Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
July 25, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32048

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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

Summary
A priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of
U.S. interests. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran’s support for militant
Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. The issue of Iran’s nuclear
program came to the fore in 2002, and, to counter that enhanced potential threat, the United States
has sought to orchestrate broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to
verifiably demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is for purely
peaceful purposes. The pressure harmed Iran’s economy and might have contributed to the June
2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran, who campaigned as
an advocate of ending Iran’s international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran
produced an interim agreement (“Joint Plan of Action,” JPA) that halts the expansion of Iran’s
nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. It ran from January 20–July 20, 2014
during which talks on a “comprehensive solution” took place. Although gaps on the core issue of
Iran’s long term capacity to enrich uranium remain wide, U.S. officials stated that there was
sufficient progress in the talks to justify an extension of the JPA. On July 18, 2014, Iran and the
six negotiating powers announced an extension of the JPA until November 24, 2014.
Rouhani’s presidency, coupled with progress in the nuclear talks, has improved prospects for an
end to the 34 years of U.S.-Iran estrangement. Since the September 2013 U.N. General Assembly
meetings in New York, senior level U.S.-Iran talks have been held regularly. U.S.-Iran bilateral
meetings have discussed primarily the nuclear issue but also sometimes include regional crises
such Iraq or Syria, and the issue of American citizens detained in Iran. The nuclear talks also have
eased tensions between Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf region, who are all allies of the
United States. However, the Gulf states, Israel, and other regional states still express concern that
Iran’s re-integration into the region and the international community will give Iran additional
political and economic resources to support movements and regimes in the region that are counter
to U.S. and U.S.-allied interests. State Department reports on international terrorism, including
the latest one for 2013, assert that Iran continues to provide funds and arms to a wide range of
movements, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, the embattled government of Bashar Al
Assad of Syria, Iraqi Shiite militias, and rebels in Yemen and Bahrain.
President Obama has asserted, both before and after the JPA was agreed, that the option of U.S.
military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities is available. However, further U.S.—or Israeli—
discussion of military options against Iran is unlikely unless the nuclear talks collapse outright. In
line with a provision of the JPA that no new sanctions be imposed on Iran during the JPA period,
the Administration has threatened to veto bills, including S. 1881, that would add sanctions on
Iran—whether or not their provisions would take effect only after the JPA expires.
Rouhani’s unexpected election win—a result of a large turnout of reform-minded voters such as
those who protested the 2009 election results—appeared to demonstrate that support for domestic
reform remains strong. Iran’s judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to restrict
social freedoms. However, some political prisoners have been released and some media
restrictions have been eased since Rouhani took office. For further information, see CRS Report
RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43333, Interim Agreement on
Iran’s Nuclear Program, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr.

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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

Contents
Political History ............................................................................................................................... 1
Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition .................................................................................... 2
Unelected or Indirectly Elected Institutions: The Supreme Leader, Council of
Guardians, and Expediency Council ...................................................................................... 2
Council of Guardians and Expediency Council .................................................................. 3
Elected Institutions: The Presidency, the Majles (Parliament), the Assembly of
Experts, and Recent Elections ................................................................................................ 8
The Presidency .................................................................................................................... 8
The Majles ........................................................................................................................... 9
The Assembly of Experts .................................................................................................... 9
Recent Elections and Their Implications ............................................................................. 9
Other Human Rights Practices ....................................................................................................... 13
Iran’s Defense Capabilities and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs .................................... 16
Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force ....................................................... 17
Nuclear Program and Related International Diplomacy .......................................................... 19
Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Activities ............................................................................ 20
Early International Diplomatic Efforts to Address Iran’s Nuclear Program ..................... 23
Developments During the Obama Administration ............................................................ 24
Missiles and Chemical/Biological Weapons............................................................................ 30
Chemical and Biological Weapons .................................................................................... 30
Ballistic and Cruise Missiles and Warheads ...................................................................... 31
Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups .......................................................................... 33
Support for International Terrorism ......................................................................................... 33
Foreign Policy: Relations with the Persian Gulf States ........................................................... 34
Yemen ................................................................................................................................ 37
Iranian Policy in Iraq ............................................................................................................... 37
Supporting Militant Anti-Israel Groups ................................................................................... 38
Iran and Hamas.................................................................................................................. 39
Iran and Hezbollah ............................................................................................................ 39
Syria ......................................................................................................................................... 40
The Caucasus and Central Asia ............................................................................................... 41
South and East Asia ................................................................................................................. 42
East Asia ............................................................................................................................ 42
South Asia: Afghanistan .................................................................................................... 42
Pakistan ............................................................................................................................. 43
India ................................................................................................................................... 44
Al Qaeda .................................................................................................................................. 44
Latin America .......................................................................................................................... 45
Africa ....................................................................................................................................... 47
Sudan ................................................................................................................................. 48
U.S. Policy Approaches and Additional Options ........................................................................... 49
Obama Administration Policy: Pressure Coupled with Engagement ...................................... 51
2009-2013: Emphasis on Pressure .................................................................................... 51
Response to Rouhani ......................................................................................................... 51
Containment and Military Options: U.S. Posture in the Gulf .................................................. 52
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Military Action: Pros and Cons ......................................................................................... 53
U.S. Deployments in the Persian Gulf .............................................................................. 54
U.S. Efforts to Enhance Indigenous Gulf Defense Capabilities ........................................ 55
Iranian Retaliation Scenarios ............................................................................................ 56
Potential for an Israeli Strike? ........................................................................................... 57
Reported Covert Action ........................................................................................................... 57
Regime Change ....................................................................................................................... 57
Democracy Promotion and Internet Freedom Efforts ....................................................... 58
Adding or Easing International Sanctions ............................................................................... 63

Figures
Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government .............................................................................. 68
Figure 2. Map of Iran ..................................................................................................................... 69

Tables
Table 1. Supreme Leader: Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i ............................................................ 3
Table 2. Major Factions, Personalities, and Interest Groups ........................................................... 4
Table 3. Human Rights Practices: General Categories .................................................................. 14
Table 4. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal ............................................................................... 18
Table 5. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ............................................................ 19
Table 6. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program
(1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929) ..................................................................................................... 30
Table 7. Iran’s Missile Arsenal....................................................................................................... 32
Table 8. Major Past Acts of Iran or Iran-Related Terrorism .......................................................... 34
Table 9. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding ................................................................................ 62
Table 10. Digest of Existing U.S. Sanctions Against Iran ............................................................. 65
Table 11. Selected Economic Indicators ........................................................................................ 66

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 70

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Political History
Iran is a country of about 75 million people, located in the heart of the Persian Gulf region. The
United States was an ally of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (“the Shah”), who
ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah assumed the throne when Britain and
Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi (Reza Shah), from power because of his perceived
alignment with Germany in World War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921 when, as an
officer in Iran’s only military force, the Cossack Brigade (reflecting Russian influence in Iran in
the early 20th century), he launched a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty. Reza
Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. The Qajars had been in decline
for many years before Reza Shah’s takeover. That dynasty’s perceived manipulation by Britain
and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906 constitutionalist movement, which forced the
Qajars to form Iran’s first Majles (parliament) in August 1906 and promulgate a constitution in
December 1906. Prior to the Qajars, what is now Iran was the center of several Persian empires
and dynasties whose reach shrunk steadily over time. Since the 16th century, Iranian empires lost
control of Bahrain (1521), Baghdad (1638), the Caucasus (1828), western Afghanistan (1857),
Baluchistan (1872), and what is now Turkmenistan (1894). Iran adopted Shiite Islam under the
Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), which ended a series of Turkic and Mongol conquests.
The Shah was anti-Communist, and the United States viewed his government as a bulwark
against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to pro-Soviet
Arab regimes and movements. Israel maintained a representative office in Iran during the Shah’s
time and the Shah supported a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1951, under
pressure from nationalists in the Majles (parliament) who gained strength in the 1949 Majles
elections, he appointed a popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, as prime
minister. Mossadeq was widely considered left-leaning, and the United States was wary of his
drive for nationalization of the oil industry, which had since 1913 been controlled by the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company. His followers began an uprising in August 1953 when the Shah tried to
dismiss him, and the Shah fled. The Shah was restored in a CIA-supported uprising that toppled
Mossadeq (“Operation Ajax”) on August 19, 1953.
The Shah tried to modernize Iran and orient it toward the West, but in so doing he alienated
religious Iranians and the Shiite clergy and he allegedly tolerated severe repression and torture of
dissidents by his SAVAK intelligence service. The Shah exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in
1964 because of Khomeini’s active opposition based on the Shah’s anti-clerical policies and what
Khomeini alleged was the Shah’s forfeiture of Iran’s sovereignty to the United States. Khomeini
fled to and taught in Najaf, Iraq, a major Shiite theological center that contains the Shrine of
Imam Ali, Shiism’s foremost figure. There, he was a peer of senior Iraqi Shiite clerics and, with
them, advocated direct clerical rule or velayat-e-faqih (rule by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent). In
1978, three years after the March 6, 1975, Algiers Accords between the Shah and Iraq’s Baathist
leaders, which settled territorial disputes and required each party to stop assisting each other’s
oppositionists, Iraq expelled Khomeini to France, from which he stoked the Islamic revolution.
Mass demonstrations and guerrilla activity by pro-Khomeini forces, allied with a broad array of
anti-Shah activists, caused the Shah’s government to collapse in February 1979. Khomeini
returned from France on February 1, 1979 and, on February 11, 1979, he declared an Islamic
Republic of Iran. The concept of velayat-e-faqih was enshrined in the constitution that was
adopted in a public referendum in December 1979 (and amended in 1989); it provided for the
post of Supreme Leader. The regime based itself on strong opposition to foreign, particularly
Western, influence, and relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic turned
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openly hostile after the November 4, 1979, seizure of the U.S. Embassy by pro-Khomeini
radicals. Ayatollah Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, and was succeeded as Supreme Leader by
Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i.
The regime faced serious unrest in its first few years, including a June 1981 bombing at the
headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the prime minister’s office that killed
several senior leaders, including Khomeini confidant Mohammad Hossein Beheshti. These
events, along with the hostage crisis with the United States, provided cover for the regime to
purge many of the secular, liberal, and left-wing personalities and parties in the anti-Shah
coalition. Examples included the Tudeh Party (Communist), the People’s Mojahedin Organization
of Iran (PMOI, see below), the first elected President Abolhassan Bani Sadr, and the Iran
Freedom Movement of the regime’s first Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan (a movement later led
by Ibrahim Yazdi, who has been in and out of prison for two decades). The regime was under
economic and military threat during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, which resulted at times in
nearly halting Iran’s oil exports. Despite these struggles, there has still been substantial diversity
of opinion in ruling circles and, prior to 2009, the regime faced only episodic unrest from
minorities, intellectuals, students, labor groups, and women.
Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition
Iran’s Islamic regime, established in a constitution adopted in an October 1979 public
referendum, is widely considered authoritarian, although it provides for elected institutions and
checks and balances. A Supreme Leader is not directly elected by the population, but he is
selected by an all-elected body. The President and the Majles (unicameral parliament) are directly
elected. There are also elections for municipal councils, which select mayors. Even within the
unelected institutions, factional disputes between those who insist on ideological purity and those
considered more pragmatic have been frequent and highly consequential. See Figure 1 for a chart
of the Iranian regime.
Unelected or Indirectly Elected Institutions: The Supreme Leader,
Council of Guardians, and Expediency Council
At the apex of the Islamic Republic’s power structure is a “Supreme Leader” who has vast formal
powers and no term limits. He is chosen by an elected body—the Assembly of Experts—which
also has the constitutional power to remove him. Upon Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, the Assembly
selected one of his disciples, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, as Supreme Leader.1 Although he has
never had Khomeini’s undisputed political or religious authority, the powers of the office enable
Khamene’i to ensure that he is Iran’s paramount leader. Under the constitution, the Supreme
Leader is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, giving him the power to appoint
commanders. He is well-represented on the highest national security body, the Supreme National
Security Council, composed of top military and civilian security officials. The constitution gives
the Supreme Leader the power to approve the removal of an elected president if either the
judiciary or the Majles (parliament) decide there is cause for that removal. The Supreme Leader

1 At the time of his selection as Supreme Leader, Khamene’i was generally referred to at the rank of Hojjat ol-Islam,
one rank below Ayatollah, suggesting his religious elevation was political rather than through traditional mechanisms.
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appoints half of the 12-member Council of Guardians; all members of the Expediency Council,
and the head of Iran’s judiciary (currently Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani).
Table 1. Supreme Leader: Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i
Born in July 1939 to an Azeri (Turkic) family from Mashhad. Was jailed by the Shah of Iran for supporting Ayatollah
Khomeini’s revolution. After the regime took power in 1979, helped organize Revolutionary Guard and other security
organs. Lost use of right arm in assassination attempt in June 1981. Was elected president during 1981-1989 and was
selected Khomeini’s successor in June 1989 upon his death. Upon that selection, Khamene’i religious ranking was
advanced in official organs to “Grand Ayatollah” from the lower ranking “Hojjat ol-Islam.” But, still lacks the
undisputed authority to end factional disputes or the public adoration Khomeini had. Has taken more of a day-to-day
role since 2009 uprising, including in the nuclear negotiations issue. Sided decisively with hardline opponents of then
president Ahmadinejad after mid-2011, but acquiesced to the election of the relatively moderate Rouhani. Khamene’i
publicly supported the JPA but has expressed skepticism that a permanent nuclear settlement can be reached.
Reputedly issued religious proclamation (2003) against Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, and has publicly (2012) called
doing so a “sin,” and is widely believed to fear direct military confrontation with United States on Iranian soil.
Generally does not meet with Western officials and is suspicious of relations with the West as potentially making Iran
vulnerable to Western cultural influence, spying, and possible regime destabilization efforts.
Throughout career, has consistently taken hard-line stances on regional issues, particularly toward Israel, often calling
it a cancerous tumor that needs to be excised from the region. In March 2014, publicly questioned whether the
Holocaust occurred—an issue highlighted by former president Ahmadinejad.
Ful y backs efforts by Revolutionary Guard and other Iranian organs to support pro-Iranian movements and
governments, including that of Syria. On economic issues, he has tended to support the business community
(bazaaris), and opposed state control of the economy, but believes Iran’s economy is self-sufficient enough to
withstand the effects of international sanctions.
His office is run by Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, with significant input from Khamene’i’s second and
increasingly influential son, Mojtaba. Also advised by Keyhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari and former Foreign Minister
Ali Akbar Velayati.
Potential successors include Expediency Council Chairman Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, hardline Ayatollah
Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Council of Guardians head Ayatol ah Ahmad Jannati, Judiciary head Ayatollah Sadeq
Larijani, and frequent Tehran Friday prayer leader Ayatollah Ahmad Khatemi. None is considered a clear consensus
choice if Khamene’i leaves the scene unexpectedly.
Source: CRS.
Council of Guardians and Expediency Council
The 12-member Council of Guardians (COG) consists of six Islamic jurists appointed by the
Supreme Leader, and six secular lawyers elected by the judiciary and confirmed by the Majles.
Currently headed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the conservative-controlled body reviews
legislation to ensure it conforms to Islamic law. It also vets election candidates by evaluating their
backgrounds according to constitutional requirements that a candidate demonstrate knowledge of
Islam, loyalty to the Islamic system of government, and other criteria that are largely subjective.
The COG also certifies election results.
The 42-member “Expediency Council” was established in 1988 to resolve legislative
disagreements between the Majles and the COG. It has since evolved into a policy advisory body
for the Supreme Leader and an overseer of the performance of the president and his cabinet. Its
members serve five-year terms; its chairman, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, was reappointed in
February 2007 and again in March 2012. The latest reappointment was widely interpreted as a
Khamene’i effort to keep Rafsanjani loyal to the regime following his March 2011 removal as
head of the Assembly of Experts (see below). But, Rafsanjani was not permitted by the COG to
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run for president again in 2013. The Expediency Council’s executive officer is former
Revolutionary Guard commander-in-chief Mohsen Reza’i.
Table 2. Major Factions, Personalities, and Interest Groups
Conservatives
Supreme Leader Ali
See box above.
Khamene’i
President Hassan Rouhani
See box below.
Expediency Council Chair
Born in 1944, a longtime key regime strategist, Khomeini disciple, and advocate of
Ayatollah Ali Akbar
“grand bargain” to resolve all outstanding issues with United States. Was Majles
Hashemi-Rafsanjani
speaker during 1981-1989 and president 1989-1997. Family owns large share of
Iran’s total pistachio production. Ouster as Assembly of Experts chairman in 2011
widely attributed to his tacit support of popular opposition to Ahmadinejad 2009
reelection. That perception undoubtedly contributed to COG denying his
candidacy in 2013 presidential elections, even though Khamene’i had reappointed
him Expediency Council chair in March 2012. Victory of close ally Rouhani in the
2013 election has revived Rafsanjani’s influence, and he remains a widely
mentioned candidate to succeed Khamene’i should he leave the scene
unexpectedly.
The political activities of Rafsanjani’s children have contributed to his uneven
relations with Khamene’i. Daughter Faizah participated in several 2009 protests,
was detained briefly in February 2011 for protesting, and was jailed in September
2012. Five Rafsanjani family members arrested in June 2009 (and another briefly
detained in March 2010), and son, Mehdi, was released on bail in December 2012.
Ex- President Mahmoud
Served as President during 2005-2013. First non-cleric to serve as president of
Ahmadinejad
the Islamic republic since the assassination of then-president Mohammad Ali Rajai
in August 1981. During his term, he asserted it is his mission is to prepare for the
return of the 12th Imam from occultation that would, according to Twelver Shi te
doctrine, be accompanied by the establishment of Islam as the global religion.
Attracted significant criticism for comments questioning the Holocaust and calling
for Israel’s destruction. During his second term, he was largely sidelined by
Khamene’i. Perhaps to prevent his criticizing the regime after leaving office, he
was permitted to start a new university and appointed to the Expediency Council.
Majles Speaker Ali
Ali Larijani has been Majles Speaker since 2008 but did not run again for president
Larijani/Larijani brothers
in the 2013 election after losing in 2005. Was state broadcasting head (1994-
2004), minister of culture and Islamic guidance (1993), and head of Supreme
National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator (2005—2007). Considered
amenable to a nuclear deal with the international community. Politically close to
Khamene’i and was a leading antagonist of Ahmadinejad. One brother (Sadeq) is
judiciary head; another (Mohammad Javad), was deputy foreign minister (1980s)
and now heads a government human rights body. His predecessor as Majles
Speaker is Gholam Ali Haddad Adel, whose daughter is married to Khamene’i’s
son, Mojtaba, and who ran unsuccessfully for president in June 2013.
Senior Shiite Clerics
The most senior clerics, most of whom are in Qom, including several Grand
Ayatollahs, are generally “quietist”—they believe that the senior clergy should
refrain from direct involvement in politics. These include Grand Ayatollah Nasser
Makarem Shirazi, Grand Ayatollah Abdol Karim Musavi-Ardabili, and Grand
Ayatollah Yusuf Sanei, all of whom have criticized the regime’s crackdown against
oppositionists. Others believe in political involvement, including Ayatollah
Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, the founder of the hardline Haqqani school and
spiritual mentor to Ahmadinejad until breaking with him in 2011. Yazdi is an
assertive defender of the powers of the Supreme Leader and a proponent of an
“Islamic state” rather than the current “Islamic republic,” but fared poorly in
December 2006 elections for Assembly of Experts. Other hardline clerics include
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Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, mentor of Iraqi cleric and faction leader Moqtada Al Sadr;
and Ahmad Khatemi, frequently Friday prayer leader at Tehran University and a
senior Assembly of Experts member. Some of these figures could be candidates
for Supreme Leader should Khamene’i leave the scene.
Judiciary Chief Ayatollah
Judiciary head since August 2009. Like his brother, Majles Speaker Ali Larijani,
Sadeq Larijani
Sadeq Larijani is close to the Supreme Leader and a hard liner against dissent.
Society of Militant Clerics
Longtime organization of hardline clerics headed by Ayatol ah Mohammad
Mahdavi-Kani, who became chair of the Assembly of Experts on March 9, 2011.
Did not back Ahmadinejad for reelection in 2009 and led a bloc opposing
Ahmadinejad in the March 2, 2012, Majles elections. President Rouhani is a
member of this group.
Bazaar Merchants
The urban bazaar merchants fear jeopardizing the economy by participating in
(“Bazaaris”)
political opposition activity. Have conducted few strikes or other organized action
since the 1979 revolution. Each city’s bazaars are organized by industry (e.g.,
carpets, gold, jewelry, clothing) and bazaari leadership positions are chosen by
consensus among elders of each industry represented in the bazaar.
Opposition/”Green Movement” (Rah-e-Sabz)
All of the blocs and personalities below can be considered, to varying degrees, part of the Green Movement or as
critics of Iran’s political system.
Titular Green Movement
The titular leader of the Green movement, Mir Hossein Musavi, a non-cleric, is
Leaders: Mir Hossein Musavi/
about 70. An architect by training, and a disciple of Ayatollah Khomeini, he served
Mohammad Khatemi/Mehdi
as foreign minister (1980), then prime minister (1981-1989), at which time he
Karrubi and Other
successful y managed the state rationing program during the privations of the Iran-
Reformists
Iraq War but often feuded with Khamene’i, who was then president. At that time,
he was an advocate of state control of the economy. His post was abolished in
the 1989 revision of the constitution.
Musavi supports political and social freedoms and reducing Iran’s international
isolation, but supports strong state intervention in the economy to benefit
workers and lower classes. Appeared at some 2009 protests, sometimes harassed
by security agents, but harder line opposition leaders resented his statements
supporting reconciliation with the regime. He and his wife (prominent activist
Zahra Rahnevard), along with fellow Green Movement leader and defeated 2009
presidential candidate Mehdi Karrubi, were placed in detention in mid-2011. In
early 2014, Karrubi was allowed to return to his home, although still under the
control of regime guards. Musavi remains in detention. Karrubi was Speaker of
the Majles during 1989-1992 and 2000-2004.
Mohammad Khatemi was elected president on a reformist platform in May 1997,
with 69% of the vote; reelected June 2001 with 77%. Rode wave of sentiment for
easing social and political restrictions, but these groups became disillusioned with
Khatemi’s failure as president to buck hardliners on reform issues. He declined to
run again for president in 2009, instead supporting Musavi, or in 2013.
Student Groups
Groups composed of wel -educated, Westernized urban youth are the backbone
of the Green Movement. They have attempted, with mixed success, to gain
support of older generation, labor, clerics, vil age-dwel ers, and other segments.
The Office of Consolidation of Unity is the student group that led the 1999 riots
but which later became controlled by regime loyalists. An offshoot, the
Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS), believes in regime replacement and in
U.S.-style free markets. CIS founder, Amir Abbas Fakhravar, is based in
Washington, DC. Co-founder, Arzhang Davoodi, remains in prison in Iran serving
a lifetime prison sentence.
Islamic Iran Participation
The most prominent and best organized pro-reform grouping, but has lost
Front (IIPF)
political ground to Green Movement groups advocating outright overthrow of the
regime. Its leaders include Khatemi’s brother, Mohammad Reza Khatemi (a
deputy speaker in the 2000-2004 Majles) and Mohsen Mirdamadi. Backed Musavi
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in June 2009 election; several IIPF leaders detained and prosecuted in postelection
dispute. The party was outlawed by the regime in September 2010.
Mojahedin of the Islamic
Composed mainly of left-leaning Iranian figures who support state control of the
Revolution Organization
economy, but want greater political pluralism and relaxation of rules on social
(MIR)
behavior. A major constituency of the reformist camp. Its leader is former Heavy
Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi, who supported Musavi in 2009 election and
has been incarcerated for most of the time since June 2009. The organization was
outlawed by the regime simultaneously with the outlawing of the IIPF, above.
Combatant Clerics
Very similar name to organization above, but politically very different. Formed in
Association
1988, it is run by reformist, not hardline, clerics and officials. Leading figures
include Mohammad Khatemi, former Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur,
and former Prosecutor General Ali Asgar Musavi-Koiniha.
Labor Unions
Organized labor has suffered from official repression for many years. It was not at
the core of the 2009 uprising, but many laborers have openly demanded political
change. Some laborers want political change but fear income disruption if they
openly defy the regime. Some labor protests took place in Tehran on “May Day”
2010, and other smal strikes (truckers, some factories) have taken place since. A
bus drivers’ union leader, Mansur Osanloo, was jail from 2007 until 2011.
Other Prominent Dissidents
Other leading dissidents, some in Iran, others in exile (including in the United
States), have been challenging the regime since well before the Green Movement
formed and are now significant opposition figures. Journalist Akbar Ganji
conducted hunger strikes to protest regime oppression; he was released on
schedule on March 18, 2006, after sentencing in 2001 to six years in prison for
alleging high-level involvement in 1999 murders of Iranian dissident intellectuals.
Abdol Karim Soroush, now exiled, has challenged the doctrine of clerical rule.
Former Revolutionary Guard organizer Mohsen Sazegara is based in the United
States, but his role in the IRGC likely discredits him in the eyes of dissidents who
want regime replacement. Other significant dissidents include former Culture
Minister Ataol ah Mohajerani, Mohsen Kadivar, and U.S.-based Fatemah
Haghighatgoo. Some wel -known dissidents incarcerated since 2010 include
filmmaker Jafar Panahi; journalist Abdolreza Tajik; famed blogger Hossein
Derakshan (serving a 20-year prison sentence); and human rights lawyer Nasrin
Sotoudeh. Sotoudeh was released in September 2013, as discussed below. 80-
year-old Iran Freedom Movement leader Ibrahim Yazdi was released from prison
in April 2011 after resigning as the Freedom Movement’s leader.
One major dissident figure is Nobel Peace Prize laureate (2003) and Iran human
rights activist lawyer Shirin Abadi. She has often represented clients persecuted
or prosecuted by the regime but she left Iran for Europe, fearing arrest. In
December 2009, the regime confiscated her Nobel Prize.
Monarchists
Some Iranians outside Iran, including in the United States, want to replace the
regime with a constitutional monarchy led by Reza Pahlavi, the U.S.-based son of
the late former Shah and a U.S.-trained combat pilot. The Shah’s son, who is
about 60 years old, has delivered statements condemning the regime for the post-
2009 election crackdown and he has cal ed for international governments to
withdraw their representation from Tehran. He appears periodical y in broadcasts
into Iran by Iranian exile-run stations in California,2 as well as in other Iran-
oriented media.
Pahlavi has always had some support particularly in the older generation in Iran,
but he reportedly is trying to broaden his fol owing by asserting that he supports
democracy and not restoration of a monarchy. Since March 2011, he has been
increasingly cooperating with—and possibly attempting to co-opt—younger

2 Ron Kampeas, “Iran’s Crown Prince Plots Nonviolent Insurrection from Suburban Washington,” Associated Press,
August 26, 2002.
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leaders in a “National Council of Iran” (NCI). He and over 30 opposition groups
formal y established the Council at a conference in Paris in April 2013, and it
drafted a set of democratic principles for a post-Islamic republic Iran. However,
several groups have left the NCI, asserting that Pahlavi sought inordinate control
over its decisions, and formed a rival group called the “National Iran Congress.”
Leftist Groups
Many oppositionists who support left-wing ideologies support the People’s
Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), which is discussed in a text box at the
end of this report.
Sunni Armed Opposition:
Jundullah is composed of Sunni Muslims primarily from the Baluchistan region
Jundullah
bordering Pakistan. The region is inhabited by members of the Baluch minority
and is far less developed than other parts of Iran. On the grounds that Jundullah
has attacked civilians in the course of violent attacks in Iran, the State Department
formally named it an FTO on November 4, 2010. Some saw the designation as an
overture toward the Iranian government, while others saw it as a sign that the
United States supports only opposition groups that are committed to peaceful
methods. Jundullah has conducted several attacks on Iranian security and civilian
officials, including a May 2009 bombing of a mosque in Zahedan and the October
2009 killing of five IRGC commanders in Sistan va Baluchistan Province. The
regime claimed a major victory against the group in February 2010 with the
capture of the group’s top leader, Abdolmalek Rigi. The regime executed him in
June 2010, but the group retaliated in July 2010 with a Zahedan bombing that
killed 28 persons, including some IRGC personnel.The group is believed
responsible for a December 15, 2010, bombing at a mosque in Chahbahar, also in
Baluchistan, that killed 38.
Kurdish Armed Groups: Free An armed Kurdish group operating out of Iraq is the Free Life Party, known by its
Life Party (PJAK)
acronym PJAK. Its leader is believed to be Abdul Rahman Hajji Ahmadi, born in
1941, who is a citizen of Germany and lives in that country. Many PJAK members
are women, supporting the organization’s dedication to women’s rights. PJAK was
designated by the Treasury Department in early February 2009 as a terrorism
supporting entity under Executive Order 13224, although the designation
statement indicated the decision was based mainly on PJAK’s association with the
Turkish Kurdish opposition group Kongra Gel, also known as the PKK. Five
Kurds executed by Iran’s regime in May 2010 were alleged members of PJAK.
In June 2010 and July 2011, Iran conducted some shelling of reputed PJAK bases
inside Iraq, reportedly killing some Kurdish civilians.
Arab Oppositionists/Ahwazi
Another militant group, the Ahwazi Arabs, operates in the largely Arab-inhabited
Arabs
areas of southwest Iran. Relatively inactive over the past few years.
U.S.-Based Opposition and Advocacy-Groups
Of the more than 1 million Iranian-Americans of differing ideologies, a vast majority want to see a change of regime in
Tehran, although many Iranian-Americans are not active on Iran policy issues. Many still have families living in Iran and
appear concerned that anti-regime activity in the United States will put them in jeopardy. Up to half of all Iranian
Americans are based in the Los Angeles area, and activists there run small broadcasting operations into Iran.
National Iranian-American
NIAC is an advocacy group that does not seek regime change in Iran. The stated
Council (NIAC)
mission of NIAC is to promote discussion of U.S. policy. The group advocates
engagement with Iran, supports easing some U.S. sanctions against Iran and has
asserted that the Administration is actively planning to take military action against
Iran. These positions have led some experts and commentators to allege,
although without providing evidence, that it is a front for the Iranian regime.
NIAC has criticized the regime’s human rights abuses.
Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian-
PAAIA’s mission is to discuss issues affecting Iranian Americans, such as
Americans (PAAIA)
discrimination caused by public perceptions of association with terrorism or
radical Islam. Some observers believe it has become less active since 2011
because of desertions by some members who want PAAIA be more active in
trying to shape U.S. Iran policy and to take a stronger stand against Tehran.
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Elected Institutions: The Presidency, the Majles (Parliament),
the Assembly of Experts, and Recent Elections
Several major institutions are directly elected by the population. However, international
organizations and governments have often questioned the credibility of Iran’s elections because of
the COG’s role in limiting the number and ideological diversity of candidates. Women can vote
and run for most offices, but no woman has ever been approved by the COG to run for President.
Presidential candidates must receive more than 50% of the vote to avoid a runoff against the next
highest vote-getter.
Another criticism of the political process in Iran is the relative absence of political parties;
establishing a party requires the permission of the Interior Ministry under Article 10 of Iran’s
constitution. The standards to obtain approval are high: to date, numerous parties have filed for
permission since the regime was founded, but only those considered loyal to the regime have
been granted (or allowed to retain) license to operate. Some have been licensed and then banned,
such as the two reformist parties Islamic Iran Participation Front and Organization of Mojahedin
of the Islamic Revolution, which were formally outlawed in September 2010.
The Presidency
The main directly elected institution is the presidency, which is clearly subordinate to—but often
institutionally feuds with—the Supreme Leader. Each president has tried, and failed, to expand
his authority relative to the Supreme Leader. Presidential authority, particularly on matters of
national security, is often countermanded by key clerics and allies of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and other powerful institutions. Presidential authority on economic and
social issues tends to be more substantial. And, the presidency provides vast opportunities for the
holder of the post to empower his political base and to affect policy, particularly on economic
issues. The president appoints and supervises the work of the cabinet, but the Supreme Leader is
believed to have significant input into security-related cabinet appointments.
As the top governing official, the presidency develops the budgets of cabinet departments and
imposes and collects taxes on corporations and other bodies. The presidency also runs oversight
bodies such as the Anticorruption Headquarters and the General Inspection Organization. All
government officials are required to submit annual financial statements to state auditors, but there
is no confirmation that such procedures are followed. Religious foundations, called “bonyads,”
for example, are loosely regulated. Through profits earned from its affiliate companies, the IRGC
is widely known to spend funds additional unbudgeted funds on arms, technology, support to pro-
Iranian movements, and other functions.
Prior to 1989, Iran had both an elected president as well as a prime minister selected by the
elected Majles (parliament). However, the officials who held these posts during 1981-1989 (Ali
Khamene’i, who is now Supreme Leader, and Mir Hossein Musavi) were in constant institutional
conflict and a 1989 constitutional revision eliminated the prime ministership. Because Iran’s
presidents have sought to assert the powers of their institution, in October 2011, Khamene’i
raised the possibility of eliminating the post of president and restoring the post of prime minister,
which would be selected by the elected Majles. The prime minister would not be directly elected
by the population and would presumably not seek to assert powers independent of the Supreme
Leader. No further action on the concept has been evident since.
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The Majles
Iran’s Majles, or parliament, is unicameral, consisting of 290 seats, all elected. Majles elections
occur one year prior to the presidential elections; the elections for the ninth Majles were held on
March 2, 2012, and the next Majles elections will be held in early 2016. It confirms cabinet
selections and drafts and acts on legislation. Among its main duties is to consider and enact a
proposed national budget, actions that typically take place in advance of the Persian New Year
(Nowruz) each March 21. It is far from the “rubber stamp” that characterizes many elected
assemblies in the region, but it has tended to defer to the presidency. The Majles has always been
highly factionalized.
There is no “quota” for the number of women to be elected, but women regularly run and win
election. Still, their representation has been small relative to the female population. There are
“reserved seats” (one each) for members of Iran’s recognized religious minorities, including Jews
and Christians.
The Assembly of Experts
A major although little publicized elected institution is the Assembly of Experts. Akin to an
electoral college, it is empowered to choose a new Supreme Leader upon the death of the
incumbent, and it formally “oversees” the work of the Supreme Leader. The Assembly can
replace him if necessary, although invoking that impeachment power would, in most
circumstances, be highly controversial. It is also the body empowered to amend the constitution.
The Assembly has 86 seats, elected to an eight-year term, with elections conducted on a
provincial basis. It generally meets two times a year, for a few days each. The fourth election for
the Assembly was held on December 15, 2006; after that election, Rafsanjani, still a major figure
having served two terms as president (1989-1997), was named deputy leader of the Assembly.
After the death of the leader of the Assembly (Ayatollah Meshkini), Rafsanjani was selected its
head in September 2007. Rafsanjani’s opposition to the crackdown on the 2009 uprising ran him
afoul of the Supreme Leader and he was not reelected as chair of the body in March 2011. He was
replaced by aging and infirm compromise candidate Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani.
The next Assembly of Experts election is expected by the end of 2014.
Recent Elections and Their Implications
After suffering presidential election defeats at the hands of President Mohammad Khatemi and
the reformists in 1997 and 2001, hardliners regained the sway they held when Khomeini was
alive. Conservatives won 155 out of the 290 Majles seats in the February 20, 2004, Majles
elections, in large part because the COG disallowed 3,600 reformist candidates. The COG
narrowed the field for the June 2005 presidential elections to 8 out of the 1,014 persons who filed.
The major candidates were Rafsanjani,3 Ali Larijani, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Tehran
mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. With 21% and 19.5%, respectively, Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad,
who apparently had the tacit backing of Khamene’i, moved to a runoff on June 24. Reformist
candidates fared relatively poorly. Ahmadinejad won with 61.8% to Rafsanjani’s 35.7%.

3 Rafsanjani was constitutionally permitted to run because a third term would not have been consecutive with his
previous two terms. In the 2001 presidential election, the Council permitted 10 out of the 814 registered candidates.
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During Ahmadinejad’s first term, which began in August 2005, splits widened between
Ahmadinejad and other conservatives. In the March 2008 Majles elections, some conservatives
ran as an anti-Ahmadinejad bloc. Reformists saw this conservative split as an opportunity to
unseat Ahmadinejad in the June 12, 2009, presidential election and rallied behind Mir Hossein
Musavi, who had been prime minister during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. The COG also
allowed the candidacies of Mehdi Karrubi and Mohsen Reza’i (see above).
Musavi’s young, urban supporters used social media such as Facebook and Twitter to organize
large rallies in Tehran, but pro-Ahmadinejad rallies were large as well. Turnout was about 85%.
The Interior Ministry announced two hours after the polls closed that Ahmadinejad had won,
although in the past results have been announced the day after. The vote totals, released June 13,
showed Ahmadinejad receiving about 25 million votes (63%); Musavi with about 13 million, and
under 1 million each for Reza’i and Karrubi. Almost immediately, Musavi supporters began
protesting, citing the infeasibility of counting the votes so quickly. Khamene’i declared the results
a “divine assessment,” appearing to short-cut a three-day complaint period. Demonstrations
against alleged fraud built throughout June 13-19, 2009, largely in Tehran but also in other cities.
Security forces used some force and killed over 100 protesters (opposition figure—Iran
government figure was 27), including a 19-year-old woman, Neda Soltani. The opposition
congealed into the “Green Movement of Hope and Change,” which mounted a challenge to the
regime. Some outside analysts said the results tracked pre-election polls, which showed strong
support for Ahmadinejad in rural and poor urban areas.4
Some of the protests in December 2009 overwhelmed regime security forces in some parts of
Tehran, but the movement’s outward activity declined after its demonstration planned for the
February 11, 2010, anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic (in 1979) was suppressed.
Minor protests were held on several subsequent occasions in 2010, and the opposition did not
experience a resurgence after the start of the Arab uprisings in early 2011. It apparently failed to
win over many traditionally conservative groups such as older Iranians and Iranians who live in
rural areas. It also experienced divisions between those who sought reform and those who sought
outright regime overthrow.
As Green Movement-led unrest faded in 2010, Ahmadinejad sought to promote the interests of
his loyalists—particularly chief-of-staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashai, to whom he is related through
their children’s marriage—and promote a nationalist version of Islam that limits the authority of
Iran’s clerics. Hardline critics of Ahmadinejad succeeded in enlisting Khamene’i’s support, based
on his own apparent suspicions about Ahmadinejad’s allies’ ambitions and ideology. Infighting
escalated in April 2011 when the Supreme Leader overrode Ahmadinejad’s dismissal of MOIS
head (intelligence inister) Heydar Moslehi and Ahmadinejad protested by refusing to attend
cabinet meetings from April 24 to May 4, 2011.
Amid the widening rifts, the March 2, 2012, Majles elections attracted only 5,400 candidacies—
33% fewer than the previous Majles elections. Only 10% of them were women. The COG issued
a final candidate list of 3,400 for the 290 seats up for election. Two blocs of candidates supported
strongly by Khamene’i won about 75% of the seats—weakening Ahmadinejad politically.

4 A paper published by Chatham House and the University of St. Andrews strongly questions how Ahmadinejad’s vote
could have been as large as reported by official results, in light of past voting patterns throughout Iran. “Preliminary
Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election.” http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk.
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June 2013 Presidential Election
In January 2013, the Majles enacted an election law for the June 14, 2013, presidential election.
the law set up an 11-member independent election body, reducing the election role of the Interior
Ministry, which is part of the executive branch. Municipal elections were held concurrently,
perhaps in part to improve turnout among voters mobilized by local issues. Candidate registration
took place during May 7-11, 2013, and the COG finalized the presidential candidate field on May
22. A runoff was to be held on June 21 if no candidate received more than 50% of the votes. The
major candidates who filed included:
• Four figures close to the Supreme Leader—Tehran mayor Qalibaf, former Majles
Speaker Haddad Adel, former foreign minister and top Khamene’i foreign policy
advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Seyed Jalilli. The
COG approved them to run; Haddad Adel dropped out before the vote.
• Mohsen Reza’i. He was approved to run, but his constituency had not broadened
since the 2009 contest.
• Former chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani, a moderate and a Rafsanjani
loyalist.
• Two significant candidates were denied permission to run. Rafsanjani’s entry was
hailed by reformists and attacked by conservatives because of his support for the
2009 pro-reform protests. The COG disapproval of his candidacy shocked
Iranians because of Rafsanjani’s prominent place in the history of the regime.
Ahmadinejad promoted the candidacy of his close ally, Mashai, but his candidacy
was not approved the COG.
Even before the disqualification of Rafsanjani and Mashai, Green Movement supporters were
expected to boycott the vote—out of fear of a crackdown and lack of hope for electoral-driven
change. However, the reform vote mobilized behind Rouhani late in the campaign as reformist
voters perceived that the regime was committed to avoiding another election-caused rift in
society. This vote propelled a 70% turnout and a first-round victory for Hassan Rouhani,
garnering about 50.7% of the 36 million votes cast—and enough to avoid a runoff. Qalibaf was
second but trailed far behind with 15%.
After the election, many Iranians celebrated the election of the most moderate candidate in the
race. Khamene’i and the rest of the political establishment congratulated Rouhani. The Obama
Administration, in statements, “respect[ed] the vote of the Iranian people and congratulat[ed]
them for their participation in the political process, and their courage in making their voices
heard,” and expressed readiness to engage Iran directly on the nuclear issue. Rouhani was sworn
in on August 4, 2013, and nominated a cabinet that same day, well ahead of a two-week deadline
to do so. His nominees appeared to reflect an intent to implement his platform, and the Majles,
even though dominated by hardliners, approved all but three of his choices. The most significant
confirmed appointees, as well as other personnel moves made by Rouhani, include
• Foreign Minister: Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Ambassador to the United
Nations in New York. That position enabled Zarif to forge a wide range of
contacts with U.S. policy makers. During his tour, Zarif periodically visited
Washington, DC, to meet with Members of Congress and congressional staff.
Rouhani later assigned Zarif to serve concurrently as chief nuclear negotiator, a
post traditionally held by the chairman of the Supreme National Security
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Council. In September 2013, Rouhani appointed senior IRGC leader and former
Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani as head of that body; Shamkhani has held more
moderate positions than his IRGC peers.
• Oil Minister: Bijan Zanganeh, who served in the same post during the Khatemi
presidency and attracted significant foreign investment to the sector. He replaced
Rostam Qasemi, who has been associated with the corporate arm of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Zanganeh has reappointed and recruited
many oil industry technocrats.
• Defense Minister: Hosein Dehgan. An IRGC stalwart, he was an early organizer
of the IRGC unit in Lebanon that helped form Hezbollah’s militia wing; that unit
later became the Qods Force. He later was IRGC Air Force commander and
deputy Defense Minister.
• Justice Minister: Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi, perhaps Rouhani’s most
controversial choice because of Pour-Mohammadi’s alleged abuses of political
dissidents in previous positions, including as Interior Minister (2005-2008).
• After the formation of the cabinet, the relatively moderate ex-Foreign Minister
Ali Akbar Salehi was appointed the head of Iran’s atomic energy agency; and
Reza Najafi was appointed as envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).

Hojjat ol-Islam Dr. Hassan Rouhani
Hassan Rouhani is a Hojjat ol-Islam, one rank below Ayatollah. He was born in 1948. He holds a Ph.D. in law from
Glasgow Caledonian University in Scotland. Rouhani is a long-time regime stalwart who was part of Ayatollah
Khomeini’s circle prior to the triumph of the Islamic revolution. He is also an associate and protégé of Rafsanjani, and
Rouhani’s pragmatic policy approach on issues such as the nuclear issue and relations with the United States
approximates Rafsanjani’s views. Rouhani’s closeness to Rafsanjani potentially complicates Rouhani’s relations with
Khamene’i, but there is no evidence of direct Rouhani-Khamene’i tension to date.
Often nicknamed the “diplomat sheikh,” Rouhani was chief nuclear negotiator during 2003-2005, when Iran did agree
to suspend uranium enrichment. He is believed amenable to a nuclear deal with the international community that
would reduce international sanctions but not necessarily preclude any options for Iran’s nuclear program over the
longer term. He also campaigned on a platform of easing the Islamic Republic’s social restrictions as well as the
suppression of free expression that has been particularly focused since the 2009 uprising. On the other hand, some
accounts suggest that he supported the crackdown against the July 1999 student uprising.
Even though Rouhani drew support from the Green movement and reform movement to win his election, he is a
longtime member of the political establishment. Rafsanjani appointed him a member of the Supreme National Security
Council in 1989, and he remains on that body. He has been a member of the Assembly of Experts since 1999, and
was a member of the Majles during 1980-2000, serving twice as deputy speaker. He has also been a member of the
Expediency Council since 1991. He has headed the Center for Strategic Studies, a foreign policy think tank that
advises both Rafsanjani and the Supreme Leader, since 1992.
Rouhani Presidency Encourages Reformists
The election of Rouhani represented an apparent decision by reform-minded Iranians to try to
achieve change through regime-conducted elections and institutions. Some experts say the
election of Rouhani began a process of national reconciliation in Iran, although others assert that
his election created unrealistic expectations of rapid reform and political and social liberalization.
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Reformist supporters say they will hold Rouhani to his campaign promises to reduce restrictions
on freedom of expression. However, the judiciary remains under the control of hardliners, and it
is unclear that Rouhani would be able to increase social and political freedoms, if that is his
intent. A test of his intentions and capabilities has been whether the titular Green Movement
leaders Mousavi and Karrubi, who were detained in early 2011, would be set free. In early 2014,
the regime moved Karrubi back to his home from a detention facility, but regime guards
reportedly are posted in his home. In June 2014, Supreme Leader Khamene’i reportedly told
reformist parlimentarian Ali Motahari that their house arrest was fair punishment and they would
have faced worse consequences if the regime had put them on trial.5 Earlier, in September 2013,
the government released nearly 80 political prisoners incarcerated for involvement in the
uprising, including prominent human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh. Musavi has not been
released from detention, to date.
In 2014, Rouhani has called for easing of official restrictions on use of the Internet and for
relaxing enforcement of restrictions on social life. However, a testament to the continuing
strength of hardliners was the arrest in May 2014 of six Iranian youths who made a dance video
to the tune of Pharell Williams’s song “Happy.” The youths (but not the director of the video)
were quickly released on bail but forced to apologize on state television for failing to adhere to
the dress code for women and for what the regime considers risqué behavior in the video.
Rouhani publicly criticized the arrest. Some argue that incidents such as this will eventually
reignite significant youth and “Green Movement” unrest as it becomes clear that Rouhani cannot
easily ease the grip of hardliners and the Islamic clergy on social life.
Other Human Rights Practices
Iran’s human rights record is scrutinized by the United Nations and multilateral groupings. After a
four-year review of Iran’s human rights record that took place in February 2010, on March 24,
2011, the U.N. Human Rights Council voted, 22 to 7, to reestablish the post of “Special
Rapporteur” on Iranian human rights abuses that existed during from 1988-2002. On June 17,
2011, former Maldives Foreign Minister Ahmad Shaheed was appointed to this role. On
November 21, 2011, the U.N. General Assembly’s Third Committee, by a vote of 86-32, with 59
abstentions, approved a resolution asserting that Iran must cooperate with the efforts of the
Special Rapporteur. The full Assembly approved the resolution on December 19, 2011, by a vote
of 89-30 with 64 abstentions. On March 28, 2014, the U.N. Human Rights Council voted 21 to 9
with 16 absentions to renew the mandate of the Special Rapporteur for another year.6
Despite Rouhani’s pledges to increase cooperation and transparency, Iran has not, to date,
permitted him to conduct fact-finding visits to Iran. In April 2014, the European Parliament
passed a resolution calling on European Union (EU) diplomats to raise Iran’s human rights record
at official engagements and to include human rights issues in official negotiations with Iran.
Earlier, on March 25, 2014, and EU human rights delegation visited Iran and held a meeting there
with the released opposition figure Nasrin Sotoudeh, who was discussed above.
International criticism of Iran’s human rights practices predates the crackdown against the 2009
uprising. Table 3, which discusses the regime’s record on a number of human rights issues, is

5 Iran’s Khamenei ‘Warns Off Bid to Free Opposition Chiefs’” Agence France Presse, July 1, 2014.
6 No votes were: India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Venezuela, Vietnam, China, and Cuba.
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based on the latest State Department human rights report (for 2013: February 27, 2014)7 and on
reports from U.N. Special Rapporteur Shaheed, the latest of which was released on March 13,
2014 (U.N. document A/HRC/25/61). These reports cite Iran for a wide range of serious abuses—
aside from its suppression of political opponents—including unjust executions, politically
motivated abductions by security forces, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and arrests of
women’s rights activists. Some outside groups, including Human Rights Watch, assert that the
2012 revisions to the penal code left in place much of the legal framework that the regime uses to
prosecute dissidents,8 although it made such reforms as eliminating death sentences for children
convicted of drug-related offenses. The Special Rapporteur noted in his latest report that Rouhani
has proposed a new “charter for citizen’s rights.” And, press reports indicate that some restrictions
on media and Internet social media have eased, as has enforcement of the public dress code for
women, since Rouhani took office. On the other hand, executions of prisoners have increased
since Rouhani took office—a trend some experts assert could be part of an effort by hardliners in
the judiciary to undermine Rouhani. In June 2014, Special Rapporteur Shaheed expressed outrage
over the high number of executions Iran had conducted in 2014.
Many different Iranian institutions play a role in repressing opposition. The most prominent
include the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the IRGC, the Basij organization of the
IRGC, and the Law Enforcement Forces (riot police, regular police, and gendarmerie). The
Ministry of Islamic Guidance monitors journalists reporting from Iran as well as media and
communications operations. Iran has an official body, the High Council for Human Rights,
headed by former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Larijani (brother of the Majles speaker and
the judiciary head). However, it largely defends the government’s actions to outside bodies rather
than acts to ensure that the government’s human rights practices achieve international standards.
Despite the criticism of its human rights record, on April 29, 2010, Iran acceded to the U.N.
Commission on the Status of Women, after dropping an attempt to sit on the higher-profile U.N.
General Assembly Human Rights Council. It also has a seat on the boards of the U.N.
Development Program (UNDP) and UNICEF. Iran’s U.N. dues are about $9 million per year.
Table 3. Human Rights Practices: General Categories
Group/Issue

Regime Practice/Recent Developments
Ethnic and
Persians are about 51% of the population, and Azeris (a Turkic people) are about 24%. Kurds
Religious
are about 7%-15% of the population, and about 3% are Arab. Shiite Muslims are about 90% of
Breakdown
the Muslim population and Sunnis are about 10%. About 2% of the population is non-Muslim,
including Christians, Zoroastrians (an ancient religion in what is now Iran), Jewish, and Baha’i.
Media Freedoms
Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has been active in blocking pro-reform
websites and blogs and closing newspapers critical of the government, as well as arresting
journalists and bloggers. However, some editors say that the government has become more
tolerant of critical media since Rouhani took office. The Majles investigated the November
2012 death in custody of blogger, Sattar Beheshti; seven security officers were arrested and
the Tehran “Cyber Police” commander was removed for the incident. Iran is setting up a
national network that would have a virtual monopoly on Internet service for Iranians.
Labor
Independent unions are legal but not al owed in practice. The sole authorized national labor
Restrictions
organization is a state-controlled “Workers’ House” umbrella.

7 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220352#wrapper.
8 Human Rights Watch, “Codifying Repression,” August 29, 2012.
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Group/Issue

Regime Practice/Recent Developments
Women
Women can vote in al elections and run in parliamentary and municipal elections. They are
permitted to drive, and work outside the home, including owning their own businesses,
although less than 20% of the workforce is female and women earn nearly 5 times less than
men. Women are required to be covered in public, generally with a garment called a chador,
but enforcement has relaxed since Rouhani took office. Women do not have inheritance or
divorce rights equal to that of men, and their court testimony carries half the weight of a
male’s. Laws against rape are not enforced effectively.
Nine women are in the Majles, but women cannot serve as judges. There was one woman in
the previous cabinet (Minister of Health) but she was fired in December 2012 for criticizing
lack of funding for medicines. Masoumah Ebtekar, a prominent woman who has previously
served as a vice president, was to be the first woman to deliver the Friday Prayer at Tehran
University in January 2014, but her appearance was cancelled.
Religious
Each year since 1999, the State Department religious freedom report has named Iran as a
Freedom
“Country of Particular Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). No
Overview
sanctions have been added under IRFA, on the grounds that Iran is already subject to
extensive U.S. sanctions. Continued deterioration in religious freedom have been noted in the
past few International Religious Freedom reports, stating that government rhetoric and
actions creates a threatening atmosphere for nearly al non-Shia religious groups.
Christians
In September 2011, a Protestant pastor who was born a Muslim, Youcef Nadarkhani, was
sentenced to death for refusing to recant his Christian faith. The White House, State
Department, and many human rights groups cal ed for an overturning of the sentence, which
was reaffirmed in late February 2012. He was released on September 8, 2012, but was
rearrested on Christmas Day 2012. On February 29, 2012, the House debated but postponed
action on H.Res. 556 demanding he be released. The issue of pastor Saeed Abedini, a dual
national, is discussed below under “arrest of dual nationals.”
Baha’is
Iran is repeatedly cited for virtual y unrelenting repression of the Baha’i community, which
Iran’s Shi te Muslim clergy views as a heretical sect, which numbers about 300,000-350,000.
At least 30 Baha’is remain imprisoned and 60 were arrested in 2012, according to the State
Department IRFA report for 2012. U.N. Rapporteur said in February 2013 that 110 Baha’is
are in jail, with 133 more to start serving jail time. Seven Baha’i leaders were sentenced to 20
years in August 2010; their sentences were reduced in September 2010 to 10 years but the
full sentence was restored on appeal. In the 1990s, several Baha’is were executed for
apostasy. Virtually yearly congressional resolutions condemn Iran’s treatment of the Baha’is.
Jews
Along with Christians, a “recognized minority,” with one seat in the Majles, the 8,800-
member (2012 census) Jewish community enjoys somewhat more freedoms than Jewish
communities in several other Muslim states. However, in practice the freedom of Iranian Jews
to practice their religion is limited, and Iranian Jews remain fearful of reprisals. In June 1999,
Iran arrested 13 Jews that it said were part of an “espionage ring” for Israel. After a 2000 trial,
10 of them were convicted and given sentences ranging from 4 to 13 years. An appeals panel
reduced the sentences and al were released by April 2003. On November 17, 2008, Iran
hanged Muslim businessman Ali Ashtari for providing Iranian nuclear information to Israel. On
September 4, 2013, Rouhani’s “Twitter” account issued greetings to Jews on the occasion of
Jewish New Year (“Rosh Hashanah”). The Jewish Majles member accompanied Rouhani on his
visit to the U.N. General Assembly meetings in September 2013.
Azeris
Azeris are one-quarter of the population and are mostly well integrated into government and
society (Khamene’i himself is of Azeri heritage), but many Azeris complain of ethnic and
linguistic discrimination. Each year, there are arrests of Azeri students and cultural activists
who press for their right to celebrate their culture and history. The government accuses
them of promoting revolution or separatism.
Kurds
There are about 5 million-11 million Kurds in Iran. The Kurdish language is not banned, but
schools do not teach it and Kurdish political organizations, activists, and media outlets are
routinely scrutinized, harassed, and closed down for supporting greater Kurdish autonomy.
Several Kurdish oppositionists have been executed since 2010.
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Group/Issue

Regime Practice/Recent Developments
Arabs
Ethnic Arabs are prominent in southwestern Iran, particularly Khuzestan Province. The 2
million to 4 million Arabs in Iran encounter systematic oppression and discrimination,
including torture and a prohibition on speaking or studying Arabic.
Human
The June 19, 2012 (latest), State Department “Trafficking in Persons” report, for the seventh
Trafficking
consecutive year, placed Iran in Tier 3 (worst level) for failing to take significant action to
prevent trafficking in persons. Iranian women, boys, and girls are trafficked for sexual
exploitation in Iran as well to Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and Europe.
Executions Policy The United Nations asserts that there were 500 executions in 2013 and that pace has,
according to some human rights groups, doubled thus far in 2014. Iran is a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and is obligated to cease the executions of minors.
Stonings
In 2002, the head of Iran’s judiciary issued a ban on stoning. However, Iranian officials later
called that directive “advisory” and could be ignored by individual judges. A sentence of
stoning against a 45-year-old woman (Sakineh Ashtiani) convicted of adultery and assisting in
the murder of her husband was set aside for further review in July 2010. In 2011, the stoning
sentence was dropped but she is serving 10 years in prison.
Detentions of
Iran does not recognize dual nationality. An Iranian American journalist, Roxanna Saberi, was
U.S. Nationals
arrested in January 2009 al egedly because her press credentials had expired, and was released
and Dual
in May 12, 2009. Three American hikers (Sara Shourd, Shane Bauer, and Josh Fattal) were
Nationals
arrested in August 2009 after crossing into Iran from a hike in northern Iraq. They were
released in 2010 and 2011 on $500,000 bail each—brokered by Oman. Several cases remain
pending, which U.S. officials say the raise during at the margins of the nuclear negotiations.
Former FBI agent Robert Levinson, remains missing after a visit in 2005 to Kish Island to meet
an Iranian source (Dawud Salahuddin, allegedly responsible for the 1980 killing in the United
States of an Iranian diplomat who had served the Shah’s government). Iran denies knowing his
status or location. In December 2011, Levinson’s family released a one-year old taped
statement by him. In January 2013, his family released recent photos of him, and they
acknowledged in late 2013 that his visit to Kish Island was partly related to his contract work
for the CIA.
A former U.S. Marine, Amir Hekmati, was arrested in 2011 and remains in jail in Iran allegedly
for spying for the United States. His family has been permitted to visit him there. On
December 20, 2012, a U.S. Christian convert of Iranian origin, Rev. Saeed Abedini, was
imprisoned for “undermining national security” for setting up orphanages in Iran in
partnership with Iranian Christians. His closed trial was held January 22, 2013, and he was
convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison.
In mid-July, the Washington Post’s Tehran correspondent Jason Rezaian (a dual national), was
detained along with two American journalists and Rezaian’s journalist wife, an Iranian national
and journalist for a UAE paper.
Sources: State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2013 (released February 27, 2014),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220352#wrapper; The
International Religious Freedom Report for 2012 (May 20, 2013), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/
index.htm?year=2012&dlid=208398#wrapper; and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2013 (June 19, 2013),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210740.pdf; and U.N Special Rapporteur report (Marcy 13, 2013).
Iran’s Defense Capabilities and
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
The United States has viewed Iran as a key national security challenge in large part because of
Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and its attempts to counter U.S. objectives in the region.
Some assert Iran seeks to exert regional influence that Iranian leaders see as commensurate with
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Iran’s size and concept of nationhood. Others interpret Iran’s foreign policy as intended rather to
protect itself from any U.S.-led effort to change Iran’s regime.
Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force
Iran’s armed forces are extensive but they are widely considered relatively combat ineffective in a
confrontation against the United States or even a major neighbor such as Turkey. Iran is believed
to lack the logistical ability to deploy ground forces much beyond its borders. But, the Iranian
armed forces are considered sufficiently effective to deter or fend off any nearby ground threats,
should they emerge, from such neighbors as Iraq, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan. A
2012 Defense Department report on Iran’s military capability (required by P.L. 111-84) reported
growing lethality and survivability of Iran’s ballistic and cruise missiles9—raising the possibility
that Iran might possess the capability to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where about one-
third of all seaborne traded oil flows.
Organizationally, Iran’s armed forces are divided to perform functions appropriate to their roles in
Iran. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, known in Persian as the Sepah-e-Pasdaran
Enghelab Islami)10 controls the Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed) volunteer militia that has
been the main instrument to repress Green Movement protests in Iran. The IRGC and the regular
military (Artesh) report to a joint headquarters, headed by Dr. Hassan Firuzabadi. The Artesh is
deployed mainly at bases outside major cities and its leaders have publicly asserted that it does
not have a mandate to maintain internal security by suppressing public demonstrations.
The IRGC Navy and regular Navy (Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, IRIN) are distinct forces; the
IRIN has responsibility for the Gulf of Oman, whereas the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the
closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. The regular Air Force controls most of Iran’s combat
aircraft, whereas the IRGC Air Force runs Iran’s ballistic missile programs. Iran has a small
number of warships on its Caspian Sea coast; it reportedly deployed on that sea in March 2013 to
augment its capabilities there. Iran said on January 21, 2014, it has sent some warships into the
Atlantic Ocean for the first time ever—presumably a demonstration of strength rather than an
actual threat to the United States.
Iran’s armed forces have few formal relationships with foreign militaries. Most of Iran’s other
military-to-military relationships, such as with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and North Korea,
generally have focused on Iranian arms purchases or upgrades. Such sales to Iran are now banned
by U.N. Resolution 1929 of June 2010 and many of these relationships have lapsed. Iran has a
formal defense relationship with Syria, in part explaining IRGC-Qods Force deployments and
arms shipments there, as discussed further below. In September 2012, Iran and North Korea
signed an agreement to cooperate on science and technology, raising concerns about potential
additional North Korean support to Iran’s nuclear program.11 Iranian technicians reportedly
attended North Korea’s December 2012 launch of a rocket that achieved orbit. Iran and India

9 Department of Defense. Annual Report on Military Power of Iran, April 2012. For the 2010 report, see
http://media.washingtontimes.com/media/docs/2010/Apr/20/Iran_Military_Report.pdf. The reports are required by
§1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84).
10 For a more extensive discussion of the IRGC, see Katzman, Kenneth, “The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard,” Westview Press, 1993.
11 Jay Solomon, “Iran-North Korea Pact Draws Concern,” Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2013.
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have a “strategic dialogue” and some Iranian naval officers reportedly underwent some training in
India in the 1990s, but this military-to-military relationship has largely ended.
Table 4. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal
Military Personnel: 460,000+. Regular ground force is about 220,000, Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ground
force is about 130,000. Remainders are regular and IRGC navy (18,000 and 20,000 personnel respectively) and Air
Forces (52,000 regular Air Force personnel and 5,000 Guard Air Force personnel.) About 12,000 air defense.
Security Forces: About 40,000-60,000 law enforcement forces on duty, with another 600,000 Basij
security/paramilitary forces available for combat or internal security missions.
Tanks: 1,800+ Includes 480 Russian-made T-72
Ships: 100+ (IRGC and regular Navy) Includes 4 Corvette; 18 IRGC-control ed Chinese-made patrol boats, several
hundred smal boats.) Also has 3 Kilo subs (reg. Navy control ed). 2012 DOD report says Iran may have acquired
additional ships and submarines over the past two years, but does not stipulate a supplier, if any.
Midget Subs: Iran has been long said to possess several small subs, possibly purchased assembled or in kit form from
North Korea. Iran claimed on November 29, 2007, to have produced a new smal sub equipped with sonar-evading
technology, and it claimed to deploy four Iranian-made “Ghadir class” subs to the Red Sea in June 2011.
Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs): 150+ I-Hawk plus possibly some Stinger
Combat Aircraft: 330+ Includes 25 MiG-29 and 30 Su-24. Still dependent on U.S. F-4’s, F-5’s and F-14 bought
during Shah’s era.
Anti-aircraft Missile Systems: Russia delivered to Iran (January 2007) 30 anti-aircraft missile systems (Tor M1),
worth over $1 billion. In December 2007, Russia agreed to sell the highly capable S-300 air defense system, which
would greatly enhance Iran’s air defense capability, at an estimated cost of $800 million. The system would not,
according to most experts, technical y violate the provisions of U.N. Resolution 1929, because the system is not
covered in the U.N. Registry on Conventional Arms. However, on September 22, 2010, then Russian President
Medvedev signed a decree banning the supply of the system to Iran, asserting that its provision to Iran is banned by
Resolution 1929. In August 2011, Iran and Russia took their dispute over the non-delivery of the S-300 to the
International Court of Justice. In November 2011, Iran claimed to have deployed its own version (Mersad) of the
system, and in January 2014 an Iranian parliamentarian said Iran was pursuing with Russia potential delivery of a
substitute system for the S-300.
Defense Budget: About 3% of GDP
Sources: IISS Military Balance—Section on Middle East and North Africa, and various press reports; April 2010
and April 2012 DOD reports on military power of Iran, cited earlier.
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Table 5. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
The IRGC is generally loyal to Iran’s hardliners politically and is clearly more politically influential than is Iran’s regular
military, which is numerically larger, but was held over from the Shah’s era. The IRGC’s political influence has grown
sharply as the regime has relied on it to suppress dissent. As described in a 2009 Rand Corporation study,“ Founded
by a decree from Ayatollah Khomeini shortly after the victory of the 1978-1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has evolved well beyond its original foundations as an ideological guard for the
nascent revolutionary regime ... The IRGC’s presence is particularly powerful in Iran’s highly factionalized political
system, in which [many senior figures] hail from the ranks of the IRGC...”
Through its Qods (Jerusalem) Force (QF), the IRGC has a foreign policy role in exerting influence throughout the
region by supporting pro-Iranian movements and leaders. The QF numbers approximately 10,000-15,000 personnel
who provide advice, support, and arrange weapons deliveries to pro-Iranian factions or leaders in Lebanon, Iraq,
Syria, Persian Gulf states, Gaza/West Bank, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. IRGC leaders have confirmed the QF is in
Syria to assist the regime of Bashar al-Assad against an armed uprising, and it reportedly provided advisers to help the
Iraqi government counter an offensive by Sunni Islamist extremists in June 2014. The QF commander, Brigadier
General Qassem Soleimani reportedly has a direct and independent channel to Khamene’i. The QF commander
during 1988-1995 was Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, who served as Defense minister during 2009-2013. He led
the QF when it allegedly assisted two bombings of Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires and is wanted by Interpol
for a role in the 1994 bombing there. He al egedly recruited Saudi Hezbol ah activists later accused of the June 1996
Khobar Towers bombing; and assassinated Iranian dissident leaders in Europe in the early 1990s.
IRGC leadership developments are significant because of the political influence of the IRGC. On September 2, 2007,
Khamene’i named Mohammad Ali Jafari as commander in chief of the Guard. Jafari is considered a hardliner against
political dissent and a close ally of the Supreme Leader. He criticized Rouhani for accepting a phone call from
President Obama on September 27, 2013, and has continued to oppose major concessions as part of a permanent
nuclear settlement. The Basij reports to the IRGC commander in chief; its leader is Brigadier General Mohammad
Reza Naqdi. It operates from thousands of positions in Iran’s institutions. Command reshuffles in July 2008 integrated
the Basij more closely with provincially based IRGC units and increased the Basij role in internal security. In
November 2009, the regime gave the IRGC’s intelligence units greater authority, perhaps surpassing those of the
Ministry of Intelligence, in monitoring dissent. The IRGC Navy has responsibility to patrol the Strait of Hormuz and
the regular Navy has responsibility for the broader Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman (deeper waters further off the
coast).
As noted, the IRGC is also increasingly involved in Iran’s economy, acting through a network of contracting
businesses it has set up, most notably Ghorb (also cal ed Khatem ol-Anbiya, Persian for “Seal of the Prophet”). Active
duty IRGC senior commanders reportedly serve on Ghorb’s board of directors and its chief executive, Rostam
Ghasemi, served as Oil Minister during 2011-2013. In September 2009, the Guard bought a 50% stake in Iran
Telecommunication Company at a cost of $7.8 billion. The Wal Street Journal reported on May 27, 2014 that
Khatam ol-Anbia has $50 billion in contracts with the Iranian government, including in the energy sector but also in
port and highway construction. It has as many as 40,000 employees.
On October 21, 2007, the Treasury Department designated several IRGC companies as proliferation entities under
Executive Order 13382. Also that day, the IRGC as a whole, the Ministry of Defense, several IRGC commanders, and
several Iranian banks were sanctioned under that same executive order. Simultaneously, the Qods Force was named
as a terrorism supporting entity under Executive Order 13224. These orders freeze the U.S.-based assets and
prevent U.S. transactions with the named entities, but these entities are believed to have virtual y no U.S.-based
assets. On June 9, 2011, the IRGC and Basij were named as human rights abusers under Executive Order 13553, with
the same penalties as the above Executive Orders.
Sources: Frederic Wehrey et al., “The Rise of the Pasdaran,” Rand Corporation, 2009; Katzman, Kenneth, “The
Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard,” Westview Press, 1993; Dept. of the Treasury;
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_filkins?printable=true&currentPage=all.
Nuclear Program and Related International Diplomacy
The United States and its allies have expressed substantial concern about the potential for Iran to
develop a nuclear weapon. A nuclear armed Iran, in the view of U.S. and regional officials, would
be more assertive than it now is in trying to influence the policies of regional states and in
supporting leaders and groups in the Middle East and elsewhere that oppose U.S. interests and
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allies. Iran could conclude that the United States would hesitate to use military pressure against it
if it possessed nuclear weapons. There is concern that Iran’s developing a nuclear weapon would
produce a nuclear arms race in one of the world’s most volatile regions, and Israel views an
Iranian nuclear weapon as a threat to its existence. There are also fears Iran might transfer nuclear
technology to extremist groups or countries.
Iran’s nuclear program has been a significant U.S. national security issue since late 2002, when
Iran confirmed that it was building a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water
production plant at Arak.12 The United States and its partners state that they accept Iran’s right to
use nuclear energy, but that Iran must verifiably demonstrate that its nuclear program is for only
peaceful purposes. Since 2010, Iran has been enriching to 20% U-235—relatively easy
technically to enrich further to weapons-grade uranium (90%+). Another requirement for a
nuclear weapon is a triggering mechanism that Iran is might have researched in the past. The
United States and its partners also insist that Iran must not possess a nuclear-capable missile.
Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Activities
The U.S. intelligence community stated in its “worldwide threat assessment” testimony on
January 29, 2014 that the community does not “know if Iran will eventually decide to build
nuclear weapons.” Some Iranian leaders appear to perceive a nuclear weapons capability as a
means of ending Iran’s historic vulnerability to great power invasion or domination. Other Iranian
leaders apparently argue that a nuclear weapon would make Iran less secure by stimulating a
regional arms race and imposition of further international sanctions, and possibly causing military
action by Israel or the United States. Such actions could, some Iranians argue, threaten the
survival of the regime.
Iranian leaders deny they are trying to achieve a nuclear weapons capability and assert that Iran’s
nuclear program is for medical uses and electricity generation in light of finite oil and gas
resources. Iran argues that uranium enrichment is its “right” as a party to the 1968 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty13 and that it wants to make its own nuclear fuel to avoid potential nuclear fuel
supply disruptions by international suppliers. U.S. officials have said that Iran’s gas resources
make nuclear energy unnecessary.
Iranian leaders also profess that WMD are inconsistent with its ideology, citing Supreme Leader
Khamene’i’s 2003 formal pronouncement (fatwas) that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic. On
February 22, 2012, he expanded on that concept in a speech saying that the production of and use
of a nuclear weapon is prohibited as a “great sin,” and that stockpiling such weapons is “futile,
expensive, and harmful.”14 On February 17, 2013, he reportedly told visitors that Iran is not
seeking to develop a nuclear weapon but that the international community would not be able to
prevent Iran from doing so if that were Iran’s goal.15 In several interviews since taking office in
August 2013, Rouhani has insisted that Iran does not seek to develop nuclear weapons.

12 In November 2006, the IAEA, at U.S. urging, declined to provide technical assistance to the Arak facility on the
grounds that it was likely for proliferation purposes.
13 For Iran’s arguments about its program, see Iranian paid advertisement “An Unnecessary Crisis—Setting the Record
Straight About Iran’s Nuclear Program,” in The New York Times, November 18, 2005, p. A11.
14 “Leader Says West Knows Iran Not Seeking ‘Nuclear Weapons,’” Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network,
February 22, 2012.
15 The comments were posted on Khamene’i’s website, khamenei.ir.
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IAEA Investigations into Past Nuclear Weapons Research
Allegations that Iran might have researched a nuclear explosive device have caused experts and
governments to question Iran’s assertions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has
been attempting to investigate information laid out in detail in an IAEA report of November 8,
2011, on Iran’s alleged research efforts on designs for a nuclear explosive device (“possible
military dimensions,” PMD). Even though many questions about PMD persist, no IAEA report—
or U.S. intelligence testimony or comments—has asserted that Iran has diverted any nuclear
material for a nuclear weapons program.16
Iran’s cooperation in addressing these issues apparently improved in the context of the November
24, 2013, interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community—the “Joint
Plan of Action.” (JPA). The JPA stipulates that clearing up such questions must be part of a
comprehensive nuclear settlement. On November 11, 2013—two weeks before the JPA was
agreed—the IAEA and Iran issued a joint statement on a “structured approach” providing for
“managed” IAEA access, within three months, to several facilities (the heavy water plant at Arak,
among others), Iranian activities (laser enrichment, for example), and planned facilities
(additional enrichment facilities) previously excluded from IAEA scrutiny. The IAEA has been
given access to some of the facilities it has sought to access, including some uranium mining
operations inspected in May 2014. As noted in the IAEA report of May 23, 2014, Iran also
provided information on the alleged development of “Explosive Bridge Wire” Detonators used in
a nuclear weapons program.17 However, the IAEA has not to date been allowed requested access
to the military facility at Parchin, where Iran allegedly conducted testing on elements of a nuclear
explosive device. It had been inspected previously in 2005. In the years prior to the JPA, Iran
repeatedly dismissed IAEA information on Iran’s experimentation on a nuclear explosive device
as based on forged information.
Nuclear Weapons Time Frame Estimates
Estimates differ as to how long it would take Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, were there a
decision to do so. On March 14, 2013, President Obama stated that it was the view of the
intelligence community that “it would take Iran over a year or so” to develop a nuclear weapon,
after a decision to do so. Prior to the JPA, the Institute for Science and International Security
(ISIS) issued an assessment in October 2013 that indicated Iran could produce enough weapons-
grade uranium for one bomb in as little as a month, were there a decision to do so. A related issue
is the ability of the United States and IAEA to detect an all-out effort by Iran to develop a nuclear
weapon (“breakout capability). Press reports state that the objective of a comprehensive nuclear
settlement is to extend the “breakout time” to 12 months, from the current estimate among experts
of less than six months.

16 The February 25, 2011, IAEA report listed Iran’s declared nuclear sites as well as a summary of all the NPT
obligations Iran is not meeting. IAEA report of February 25, 2011. http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2011/02/
gov2011-7.pdf.
17 http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/iaea-iranreport-230514.pdf.
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Status of Uranium Enrichment and Ability to Produce Plutonium18
A key to extending the “breakout time” for an Iranian nuclear weapon is to limit Iran’s ability to
produce fissile material. Iran enriches uranium using centrifuges; it has about 22,000 total
installed centrifuges, of which about 9,000 are in operation. Prior to the JPA, some were enriching
uranium to the 20% level—which requires nearly as much effort as is required to produce
weapons grade uranium (90% U-235). Iran had a stockpile of about 15,000 lbs of low-enriched
(3.5%-5%) uranium—enough to produce about five nuclear weapons if it were to enrich that
stockpile to weapons grade. And, Iran had a stockpile of about 400 lbs of 20% U-235. That
amount of 20% U-235 is still short of the 550 lbs. that would be needed, if enriched to HEU, to
produce one nuclear weapon. Some of the enrichment to 20% took place at the heavily fortified
Fordow site that Iran acknowledged in September 2009. Iran is assessed by the IAEA as
complying with the JPA provision to cease enriching to 20%, to dilute its former stockpile of 20%
enriched uranium, and to cease expanding its stockpile of 5% enriched uranium.
Another issue is centrifuge capability. IAEA reports prior to the start of the JPA said that Iran had
installed about 1000 of the more advanced IR-2 centrifuges at its Natanz enrichment site,
although they were not put into operation. To some experts, the installation of the newer
centrifuges cast doubt that an all-out Iranian effort to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear
weapon would be discovered in time to take unspecified action.
Plutonium Route? Another means of acquiring fissile material for a nuclear weapon is to produce
plutonium, and some experts are increasingly concerned Iran is developing the option to use this
route to produce a nuclear weapon, if there were a decision to do so. Iran’s heavy water plant at
Arak, which had been slated for completion in 2014, could produce plutonium that can be
reprocessed into fissile material for a nuclear weapon. However, Iran does not have a facility to
reprocess the material from Arak and there have been no indications of construction of such a
reprocessing facility. The JPA requires Iran to halt construction of the reactor, although not
necessarily all construction of the site.
Bushehr Reactor
U.S. officials have generally been less concerned with Russia’s work, under a January 1995
contract, on an $800 million nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Russia insisted that Iran sign an
agreement under which Russia would reprocess the plant’s spent nuclear material; that agreement
was signed on February 28, 2005. The plant was expected to become operational in 2007, but
Russia appeared to delay opening it to pressure Iran on the nuclear issue. The plant was
inaugurated on August 21, 2010, and fueling was completed by October 25, 2010. It began
limited operations on May 8, 2011, and was linked to Iran’s power grid in September 2011. It was
reported by Iran as operational as of September 3, 2012, and Iran has been assuming full control
over plant operations since then. As part of this work, Russia trained 1,500 Iranian nuclear
engineers. Russia and Iran are reportedly negotiating for Russia to build two more reactors at
Bushehr as part of a deal for up to eight additional reactors.19

18 http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_Safeguards_Report_14Nov2013.pdf.
19 Reuters, May 22, 2014.
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Early International Diplomatic Efforts to Address Iran’s Nuclear Program
The international response to Iran’s nuclear program evolved into a global consensus to apply
economic pressure on Iran, coupled with diplomacy, to persuade Iran to limit its nuclear program.
In 2003, France, Britain, and Germany (the “EU-3”) opened a separate diplomatic track to curb
Iran’s program. On October 21, 2003, Iran pledged, in return for peaceful nuclear technology, to
(1) fully disclose its past nuclear activities, (2) sign and ratify the “Additional Protocol” to the
NPT (allowing for enhanced inspections), and (3) suspend uranium enrichment activities. Iran
signed the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, although the Majles has not ratified it.
Iran ended the suspension several months after it began, but the EU-3 and Iran reached a more
specific November 14, 2004, “Paris Agreement”—suspending uranium enrichment as of
November 22, 2004, in exchange for renewed trade talks and other aid.20 The Bush
Administration supported Paris Agreement on March 11, 2005, by announcing it would drop U.S.
objections to Iran applying to join the World Trade Organization and to selling civilian aircraft
parts to Iran. The Paris Agreement broke down after Ahmadinejad’s election, when Iran rejected
as insufficient an EU-3 proposal for a permanent nuclear agreement that would provide Iran with
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and limited security guarantees. On August 8, 2005, Iran broke
the IAEA seals and began uranium “conversion” (one step before enrichment) at its Esfahan
facility. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board declared Iran in non-compliance with the NPT
and, on February 4, 2006, the IAEA board voted 27-321 to refer the case to the Security Council.
On March 29, 2006, the Council presidency set a 30-day time limit for ceasing enrichment.22
“P5+1” Formed. After the EU-3 agreements with Iran broke down, the Bush Administration
offered on May 31, 2006, to join the nuclear talks. The expanded negotiating group was called the
“Permanent Five Plus 1” (P5+1: United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany).
The P5+1’s intent was to persuade Iran to again suspend uranium enrichment through a
combination of incentives and possible sanctions. Then EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana
presented the P5+1’s first offer to Iran on June 6, 2006, focused on easing sanctions and
guaranteeing Iran nuclear fuel (Annex I to Resolution 1747). Sanctions threatened,23 such as a
ban on technology and arms sales to Iran, were imposed in subsequent years.
First Four U.N. Security Council Resolutions Adopted
The U.N. Security Council subsequently imposed sanctions on Iran in an effort to shift Iran’s
calculations toward compromise.
• Resolution 1696. On July 31, 2006, the Security Council voted 14-1 (Qatar
voting no) for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696, giving Iran until August
31, 2006, to fulfill the long-standing IAEA nuclear demand to suspend
enrichment suspension; suspend construction of the heavy-water reactor, and

20 For text of the agreement, see http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/eu_iran14112004.shtml. EU-3-Iran
negotiations on a permanent nuclear pact began on December 13, 2004, and related talks on a trade and cooperation
accord (TCA) began in January 2005.
21 Voting no: Cuba, Syria, Venezuela. Abstaining: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, South Africa.
22 See http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/290/88/PDF/N0629088.pdf?OpenElement.
23 One source purports to have obtained the contents of the package from ABC News: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/
Notes/BN060609.htm.
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ratify the Additional Protocol to Iran’s IAEA Safeguards Agreement. It was
passed under Article 40 of the U.N. Charter, which makes compliance mandatory,
but not under Article 41, which refers to economic sanctions, or Article 42, which
would authorize military action.
• Resolution 1737. After Iran refused a proposal to temporarily suspend
enrichment, the Security Council adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737
unanimously on December 23, 2006, under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N.
Charter. It demanded enrichment suspension by February 21, 2007, and
prohibited sale (or financing of a sale) to Iran of technology that could contribute
to Iran’s nuclear program. It required U.N. member states to freeze the financial
assets of named Iranian nuclear and missile firms and related persons. In
deference to Russia, the Resolution exempted the Bushehr reactor.
• Resolution 1747. On March 24, 2007, Resolution 747 was adopted unanimously
demanding Iran suspend enrichment by May 24, 2007. The Resolution added
entities to those sanctioned by Resolution 1737; banned arms transfers by Iran, a
provision targeted at Iran’s alleged arms supplies to Lebanese Hezbollah and to
Shiite militias in Iraq. It called for, but did not require, countries to cease selling
arms or dual use items to Iran and for countries and international financial
institutions to avoid giving Iran any new loans or grants (except loans for
humanitarian purposes).
• Resolution 1803 and Additional Incentives for Iran. On March 3, 2008,
Resolution 1803 was adopted by a vote of 14-0 (Indonesia abstaining). It added
12 more entities to those sanctioned; banned virtually all sales of dual use items
to Iran (citing equipment listed as dual use in various proliferation conventions);
authorized, but did not require, inspections of shipments by Iran Air Cargo and
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, if such shipments are suspected of
containing banned WMD-related goods; and imposed a firm travel ban on five
Iranians named in Annex II. It stated the willingness of the P5+1 to consider
additional incentives and, in May 2008, the P5+1 added political and enhanced
energy cooperation with Iran to previous incentives. (The text of that enhanced
incentive offer to Iran was later revealed as an Annex to Resolution 1929,
adopted in June 2010.)
• Resolution 1835. The August 2008 crisis between Russia and Georgia contributed
to Russia’s opposing new U.N. sanctions on Iran. In an effort to demonstrate to
Iran continued P5+1 resolve, on September 27, 2008, the Council adopted
Resolution 1835 (September 27, 2008), demanding compliance with existing
resolutions but not adding sanctions.
In July 2008, just prior to the passage of Resolution 1835, Iran it indicated it might be ready to
accept a temporary “freeze for freeze:” the P5+1 would impose no new sanctions and Iran would
stop expanding uranium enrichment. No agreement on that concept was reached, even though the
Bush Administration sent then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns to a
P5+1—Iran negotiation in Geneva on July 19, 2008.
Developments During the Obama Administration
After President Obama was inaugurated, the P5+1 met in Germany on February 4, 2009, seeking
to incorporate into its proposals to Iran the new Administration’s commitment to direct U.S.
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engagement with Iran.24 On April 8, 2009, then Under Secretary William Burns announced that a
U.S. diplomat would henceforth attend all of the group’s meetings with Iran. A July 9, 2009, G-8
summit statement said that Iran needed to offer constructive proposals by late September 2009 or
face “crippling sanctions.” On September 9, 2009, Iran distributed its proposals to settle the
nuclear issue to P5+1 representatives in Iran, which the P5+1 considered a sufficient basis to meet
with Iran on October 1, 2009.
Tentative Agreement Falls Apart. In light of September 25, 2009, revelations about the Fordow
uranium enrichment site, little progress was expected at an October 1, 2009 P5+1 – Iran meeting
in Geneva. However, the meeting produced a tentative agreement for Iran to allow Russia and
France to reprocess 2,600 pounds (which at that time was 75% of Iran’s low-enriched uranium
stockpile) for medical use. Technical talks on the tentative agreement were held October 19-21,
2009 in Vienna and a draft agreement was approved by the P5+1 countries and the IAEA.
However, the Supreme Leader reportedly opposed the agreement and it was not implemented.
Tehran Declaration Brokered by Brazil and Turkey. In April 2010, Brazil and Turkey negotiated
with Iran to revive the October arrangement. On May 17, 2010, with the president of Brazil and
prime minister of Turkey in Tehran, the three signed an arrangement (“Tehran Declaration”) for
Iran to send 2,600 pounds of uranium to Turkey, which would be exchanged for medically-useful
reprocessed uranium.25 Iran forwarded to the IAEA a formal letter of acceptance. Even though
some assert that the Obama Administration quietly supported the Brazil-Turkey initiative, the
Obama Administration publicly rejected it on the grounds that it did not address Iran’s enrichment
to the 20% level. The Administration opted to finalize agreement on another Security Council
resolution that would pressure Iran.
Fifth and Most Sweeping Security Council Resolution Adopted: Resolution 1929
On May 18, 2010, one day after the signing of the Tehran Declaration, Secretary of State Clinton
announced that the P5+1 had reached agreement on a new sanctions resolution that would give
U.S. allies authority to take substantial new measures against Iran. Adopted on June 9, 2010,26 the
key provisions of Resolution 1929 are contained in the summary table below.27 An annex
presented the modified offer of incentives discussed above. (Simultaneous with Russian
agreement on the draft, several Russian entities, including the main state arms export agency
Rosoboronexport, were removed from U.S. lists of sanctioned entities.)
President Obama and other senior officials noted that the intent of Resolution 1929 was to bring
Iran back to negotiations. However, P5+1-Iran talks during December 6-7, 2010, in Geneva and
January 21-22, 2011, in Istanbul failed in part because Iran demanded immediate lifting of
international sanctions. Following Iran-Russia talks during August 15-16, 2011, Iran praised
Russia’s proposals for a stepwise exchange of the lifting of international sanctions for Iran’s
giving up some nuclear activities. State Department official Victoria Nuland confirmed that U.S.
diplomats had worked with Russian counterparts to develop the proposal.

24 Dempsey, Judy. “U.S. Urged to Talk With Iran.” International Herald Tribune, February 5, 2009.
25 Text of the pact is at http://www.cfr.org/publication/22140/.
26 It was adopted by a vote of 12-2 (Turkey and Brazil voting no) with one abstention (Lebanon).
27 Text of the resolution is at http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/
Draft_resolution_on_Iran_annexes.pdf.
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P5+1—Iran talks resumed April 13-14, 2012, in Istanbul, and in Baghdad, Iraq on May 23-24,
2012. In Baghdad, the P5+1 proposed that Iran halt enrichment to the 20% level (“stop”); allow
removal from Iran of the existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium (“ship”); and eventually
close the Fordow facility (“shut”). The P5+1 also demanded Iran accept a comprehensive
verification regime and clear up reputed past efforts to design a nuclear explosive device (see
above). The P5+1 offer would allow Iran to enrich uranium to the 3.5%-5% level; guarantee Iran
a supply of medical isotopes; and provide for sales of passenger aircraft spare parts.
A further round of P5+1—Iran talks was held June 18-19, 2012, in Moscow, focusing primarily
on the “stop, shut, and ship” concept. No breakthrough was achieved, but the parties subsequently
held lower level technical talks on July 3, 2012. At talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan during February
26-27, 2013, the P5+1 dropped the insistence that Iran dismantle the Fordow site, but continued
to insist Iran cease enrichment to 20% there. A second “Almaty round” convened during April 5-
6, 2013, although Iran’s looming presidential election intruded on the talks.
Rouhani Spurs Optimism
Leaders in the P5+1 countries asserted that the election of Rouhani improved the prospects for a
nuclear settlement. Those sentiments increased in the context of his visit to the U.N. General
Assembly meetings in New York during September 23-27, 2013. In advance of his visit, Rouhani
reiterated in press interviews that Iran has no intention of developing a nuclear weapon. He also
stated that the Supreme Leader had given him and his team—with Foreign Minister Zarif as chief
nuclear negotiator—authority to negotiate a nuclear deal. The Supreme Leader largely affirmed
that authority in a speech to the IRGC on September 17, 2013, in which Khamene’i said he
believes in the concept of “heroic flexibility”—adopting “proper and logical diplomatic moves,
whether in the realm of diplomacy or in the sphere of domestic policies.”28
On September 26, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry attended a P5+1 meeting with Iran on the
sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly meetings, and Foreign Minister Zarif and Secretary Kerry
met separately as well. The meetings resulted in a decision to hold another round of high-level
P5+1-Iran talks in Geneva on October 15-16, 2013. At the talks, which included a subsequent
round during November 7-9, Iran and the P5+1 discussed an interim agreement during which Iran
would suspend 20% enrichment and take other steps to improve international oversight, and a
more comprehensive end-stage agreement that would sharply limit Iran’s enrichment of uranium.
No agreement was reached, but the parties agreed to convene again on November 20.
Joint Plan of Action (JPA)
The meetings that began in Geneva on November 20 ended with an agreement (“Joint Plan of
Action,” JPA) early in the morning of November 24, 2013. The JPA:
• is to be in place for six months, renewable for up to six additional months, during
which time a “comprehensive solution” to Iran’s nuclear program is negotiated.
The agreement does not explicitly recognize Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium but
does indicate that a final agreement would likely “involve a mutually defined

28 Open Source Center, “Iran: Leader Outlines Guard Corps Role, Talks of ‘Heroic Flexibility,’” published September
18, 2013.
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enrichment program.” Technical discussions agreed that implementation would
begin on January 20, 2014 and extend until July 20, 2014.
• requires Iran to cease enriching uranium to 20% U-235 and to dilute or convert of
the 20% enriched stockpile to other forms that are difficult to enrich further. Iran
is permitted to continue enriching to the 3.5% level but not to expand its
stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium.
• requires Iran not to substitute its existing centrifuges with newer models, to limit
production of centrifuges to replacing those that break, and to halt development
of (although not all construction at) the heavy-water nuclear reactor at Arak.
• requires that the comprehensive solution address the requirements of U.N.
Security Council resolutions, which, among other provisions, ban Iran from
developing a ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon.
• provides for temporary sanctions relief totaling about $7 billion, including access
to $4.2 billion in hard currency abroad that Iran has been unable to repatriate
because of financial sanctions, tuition payments for Iranian students abroad, and
likely revenues from resuming sales of petrochemicals, trading in previous
metals, and easing of sanctions on Iran’s auto industry. The agreement stipulates
that Iran’s current oil exports of about 1 million barrels per day will remain
constant, and that the P5+1 countries and EU will impose no new nuclear
sanctions on Iran. Iran will also receive help buying humanitarian supplies,
including spare parts for civilian aircraft. Iran would receive its $4.2 billion in
eight installments of about $500 million each, with the first occurring on
February 1, 2014. (For detail on the sanctions relief aspects of the deal, including
steps needed to implement the deal as regards U.S. sanctions laws, please see
CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.)
Some U.S. allies and Members of Congress criticized the JPA as allowing Iran to retain the
infrastructure it could use to eventually develop a nuclear weapon and as likely to cause the entire
sanctions regime to unravel. The Administration argued that the JPA would freeze Iran’s nuclear
program and roll some aspects of it back, while not precluding U.S. options to increase sanctions
or take other action if no comprehensive deal is reached. Iranian hardliners criticized the JPA as
failing to substantially ease sanctions, and journalists say that Iran’s economy has improved only
slightly since implementation began.
JPA Implementation. All IAEA reports issued since the JPA began implementation asserted that
Iran complied with the JPA requirements.29 However, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for International Security and Non-Proliferation Vann Van Diepen said on March 16, 2014,
that Iran is still “very actively” creating front companies and attempting to procure items for their
nuclear program and missile program and other programs.30 A report of the U.N.-backed “Panel
of Experts” dated June 11, 2014 reports that Iran has continued to try to import items that could
be used in programs that would violate applicable U.N. Security Council Resolutions.31

29 The latest report can be found at http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/iaea-iranreport-
230514.pdf.
30 “Iran Pursuing Banned Items for Nuclear, Missile Work: U.S. Official.” Reuters, March 16, 2014.
31 “U.N. Document S/2014/394. Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010).
June 11, 2014.
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The United States and partner countries have eased sanctions in line with the JPA requirements.
The hard currency payments to Iran are being processed in accordance with the stipulated
schedule. Some U.S. firms have applied for and received licenses to sell Iran spare aircraft parts.
Talks on a Comprehensive Solution
Talks on a comprehensive solution on Iran’s nuclear program began on February 20, 2014, and
quickly agreed on a framework for the negotiations. Two more sets of talks to build
understanding of each side’s positions took place in Vienna during March 17-19, and April 7-9,
2014. The April talks were not, by all accounts, affected by U.S. unrest at Iran’s apparent
appointment of one of those involved in the 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran—Hamid
Aboutalebi—as ambassador to the United Nations. That was the subject of April 2014
congressional passage of S. 2195, which would give the Administration authority to deny him a
visa to take up his duties. The United States subsequently announced he would not be admitted to
the United States and Iran has named American-educated Mohammad Nahavandian as a
replacement nominee.
The May 13-16, 2014 round intended to begin the process of drafting an actual agreement and
narrowing the reported gaps in each other’s positions. The talks did not narrow differences
substantially, and the Administration sent Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns and other officials
to hold bilateral talks with Iran on June 9-10, 2014, in advance of the subsequent P5+1 – Iran
talks on June 16-20. Neither the U.S.-Iran bilateral nor the June 16-20 P5+1 – Iran talks made
apparent progress on the core issue of uranium enrichment. The June 16-20 talks began to draft
an agreement and concluded with a decision to reconvene on July 2 and to hold talks nearly
continuously until the July 20 JPA expiration.
With the July 20 expiration approaching, Secretary of State Kerry joined the talks and Iranian
Foreign Minister Zarif publicized his proposal that, for up to seven years, Iran would freeze its
centrifuges at the number already installed and convert any low-enriched (5%) uranium produced
to a form that could not be easily enriched further.32 The proposal suggested that Supreme Leader
Khamene’i’s July 7 speech asserting that Iran requires a long term industrial-level enrichment
capability involving 190,000 “separative work units”33 (equivalent to well over 100,000
centrifuges) would not necessarily limit the flexibility of Iran’s negotiating team.
The Zarif proposal—particularly the relatively short duration of the limits—was immediately
rejected by the P5+1, but it did appear to show Iran starting to move off maximalist positions.
Still, skeptics noted that the proposal was not close to the P5+1’s reported demands that Iran be
limited to about 2,000–3,000 operating centrifuges.
JPA Four-Month Extension. On the basis of some movement on the enrichment issue and
narrowing of gaps on other issues, as well as Iran’s compliance with the JPA terms, on July 18,
2014, Iran and the P5+1 announced that the JPA would be extended four months, until November
24, 2014 (the one-year anniversary of the JPA’s signing). In general, all provisions of the original
JPA are extended, although Iran made an additional commitment to accelerate its conversion of its

32 David Sanger. “Iran Outlines Nuclear Deal; Accepts Limit.” New York Times, July 15, 2014.
33 Louis Charbonneau and Parisa Hafezi. “Exclusive: Iran Nuclear Negotiators Under Pressure After Leader Speech.”
Reuters, July 14, 2014.
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stockpile of 20% enriched uranium into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor.34 During the
extension period, Iran will be able to access $2.8 billion in hard currency payments for oil sales.
This total represents $700 million for each of the four months of the extension—the same
monthly amount as the first six months of the JPA.35 All other JPA sanctions relief, including
eased restrictions on dealing with Iran’s petrochemical and automotive sector, also remain in
place for the extension. Areas where gaps have been narrowed are discussed below.
• The parties are said to be close to agreement on Iran’s proposal to reengineer the
Arak reactor to produce minor amounts of plutonium. The plan presumably
would alleviate P5+1 concerns about Iran using the products of the reactor, after
reprocessing, for a nuclear weapon.
• Iran reportedly has acquiesced to the P5+1 insistence that sanctions be eased in
stepwise fashion as Iran complies with the provisions of the agreement—rather
than all relief being provided immediately after an agreement.
• Iran has reportedly agreed to enhanced monitoring and verification arrangements
for any final nuclear deal.36
• Iran reportedly has agreed to alter the hardened uranium enrichment site at
Fordow so that it could not be used to build a nuclear weapon.
• On the other hand, Iran has rejected limitations in its ballistic missile capabilities.
P5+1 – Iran differences on the issue appeared to widen the day before the May
13 talks with comments by the Supreme Leader that the P5+1 expectations for
Iran to curb its missile program were “stupid and idiotic.”
The four-month extension suggests that U.S. officials perceive that a final nuclear deal with Iran
is obtainable. An extension of six months could have suggested that a deal was far away or
unlikely. In further talks, many experts assess that additional Iranian concessions are likely.
Iranian leaders have built up an expectation in the Iranian public that a deal will be reached that
will cause sanctions to be lifted and the economy to rebound.37 It would be very difficult for the
Iranian leadership to explain to its public that no deal was reached.
Some in Congress have sought to legislate a congressional opportunity to vote to approve or
disapprove any deal that might be reached.38 The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act
(H.R. 4435), passed by the House on May 22, 2014, contains a section (1264) that expresses the
sense of Congress that a settlement with Iran result in Iran’s ceasing uranium enrichment, ending
its nuclear weapons and other WMD programs, and ceasing support for acts of international
terrorism. A White House statement said the provision undermines the negotiations by attempting
to spell out conditions for the final settlement. The statement also asserts the Administration’s
intent to consult closely with Congress on the status of the negotiations.

34 Department of State. Press Statement of Secretary of State John Kerry. July 18, 2014.
35 Ibid.
36 Statement by Secretary of State Kerry, op.cit.
37 Author conversation with Brookings Institution Iran expert Suzanne Maloney. U.S. Institute of Peace, July 8, 2014.
38 Josh Rogin. “Key Senator Wants to Force Vote on Iran Deal.” Daily Beast, May 16, 2014.
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Table 6. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program
(1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929)
Requires Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, cease construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak, and sign the
Additional Protocol. (1737 and subsequent resolutions)
Prohibits transfer to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual use items, except for use in light-water reactors. (All combined)
Prohibits Iran from exporting arms or WMD-useful technology. (1747)
Prohibits Iran from investing abroad in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies or nuclear capable ballistic missile
technology. Prohibits Iran from launching ballistic missiles even on its own territory. (1929)
Freezes the assets of over 80 named Iranian persons and entities, including Bank Sepah, and several corporate
affiliates of the Revolutionary Guard. (1737 and subsequent resolutions)
Requires that countries ban the travel of over 40 named Iranians.
Mandates that countries not export major combat systems to Iran. It did not bar sales of missiles not on the “U.N.
Registry of Conventional Arms” (meaning that the delivery of the S-300 system, discussed above, would not be legal y
banned). (1929)
Calls for “vigilance” (a nonbinding call to cut off business) with respect to all Iranian banks, particularly Bank Melli and
Bank Saderat. (1929)
Calls for vigilance (voluntary restraint) with respect to providing international lending to Iran and providing trade
credits and other financing and financial interactions. (1929)
Cal s on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines—or by any
ships in national or international waters—if there are indications they carry cargo banned for carriage to Iran.
Searches in international waters would require concurrence of the country where the ship is registered. (1929)
A Sanctions Committee, composed of the 15 members of the Security Council, monitors implementation of all Iran
sanctions and collects and disseminates information on Iranian violations and other entities involved in banned
activities. A seven-member “panel of experts” is empowered (renewable each year) to report on sanctions violations
and make recommendations for improved enforcement. The panel’s reports are not official y published by the
Sanctions Committee but are usual y carried by various websites. Resolution 2105, adopted June 5, 2013, extended
the mandate of the Panel of Experts until July 9, 2014. (1929)

Missiles and Chemical/Biological Weapons
Iran has an array of conventional weapons that it could potentially use against the United States
and its allies in the Persian Gulf. In particular, Iran’s missiles are considered to pose a threat to
U.S. ships, forces, and allies in the Gulf region and beyond.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
Official U.S. reports and testimony state that Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical
warfare (CW) agents and “probably” has the capability to produce some biological warfare agents
for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so.39 This raises questions about Iran’s
compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which Iran
signed on January 13, 1993, and ratified on June 8, 1997.

39 Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to
31 December 2010,” March 2011.
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Ballistic and Cruise Missiles and Warheads40
The Administration’s insistence that missile limitations be part of a comprehensive nuclear
settlement is based, at least in part, on the apparent view that Iran’s ballistic missiles and its
acquisition of indigenous production of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) provide capabilities
for Iran to project power. DNI Clapper testified on March 12, 2013 that the intelligence
community assesses that “Iran’s ballistic missiles are capable of delivering WMD.” There has
been a long-standing U.S. estimate that Iran would likely not be able to fully develop a missile of
intercontinental range until 2015, although that time frame is not far away and there have not
been any recent reports that Iran is approaching that capability.
Tehran views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter—and if
necessary retaliate against—forces in the region, including U.S. forces. A particular worry of U.S.
commanders remains Iran’s inventory of cruise missiles, which can reach U.S. ships in the Gulf
quickly after launch. U.S. officials and reports have estimated that Iran is steadily expanding its
missile and rocket inventories and has “boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems
with accuracy improvements and new sub-munition payloads.”
It is unclear the extent to which Iran continues to receive outside assistance for its missile
program. Some reports suggest Iranian technicians may have witnessed North Korea’s satellite
launch in December 2012, which, if true, could support the view that Iran-North Korea missile
cooperation is extensive. Table 7 contains some details on Iran’s missile programs.41 It is also not
clear to what extent, if any, Iran’s missile programs might have been set back by the November
12, 2011, explosion at a ballistic missile base outside Tehran that almost completely destroyed it
and killed the base commander.

40 For more information on Iran’s missile arsenal, see CRS Report R42849, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch
Programs, by Steven A. Hildreth.
41 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dennis C. Blair,
Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010.
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Table 7. Iran’s Missile Arsenal
Shahab-3
800-mile range. The missile is operational, and Defense Department report of April 2012,
(“Meteor”)
indicates Tehran has improved its lethality and effectiveness, tempering previous assessments
by experts that the missile is not completely reliable.
Shahab-3 “Variant” 1,200-1,500-mile range. The April 2010 Defense Department report had the liquid fueled
/Sijil/Ashoura
Shahab-3 “variant” as “possibly deployed,” and the April 2102 report indicates the solid fuel
version (Sijil or Ashoura) is increasing in range, lethality, and accuracy. These missiles
potential y put large portions of the Near East and Southeastern Europe in range, including
U.S. bases in Turkey. A U.N. experts panel reported in May 2011 that Iran tested the missile
in October 2010 although the launch was “reported by a [U.N.] Member state,” and not
announced publicly. In concert with the beginning of 10-day “Great Prophet Six” military
exercises, on June 28, 2011, Iran unveiled underground missile silos.
BM-25
1,500-mile range. On April 27, 2006, Israel’s military intelligence chief said that Iran had
received a shipment of North Korean-supplied BM-25 missiles. Missile said to be capable of
carrying nuclear warheads. The Washington Times appeared to corroborate this reporting in a
July 6, 2006, story, which asserted that the North Korean-supplied missile is based on a
Soviet-era “SS-N-6” missile. Press accounts in December 2010 indicate that Iran may have
received components but not the entire BM-25 missile from North Korea.
ICBM
U.S. officials believe Iran might be capable of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile
(3,000 mile range) by 2015, a time frame reiterated by the April 2012 DOD report.
Short Range
Iran is fielding increasingly capable, short range ballistic missiles, according to DOD 2012
Ballistic Missiles
report, such as ability to home in on and target ships while in flight. One version could be a
and Cruise
short range ballistic missile named the Qiam, tested in August 2010. Iran has long worked on
Missiles
a 200 mile range “Fateh 110” missile (solid propellant), which it again tested in August 2012.
Iran also possesses a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-1 (Scud-
b), the Shahab-2 (Scud-C), and the Tondar-69 (CSS-8). In January 2009, Iran claimed to have
tested a new air-to-air missile. On March 7, 2010, Iran claimed it was producing short-range
cruise missiles that it claimed are highly accurate and can destroy heavy targets. Iran also is
able to arm its patrol boats with Chinese-made C-802 cruise missiles. Iran also has Chinese-
supplied Seerseekers and C-802’s emplaced along Iran’s coast.
Space Vehicle
In February 2008 Iran claimed to have launched a probe into space, suggesting its missile
technology might be improving to the point where an Iranian ICBM is realistic. Following an
August 2008 failure, in early February 2009, Iran successfully launched a small, low-earth
satellite on a Safir-2 rocket (range about 155 miles). The Pentagon said the launch was
“clearly a concern of ours” because “there are dual-use capabilities here which could be
applied toward the development of long-range missiles.” A larger space vehicle, Simorgh, was
displayed in February 2010. Iran claimed a satellite launch into orbit on June 16, 2011. Iran
says it plans another space launch in late December 2013.
Warheads
Wall Street Journal report of September 14, 2005, said that U.S. intelligence believes Iran is
working to adapt the Shahab-3 to deliver a nuclear warhead. Subsequent press reports say
that U.S. intel igence captured an Iranian computer in mid-2004 showing plans to construct a
nuclear warhead for the Shahab.42

42 William Broad and David Sanger, “Relying On Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran’s Nuclear Aims,” New York
Times, November 13, 2005.
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Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups
Iran’s foreign policy is a product of the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, blended with long-
standing national interests. Some U.S. observers interpret Iran’s foreign policy objectives as
attempting to overturn the power structure in the Middle East that Iran believes favors the United
States, Israel, and Sunni Muslim regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states. Iran couches
that policy as support for an “oppressed” underclass, while denying any intent to empower fellow
Shiites. Iran and its supporters interpret Iran’s policies as attempting to thwart a U.S. goal of
isolating Iran to the point where its Islamic revolution can be overturned.
Some argue that Iran’s foreign policy is ineffective. Countries in the region have helped the
United States enforce strict sanctions against Iran. Iran’s strategic position is threatened by the
civil conflict in Syria, in which Iran’s closest Arab ally, Bashar Al Assad of Syria, has lost control
of a considerable amount of the country. Assad has been key to Iran’s efforts to position itself to
strategically counter Israel. Another key ally, the Shiite-dominated government of Iraq, is facing a
significant Sunni rebellion that has put nearly half that country out of central government control.
On the other hand, Rouhani’s election and the nuclear deal have made some of Iran’s historic
adversaries in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere somewhat more willing to engage with Iran on
bilateral and regional issues.
Support for International Terrorism
Iran’s foreign policy has made use of groups that are named as terrorist organizations by the
United States. Iran was placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism (“terrorism list”) in
January 1984. The State Department report on international terrorism for 2013,43 released April
30, 2014, stated that Iran “continued its terrorist-related activity” in 2013 and that Iran “also
increased its presence in Africa and attempted to smuggle arms” to oppositionists in Yemen and
Bahrain. In 2012, Iran allegedly backed terrorist plots against Israeli diplomats and officials in
such countries as India (in which the wife of an Israeli diplomat was wounded in an attack in
Delhi in on February 13, 2012), Bulgaria (where a July 19, 2012, bombing killed five Israeli
tourists), Thailand, Georgia, and Kenya. Other alleged plots took place in Azerbaijan and Cyprus.
In 2011 and 2012, U.S. officials asserted that Iran might be planning acts of terrorism in the
United States itself. The assessment was based largely on an alleged Iranian plot, revealed on
October 11, 2011, by the Department of Justice, to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the
United States.
Some assert that Rouhani seeks to curb Iran’s support for militant movements in the region
because their activities could injure his goals of broader international engagement. However,
many doubt that Rouhani is able to curb Iranian support for terrorism. Rouhani is perceived as
having no ability to remove the head of the Qods Force, Qasem Soleimani, who runs Iran’s
external operations and reports directly to Khamene’i.44

43 The text of the section on Iran can be found at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm.
44 http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_filkins?printable=true&currentPage=all.
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In prior decades, Iranian terrorism took the form of assassinating dissidents abroad. In the late
1980s and early 1990s, Iran allegedly was responsible for the assassination of several Iranian
dissidents based in Europe, including Iranian Kurdish dissident leader Abdol Rahman Qasemlu,
several other Kurdish leaders (including those killed at the Mykonos café in Berlin in September
1992), the brother of PMOI leader Masud Rajavi, and several figures close to the late Shah of
Iran. In May 2010, France allowed the return to Iran of Vakili Rad, who had been convicted in the
1991 stabbing of the Shah’s last prime minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar. Iran has not been accused of
dissident assassinations abroad in well over a decade.
Table 8. Major Past Acts of Iran or Iran-Related Terrorism
Date
Incident/Event Likely/Claimed
Perpetrator
April 18, 1983
Truck bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon.
Factions that eventually formed
63 dead, including 17 U.S. citizens.
Lebanese Hezbol ah claimed
responsibility.
October 23, 1983
Truck bombing of U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut.
Same as above
241 Marines killed.
December 12,
Bombings of U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait
Da’wa Party of Iraq—Iran-
1983
City. 5 fatalities.
supported Iraqi Shiite militant
group. 17 Da’wa activists charged
and imprisoned in Kuwait
September 20,
Truck bombing of U.S. embassy annex in Beirut.
Factions that eventually formed
1984
23 killed.
Lebanese Hezbol ah
May 25, 1985
Bombing of Amir of Kuwait’s motorcade
Da’wa Party of Iraq
June 14, 1985
Hijacking of TWA Flight 847. One fatality, Navy
Lebanese Hezbol ah
diver Robert Stetham
April 5, 1988
Hijacking of Kuwait Air passenger plane. Two killed.
Lebanese Hezbollah, seeking
release of 17 Da’wa prisoners in
Kuwait.
March 17, 1992
Bombing of Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires.
Lebanese Hezbol ah, assisted by
29 killed.
Iranian intelligence/diplomats.
July 18, 1994
Bombing of Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association
Same as above
(AMIA) building in Buenos Aires.
June 25, 1996
Bombing of Khobar Towers housing complex near
Saudi Hezbol ah, supported by
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 19 U.S. Air Force personnel
Iran, but some assessments point
killed.
to involvement of Al Qaeda.
July 19, 2012
Bombing in Bulgaria killed five Israeli tourists.
Lebanese Hezbollah
Source: State Department Country Reports on Terrorism.
Foreign Policy: Relations with the Persian Gulf States
Most of the leaders of the Persian Gulf monarchy states (Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC: Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates) are concerned about Iran’s
influence and intentions in the Gulf and broader region. These states, all controlled by Sunni-led
governments, are cooperating with U.S. policy toward Iran politically, economically, and
militarily. Still, the GCC states often seek to lower tensions with Iran, and Qatar, Oman, UAE,
and Kuwait welcomed visits by Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif and his aides subsequent to the
November 2013 JPA agreement. At the same time, GCC leaders are concerned a comprehensive
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nuclear deal could lead to a U.S.-Iran rapprochement and possibly weaken the U.S. commitment
to Gulf security.
• Saudi Arabia. Iran and Saudi Arabia represent opposing interests in the region;
Saudi Arabia sees itself as leader of the Sunni Muslim world and views Shiite
Muslims, including those in eastern Saudi Arabia, as heretical. In speeches and
statements, senior Saudi officials have criticized the Obama Administration’s
engagement with the Rouhani government. Saudi alarm over Iranian influence in
the Gulf was a major factor in the military intervention by Saudi Arabia on behalf
of the Bahrain government in March 2011. The Saudis repeatedly criticize Iran
for past actions, including inspiring violent demonstrations at some Hajj
pilgrimages in Mecca in the 1980s and 1990s—which caused a break in relations
from 1987 to 1991. The Saudis also often accuse Iran of stoking Shiite
oppositionists in the Gulf, including within the Kingdom itself.45 Saudi leaders
have threatened to try to acquire a nuclear weapon if Iran acquires one. However,
apparently seeking to cooperate with the recent U.S. emphasis on diplomacy with
Iran, in May 2014 the Saudi government announced it had invited Foreign
Minister Zarif to visit. Iran has accepted the invitation, but the visit has not
occurred, to date.
United Arab Emirates (UAE). Like Saudi Arabia, UAE tends to take hardline
positions on Iran’s nuclear program and its influence in the region. Relations with
Iran remain colored by the April 1992 Iranian expulsion of UAE security forces
from the Persian Gulf island of Abu Musa, which it and the UAE shared under a
1971 bilateral agreement. (In 1971, Iran, then ruled by the U.S.-backed Shah,
seized two other islands, Greater and Lesser Tunb, from the emirate of Ras al-
Khaymah, as well as part of Abu Musa from the emirate of Sharjah.) The UAE
has sought to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but Iran
has insisted on resolving the issue bilaterally. (ICJ referral requires concurrence
from both parties to a dispute.) The issue reignited on April 11, 2012, when then-
president Ahmadinejad visited Abu Musa. In May 2012, IRGC Commander
Mohammad Ali Jafari, accompanied by several Majles deputies, visited the island
and discussed developing a tourism industry there. Yet, in the aftermath of the
JPA and a visit to Iran by the UAE’s Foreign Minister, in early 2014 the two
countries reportedly made progress toward resolving the islands dispute. Iran
reportedly removed some military equipment from them. Despite the territorial
and political disputes, the UAE and Iran maintain relatively normal trade and
diplomatic ties. Earlier, to avoid antagonizing Iran, in May 2007 the UAE
received then president Ahmadinejad (the highest-level Iranian visit since the
1979 revolution) and allowed him to lead an anti-U.S. rally of several hundred
Iranian-origin residents of Dubai – a community that numbers about 300,000.
• Qatar is wary that Iran might eventually seek to encroach on its large North Field
(natural gas). It shares that field with Iran (called South Pars on Iran’s side) and
Qatar earns large revenues from natural gas exports from it. Qatar’s fears have

45 Elsa Walsh, “Annals of Politics: Louis Freeh’s Last Case.” The New Yorker, May 14, 2001. The June 21, 2001,
federal grand jury indictments of 14 suspects (13 Saudis and a Lebanese citizen) in the Khobar bombing indicate that
Iranian agents may have been involved, but no indictments of any Iranians were announced. In June 2002, Saudi
Arabia reportedly sentenced some of the eleven Saudi suspects held there. The 9/11 Commission final report asserts
that Al Qaeda might have had some as yet undetermined involvement in the Khobar Towers attacks.
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been heightened by occasional Iranian statements, such as one in April 2004,
when Iran’s deputy oil minister said that Qatar is probably producing more gas
than “her right share” from the field and that Iran “will not allow” its wealth to be
used by others. Possibly to try to ease such implied threats, Qatar invited
Ahmadinejad to the December 2007 GCC summit there.
• Bahrain is about 60% Shiite-inhabited, many of whom are of Persian origin, but
its government is dominated by the Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa family. In 1981 and
again in 1996, Bahrain publicly accused Iran of supporting Bahraini Shiite
dissidents in efforts to overthrow the ruling Al Khalifa family. Bahrain has
accused Iran of supporting the post-2011 uprising against the Al Khalifa regime
by mostly Shiite demonstrators, although the November 2011 final report of the
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) concluded there is no
evidence to indicate Iran instigated the protests. On February 21, 2013, the
government said that the IRGC had helped form a Bahraini cell to recruit other
agents and store weapons in Bahrain for possible attacks on officials and key
locations.46 On December 30, 2013, following a two-day raid, Bahraini
authorities seized a ship, originating in Iraq, allegedly carrying Iranian weaponry
and bomb-making material for the Bahrain opposition.47 The State Department
report on international terrorism for 2013 asserted that Iran has attempted to
provide arms and other aid to Shiite militants in Bahrain. Earlier, tensions flared
several times after July 2007 over Iranian attempts to question the legitimacy of a
1970 U.N.-run referendum in which Bahrainis opted for independence from Iran.
• Oman. Of the GCC states, the Sultanate of Oman is closest politically to Iran.
During the Shah’s rule, Iran sent troops to help the Sultan suppress rebellion in
the Dhofar region. Sultan Qaboos made a state visit to Iran in August 2009,
coinciding with the second inauguration of Ahmadinejad and related unrest inside
Iran over his reelection. He visited again in late August 2013, reportedly to
explore concepts for improved U.S.-Iran relations and what eventually became
the JPA. Rouhani visited Oman in March 2014, the only GCC state he has visited
since taking office. Some press reports say Omani officials turn a blind eye to or
cooperate in the smuggling of western goods to Iran. Oman and Iran held some
joint naval search and rescue exercises in early April 2014.
• Kuwait. Kuwait had pursued ties to Iran as a counterweight to Saddam Hussein,
who invaded Kuwait in August 1990. After Saddam’s overthrow in 2003, Kuwait
has become more distant from and critical of Iran. During 2010-2011, Kuwait
and Iran arrested persons they accused of spying for or plotting attacks in the
other.48 However, as the GCC countries increasingly engaged with Rouhani and
his government, in early June 2014, Amir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah became the
first leader of a GCC country to visit Iran. About 25% of Kuwaitis are Shiite
Muslims, and Iran supported Shiite radical groups in Kuwait in the 1980s as a
means to try to pressure Kuwait not to support the Iraqi war effort in the Iran-Iraq
War (1980-1988), as listed above.

46 “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Behind Terror Cell, Says Bahrain.” Saudi Gazette, February 22, 2013.
47 Sandeep Singh Grewal. Arms Ring is Smashed by Police. Daily News, December 31. 2013.
48 “Iran Spy Cell Dismantled in Kuwait,” Associated Press, May 6, 2010; “Iran Cell Planned Attacks in Kuwait,
Minister Says,” Reuters, April 21, 2011.
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Yemen
Yemeni leaders have long claimed that Iran was trying to destabilize Yemen, which underwent a
leadership transition in January 2012 following an uprising. DNI Clapper testified on January 29,
2014, that Iran will likely continue to “provide arms and other aid to ... Houthi rebels” in Yemen.
These assertions were reiterated in the State Department terrorism report for 2013, cited earlier.
Some accounts say that the Quds Force is using small boats to ship in AK-47s, rocket-propelled
grenades, and other arms to replace older weapons used by the Houthis. In January 2013, U.S.
Ambassador to Yemen Gerald Feierstein accused Iran of supporting secessionist Yemeni leaders,
particularly Ali Salim al-Baidh, who is in exile in Beirut. Perhaps as a response to the alleged
Iranian intervention in Yemen, in January 2014 gunmen assassinated an Iranian diplomat in
Yemen’s capital, Sanaa.
Iranian Policy in Iraq49
The U.S. military ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003 benefitted Iran strategically by removing a
long-time antagonist and producing a government led by Shiite Islamists who have long-standing
ties to Iran. Iran has strongly backed the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a Shiite
Islamist who has lived in Iran and is viewed by Tehran as a loyal and somewhat pliable ally.
Maliki has supported most of Iran’s regional goals, including keeping Bashar Al Assad of Syria in
power, in part by allowing Iran to overfly Iraqi airspace to supply the Syrian military.50
The June 2014 offensive led by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) threatened to destabilize Maliki
and Iran responded quickly with Qods Force advisers, intelligence drone surveillance, weapons
shipments, and other assistance. Iran is also aiding Maliki by reactivating Shiite militias such as
the Promised Day Brigade, As’aib Ahl Al Haq (League of the Righteous) and Kata’ib Hezbollah
(Hezbollah Brigades), and the Mahdi Army of Moqtada Al Sadr. Kata’ib Hezbollah has been
named a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States. Prior to the June 2014 crisis
in Iraq, these groups were evolving from militias into political organizations, although several of
them had, with Iranian encouragement and assistance, sent fighters to Syria to fight on behalf of
the Assad regime. Many Iraqi Shiite militiamen who went to Syria have returned to Iraq. The
revival of the militias is increasing tensions with Iraq’s Sunnis, including those who still live in
Baghdad and fear Shiite sectarian violence. Many Shiite militia forces had gone to Syria to help
President Asad but returned to Iraq after the fall of Mosul to help defend Baghdad.
The rapidity of the collapse of Iraqi forces in Mosul and other parts of Iraq in June 2014 appeared
to align the interests of Iran and the United States in preventing an IS seizure of Baghdad.
Secretary of State John Kerry said in an interview that the United States was “open to discussions
[with Iran on Iraq] if there’s something constructive that can be contributed by Iran.”51 U.S.
diplomats reportedly discussed the situation in Iraq at the margins of the June 16, 2014, talks on
Iran’s nuclear program, reportedly seeking Iran’s cooperation to compel Iraq’s Prime Minister

49 For information on Iran’s role in the Iraq crisis, see CRS Report R43612, Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman et al.
50 Michael Gordon, “Iran Supplying Syrian Military Via Iraqi Airspace,” New York Times, September 5, 2012.
51 Michael Gordon and David Sanger. “U.S. Is Exploring Talks with Iran on Crisis in Iraq.” New York Times, June 17,
2014.
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Maliki to share power or be replaced outright.52 No decision on direct cooperation on Iraq was
announced after that meeting.
Many observers remain skeptical that that the United States could or should cooperate with Iran
on Iraq. Iran has been a staunch supporter of the Shiite-led government in Iraq and those in Iran
who control policy toward Iraq do not necessarily share the U.S. goal of creating a broad-based,
inclusive central government. Iran reportedly is open to supporting other Shiite leader as an
alternative to Maliki, although as Prime Minister but has not publicly insisted he be replaced.53
Iraq conducts a full spectrum of trade with Iran, sometimes running afoul of U.S. sanctions
against Iran. On July 31, 2012, the United States sanctioned the Elaf Islamic Bank of Iraq for
conducting sanctionable banking transactions with Iran, although the sanctions were removed in
May 2013 when Elaf bank ceased the activity. In July 2013, Iraq and Iran signed an agreement for
Iran to export natural gas to Iraq through a pipeline under construction; the project is potentially
sanctionable under the Iran Sanctions Act. Press reports in late February 2014 said Iraq agreed to
a deal for nearly $200 million worth of Iranian arms and ammunition—shipments that would
violate Resolution 1747 on Iran—but Iraqi officials have told CRS the deal was cancelled shortly
after it was signed. (For more information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, and CRS
Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights.)
Supporting Militant Anti-Israel Groups
Iran has long opposed Israel as a creation of the West and an oppressor of the Palestinian people
and other Arabs. Former president Ahmadinejad went well beyond that to statements that Israel
should be destroyed. The Supreme Leader has repeatedly called Israel a “cancerous tumor.” Iran
has hosted numerous conferences to which anti-peace process terrorist organizations were invited
(for example: April 24, 2001, and June 2-3, 2002). President Rouhani has sought to soften Iran’s
image on this issue, in part by publicly issuing greetings to the Jewish community on the occasion
of the Jewish New Year (Rosh Hashana) in September 2013. Despite that outreach, in March
2014, Khamene’i questioned the Holocaust—an issue that Ahmadinejad had raised during his
presidency and for which he had incurred major international criticism.
Iran’s support for Palestinian militant groups has long concerned U.S. administrations. The State
Department report on terrorism for 2012 repeated previous year’s reports assertions that Iran
provides funding, weapons, and training to Hamas, a faction of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ),
the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC). All are named as foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) by the State
Department for their use of violence against Israel. During the second Palestinian intifada
(“uprising”) in January 2002, Israel intercepted a ship (the Karine A) carrying about 50 tons of
Iranian-supplied arms bound for the Gaza Strip. The formal position of the Iranian Foreign
Ministry is that Iran would not seek to block an Israeli-Palestinian settlement but that the process
is too weighted toward Israel to yield a fair result.

52 Ibid.
53 Author conversations with experts on Iran. Washington, D.C. June – July 2014
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Iran and Hamas
For well over a decade, the State Department annual report on terrorism, including the report for
2013, has said that Hamas (named as an FTO) receives funding, weapons, and training from Iran.
However, the State Department report noted that Hamas’ position on Syria has caused the Iran-
Hamas relationship to deteriorate somewhat. Largely out of sectarian sympathy with the mostly
Sunni protesters and rebels in Syria, Hamas opposed the efforts by Asad to defeat the rebellion
militarily. Hamas’ Syria-based leaders left Syria in late 2011. Iran has tried to rebuild the Hamas
relationship since late 2012 by reportedly providing “missile technology” that Hamas has
apparently used to construct its own rockets including during the November 14-22, 2012, conflict
between various Palestinian militant groups and Israel. Prior to the conflict, Iran reportedly
supplied pre-built missiles, such as the “Fajr-5,” to Hamas via Sudan, from where the gear was
trucked into Gaza through Egypt.
Hamas and Iran forged a relationship in the 1990s as part of an apparent attempt to disrupt the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process through a campaign of Hamas suicide bombings and other
attacks on buses, restaurants, and other civilian targets inside Israel. In recent years, however,
Hamas has directly involved itself in Palestinian politics and its terrorist activities appear to have
diminished. Iran’s attempts to position its allies to strategically threaten Israel were strengthened
by Hamas successes, such as its victory in the January 25, 2006, Palestinian Legislative Council
elections, and even more so by Hamas’s June 2007 armed takeover of the Gaza Strip. Iran
provided material support to Hamas during the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza (December 27,
2008-January 17, 2009). In March 2011, Israel intercepted a ship, the Victoria, off its coast, and
seized a large quantity of mortars and C-704 cruise missiles that Israel said were bound for
Hamas in Gaza. On March 5, 2014, Israeli intercepted a ship in the Red Sea that Israel said was
carrying Iranian “advanced weaponry” bound for militants in Gaza, possibly via Sudan.
Iran and Hezbollah54
Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s chief protégé movement in the region. The 2014 U.S. intelligence
community worldwide threat assessment, referenced earlier, states that Hezbollah “has increased
its global terrorist activity in recent years to a level that we have not seen since the 1990s.” The
relationship began when Lebanese Shiite clerics of the pro-Iranian Lebanese Da’wa Party began
to organize in 1982 into what later was unveiled in 1985 as Hezbollah. Iran’s political, financial,
and military aid to Hezbollah has helped it become a major force in Lebanon’s politics and Iran
reportedly has been instrumental in persuading Hezbollah leaders to become directly involved in
the Syria conflict on behalf of Assad. The State Department terrorism report for 2012 repeated
previous years’ assertions that Iran “ has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of
Hezbollah and has trained thousands of Hezbollah fighters at camps in Iran.”
Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon contributed to an Israeli withdrawal in
May 2000, but Hezbollah maintained military forces along the border. Although Iran likely did
not instigate Lebanese Hezbollah to provoke the July-August 2006 war with Israel, Iran has long
been its major arms supplier. Hezbollah fired Iranian-supplied rockets on Israel’s northern towns
during the fighting, including at the Israeli city of Haifa (30 miles from the border)55 and in July

54 For detail on Hezbollah, see CRS Report R41446, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress, by Casey L.
Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard.
55 “Israel’s Peres Says Iran Arming Hizbollah,” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
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2006 hit an Israeli warship with a C-802 sea-skimming missile probably provided by Iran. During
the conflict, Iran also sent additional QF personnel—augmenting its 50 QF contingent there—to
advise Hezbollah and help it operate the Iran-supplied weaponry. Even though Hezbollah reduced
its overt military presence in southern Lebanon in accordance with U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1701 (July 31, 2006), Hezbollah was perceived as a victor in the war for holding out
against Israel. Since that conflict, Iran has resupplied Hezbollah with at least 25,000 new
rockets56 and several hundred Iranian-made “Zelzal” (Earthquake) missiles with a range of 186
miles (capable of reaching Tel Aviv from south Lebanon). In November 2009, Israel intercepted a
ship that it asserted was carrying 500 tons of arms purportedly for Hezbollah.
Iran has been a political beneficiary of Hezbollah’s growing influence over decision-making and
leadership selections in Lebanon. The movement now plays a major role in all major selections.
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is considered unable to defeat Hezbollah’s powerful militia
and rarely acts against Hezbollah’s forces or interests.
However, there has been more vocal criticism of Hezbollah within and outside Lebanon because
it supports its other key patron, Syrian President Assad, against a Sunni-led rebellion in Syria.
That involvement has diluted Hezbollah’s image as a steadfast opponent of Israel by embroiling it
in war against fellow Muslims. On April 30, 2013, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah
openly admitted that Hezbollah fighters are helping Assad. Iranian financial and logistical help
has facilitated the Hezbollah intervention in Syria. Probably in retaliation for Iran’s role in the
Syria conflict, militants detonated bombs outside Iran’s embassy in Beirut on November 19,
2013, killing 25 persons including Iran’s cultural attache to Lebanon.
Syria
Syria’s Bashar Al Assad has been Iran’s closest Arab ally, and Iran would suffer a considerable
strategic setback if the Sunni-led rebellion succeeds in toppling his regime. Syria has been the
main transit point for Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah, and both Iran and Syria have used
Hezbollah as leverage against Israel to try to achieve regional and territorial aims. Rouhani has
not sought to slow Iranian support to Assad, and it is not clear he would be able to change Iran’s
overall policy were he to try to do so. Iran’s support for the beleaguered Iraqi government as of
June 2014 could be draining off Iranian resources that might otherwise go to Assad.
U.S. officials and reports assert that, to try to prevent Assad’s downfall, Iran is providing
substantial amounts of material support to the Syrian regime, including funds, weapons, and
fighters.57 The State Department has said repeatedly that Iran has sent Qods Forces (QF) to Syria
to advise the regime and fight alongside the Syrian military. Some experts say the Iranian direct
intervention goes beyond QF personnel to include an unknown number of IRGC ground forces as
well.58 The Iranian advisers also have helped Syria set up militia forces to ease the burden on the
Syrian army. In May 2014, there were press reports that Iran was attempting to recruit Afghan
refugees in Iran to fight in Syria.

56 Sebastian Rotella, “In Lebanon, Hezbollah Arms Stockpile Bigger, Deadlier,” Los Angeles Times, May 4, 2008.
57 Details and analysis on the full spectrum of Iranian assistance to Assad is provided by the Institute for the Study of
War. “Iranian Strategy in Syria,”by Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. May 2013.
58 Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer, “Iranian Strategy in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, May 2013.
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Iran has not denied assisting Syria; on December 11, 2013 and on several occasions since, IRGC
leaders including Commander-in-Chief Jafari have said the IRGC has sent military experts to
Syria. Iran bases its justification for its intervention in Syria on a long-standing defense
relationship with the Assad regime. On December 13, 2009, the Syrian and Iranian defense
ministers signed a defense agreement. In June 2010, it was reported that Iran had sent Syria a
sophisticated air defense radar system that could potentially down Israeli aircraft.59 On some
occasions, including the early 1990s, Iran purportedly has acted as an intermediary with North
Korea to supply Syria with various forms of WMD and missile technology, and Iran reportedly
has helped Syria expand its chemical weapons arsenal.60
In large part to build on the nuclear diplomacy with Iran, the Obama Administration has
entertained a possible role for Iran in finding a political solution in Syria, despite Iran’s role in
helping Assad militarily. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon invited Iran to the January 22,
2014, “Geneva 2” conference that is attempting to find a political solution to the Syria conflict
conference after Iran reportedly privately assured him its supports efforts to form a transition
government in Syria. However, Iran refused to state that position publicly and the United Nations
rescinded Iran’s invitation to the conference. In December 2012, Iran announced a six-point plan
for a peaceful transition that would culminate in free, multiparty elections, although the plan was
rejected by Syrian rebels because it provided for Assad to be able to compete in 2014 elections.
The Caucasus and Central Asia
Iran’s policy in the nearby Caucuses has thus far emphasized Iran’s rights to Caspian Sea
resources, particularly against Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is, like Iran, mostly Shiite Muslim-
inhabited, but Azerbaijan is ethnically Turkic and its leadership is secular. Iran reportedly fears
not only Azerbaijan’s alignment with the United States, but also that Azerbaijan nationalists might
stoke separatism among Iran’s large Azeri Turkic population, which has sometimes been restive.
These differences could explain why Iran has generally tilted toward Armenia, which is Christian,
in Armenia’s disputes with Azerbaijan. Iran has often slowed or stopped Azerbaijani truck traffic
that must transit Iran in order to reach a non-contiguous part of Azerbaijan (Nakichevan), which
is cut off from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenia’s occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. In May
2012, Azerbaijan refused entry to a senior aide to Khamene’i.
The United States successfully backed construction of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline,
intended in part to provide alternatives to Iranian oil. In July 2001, Iranian warships and combat
aircraft threatened a British Petroleum (BP) ship on contract to Azerbaijan out of an area of the
Caspian that Iran considers its own. The United States called that action provocative. Israel also is
apparently looking to Azerbaijan to counter Iran, announcing in February 2012 a major sale of
defense equipment. In mid-March 2012, Azerbaijan arrested 22 persons it said were Iranian
agents plotting attacks against Israeli and Western targets there.
Iran has generally sought and maintained good relations with the Central Asian states. Along with
India and Pakistan, Iran has been given observer status at the Central Asian security grouping
called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO—Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). In April 2008, Iran applied for full membership in the organization,

59 Charles Levinson, “Iran Arms Syria With Radar,” Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2010.
60 James Ball, “Documents: Iran Helped Syria Expand Chemical Weaponry,” Washington Post, July 28, 2012.
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but, not wanting to antagonize the United States, in June 2010 the SCO barred admission to
countries under U.N. Security Council sanctions (which is the case for Iran).61
South and East Asia
Iran looks to countries in East and South Asia as potential allies to help parry U.S. and European
pressure on Iran’s economy and its leaders. This section focuses primarily on South Asia, which
is in Iran’s immediate neighborhood.
East Asia
Many countries in East Asia are aligned with the United States. China is an emerging world
power that opposes a nuclear-armed Iran but also questions unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran.
North Korea and Iran have cooperated on weapons-related technology, particularly ballistic
missiles. In April 2013, press reports indicated Iran might supply oil to North Korea, presumably
in exchange for the technological help, but it is not clear that this deal ever materialized. For more
information on Iran’s relations with East Asia, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by
Kenneth Katzman, which focuses on Iran’s oil customers such as China.
South Asia: Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, Iran is apparently pursuing a multi-track strategy by helping develop Afghanistan
economically, engaging the central government, and supporting pro-Iranian groups and anti-U.S.
militants. A long-term Iranian goal appears to be to restore some of its traditional sway in eastern,
central, and northern Afghanistan, where “Dari”-speaking (Dari is akin to Persian) supporters of
the “Northern Alliance” grouping of non-Pashtun Afghan minorities predominate. Iran has also
sought to use its influence in Afghanistan to try to blunt the effects of international sanctions
against Iran.62
Iran has sought some influence by supporting the Afghan government. Outgoing President Hamid
Karzai, who is a Sunni Muslim and a Pashtun, has repeatedly and publicly opposed any
competition between the United States and Iran in Afghanistan. Karzai regularly meets with
Iranian leaders bilaterally as well as in the context of several regional summit series that include
Pakistan and Central Asian states. The two countries are said to be cooperating effectively against
narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan into Iran; Iranian border forces take consistent heavy
losses in operations to try to prevent this trafficking.
Reflecting concern about the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Iran reportedly tried to derail
the U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement that was signed on May 1, 2012, and it is
attempting to derail the Bilateral Security Agreement that has been completed by not signed by
Karzai to date. The BSA text prohibits the United States from using Afghanistan as a base from
which to launch military action against other countries. During a visit by Karzai to Tehran to meet
with the new leadership team of Rouhani on December 7, 2013, the two presidents agreed to start

61 Substantially more detail on Iran’s activities in Afghanistan is contained in: CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan:
Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
62 Matthew Rosenberg and Annie Lowry, “Iranian Currency Traders Find a Haven in Afghanistan,” New York Times,
August 18, 2012.
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negotiating a “pact of friendship.” U.S. officials say the pact, even if signed, would not affect
U.S. post-2014 plans in Afghanistan. Iran has not shied away from using financial resources to try
to sway the Afghan leadership; in the past, Iran has given about $2 million per year in direct
payments to Karzai’s government. Karzai admitted on October 26, 2010, that Iran was providing
cash payments to his government, through his chief of staff.
Even though it engages the Afghan government, Tehran has sought leverage against U.S. forces in
Afghanistan. The State Department has reported on Iranian materiel support to militants in
Afghanistan in its annual reports on terrorism, including citing the Qods Force for supplying
various munitions, including 107 mm rockets, to select Taliban and other militants in
Afghanistan, and of training Taliban fighters in small unit tactics, small arms use, explosives, and
indirect weapons fire. The State Department reports assert that Iran has supplied militants in
Qandahar, which is a Pashtun-inhabited province in southern Afghanistan and demonstrates that
Iran is not only assisting militants near its borders. In February 2011, British forces captured 48
Iranian-made rockets in Afghanistan’s western province of Nimruz, allegedly bound for Taliban
militants. On the other hand, U.S. commanders have consistently maintained that the Iranian
assistance to Afghan militants is not decisive on the battlefield.
The support Iran gives to Afghan insurgents gives Iran potential leverage in any Taliban-
government political settlement in Afghanistan. In July 2012, Iran reportedly allowed the Taliban
to open an office in Zahedan, in eastern Iran—possibly to better coordinate policy with the
Taliban or possibly to facilitate and Iranian role in political reconciliation in Afghanistan.63
Iran has, with U.S. acceptance, engaged in some of the international diplomacy on Afghanistan. It
attended the October 18, 2010, meeting in Rome of the 44-nation “International Contact Group”
on Afghanistan. The United States did not object to the Iranian attendance at the meeting, which
included a briefing by General David Petraeus (then top U.S./NATO commander in Afghanistan).
Iran did not attend the January 28, 2010, international meeting in Britain on Afghanistan, but it
did attend a follow-up meeting in Kabul on July 20, 2010. It also attended the major international
Bonn Conference on Afghanistan on December 5, 2011, and subsequent international conferences
on that issue.
Pakistan
Iran’s relations with Pakistan have been partly a function of events in Afghanistan, although
relations have occasionally been tense over the activities of Sunni Muslim militant groups
operating on both sides of their border. These Sunni guerrillas from groups such as Jundullah and
one called Jaysh al-Adl operate from Pakistan and have conducted a number of attacks on Iranian
regime targets. Jaysh al-Adl seized five Iranian border guards in February 2014; one reportedly
was killed and the other four were returned to Iran in April 2014.
Iran engaged in substantial military cooperation with Pakistan in the early 1990s, and it was
revealed in 2003 that the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, A. Q. Khan, sold Iran
nuclear technology and designs.64 However, that cooperation waned later in the 1990s as Pakistan
supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, which committed alleged atrocities against Shiite Afghans

63 Maria Abi-Habib, “Tehran Builds On Outreach to Taliban,” Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2012.
64 John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran,” Washington Post, January 24,
2004, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_8Nov2011.pdf.
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(Hazara tribe), and which seized control of Persian-speaking areas of western and northern
Afghanistan. Iran remains suspicious that Pakistan might want to again implant Taliban militants
in power in Afghanistan, but Iran-Pakistan relations have improved since mid-2011 as Pakistan’s
relations with the United States have worsened. Iran and Pakistan now have a broad bilateral
agenda that includes a potential major gas pipeline project that Pakistan hopes can alleviate its
energy shortages. Then president of Iran Ahmadinejad and Pakistan’s then President Asif Ali
Zardari formally inaugurated the project in March 2013. Iran has completed the line on its side of
the border, but Pakistan reportedly has had trouble financing the project on its side of the border.
U.S. officials say they consider it potentially sanctionable under the Iran Sanctions Act. Iran and
Pakistan conducted joint naval exercises in early April 2014.
India
India and Iran have overlapping histories, civilizations, and interests, aligning on numerous issues
including Afghanistan. Both countries support the minority factions based in the north and west.
As international sanctions increased in 2011-2012, India wrestled with a choice of preserving its
ties to Iran—which has provided it with needed oil for its growing economy—or joining U.S. and
international attempts to isolate Iran. Since 2012, it has generally sided with the United States and
the EU by cutting its purchases of Iranian oil, and has received exemptions from U.S. sanctions.
However, India wants to preserve ties to Iran in support of India’s own strategic interests; after
the JPA was reached, Indian officials announced they would move forward on the development of
Iran’s Chabahar port, which would give India direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia
without relying on transit routes through Pakistan. International sanctions have delayed that
project to date. For detail on India’s cooperation with sanctions, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran
Sanctions.
Of concern to some U.S. officials in the late 1990s were India-Iran military-to-military ties. The
relationship included visits to India by some Iranian naval personnel, although India said these
exchanges involve junior personnel and focus mainly on promoting interpersonal relations and
not on India’s provision to Iran of military expertise. The military relationship between the
countries has withered over at least the past five years. India and Iran, along with the United
States, backed the anti-Taliban “Northern Alliance” in Afghanistan during 1996-2001.
Al Qaeda
Iran is not a natural ally of Al Qaeda, largely because Al Qaeda is an orthodox Sunni Muslim
organization. However, some experts believe that hardliners in Iran still might want to use Al
Qaeda activists as leverage against the United States and its allies, despite the May 1, 2011, death
of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden in a U.S. raid in Pakistan. Some allege that Iran is forging
links to Al Qaeda affiliates in Africa for the purpose of extending its influence there. However, it
is unclear whether any Iranian ties to these groups are approved at the highest levels of the
Iranian leadership. On April 22, 2013, Canada asserted it had foiled a plot by Al Qaeda members
based in Iran to bomb Amtrak trains running between Canada and the United States. Officials
who revealed the alleged plot did not assert that the Iranian government was involved.
Three major Al Qaeda figures who have been in Iran since the September 11, 2001, attacks
include spokesman Sulayman Abu Ghaith, top operative Sayf Al Adl, and a bin Laden son,
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Saad.65 U.S. officials blamed the three for the May 12, 2003, bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
against four expatriate housing complexes, saying they were able to contact associates outside
Iran.66 As a possible sign of an Iranian shift, Abu Ghaith was expelled to Turkey, and was
apprehended by U.S. authorities on March 13, 2013, with the help of Turkey and Jordan while on
his way to his native Kuwait. In February 2014, it was reported that another senior Al Qaeda
figure, Thirwat Shihata, was expelled by Iran.67
Earlier, the Department of Treasury, on January 16, 2009, designated four Al Qaeda operatives in
Iran, including Saad bin Laden (and three lesser known figures) as terrorist entities under
Executive Order 13224. On July 28, 2011, under that same order, the Treasury Department
sanctioned six Al Qaeda members for allegedly moving funds to Al Qaeda in Pakistan and
Afghanistan via their bases in Iran, and under a specific agreement between Al Qaeda and Iran.
Another bin Laden ally, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, killed by U.S. forces in Iraq on June 7, 2006,
reportedly transited Iran into Iraq after the September 11, 2001, attacks and became an insurgent
leader in Iraq.
Iran has, to some extent, confirmed the presence of Al Qaeda militants in Iran. It asserted on July
23, 2003, that it had “in custody” senior Al Qaeda figures. On July 16, 2005, Iran’s intelligence
minister said that 200 Al Qaeda members are in Iranian jails.68 U.S. officials have said since
January 2002 that Iran has not prosecuted or extradited any senior Al Qaeda operatives.
The 9/11 Commission report said several of the September 11 hijackers and other plotters,
possibly with official help, might have transited Iran, but the report did not assert that the Iranian
government knew about the plot. A U.S. district court filing in May 2011 in New York named
Iranian officials and ministries as materially supporting the Al Qaeda in the September 11 attacks.
On December 15, 2011, the court in favor of the plaintiffs and later ordered Iran, Al Qaeda, and
the Taliban to pay $6 billion in damages to the relatives of the September 11 attacks. Earlier, on
November 28, 2011, a U.S. district court issued a ruling linking Iran (and Sudan) to the August
1998 Al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
Latin America
Some U.S. officials and some in Congress have sought to scrutinize Iran’s relations with countries
and leaders in Latin America. Iran views some left-leaning and anti-U.S. leaning countries in
Latin American as sharing its distrust of the United States and as willing to help Iran circumvent
some international sanctions. However, Rouhani has not expressed substantial interest in
expanding ties in Latin America, in sharp contrast to Ahmadinejad, who visited the region six
times as President. Iran has developed exchange programs that bring students from Latin America
to study Islam in Iran; it does not appear that these programs are intended to build terrorist or
other pro-Iranian operational cells.69

65 Bill Gertz, “Al Qaeda Terrorists Being Held by Iran,” Washington Times, July 24, 2003.
66 Bill Gertz, “CIA Points to Continuing Iran Tie to Al Qaeda,” Washington Times, July 23, 2004.
67 Adam Goldman. “Senior al-Qaeda Figure Leaves Iran Amid Series of Departures.” Washington Post, February 16,
2014.
68 “Tehran Pledges to Crack Down on Militants,” Associated Press, July 18, 2005.
69 Joby Warrick, “Mexican Depicts Iran’s Wooing of Hispanic Youths,” Washington Post, August 11, 2013.
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During 2006-2011, when Ahmadinejad was president, Iran opened six embassies in countries in
the region (Colombia, Nicaragua, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Bolivia), and expanded
embassies in Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. In Ahmadinejad’s visits to the
region, some economic agreements were reached but few were implemented, by all accounts.
Ahmadinejad attended the U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development in Brazil on June 21,
2012, which was bounded by his travel to Bolivia and Venezuela.
In the 112th Congress, H.R. 3783, the “Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act,”
requiring the Administration to develop within 180 days of enactment a strategy to counter Iran’s
influence in Latin America, passed both chambers and was signed on December 28, 2012 (P.L.
112-220). The Administration report required by that law was provided to Congress in late June
2013; the unclassified portion asserted that “Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean
is waning” in part because of U.S. efforts to cause Latin American countries to assess the costs
and benefits of closer relations with Iran.70 No Latin American leader attended the NAM summit
in Tehran in August 2012.
Venezuela. Iran, then under Ahmadinejad’s presidency, had particularly close relations with
Venezuela during the presidency of Hugo Chavez, who passed away in March 2013. Chavez’s
hand-picked successor, Nicolas Maduro, was declared the winner of the April 2013 presidential
election, but Maduro has not expressed nearly the enthusiasm for the Iran relationship that
Chavez did. Even before Chavez’s death on March 5, 2013, there was no U.S. consensus on the
degree of threat posed by Iran-Venezuela ties; in July 2012, President Obama stated that Iran-
Venezuela ties do not constitute a strategic threat to the United States.
Indications differ over how active is Iran’s presence in Venezuela. An April 2010 Defense
Department report on Iran was the first U.S. government publication to say that Qods Force
personnel were in Venezuela, although the 2012 version of the report did not address that issue.
However, a State Department official testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on
June 24, 2011, that Iran’s embassy in Caracas has only about 14 diplomats and is not particularly
active in terms of open diplomatic activity. About 400 Iranian engineers reportedly were sent to
Venezuela to work on infrastructure projects there. Many accounts say that most of the economic
agreements between Iran and Venezuela were not implemented. The arrangements that were
implemented included the establishment of direct air links through an obscure air service,
although the route was suspended in 2010. A deal for Petroleos de Venezuela to supply Iran with
gasoline was signed in September 2009, apparently in a joint effort to circumvent U.S. sanctions
on sales of gasoline to Iran. In part because of this trade, the firm was sanctioned under the Iran
Sanctions Act in May 2011. Other Venezuelan firms have also been sanctioned for ties to Iran, as
discussed in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.
As far as military cooperation, it was reported in May 2011 that the two may have signed an
agreement in October 2010 to develop a joint missile base in Venezuela. However, the Obama
Administration said there was no evidence to support the missile base assertion. Venezuela
reportedly has purchased some Iranian military equipment, such as rifles, as well as $23 million
in military equipment upgrades and an explosives factory.71

70 Department of State, “Annex Z: Unclassified Summary of Policy Recommendations,” June 2013.
71 Martin Arostegui, “Iran Tries to Gain Sway in Latin America,” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2011.
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Cuba. Iran’s relations with Cuba are long-standing and Cuba was routinely included in then
president Ahmadinejad’s several visits to Latin America. In the past, Cuba reportedly has helped
Iran jam the broadcasts of Iranian dissidents based in Los Angeles and elsewhere in the United
States. Still, Cuba’s economy is widely considered too small to be able to materially reduce the
effect of international sanctions against Iran.
Nicaragua. Iran’s embassy in Managua, Nicaragua, is said by close observers to be small, and
Nicaragua has refused Iranian demands to repay $164 million in debt it owes Iran for past crude
oil deliveries. Nicaragua reportedly was upset that Ahmadinejad’s January 2012 visit did not
result in an Iranian pledge to forgive that debt. Iran also failed to implement some promises to
undertake joint ventures with Nicaragua, including a $350 million deep water port there. Still,
President Daniel Ortega hosted Ahmadinejad during his visit there in January 2012.
Argentina. Iran’s relations with Argentina have been strained since the 1992 bombing of the
Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, which was followed by the 1994 bombing of a Jewish
community center there. Both events were widely blamed by investigators and others on Iran,
working through its close ally Hezbollah. Then-Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi visited
Bolivia in May 2011, but President Evo Morales was compelled to apologize to Argentina for
inviting him because of Vahidi’s alleged involvement in the 1994 Buenos Aires bombing. Vahidi
was, at the time of the bombing, the head of the Qods Force. Some in the Jewish community have
opposed a January 2013 Iran-Argentina memorandum of understanding to investigate the 1994
bombing by forming a “truth commission,” rather than to aggressively prosecute the Iranians
involved. In May 2013, the Argentine prosecutor in the AMIA bombing case, Alberto Nisman,
issued a 500-page report alleging that Iran has been working for decades in Latin America, setting
up intelligence stations in the region by utilizing embassies, cultural organizations, and even
mosques as a source of recruitment.
Brazil. Because of its large economy, Brazil, under previous President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva,
emerged as Iran’s most significant supporter, particularly because of Brazil’s engagement with
Iran to forge the “Tehran Declaration” on nuclear issues in June 2010. However, the government
of President Dilma Roussef, whose term began January 1, 2011, has been less supportive of Iran
than was her predecessor. Ahmadinejad did not visit Brazil during his January 2012 visit to the
region, but he did visit in June 2012 to attend the U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development.
Africa
Former President Ahmadinejad tried to enlist the support of some African leaders to reduce Iran’s
international isolation. Ahmadinejad’s outreach focused on those African countries that might be
able to export natural uranium for Iran’s nuclear program to compensate for Iran’s domestic
deficiencies; such uranium producers include Zimbabwe, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo. He made five visits to Africa during his presidency, the most
recent of which was to Niger, Benin, and Ghana in April 2013. However, the visits produced no
major agreements, by most accounts, in part because most African countries do not want to risk
their relationships with the United States by undertaking new dealings with Iran. And, some
countries in Africa complain that Iran has not implemented some of its pledges: an Iranian
promise to build a new oil refinery in Senegal to ease that country’s gasoline shortages was not
implemented. Rouhani is likely to concentrate on Iran’s relationships with the larger and
wealthier countries and likely de-emphasize Africa relative to the policies of Ahmadinejad.
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The State Department report on terrorism for 2013 states that Iran “has increased its presence in
Africa,” but without providing additional detail. In October 2010, according to Senegalese
government sources, the IRGC-QF reportedly attempted to ship weapons to Gambia, via Nigeria,
but the shipment was intercepted in Nigeria. Several Iranian entities, and a Nigerian shipping
agent, were sanctioned by the United States in April 2012 for facilitating this incident. The
Nigerian shipping agent allegedly helped Qods Force personnel enter Nigeria. On May 13, 2013,
a Nigerian court convicted one alleged QF member and his Nigerian accomplice to five years in
prison for the shipment. The U.N. panel of experts report on Iranian arms sales embargo
violations, discussed above, have cited Iranian attempts to ship weapons to allies in the Middle
East via Nigeria. Iran restored relations with Senegal on February 7, 2013; relations had been
severed in February 2011 when Senegal accused Iran of supplying weapons to rebels in its
southern Casamance region. (For more information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by
Kenneth Katzman.)
Some Members of Congress are concerned that Iran is supporting radical Islamist movements or
planning acts of terrorism in Africa. Allegations of Iran’s support for Al Qaeda affiliates in Africa
are discussed above in the section on Al Qaeda. A Kenyan court found two Iranian men guilty on
May 2, 2013, of planning to carry out bombings in Kenya, apparently against Israeli targets there.
As noted above, the U.N. panel of experts reportedly concluded in early 2014 that Iranian arms
had reached Al Shabab in Somalia. However, such activity appears to be a minor component of
Iranian policy and it is not clear that Iran seeks a broad relationship with Al Shabab.
Sudan
Perhaps Iran’s closest relationship in Africa is with the government of Sudan, which, like Iran, is
identified by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran’s relations with Sudan give
Iran leverage against Egypt and a channel to supply weapons to Hamas and pro-Iranian
movements in north and east Africa.72 Independent experts have documented Iranian defense
transfers to Sudan, which are not voluntarily reported to the United Nations.73 There is periodic
media speculation, and accusations from Israel, that links Iran to alleged weapons shipments
through Sudan bound for Gaza.74 In October 2012, a weapons factory in Khartoum, purportedly a
source of Iranian weapons supplies for Hamas, was bombed, apparently by Israel.
Iran’s relations with Sudan were particularly close in the early 1990s when Islamist leaders in
Sudan welcomed international Islamist movements to train and organize there, but outwardly
cooled in the mid-1990s when international sanctions on Sudan compelled that country to
downplay Islamist links abroad. Iran nonetheless continued to supply the Sudanese government
with weapons it has used on its various fronts, such as the one with South Sudan, and the QF

72 Michael Lipin. “Sudan’s Iran Alliance Under Scrutiny.” VOANews October 31, 2012. http://www.voanews.com/
content/article/1536472.html.
73 Mike Lewis, “Skirting the Law, Sudan’s Post-CPA Arms Flows, Small Arms Survey, September 2009;” Sudan
Human Security Baseline Assessment, “SAF “Were the Israelis Behind the ‘Mystery’ Air Strike in Sudan?”
Time, April 6, 2011; “Car Blast in E. Sudan, Khartoum Points to Israel,” Reuters, May 22, 2012; “Rockets
and Meetings,” Africa Confidential, May 25, 2012.Weapons Documented in South Kordofan,” Small Arms
Survey, April 2012.
74 “Were the Israelis Behind the ‘Mystery’ Air Strike in Sudan?” Time, April 6, 2011; “Car Blast in E. Sudan,
Khartoum Points to Israel,” Reuters, May 22, 2012; “Rockets and Meetings,” Africa Confidential, May 25,
2012.Weapons Documented in South Kordofan,” Small Arms Survey, April 2012.
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reportedly has armed and trained Sudanese forces including the Popular Defense Force militia.75
Some observers say Iranian pilots have assisted Sudan’s air force there. Iran’s naval forces made
three visits to Port Sudan since 2012, and Iran has offered to build missile defense platforms in
Sudan that would help stop further Israeli attacks. Sudan’s Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Karti
stated in November 2013 that Sudan had rejected the offer, possibly to avoid alarming the Persian
Gulf states who view Khartoum’s relations with Sudan with suspicion.
U.S. Policy Approaches and Additional Options
The February 11, 1979, fall of the Shah of Iran, a key U.S. ally, opened a deep and ongoing rift in
U.S.-Iranian relations. The Islamic revolution in Iran occurred at the start of the third year of the
Carter Administration. That Administration initially sought a degree of engagement with the
Islamic regime, but it agreed to allow the ex-Shah into the United States for medical treatment
and engaged some moderate Iranian officials of the new regime who were viewed by Khomeini
loyalists as insufficiently revolutionary. As a result, the U.S.-Iran estrangement deepened
significantly began on November 4, 1979, when radical pro-Khomeini “students in the line of the
Imam (Khomeini)” seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held its diplomats hostage until
minutes after President Reagan’s inauguration on January 20, 1981. That anniversary is
remembered each year in Iran with large government-orchestrated anti-U.S. demonstrations near
the former U.S. embassy in Tehran. That embassy is now used as a museum commemorating the
revolution and as a Basij headquarters. The United States broke relations with Iran on April 7,
1980, two weeks prior to the failed U.S. military attempt to rescue the hostages during April 24-
25, 1980. Until 2013, the two countries had limited contact after that time.
Reagan Administration. Iran was placed on the U.S. “terrorism list” in 1984, a designation that
reinforces the U.S “tilt” toward Iraq in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. As part of the effort to
bolster Iraq in that war, U.S. diplomacy attempted to block conventional arms sales to Iran and
the United States provided battlefield intelligence to Iraq.76 During 1987-1988, U.S. naval forces
engaged in several skirmishes with Iranian naval elements in the course of U.S. efforts to protect
international oil shipments in the Gulf from Iranian mines and other attacks. On April 18, 1988
(“Operation Praying Mantis”), Iran lost one-quarter of its larger naval ships in an engagement
with the U.S. Navy, including a frigate sunk. On July 3, 1988, U.S. forces in the Gulf mistakenly
shot down Iran Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes over the Gulf.
George H. W. Bush Administration. After the Iran-Iraq War ended, President George H. W. Bush
laid the groundwork for a rapprochement with Iran. In his January 1989 inaugural speech, saying
that, in relations with Iran, “goodwill begets goodwill,” implying better relations if Iran helped
obtain the release of U.S. hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran did assist in obtaining
their release, completed in December 1991. However, no thaw followed, possibly because Iran
continued to back groups opposed to the U.S.-sponsored Middle East peace process.
Clinton Administration. Upon taking office in 1993, the Clinton Administration at first adopted a
strategy of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq. In 1995 and 1996, the Clinton Administration and

75 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2012/1025/Did-Israel-just-blow-up-an-Iranian-
weapons-factory-in-Sudan.
76 Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1991), p. 168.
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Congress banned U.S. trade and investment with Iran and imposed penalties on investment in
Iran’s energy sector (Iran Sanctions Act) in response to growing concerns about Iran’s weapons of
mass destruction and its efforts to subvert the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Clinton
Administration expressed skepticism of the EU’s policy of “critical dialogue” with Iran—a
dialogue consisting of EU meetings with Iran that included criticisms of Iran’s human rights
policies and its support for militant movements in the Middle East.
The election of relative moderate Mohammad Khatemi in May 1997 precipitated a U.S. offer of
direct dialogue with Iran without preconditions. In January 1998, Khatemi publicly agreed to
“people-to-people” U.S.-Iran exchanges, but ruled out direct talks. In a June 1998 speech, then-
Secretary of State Albright called for mutual confidence building measures that could lead to a
“road map” for normalization. In a March 17, 2000, speech, she acknowledged past U.S.
meddling in Iran, announcing an easing of the U.S. trade ban, and promised to try to resolve
outstanding claims disputes. At the September 2000 U.N. “Millennium Summit” in New York,
Albright and President Clinton attended Khatemi’s speeches.
George W. Bush Administration. Although Iran’s government apparently had no direct role in the
September 11, 2001, attacks, President George W. Bush defined Iran as an adversary of the
United States when he included Iran as part of an “axis of evil” (along with Iraq and North Korea)
in his January 2002 State of the Union message. Later that year, Iran’s nuclear program emerged
as a major issue for U.S. policy toward Iran. President Bush’s January 20, 2005, second inaugural
address and his January 31, 2006, State of the Union message stated that the United States would
be a close ally of a free and democratic Iran—reflecting sentiment for changing Iran’s regime.77
On the other hand, reflecting the views of those in the Administration who favored diplomacy,
particularly on Iraq and Afghanistan. The Administration conducted a dialogue in Geneva with
Iran on Iraq and Afghanistan from late 2001 until May 2003,78 representing the first confirmed
direct dialogue between the two countries since the 1979 revolution. The United States aided
victims of the December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran. An amendment by then Senator Joseph
Biden to the FY2007 defense authorization bill (P.L. 109-364) supported the Administration
joining the European countries’ nuclear talks with Iran.
The Bush Administration did not offer Iran an unconditional, direct U.S.-Iran bilateral dialogue
on all issues of U.S. concern. Some assert that the Bush Administration missed an opportunity for
a “grand bargain” with Iran on its nuclear program and other issues of concern by rebuffing a
reported comprehensive overture from Iran just before the May 12, 2003, Riyadh bombing. The
Washington Post reported on February 14, 2007, (“2003 Memo Says Iranian Leaders Backed
Talks”) that the Swiss ambassador to Iran in 2003, Tim Guldimann, had informed U.S. officials of
a comprehensive Iranian proposal for talks with the United States.79 However, State Department
and some European diplomats dispute that the proposal was fully vetted within Iran’s leadership.

77 Helene Cooper and David Sanger, “Strategy on Iran Stirs New Debate at White House,” New York Times, June 16,
2007.
78 Robin Wright, “U.S. In ‘Useful’ Talks With Iran,” Los Angeles Times, May 13, 2003.
79 http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/2003_Spring_Iran_Proposal.pdf.
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Obama Administration Policy: Pressure Coupled with Engagement
After taking office in 2009, President Obama asserted that there was an opportunity to
diplomatically persuade Iran to limit its nuclear program and to build a new relationship after
decades of estrangement and enmity. Some Obama Administration officials expressed skepticism
that engagement would yield changes in Iran’s policies, while other officials believed that the
United States needed to present Iran with clear choices if it continues to expand its nuclear
program. Obama Administration Iran policy unfolded in President Obama’s first message to the
Iranian people on the occasion of Nowruz (Persian New Year) on March 21, 2009. He stated that
the United States “is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before
us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran, and the international
community.” He also referred to Iran as “The Islamic Republic of Iran,” a formulation suggesting
aversion to regime change. Other steps included the following.
• President Obama’s reported two letters in 2009 to Iran’s Supreme Leader
expressing the Administration’s philosophy in favor of engagement with Iran.
• A major speech to the “Muslim World” in Cairo on June 4, 2009, in which
President Obama acknowledged that the United States had played a role in the
overthrow of Mossadeq, and said that Iran had a right to peaceful nuclear power
if it complies with its responsibilities under the NPT.
• An announcement on April 8, 2009, that U.S. officials would attend all P5+1
meetings with Iran, and a loosening of restrictions on U.S. diplomats to meet
their Iranian counterparts at international meetings.
2009-2013: Emphasis on Pressure
At the end of 2009, Iran’s crackdown on the 2009 election-related unrest and its refusal to finalize
the October 1, 2009, interim nuclear agreement discussed above caused the Administration to
shift to a “two track strategy:” economic pressure coupled with nuclear negotiations and offers of
sanctions relief in return for a compromise. The sanctions imposed during the period, and the
degree of international cooperation with the sanctions engendered, were substantial—reflecting
the emphasis in the U.S. strategy on pressure. The sanctions imposed are discussed in detail in
CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. The Administration also criticized Iran’s human rights
abuses, altered some sanctions regulations to help Iranians circumvent government restrictions on
the Internet, and continued to fund training and exchanges with civil society activists in Iran. The
Administration repeatedly stated that a military option “remains on the table” and it continued to
work with the Persian Gulf states and other regional allies to contain Iranian missile and other
capabilities.
Response to Rouhani
The election of Hassan Rouhani was judged by the Administration as providing an opportunity
for a shift in policy from emphasis on economic pressure to emphasis on diplomacy. The
Administration reacted to the election by reiterating the offer stated by Vice President Biden in
February 2013, to engage in direct talks with Iran on the nuclear issue. A letter signed by 131
House Members to President Obama, dated July 19, 2013, stated that it would be “prudent for the
United States to utilize all diplomatic tools to reinvigorate ongoing nuclear talks.”
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The potential for rapprochement seemed to improve as the U.N. General Assembly meetings in
New York approached. On September 20, 2013, the Washington Post published an op-ed by
Rouhani, entitled “Time to Engage,” stating a commitment to “fulfilling my promises to my
people, including my pledge to engage in constructive interaction with the world.” President
Obama, in his September 24, 2013, speech, confirmed that he had exchanged letters with Rouhani
stating the U.S. willingness to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully.80 President Obama’s speech
also appeared intended, in part, to assuage the Supreme Leader’s reported concerns, by stating
“We are not seeking regime change.” He also reiterated that the United States “respect[s] the right
of the Iranian people to access peaceful nuclear energy.”
September 2013 Phone Conversation. The Administration signaled that the President would be
open to meeting Rouhani on September 24, 2013, between their respective speeches to the
General Assembly. That meeting did not occur; Rouhani attributed the failure to meet to
inadequate time to prepare for a meeting, although experts attributed it to Rouhani’s need to avoid
angering hardline regime elements in Iran. President Obama called Rouhani by phone on
September 27, 2013, representing the first direct contact between presidents of the two countries
since the 1979 Islamic revolution. The two presidents reportedly agreed to direct their teams to
focus on a nuclear solution.
After the U.N. meetings, the Administration focused on the nuclear talks in Geneva, which
reached agreement on the JPA and continued with the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear
settlement. The Administration has said that there will be no linkage between a comprehensive
deal and Iranian cooperation on such other issues as Iraq, Syria, or Iran’s human rights record.
Still, the negotiations have improved the climate for broadening U.S.-Iran talks, and the United
States and Iranian officials met bilaterally on the Iraq issue at the margins of the nuclear talks in
June 2014. There is speculation among experts that President Obama and Rouhani might meet,
perhaps briefly, during the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York in September 2014 in
an attempt to overcome obstacles to a comprehensive nuclear settlement.
Containment and Military Options: U.S. Posture in the Gulf
Some take the view that Iran will inevitably become a nuclear armed state and that containing a
nuclear armed Iran is a more feasible and effective option than any other. Experts who support
containment argue that the strategy can also limit Iran’s political and military influence more
broadly, even if there is a nuclear settlement. Critics of containment see any formal adoption of
that strategy as an abandonment of U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state. All
senior Obama Administration officials, including President Obama, have explicitly asserted that
U.S. policy is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state. S.J.Res. 41, which passed the
Senate on September 22, 2012, in the 112th Congress, rejects any U.S. policy that relies on
containment but acknowledges that President Obama has ruled out a containment policy.
There is no consensus on the parameters of a containment strategy. Many argue that such a policy
would consist of isolating Iran to the extent possible through sanctions and diplomacy, as well as
through the threat of U.S. military action to prevent Iranian aggression. A key component of a
containment policy is for the United States to maintain a significant defense capability in the Gulf

80 Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 2013.
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and to enhance the capabilities and resolve of U.S. allies there. The Obama Administration has
continued to implement both of these policy components, as discussed below.
Military Action: Pros and Cons
A significant U.S. defense posture can be used not only for containment, but to implement any
U.S. decision to take military action to stop Iran’s nuclear progress. President Obama has
repeatedly stated that “all options are on the table” to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon. In a March 2, 2012, interview in The Atlantic, President Obama clarified that the
“military option” as meaning that there is a military component to preventing a nuclear-armed
Iran.81 He has repeated the “all options on the table” formulation even after the JPA was agreed,
indicating that such an option is open should the JPA collapse or no permanent nuclear deal be
reached. Yet, President Obama and other senior officials continued to maintain that military
action is a last resort if sanctions and diplomacy fail.
Some argue that U.S. military action could set back Iran’s nuclear program substantially because
there are a limited number of key targets and all targets, even the hardened Fordow site, are
vulnerable to U.S. air power.82 Other experts suggest that U.S. expressions of confidence in its
ability to do substantial damage to Iranian nuclear targets could be intended to signal to Israel that
the United States can destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, if needed. A U.S. ground invasion to
remove Iran’s regime has not, at any time, appeared to be under serious consideration, in part
because of the likely resistance an invasion would meet in Iran.
Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly stressed the potential adverse consequences of military
action, such as Iranian retaliation that might expand throughout the region or even beyond, a
reduction of Iran’s regional isolation, a strengthening of Iran’s regime domestically, an escalation
of world oil prices, and the likelihood that military action would only delay Iran’s eventual
acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by about one to two years.83 Most U.S. allies oppose
military action, and some allied countries and experts warn that U.S.-Iran military conflict could
result from events or actions other than a deliberate U.S. strike. For example, Iran threatened
repeatedly in 2012 to close the Strait of Hormuz if sanctions are imposed on Iran’s exportation of
oil. This issue is discussed in detail in CRS Report R42335, Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,
coordinated by Kenneth Katzman.
Some argue that there are U.S. military options that would not require hostilities. These options
include a naval embargo or a “no-fly zone” over Iran to pressure the regime. These options appear
to be under current consideration.
Presidential Authorities and Legislation on Military Action. A decision to take military action
might raise the question of presidential authorities, but no legislation has been passed by both
chambers and signed into law limiting the President’s authority to use military force against Iran.
In the 109th Congress, H.Con.Res. 391 (introduced on April 26, 2006) called on the President to

81 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama to Iran and Israel: ‘As President of the United States, I Don’t Bluff’,” The Atlantic, March
2, 2012.
82 Joby Warrick, “Iran: Underground Sites Vulnerable, Experts Say,” Washington Post, March 1, 2012. For an extended
discussion of U.S. air strike options on Iran, see Rogers, Paul. Iran: Consequences Of a War. Oxford Research Group,
February 2006.
83 http://2scottmontgomery.blogspot.com/2011/12/panetta-brookings-speech.html.
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not initiate military action against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress. A
similar bill, H.Con.Res. 33, was introduced in the 110th Congress. An amendment to H.R. 1585,
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008, requiring authorization for force against
Iran, was defeated 136 to 288. A provision that sought to bar the Administration from taking
military action against Iran without congressional authorization was taken out of an early draft of
an FY2007 supplemental appropriation (H.R. 1591). Other provisions, including requiring
briefings to Congress about military contingency planning related to Iran’s nuclear program, were
in the House version (H.R. 5658) of a FY2009 defense authorization bill, but not the final law.
The FY2011 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383, signed January 7, 2011) contained a
provision (§1243) requiring the Administration to develop a “National Military Strategy to
Counter Iran.”
In the 111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 94 called for the United States to negotiate an “Incidents at
Sea” agreement with Iran. Section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011
(P.L. 111-383) called for a DOD report, within one year of enactment, on the merits of such an
agreement with Iran and other Persian Gulf countries. A press report in September 2011 said that
some Defense Department officials were contemplating establishing formal communications
channels to Iranian naval officers to prevent misunderstandings and unintended conflict.84 The
idea grew out of a series of incidents with Iranian vessels, some of the incidents involving British
warships, that nearly prompted confrontation with Iran. The concept has not been implemented.
U.S. Deployments in the Persian Gulf
Whether or not U.S. military action against Iran is ordered, the United States maintains a large
Persian Gulf presence as a demonstration that a military option can be implemented. During an
early December 2013 visit to several Gulf states, Secretary of Defense Hagel stated that the
United States maintains about 35,000 forces in the Gulf region. Most of them are stationed at
various Gulf state facilities that the United States has access to, in accordance with Defense
Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) between the United States and these countries. Some of the
forces are aboard the at least one U.S. aircraft carrier task force that is in the Gulf region virtually
continuously. The U.S. defense posture in the Gulf is as follows:85
• Saudi Arabia. The United States does not have a DCA with Saudi Arabia.
Nonetheless, a few hundred U.S. military personnel are in Saudi Arabia training
its military and Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) forces. During the 1990s,
the United States emplaced forces and combat aircraft at such Saudi facilities as
Prince Sultan Air Base, about 60 miles south of Riyadh.
• Kuwait. The United States has had a DCA with Kuwait since 1991, and about
13,000 U.S. Army personnel are stationed there, providing ground combat
capability in the wake of the full U.S withdrawal from Iraq. The forces operate
out of such facilities as Camp Arifjan, south of Kuwait City, where the United
States prepositions ground armor including tanks. U.S. forces train at Camp

84 Jay Solomon and Julian Barnes, “U.S. Weighs A Direct Line to Tehran,” Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2011.
85 The U.S. deployments in the Gulf are discussed in greater detail in CRS reports on the individual GCC states.
Information in this section is derived from author visits to the GCC states since 1993 and conversations with U.S. and
Gulf state diplomats.
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Buehring, about 50 miles west of the capital, and operate in other facilities such
as Shaykh Jabir Air Base.
• Qatar. The United States has had a DCA with Qatar since 1992; Secretary Hagel
signed an updated version during his visit in December 2013. About 5,000 U.S.
forces, mostly Air Force, are in Qatar, manning the forward headquarters of U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM), which has responsibility for the Middle East
and Central Asia; a Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) that oversees U.S.
combat aircraft missions in the region; the large Al Udeid Air Base, and the As
Saliyah army prepositioning site where U.S. tanks are prepositioned.
• UAE. The United States has had a DCA with UAE since 1994. About 5,000 U.S.
forces, mostly Air Force and Navy, are stationed in UAE, operating surveillance
and refueling aircraft from Al Dhafra Air Base, and servicing U.S. Navy and
contract ships which dock at the large commercial port of Jebel Ali.
• Bahrain. The United States has had a DCA with Bahrain since 1991. About 6,000
U.S. personnel, mostly Navy, operate out of the large Naval Support Activity
facility that houses the U.S. command structure for all U.S. naval operations in
the Gulf. U.S. Air Force personnel also access Shaykh Isa Air Base.
• Oman. The United States has had a “facilities access agreement” (not a DCA)
with Oman since April 1980. Under the agreement, U.S. forces, mostly Air Force,
have access to Omani air bases such as those at Seeb, Masirah Island, Thumrait,
and Musnanah. A few hundred U.S. forces serve at these facilities.
U.S. Efforts to Enhance Indigenous Gulf Defense Capabilities
The Obama Administration has continued, and in some ways expanded, prior initiatives to
support the indigenous military capabilities of the GCC states. The Administration inaugurated a
“U.S.-GCC Strategic Dialogue” in March 30-31, 2012. A cornerstone of the initiative, similar to
that of forerunner efforts, is to coordinate Gulf state missile defense capabilities. Secretary of
Defense Hagel emphasized the joint missile defense vision during his December 2013 and May
2014 visits to the Gulf, including stating that the United States prefers to sell related equipment to
the GCC as a bloc, rather than individually. As part of this effort, there have been several recent
missile defense sales include PAC-3 sales to UAE and Kuwait; and the advanced “THAAD”
(Theater High Altitude Area Defense) to UAE and Qatar. In September 2012, it was reported that
the United States was putting in place an early-warning missile defense radar in Qatar that, when
combined with radars in Israel and Turkey, would provide a wide range of coverage against Iran’s
missile forces.86
Other major U.S. arms sales to the GCC countries have been intended to improve their air and
naval capabilities and their interoperability with U.S. forces, as well as to improve border and
maritime security. The United States has continued to agree to major sales to virtually all of the
GCC states, including such equipment as combat aircraft, precision-guided munitions, Littoral
Combat Ships, radar systems, and communications gear. Some arms sales to Bahrain have been
withheld because of the government’s use of force to suppress Shiite unrest there.

86 David Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “To Calm Israel, U.S. Offers Ways to Restrain Iran,” New York Times, September 3,
2012.
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Some U.S. officials have at times raised the possibility of a more expansive U.S. security
commitment to the Gulf states against Iran. In February 2010, then-Secretary of State Clinton
raised the issue of a possible U.S. extension of a “security umbrella” or guarantee to regional
states against Iran.
Other Missile Defense Concepts
As part of the effort to demonstrate to Iran that nuclear weapons have no utility, there has also
been planning to defend against an eventual long-range Iranian missile system. In August 2008,
the George W. Bush Administration reached agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to
establish a missile defense system to counter Iranian ballistic missiles. These agreements were
reached over Russia’s opposition, which was based on the belief that the missile defense system
would be used to neutralize Russian capabilities. However, reportedly based on assessments of
Iran’s focus on missiles of regional range, on September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration
reoriented this missile defense program to focus, at least initially, on ship-based systems, and
systems based in other European countries, including Romania, possibly later returning to the
idea of Poland- and Czech-based systems. Some saw this as an effort to win Russia’s support for
additional sanctions on Iran, although Russia continues to disagree with the plan. The FY2013
national defense authorization act (P.L. 112-239) contained provisions urging the Administration
to undertake more extensive efforts, in cooperation with U.S. partners and others, to defend
against the missile programs of Iran (and North Korea).
Iranian Retaliation Scenarios
Consistent with U.S. assessments, Iran’s Supreme Leader and other Iranian political and military
figures have repeatedly warned that Iran would retaliate for any U.S. or other military action
taken against Iran. In September 2012, IRGC officials warned that even if military action were
taken only by Israel, the action would trigger retaliation against U.S. targets. Some U.S. officials
believe Iran would try to retaliate through terrorist attacks inside the United States or against U.S.
embassies and facilities in Europe or the Persian Gulf. Iran could also try to direct anti-U.S.
militias in Afghanistan to attack U.S. personnel there.
Were Iran to take retaliatory action against the United States and the GCC states, it would
probably rely most heavily on its ships, submarines, and short range missiles. Iran could
potentially use its large fleet of small boats to “swarm” U.S. ships, and its ability to lay numerous
mines in the narrow Strait of Hormuz. Iran has added naval bases along its Gulf coast in recent
years, enhancing its ability to threaten shipping in the Strait. In February 2013, Iran began
planning an additional naval base near Iran’s border with Pakistan, on the Sea of Oman.
To reduce the effectiveness of Iranian retaliation, some argue that the United States would need to
strike not only nuclear facilities but all of the retaliatory capabilities discussed above. Press
reports in February 2012, citing reported Defense Department briefings of President Obama on
military options on Iran, said that a U.S. strike could include IRGC and Iranian leadership targets.
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Potential for an Israeli Strike?87
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has asserted that a nuclear-armed Iran would
constitute an existential threat to Israel, and that Israel would take unilateral action to prevent a
nuclear-armed Iran. Israeli leaders have expressed concern that Iran’s nuclear program was
advancing to the point where Israel would no longer have a military option, and Netanyahu
openly opposed the JPA as failing to dismantle Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The Obama
Administration resisted the urgings of Netanyahu, in his September 27, 2012, U.N. General
Assembly speech, to set clear “red lines”—actions by Iran that would trigger certain U.S. military
action. On May 22, 2013, by a vote of 99-0, the Senate passed a “sense of Congress” resolution,
S.Res. 65, that the United States should support Israel diplomatically, economically, and
militarily if it felt compelled to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Still, the JPA and the talks on a
comprehensive nuclear agreement appear to preclude an Israeli military strike on Iran, at least in
the short term.
Although Israeli strategists say that a strike might be a viable option, several U.S. experts doubt
that Israel has the capability to make such action sufficiently effective to justify the risks. The
IAF is capable but far smaller than that of the United States, and could require overflight of
several countries not likely to support Israeli action, such as Iraq.
Reported Covert Action
There reportedly has also been U.S. covert action to slow Iran’s nuclear program, but no apparent
U.S. covert action to try to destabilize Iran politically. During 2006-2008, it was reported that the
United States and Israel conducted operations that resulted in the sale to Iran of nuclear and other
technology rigged to have a destructive effect on Iran’s programs. Another example includes the
Stuxnet computer virus that caused many Iranian centrifuges to be destroyed. The killings of
some Iranian scientists over the past few years remain unexplained and could have been the result
of covert action. Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, a chemical engineer at the Natanz enrichment facility,
died when a bomb placed under his car exploded on January 10, 2012.
Some believe that Iran is retaliating for the reported covert action through cyberattacks on U.S. or
foreign financial institutions, which have been occurring since 2012. U.S. officials have said Iran
might also have perpetrated a cyberattack against Persian Gulf state oil and gas firms in mid-
2012. U.S. officials say they are working with affected institutions to try to stop the attacks, and
some press reports say that other forms of retaliation against Iran might be under consideration.88
Regime Change
Even before the election of Rouhani, the Obama Administration has consistently sought to allay
Iran’s long-standing suspicions that the main U.S. goal is to unseat the Islamic regime in Iran.
Since then, in a September 24, 2013, General Assembly speech, President Obama explicitly stated
the United States does not seek to change Iran’s regime. However, many of Iran’s leaders,

87 This option is analyzed in substantial depth in CRS Report R42443, Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s
Nuclear Facilities, coordinated by Jim Zanotti.
88 Siobhan Gorman and Danny Yadron, “Banks Seek U.S. Help on Iran Cyberattacks,” Wall Street Journal, January 16,
2013.
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particularly Khamene’i, continue to articulate a perception that the United States has never
accepted the 1979 Islamic revolution. Khamene’i and other Iranian figures note that the United
States provided some funding to anti-regime groups, mainly pro-monarchists, during the 1980s,89
and the George W. Bush Administration expressed attraction to this option on several occasions.
There was criticism in Iranian opposition and other circles of the Administration decision not to
materially support the 2009 domestic uprising in Iran. The Administration asserts that it was
appropriately critical of the regime crackdown on protests. On December 28, 2009, President
Obama stated that “Along with all free nations, the United States stands with those who seek their
universal rights.”90 On September 19, 2010, then-Secretary of State Clinton asserted that overt
and extensive U.S. support for the opposition could undermine the opposition’s position in Iran.
In 2011, the Administration reevaluated its stance slightly in the context of the broader Middle
East uprisings. Statements by then-Secretary Clinton accused Iran of hypocrisy for supporting
demonstrations in Egypt while preventing similar free expression inside Iran.91 Many observers
noted that President Obama’s 2011 Nowruz address was far more explicitly supportive of the
Iranian opposition than in past years, mentioning specific dissidents who have been jailed and
saying to the “young people of Iran ... I want you to know that I am with you.”92 Since that
statement, the Administration has sanctioned Iranian officials for human rights abuses in Iran and
for assisting Syria with its crackdown against demonstrations. These statements and steps stop
short of constituting a policy of “regime change,” although Iran interprets any public support for
the domestic opposition as evidence of U.S. intent to overthrow the clerical government.
Some in Congress have advocated a U.S. policy of overthrow of the regime. In the 111th
Congress, one bill said that it should be U.S. policy to promote the overthrow of the regime (The
Iran Democratic Transition Act, S. 3008).
Democracy Promotion and Internet Freedom Efforts
In the absence of all-out U.S. pursuit of regime change, successive Administrations and Congress
have agreed on steps to promote gradual political evolution in Iran through “democracy
promotion” and sanctions on Iranian human rights abuses. The laws and Executive Orders
discussed in this section are analyzed in greater detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.
That report also contains tables listing Iranian entities sanctioned under these provisions.

89 CRS conversations with U.S. officials responsible for Iran policy. 1980-1990. After a period of suspension of such
assistance, in 1995, the Clinton Administration accepted a House-Senate conference agreement to include $18-$20
million in funding authority for covert operations against Iran in the FY1996 Intelligence Authorization Act (H.R.
1655, P.L. 104-93), according to a Washington Post report of December 22, 1995. The Clinton Administration
reportedly focused the covert aid on changing the regime’s behavior, rather than its overthrow.
90 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on the Attempted Attack on Christmas Day
and Recent Violence in Iran,” December 28, 2009.
91 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/27/statement-national-security-council-spokesman-tommy-
vietor-iran.
92 White House, “Remarks of President Obama Marking Nowruz,” March 20, 2011.
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Sanctioning Iranian Human Rights Abusers and Abuses
As part of its efforts to isolate the regime on human rights grounds, on September 29, 2010,
President Obama, acting in accordance with Section 105 of P.L. 111-195 (CISADA), issued
Executive Order 13553, imposing sanctions on Iranian officials determined to have committed
human rights abuses since Iran’s 2009 election. Sanctions include a ban on visas to the United
States and freeze on U.S.-based assets or trade with them. In an annex, eight Iranian officials
were named as violators and were subjected to the sanctions.
In the 112th Congress, several bills were introduced to increase sanctions on Iranian human rights
abusers, including S. 879 and H.R. 1714. Elements of them were incorporated into a broad Iran
sanctions bill, H.R. 1905, passed by both chambers on August 1, 2012, and signed on August 10
(P.L. 112-158), and expanded since.
Promoting Internet Freedom in Iran
U.S. actions have focused on preventing the Iranian government’s suppression of electronic
communication. Several laws and Executive Orders issued since 2010 are intended to promote
Internet freedom, and the Administration has amended U.S.-Iran trade regulations to allow for the
sale to Iranians of consumer electronics and software that help them communicate. Under
Secretary of State Wendy Sherman testified on October 14, 2011, that some of the democracy
promotion funding for Iran has been to train Iranians in the use of technologies that undermine
regime Internet censorship efforts.
Democracy Promotion Funding
Binding legislation to favor democracy promotion in Iran was enacted in the 109th Congress. The
Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293), signed September 30, 2006, authorized funds (no
specific dollar amount) for Iran democracy promotion.93 Iran asserts that funding democracy
promotion represents a violation of the 1981 “Algiers Accords” that settled the Iran hostage crisis
and provide for non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
The George W. Bush Administration asserted that open funding of Iranian pro-democracy
activists (see below) as a stated effort to change regime behavior, not to overthrow the regime,
although some saw the Bush Administration’s efforts as a cover to achieve a regime change
objective. A few accounts, such as “Preparing the Battlefield” by Seymour Hersh in the New
Yorker (July 7 and 14, 2008), say that President George W. Bush authorized U.S. covert
operations to destabilize the regime,94 involving assistance to some of the ethnic-based armed
groups discussed above. CRS has no way to confirm assertions in the Hersh article that up to
$400 million was appropriated and/or used to aid the groups mentioned.
The State Department, the implementer of U.S. democracy promotion programs for Iran, has used
funds in appropriations (see Table 9) to support pro-democracy programs run by at organizations

93 This legislation was a modification of H.R. 282, which passed the House on April 26, 2006, by a vote of 397-21, and
S. 333, which was introduced in the Senate.
94 Brian Ross and Richard Esposito, “Bush Authorizes New Covert Action Against Iran,” http://blogs.abcnews.com/
theblotter/2007/05/bush_authorizes.html.
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based in the United States and in Europe; the department refuses to name grantees for security
reasons. The funds shown below have been obligated through DRL and the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs in partnership with USAID. Some of the funds have been appropriated for cultural
exchanges, public diplomacy, and broadcasting to Iran. A further indication of the sensitivity of
specifying the use of the funds is that, since FY2010, the Obama Administration has requested
funds for Iran democracy promotion as part of a broader “Near East regional democracy
programs” rather than delineating a specific request for Iran programs.
Many have consistently questioned the effectiveness of such funding. In the view of many
experts, U.S. funds would make the aid recipients less attractive to most Iranians. Even before the
post-2009 election crackdown, Iran was arresting civil society activists by alleging they are
accepting the U.S. democracy promotion funds, while others have refused to participate in U.S.-
funded programs, fearing arrest.95 In May 2007—Iranian American scholar Haleh Esfandiari, of
the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, was imprisoned for several months, on the
grounds that the Wilson Center was part of this effort. The center has denied being part of the
democracy promotion effort in Iran.
Perhaps in response to some of these criticisms, the Obama Administration altered Iran
democracy promotion programs somewhat toward working directly with Iranians inside Iran who
are organized around such apolitical issues as health care, the environment, and science.96 During
2009, less emphasis was placed on funding journalists and human rights activists in Iran, or on
sponsoring visits by Iranians to the United States.97 One issue arose concerning the State
Department decision in late 2009 not to renew a contract to the Iran Human Rights
Documentation Center (IHRDC), based at Yale University, which was cataloguing human rights
abuses in Iran. However, IHRDC has reportedly continued to receive some U.S. funding to
continue its work.
Broadcasting/Public Diplomacy Issues
Another part of the democracy promotion effort has been the development of new U.S.
broadcasting services to Iran. The broadcasting component of policy has been an extension of a
trend that began in the late 1990s. Radio Farda (“tomorrow,” in Farsi) began under Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), in partnership with the Voice of America (VOA), in 2002. The
service was established as a successor to a smaller Iran broadcasting effort begun with an initial
$4 million from the FY1998 Commerce/State/Justice appropriation (P.L. 105-119). It was to be
called Radio Free Iran but was never formally given that name by RFE/RL. Radio Farda now
broadcasts 24 hours/day. Radio Farda has 59 full time employees. No U.S. assistance has been
provided to Iranian exile-run stations.98

95 Three other Iranian Americans were arrested and accused by the Intelligence Ministry of actions contrary to national
security in May 2007: U.S. funded broadcast (Radio Farda) journalist Parnaz Azima (who was not in jail but was not
allowed to leave Iran); Kian Tajbacksh of the Open Society Institute funded by George Soros; and businessman and
peace activist Ali Shakeri. Several congressional resolutions called on Iran to release Esfandiari (S.Res. 214 agreed to
by the Senate on May 24; H.Res. 430, passed by the House on June 5; and S.Res. 199). All were released by October
2007. Tajbacksh was rearrested in September 2009 and remains incarcerated.
96 CRS conversation with U.S. officials of the “Iran Office” of the U.S. Consulate in Dubai, October 2009.
97 Jay Solomon, “U.S. Shifts Its Strategy Toward Iran’s Dissidents,” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2010.
98 The conference report on the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriations, P.L. 109-102, stated the sense of Congress
that such support should be considered.
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According to information provided to CRS by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), the
costs of Radio Farda are FY2010: $9.9 million; FY2011: $11.84 million; and FY2012: $11.77
million.
Persian News Network (PNN). The VOA established a Persian language service to Iran (VOA
Persian Service) in July 2003. In July 2007, it was renamed Persian News Network (PNN),
encompassing radio (1 hour a day or original programming); television (6 hours a day of
primetime programming, rebroadcast throughout a 24-hour period); and Internet.
Even though PNN has expanded its offerings significantly, it has come under substantial criticism
from observers. Some say that PNN has lost much of its audience among young, educated, anti-
regime Iranians who are looking for signs of U.S. official support. The Inspector General report
cited above, as well as many observers, maintains that decisions on who to put on PNN panel
discussion shows have been made by a small group of Iranian exiles who deliberately deny
appearances to certain Iranians with whom they disagree. Still others say that PNN frequently airs
the views of Iranian groups that are advocates of U.S. engagement of the regime or who
downplay regime transgressions. Some have criticized PNN for covering long-standing exiled
opposition groups, such as supporters of the son of the former Shah of Iran.99 Other critics say
PNN offers little coverage of the Green Movement, even though a mission of the network is, or
should be, to highlight the purported unpopularity of the regime. Others say it has run pieces
pointing out such U.S. social problems as homelessness and drug use, while refusing to air pieces
showcasing U.S. democracy and rule of law. Other observers say there is wide-ranging nepotism
at PNN, in which employees hire their relatives and deny opportunities to employment applicants
based on merit. VOA officials said in September 2012 they are attempting address some of these
issues through the human resources office of the VOA.
Several observers point to one particular PNN show as having particular effect on audiences
inside Iran. That show is called “Parazit” (Persian for static); it is a weekly comedy show
modeled on a U.S. program on Comedy Central network called “The Daily Show.” On Parazit,
the writers of the show, Kambiz Hosseini and Saman Arbabi, mocked then president
Ahmadinejad and other Iranian figures, using political satire. Observers say that the show
deteriorated in quality in 2012 after Mr. Hosseini left the show or was ousted from it, and it was
taken off PNN in February 2012. A different show that satirizes Iranian leaders and news from
Iran—called On Ten—began in April 2012.
Other issues relate to the PNN’s leadership and governance. In February 2011, Ramin Asgard, a
former State Department officer, was hired as PNN director,100 tasked with redressing the PNN
deficiencies. However, he left in January 2012, reportedly out of frustration at his inability to
restructure PNN.
According to a VOA briefing on September 21, 2012, PNN has 79 full-time employees and 114
contractors. Past costs for PNN are: FY2010, $23.78 million; FY2011, $22.5 million; and
FY2012 (estimate), $23.32 million. In FY2013 its costs are expected were about $18 million.

99 CRS conversations with Iranian members of the Green Movement, December 2009-August 2010.
100 http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54504. Confirmed to CRS on February 25, 2011, by a member of the BBG.
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Table 9. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding
FY2004 Foreign operations appropriation (P.L. 108-199) earmarked $1.5 million for “educational,
humanitarian and non-governmental organizations and individuals inside Iran to support the
advancement of democracy and human rights in Iran.” The State Department Bureau of Democracy
and Labor (DRL) gave $1 million to a unit of Yale University, and $500,000 to National Endowment for
Democracy.
FY2005 $3 million from FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) for democracy promotion.
Priority areas: political party development, media, labor rights, civil society promotion, and human
rights.
FY2006 $11.15 for democracy promotion from regular FY2006 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102).
$4.15 million administered by DRL and $7 million for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
FY2006
Total of $66.1 million (of $75 million requested) from FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234): $20
supp.
million for democracy promotion; $5 million for public diplomacy directed at the Iranian population; $5
million for cultural exchanges; and $36.1 million for Voice of America-TV and “Radio Farda”
broadcasting. Broadcasting funds are provided through the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
FY2007
FY2007 continuing resolution provided $6.55 million for Iran (and Syria) to be administered through
DRL. $3.04 million was used for Iran. No funds were requested.
FY2008 $60 million (of $75 million requested) is contained in Consolidated Appropriation (H.R. 2764, P.L.
110-161), of which, according to the conference report $21.6 mil ion is ESF for pro-democracy
programs, including non-violent efforts to oppose Iran’s meddling in other countries. $7.9 million is
from a “Democracy Fund” for use by DRL. The Appropriation also fully funded additional $33.6 mil ion
requested for Iran broadcasting: $20 million for VOA Persian service; and $8.1 million for Radio Farda;
and $5.5 million for exchanges with Iran.
FY2009
Request was for $65 million in ESF “to support the aspirations of the Iranian people for a democratic
and open society by promoting civil society, civic participation, media freedom, and freedom of
information.” H.R. 1105 (P.L. 111-8) provides $25 million for democracy promotion programs
in the region, including in Iran.
FY2010 $40
million requested and used for Near East Regional Democracy programming. Programs to
promote human rights, civil society, and public diplomacy in Iran constitute a significant use of these
region-wide funds.
FY2011 $40
million requested and will be used for Near East Regional Democracy programs. Programming for
Iran with these funds to be similar to FY2010.
FY2012 $35
million for Near East Regional Democracy, and Iran-related use similar to FY2010 and FY2011.
FY2013 $30
million for Near East Regional Democracy, with Iran use similar to prior two fiscal years.
FY2014 $30
million for Near East Regional Democracy, with Iran use similar to prior three fiscal years.
FY2015 $30
million requested for Near East Regional Democracy, with Iran use likely similar to previous years.
Request mentions funding to be used to help circumvent Internet censorship in countries where the
funds are to be used.
Sources: Information provided by State Department and reviewed by Department’s Iran Office,
February 1, 2010; State Department Congressional Budget Justifications; author conversation with Department
of State Iran Office, April 21, 2011.
State Department Diplomatic and Public Diplomacy Efforts
Iran has an interest section in Washington, DC, under the auspices of the Embassy of Pakistan; it
is staffed by Iranian Americans. The former Iranian Embassy closed in April 1980 when the two
countries broke diplomatic relations, and remains under the control of the State Department. The
U.S. interest section in Tehran—under the auspices of the Embassy of Switzerland there—has no
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American personnel. There has been occasional U.S. consideration of requesting that Tehran
allow U.S. personnel there, but Iran has not supported the idea to date.
Since 2006, the State Department has been increasing the presence of Persian-speaking U.S.
diplomats in U.S. diplomatic missions around Iran, in part to help identify and facilitate Iranian
participate in U.S. democracy-promotion programs. The Iran unit at the U.S. consulate in Dubai
has been enlarged significantly into a “regional presence” office, and “Iran-watcher” positions
have been added to U.S. diplomatic facilities in Baku, Azerbaijan; Istanbul, Turkey; Frankfurt,
Germany; London; and Ashkabad, Turkmenistan, all of which have large expatriate Iranian
populations and/or proximity to Iran.101 An Iran watch position is being added in Herat,
Afghanistan, in early 2013. An enlarged (eight-person) “Office of Iran Affairs” has been formed
at the State Department, and it is reportedly engaged in contacts with U.S.-based exile groups
such as those discussed earlier.
The State Department also is trying to enhance its public diplomacy to reach out to the Iranian
population.
• In May 2003, the State Department added a Persian-language website to its list of
foreign language websites, under the authority of the Bureau of International
Information Programs. The website, according to a statement issued by then-
Secretary of State Colin Powell, is intended to be a source of information about
the United States and its policy toward Iran.
• On February 14, 2011, the State Department announced that it had begun
Persian-language Twitter feeds in an effort to connect better with Internet users in
Iran.
• In part to augment U.S. public diplomacy, the State Department announced in
April 2011 that a Persian-speaking U.S. diplomat based at the U.S. Consulate in
Dubai, would make regular appearances on Iranian official media to explain U.S.
positions.
Adding or Easing International Sanctions
Many assert that it is the significant effect of sanctions on Iran’s economy that caused Rouhani’s
election and Iranian agreement to the JPA. U.S. sanctions laws and multilateral sanctions and
their effects on Iran are discussed in detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth
Katzman. The JPA eased U.S. sanctions on foreign firms and countries that deal with Iran, and
requires the international community not to impose any new sanctions against Iran during the JPA
period. The Administration argues that Congress should not enact—and it has threatened to
veto—additional sanctions legislation while the JPA is in effect. This veto threat applies to S.
1881, even though the sanctions provisions would not take effect until after the JPA expires.
Should a comprehensive deal not be agreed, the Administration and Congress say additional
sanctions are likely to be imposed. There are numerous remaining ideas and suggestions for
additional economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran. Some are U.S. sanctions, some are
U.S. sanctions against foreign entities intended to compel them to exit the Iranian market, and
others are multilateral or international. Other options include

101 Farah Stockman, “‘Long Struggle’ With Iran Seen Ahead,” Boston Globe, March 9, 2006.
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• Mandating Reductions in Diplomatic Exchanges with Iran or Prohibiting Travel
by Iranian Officials.
• Banning Passenger Flights to and from Iran.
• Limiting Lending to Iran by International Financial Institutions. Resolution 1747
calls for restraint on but does not outright ban international lending to Iran.
• Banning Trade Financing or Official Insurance for Trade Financing. This was
not made mandatory by Resolution 1929, but several countries imposed this
sanction (as far as most trade financing) subsequently.
• Banning All Investment in Iran’s Energy Sector. Such a step is authorized, not
mandated, by Resolution 1929, and the Iran Sanctions Act allows for U.S.
sanctions against foreign investment in that sector. A growing number of
countries have used that authority to impose these sanctions on Iran.
• Restricting Operations of and Insurance for Iranian Shipping. A call for restraint
is in Resolution 1929, but is not mandatory. The EU and other national measures
announced subsequently did include this sanction (IRISL) to take effect as of
July 1.
• Imposing a Worldwide Ban on Sales of Arms to Iran. Resolution 1929 imposes a
ban on sales of major weapons systems to Iran, but another option is to extend
that ban to all lethal equipment.
• Imposing an International Ban on Trade With Iran, Particularly Purchases of
Iranian Oil or Gas. As noted, the EU has agreed to stop all purchases of Iranian
oil as of July 1, 2012, and it later banned purchases of Iranian natural gas. Other
countries have cut their oil buys. An option is to impose a worldwide ban on all
purchases of oil or gas, or to further pressure or incent nations to end such buys
from Iran. A related idea could be the enactment of a global ban on trade with
Iran or of U.S. sanctions that seek to compel a partial or comprehensive global
ban on trade with Iran. As noted, H.R. 850, introduced in the 113th Congress on
February 27, 2013, comes close to this later concept.
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Table 10. Digest of Existing U.S. Sanctions Against Iran
Ban on U.S. Trade With and Investment in Iran. Executive Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) bans almost all U.S. trade with and
investment in Iran. Modifications in 1999 and 2000 al owed for exportation of U.S. food and medical equipment, and
importation from Iran of luxury goods (carpets, caviar, dried fruits, nuts), but P.L. 111-195 (Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, CISADA) restored the complete ban on imports. The trade ban does
not generally apply to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms. P.L. 112-239 sanctions most foreign dealings with Iran’s
energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sector, as well as the sale of certain items for Iranian industrial processes and the
transfer to Iran of precious metals (often a form of payment for oil or gas).
U.S. Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Deal With Iran’s Energy Sector. The Iran Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172, August
5, 1996, as amended, most recently by H.R. 1905/P.L. 112-158) authorizes the President to select five out of a
menu of twelve sanctions to impose against firms that the Administration has determined: have invested more than
$20 million to develop Iran’s petroleum (oil and gas) sector; that buy Iranian oil (unless such country has a sanctions
exemption under the FY2012 National Defense Act, see below); have sold Iran more than $1 million worth of
gasoline or equipment to import gasoline or refine oil into gasoline; have sold energy $1 million or more worth of
energy equipment to Iran; that provided shipping services to transport oil from Iran; that have engaged in an energy
joint venture with Iran outside Iran; or that buy Iran’s sovereign debt.
Sanctions On Iran’s Central Bank. CISADA bans accounts with banks that do business with the Revolutionary Guard and
sanctioned entities and the Treasury Dept. in November 2011 declared Iran’s financial system an entity of primary
money laundering concern. Section 1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Act, signed December 31, 2011, prevents
foreign banks that do business with Iran’s Central Bank from opening U.S. accounts.
Terrorism List Designation Sanctions. Iran’s designation by the Secretary of State as a “state sponsor of terrorism”
(January 19, 1984—commonly referred to as the “terrorism list”) triggers several sanctions, including the following:
(1) a ban on the provision of U.S. foreign assistance to Iran under Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act; (2) a
ban on arms exports to Iran under Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 95-92, as amended); (3)
under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act (P.L. 96-72, as amended), a significant restriction—amended
by other laws to a “presumption of denial”—on U.S. exports to Iran of items that could have military applications; (4)
under Section 327 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (P.L. 104-132, April 24, 1996), a
requirement that U.S. representatives to international financial institutions vote against international loans to
terrorism list states.
Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Aid Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. The Iran-Syria-North Korea
Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, March 14, 2000, as amended) authorizes the Administration to impose
sanctions on foreign persons or firms determined to have provided assistance to Iran’s weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) programs. Sanctions include restrictions on U.S. trade with the sanctioned entity.
Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Sell Advanced Arms to Iran. The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 102-
484, October 23, 1992, as amended) provides for U.S. sanctions against foreign firms that sell Iran “destabilizing
numbers and types of conventional weapons” or WMD technology.
Ban on Transactions With Foreign Entities Determined to Be Supporting International Terrorism. Executive Order 13324
(September 23, 2001) authorizes a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting international
terrorism. The Order was not specific to Iran, coming 12 days after the September 11, 2001, attacks, but several
Iranian entities have been designated.
Ban on Transactions With Foreign Entities that Support Proliferation. Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) amended
previous executive orders to provide for a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting
international proliferation. As is the case for Executive Order 13324, mentioned above, Executive Order 13382 was
not specific to Iran. However, numerous Iranian entities, including the IRGC itself, have been designated.
Divestment. A Title in P.L. 111-195 authorizes and protects from lawsuits various investment managers who divest
from shares of firms that conduct sanctionable business with Iran.
Counter-Narcotics. In February 1987, Iran was first designated as a state that failed to cooperate with U.S. anti-drug
efforts or take adequate steps to control narcotics production or trafficking. The Clinton Administration, on
December 7, 1998, removed Iran from the U.S. list of major drug producing countries. This exempted Iran from the
annual certification process that kept drug-related U.S. sanctions in place on Iran.
Sanctions Against Human Rights Abuses and Internet Monitoring. Various laws discussed above, and Executive Orders,
impose sanctions on named Iranian human rights abusers, and on firms that sel equipment Iran can use to monitor
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the Internet usage of citizens or employ against demonstrators.
Source: CRS. For analysis and extended discussion of U.S. and international sanctions against Iran, see CRS
Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
Table 11. Selected Economic Indicators
Economic Growth
Negative 5% growth in 2013
Per Capita Income
$12,800/yr (purchasing power parity) (2013)
GDP
$988 billion (purchasing power parity) (2013)
Proven Oil Reserves
135 billion barrels (highest after Russia and Canada)
Oil Production/Exports
About 1 mbd exports since the end of 2013.
Major Oil/Gas Customers
Remaining customers: primarily China, India, South Korea, Japan, and Turkey.
Turkey also buys 8.6 billion cubic meters/yr of gas from Iran.
Major Export Markets
Mirrors major oil customers.
Major Imports
Mirrors major oil customers.
Development Assistance
2003 (latest available): $136 million grant aid. Biggest donors: Germany ($38
Received
million); Japan ($17 million); France ($9 million).
Inflation
30%+, according to Iran Central Bank, but believed to be about 42% by outside
experts.
Unemployment Rate
Official rate is 15.3%, but outside experts believe the rate is higher
Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; various press; IMF; Iran Trade Planning Division; CRS conversations with
experts and foreign diplomats.

Opposition Group: People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)
The best-known exiled opposition group is the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as the
Mohahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO). Secular and left-leaning, it was formed in the 1960s to try to overthrow the
Shah of Iran and has been characterized by U.S. reports as attempting to blend several ideologies, including Marxism,
feminism, and Islamism, although the organization denies that it ever advocated Marxism. It allied with pro-Khomeini
forces during the Islamic revolution and, according to State Department reports, supported the November 1979
takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The group was driven into exile after it unsuccessful y rose up against the
Khomeini regime in September 1981. It is led by spouses Maryam and Massoud Rajavi; Maryam, based in France, is the
“President-elect” of the PMOI-led opposition. The whereabouts of historical PMOI leader Massoud are unknown.
Even though the PMOI opposes the regime in Tehran, the State Department generally shied away from contact with
the group during the 1980s and 1990s. The State Department designated the PMOI as an FTO in October 1997—
during the presidency of the relatively moderate Mohammad Khatemi. The NCR was named as an alias of the PMOI
in October 1999, and in August 2003, the State Department designated the NCR offices in the United States an alias
of the PMOI and NCR and the Treasury Department ordered the groups’ offices in the United States closed. The
State Department’s reports on international terrorism for the years until 2011 asserted that the members of the
organization were responsible for: the alleged killing of seven American military personnel and contract advisers to
the former Shah during 1973-1976—including the deputy chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Tehran; bombings at U.S.
government facilities in Tehran in 1972 as a protest of the visit to Iran of then-President Richard Nixon; and bombings
of U.S. corporate offices in Iran to protest the visit of Secretary of State Kissinger. The reports also listed as
terrorism several attacks by the group against regime targets (including 1981 bombings that killed high ranking
officials), attacks on Iranian government facilities, and attacks on Iranian security officials. However, the reports did
not assert that any of these attacks purposely targeted civilians. The group’s alliance with Saddam Hussein’s regime in
contributed to the designation, even though Saddam was a tacit U.S. al y when the group moved to Iraq in 1986.
In challenging its FTO decision, the PMOI asserted that, by retaining the group on the FTO list, the United States was
preventing the PMOI from participating in opposition activities and was giving the Iranian regime justification for
executing its members. In July 2008, the PMOI petitioned to the State Department that its designation be revoked,
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but the Department reaffirmed the listing in January 2009 and after a January 2010 review. The reaffirmations came
despite the fact that in January 2009, the European Union (EU) had removed the group from its terrorist group list
(2002 designation) and in May 2008, a British appeals court determined that the group should no longer be
considered a terrorist organization. In June 2012, the Appeals Court gave the State Department until October 1,
2012, to decide on the FTO designation, although without prescribing how the Department should decide. On
September 28, 2012, maintaining there had not been confirmed acts of PMOI terrorism for more than a decade and
that it had cooperated on the Camp Ashraf issue (below), the group was removed from the FTO list as well as from
the designation as a terrorism supporter under Executive Order 13224. However, State Department officials, in a
background briefing that day, said “We do not see the [PMOI] as a viable or democratic opposition movement....
They are not part of our picture in terms of the future of Iran.” On December 20, 2012, Canada removed the group
from its list of terrorist organizations. The NCR-I reopened its offices in Washington, DC, in April 2013.
Camp Ashraf Issue
The de-listing of the group has not resolved the situation of PMOI members in Iraq. U.S. forces attacked PMOI
military installations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (March 2003) and negotiated a ceasefire with PMOI
elements in Iraq, according to which the approximately 3,400 PMOI members consolidated at Camp Ashraf, near the
border with Iran. Its weaponry was placed in storage, guarded first by U.S. and now by Iraqi personnel.
In July 2004, the United States granted the Ashraf detainees “protected persons” status under the 4th Geneva
Convention, although that designation lapsed when Iraq resumed ful sovereignty in June 2004. A subsequent bilateral
U.S.-Iraq agreement limited U.S. flexibility in Iraq, and the Iraqi government pledged to adhere to all international
obligations. That pledge came into question on July 28, 2009, when Iraq used force to overcome resident resistance
to setting up a police post in the camp. Thirteen residents of the camp were killed. On April 8, 2011, after the Iraqi
government changed the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) brigade that guards Ashraf, clashes between the Iraqi force and
camp residents resulted in the death of 35 Ashraf residents. The State Department issued a statement attributing the
deaths to the actions of Iraq and its military.102
After the clash, Iraqi officials reiterated their commitment to close Ashraf at the end of 2011 (fol owing a ful U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq) in co-operation with the United Nations and other international organizations. The U.N. High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) declared the residents “asylum seekers” and offered to assess each resident in
an effort to resettle them elsewhere. The then top U.N. envoy in Iraq, Martin Kobler, offered to mediate between
the issue and he called on the Iraqi government to postpone its deadline to close the camp.
In December 2011, the Iraqi government and the United Nations announced agreement to relocate the residents to
former U.S. military base Camp Liberty, near Baghdad’s main airport. The PMOI, which had demanded safeguards for
their transfer, subsequently announced acceptance of the deal and the move to Camp Liberty (renamed Camp
Hurriya). The relocation was completed by September 17, 2012, leaving a residual group of 101 PMOI persons at
Ashraf. Still, the group alleges that conditions at Liberty are poor. On February 9, 2013, the camp was attacked by
rockets, killing six PMOI members; the Shiite militia group Kata’ib Hezbollah (KAH) claimed responsibility. Another
rocket attack on the camp took place on June 15, 2013. On September 1, 2013, 52 of the Ashraf residents were killed
by organized gunmen that appeared to have, at the very least, assistance from Iraqi forces guarding Ashraf’s
perimeter. Seven others are missing and allegedly being held by Iraqi security forces. The survivors were moved to
Camp Liberty.
The U.N. High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) is conducting refugee status determinations for al the residents
who relocated to Camp Hurriya. About 352 have been resettled through the UNHCR process: 237 went to Albania;
95 to Germany; 95 to Italy; 15 to Norway; and 2 to Finland. The United States reportedly might resettle 100 or
more. Earlier, 200 Ashraf residents took advantage of an arrangement between Iran and the International Committee
of the Red Cross for them to return to Iran if they disavow further PMOI activities; a few reportedly were
subsequently imprisoned and mistreated.

102 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/160404.htm.
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Figure 1. Structure of the Iranian Government

Source: CRS.

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Figure 2. Map of Iran

Source: Map boundaries from Map Resources, 2005. GRAPHIC: CRS.

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Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612


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