Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms:
Economic, Program, and Policy Issues

Glennon J. Harrison
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
August 4, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS20210


Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms: Economic, Program, and Policy Issues

Summary
The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs were authorized by Congress in the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 to help workers and firms adjust to import competition and dislocation
caused by trade liberalization. Trade liberalization, which is widely held to increase the economic
welfare of all trade partners, can also cause adjustment problems for import-competing firms and
workers. TAA has long been justified on grounds that TAA may be the least disruptive option for
offsetting policy-driven trade liberalization. The TAA programs for workers, firms, and farmers
represent an alternative to policies that would restrict imports, and so provide assistance while
bolstering freer trade and diminishing prospects for potentially costly tension (retaliation) among
trade partners.
Since the 1990s, debates over trade liberalization have increasingly focused on the changing
nature of trade in an era of globalization—especially the emergence of global value chains
(GVCs). GVCs are organized and coordinated by multinational companies (MNCs) and now
account for about 70% of global trade in goods and services and capital goods. Numerous studies
and statistical data show that GVCs offer the potential for small- and medium-size firms to
become more integrated into international trade and produce higher value-added products.
Although many small- and medium-size enterprises (or SMEs) have built strong ties to large U.S.
exporters, a potential question is whether the Economic Development Administration (EDA) of
the U.S. Department of Commerce, through the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms (TAAF)
program, could assist trade-impacted firms in developing relationships with MNCs, as well as
analyzing the necessary conditions that would allow TAAF-participating firms to have a realistic
chance to do so.
This report discusses the TAAF program and policy issues, as well as legislation to reauthorize
the TAAF program. It provides technical assistance to help trade-impacted firms make strategic
adjustments to improve their global competitiveness. In the 113th Congress, House and Senate
bills have been introduced. The Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2013 (S. 1357),
which would maintain current annual funding levels through 2020, was introduced on July 24,
2014, and the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act of 2014 (H.R. 4163) was introduced on March 6,
2014. President Obama also has supported passage TAA reauthorization, linking it to renewal of
Trade Promotion Authorization (TPA).
As required by the Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act of 2009 (TGAAA) (Title
II of P.L. 111-5), EDA publishes annual reports on the performance of the TAAF program. The
reports have generally shown that two years after completion of the program, on average,
participating firms have increased sales, employment, and productivity. The high success rate for
firms that “completed” the TAAF program represents only about half of all firms certified as
eligible for assistance. The rest left the program without completing an adjustment plan and were
no longer monitored. The Government Accountability Office (GAO), which completed a
comprehensive evaluation of the TAAF program in 2012, found that EDA’s administration and
evaluation efforts had improved markedly and also confirmed EDA’s assessment that trade-
impacted firms benefitted from the specialized attention provided by TAAF assistance. GAO
found a “small and statistically significant relationship between program participation and sales,”
which was particularly relevant to smaller firms, albeit also highly correlated with firms operating
in high-growth industries. Employment effects were not found to be statistically significant.

Congressional Research Service

Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms: Economic, Program, and Policy Issues

Contents
The TAAF Program: Recent Legislative Background ..................................................................... 1
The Economics of Trade Adjustment ............................................................................................... 3
TAA and Global Value Chains: What Do We Know? ...................................................................... 4
Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program ............................................................................ 6
The TAAF Program: How It Operates ....................................................................................... 6
Eligibility and Certification ................................................................................................. 7
Program Evaluation ....................................................................................................................... 10
GAO 2012 Evaluation of TAAF Program Remains Relevant ................................................. 11
EDA Annual Reports on the TAAF Program: Discussion ....................................................... 12
Legislation in the 113th Congress ................................................................................................... 14

Figures
Figure 1. Three Stages of TAAF: Process and Interaction among Firms, TAACs, and
EDA .............................................................................................................................................. 8

Tables
Table 1. Firm TAA Authorizations and Appropriations, FY2001-FY2014 ...................................... 6
Table 2. Characteristics of Technical Assistance in APs: FY2013 ................................................... 9
Table 3. Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms, Select Program Indicators for FY2004-
FY2013 ....................................................................................................................................... 10

Appendixes
Appendix A. Simplified View of Trade in Global Value Chains ................................................... 15
Appendix B. Acronyms.................................................................................................................. 17

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 18
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 18

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Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms: Economic, Program, and Policy Issues

he Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs were authorized by Congress in the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, to help workers and firms adjust to import
Tcompetition and dislocation caused by trade liberalization.1 Although the economic
welfare of all trade partners can be increased by trade liberalization, TAA has long been justified
on grounds that the government has an obligation to help the “losers” of policy-driven trade
openings that cause adjustment problems for import-competing firms and workers. TAA
programs cover workers, firms, and farmers facing import competition. Congress continues to
monitor performance and amend the governing legislation.2
This report discusses the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms (TAAF) program, which is
administered by the Economic Development Administration (EDA) of the Department of
Commerce. Through the TAAF program, EDA provides technical assistance, on a cost-sharing
basis, to help eligible businesses create and implement targeted business recovery plans that may
allow them to remain competitive in a dynamic international economy.3 The TAAF program
provides technical assistance through a partnership with a national network of 11 EDA-funded
Trade Adjustment Assistance Centers (TAACs).
The TAAF Program: Recent Legislative Background
Early in the 111th Congress, a bipartisan agreement was reached to reauthorize the TAA. The
Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act (TGAAA) of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) expanded and extended the then-existing
programs for workers, firms, and farmers, and added a fourth program for communities (later
repealed). The TGAAA expanded eligibility to include services firms, increased annual
authorized funding levels from $16 million to $50 million, provided greater flexibility for a firm
to demonstrate eligibility for assistance (the “extended look-back period”), established new
oversight and evaluation criteria, created a new position of Director of Adjustment Assistance for
Firms, and required submission to Congress of a detailed annual report.
With the TAA programs set to expire on January 1, 2011, the House and Senate passed, and the
President signed, the Omnibus Trade Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-344) in late December 2010. The act
extended TAA programs through February 12, 2012, but eliminated some of the expanded
provisions of the TGAAA, including eligibility for services firms and the expanded look-back
periods for qualifying firms to meet eligibility requirements. The 112th Congress offered
supporters an opportunity to revisit TAA reauthorization as part of the debate over passage of
implementing legislation for the proposed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Colombia, Panama,
and South Korea. The Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011 (TAAEA) passed on
October 12, 2011, and was signed into law on October 21, 2011 (Title II, P.L. 112-40; H.R. 2832).

1 A list of acronyms is provided at the end of this report to assist readers.
2 For a broader discussion on the policy debate over TAA, see CRS Report R41922, Trade Adjustment Assistance
(TAA) and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy
, by J. F. Hornbeck. See also CRS Report R42012, Trade Adjustment
Assistance for Workers
, by Benjamin Collins; CRS Report R40206, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers, by
Remy Jurenas, and CRS Report R42661, Trade Adjustment Assistance Community College and Career Training
Grants
, by Benjamin Collins.
3 The Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms (TAAF) program is authorized by Chapters 3 and 5 of title II of the Trade
Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. §2341 et seq.).
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The TAAEA authorized the TAAF program through December 31, 2014. On January 1, 2015,
only those firms that are already certified and participating in the TAAF program will be eligible
to receive technical assistance subject to funds being available. The TAAEA retroactively
extended the enhanced provisions (inclusion of services firms and the extended “look-back”
period) contained in the TGAAA through December 31, 2013. On January 1, 2014, the TAAF
reverted back to the more limited program that was in effect as of February 13, 2011. The
expiration of the expanded provisions of the TAAF program in 2011 limited the number of firms
entering the program (services firms were no
longer eligible to participate), and the
Status of TAAF as of January 1, 2014
extended look back period was eliminated.

Service sector firms are no longer eligible for
These factors combined with an improving
assistance;
economy that made it more difficult for firms
to demonstrate their eligibility to participate.

Petitioning firms may use a 12-month “look back”
period only to demonstrate their eligibility and not a
Additionally, there was uncertainty about the
24- or 36-month look back period;
TAAF program’s future. With the January 1,
2014, expiration of the expanded provisions, it

The Economic Development Administration (EDA)
must make a determination on a petition within 60
is possible that the TAAF program, which
days from the date of acceptance of the petition;
continues to operate at slightly lower levels of
and
funding (the program has an appropriation of

On January 1, 2015, the TAAF authorization
$15 million for FY2014), may once again see
expires; after January 1, 2015, only firms that are
a decline in the number of firms entering the
certified and participating in a business recovery
program. Uncertainty about the
plan will be eligible to receive technical assistance.
reauthorization of TAAF by the end of 2014
could also affect the recruitment of new firms.4
As required by Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a
comprehensive review of the TAAF program, which was released in September 2012. It notes
important progress in the administrative capabilities of EDA and documents the positive impact
of the TAAF program on trade-affected businesses. The GAO report also discussed the positive
contribution of the changes initially made by the TGAAA and reinstated by the TAAEA,
including the ability of service sector firms to participate in the program and the extended look-
back periods. The lapse of the TGAAA changes made service firms ineligible and limited the
ability of some manufacturing firms to demonstrate the requisite declines in production or sales.
The report also pointed to continuing challenges in centralized data management, evaluation
reporting, and assessment of the effectiveness of TAAF.5

4 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Trade Adjustment Assistance: Commerce Program Has Helped
Manufacturing and Service Firms, but Measures, Data, and Funding Formula Could Be Enhanced
, Statement of J.
Alfredo Gomez, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Government Organization, Efficiency, and Financial
Management, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, GAO-13-166T, November
14, 2012, p. 4, and the full report: GAO, Trade Adjustment Assistance: Commerce Program Has Helped
Manufacturing and Service Firms, but Measures, Data, and Funding Formula Could Be Enhanced
, GAO-12-930,
September 2012; U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, Economic Development
Administration, Trade Adjustment Assistance to Firms Program: Fiscal Year 2013 Annual Report to Congress
,
December 15, 2013, pp. 13, 17.
5 GAO, Trade Adjustment Assistance: Commerce Program Has Helped Manufacturing and Service Firms, but
Measures, Data, and Funding Formula Could Be Enhanced
, GAO-12-930, September 2012.
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The Economics of Trade Adjustment
Economists tend to agree that in defining the rules of exchange among countries, freer trade is
preferable to protectionism. Insights from trade theory point to the mutual gains for countries
trading on their differences, producing those goods at which they are relatively more efficient,
while trading for those at which they are relatively less so. Additional gains are realized from
intra-industry trade based on efficiencies from segmented and specialized production.6 Firm-level
evidence supports theory. Trade appears to “enable efficient producers within an industry, and
efficient industries within an economy, to expand,” leading to a reallocation of resources that
increases a country’s productivity, output, and income.7 Consumers (both firms and households)
also gain from a wider variety of goods and lower prices.
Increased competition from trade liberalization also creates “winners and losers,” presenting
adjustment problems for all countries. The more efficient firms and plants may grow as they
expand into overseas markets; the less efficient may contract, merge, or fail when faced with
greater foreign competition. While the adjustment process may be healthy from a macroeconomic
perspective, much like market-driven adjustments that occur for reasons other than trade (e.g.,
technological change), it can be a harsh transition for some firms and their workers.8
Critics of free trade agreements often highlight the adjustment costs of reducing trade barriers. To
avoid business closures and layoffs, trade-impacted firms may seek to weaken, if not defeat, trade
liberalizing legislation. This makes economic sense from the perspective of affected industries,
firms, and workers, but economists argue that in the long run it can be more costly for the country
as a whole. The costs of protection arise because competition is suppressed, reducing pressure on
firms to innovate, operate more efficiently, and become lower cost producers. The brunt of these
costs falls to consumers, both individuals and businesses, who must pay higher prices, but the
national economy is also denied higher standards of living because of forgone productivity gains.
In response, larger firms may opt to avoid the costs of rising protection by shifting the least
productive activities to lower cost countries.
One way to balance the large and broad-based gains from freer trade with the smaller and more
highly concentrated costs is to address the needs of firms negatively affected. Congress has done
so in authorizing the TAA programs, including the one for firms.9 Supporters justify TAA policy
on grounds that (1) it helps those who are hurt by trade liberalization (the “losers”); (2) the
economic costs are lower than protectionism and can be borne by society as a whole (“the
winners”); and (3) given rigidities in the adjustment process, it may help redeploy economic
resources more quickly, thereby reducing productivity losses and related public sector costs (e.g.,

6 For an accessible and authoritative summary of these effects, see Paul Krugman, “The Increasing Returns Revolution
in Trade and Geography,” American Economic Review, vol. 99, no. 3 (June 2009), pp. 561-571.
7 On how trade affects total factor productivity based on U.S. manufacturing firm and plant level data, see Andrew B.
Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen, “Exporting and Productivity in the USA,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 20,
no. 3 (2004), pp. 343-344, 350, 352, and 356.
8 Both the benefits and costs of trade derive from resources moving from less to more productive plants (intra-industry)
and firms (inter-industry). Employment dislocation is the most noticeable cost, giving rise to congressional interest in
TAA programs. Ibid., pp. 345 and 356.
9 Howard F. Rosen, Strengthening Trade Adjustment Assistance, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy
Brief PB08-2, Washington, DC, January 2008, pp. 1-2.
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unemployment compensation). Others dispute these claims and have raised concerns over the
effectiveness and costs of the program, arguing that it should be limited or discontinued.10
TAA and Global Value Chains: What Do We Know?
One factor that may be underappreciated in debates over trade liberalization is the changed nature
of trade in an era of globalization—especially the emergence of global value chains (GVCs).
GVCs are mainly organized and coordinated by large multinational companies (MNCs) and
account for more than 70% of global trade in goods and services and in capital goods.11 A large
share of global trade takes place within GVCs in the form of imports and exports of intermediate
(or unfinished) goods and services that move within, between, and among countries. This system
of production depends on the willingness of many countries to import in order to export. At the
domestic level, the U.S. small- and medium-sized domestic producers that sell goods and services
to multinational exporters are not counted as exporters—even though they contribute a substantial
amount of the value added in U.S. exports. The statistical data needed to measure the contribution
of domestic and foreign value added at each stage of GVC production is under development and a
complete picture of the impact of GVCs may not be possible until such data are available. (See
Appendix: A Simplified View of Trade in Global Value Chains.)
In a recent study, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states
that the participation of smaller firms in GVCs is often underestimated. Smaller firms “often
supply intermediates to exporting firms in their country and are as such relatively more integrated
in the domestic value chains.”12 Unlike most other major industrialized, emerging, and
developing economies, the United States is less dependent on imports of foreign intermediate
goods for its exports.13 Instead, small- and medium-size domestic firms are, in aggregate, major
suppliers of goods (parts, components, and finished products) and services to large U.S.
exporters. The OECD cites studies by Matthew Slaughter and the U.S. International Trade
Commission (USITC) that show that
the typical U.S. MNC buys more than $3 billion in inputs [goods and services] from more
than 6,000 U.S. small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—or almost 25% of the total
input purchased by these firms. These domestic supplies are not reflected in international
trade statistics, which only count direct exports; estimates for the United States show that in

10 A discussion of both sides of the argument may be found in CRS Report R41922, Trade Adjustment Assistance
(TAA) and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy
, by J. F. Hornbeck.
11 OECD/World Trade Organization (WTO)/The World Bank, Global Value Chains: Challenges, Opportunities, And
Implications For Policy
, Report prepared for submission to the G20 Trade Ministers Meeting, Sydney, Australia, July
19, 2014, p. 7.
12 OECD, Interconnected Economies: Benefiting from Global Value Chains, September 2013, p. 21.
13 Brazil and Russia, large emerging economies, are the two major exceptions. In 2009, the Russian Federation had the
highest level of domestic value-added content of any of the G-20 countries (93%) because of an increasing dependence
on mining exports, while second place Brazil (at 91%) had, since 1995, become increasingly specialized in agricultural
and mining exports. OECD, OECD/WTO Trade in Value Added (TIVA) Indicators, May 28, 2013,
http://www.oecd.org/trade/measuringtradeinvalue-addedanoecd-wtojointinitiative.htm#countries; Jeffrey Horowitz and
David Riker, “Measuring Shifts in Brazil’s Trade Using International Input-Output Tables,” Journal of International
Commerce and Economics
, April 2014, http://www.usitc.gov/journals.
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2007 the export share of SMEs increased from approximately 28% (in gross exports) to 41%
(in value-added exports), when such indirect exports are taken into account.14
The USITC calculated that in 2007 total direct exports by U.S. SMEs amounted to $382 billion
and indirect exports of SMEs amounted to $98 billion.15 These figures translate into an estimated
4.0 million U.S. jobs, with 1.7 million U.S. jobs supported by direct SME exporters and an
additional 2.1 million jobs created by SME indirect exporters that sell intermediate inputs to
direct exporters.16 Of the 10 million U.S. jobs that are supported by U.S. exports of goods and
services, SME exports account for approximately 40% of all export-supported jobs in the United
States.17 Significantly, the USITC report found that “much of the indirect value-added exports by
SMEs—the intermediate goods and services produced by SMEs that are eventually shipped
abroad as components embedded in other products—is concentrated in the manufacturing
sector.”18
Although the main focus of TAAF is on troubled SMEs, the magnitude of U.S. SME-produced
goods that are exported by GVCs suggests that EDA, through the TAAF and the TAACs, could
potentially assist and encourage linkages between troubled, import-impacted SMEs and the
MNCs that are major exporters of SME inputs. While many of the U.S. SMEs that participate in
GVCs will be capable of withstanding foreign import competition, there are few guarantees that
the current domestic sourcing advantage enjoyed by U.S. SME producers will remain stable in the
future. Liberalized trade policies adopted by the United States or other countries, new
technologies, or macroeconomic conditions could potentially erode the favorable position that
some U.S. SMEs currently enjoy. Although many SMEs have built strong ties to large U.S.
exporters, a potential question is whether the EDA, through the TAAF program and the TAACs,
could assist trade-impacted firms in developing relationships with MNCs, as well as analyzing the
necessary conditions that would allow TAAF-participating firms to have a realistic chance of
doing so.
The high volume of trade that flows through GVCs and the predominant position of the United
States as a major GVC hub and headquarters nations (with the highest level of domestic value-
added export content (89%) of any OECD country and the third highest in the Group of Twenty
(G20) after Russia and Brazil) suggests the possibility that GVCs could be a source of
opportunity for U.S. trade-impacted firms.19 EDA produces an annual report for Congress on the
operations of the TAAF program, but among the data requirements established by Congress in the
TGAAA, as amended, there are no performance measures that document or report on TAAF-

14 See Matthew J. Slaughter, American Companies and Global Supply Networks: Driving US Economic Growth and
Jobs by Connecting with the World
, Washington, DC, 2013, p. 6, and USITC, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises:
Characteristics and Performance
, Investigation No. 332-510, Publication 4189, Washington, DC, November 2010, p.
5-5.
15 The figures in the quoted paragraph and the text immediately preceding this footnote reflect purchases of goods and
services by the typical U.S. MNC (which on average amounted to $3 billion in 2007) and total direct and indirect
exports by SMEs (which respectively amounted to $382 billion and $98 billion in 2007).
16 USITC, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Characteristics and Performance, 2010, pp. 5-5 to 5-6.
17 Ibid., p. xiv.
18 Ibid., p. 5-6.
19 OECD/WTO, Trade in Value Added (TIVA) Indicators: United States (Country Notes), May 28, 2013,
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/TiVA_USA_MAY_2013.pdf. Data is for 2009. For an explanation of the OECD/WTO
Trade In Value Added (TIVA) Indicators, see their Guide to Country Notes, May 28, 2013,
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/TiVA_Guide_to_Country_Notes.pdf.
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participating firms that sell goods or services to U.S. exporters (in terms of number of firms
assisted and value of goods sold), or that provide data on direct exports by firms receiving TAAF
assistance.
Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program20
Congress first authorized TAA in Title III of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794),
including a new firm and industry assistance program, which is administered by the EDA.21 It
provides technical assistance to help trade-impacted firms make strategic adjustments that may
allow them to remain competitive in a global economy. Originally, TAAF also included loans and
loan guarantees, but Congress eliminated all direct financial assistance in 1986 because of federal
budgetary cutbacks and concern over the program’s high default rates and limited effectiveness.
Congress has amended the program many times over the half century of its existence.
TAAF authorizations and appropriations for FY2002-FY2014 appear in Table 1. The TAAF
program has been reauthorized through December 31, 2014, and is currently operating under the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76) with an FY2014 appropriation of
$15 million.
Table 1. Firm TAA Authorizations and Appropriations, FY2001-FY2014
($ millions)

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Authorizations 10.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 16.0 16.0 16.0
Appropriations 10.5 10.0 11.9 11.0 12.8 12.8 14.1 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.0
Data Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration (EDA).
The TAAF Program: How It Operates
The TAAF program provides technical assistance to firms through eleven regional Trade
Adjustment Assistance Centers (TAACs). TAACS, which operate under cooperative agreements
with EDA, are available to assist firms in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The following entities may apply for assistance to operate a
TAAC: (1) Universities or affiliated organizations; (2) States or local governments; or (3)
Nonprofit organizations.22 They provide or contract for technical assistance to firms from the
initial certification process through Adjustment Proposal (AP) implementation. TAACs are
staffed by professionals with broad business expertise who can help firms develop recovery
strategies and also identify financial resources. They are, in effect, consultants who specialize in
business turnaround strategies specifically designed to meet the needs of individual firms that

20 Based on 2012 13 C.F.R. §315, which provides details for applying for TAAF assistance, and EDA, Annual Report
to Congress on the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program for Fiscal Year 2013
, Washington, DC, December
15, 2013.
21 The TAAF program was originally administered jointly by the Tariff Commission (predecessor to the USITC) and
the U.S. Department of Commerce.
22 13 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Ch. III §315.4, January 1, 2014, p. 774.
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often face adjustments in many areas to compete with lower-priced imports.23 TAACs apply for
EDA grants to operate their programs. All appropriated funds are used to support the TAAC
process; no funds or direct financial assistance may be provided to firms.
Eligibility and Certification
There are three phases to successful completion of a trade adjustment assistance project (see
Figure 1).
In phase one a firm must demonstrate that it is eligible to apply for assistance. The firm submits a
petition for certification documenting that it is a “trade-impacted firm” by having met three
conditions:24
1. “a significant number or proportion of workers”25 in the firm have become or are
threatened to become totally or partially separated;
2. sales, or production, or both decreased absolutely, or sales, or production, or both
of any article that accounted for not less than 25% of total sales or production of
the firm during the 12 months preceding the most recent 12 months for which
data are available have decreased absolutely; and
3. increased imports of articles like or directly competitive with articles produced
by the firm have “contributed importantly”26 to both layoffs and the decline in
sales and/or production.
Certification specialists are available in the TAACs to work with firms (at no cost to the firm) to
complete and submit a petition to EDA to be certified as a trade impacted firm. As of January 1,
2014, EDA is statutorily required to make a final determination on a petition within 60 days of
accepting it. In recent years, this time has averaged four weeks, and was 25 days in FY2013.27
In phase two, a firm certified as eligible has two years to develop and submit a business recovery
plan or Adjustment Proposal (AP). Approval of the AP is contingent on EDA’s finding that the AP
(1) is reasonably calculated “to materially contribute” to the economic adjustment of the firm; (2)
gives adequate consideration to the interests of the firm’s workers; and (3) demonstrates that the
firm will use its own resources for adjustment.
The TAACs also provide detailed assistance for the adjustment proposal, which seeks to identify
business planning and practices that can be enhanced to improve firm competitiveness. EDA has

23 P.L. 93-618, Section 253, as amended, and U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration,
http://www.taacenters.org.
24 13 C.F.R. §315.7 and U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, Annual Report to
Congress on the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program for Fiscal Year 2013
, Washington, DC, December
15, 2012, pp. 10-11.
25 Five percent of a firm’s work force or 50 workers, whichever is less, with EDA discretion to set other parameters in
special cases. 13 C.F.R. §315.2
26 In this case, the contributing cause must be important, but not necessarily more important than any other cause. A
firm must provide a list of four important customers, of which the TAAC must interview two, to help evaluate whether
the firm has been “trade-impacted.” 13 C.F.R. §315.2.
27 EDA, Annual Report to Congress on the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program for Fiscal Year 2013,
Washington, DC, December 15, 2013, p. 13.
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another 60 days to accept or reject the adjustment proposal. In FY2013, the average processing
time for APs was 15 days. Because technical assistance is provided in the preparation of the
petition and adjustment proposal, there is a high formal acceptance rate. TAAC assistance ensures
that submissions are completed correctly and that poor candidates are weeded out early in the
process. The firm must pay at least 25% of the cost to prepare the adjustment proposal.28 In
FY2013, 133 firms received assistance in developing APs.
Figure 1. Three Stages of TAAF: Process and Interaction among Firms, TAACs, and
EDA

Source: Government Accountability Office, Trade Adjustment Assistance: Commerce Program Has Helped
Manufacturing and Services Firms, but Measures, Data, and Funding Formula Could Improve
, GAO-12-930,
Washington, DC, September 2012, p. 7.
Notes: Diagram based on GAO analysis of EDA documents. As of January 1, 2014, EDA is statutorily required
to make a final determination on a petition for certification within 60 days of accepting it.
In phase three, firms have five years to complete project implementation based on an approved
AP. EDA may provide financial assistance for project implementation, but firms must pay at least
a 25% match where total implementation cost for an AP are less than $30,000. For project
assistance exceeding $30,000, a firm must cover at least 50% of the total cost, with the federal
share capped at $75,000.29
Adjustment proposals may involve strategic restructuring of various aspects of business
operations. First, because firms must be experiencing falling sales or declining production to be
eligible, TAACs often focus on marketing or sales strategies to identify new markets, new
products, promotional initiatives, and export opportunities. The core idea is to increase revenue.

28 Ibid., p. 25 and 13 CFR 315.6 (c) (2).
29 Ibid., pp. 11, 25.
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Second, production inefficiencies are often targeted to reduce firm costs and improve price
competitiveness. Third, TAACs can develop debt restructuring strategies and act as intermediaries
in finding new sources of business financing. In 2013, 41% of adjustment assistance focused on
improving marketing-sales, 25% on production, 30% on enhancing support or management
systems, and 4% on financial systems.30 In FY2013, 692 firms received AP implementation
assistance (see Table 2). TAAC assistance to firms to prepare petitions and to develop and
implement business recovery plans (APs) amounted to $9.703 million in FY2013 and the
financial contribution of firms participating in the program amounted to $6.182 million.
Table 2. Characteristics of Technical Assistance in APs: FY2013
Project
Number of AP
APs by Project
AP Project
Classification
Sample Types of Projects
Projects
Classification
Costsa
Financial Accounting
systems
upgrade
Cost control tracking system
16 4%
$316,500
Automatic Data Processing development
Management
Strategic business planning
Succession management
23 6%
$442,000
Management development
Marketing/Sales
Sales process training
Market expansion and feasibility
152 41%
$4,657,290
Web site design and upgrade
Production
Lean manufacturing and certification
New product development
94 25%
$3,396,150
Production and warehouse automation
Support Systems Enterprise Resource Planning
Management Information Systems upgrades
89 24%
$3,156,555
Computer Aided Design software
Supply chain management software
Source: EDA, Annual Report to Congress on the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program for Fiscal Year 2013,
Washington, DC, December 15, 2013, pp. 38-39.
Notes:
a. AP Project Costs reflect the cost of technical assistance provided by the TAACs and the financial
contributions made by participating firms to develop and implement business recovery plans.
Table 3 summarizes select firm trade adjustment data for FY2004-FY2013. The TAAF program
targets small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which is borne out in the firm data. With the
exception of 2010, firms averaged fewer than 100 employees and had average sales of $19
million since then. In 2013, the federal government provided 52.0% of adjustment costs, for an
average $54,340 per firm. In FY2013, 89% of certified firms were in manufacturing, 3% were

30 EDA, Annual Report to Congress on the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program for Fiscal Year 2013, p.
39.
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service firms (in manufacturing and technical services), 3% were in wholesale trade, 3% were in
agriculture, and 2% were in commercial machinery.31

Table 3. Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms,
Select Program Indicators for FY2004-FY2013

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of Firms Assisteda 177 132 137 126 143 172 264 183 102 114
Avg.
Firm
Sales
(millions)
$11.6 $8.4 $10.6 $11.2 $13.1 $10.3 $19.1 $19.6 $19.2 $15.2
Avg.
Firm
Employees
88 64 91 68 82 79 138 91 81 86
Gov’t.
Share
(millions)
$8.5 $5.9 $6.7 $7.1 $8.2 $10.4 $16.5 $16.1 $5.4 $6.2
Firm
Share
(millions)
$8.1 $5.4 $6.0 $5.9 $7.7 $9.9 $15.7 $10.6 $5.0 $5.8
Total
Cost
(mil ions)
$16.6 $11.3 $12.7 $13.0 $15.9 $20.3 $32.2 $21.7 $10.4 $12.0
Avg. TAA Per Firmb
$48,023 $44,697 $48,905 $56,449 $57,361 $60,428 $62,307 $60,522 $53,308 $54,325
Data Source: EDA, Annual Report to Congress on the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program, Fiscal Year
2013
, pp. 25, 31.
a. Number of Adjustment Proposals approved. Participating firms may have up to five projects in an approved
AP. Firms can remain in an approved AP for up to five years, with firms remaining in the program for
differing lengths of time.
b. Government share of TAA Firm program divided by the number of accepted Adjustment Proposals.
Program Evaluation
Historically, TAAF program evaluation was limited, with EDA lacking a formal evaluation
process. Early efforts to analyze the program included comprehensive outside studies by the
Urban Institute in 1998 and GAO in 2000 that addressed two critical issues: program
administration and effectiveness.32 Both found deficiencies with the TAAF program, such as a
cumbersome certification process, long approval times, and little oversight and evaluation of
projects. As a small program with limited resources, the TAAF had not received the managerial
input required to adequately evaluate its efforts. Congress addressed this issue in the TGAAA,
which required the creation of a new Director of Adjustment Assistance for Firms, along with
additional support staff. The 2009 act also required an annual report to Congress and included
specific performance measures to be collected and analyzed. Congress also mandated EDA to
certify petitions for assistance and Adjustment Proposals within specific time frames.

31 Ibid., p. 19.
32 EDA, Effective Aid to Trade-Impacted Manufacturers: An Evaluation of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program,
prepared by the Urban Institute, Washington, DC, November 1998; GAO, Trade Adjustment Assistance: Impact of
Federal Assistance to Firms Is Unclear
. Report GAO-01-12, Washington, DC, December 2000.
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GAO 2012 Evaluation of TAAF Program Remains Relevant
The TGAAA required GAO to conduct an extensive evaluation of the TAAF program, which was
released in September 2012.33 GAO found that EDA’s administration of the TAAF program had
improved markedly as a result of changes resulting from the 2009 legislation. EDA reduced
processing times, provided new performance reporting measures, and increased firm
participation. GAO noted that TGAAA modifications to the TAAF program led to improvements
in (1) management and staffing, (2) annual reporting, (3) eligibility for participation of services
firms, and (4) expansion of the “look-back” period that permitted more firms to meet certification
criteria.34
In its report, GAO raised concerns about EDA’s ability to improve program management and
program outcomes. One of the weaknesses identified by GAO was EDA’s funding allocation
formula for TAACs to ensure that the distribution of funds across TAACs provide “equivalent
benefits” adequate to meet the varying needs of the 11 TAACs.
The second area of concern raised by GAO was EDA’s analysis of performance measures. The
three most recent TAAF annual reports (FY2011 through FY2013) emphasize output measures
(the type or level of program activities conducted or the direct products or services delivered by a
program: number of firms assisted, petitions accepted, processing times) rather than outcome
measures (defined as goals and performance measures that assess the results of a program,
compared with its intended purpose). In part, this appears to be a result of the measures and
indicators that Congress required EDA to collect and analyze. Of the 16 performance indicators,
GAO reported that 13 emphasize outputs, or measures, of the goods and services provided by the
program.
The TAAF annual reports have compared the performance of TAAF participants, which are, by
definition, trade-impacted, troubled firms to the average performance of the U.S. manufacturing
sector as a whole (using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data). GAO expressed concerns with
EDA’s methodology and recommended that “using program evaluation methods to rule out
plausible alternative explanations for outcomes that may be influenced by a variety of external
factors, such as changes in the economy, can help strengthen evaluations.”35 GAO conducted its
own analysis to evaluate the policy impact of the TAAF on firms participating in the program.
The GAO report discussed the difficulties inherent in attempting to assess the “apples-to-oranges”
effect of comparing TAAF-participating companies with a group of nonparticipating firms (as
EDA has done). Even if a control group with characteristics similar to TAAF-participating firms
could be identified, GAO noted that such an analysis would also have weaknesses. Given these
limitations, GAO analyzed the performance of TAAF-participating firms, but explicitly
recognized that such an approach could not determine whether TAAF firms’ performance would
have improved in the absence of the program.36

33 GAO, Trade Adjustment Assistance: Commerce Program Has Helped Manufacturing and Services Firms, but
Measures, Data, and Funding Formula Could Improve,
Report GAO-12-930. Washington, DC, September 2012.
34 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
35Ibid, p. 18. The recommendations are contained in GAO, Program Evaluation: A Variety of Rigorous Methods Can
Help Identify Effective Interventions
, GAO-10-30, November 23, 2009, Washington, DC.
36 GAO, Trade Adjustment Assistance: Commerce Program Has Helped Manufacturing and Services Firms, but
Measures, Data, and Funding Formula Could Improve, Appendix III: Economic Analysis of the Effect of Trade
(continued...)
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Using its own methodology, GAO found a “small and statistically significant relationship
between program participation and sales.”37 GAO estimated that TAAF assistance, on average,
resulted in a 5% to 6% increase in sales, which was particularly relevant to smaller firms, and a
4% increase in productivity, albeit also highly correlated with firms operating in industries that
were experiencing growth. Employment effects were not found to be statistically significant.
GAO also confirmed EDA’s assessment that both manufacturing and services firms faced import
competition that directly affected their sales, and that these firms, by and large, benefitted from
specialized attention provided by TAACs. In addition, GAO conducted a survey of firms
participating in the TAAF program. The survey found that 90% of respondent firms reported that
they were “very” or “generally” satisfied with the services that they received from the TAACs.
The GAO report provided some of the strongest evidence to date of the benefits of the now-
lapsed 2009 legislative changes, as well as EDA’s much-improved administration and evaluation
of the TAAF program compared to years past.
EDA Annual Reports on the TAAF Program: Discussion
EDA is required by Congress to submit an annual report that provides findings and results (or
performance measures) on the TAAF program.38 EDA has released four annual reports (FY2010
through FY2013) that identify numerous administrative and operational improvements that have
been made. In addition, TAACs are now allocated funds in part based on performance measures
(number of firm certifications and adjustment proposals generated) and quality measures.
As part of the TAAF annual report, EDA is required to provide a comparison of sales,
employment, and productivity for each firm at the time it was certified and both one and two
years after the recovery plan was implemented. EDA does not estimate the specific number of
"jobs retained" or "jobs created.” In its FY2013 report, EDA notes that, from FY2011 to FY2013,
average firm sales had increased by 20.3%, average employment rose by 6.6%, and average
productivity increased by 12.8%.39 EDA also notes that all firms completing the adjustment
program were still in operation—suggesting an impressive “survival rate”—particularly given
that all these firms have the additional burden of adjusting to import competition.40 In analyzing
earlier EDA reports (FY2010 to FY2013), GAO concluded that these trends provide only a
limited understanding of program effectiveness. The data on employment and productivity are
derived from annual surveys conducted by the 11 TAACs. The data are then aggregated and
presented as part of the congressionally required annual report. Employment effects are referred
to as number of “jobs impacted,” or number of jobs retained or generated at firms completing at
least one technical assistance project.
Declines in employment do not necessarily reflect TAAC performance. Employment can fall
dramatically for firms that are hit by a surge of foreign import competition or by market

(...continued)
Adjustment Assistance Policy on Firm Market Performance, Report GAO-12-930, Washington, DC, September 2012,
p. 50.
37 Ibid., pp. 22-24.
38 Section 255A of chapter 3 of title II of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.
39 Productivity is defined as sales per worker, a simple measure that can be used across industries, but which may have
limitations for evaluative purposes.
40 EDA, Annual Report to Congress on the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program for Fiscal Year 2012, p.
34.
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disruptions that are not trade-related. In the two reporting years following firms’ completion of
business recovery programs, firms may continue to experience increased import competition or
other negative effects (for instance, a slow economic recovery from the Great Recession). Under
these circumstances, the fact that employment may continue to decline two years after an
adjustment proposal has been implemented is not necessarily an unexpected or negative outcome
in terms of trade adjustment assistance effectiveness. Whether the current one and two-year post-
TAAF-exit reporting periods provide enough time and data to assess the effectiveness of recovery
programs, it is possible that a number of successful TAAF-participants will continue to face
increased competition that results in some program participants operating at levels of output or
employment that existed prior to TAAC assistance.
As noted in the previous section, caution is warranted when drawing conclusions on the basis of
limited trend data. EDA figures reflect employment trends that may be understood to imply that
results may be attributable to the TAAF program. A more rigorous analysis would be needed to
estimate and isolate the effects of the TAAF program from other factors that may affect
employment trends in TAAF-participating firms. To more accurately assess the effectiveness of
the TAAF program in terms of helping firms or “saving jobs,” it would be necessary to use more
sophisticated methodologies and analyses (such as those employed and recommended by GAO)
than Congress currently requires for the TAAF annual report.
With respect to the reported high “survival rate” for firms that completed the TAAF program,
they represent only about half of all firms that had their adjustment proposals approved for
assistance. In FY2013, of the 128 firms that exited the TAAF program, 88 firms (69%)
successfully exited the program. Of that 88, 51 (40%) firms completed their program and another
37 (29%) completed an achievable number of projects within the five-year limit. The remaining
40 (31%) did not complete the program for various reasons, including failure to submit AP within
2 years of TAAF certification (12, 9%); firm inactive/lost interest in TAAF Program (12, 9%);
time in program expired (7, 6%); company sold (6, 5%); and out of business or owner retired (3,
2%).41
Firms enter and exit the TAAF program in different years, and some firms participate in more
than one TAAF adjustment program at the same time, so it is difficult to compare firms. Given
that TAAF focuses primarily on small- and medium-size firms that face multiple challenges, it is
not entirely surprising that a significant number of firms that receive TAAF certifications are
unable to complete the program. Yet, the TAAF program is successful in assisting many firms
through a recovery process that can last from two to seven years, which suggests that the limited
amount of funds available to trade-impacted firms through the TAAF program may amount to a
relatively efficient policy tool.
In a final section, the FY2012 and FY2013 TAAF annual reports offer anecdotes collected from
the TAACs that provide “success” stories about participating firms from all parts of the country
and in various industries that used TAAF assistance. Although these examples may identify
TAAC-provided assistance to select firms, they do not demonstrate the extent to which TAAF or
the TAACs provided the assistance that may have been critical to the success of any one

41 EDA, Annual Report to Congress on the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program for Fiscal Year 2012, p.
40.
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particular firm to succeed where others do not. Whether some firms might have been able to
adjust on their own cannot be determined.42
Legislation in the 113th Congress
On July 24, 2013, Senator Max Baucus introduced the Trade Adjustment Assistance Expansion
Act of 2013 (S. 1357). The bill would extend the version of TAA that expired on December 31,
2013, at current funding levels through 2020.
On March 6, 2014, Representative Adam Smith introduced the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act
of 2014 (H.R. 4163), a bill to extend and expand TAA programs through 2020. The House bill
differs from S. 1357 in that it would authorize $50 million in annual appropriations for TAAF;
would reinstate benefits for service workers and service-sector firms; and would also require the
Secretary to reconsider any determination made before enactment of this act not to certify such
workers or firms, and to certify them as eligible if they meet the specified requirements.
On July 30, 2013, President Obama announced his support for reauthorization of TAA programs
and linked it to TPA. TAA renewal continues to spur heated debate in Congress. TAA
reauthorizations tied to the granting of trade promotion authority have generally received strong
support.

42 EDA, Annual Report to Congress on the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program for Fiscal Year 2012, pp.
47-54, and Annual Report to Congress on the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms Program for Fiscal Year 2013,
pp. 44-51.
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Appendix A. Simplified View of Trade in Global
Value Chains

Goods and services are transformed into final products as they move through GVCs that are
coordinated by MNCs. However, because statistical data on exports are reported in gross terms
(the total value of the export, including the value that was added by each producer in countries
spread along the value chain), the total value added is double counted (the gross value of the
product is counted at each border crossing). According to the OECD, GVCs largely account for
the rapid rise in double counting, which is implicit in current gross trade flows as intermediate
goods and service cross borders many times.43
To address the issue of double counting, only those flows that are related to the value that is
added (labor compensation, other taxes on production, and operating surplus or profits) by each
country in the production of any good or service that is exported should be counted, rather than
total gross trade flows. For example, if Malaysia exports $100 in goods that have been produced
entirely in Malaysia to China, which then further processes them, and in so doing adds $10 in
additional value to the goods before exporting them to the United States for final consumption,
the total value-added by Malaysia and China amounts to $110. Expressed in terms of gross trade
flows, China has imported $100 of goods from Malaysia and, in turn, China has exported $110 in
goods to the United States. However, in terms of gross trade flows the contribution to total world
exports and imports of goods amount to $210.44 In fact, only $110 in value-added has been
generated in production and imported by the United States.45
Conventional trade measures obscure the origins of production that occurs within GVCs. One
result is that the United States trade deficit with China appears to be $110, while the trade deficit
with Malaysia is $0. If trade is measured in terms of value-added, the U.S. deficit with China
would be $10, while the U.S. trade deficit with Malaysia would be $100. A key take-away is that
gross bilateral trade deficits are useful as a measure of overall bilateral trade deficits, but are
unhelpful (or even harmful) when attempting to unravel the sources of value-added trade. U.S.
consumers, rather than Chinese consumers, are driving demand for Malaysia’s products, and
China’s exports are dependent on intermediate imports from Malaysia. If protectionist measures
are placed on imports from Malaysia, its exports and competitiveness could be adversely affected.
Protectionist measures placed on China could produce ripple effects along the value chain with
similar results. As the OECD notes:
...it is demand from North American consumers that drives the output throughout this global
value chain. The aim of the trade in value added approach is therefore to identify the nature

43 OECD, Interconnected Economies: Benefiting from Global Value Chains, September 2013, pp. 54-55.
44 An additional complicating factor is that duties (which may be quite small) must be paid on the entire (gross) value
of the product each time an intermediate good crosses a border. This leads to tariff amplification, a potentially serious
problem when intermediate goods flow across a number of borders. The value of the product continually increases as
value is added, as do tariffs (which are charged on the full value of a good rather than only the value added). The
addition of tariffs on the gross value of the good at each border is incorporated into the price of the good and may
ultimately be passed through to the consumer. Tariff amplification could be eliminated if only the value added by the
exporting country was assessed by the importing country.
45 Ibid.
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of these inter-relationships by breaking the value of a given gross export down into its value-
added components (by country of origin and industry).46
This approach allows policymakers to better understand the sources of value added. Without the
data provided by the development of robust GVC statistics and the analysis that flows from such
data, policies that are protectionist or result in trade retaliation could have a boomerang effect. If
U.S. SMEs are major suppliers of intermediate goods to U.S. MNCs or U.S.-based foreign
affiliates of MNCs that coordinate GVCs, U.S. trade restrictions or retaliation against foreign
goods by a country that participates in the same GVC could cause direct harm to the GVC and
damage the competitiveness of U.S. SMEs.



46 Ibid., p. 55.
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Appendix B. Acronyms
Glossary
AP
Adjustment Proposal
ARRA
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
BLS
Bureau of Labor Statistics (of the Department of Labor)
EDA
Economic Development Administration (of the Department of Commerce)
FTAs
Free trade agreements
GVCs
Global value chains
GAO
Government Accountability Office
MNCs
Multinational companies
OECD
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a 34-member
organization of the world’s most advanced countries and emerging countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, and the United States.
SMEs
Small and medium-sized enterprises
G20
The Group of Twenty, major advanced and emerging economies: Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.
TAA
Trade Adjustment Assistance
TAAEA
Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011
TAACs
Trade Adjustment Assistance Centers
TAAF
Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms
TGAAA
Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act of 2009
USITC
U.S. International Trade Commission




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Author Contact Information

Glennon J. Harrison

Specialist in International Trade and Finance
gharrison@crs.loc.gov, 7-7783

Acknowledgments
This updated report was originally authored by former longtime Specialist in International Trade and
Finance, John F. Hornbeck.

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