venezuela, and threats to political rights and civil liberties in other countries in the region.
Assistant Secretary of State Jacobson has spoken out about the erosion in the full respect for
freedom of expression in some countries, and has also contended that hemispheric nations should
collectively remain on guard against efforts to weaken the Inter-American human rights system.17
Clean Energy Future
The Obama Administration introduced the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas
(ECPA) in 2009 designed to strengthen inter-American collaboration on clean energy. Many
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are vulnerable to climate change, and struggle with
energy security. ECPA includes voluntary bilateral and multi-country initiatives to promote clean
energy, advance energy security, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Some of the initiatives
involve international and regional organizations and the private sector.18 At the sixth Summit of
17 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Toward the Americas: The Summit and Beyond,” Remarks by Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson, May 11, 2012.
18 U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet, “Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas,” May 31, 2012, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2012/191563.htm; also see the website of the ECPA at http://www.ecpamericas.org/
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the Americas in April 2012, President Obama joined with Colombia in Connecting the Americas
2022, an initiative with the goal of achieving universal access in the hemisphere to reliable, clean,
and affordable electricity.19
Latin America’s Economic and Political Environment
U.S. policy toward the Latin American and Caribbean region is conducted in the context of
significant economic and political changes in the hemisphere as well as the region’s increasing
independence from the United States.
A Changed Region
Political Changes. The Latin American and Caribbean region has made significant advances over
the past three decades in terms of both political and economic development. In the early 1980s,
16 countries in the region were governed by authoritarian regimes, both on the left and the right,
but today, all nations with the exception of Cuba are elected democracies. This past December,
Argentina celebrated 30 years of civilian democratic rule since its military relinquished power in
1983 after seven years of harsh dictatorship. Some observers contend that the region overall,
despite some exceptions, appears to be moving politically toward the ideological center, focusing
on centrist, pragmatic polices.20 The threat to elected governments in the region from their own
militaries has dissipated in most countries, although the 2009 ouster of President Manuel Zelaya
in Honduras is an exception. Colombia’s ongoing peace negotiations with the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which began formally in October 2012, have raised hopes
that the hemisphere’s oldest civil conflict, which dates back to the 1960s, may be resolved.
Free and fair elections have become the norm in most countries in the region, even though some
elections have been controversial with allegations of irregularities. In 2013, seven nations in the
hemisphere held elections for head of government. Late in the year, former Chilean President
Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) was elected to a new four-year term in December, and was
inaugurated in March 2014. Bachelet has promised reforms aimed at reducing inequality,
including a gradual move toward free higher education.
To date in 2014, five countries in the region
2014 Elections
have held elections for head of government—
Costa Rica—February 2; April 6
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Colombia,
El Salvador—February 2; March 9
and Antigua and Barbuda. In Costa Rica, Luis
Panama—May 4
Guillermo Solís, an academic and former
Colombia—May 25; June 15
Antigua and Barbuda—June 12
diplomat from the center-left Citizen Action
Brazil—October 5; October 26
Party, was elected president with 78% of the
Bolivia—October 12
vote in a second round runoff, defeating the
Uruguay—October 26; November 30
candidate of the ruling National Liberation
Party. In El Salvador, the candidate of the ruling leftist Farabundo Martí National Liberation
Front, Salvador Sánchez Cerén (the sitting Vice President and a former guerrilla commander),
19 U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet, “Connecting the Americas 2022,” October 23, 2012, available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2012/199772.htm
20 Michael Shifter, “Latin America, A Surge to the Center,” Journal of Democracy, January 2011; Daniel Zovatto,
“Latin America 2013: Political and Electoral Balance,” Brooking Institution, January 3, 2014.
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won the country’s presidential election in a close second round race in which he defeated the
candidate of the rightist National Republican Alliance.21 In Panama’s election, Juan Carlos Varela
of the center-right Panameñista Party won the presidency in a three-candidate race, defeating the
candidate from the ruling Democratic Change party of outgoing President Ricardo Martinelli.22 In
Colombia, incumbent President Juan Manuel Santos won a heated runoff race in June, and
primarily based his campaign on continuing peace negotiations with the FARC that began in
2012.23 In Antigua and Barbuda, the ruling United Progressive Party led by Baldwin Spencer was
ousted by the opposition Antigua and Barbuda Labour Party led by Gaston Browne, with
economic issues dominating the campaign.
Elections scheduled for the remainder of this year include Brazil, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Brazil
will go the polls on October 5 with a second round scheduled for October 26 if no candidate
receives an absolute majority. Incumbent President Dilma Rouseff of the center-left Workers
Party is seeking a second term. The death of presidential candidate Eduardo Campos from the
center-left Brazilian Socialist Party in a plane crash on August 13 stirred up the election
campaign. The Socialist Party’s replacement candidate is former environment minister Marina
Silva, who some polls show has surpassed the other major opposition candidate, Aécio Neves of
the centrist Brazilian Social Democracy Party, and could be competitive with Rouseff in a second
round.24 In Bolivia, incumbent President Evo Morales of the leftist Movement Toward Socialism
party is expected to be easily re-elected, with polls showing him far head of his opponents.25 In
Uruguay, the election appears to be shaping up to be a close race between former president Tabaré
Vázquez of the center-left Broad Front coalition and Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou, the candidate of
the center-right National Party.
Despite significant improvement in political rights and civil liberties, several countries in the
region still face considerable challenges. In a number of countries, weaknesses remain in the
state’s ability to deliver public services, ensure accountability and transparency, advance the rule
of law, and ensure citizen safety and security. Many of the street protests that swept Latin
America in 2013, most notably in Brazil, were sparked by new middle classes demanding better
public services. There are also numerous examples of elected presidents over the past 25 years
who left office early amid severe social turmoil, often with economic crises, high-profile
corruption, or even the presidents’ own autocratic actions contributing to their ousters.
The quality of democracy in several countries in the region also has been eroded by two key
factors in recent years. One factor is increased organized crime. Mexico and several Central
American countries have been especially affected because of the increased use of the region as a
drug transit zone and the associated rise in corruption, crime, and violence.26 A second factor
negatively affecting democracy is the executive’s abuse of power in several countries that has led
to a setback in liberal democratic practices, with elected leaders seeking to consolidate power at
the expense of minority rights. In recent years, there has also been a deterioration of media
21 See CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
22 See CRS Report R43620, Panama: Background and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan and Andrew Lee.
23 See CRS Report IN10024, Colombia’s 2014 Elections: Referendum on the Peace Process, by June S. Beittel.
24 See CRS Report RL33456, Brazil: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations, by Peter J. Meyer
25 See CRS Report R43473, Bolivia: In Brief, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
26 For example, see Emily Edmonds-Poli, The Effects of Drug-War Related Violence on Mexico’s Press and
Democracy, Wilson Center, Mexico Institute and University of San Diego, Trans-border Institute, April 2013.
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freedom in several countries in the region precipitated by the increase in organized crime-related
violence and by politically driven attempts to curb critical or independent media.
Some analysts see the growth of leftist populism in the region in such countries as Venezuela,
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua as a threat to democracy because of the tough treatment of
political opponents and the dismantling of institutional checks and balances. They contend that a
type of competitive or electoral authoritarianism is taking hold in these countries, in which
democratic institutions exist but abuse by the incumbent skews the playing field against
opponents.27 Some also fear that El Salvador under Sánchez Cerén could join that group. In
January 2014, Nicaragua’s National Assembly, dominated by President Daniel Ortega’s
Sandinista party, approved constitutional changes eliminating presidential term limits and
eliminating the 35% threshold requirement needed for election. This paves the way for Ortega to
seek a fourth term in 2016.
The human rights group Freedom House compiles an annual evaluation of political rights and
civil liberties in which it categorizes countries as free, partly free, and not free. In its 2014 report
(covering 2013), the group ranked just one country as not free: Cuba; 10 countries as partly
free—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
and Venezuela; and the remaining 22 countries of the region as free. While the Dominican
Republic was categorized as free, Freedom House noted a decline in civil liberties in the country
because of a court ruling that could render thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent stateless,
an action that was criticized by other Latin American countries and the United States. In Panama,
Freedom House maintained that political rights declined because of concerns about a lack of
investigations of government corruption and verbal attacks against journalists investigating
corruption. In contrast, political rights and civil liberties were reported to have improved in
Nicaragua because of, among other things, advances in transparency, progress in women’s rights,
and efforts to combat trafficking.28 (The Freedom House evaluation, however, was completed
before Nicaragua’s Sandinista-dominated legislature approved constitutional changes in late
January 2014 that eliminated presidential term limits.)
Economic Changes. The region has also undergone a significant economic transformation. While
the 1980s were commonly referred to as the lost decade of development as many countries
became bogged down with unsustainable public debt, the 1990s brought about a shift from a
strategy of import-substituting industrialization to one focused on export promotion, attraction of
foreign capital, and privatization of state enterprises. Latin America experienced an economic
downturn in 2002 (brought about in part because of an economic downturn in the United States),
but recovered with strong growth rates until 2009, when a global economic crisis again affected
the region with an economic contraction of about 2%.29 Some countries experienced deeper
recession in 2009, especially those more closely integrated with the U.S. economy, such as
Mexico, while other countries with more diversified trade and investment partners experienced
27 See Kurt Weyland, “Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift, The Threat form the Populist Left,” Journal of Democracy,
July 2013. Also see Sebastián Mazzuca, “The Rise of Rentier Populism,” Journal of Democracy, April 2013; Steven
Levitsky and James Loxton, “Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Andes,” Democratization, January
2013; and Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia J. Arnson
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).
28 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2014,” 2013.
29 Sidney Weintraub, “An Economic Storm Hits Latin America,” Current History, February 2009.
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lesser downturns. The region rebounded in 2010 and 2011, with growth rates of 5.6% and 4.3%
respectively.30
Economic growth rates declined since to a regional average of 3.1% in 2012 and 2.5% in 2013.
Last year, the weak performances of Brazil (2.5%) and Mexico (1.1%) dragged down the regional
average. ECLAC’s regional forecast for 2014 originally was for an improved growth rate of 3.2%
based on increasing external demand tied to improving economic conditions in the global
economy and better economic performance in Brazil and Mexico.31 That forecast, however, has
been reduced to a regional growth rate of 2.2%, in part because of the slow pace of economic
recovery in developed countries and slower growth in China.32 There is also concern about
economic conditions in Venezuela, which is facing shortages of basic food and consumer items,
falling international reserves, and high inflation—the economy is forecast to contract 2.5% in
2014.33 Likewise, Argentina’s economy is forecast to contract in 2014 by 1.2%, and there is
considerable economic uncertainty as a result of the government’s confrontation with remaining
private creditor holdouts who did not participate in the government’s 2005 and 2010 debt
restructurings.34
As noted above, Latin America has made significant progress in combating poverty and
inequality. Two key factors accounting for this decline are increasing per capita income levels and
targeted public expenditures known as conditional cash transfer programs for vulnerable sectors.
Brazil and Mexico were pioneers in these targeted programs that have spread to other countries.
In terms of income distribution, while Latin America is still the most unequal region in the world,
inequality has declined in many countries since 2002, and there has been a clear downward trend
in income concentration in the region over the past decade.35 Rising growth and income levels
and progress in poverty reduction also have helped expand Latin America’s middle class by about
50% over the past decade, according to the World Bank. Now more than 150 million people in the
region (about 30% of total population) are considered in the middle class.36
30 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and
the Caribbean, 2013, July 2013.
31 ECLAC, Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, November 29, 2013;
Economic and Social Panorama of Latin America and Caribbean States, 2013, January 2014.
32 ECLAC, 2014 Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, June 2014.
33 “Venezuela Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), August 2014.
34 “Argentina Country Report,” EIU, August 2014.
35 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2012, p. 21. For further discussion of progress in reducing inequality in
the region, see Nora Lustig, “Latin America’s Inequality Success Story,” Current History, February 2013.
36 World Bank, Economic Mobility and the Rise of the Latin American Middle Class, by Francisco H.G. Ferreira et al,
2013.
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Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Map Resources, edited by CRS.
Notes: While Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located on the northern coast
of South America, all three countries are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
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Latin America’s Increasing Independence
In recent years, Latin America’s relatively sustained political stability and steady economic
performance (with some exceptions) have increased the region’s confidence in solving its own
problems, and lessened the region’s dependency on the United States. The region’s growing
ideological diversity in recent years has also been a factor in the region’s increased independence
from the United States, as has Brazil’s rising regional and global influence.
Latin American and Caribbean countries have diversified their economic and diplomatic ties with
countries outside the region. China, for example, has become a major trading partner for many
countries in the region, ranking as one of the top two export and import markets. Total Chinese
trade with the region grew from almost $18 billion in 2002 to almost $260 billion in 2013.37
(Nevertheless, the United States remains the single largest trading partner for many countries;
total U.S. trade with the region amounted $846 billion in 2013, more than three times that of
China’s trade with the region.)38
Several Latin American regional integration organizations have been established in the past few
years, a reflection of the region’s increasing independence, growing internal cooperation, and
ideological diversity.
The Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA, originally established as the
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) was launched by President Hugo Chávez in 2004 with
the goals of promoting regional integration and socioeconomic reform and alleviating poverty. In
addition to Venezuela, this nine-member group currently includes Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, and
Nicaragua, as well as the Caribbean island nations of Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, and most recently St. Lucia, which became a member in July 2013.
ALBA has the goals of promoting regional integration and socioeconomic reform and alleviating
poverty, but is most often associated with the anti-American rhetoric of its Latin American
members. Some observers maintain that ALBA has lost its initial energy. Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper maintained in January 2012 congressional testimony that ALBA was
“created in part to spread Chávez’s influence in the region” but “is only muddling through.”39 In
the aftermath of President Chávez’s death in March 2013, some observers question the future of
the Venezuelan-founded alliance.
Another regional organization is the 12-member Union of South American Nations (UNASUR),
established in 2008 (largely because of Brazil’s influence) to promote political, economic, and
security coordination in South America. It has served as a forum for dispute resolution. For
example, the organization played a role in defusing tensions between Colombia and Venezuela in
2008, and helped resolve internal political conflicts in Bolivia in 2008 and Ecuador in 2010.
Some analysts, however, have raised questions about UNASUR’s overall efficacy, financial
support, and ability to develop specialized capabilities and programs.40 In March 2014, in an
37 Trade figures cited are drawn from the Global Trade Atlas, using trade statistics reported by China.
38 U.S. trade statistics are drawn from the Global Trade Atlas, using statistics reported by the U.S. Department of
Commerce.
39 Testimony of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, January 31, 2012, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf
40 Michael Shifter, “The Shifting Landscape of Latin American Regionalism,” Current History, February 2012; Also
see Clapper, op. cit.
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attempt to quell political unrest in Venezuela, UNASUR foreign ministers approved a resolution
expressing support for dialogue between the Venezuelan government and all political forces and
social sectors; in April, the foreign ministers of Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador were initially
successful in establishing such dialogue, but talks between the government and the political
opposition ultimately broke down in May.
A regional trade integration arrangement, the Pacific Alliance, first emerged in 2011 with the
primary goal of facilitating the flow of goods, services, capital, and people among its members.
The Alliance currently includes Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. In February 2014, Costa
Rica signed a declaration of intent to join the agreement in a process that reportedly will take a
year. Different from other initiatives describe above, the Alliance welcomed the United States as
an observer in July 2013.
A region-wide organization established in December 2011, the Community of Latin American
and Caribbean States (CELAC), consists of 33 hemispheric nations, but excludes the United
States and Canada. CELAC’s goal is to boost regional integration and cooperation. While some
observers have concerns that CELAC could be a forum for countries that have tense or difficult
relations with the United States, others point out that strong U.S. partners in the region are also
members. Some observers have predicted that CELAC could diminish the role of the
Organization of American States (OAS), while others maintain that CELAC does not have a
permanent staff or secretariat that could compete with the OAS. CELAC held its first summit in
Chile in January 2013, in which Cuban President Raúl Castro assumed the presidency of the
organization for a year. CELAC’s second summit was held in late January 2014 in Havana, Cuba.
At the summit, leaders declared their region a “zone of peace,” pledging to resolve disputes as
respectful neighbors. The leaders also committed their nations to nonintervention and pledged to
respect “the inalienable right of every state to choose its political, economic, social, and cultural
system.”41
While to some extent CELAC’s establishment reflects Latin American desire to lessen U.S.
influence in the region, the United States still remains very much engaged in the region bilaterally
and multilaterally through the OAS and its numerous affiliated organizations. In addition, the
Summit of the Americas process (affiliated with the OAS) remains an important mechanism for
the United States to engage with Latin American nations at the highest level. While the sixth
Summit of the Americas, held in Colombia in April 2012, displayed U.S. divergence from the
region in terms of policy toward Cuba and anti-drug strategy, the meeting also included a variety
of initiatives to deepen hemispheric integration and address key hemispheric challenges.
An impending challenge for the United States is how to deal with the next Summit of the
Americas, scheduled to be hosted by Panama in May 2015. In early August 2014, Panama’s Vice
President Isabel de Saint Malo announced that Panama would invite Cuba to the seventh summit,
presenting a policy dilemma for the Obama Administration.42 Previously, several Latin American
leaders pledged that they would not attend if Cuba was not invited. Cuba had expressed interest in
attending the sixth summit in 2012 in Colombia, but ultimately was not invited to attend. The
United States and Canada had expressed opposition to Cuba’s participation at the time. Previous
summits have been limited to the hemisphere’s 34 democratically elected leaders, and the OAS
41 Peter Orsi, “LatAm Leaders Declare Region a ‘Zone of Peace,’” Associated Press, January 29, 2014.
42 “Panamá Invitará Formalmente a Cuba a la VII Cumbre de las Américas,” La Estrella (Panama), August 2, 2014.
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(in which Cuba does not participate) has played a key role in summit implementation and follow-
up activities.
Continuity and Change in U.S. Policy
Under the Obama Administration, there has been significant continuity in U.S. policy toward
Latin America from the Bush Administration. Some of the same basic policy approaches have
been continued, although in many cases there has been a change of emphasis.
Like the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration has provided significant anti-drug and
security support to Colombia and significant support to Mexico and Central America to combat
drug trafficking and organized crime through the Mérida Initiative and CARSI. Assistance to
Mexico, however, has shifted toward more support for rule of law programs (including police,
judicial, and penal reform) and programs to help communities withstand the pressures of crime
and violence. In anticipation of a potential “balloon effect” of drug trafficking shifting to the
Caribbean region, the Obama Administration also established the CBSI, the origin of which,
however, dates back to the Bush Administration. Assistance for Colombia has become more
evenly balanced between enhancing rule of law, human rights, and economic development
programs on the one hand, and continuing efforts on security and drug interdiction on the other.
Overall U.S. assistance levels to Colombia have begun to decline as the country is increasingly
taking over responsibility for programs once funded by the United States.
On trade matters, implementing bills for FTAs with Colombia and Panama that were negotiated
under the Bush Administration ultimately were introduced and enacted into law in October 2011
(P.L. 112-42 and P.L. 112-43) after extensive work by the Obama Administration to resolve
outstanding congressional concerns related to both agreements. Another trade initiative begun
informally under the Bush Administration and continued by the Obama Administration through
formal trade negotiations is the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement,
which involves negotiations with Mexico, Chile, and Peru and eight other Pacific countries. A
framework for a TPP agreement was announced in November 2011; the goal was to reach an
agreement in 2013, but negotiations are still continuing. Countries reportedly are looking to
announce an agreement on the sidelines of the November 2014 Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ summit.43
Just as the Bush Administration had, the Obama Administration has expressed support for
comprehensive immigration reform, an especially important issue in U.S. relations with Mexico
and Central America. Reform efforts were stymied in 2007 when the Senate failed to invoke
cloture and limit debate on two comprehensive reform measures, and Congress did not return to
consideration of such measures. In 2013, however, a bipartisan group of Senators developed a
framework for comprehensive reform legislation that the Senate approved in June 2013; the
measure included a pathway for citizenship for some 11 million undocumented immigrants living
in the United States. The House has not considered comprehensive immigration reform. In mid-
2014, both houses began focusing on how to address the surge in unaccompanied minors from
Central America that have entered the United States along the U.S.-Mexico border.
43 See CRS Report R42694, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress, coordinated
by Ian F. Fergusson, and CRS Report IF00001, Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (In Focus), by Brock R.
Williams and Ian F. Fergusson.
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In other areas, the Obama Administration has made policy changes on Latin America that have
more clearly differentiated it from the Bush Administration. Early on, the Administration put
more of an emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility in its policy toward the region. The
Administration increased and sustained higher levels of development assistance to the region
even in recent years as overall U.S. assistance to the region has declined. The Administration has
also implemented several changes in Cuba policy by lifting restrictions on family travel, easing
restrictions on other types of purposeful travel, and restarting semi-annual migration talks with
Cuba. At the same time, the Administration has continued the long-standing U.S. policy of
maintaining economic sanctions on Cuba and speaking out about the poor human rights situation
on the island.
In assessing U.S. policy toward Latin America under the Obama Administration, many observers
and policy analysts have commended the Administration for its emphasis on partnership and
multilateralism; for deepening security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the
Caribbean focused on ensuring citizen security; for broadening relations with Colombia beyond
counternarcotics and counterterrorism issues; and for a strong U.S. response to the earthquake in
Haiti. According to a former State Department official, U.S. diplomacy in the region today “is
focused on being relevant to practical needs widely felt by other peoples—the way it should be,”
and socioeconomic changes in the region, which the United States helped support, “are fostering
a convergence of basic values and interests that can and should define relationships that are
bright, cooperative, and productive for decades to come.”44
On the other hand, a number of analysts have urged the Administration to articulate a strategic
vision and more cohesive policy approach toward Latin America.45 In looking at President
Obama’s first term, some analysts contend that as problems have arisen in the region, U.S.
responses have been reactive rather than proactive, and can be characterized “as improvised and
lacking a sense of strategic direction.”46 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
senior associate Howard Wiarda argues that a “coherent, mature policy for the region” needs to be
articulated, although he contends that the United States has accomplished a great deal at
individual country-level policies in terms of democracy, development, modernization, and in
fostering good bilateral relations.47 Peter Hakim of the Inter-American Dialogue has described
U.S. policy toward Latin America as adrift, with a growing separation of the United States from
Latin America and a shrinking U.S. vision for Latin America. He contends that while U.S. leaders
regularly affirm the importance of the region to the United States, they have not been able to
devise a strategy to effectively exploit what former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
described as the “power of proximity.”48
Many policy analysts and think tanks across the political spectrum have called for the
Administration to elevate U.S. relations with both Brazil and Mexico, the two economic
44 William McIlhenny, “Get the Story Right: Time for Stories of Fading U.S. Interest to Fade,” Americas Quarterly,
AQ Web Exclusive, November 26, 2012.
45 Shifting the Balance, Obama and the Americas, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone, and Lawrence
Whitehead (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), p. 21.
46 Laurence Whitehead and Detlef Nolte, “The Obama Administration and Latin America: A Disappointing First
Term,” GIGA Focus, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Number 6, 2012.
47 Howard J. Wiarda, “Recommendations for a New Administration: Base Hemispheric Relations on Opportunities,
Not Threats,” CSIS, November 26, 2012.
48 Peter Hakim, “The Incredibly Shrinking Vision: U.S. Policy in Latin America,” Política Exterior (Madrid), July 5,
2012.
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powerhouses of the region. Many advocate a deepening and broadening of U.S. relations with
Brazil in the areas of defense and security, trade, energy, and also multilateral issues given
Brazil’s rising global profile. With regard to Mexico, many argue that the Obama Administration
should, in addition to continuing strong security cooperation, seize the opportunity to work with a
new government in Mexico in deepening economic relations, including energy cooperation, and
engaging Mexico on global issues.49 On immigration, in particular, many Latin America policy
analysts have called for U.S. efforts to fix its immigration system as a means of improving
relations not only with Mexico, but with the region overall. Michael Shifter of the Inter-American
Dialogue maintains that meaningful immigration reform would be welcomed throughout Latin
America, especially in Mexico, “where the issue has long been a source of tension in the bilateral
relationship.”50
Think tanks and policy analysts have made numerous other recommendations for U.S. policy
toward the region.51 With regard to drug policy, there are calls for the United States to reevaluate
its anti-drug strategy, pointing to efforts by some Latin American leaders and others to explore
drug policy alternatives. While some stress the need to sustain a strong international drug control
regime focused on eradication and interdiction, others appear to emphasize the need for more
efforts to address U.S. domestic drug addiction and consumption. With regard to Cuba, some
argue for moving away from the sanctions-based approach toward Cuba, while others contend
that sanctions should be maintained as long as the government continues its harsh human rights
violations. With regard to democracy promotion, some analysts argue that U.S. engagement with
the region should include a more vibrant democracy promotion component, especially in
countries facing challenges; others contend that the United States already has strong democracy
and human rights programs; and some question the efficacy of such programs.
Congress and Policy toward Latin America and
the Caribbean
Congress plays an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Legislative and
oversight attention to the region during the 113th Congress has focused on such issues as U.S.
support to countries contending with drug trafficking and transnational crime, including Mexico
under the Mérida Initiative, Central America under CARSI, and the Caribbean under the CBSI;
49 Wiarda, op. cit.; Andrew Selee and Christopher Wilson, “A New Agenda with Mexico,” Wilson Center, November
2012; Duncan Wood, “Recommendations for a New Administration: Safeguarding Progress with Mexico,” CSIS,
December 10, 2012; Peter Hakim and Sergio Munoz Bata, “A Second Term Agenda for Latin America,” Infolatam,
January 22, 2013; James M. Roberts and Ray Walser, “Latin America and the Caribbean: A Wish List for 2013,” Issue
Brief, Heritage Foundation, January 7, 2013; Roger F. Noriega and José R. Cárdenas, “An Action Plan for US Policy in
the Americas,” American Enterprise Institute, December 2012; Johanna Mendelson Forman, with Alek Suni,
“Recommendations for a New Administration: Building a Dynamic U.S.-Brazil Partnership,” CSIS, December 19,
2012; and “A More Ambitious Agenda, A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue’s Commission on Mexico-U.S.
Relations, Inter-American Dialogue,” February 2013.
50 Michael Shifter, “Will Obama Kick the Can Down the Road?” Revista Ideele (Peru), December 27, 2012.
51 In addition to the various reports cited in footnote 31, also see Stephen Johnson, “Recommendations for a New
Administration: Interests, Policies, and Challenges in the Americas,” CSIS, November 21, 2012; Anton Edmunds,
“Recommendations for a New Administration: Be a Good Neighbor to the Caribbean,” CSIS, December 26, 2012;
Phillip McLean, “Recommendations for a New Administration: Move Beyond the Drug Focus in the Andes,” CSIS,
January 3, 2013; and Cynthia J. Arnson, “Setting Priorities for U.S. Policy in Latin America,” Wilson Center, January
2013.
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continued counternarcotics and security support to Colombia as it moves toward a potential peace
agreement; and continued support to Haiti as it continues to recover from the 2010 earthquake.
Hearings on the region have covered these issues as well as a variety of other topics, including
overall U.S. interests and policy in the Western Hemisphere; energy issues; U.S. foreign aid to the
region; challenges to democracy, including media freedom, the rule of law, and political unrest in
Venezuela; concerns about Iranian activities in the region; U.S. relations with such countries as
Brazil, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic; and the surge of unaccompanied minors from
Central America (see Appendix B for links to hearings on the region during the 113th Congress).
Legislative action to date in the 113th Congress has included approval of
• omnibus appropriations legislation for FY2013 (P.L. 113-6, Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, signed into law March 26, 2013),
which included foreign aid appropriations with numerous provisions on Latin
America;
• the Organization of American States Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 (P.L.
113-41, signed into law October 2, 2013), which directs the Secretary of State to
develop a strategy for the adoption of proposed reforms at the OAS;
• the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement in the Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-67, signed into law December 26, 2013);
• the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79, signed into law February 7, 2014), with
modifications to the U.S. cotton program related to a trade dispute with Brazil
over U.S. subsidies and a reporting requirement on a U.S.-Mexico water dispute
in the Rio Grande Basin;
• omnibus appropriations FY2014 (P.L. 113-76, Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2014, signed into law January 17, 2014), which included foreign aid
appropriations with numerous provisions on Latin America; and
• the Assessing Progress in Haiti Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-162), which directs the
Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress annually through 2017 on the
status of post-earthquake recovery and development efforts in Haiti.
There was also legislative action on the following measures by either the House or the Senate:
• In June 2013, the Senate approved comprehensive immigration reform, S. 744.
• In March 2013, the Senate approved a resolution on Haiti’s recovery and
reconstruction, S.Res. 12.
• Three resolutions were approved regarding the political and human rights
situation in Venezuela: in October 2013, the Senate approved S.Res. 213; in
March 2014, the House approved H.Res. 488 and the Senate approved S.Res.
365.
• In May 2014, the House approved a Venezuela sanctions bill, H.R. 4587, which
would impose targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for carrying out or
ordering human rights abuses associated with the protests that began in February
2014. (In May 2014, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also approved a
Venezuela sanctions bill, S. 2142.)
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• In July 2014, the House approved its version of the FY2015 Financial Services
and General Government appropriations measure, H.R. 5016, with a provision
that would prohibit any funding authorizing people-to-people travel to Cuba. (A
draft Senate Appropriation Committee version of the bill does not contain any
provisions on Cuba sanctions.)
• On August 1, 2014, the House approved an FY2014 supplemental appropriations
bill, H.R. 5230, that would reprogram up to $40 million in FY2014
appropriations to support repatriation and reintegration activities in Central
America. A Senate bill, S. 2648, introduced in July 2014, would provide $300
million in FY2014 supplemental appropriations to address the issue of
unaccompanied minors (the same amount requested by the Administration).
Other remaining actions for the reminder of the 113th Congress include completion of FY2015
appropriations measures. Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported out
foreign aid appropriations measures in June 2014, H.R. 5013 and S. 2499, respectively. Both bills
would include funding to address the surge in unaccompanied minors from Central America as
well as providing funding and conditions for other U.S. assistance to Latin American and
Caribbean countries.
Regional Issues
U.S. Foreign Aid
Although many Latin American and Caribbean nations have made significant development
progress in recent years, foreign aid remains an important tool for advancing U.S. policy
priorities in the hemisphere. Current aid programs reflect the diversity of the region. Some
nations receive a broad range of U.S. assistance, with projects in areas such as democracy
promotion, economic reform, basic education, human health, environmental protection, citizen
security, and counternarcotics. Others no longer require traditional development assistance but
continue to receive low levels of aid, usually targeted toward strengthening security capabilities.
Absolute assistance levels for the region have declined each year since FY2010. In FY2014, the
United States is providing an estimated $1.5 billion of aid to Latin American and Caribbean
nations through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State
Department. Some countries in the region receive additional assistance through other U.S.
agencies, such as the Department of Defense, the Inter-American Foundation, the Millennium
Challenge Corporation, and/or the Peace Corps.
Key Policy Issues: The 113th Congress has spent a substantial amount of time considering
appropriations for foreign aid and other programs. Final action on FY2013 appropriations was
delayed until March 2013, when Congress approved the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6), and final action on FY2014 appropriations was delayed
until January 17, 2014, when the President signing into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2014 (P.L. 113-76).
Congress is now considering the Administration’s request for FY2014 supplemental
appropriations to address the surge in unaccompanied alien children arriving at the U.S. border. S.
2648, introduced in the Senate on July 23, 2014, would provide $300 million for programs
designed to deter migration, support the safe repatriation and reintegration of Central American
migrants, and address the root causes pushing unaccompanied minors to leave the region. The
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House supplemental appropriations bill, H.R. 5230, was introduced on July 29, 2014, and adopted
on August 1, 2014. It would not appropriate any new funds for programs in Central America, but
would reprogram “up to” $40 million appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014
(P.L. 113-76) and prior acts to support repatriation and reintegration activities in Central America.
Congress is also considering appropriations for FY2015. The House and Senate Appropriations
Committees reported out their respective FY2015 State Department, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs appropriations bills (H.R. 5013 and S. 2499) in June 2014. It is currently
unclear whether Congress will fully fund the Administration’s request for $1.3 billion in
assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean since, for the most part, appropriations levels for
individual countries and programs are not specified in the bills or the accompanying reports
(H.Rept. 113-499 and S.Rept. 113-195). The bills do appear to emphasize different priorities than
the Administration’s request. According to H.Rept. 113-499, H.R. 5013 would provide funding
above the request for security programs in Colombia, Mexico, Central America, and the
Caribbean, and for democracy programs in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
Moreover, although the Administration did not request any funding for programs to address the
surge in unaccompanied minors in FY2015, H.R. 5013 would provide $120 million and S. 2499
would provide $100 million for that purpose.
For additional information, see CRS Report R43577, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2015 Appropriations, by Peter J. Meyer.
Migration Issues
Latin America is the leading source of both legal and illegal migration to the United States.
Mexico, El Salvador, Cuba, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic are among the top 10
leading countries of birth for the U.S. foreign born population. Factors that have fueled Latin
American migration to the United States have included family ties, poverty and unemployment,
political and economic instability, natural disasters, proximity, and most recently, crime and
violence. Since the mid-1990s, increased border enforcement has made unauthorized entry into
the United States more difficult and expensive, which has had the unintended consequence of
creating a “caging effect” by encouraging unauthorized immigrants to settle in the United States.
It has also prompted more migrants to rely on alien smugglers (coyotes), many of whom collude
with Mexican criminal groups, to transit Mexico and cross the U.S.-Mexico border. Migrants
have been vulnerable to kidnapping, human trafficking, and other abuses. For these reasons, Latin
American governments have supported the enactment of comprehensive immigration reform
(CIR) in the United States that would normalize the status of illegal migrant workers and create
guest worker programs to facilitate legal circular migration.
Immigration reform received substantial attention in both chambers during the first session of the
113th Congress, but the likelihood of reforms being enacted has dimmed during the second
session. In June 2013, the Senate passed the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and
Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744), a CIR bill that would double recent investments in
border security and require employers to verify employment eligibility electronically, but also
create new visa programs and provide paths to legalization for unauthorized immigrants. In the
House, five different immigration bills received committee attention in 2013, none of which
included CIR. Thus far in 2014, attention in both the Senate and House has focused on how to
address the unprecedented surge in unaccompanied minors who have been apprehended along the
U.S.-Mexico border.
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In the absence of comprehensive immigration reform, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and
Nicaragua have advocated for extensions of their eligibility for temporary protected status (TPS)
and Guatemala has requested inclusion in the program. TPS is a discretionary, humanitarian
benefit granted to eligible nationals after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
determines that a country has been affected by ongoing armed conflict, natural disaster, or other
extraordinary conditions that limit the country’s ability to accept the return of its nationals from
the United States. DHS deemed Honduras and Nicaragua to be eligible for TPS in 1999 in
response to devastation from Hurricane Mitch; El Salvador to be eligible in 2001 following a
series of earthquakes, and Haiti to be eligible in 2011 following a 2010 earthquake. U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) estimates that 64,000 Hondurans, 3,000
Nicaraguans, 212,000 Salvadorans, and 60,000 Haitians benefit from TPS. Eligibility for TPS
currently expires for Honduras and Nicaragua in January 2015, El Salvador in March 2015, and
Haiti in January 2016.
Another issue in U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean is the increase in removals
(deportations) in recent years. In FY2013, for example, DHS deported almost 368,644 individuals
worldwide, some 97% of whom were returned to Latin American and Caribbean countries. Of
those deported to Latin America and the Caribbean, more than half were removed based on a
criminal conviction.52 Mexico remains concerned about the stress that increased deportations
have put on border communities, as well as the safety of the deportees arriving into dangerous
localities. Caribbean and Central American countries are also concerned about the potential effect
of the deportations on increased levels of crime and violence. Officials from across the region
have called on the United States to provide better information on deportees with criminal records,
which DHS has begun to do in certain countries, and to provide reintegration assistance to help
governments support returning nationals.
In recent years, emigration from Mexico has declined dramatically, but illegal emigration of both
adults and children (accompanied and unaccompanied) from Central America’s “northern triangle
countries” (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) has surged. Some of the “push” factors why
children are migrating include poverty, violence, and the existence of smuggling networks, while
some of the “pull” factors include family reunification and the promise of better economic and
educational opportunities. Many analysts doubt the northern triangle governments’ willingness
and ability to address the root causes pushing unaccompanied children to leave despite their
pledges to do so. Mexico is also under pressure to better secure its southern border, arrest alien
smugglers, and combat Central American transmigration.
Key Policy Issues: As in recent months, during the remainder of the second session, Congress is
likely to focus on how to respond to the surge in unaccompanied minors from Central America
who have been apprehended on the U.S. Southwest border. Some policy makers favor increasing
support to Central America to address root causes prompting this migration and improve
governments’ capacity to absorb those who are deported, while others favor cutting foreign aid to
Central America and Mexico until governments increase their efforts to respond to the
phenomenon.
On July 8, 2014, the Administration submitted an FY2014 supplemental appropriations request to
Congress to address increased migration from Central America. While the vast majority of the
52 Deportation statistics provided to CRS by the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement.
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$3.7 billion requested would be used to enforce U.S. immigration policies, $300 million would be
dedicated to programs in Central America.53 The Senate-introduced version of the FY2014
supplemental (S. 2648) would provide the requested foreign aid funds. The House-passed version
of the supplemental (H.R. 5230) does not include new funds for Central America, but would
allow $40 million of previously appropriated aid for Central America to be made available for
repatriation and reintegration activities.
The FY2015 foreign aid appropriations bills introduced in both houses also include provisions to
address the surge in unaccompanied children. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s version (S.
2499) would provide $100 million to address the root causes pushing children to leave Central
America and support reintegration programs. The House Appropriations Committee’s version
(H.R. 5013) would provide $120 million to help secure the Mexico-Guatemala border and to
combat alien smuggling and human trafficking. This funding is over and above what would be
provided for by CARSI.
For additional background, CRS Report R43320, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 113th
Congress, coordinated by Andorra Bruno; CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration
Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, by Lisa Seghetti; CRS Report RS20844, Temporary
Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem and Karma Ester;
CRS Report RL33200, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, by Clare
Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R43628, Unaccompanied Alien Children: Potential Factors
Contributing to Recent Immigration, coordinated by William A. Kandel; and CRS Report
R43702, Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations,
coordinated by Peter J. Meyer.
Trade Policy
The Latin America and Caribbean region is one of the fastest-growing regional trading partners
for the United States. The average rate of growth in trade between the United States and the
region since 1998 surpasses that of U.S. trade with Asia and the European Union. Despite
challenges such as diplomatic tensions or violence in certain countries, economic relations
between the United States and most of its trading partners in the region remain strong. The United
States accounts for roughly 40% of the region’s imports and exports. Most of this trade is with
Mexico, which accounts for 60% of U.S. imports from and 54% of U.S. exports to the region. In
2013, total U.S. exports to Latin America and the Caribbean were valued at $407 billion, while
U.S. imports were valued at $438 billion (see Appendix A).
The United States has strengthened economic ties with the region over the past two decades
through the negotiation and implementation of free trade agreements (FTAs). Starting with the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered into force 20 years ago in
January 1994, the United States has entered into a total of six FTAs involving 11 countries in the
region, including Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. Some of the largest economies in South
America, however, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, have resisted the idea of forming
trade integration agreements with the United States. As a result, there are numerous other bilateral
53 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Emergency Supplemental Request to Address the Increase
in Child and Adult Migration from Central America in the Rio Grande Valley Areas of the Southwest Border,” July 8,
2014.
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and plurilateral trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphere that do not include the
United States. In addition to FTAs, the United States extends unilateral trade preferences to some
countries in the region through trade preference programs such as the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA). In the early 1990s,
the United States began extending unilateral trade preferences to certain countries in the Andean
region under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). However, trade preferences for Ecuador,
the only remaining designated beneficiary country under ATPA, expired on July 31, 2013; in late
June 2013, Ecuador had renounced its participation in the program.
As wages rise in East Asia and productivity increases in countries that have an FTA with the
United States, such as Mexico, numerous analysts have proposed that the United States employ
trade policy to further hemispheric cooperation and focus on improving regional supply networks.
The next possible step toward trade integration may be the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), which could have significant implications for U.S. trade and investment ties with the three
Latin American countries participating in the negotiations—Mexico, Chile, and Peru—as well as
with Canada and seven other countries in the Pacific involved in the negotiations (other Latin
American countries could also join in the future). The proposed TPP may open some issues
related to NAFTA and strengthen provisions in areas such as intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection, labor rights, and environmental protection.
Key Policy Issues. The TPP negotiations are likely to continue to be of congressional interest,
especially in the areas of services trade, IPR protection, worker rights, environmental issues, and
regulatory cooperation. Given that only three countries from Latin America are participating in
the negotiations, this could raise questions as to whether the United States should consider
broadening trade policy efforts to the region as a whole. Another possible issue of interest for
Congress is the Pacific Alliance, a trade liberalization initiative among Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
and Peru. The United States was granted observer status to the Alliance in July 2013, which will
allow it to attend negotiating rounds and also makes it a candidate for full membership. Congress
may also be interested in the recent passage of energy reform in Mexico and the implications for
U.S. oil imports from Mexico and for investment or business opportunities for U.S. companies.
Congress also could consider trade policy with Brazil in an effort to boost U.S. exports, especially
now that there is a possibility of trade talks between Mexico and Brazil. (Also see sections on
“Brazil” and “Mexico” below.)
For additional background, see CRS Report R42965, NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects,
by M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report R42694, The Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson; CRS
Report R41429, Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options, coordinated by Vivian
C. Jones; and CRS Report RS22548, ATPA Renewal: Background and Issues, by M. Angeles
Villarreal.
Drug Policy
Latin America and the Caribbean feature prominently in U.S. counternarcotics policy due to the
region’s role as a source and transit zone for several illicit drugs destined for U.S. markets—
cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and opiates. Contemporary drug trafficking and
transnational crime syndicates in the region have contributed to degradations in citizen security
and economic development, often resulting in record levels of violence and drug trafficking-
related homicides. Despite significant efforts to combat the drug trade, many governments in
Latin America continue to suffer from overtaxed criminal justice systems and overwhelmed law
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enforcement and border control agencies. Moreover, extensive government corruption,
entrenched by deeply influential criminal kingpins, frustrates efforts to interdict drugs, investigate
and prosecute traffickers, and recover illicit proceeds. There is a widespread perception,
particularly among many Latin American observers, that continuing U.S. demand for illicit drugs
is largely to blame for the Western Hemisphere’s ongoing crime and violence problems.
Ongoing struggles to deal with the violent and destabilizing effects of the illicit drug trade,
however, have spurred some Latin American leaders and others to explore drug policy
alternatives. In 2009, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy (later renamed
the Global Commission on Drug Policy) advocated the decriminalization of drug consumption
and treatment of drug addiction as a public health matter as well as a redoubling of law
enforcement efforts to crack down on drug trafficking-related organized crime. At the sixth
Summit of the Americas held in April 2012, several Latin American presidents criticized current
international drug control efforts. As a result, Summit participants tasked the OAS Inter-
American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) to prepare two inter-related reports to
evaluate current Latin American drug policies and provide policy options for alternative drug
control approaches.
The first of these two OAS reports assessed the scope of the drug problem in the Americas. It
concluded that there is no single manifestation of the drug problem in the region. For example, it
found that health-related consequences of drug consumption were most apparent in end-user
countries while criminal activity and related violence predominantly affected drug production and
transit countries. As a result, the report suggests that regional responses may benefit from greater
policy flexibility that allows for a diversity of approaches tailored to the problems facing
individual countries. Such flexibility may include changes in national legislation or international
law to permit the decriminalization or legalization of marijuana.
The second OAS report presents four potential scenarios for the future direction of the drug
problem in the Americas, depending on the policy decisions taken by regional actors between
2013 and 2025. Collectively, policy options identified include (1) addressing insecurity and weak
governance through institutional capacity building in the justice sector; (2) experimenting with
alternatives to the current prohibitionist drug control regime, including but not limited to the
decriminalization or legalization of marijuana; (3) mitigating drug-related violence and addiction
through local community and civic engagement; and (4) allowing drug traffickers to operate
freely and with impunity in order to reduce the visibility of drug trafficking-related violence.
The OAS drug reports were highlighted at its most recent General Assembly session in June
2013, where the theme of the conference was “For a Comprehensive Policy Against the World
Drug Problem in the Americas.” Many stakeholders had hoped that the OAS reports would spur
further consideration of alternative drug policy options, including in particular changes in policy
approaches to marijuana-related crimes. To date, the Obama Administration’s position on this
issue remains firmly against national-level policies that would legalize or decriminalize
controlled substances, including marijuana. Some countries in Latin America have already begun
the process of modifying domestic drug laws to decriminalize and reduce or alter the penalties
and consequences of certain aspects of the drug control regime, such as for drug possession and
consumption. In an unprecedented move, Uruguay enacted legislation to establish a nationally
regulated legal market for domestic, recreational consumption of cannabis in late December 2013.
Bolivia has also sought a different approach to counternarcotics policy, including ending its
reliance on U.S. antidrug support and decriminalizing certain activities involving coca leaf.
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Advocates of counternarcotics policy reform have hailed recent Latin American initiatives as a
breakthrough, praising such efforts as overdue, given the perception that existing policies have
not translated into enduring counterdrug progress for the region. Others, however, consider the
prospect of a growing divide between U.S. and Latin American drug control policy as one of the
most serious threats to the integrity of the global drug control regime. Such critics are concerned
that variations in national drug control policies could provide criminal elements additional
opportunities to exploit gaps in drug enforcement. It remains unclear whether such policy debates
may translate into lasting improvements to reduce the production, trafficking, use, and
consequences of illegal drug trade.
Key Policy Issues: The future direction of regional debates on drug policy reform may have
implications for Congress as it evaluates the Obama Administration’s counternarcotics goals in
the Western Hemisphere, including counternarcotics and foreign aid budget plans. Congress could
also address this issue as it evaluates the distribution of domestic and international drug control
funding, and the relative balance of civilian, law enforcement, and military roles in regional anti-
drug efforts. The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act of 2014, H.R. 4640, reported
by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 26, 2014, would establish a commission to
review and make recommendations on how to improve U.S. domestic and international drug
policies.
For additional information, see CRS Report RL34543, International Drug Control Policy:
Background and U.S. Responses, by Liana Rosen. Also see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican
Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin
Finklea; and CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and
Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.
Terrorism Issues
U.S. attention to terrorism in Latin America intensified in the aftermath of the September 2001
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, with an increase in bilateral and regional
cooperation. In its 2013 Country Reports on Terrorism (issued in April 2014), the State
Department maintained that the majority of terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere were
committed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The State Department
asserted that Latin American governments made modest improvements in their counterterrorism
capabilities and border security, but that for some countries, corruption, weak government
institutions, insufficient interagency cooperation, weak or nonexistent legislation, and a lack of
resources impeded progress.
Over the past several years, policy makers have been concerned about Iran’s increasing activities
in Latin America. Concerns center on Iran’s attempts to circumvent U.N. and U.S. sanctions, as
well as on its ties to the radical Lebanon-based Islamic group Hezbollah. Both Iran and Hezbollah
are reported to be linked to two bombings against Jewish targets in Argentina in the early 1990s.
A June 2013 State Department report to Congress on Iran’s activities in Latin America (submitted
pursuant to the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-220)) asserted
that Iran’s influence in the region is waning. Some critics maintain that the State Department is
playing down the threat posed by Iran in the region, while others contend that while Iran’s
involvement in the region is a concern, its level and significance are being exaggerated. As in past
years, the State Department’s 2013 terrorism report maintained that “there were no known
operational cells of either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah in the hemisphere,” but noted that “ideological
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sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and ideological
support to those and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.”
Cuba has remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982
pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act. Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the
State Department’s annual list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S.
antiterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act. U.S. officials have
expressed concerns over the past several years about Venezuela’s lack of cooperation on
antiterrorism efforts, its relations with Iran, and the involvement of senior Venezuelan officials in
supporting the drug and weapons trafficking activities of the FARC. In recent years, however,
improved Venezuelan-Colombian relations have resulted in closer cooperation between the two
countries on antiterrorism and counternarcotics efforts and border security.
Key Policy Issues. The 113th Congress has continued oversight of terrorism concerns in the
Western Hemisphere, especially the activities of Iran and Hezbollah. The State Department
assessment of Iranian activities in the region was the subject of two House hearings in 2013, and
another House hearing on terrorist groups in Latin America was held in February 2014 (see
Appendix B). In terms of legislative initiatives, two have been introduced so far in the 113th
Congress related to Cuba. H.R. 1917 (Rush) would, among its provisions, rescind any
determination of the Secretary of State in effect on the date of enactment of the act that Cuba has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. H.Res. 262 (King) would call for
the immediate extradition or rendering to the United States of all fugitives from justice who are
receiving safe harbor in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or confinement for criminal offenses
in the United States. The issue of Cuba’s harboring of fugitives wanted in the United States has
been mentioned for several years in the State Department’s annual report on terrorism.
For additional information, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark
P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel.
Organization of American States
Since its foundation in 1948, the Organization of American States (OAS) has served as a forum
through which the United States has sought to foster regional cooperation and advance U.S.
priorities in the Western Hemisphere. OAS actions reflected U.S. policy for much of the 20th
century as other members sought to closely align themselves with the dominant economic and
political power in the region. As the other 34 members have developed more independent foreign
policies, however, the OAS has become less receptive to U.S. initiatives and more prone to
inaction. A number of Members of Congress have expressed concerns about the organization’s
direction in recent years. Some assert that the OAS advances policies counter to U.S. interests and
argue that the United States should no longer fund the organization. Others assert that the OAS
continues to be an important hemispheric institution but worry that administrative and financial
problems are preventing it from effectively carrying out its core missions of democracy
promotion, human rights protection, economic and social development, and regional security
cooperation.
Key Policy Issues: The 113th Congress has maintained considerable interest in the OAS, and has
adopted legislation designed to strengthen the organization. On October 2, 2013, President
Obama signed into law the OAS Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-41), which had
been passed by both houses of Congress in September 2013. The measure expresses support for
the OAS, asserts that the organization could carry out its mission more effectively by
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implementing certain management and programmatic reforms, and directs the Secretary of State
to develop a strategy to ensure the proposed changes are adopted. It also directs the Secretary of
State to submit the strategy to Congress within 180 days of enactment, and provide quarterly
briefings on the implementation of the proposed reforms.
The 113th Congress has also continued to demonstrate support for the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), an autonomous OAS institution. The report (S.Rept.
113-195) accompanying the Senate version of the FY2015 Department of State Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (S. 2499) “recognizes the essential role of
the IACHR in providing justice for victims of human rights violations and protecting fundamental
freedoms in many Latin American countries.” The bill would provide $2 million for the IACHR,
including $500,000 for the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. In
addition, a provision of the Countering ALBA Act of 2013 (H.R. 1687), introduced in April 2013,
would direct the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS to use the voice, vote, and influence
of the United States to protect and strengthen the IACHR.
For additional information, see CRS Report R42639, Organization of American States:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer.
Selected Country and Sub-Regional Issues
Argentina
U.S.-Argentine relations generally have been strong since the country’s return to democracy in
1983, although at times there have been tensions in the bilateral relationship. While the United
States and Argentina have a bilateral investment treaty in place, Argentina had taken actions in
recent years that had dampened the investment climate. Over the past year, however, the
government of President Cristina Fernández has taken several positive measures that could
eventually lead to an improvement in the investment climate. These include settling outstanding
international arbitral awards (including some $300 million owed to two U.S. companies in
October 2013); engaging with the International Monetary Fund to improve the country’s reporting
of its economic growth and inflation data (revised data were released in March 2014); and
reaching an agreement with the Paris Club group of official creditors in May 2014 to repay some
$9.7 billion (including some $600 million owed to the U.S. government).54 In June 2014, the IMF
indicated that Argentina to date had met steps required to improve the quality of its reporting on
inflation and growth, although the IMF will continue to monitor additional steps to be taken by
Argentina.55
Despite these positive developments, Argentina is currently in the midst of a confrontation with
private creditor holdouts who did not participate in the government’s 2005 and 2010 debt
restructurings. In 2001, Argentina had defaulted on $81.8 billion of sovereign debt, but the
restructurings resolved 92% of the debt, although with large haircuts on the amount owed. The
remainder was largely held by hedge funds and subject to court-ordered judgments and
attachment orders. U.S. federal court rulings in 2012 ordered Argentina to pay some litigating
54 U.S. Department of State, 2014 Investment Climate Statement – Argentina, June 2014; Martin Hutchinson, “Playing
Nice Starts to Pay Off for Argentina,” Reuters News, May 29, 2014.
55 IMF, “Statement by the IMF Executive Board on Argentina,” Press Release, June 6, 2014.
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private creditor holdouts the full value of their claim, $1.3 billion. Argentina had asked the U.S.
Supreme Court to review the case, but in mid-June 2014, the Supreme Court declined to take the
case and let the lower court rulings stand.
Pursuant to those rulings, Argentina was ordered not to make payments on its bonds issued as a
result of the 2005 and 2010 restructurings without paying the litigating holdouts in full. Argentina
is concerned about triggering a clause in its restructured bonds that specifies that Argentina
cannot offer the holdouts a better deal than those provided in the 2005 and 2010 restructurings; it
fears that paying the holdouts in full or giving them a better deal would unleash a flood of
lawsuits from those who had accepted the terms of the previous debt restructurings. A U.S.
federal court judge had ordered Argentina and the litigating holdouts to meet with a court-
appointed mediator until the two sides could come to an agreement. The U.S. court had blocked
Argentina’s payment of $539 million for the restructured bonds that was due on June 30, 2014,
because Argentina did not pay the litigating holdouts at the same time. With a one-month grace
period for the payment on the restructured bonds, Argentina’s new deadline was July 30, 2014,
but it did not make the payment and the government once again went into default. The default
will prolong the inability of Argentina to access the international credit markets and make a
difficult domestic economic situation even worse.
In terms of the broader political picture in Argentina, President Fernández, from the leftist wing
of the Peronist party (Justicialista Party, PF), was elected twice in 2007 and 2011 (her deceased
husband, former President Néstor Kirchner, had served 2003 to 2007), but she is ineligible to run
for a third term in 2015. Her government has been lauded for its efforts to bring to justice former
members of the military and police for killings, disappearance, and torture committed during the
era of military rule, but there has also been criticism of the government regarding press freedom
because of its efforts to compel a major media company to sell some of its assets; the government
maintains that its actions have been designed to create more competition in the media market. The
government is facing declining support largely because of a difficult economic situation marked
by an economic recession, with a projected GDP decline of 1.2% in 2014, and high inflation,
projected to be almost 36% by year’s end.56
Key Policy Issues: Congress has maintained an interest in Argentina because of defaulted debt
owed to private creditors and the U.S. government as well as the treatment of U.S. investors in
the country. Some Members of Congress also have expressed concern about the state of
democracy and Argentina’s difficult economic situation and its current macroeconomic policy
framework.
For background information, see the following two archived reports: CRS Report R41029,
Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with the “Holdouts”, and CRS Report R43022,
Argentina’s Post-Crisis Economic Reform: Challenges for U.S. Policy.
Brazil
U.S. policy toward Brazil remains in flux as officials adjust to the country’s increasingly global
reach. Brazil enjoyed strong economic growth from 2004 to 2010 and is now the world’s seventh-
largest economy. The country has utilized its economic clout to exert more influence on global
matters. As a result, the United States and Brazil increasingly engage on international issues in
56 “Argentina, Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2014.
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addition to bilateral concerns. The changing relationship has occasionally frustrated U.S. policy
makers as the two multicultural democracies’ shared values have not always translated into
common approaches to international affairs. Some analysts assert that the independent foreign
policies and occasionally divergent national interests of Brazil and the United States will
inevitably lead to disputes, but that the countries can maintain a constructive partnership through
transparent and respectful engagement. Such engagement has proven more challenging, however,
since press reports disclosed that the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted Brazilian
communications, including those of President Dilma Rousseff and the state-owned oil company,
Petrobras. The reports led Brazil to indefinitely postpone a state visit that Rousseff was scheduled
to make in October 2013, and contributed to a general cooling of relations.
Key Policy Issues: The 113th Congress has expressed interest in several aspects of U.S.-Brazil
relations, though commercial ties have received particular attention. In June 2013, the House
Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade held a hearing examining the
opportunities and challenges of the U.S.-Brazil trade and investment relationship (see Appendix
B). The hearing witnesses generally agreed with one another that there is considerable room for
growth in commercial relations, and called for Brazil and the United States to work together to
address barriers to trade and investment. As part of the farm bill reauthorization (P.L. 113-79),
signed into law on February 7, 2014, Congress approved modifications to the U.S. cotton
program that could help resolve a long-running trade dispute with Brazil.
The 113th Congress is also considering several other measures related to Brazil. The Border
Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744), which was passed
by the Senate in June 2013, includes a provision that would require U.S. consular missions to
explore options for expanding visa processing capacity in Brazil. In June 2014, the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees reported out their respective FY2015 foreign aid
appropriations bills (H.R. 5013 and S. 2499), both of which include funding for conservation
programs in the Brazilian Amazon. According to the accompanying reports (H.Rept. 113-499 and
S.Rept. 113-195), H.R. 5013 would provide $10.5 million for such programs and S. 2499 would
provide $10 million. H.Rept. 113-499 also recognizes the work being done under the U.S.-Brazil
Joint Action Plan to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and Promote Equality and states
that H.R. 5013 includes funding to continue the initiative. Two other bills, introduced in February
2013, are designed to pressure Brazil to amend its constitution and allow the extradition of
Brazilian nationals; H.R. 571 would suspend foreign assistance to Brazil and H.R. 572 would
suspend the issuance of visas to Brazilian nationals.
For additional information, see CRS Report RL33456, Brazil: Political and Economic Situation
and U.S. Relations, by Peter J. Meyer and CRS Report R43336, Status of the WTO Brazil-U.S.
Cotton Case, by Randy Schnepf.
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)
Because of their geographic location, many Caribbean nations are transit countries for illicit drugs
from South America and the Caribbean destined for the U.S. and European markets. Currently, of
the 15 countries in the Caribbean region, President Obama identified 4—the Bahamas, the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica—as major drug-producing or drug-transit countries in
September 2013 pursuant to annual legislative drug certification requirements. Many other
Caribbean nations, particularly in the Eastern Caribbean, are also vulnerable to drug trafficking
and associated crimes. Homicide rates in several Caribbean countries have increased in recent
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years because of gangs and organized crime, competition between drug trafficking organizations,
and the availability of firearms.
In 2009, the Obama Administration developed the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)
through a process of dialogue with Caribbean countries with the goal of reducing illicit trafficking
in the Caribbean, advancing public safety and security, and promoting social justice. U.S. funding
for the program from FY2010 through FY2014 amounted to an estimated $327 million with
assistance in the following five areas: maritime and aerial security cooperation; law enforcement
capacity building; border/port security and firearms interdiction; justice sector reform; and crime
prevention and at-risk youth.
Key Policy Issues: For FY2015, the Obama Administration requested almost $57 million for the
CBSI. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported out their respective FY2015
foreign aid appropriations bills (H.R. 5013 and S. 2499) in June 2014. The report to the House
bill (H.Rept. 113-499) recommended not less than the FY2014 level of assistance for the CBSI,
or almost $64 million. It also would require a State Department report on CBSI funding on a
country-by-country basis for FY2010 through FY2014. The report to the Senate bill (S.Rept. 113-
195) did not include a specific funding level for the CBSI, but indicated its support for the CBSI.
Nevertheless, the Senate report also indicated that CBSI assistance should be made available only
for governments that the Secretary of State determines demonstrate a clear and convincing
commitment to punishing corruption and reforming their security forces. In terms of oversight,
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, held
hearings examining the status of the CBSI in June 2013 and April 2014 (see Appendix B).
Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)
In recent years, U.S. policy makers have expressed significant concerns about security and human
rights conditions in Central America. Countries in the region—particularly the “northern triangle”
countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—have long struggled to deal with rising
levels of crime and violence, which analysts have linked to inter-related factors such as
widespread social exclusion and weak and corrupt security and justice sector institutions. These
problems have been compounded by transnational criminal organizations seeking to control
Central American territory in order to transport illicit narcotics from producers in South America
to consumer markets in the United States and Europe. The U.S. government has sought to assist
countries in the region through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). The
initiative provides partner nations with equipment, training, and technical assistance to support
immediate law enforcement operations, build long-term institutional capacity, and address
underlying socioeconomic challenges. Congress appropriated $803.6 million for CARSI between
FY2008 and FY2014.
Key Policy Issues: Security and human rights concerns in Central America have continued to
receive congressional attention during the 113th Congress. The House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a hearing that examined the effectiveness
of CARSI in June 2013, and the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission held a hearing that
examined the human rights situation in Honduras in July 2013 (see Appendix B for links to the
hearings). The 113th Congress has also continued to appropriate funding for security programs in
Central America.
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported out their respective FY2015 foreign
aid appropriations bills (H.R. 5013 and S. 2499) in June 2014. According to the accompanying
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report to the House bill (H.Rept. 113-499), H.R. 5013 would provide $170 million for CARSI in
FY2015, which is $40 million above the Administration’s request. The bill would also provide
$10 million for a multifaceted anti-human trafficking program in Guatemala, $5 million for the
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), and $3 million for
Guatemalan police units dealing with sexual assaults. The bill would not maintain the human
rights conditions on security aid to Guatemala and Honduras that have been enacted in recent
years.
While S. 2499 would not designate a specific funding level for CARSI, the accompanying report
(S.Rept. 113-195) notes continued support for the initiative and states that the bill would provide
$4 million for CICIG and $3 million for sexual assault units of the Guatemalan police. The report
also expresses concerns that “corrupt and abusive police and military forces, impunity, and a lack
of political will to address these problems have limited the effectiveness” of CARSI, and directs
that assistance “be made available only for governments that the Secretary of State determines
demonstrate a clear and convincing commitment to punishing and reforming their security
forces.” Additionally, the bill would slightly alter human rights conditions on security aid to
Guatemala and would impose more stringent human rights conditions on security aid to
Honduras.
For additional information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security
Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando
Seelke; CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report
RS21655, El Salvador: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando
Seelke; CRS Report R42580, Guatemala: Political, Security, and Socio-Economic Conditions
and U.S. Relations, by Maureen Taft-Morales; CRS Report RL34027, Honduras: Background
and U.S. Relations, by Peter J. Meyer; and CRS Report R43620, Panama: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan and Andrew Lee.
Colombia
A key U.S. ally in the region, Colombia has endured an internal armed conflict for half a century.
Drug trafficking has helped to perpetuate Colombia’s conflict by funding both left-wing and
right-wing armed groups. Over the years, Colombia and the United States forged a close
partnership focused initially on counternarcotics and later counterterrorism. Building on that
cooperation, the U.S.-Colombia partnership has broadened to include development, human rights,
and trade.
The Colombian government, in close cooperation with the United States through a strategy
known as Plan Colombia, has reestablished government control over much of its territory,
reduced poverty and homicide rates, and made significant headway in combating drug trafficking
and terrorist activities. Colombia has substantially improved citizen security and economic
stability, but some observers continue to raise concerns about human rights conditions in the
country. Between FY2000 and FY2014, Congress provided Colombia more than $9 billion in
assistance to carry out Plan Colombia and its follow-on strategies. This support is gradually being
reduced as programs are turned over to Colombian control.
President Juan Manuel Santos, inaugurated for a second four-year term in August 2014, won in a
heated runoff race in June advocating a peace platform. In his first term, he launched peace
negotiations with the country’s main leftist insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC). During the campaign, President Santos announced that exploratory talks had
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also begun with Colombia’s second-largest guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN).
In legislative elections held in March, former President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), a harsh critic
of Santos and the peace negotiations, won a seat in the Colombian Senate. In the new Congress,
Santos’s “national unity” coalition of parties retained a majority in the lower house and has a
working majority in the Senate. Nevertheless, Santos now faces a divided Congress with Uribe
and his right-leaning Democratic Center party leading the opposition.
Prospects for concluding the peace talks with the FARC remain uncertain although they have
progressed halfway through a six-point negotiating agenda. There are five substantive topics—
land and rural development; political participation; ending the armed conflict including
reinsertion of rebel forces into civilian life; illegal drug trafficking; and victims’ reparations—and
a final procedural point, terms for implementing the final agreement, including its ratification and
verification. With the caveat that no agreement is final until an entire agreement is concluded,
negotiators have resolved issues of land and rural development (May 2013), the FARC’s political
participation after disarmament (November 2013), and illegal drugs and drug trafficking (May
2014). In mid- August 2014, as negotiators wrestled with the challenging issue of reparation and
justice for conflict victims, victim representatives joined the talks. The final substantive topic—
how to end the conflict—may be the most controversial. The 2014 elections demonstrated that the
Colombian people remain deeply ambivalent about the scope of punishment and forgiveness for
FARC crimes, the delicate issue of extradition, and other aspects of disarmament and
reintegration. Nearly 220,000 have perished, most of them civilians, and some 5 million have
been displaced in the course of the armed conflict, according to Colombia’s National Center for
Historical Memory.
Key Policy Issues. The 113th Congress has maintained a strong interest in Colombia’s progress in
security, counternarcotics, human rights, and trade. In October 2011, the U.S. Congress approved
implementing legislation for the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, which went into force on
May 15, 2012, and will eventually eliminate most tariffs and barriers to bilateral trade. Members
of Congress are monitoring Colombia’s peace negotiations and may consider how U.S. assistance
will shift in the event a peace accord is signed. Members may also want to consider what role the
United States should continue to play in Colombia’s ongoing struggle with drug trafficking and
illegal armed groups.
Regarding oversight of continued U.S. foreign aid to Colombia, key issues include funding levels
for Plan Colombia’s follow-on strategies, continuing allegations of human rights abuses,
assistance to Colombia for security training in third countries, and the future of cooperation to
support a potential peace agreement and demobilization of guerilla forces. Proposed FY2015
foreign operations appropriation bills in the House (H.R. 5013) and the Senate (S. 2499) appear to
either fully fund or exceed the Obama Administration’s request of approximately $281 million.
The proposed House measure appears to restore FY2014’s higher funding levels for Colombian
assistance from State Department accounts.
For additional information, see CRS Report R42982, Peace Talks in Colombia, by June S. Beittel;
and CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues,
by M. Angeles Villarreal.
Cuba
Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s
political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was
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characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. In February 2013, Castro was reappointed to a
second five-year term as President (until 2018, when he would be 86 years old), and selected 52-
year old former Education Minister Miguel Díaz-Canel as his First Vice President, making him
the official successor in the event that Castro cannot serve out his term. Raúl Castro has
implemented a number of gradual economic policy changes over the past several years, including
an expansion of self-employment. Few observers, however, expect the government to ease its
tight control over the political system. While the government reduced the number of political
prisoners in 2010-2011, the number has increased since 2012; moreover, short-term detentions
and harassment have increased significantly over the past several years.
Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of
legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. While U.S. policy
has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions, a second policy component
has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S. government-sponsored
broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí) and support for human rights and democracy projects. The
Obama Administration has continued this similar dual-track approach. While the Administration
has lifted all restrictions on family travel and remittances, eased restrictions on other types of
purposeful travel, and moved to reengage Cuba on several bilateral issues, it has also maintained
most U.S. economic sanctions in place. On human rights, the Administration welcomed the
release of many political prisoners in 2010 and 2011, but it has also criticized Cuba’s continued
harsh repression of political dissidents through thousands of short-term detentions and targeted
violence. The Administration has continued to call for the release of U.S. government
subcontractor Alan Gross, detained in 2009 and subsequently sentenced to 15 years in prison, and
maintains that Gross’s detention remains an impediment to more constructive relations.
Key Policy Issues: Strong interest in Cuba is continuing in the 113th Congress with attention
focused on economic and political developments, especially the human rights situation, and U.S.
policy toward the island nation, including sanctions. The continued imprisonment of Alan Gross
remains a key concern for many Members. In March 2013, Congress completed action on full-
year FY2013 appropriations with the approval of H.R. 933 (P.L. 113-6), and in January 2014, it
completed action on an FY2014 omnibus appropriations measure, H.R. 3547 (P.L. 113-76)—both
of these measures continued funding for Cuba democracy and human rights projects and Cuba
broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí). Both the House and Senate versions of the FY2014 Financial
Services and General Government appropriations measure, H.R. 2786 and S. 1371, had
provisions that would have tightened and eased travel restrictions respectively, but none of these
provisions were included in the FY2014 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 113-76).
For FY2015, the Administration is requesting $20 million for Cuba democracy projects (the same
being provided for FY2014) and $23.130 million for Cuba broadcasting ($3.9 million less than in
FY2014). The House Appropriations Committee reported out its foreign aid appropriations bill,
H.R. 5013 (H.Rept. 113-499), on June 27, 2014, which would make available $20 million “to
promote democracy and strengthen civil society in Cuba,” and provide not less than $28.266
million for Cuba broadcasting. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its version, S.
2499 (S.Rept. 113-195), on June 19, 2014, which would provide up to $10 million for Cuba
democracy programs and an additional $5 million for programs to provide technical and other
assistance to support the development of private businesses in Cuba; the Senate measure would
also provide $23.130 million for Cuba broadcasting.
With regard to U.S. sanctions on Cuba, the House version of the FY2015 Financial Services and
General Government Appropriation bill, H.R. 5016 (H.Rept. 113-508), approved July 16, 2014,
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has a provision that would prohibit the use of any funds in the act “to approve, license, facilitate,
authorize or otherwise allow” people-to-people travel.
Several other initiatives on Cuba have been introduced in the 113th Congress. Several would lift
or ease U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba: H.R. 214 and H.R. 872 (overall embargo); H.R. 871
(travel); and H.R. 873 (travel and agricultural exports). H.R. 215 would allow Cubans to play
organized professional baseball in the United States. H.R. 1917 would lift the embargo and
extend nondiscriminatory trade treatment to the products of Cuba after Cuba releases Alan Gross
from prison. Identical initiatives, H.R. 778/S. 647 would modify a 1998 trademark sanction; in
contrast, H.R. 214, H.R. 872, H.R. 873, and H.R. 1917 each have a provision that would repeal
the sanction. H.Res. 121 would honor the work of Cuban blogger Yoani Sánchez. H.Res. 262
would call for the immediate extradition or rendering of all U.S. fugitives from justices in Cuba.
For additional information, see CRS Report R43024, Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th
Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and
Remittances, by Mark P. Sullivan.
Haiti
Three years into President Michel Martelly’s five-year term, Congress and the donor community
have expressed growing concern about his commitment to the democratic process due to Haiti’s
failure to hold legislative elections that are already two and a half years overdue. The Haitian
government took some steps to move the process forward, and scheduled elections for October
26, 2014, but they are unlikely to occur on schedule, as the Senate has failed to pass the necessary
electoral law amendments. Saying they lack confidence in the provisional electoral council that is
to oversee the elections, some opposition members refuse to vote for the bill, and several major
opposition parties are boycotting the elections. If the elections do not occur before January 2015,
the parliament will lack a quorum and Martelly could rule by decree, increasing already-high
political tensions and the likelihood of more popular protests.
Four and a half years after the January 2010 earthquake that devastated its capital, Haiti continues
to make progress in its overall recovery effort, but enormous challenges remain. Criticism
abounds that reconstruction aid and efforts are moving too slowly, contributing to mounting
public frustration with international donors and the government. A cholera epidemic broke out in
late 2010. Scientific studies link its introduction to inadequate sanitation at a U.N. peacekeepers’
camp. Victims filed a class action suit against the U.N. in a U.S. federal court in October 2013,
seeking establishment of a U.N standing claims commission to address claims for harm, and
compensation for victims, including $2.2 billion for the Haitian government to eradicate cholera.
Citing diplomatic immunity, the U.N. says that it will not compensate cholera victims. In March
2014, the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti issued a report disagreeing
with that position. He instead said that full reparation should be provided and that those
responsible should be punished.
To enhance citizen security, donors have encouraged Haiti to focus on further strengthening the
Haitian National Police. Some 2,000 new officers were graduated from the police academy in
2012-2013. Despite opposition at home and abroad, Martelly has taken steps to re-create an army.
Ecuador trained 41 Haitian military recruits last year to work on engineering projects. The
opposition-controlled Parliament would have to vote to reconstitute the army, which was
abolished in 1995 after decades of gross violations of human rights and repeated coups.
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The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes,
continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other issues include the cost
and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics-, arms-, and human-
trafficking; and alleviating poverty. Congress shares these concerns. The Obama Administration
granted Temporary Protected Status to Haitians living in the United States at the time of the
earthquake, and has since extended it.
Key policy issues. The pressing issue for the remainder of the 113th Congress will be to see that
Haiti’s overdue elections are held soon in a free, fair, and transparent manner. Another concern is
the impact for Haiti of a September 2013 court ruling in the Dominican Republic that could
render some 200,000 Dominicans, mostly of Haitian descent, stateless. If the Dominican Republic
were to render those people stateless and send them to Haiti, the impact on Haiti could be
enormous. Beginning in June 2014, Dominicans of Haitian descent were given 18 months to
apply for a process that could lead to naturalization. Haiti and the Dominican Republic are in
talks to resolve remaining issues.
About 65 Members of Congress called on the U.N. to “acknowledge its legal responsibility” for
the cholera outbreak and “fully fund the Cholera Elimination Plan” of the Haitian government.
Some reports criticizing labor practices in Haitian factories, including at the U.S.-funded Caracol
Industrial Park, may renew Congressional concern over the alleged widespread underpayment of
workers and unsafe working conditions.
In July 2014, both houses approved S. 1104, the Assessing Progress in Haiti Act of 2014, and the
measure was signed into law on August 8, 2014 (P.L. 113-162). The law directs the Secretary of
State to coordinate and transmit to Congress a three-year strategy for Haiti that includes specific
steps and benchmarks for assistance, and to report to Congress annually through December 31,
2017, on the status of specific aspects of post-earthquake recovery and development efforts in
Haiti.
The FY2015 foreign aid appropriations bills (H.R. 5013 and S. 2499) would condition aid to
Haiti. The House version would prohibit assistance to the central government of Haiti until the
Secretary of State certifies that Haiti “is taking steps” to hold free and fair parliamentary elections
and to seat a new Haitian Parliament. The Senate version would prohibit aid until those elections
were held and a new Parliament seated. Both would further condition aid on the Haitian
government’s respecting judicial independence; combating corruption; and improving governance
and financial transparency. The Senate version would also require that the government be
selecting judges in a transparent manner and making reforms to improve the investment climate.
Both bills would also prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for Haiti except as provided
through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations, but would
allow Haiti to purchase defense articles and services under the Arms Export Control Act for its
Coast Guard.
For background information, see CRS Report R42559, Haiti under President Martelly: Current
Conditions and Congressional Concerns, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
Mexico
Congress has maintained significant interest in Mexico and played an important role in shaping
U.S.-Mexico relations. President Enrique Peña Nieto of the centrist Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI) assumed the Mexican presidency on December 1, 2012, after 12 years of rule by the
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conservative National Action Party (PAN). Since his inauguration, President Peña Nieto has
sought to enact bold structural reforms and broaden relations with the United States beyond
security issues.
President Peña Nieto’s 19 months in office have brought mixed results. On the one hand, the
economy has faltered (economic growth fell from 3.7% in 2012 to 1.2% in 2013) and significant
security challenges remain. On the other hand, Peña Nieto’s “Pact for Mexico” agreement with
the PAN and leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) facilitated the passage of historic
financial, education, telecommunications, and political reforms. These reform efforts culminated
in the December 20, 2013, promulgation of a series of energy reforms that will open up Mexico’s
hydrocarbons and electricity sectors to private investment. After some delays, secondary
legislation implementing all of those reforms has been enacted.
As Mexico has experienced a domestic shift in power, U.S.-Mexican relations have also evolved.
President Obama and Vice President Biden have embraced President Peña Nieto’s desire to
bolster economic ties and focus on issues beyond security, including education, during several
visits to Mexico, including President Obama’s participation in the February 2014 North American
Leaders’ Summit. U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has continued under the Mérida framework,
albeit with a new focus on judicial reform, prevention, and securing Mexico’s southern border.
The Peña Nieto government is working with U.S. and Central American officials to address the
recent surge in child migrants through its territory, but has urged U.S. policy makers not to
militarize the U.S.-Mexico border. Water disputes have continued in the border region. The July
2014 announcement of the first oil lease sale in the Gulf of Mexico region covered by the
bilateral Trans-Boundary Hydrocarbons Agreement signed in February 2012 and Mexican
approval of energy reforms are likely to create opportunities for energy cooperation.
Key Policy Issues: A range of issues in U.S.-Mexican relations have received congressional
attention during the 113th Congress. The Senate passed S. 744 in June 2013, a comprehensive
immigration reform bill that includes additional funding for border security; in contrast, House
committees have approved a series of discrete immigration measures, including H.R. 1417, which
would require new border security metrics. In December 2013, Congress approved the U.S.-
Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement that is intended to facilitate joint development
of oil and natural gas in part of the Gulf of Mexico (P.L. 113-67). Congress has continued
oversight of the Mérida Initiative and provided $194 million in Mérida assistance to Mexico in
the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 113-76, subject to human rights conditions,
along with funding for additional customs inspectors and infrastructure at the border. The Obama
Administration asked for $115 million for Mérida and $137 million in total aid to Mexico in its
FY2015 foreign aid budget request. The House Appropriations Committee’s version of the
FY2015 foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 5013 (H.Rept. 113-499), would provide more than
$200 million in aid to Mexico and another $120 million in Western Hemisphere Regional aid for
Mexico and Central America to address border security, alien smuggling, and other migration
issues. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s version, S. 2499, did not specify an amount of
funding for Mexico, but did include human rights conditions for security assistance.
U.S.-Mexican energy cooperation and the recent reforms that Mexico has enacted have generated
congressional interest, as has how Mexico’s participation in the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP)
negotiations may impact U.S.-Mexico economic relations, especially in the context of the 20th
anniversary of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
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Potential oversight questions that Congress might consider include: How is security cooperation
under the Mérida Initiative evolving? On the border, how are security concerns being balanced
against bilateral efforts to promote economic dynamism? What are the prospects for economic
growth in Mexico and how might the recent enactment of fiscal and energy reforms in Mexico
affect U.S. businesses? How can Mexico help the United States confront the surge in
unauthorized migration from Central America?
For additional information, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida
Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea; CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-
Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal; CRS
Report R43313, Mexico’s Oil and Gas Sector: Background, Reform Efforts, and Implications for
the United States, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke; and CRS Report R43312, U.S.-Mexico
Water Sharing: Background and Recent Developments, by Nicole T. Carter, Clare Ribando
Seelke, and Daniel T. Shedd.
Venezuela
While historically the United States has had close relations with Venezuela, a major oil supplier,
friction in bilateral relations rose over the past decade under the leftist populist government of
President Hugo Chávez, who died in March 2013 after battling cancer for almost two years. After
Chávez’s death, Venezuela held presidential elections in April 2013 in which acting President
Nicolás Maduro, who had been serving as Chávez’s vice president, defeated opposition candidate
Henrique Capriles by a margin of just 1.49%, with the opposition alleging significant
irregularities. Venezuela’s December 2013 municipal elections demonstrated mixed results for the
ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and the opposition Democratic Unity
Roundtable (MUD).
In 2014, the Maduro government is facing significant challenges, including deteriorating
economic conditions (with high inflation and shortages of consumer goods) and high rates of
crime and violence. Most significantly, in February, student-led street protests erupted into
violence with protestors attacked by Venezuelan security forces and militant pro-government
civilian groups. While the protests largely had dissipated by June, 42 people were killed on both
sides of the conflict, more than 800 were injured, and more than 3,000 were arrested (while most
have been released, 75 were still being held as of August 2014, according to the Venezuelan
human rights group Foro Penal). A major opposition figure, Leopoldo López, was arrested in
February, and two opposition mayors were imprisoned in March. Diplomatic efforts to deal with
the crisis at the OAS were frustrated in March. UNASUR was successful in getting the
government and a segment of the opposition to begin talks in April, but the talks broke down in
May because of a lack of progress.
U.S. policy makers and Members of Congress have been concerned in recent years about the
deterioration of human rights and democratic conditions in Venezuela as well as the Venezuelan
government’s lack of cooperation on anti-drug and counterterrorism efforts and its relations with
Iran. The United States has imposed financial sanctions on eight current or former Venezuelan
officials for allegedly helping the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia with drug and
weapons trafficking. The United States has also imposed sanctions on three Venezuelan
companies for support to Iran and on several Venezuelan individuals for supporting Hezbollah.
Despite tensions in relations, the Obama Administration has maintained that the United States
remains committed to seeking constructive engagement with Venezuela.
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The Obama Administration strongly criticized the Venezuelan government’s heavy-handed
response to the student-led protests in 2014, and called on the government to engage in
meaningful dialogue with the opposition. In late July 2014, the State Department announced that
it was imposing visa restrictions on Venezuelan officials considered to be responsible for human
rights violations in the government’s crackdown on the protests; reportedly 24 high-ranking
officials were sanctioned.57
In recent years, developments in Venezuela and U.S. relations with the country have largely been
oversight issues for Congress. Congress has also appropriated funding for democracy projects in
Venezuela through the annual foreign aid appropriations measure: for FY2014, an estimated $4.3
million is being provided through P.L. 113-76; and for FY2015, the Administration has requested
$5 million.
Key Policy Issues: To date in the 113th Congress, three resolutions have been approved regarding
the political and human rights situation in Venezuela. S.Res. 213, approved by the Senate in
October 2013, condemned violence and intimidation against the country’s political opposition and
called for dialogue. In March 2014, two resolutions were approved in the aftermath of
Venezuela’s crackdown on protests in 2014: H.Res. 488, approved by the House, and S.Res. 365,
approved by the Senate.
There has also been action on legislation that would impose targeted sanctions (visa restrictions
and asset blocking) on those responsible for human rights abuses associated with the protests.
H.R. 4587, passed by the House (voice vote) on May 28, 2014, would impose targeted sanctions
on individuals responsible for carrying out or ordering human rights abuses associated with the
protests and authorize $5 million for assistance to civil society in Venezuela. S. 2142, approved
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 20, 2014, would impose targeted sanctions
on those responsible for significant acts of violence or serious human rights abuses associated
with the protests, or more broadly, anyone that has directed or ordered the arrest or prosecution of
a person primarily because of the person’s legitimate exercise of freedom of expression or
assembly; the measure would also authorize $15 million in support of civil society in Venezuela.
Both H.R. 4587 and S. 2142 include provisions providing presidential waiver authority for the
sanctions. As noted above, in late July 2014, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on 24
high-ranking Venezuelan officials responsible for human rights violations associated with the
protests.
For further information, see CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Mark P. Sullivan. For additional background, see the following archived reports: CRS Report
R42989, Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations; and CRS Report
R40938, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, 2009-2012.
57 U.S. Department of State, “Visa Restrictions Against Human Rights Abusers in Venezuela,” Press Statement, July
30, 2014; William Neuman, “U.S. Bars Travel by Top Venezuelan Officials,” New York Times, July 31, 2014.
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Appendix A. U.S. Trade with Latin America and the
Caribbean, 2007-2013
Table A-1. U. S. Imports from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 2007-2013
(U.S. $ Millions)
Partner
2013/2012
Country
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
% Change
Mexico
210,714
215,942
176,654
229,986
262,874 277,594 280,529
1.06
Venezuela
39,910
51,424
28,059
32,707
43,257 38,724 31,997 -17.37
Brazil
25,644
30,453
20,070
23,958
31,737 32,123 27,634 -13.98
Colombia
9,434
13,093
11,323
15,659
23,114 24,622 21,626 -12.17
Costa
3,942
3,938
5,612
8,697
10,115 12,046 11,914
-1.10
Rica
Ecuador
6,135
9,048
5,273
7,451
9,622 9,484
11,490 21.15
Chile
8,999
8,196
5,949
7,017
9,076 9,367
10,384 10.87
Peru
5,272
5,812
4,223
5,243
6,605 6,418 8,122 26.54
Trinidad &
Tobago
8,790
9,030
5,180
6,613
8,113 8,158 6,494 -20.40
Argentina
4,487
5,822
3,890
3,803
4,503 4,350 4,644
6.74
Total
LAC 345,458 375,763 284,726 361,363 436,506 448,370 438,498
-2.20
World
1,956,962 2,103,641 1,559,625 1,913,857 2,207,954 2,276,302 2,268,321
-0.35
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce statistics as presented by Global Trade Atlas, August 20, 2014.
Notes: Provides statistics on top 10 countries fol owed by total U.S. imports from Latin America and the
Caribbean.
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Table A-2. U.S. Exports to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), 2007-2013
(U.S. $ Millions)
Partner
2013/2012
Country
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
% Change
Mexico
135,918
151,220
128,892
163,665
198,289 215,907 226,079
4.71
Brazil
24,172
32,299
26,095
35,418
43,019 43,807 44,119
0.71
Colombia
8,558
11,437
9,451
12,068
14,336 16,357 18,392 12.44
Chile
8,148
11,857
9,346
10,907
15,993 18,772 17,515 -6.70
Venezuela
10,201
12,610
9,315
10,645
12,383 17,518 13,204 -24.63
Panama
3,669
4,887
4,293
6,066
8,252 9,829 10,564 7.48
Argentina
5,856
7,536
5,569
7,392
9,899 10,257 10,354
0.95
Peru
4,120
6,183
4,919
6,750
8,342 9,349 10,102 8.05
Ecuador
2,936
3,450
3,938
5,409
6,078 6,693 7,665 14.52
Costa Rica
4,580
5,680
4,700
5,178
6,099 7,236 7,224 -0.17
Total
LAC 241,830 287,015 237,381 301,421 365,596 396,732 407,472
2.71
World
1,148,199 1,287,442 1,056,043 1,278,495 1,482,508 1,545,703 1,579,593
2.19
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce statistics, as presented by Global Trade Atlas, August 20, 2014.
Notes: Provides statistics on top 10 countries fol owed by total U.S. exports to Latin America and the
Caribbean.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress
Appendix B. Hearings in the 113th Congress
Table B-1.Congressional Hearings in the 113th Congress on
Latin America and the Caribbean
Committee and Subcommittee
Date
Title
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
February 28, Overview of U.S. Interests in the Western
Subcommittee on the Western
2013
Hemisphere: Opportunities and Challenges
Hemisphere
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
March 14,
U.S. Energy Security: Enhancing Partnerships
Subcommittee on the Western
2013
with Mexico and Canada
Hemisphere
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
March 20,
Hezbol ah’s Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
2013
Threat
Nonproliferation, and Trade
House Armed Services Committee
March 20,
The Posture of the U.S. Northern Command
2013
and U.S. Southern Command
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
April 11,
Energy Opportunities in Latin America and
Subcommittee on the Western
2013
the Caribbean
Hemisphere
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
May 23,
U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: An
Subcommittee on the Western
2013
Overview of the Mérida Initiative 2008-
Hemisphere
Present
House Committee on Ways and Means,
June 12,
U.S.-Brazil Trade and Investment
Subcommittee on Trade
2013
Relationship: Opportunities and Challenges
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
June 18,
Security Cooperation in Mexico: Examining
Subcommittee on the Western
2013
the Next Steps in the U.S. Mexico Security
Hemisphere and Global Narcotics Affairs
Relationship
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
June 19,
Regional Security Cooperation: An
Subcommittee on the Western
2013
Examination of the Central American
Hemisphere
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)
House Committee on Homeland Security
July 9, 2013
Threat to the Homeland: Iran’s Extending
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Influence in the Western Hemisphere
Management Efficiency
Senate, Tom Lantos Human Rights
July 25,
Human Rights in Honduras
Commission
2012
Joint Hearing, House Foreign Affairs
August 1,
Examining the State Department’s Report on
Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East
2013
Iranian Presence in the Western Hemisphere
and North Africa and Subcommittee on
19 Years after AMIA Attack
the Western Hemisphere
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
September
Challenges to Democracy in the Western
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
10, 2013
Hemisphere
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
September
A Closer Look at Cuba and its Recent
Subcommittee on the Western
26, 2013
History of Proliferation
Hemisphere
House Foreign Affairs Committee
October 9,
Haiti: Is U.S. Aid Effective?
2013
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Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress
Committee and Subcommittee
Date
Title
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
October 24, Creating Peace and Finding Justice in
2013
Colombia
House Committee on Homeland Security,
November
What Does a Secure Maritime Border Look
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
19, 2013
Like?
Security
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
November
The Global Gender-Based Violence Threat
20, 2013
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
December
Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce
Subcommittee on the Western
9, 2013
with Mexico at America’s Southern Border
Hemisphere
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
January 15,
NAFTA at Twenty: Accomplishments,
Subcommittee on the Western
2014
Challenges, and the Way Forward
Hemisphere
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
February 4,
Terrorist Groups in Latin America: The
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
2014
Changing Landscape
Nonproliferation and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee
March 13,
Advancing U.S. Interests Abroad: The FY2015
2014
Foreign Affairs Budget
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
March 25,
U.S. Disengagement from Latin America:
Subcommittee on the Western
2014
Compromised Security and Economic
Hemisphere
Interests
House Committee on Homeland Security
April 2,
Taking Down the Cartels: Examining United
2014
States- Mexico Cooperation
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
April 9,
Advancing U.S. Interests in the Western
Subcommittee on the Western
2014
Hemisphere: The FY2015 Foreign Affairs
Hemisphere
Budget
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
April 29,
Confronting Transnational Drug Smuggling:
Subcommittee on the Western
2014
An Assessment of Regional Partnerships
Hemisphere
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
May 8, 2014
Assessing Venezuela’s Political Crisis: Human
Rights Violations and Beyond
House Foreign Affairs Committee
May 20,
The Future of U.S.-Mexico Relations
2014
House Homeland Security
June 24,
Dangerous Passage: The Growing Problem of
2014
Unaccompanied Children Crossing the U.S.
Border
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
June 25,
Children Migrating from Central America:
Subcommittee on the Western
2014
Solving a Humanitarian Crisis
Hemisphere
House Homeland Security, Field Hearing
July 3, 2014
Crisis on the Texas Border: Surge of
Unaccompanied Minors
Senate Homeland Security and
July 9, 2014
Challenges at the Border: Examining and
Governmental Affairs Committee
Addressing the Root Causes Behind the Rise
in Apprehensions at the Southern Border
(Part 1)
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
July 17,
Dangerous Passage: Central America in Crisis
2014
and the Exodus of Unaccompanied Minors
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Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress
Committee and Subcommittee
Date
Title
Senate Committee on Homeland Security
July 16,
Challenges at the Border: Examining and
and Governmental Affairs
2014
Addressing the Root Causes Behind the Rise
in Apprehensions at the Southern Border
(Part 2)
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
July 23,
U.S. – Dominican Republic Relations:
Subcommittee on the Western
2014
Bolstering Economic Growth and Energy
Hemisphere
Independence
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
July 30,
Building Prosperity in Latin America: Investor
Subcommittee on the Western
2014
Confidence in the Rule of Law
Hemisphere
Source: Prepared by Anne Leland, Information Research Specialist, CRS.
Notes: The listed hearings are linked to PDF documents of the committee prints or committee webpages on
the hearings, where available. See also hearing information at House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee
on the Western Hemisphere at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/subcommittees/western-hemisphere; House
Committee on Homeland Security at http://homeland.house.gov/legislation; Senate Foreign Relations Committee
at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/
Author Contact Information
Mark P. Sullivan, Coordinator
Liana Rosen
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics
msullivan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7689
lrosen@crs.loc.gov, 7-6177
June S. Beittel
Clare Ribando Seelke
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
jbeittel@crs.loc.gov, 7-7613
cseelke@crs.loc.gov, 7-5229
Anne Leland
Maureen Taft-Morales
Information Research Specialist
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
aleland@crs.loc.gov, 7-4704
mtmorales@crs.loc.gov, 7-7659
Peter J. Meyer
M. Angeles Villarreal
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
pmeyer@crs.loc.gov, 7-5474
avillarreal@crs.loc.gov, 7-0321
Acknowledgments
Former CRS Information Research Specialist Dini R. Robinson prepared the original trade tables in
Appendix A. Former CRS Specialist in International Trade and Finance J. F. Hornbeck prepared the
original section on Argentina.
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