Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Ben Dolven
Specialist in Asian Affairs
June 19, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32593
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
Thailand is a long-time military ally and a significant trade and economic partner for the United
States. In 2013, Thailand was the United States’ 24th largest goods trading partner, with $38.0
billion in total two-way goods trade. For many years, Thailand was also seen as a model of stable
democracy in Southeast Asia, although this image, along with U.S. relations, has been
complicated by deep political and economic instability in the wake of two military coups in the
past eight years. The first, in 2006, displaced Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a popular but
polarizing figure who remains a focus of many divisions within Thailand. The second, in 2014,
deposed an acting prime minister after Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, was ousted from the
premiership by a Constitutional Court decision that many saw as politically motivated.
In recent years, Thai politics have been dominated by rivalries between populist forces led by
Thaksin (now in exile) and his opponents, a mix of conservative royalists and military figures,
and other Bangkok elites. Despite his exile, pro-Thaksin political parties have won the three
nationwide elections since his ouster. Mass movements both supporting and opposing Thaksin
have staged vigorous demonstrations, including protests in 2010 that spilled over to riots in
Bangkok and other cities, causing the worst street violence in Thailand in decades. The ruling
military government has indicated that national elections will not be held for at least a year. Many
analysts expect violence to continue, particularly from the disenfranchised voters who support
Thaksin. Risks are heightened by uncertainty about the health of Thailand’s widely revered King
Bhumiphol Adulyadej, who is 86 and has been hospitalized for much of the past four years.
The 2014 coup threatens to derail the traditionally strong U.S.-Thai security relationship and
could disrupt trade and investment links as well. Military-to-military cooperation has been robust
in terms of security assistance, training, and military exercises, and Thailand provides access to
strategically key facilities such as the Utapao air base. The United States has suspended security
assistance funds, and the rationale for maintaining the defense relationship may falter in the face
of the military’s record of overthrowing democratically elected leaders. On the other hand,
Thailand’s strategic position and the U.S. emphasis on ASEAN as a multilateral platform for
engaging the Asia Pacific region are strong motivations for continuing the partnership. Thailand
maintains close relations with China and is considered by some to be a key arena of competition
between Beijing and Washington for influence. Given its internal unrest, Bangkok’s ability to be a
regional leader is uncertain.
Thailand faces domestic problems as well. Successive Thai governments have been unable to
stem violence by insurgents in the southern majority-Muslim provinces. The United States and
the international community have raised concern about human trafficking, large refugee
populations within Thailand’s borders, and human rights and democracy conditions, all of which
present challenges to the Thai government.
This report will be updated periodically.
Congressional Research Service
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Overview of U.S.–Thailand Relations ............................................................................................. 1
Political Crisis and Military Coup in 2013-2014 ............................................................................. 2
U.S. Response to Coup .............................................................................................................. 2
Thailand Politics and Government .................................................................................................. 4
Historical Background ............................................................................................................... 4
Social Divisions and the Thai Political Landscape .................................................................... 4
Role of the Palace ................................................................................................................ 5
U.S.-Thailand Security Relations .................................................................................................... 6
Historical Background ............................................................................................................... 6
Bilateral Security Cooperation .................................................................................................. 7
Security Assistance .............................................................................................................. 7
Military Exercises ............................................................................................................... 8
Training ............................................................................................................................... 8
Intelligence .......................................................................................................................... 9
Law Enforcement ................................................................................................................ 9
Counter-Narcotics ............................................................................................................... 9
U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations ............................................................................... 10
Thailand in Asia ............................................................................................................................. 11
Thailand’s Strong Ties with China .......................................................................................... 11
Thailand-Burma Ties ............................................................................................................... 12
ASEAN Relations .................................................................................................................... 13
Violence in the Southern Provinces ............................................................................................... 14
Background to the Current Conflict ........................................................................................ 14
Leadership of Insurgency Unclear ........................................................................................... 15
Human Rights and Democracy Concerns ...................................................................................... 15
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) .................................................................................................... 15
Refugees in Thailand ............................................................................................................... 16
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Thailand ............................................................................................................. 18
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2007-2014 ............................................................................. 8
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19
Congressional Research Service
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Overview of U.S.–Thailand Relations
An American treaty ally since 1954, Thailand was for years praised as an economic and
democratic success story. The U.S.-Thai relationship, solidified during the Cold War, expanded
on the basis of shared economic and security interests. Thailand is a large trade and investment
partner for the United States, and U.S. access to Thai military facilities and sustained military-to-
military cooperation make Thailand an important element of the U.S. strategic presence in the
Asia-Pacific region.
The country’s political stability and democratic development have been shaken, however, by
extensive political turmoil and two military coups in the past eight years. Since the 2006 coup
that deposed populist Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, protests from both sides of the political
divide have continued sporadically, sometimes exploding into violence, until the military again
seized power in May 2014. Societal divisions—largely between urban elites and the larger rural
population—appear to be deep and lasting. Anxiety about the royal succession process looms
over the political landscape as the king, 86 years old and in poor health, has receded from public
view.
The situation in Thailand presents a stark challenge for the United States to balance support for
electoral democracy and close diplomatic relations with an ally. Thailand serves as a regional
operational platform for over 50 U.S. government agencies, with particularly strong programs in
health care and infectious disease research, law enforcement, and refugee assistance. Thailand’s
cooperation is critical to efforts such as facilitating neighboring Burma’s democratic transition
and addressing cross-border problems like human trafficking and refugee flows. As the Obama
Administration executes its policy of rebalancing to Asia, a stable Thailand could provide a
critical anchor for additional U.S. initiatives such as broadening regional defense cooperation,
fostering more liberal trade and investment regimes in Asia, and strengthening the region’s
multilateral organizations. However, Bangkok’s internal problems and the resulting damage to the
U.S.-Thai relationship make such a role difficult to envision, pointing to the deep costs that the
turmoil may have for U.S. interests in the region.
Another motivation for maintaining strong relations with Bangkok is the ongoing competition
with Beijing for influence in Southeast Asia. Thailand serves as the regional coordinator of talks
between Southeast Asian nations and China on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. With
Bangkok consumed with its own political crisis, analysts believe Thailand’s ability to help with
regional initiatives, including those supported by the United States, is highly limited. With the
prospect that the military may hold on to power until the royal succession unfolds, perhaps over
several years, U.S. policy makers must judge how stringently to advocate democratic principles in
its relations with Bangkok.
In the past, many analysts say Thailand has demonstrated a remarkable ability to “muddle
through” its crises; despite periodic bouts of violence and political discord, accommodations have
been made to allow Thailand’s government and economy to move forward. Many experts say this
time may be different and that Thailand is convulsing through a historic transition. The current
monarch has been in place for 65 years. Many analysts believe the inevitable royal succession,
when it comes, could reshape the role the palace plays within Thailand’s political structure.
Critical questions about Thailand’s future loom: Without representative government, how will the
disenfranchised majority respond? Is civil war possible? Which succession scenarios could
further destabilize the country, and which could restore some degree of unity for Thais? What role
Congressional Research Service
1
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
will Thaksin and his supporters play? Will foreign investors shy away from Thailand given the
uncertainties? With Thailand’s long borders and central geographic position in Southeast Asia,
what are the regional repercussions of Bangkok’s political quagmire? If Thailand is under a
military government for an extended period, what are the implications for U.S. relations with one
of its Asian treaty allies, and for U.S. policy in the region?
Political Crisis and Military Coup in 2013-2014
Thai politics, in crisis since fall 2013, was thrown into further turmoil when the Royal Thai
military seized power in Bangkok on May 22, 2014. Initially declaring martial law on May 20,
calling the move “softer than a coup,” Army Commander Prayuth Chan-ocha formalized the
military coup two days later. The military then dissolved the Parliament, detained political leaders
and academics, imposed a curfew, and restricted media outlets. Sporadic violence in the months
leading up to the coup left 28 people dead, but there was no widespread bloodshed associated
with the coup itself. Prayuth announced that a group of senior military leaders known as the
National Peace and Order Maintaining Council will govern Thailand until a political solution
emerges, and later announced that elections would not be held for over a year.
Among those detained and later released under house arrest was former Prime Minister Yingluck
Shinawatra, who had been ousted from office by the Thailand Constitutional Court a few weeks
earlier. Elected in a landslide in July 2011, Yingluck is the sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, who was
deposed in Thailand’s last military coup in 2006 and remains a powerful figure in Thai politics.
Thaksin and his supporters, many of whom hail from the rural, poorer regions of Thailand, have
won all six national elections since 2001, but their leaders have been removed from office either
by a military coup or by a court order. This group of Thaksin supporters, broadly known as the
“Red Shirts,” is pitted against a competing faction known as the “Yellow Shirts,” led by
Bangkok’s middle-class and wealthier elites traditionally aligned with the military and the royal
family, who have opposed elections to break the long political stalemate.
Before the coup, Thai politics had been dysfunctional since October 2013, when the ruling party
tabled a general amnesty bill that would have cleared Thaksin from his corruption conviction (as
well as several opposition leaders from charges related to earlier protests). Large-scale opposition
demonstrations erupted in the streets of Bangkok. The protestors, reported to be up to 200,000 at
their peak, occupied several government compounds and created gridlock in areas of the capital
city. Protest leaders called for the end of the “Thaksin regime” and demanded that a “people’s
council” reporting to the King replace Parliament. New elections were held in February 2014, but
the opposition Democrat Party boycotted the polls, and the courts later ruled that the election
results were invalid. Until her removal by court order in early May, Yingluck remained the head
of a “caretaker” government as demonstrations continued in Bangkok.
U.S. Response to Coup
The United States immediately suspended an estimated $10.5 million in foreign assistance to
Thailand,1 cancelled a series of military exercises and Thai military officers’ visits, and urged a
1 Daily State Department Press Briefing, May 22, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/05/
226556.htm#THAILAND.
Congressional Research Service
2
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
quick return to civilian rule and early elections. In a May 22 statement, Secretary of State Kerry
said, “There is no justification for this coup ... I urge the restoration of civilian government
immediately, a return to democracy, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
such as press freedoms.” Kerry continued, “While we value our long friendship with the Thai
people, this act will have negative implications for the U.S.–Thai relationship, especially for our
relationship with the Thai military. We are reviewing our military and other assistance and
engagements, consistent with U.S. law”2
The Administration has some latitude in determining how much assistance to suspend to
Thailand.3 Aid that could continue because of “notwithstanding” clauses is generally
humanitarian in nature: emergency food aid, international disaster assistance, migration and
refugee aid, global health (HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis) programs, Child Survival programs,
the Peace Corps, demining, and non-proliferation programs. The State Department was specific
about the suspension of several military assistance programs: immediately following the coup,
$3.5 million in unspent and unobligated Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance, consisting
of training and education programs, as well as the remaining $85,000 of unspent funds this fiscal
year for the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program were suspended.
Thailand receives approximately $1.3 million in IMET annually.4
Many observers saw the U.S. response to the last coup in 2006 as relatively mild. Although
funding for development assistance and military financing and training programs were cut off
while the military remained in power, U.S. assistance for law enforcement, counterterrorism and
nonproliferation efforts, global health programs, and the Peace Corps remained in place. The
annual Cobra Gold exercises—the largest multilateral military exercises in Asia—continued
without interruption. It is unclear if the Administration will follow a similar pattern in response to
the 2014 coup.
2 http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/05/226446.htm
3 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), at Division K, provides the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014, and the general provisions within that Act provides, at
128 Stat. 494, the coup foreign aid cut-off language, as follows:
Sec. 7008. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to titles III through
VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the government
of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'etat or decree
or, after the date of enactment of this Act, a coup d'etat or decree in which the military plays a
decisive role: Provided, That assistance may be resumed to such government if the President
determines and certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that subsequent to the termination of
assistance a democratically elected government has taken office: Provided further, That the
provisions of this section shall not apply to assistance to promote democratic elections or public
participation in democratic processes: Provided further, That funds made available pursuant to the
previous provisos shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations.
4 Daily State Department Press Briefing, May 28, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
3
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Thailand Politics and Government
Historical Background
The Kingdom of Thailand, a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of government,
is marked by an important historical dissimilarity from its regional neighbors. Although occupied
briefly by Japan during World War II, Thailand was the only country in Southeast Asia that was
not colonized by Europeans, and it also avoided the wave of communist revolutions that took
control of the neighboring governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.
Thailand followed a troubled path to democracy, enduring a series of mostly bloodless coups and
multiple changes of government in its modern history. Although Thailand became a constitutional
monarchy in 1932, it was ruled primarily by military dictatorships until the early 1990s. A
military and bureaucratic elite controlled Thai politics during this period, denying room for
civilian democratic institutions to develop. Brief periods of democracy in the 1970s and 1980s
ended with reassertions of military rule. After Thai soldiers killed at least 50 people in
demonstrations demanding an end to military dominance of the government, international and
domestic pressure led to new elections in 1992. The 2006 coup was the first in 15 years.
Thailand’s government is composed of the executive branch (prime minister as head of
government and the king as chief of state), a bicameral National Assembly, and a judicial branch
of three court systems. In the years immediately preceding Thaksin’s election in 2001, the
Democrat Party dominated Thai politics by instituting a series of reforms that enhanced
transparency, decentralized power from the urban centers, tackled corruption, and introduced a
broad range of constitutional rights. Thaksin’s 2001-2006 tenure as Prime Minister was marked
by an unprecedented centralization of power in the Prime Minister’s office, as well as the
implementation of populist economic policies such as public subsidy of health care. Some of
these developments, analysts note, set the context for the military’s decision to oust Thaksin in
2006.
Social Divisions and the Thai Political Landscape
The political turmoil in Thailand underscores a growing divide between the rural, mostly poor
population and the urban middle class, largely based in Bangkok. By stoking Thai nationalism
and providing inexpensive health care and other support to rural communities, Thaksin
galvanized a populist movement in Thailand, with the support leading to emphatic electoral
victories for his Thai Rak Thai Party, then the successor People’s Power Party (PPP) and the Puea
Thai Party. This success threatened the traditional model of governance, which combines a
powerful military backed by the royal family, an elite corps of bureaucrats, and a relatively weak
executive government. Thaksin’s rise and fall—and the role he continues to play in Thai
politics—did much to expose and exacerbate the country’s regional and class-based rifts.
These divisions have been emerging for years, but many hoped that the reckoning could unfold
without bloodshed. The confrontation is no longer as simple as a conflict between mostly poor,
rural Thaksin supporters and the elite, although those disparities remain significant and motivate
many of the participants. The fight also involves regional rivalries; most of the protesters hail
from the northeastern part of Thailand and resent the control emanating from the richer governing
class in Bangkok. The differences are also exploited by politicians who are motivated by their
own self-interest. Many Puea Thai politicians attached themselves to Thaksin to win votes but
Congressional Research Service
4
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
come from the same privileged—and often corrupt—club of powerbrokers as members of the
opposition party.
The competing protestors are divided between two main groups: the “yellow shirts” (with sub-
groups such as the People’s Alliance for Democracy and the People’s Democratic Reform
Committee, among others) and the “red shirts” (sometimes known as the United Front for
Democracy Against Dictatorship).The yellow shirts are a mix of the military, royalists, the
bureaucracy, and largely urban and middle class citizens. The combination of Thaksin’s broad
popularity and clampdown on opposition opinions in the media threatened many of those in the
“old guard.” The red shirts are mostly Thaksin loyalists who supported his populist policies that
benefited the poor, rural regions of Thailand. A fundamental divide between the two groups
centers on the electoral process, with the yellow shirts arguing that ethical imperatives trump the
polls, while the red shirts believe that governance should be determined entirely by the
population’s vote.
Both sides have seen what they perceive as distortion of the system and have taken to the streets
with their grievances throughout the past several years, with the worst violence in modern Thai
history occurring in spring 2010 when the Democratic Party was in power. Anti-government
protestors occupied parts of Bangkok for nine weeks. Initially peaceful, the demonstrations and
the response from the security forces became increasingly aggressive, eventually spiraling into
urban warfare. On May 19, 2010, armored vehicles and infantry troops stormed the protestors’
encampments and several protest leaders surrendered. By the time a military crackdown dispersed
the crowds, at least 90 people were dead and up to 2,000 wounded. As the crisis exploded,
splinter groups emerged within all of the major institutions: the government, the military, the
police, the anti-government “red shirt” protestors, and the “yellow shirt” counter-protestors, who
disrupted Bangkok with their own mass rallies in 2008. Rogue elements among the police and
military forces and among the protestors’ ranks may have been responsible for the most egregious
violence and damage that occurred during the stand-off.
Role of the Palace
The ailing King Bhumiphol Adulyadej has remained largely disengaged from the ongoing
political crisis. Many analysts believe the current political tensions in Thailand are exacerbated by
uncertainties over the succession process for the King, still widely revered at age 86. Because the
palace has been one of the country’s most powerful institutions under the current monarch, many
analysts believe that political and private actors in Thailand are jockeying for position under
different potential succession scenarios—adding to the other political and social divisions evident
in Thai society. The intense popularity of the king has traditionally provided an important pillar of
stability for Thailand. In years past, when civil unrest spilled over into violence, the king’s public
interventions had successfully stemmed the conflict. In 2014, the King’s lack of public
involvement has added to the uncertainties, and pointed to the weakness of Thailand’s political
and governmental institutions, which have been unable to lessen the roiling tensions within the
country.
Due to stringent lèse-majesté laws, under which it is a crime, punishable with a prison term of up
to 15 years, to “criticize, insult or threaten” the King, Queen, royal heir apparent, or regent, the
issue of royal continuity is rarely broached publicly. According to news reports, the use of these
legal provisions has soared in recent years: reportedly, the number of charges brought before the
lower courts has risen from five or six a year in the early 2000s to 478 in 2010 and thousands of
Congressional Research Service
5
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
websites have been blocked.5 An American was arrested for lèse-majesté in 2011, drawing
complaints from the U.S. embassy in Bangkok.
U.S.-Thailand Security Relations
In many ways, the military-to-military connection has long been the strongest pillar of the U.S.-
Thai relationship. The recent coups are therefore particularly problematic for maintaining strong
bilateral relations, because U.S. aid suspension targets military assistance, cancels exercises, and
chills security ties. Before the most recent coup, U.S. military leaders touted the alliance as
apolitical and praised the Thai armed forces for exhibiting restraint amidst the competing protests
and political turmoil. By seizing power, Prayuth and the Thai Army put themselves at the center
of politics for the second time in eight years. Further, the overthrow of democratically elected
leaders repudiates the years of U.S. training about the importance of civilian control of the
military.
However, the strategic value of the alliance is high. The access that Thailand provides to military
facilities, particularly the strategically located and well-equipped Utapao airbase, is considered
invaluable to U.S. strategic planners. Utapao has been suggested as permanent Southeast Asian
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) hub based on its capacity to receive large
aircraft (including C-17s and C-130s), location adjacent to a deep seaport, and infrastructure
capable of handling command and control systems. Thailand annually hosts the multilateral
Cobra Gold military exercises, the largest exercise in Asia and one of the largest worldwide.
The 2014 coup disrupted the strong momentum of the bilateral alliance, which had just recently
recovered its funding to levels equivalent to the pre-2006 coup period. In November 2012, U.S.
Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta and Thai Defense Minister Sukampol Suwannathat signed the
2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance. The document celebrated 180
years of cooperation and updated the goals of the alliance, putting a particular emphasis on
building regional security partnerships. U.S. officials noted Thailand’s commitment to building
relationships with Myanmar’s armed forces by convening trilateral exercises with U.S. forces and
the Thai military’s enthusiasm for further operational and strategic engagement.
Historical Background
The 1954 Manila Pact of the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), together with
the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communiqué, forms the basis of the U.S.-Thai security relationship.
Although SEATO was dissolved in 1977, Article IV (1) of the Manila Pact, which calls for
signatories to “act to meet the common danger” in the event of an attack in the treaty area,
remains in force. Thailand has been considered to be one of the major U.S. security allies in East
Asia, along with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and non-treaty partner Singapore.
The U.S. security relationship with Thailand has a firm historical foundation based on joint
efforts in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Thailand sent more
than 6,500 troops to serve in the United Nations Command during the Korean War, where the
5“Review Thailand’s Lese Majeste Laws,” TODAY (Singapore), July 22, 2011.
Congressional Research Service
6
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Thai force suffered over 1,250 casualties.6 A decade later, the United States staged bombing raids
and rescue missions over North Vietnam and Laos from Thailand. During the Vietnam War, up to
50,000 U.S. troops were based on Thai soil, and U.S. assistance poured into the country to help
Thailand fight its own domestic communist insurgency.7 Thailand also sent troops to South
Vietnam and Laos to aid the U.S. effort. The close security ties continued throughout the Cold
War, with Thailand serving as a solid anti-Communist ally in the region. More recently, Thai ports
and airfields played a crucial role in maintaining the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies in
both the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars.
In 2003, President George W. Bush designated Thailand as a “major non-NATO ally,” a
distinction which allows more access to U.S. foreign aid and military assistance, including credit
guarantees for major weapons purchases.8 Thaksin authorized the reopening of the Vietnam-era
U.S. airbase in Utapao and a naval base in Sattahip, from which the U.S. military can logistically
support forces in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Thailand also contributed troops to U.S.
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s. Thailand served as the logistics hub for
much of the U.S. and international relief effort after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2008
Cyclone Nargis in Burma. U.S. relief operations by air and sea for the entire region were directed
out of Utapao air base and Sattahip naval base.
Bilateral Security Cooperation
Security Assistance
The United States has provided funds for the purchase of weapons and equipment to the Thai
military through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program (see Table 1). As a major non-
NATO ally, Thailand also qualifies for the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, which allows
for the transfer of used U.S. naval ships and aircraft. The United States faces stiff competitors in
the foreign military sales market in Thailand, particularly because other countries are more
willing to engage in barter trade for agricultural products. When the 2014 coup suspended FMF
funds, the Thais were upgrading their F-16 fighter aircraft fleet and had agreed to purchase UH-
72 Lakotas, the first international customer for the helicopters.
6 See http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/allied.shtml (official public access website for Department of Defense
Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War).
7 The Eagle and the Elephant: Thai-American Relations Since 1833 (Bangkok: U.S. Agency for International
Development, 1997).
8 Under Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President can designate a non-North Atlantic Treaty
Organization state as a major ally for the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act.
Congressional Research Service
7
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2007-2014
(thousands of dol ars)
FY2013
FY2014
Account FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 estimate request
DA
0
0 4,500 6,151 5,051 5,051 4,826 5,051
ESF
990 0
2,500
2,500 0 0 0 0
FMFa
0 423 1,600 1,600 1,568 1,187 1,424 988
GH
1,400 1,492 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,000
0
IMETa
0 1,202 1,459 1,571 1,568 1,318 1,234 1,300
INCLE
900 1,686 1,400 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,466
NADR
2,100 2,483 2,700 3,300 1,541 1,450 1,152 1,320
Peace
Corps
2,144 2,278 2,815 3,064 3,300 3,000 3,100 3,700
Totals
7,534
9,786
15,659
18,362
12,968
12,246
11,376
11,275
Sources: U.S. Department of State; USAID.
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Funds; FMF = Foreign Military Sales Financing;
GH = Global Health; IMET = International Military Education and Training; INCLE = International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related.
a. These programs were suspended on September 28, 2006, under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102) and resumed on February 6, 2008.
Military Exercises
Training opportunities for U.S. forces in Thailand are considered invaluable by the U.S. military.
Before the coup, Thailand and the United States were conducting over 50 joint military exercises
a year, including Cobra Gold, the world’s largest combined military exercise. For the February
2014 exercises, over 13,000 military personnel participated in the exercise. The fully participating
nations include Thailand, the United States, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and
Malaysia, with observers from several other Asian nations also joining, including, for the second
time, military officials from Burma. In 2014 China became an “Observer Plus,” bringing
personnel to participate in medical and humanitarian assistance projects.
Training
Tens of thousands of Thai military officers, including many of those in top leadership positions
throughout the services and in the civilian agencies, have received U.S. training under the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Designed to enhance the
professionalism of foreign militaries as well as improve defense cooperation with the United
States, the program is regarded by many as a relatively low-cost, highly effective means to
achieve U.S. national security goals. In 2013, over 100 Thai officers received training in the
United States. IMET funding was suspended following both the 2006 and 2014 coups.
Congressional Research Service
8
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Intelligence
Intelligence cooperation between Thailand and the United States reportedly increased markedly
after the September 11, 2001, attacks, culminating in the establishment of the Counter Terrorism
Intelligence Center (known as the CTIC) in 2001. The CTIC, which combines personnel from
Thailand’s intelligence agency and specialized branches of the military and armed forces,
provides a forum for CIA personnel to work closely with their Thai counterparts, sharing facilities
and information daily, according to reports from Thai security officials.9 Close cooperation in
tracking Al Qaeda operatives who passed through Thailand reportedly intensified into active
pursuit of suspected terrorists following the 9/11 strikes.10 The most public result of enhanced
coordination was the arrest of suspected Jemaah Islamiyah leader Hambali, outside of Bangkok in
August 2003. Other intelligence cooperation focuses on counter-narcotics or specialized military
intelligence.
Law Enforcement
In 1998, the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Bangkok was established to
provide legal training for officials to combat transnational crime.11 The center is open to
government officials from any Southeast Asian country. ILEA Bangkok aims to enhance law
enforcement capabilities in each country, as well as to encourage cross-border cooperation on
issues like human trafficking and gang suppression. Instruction for the courses is provided largely
by the Royal Thai Police, the Thai Office of the Narcotics Control Board, and various U.S.
agencies, including the Diplomatic Security Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Internal
Revenue Service.12
The arrest of Victor Bout, an international arms dealer, in Bangkok in 2008 was a highlight of
U.S. and Thai law enforcement coordination, although the drawn-out extradition process also
became an irritant to bilateral relations until his transfer to the United States in 2010.
Counter-Narcotics
Counter-narcotics cooperation between Thailand and the United States has been extensive and
pre-dates the foundation of ILEA-Bangkok. Coordination between the DEA and Thailand’s law
enforcement agencies, in conjunction with a mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition
treaty, has led to many arrests of international drug traffickers. Specialized programs include the
establishment of Task Force 399, in which U.S. special forces train Thai units in narcotics
interdiction tactics.13
9 Crispin, Shawn, and Leslie Lopez, “U.S. and Thai Agents Collaborate in Secret—Cold-War-Style Alliance Strikes
Jemaah Islamiyah Where It Least Expects It.” Asian Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2003.
10 Ibid.
11 ILEA-Bangkok is one of five ILEAs in the world. The others are located in Budapest, San Salvador, Gaborone, and
Roswell, New Mexico.
12 Course information from http://www.ileabangkok.com.
13 Chambers, Paul, “U.S.-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.
26, Issue 3. December 2004.
Congressional Research Service
9
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations
Thailand’s economy has performed strongly for much of the nation’s period of political turmoil,
although growth slowed in 2013 and many observers expect the deceleration to continue in 2014.
Thailand is one of Southeast Asia’s more developed economies and has been for many years one
of the region’s largest destinations for foreign direct investment. According to the World Bank,
Thailand became an upper middle income economy in 2011.
In 2013, Thailand was the United States’s 24th largest goods trading partner, with $38.0 billion in
total two-way goods trade. Overall, with services included, two-way trade with Thailand totaled
$41 billion in 2012, the latest year for which such data are available, with an overall U.S. trade
deficit with Thailand of $15 billion. Major exports from the United States include integrated
circuits, computer parts, semi-conductors, cotton, aircraft parts, electronics, soybeans, and oil.
Major imports to the United States include electronics, jewelry, seafood, clothing, furniture,
natural rubber, auto parts, and rice.14 U.S. companies have substantial investments in Thailand.
U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Thailand was $16.9 billion in 2012, a 16% increase from
the previous year, led by investments in the manufacturing and banking sectors. Thailand also
receives substantial investment from other countries, notably Japan, China, and South Korea.
Thailand is not a member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade negotiations, the Obama
Administration’s signature economic initiative in Asia. Prime Minister Yingluck expressed
interest in joining the TPP negotiations in 2012, but Thailand has taken no further steps since then
toward joining the talks. The United States and Thailand initiated negotiations for an FTA in
2004, but the talks were suspended in 2006 following the military coup and have not been
restarted.
According to the U.S. Trade Representative, some of the largest barriers to trade in Thailand are
high tariff rates in selected industries, particularly in agriculture; a lack of transparency in
customs policy, where Customs Department officials have “significant discretionary authority”;
the use of price controls or import license requirements in some industries; and poor protection of
intellectual property rights, where Thailand was on the USTR’s Priority Watch List in 2013.15
Thailand has aggressively pursued FTAs with countries other than the United States in its
campaign to expand trading opportunities. It has signed trade agreements with Bahrain, China,
Peru, Australia, Japan, India, and New Zealand. Further deals are possible with South Korea,
Chile, and the European Union (EU). Thailand has championed ASEAN regionalism, seeing the
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA, among ASEAN countries only) and the planned ASEAN
Economic Community (AEC) as vehicles for investment-driven integration which will benefit
Thailand’s outward-oriented growth strategy.16
Economic policy divides in Thailand, however, have grown in recent years, along with the
nation’s political divisions. As noted above, Thaksin pursued large-scale populist measures as
14 Office of Commercial Thailand Affairs, Royal Thailand Embassy, 2007.
15 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “2014 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,”
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB%20Thailand.pdf.
16 Chirathivat, Suthiphand, and Sothitorn Mallikamas, “Thailand’s FTA Strategy: Current Developments and Future
Challenges,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin, vol. 21, no. 1 (April 2004).
Congressional Research Service
10
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Prime Minister, including subsidizing low-cost health care and transferring substantial revenues
from the central government to states and townships. Such populism continued under Yingluck,
whose government announced a rice-subsidy plan in 2012 that would buy rice from Thai farmers
at prices around 50% above market rates and stockpile it before selling it on the open market.
Many observers criticized the plan as fiscally unsustainable. Thailand’s public debt rose from
41% of GDP in 2011 to 46% in early 2014, and many observers argue that the 2013 economic
slowdown was at least partially caused by the fiscal burden of subsidizing rice farmers.17 Amidst
the political turmoil, Yingluck opponents filed an impeachment charge against her for the
policy—that motion was still pending when she was ousted by the Constitutional Court.
Thailand in Asia
Thailand is important to the region because of its large economy, its working relationships with
numerous neighbors, including Burma and China, and, until the coups, its relatively long-standing
democratic rule. Its years of domestic political paralysis raise concerns among its neighbors that
Thailand appears increasingly unable to take a leadership role in regional initiatives. That, many
argue, has implications for issues such as ASEAN’s diplomacy with China over maritime disputes
in the South China Sea, regional efforts to combat human trafficking, and regional economic
integration under a planned ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).
Southeast Asia is considered by many Asian experts to be a key arena of competition for
influence between the United States and China. The loss of a democratic government in Thailand,
as well as any resulting friction with the United States, could be considered as a possible opening
for closer Sino-Thai relations. It also raises challenges for the Obama Administration’s strategic
rebalance to Asia, particularly its focus on strengthening treaty alliances, and committing focus to
Southeast Asia and multilateral institutions.
Thailand’s Strong Ties with China
Sino-Thailand ties, historically far closer than Beijing’s relations with most other Southeast Asian
states, have strengthened considerably over the past decade. Bilateral trade has boomed under the
new China-ASEAN Free trade Agreement, which entered into force in 2010. In recent years,
Thailand has also continued to court China, including inking agreements on technology,
environmental protection, and strategic cooperation.
Military-to-military ties increased through both exchanges and arms sales: China exports major
weapons and military equipment to Thailand, a practice that originated in the 1980s when both
countries supported Cambodian resistance groups, including the Khmer Rouge, against the
Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh. Many analysts saw the suspension of several
U.S. military programs following the coup as an opportunity for China to expand its influence in
the Thai defense establishment. China participated as an observer for the first time in the May
2008 Cobra Gold exercises. Security cooperation has also been stirred by an October 2011
incident in which 13 Chinese soldiers guarding PRC cargo boats were killed in a raid by armed
members of a Burmese minority group in a portion of the Mekong River controlled by Thailand.
17 Bangkok Post, “Six Years to Settle Rice Debt,” June 9, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
11
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
In December 2011, China began limited joint patrols with Thailand, Laos, and Burma along the
Mekong, which is increasingly used for trans-border trade.18
Trade and investment between Thailand and China have grown as well. Thai companies, many
run by ethnic-Chinese families, were among the largest early investors in China following its
economic opening in 1979. Thailand has been a strong backer of trade agreements with China. In
2010, the year the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement went into effect, China replaced the
United States as Thailand’s largest trading partner that year. Thai-China trade grew 36% between
2010 and 2013 compared to 16% growth in Thai-U.S. trade, and in 2013, overall Thai-China
trade was 73% larger than Thai-U.S. trade. 19
Thailand’s strong relationship with China is based on a history far less antagonistic than Beijing’s
past with many other ASEAN countries. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Bangkok
pursued a strategic alignment with Beijing in order to contain Vietnamese influence in
neighboring Cambodia. Bangkok restored diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1975, long before other
Southeast Asian nations. The sizeable ethnic Chinese population in Thailand assimilated
relatively easily and became a strong presence in the business world, and in the political arena as
well.
Thailand also has no territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, unlike Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. In 2013 and 2014, it has served as ASEAN’s coordinator of
discussions with China over a potential Code of Conduct for parties in the South China Sea,
which brought the restart of these negotiations after several years of stasis, although the talks
have failed to make substantial progress in the wake of rising tensions between China and other
claimants.
Thailand-Burma Ties
Thailand has long had a deeply uneasy relationship with Burma’s government, both during the
period in which Burma was led by a military regime and in the current reform period. Much of
the 1,800 kilometer border that separates the two nations is held on the Burmese side by ethnic-
minority militias that oppose the central government. The flow of narcotics, migrants, and
sometimes militants across the border are some of Thailand’s most pressing foreign policy and
security problems.
Until the Obama Administration began pursuing an opening with Burma, Bangkok’s approach
toward Burma had been seen as conflicting with U.S. policy for many years. While the United
States pursued strict economic and diplomatic sanctions against the regime, Thailand led
ASEAN’s “constructive engagement” initiative, which favors integration and incentives to coax
Burma into reform. Thailand energy company PTT made substantial investments in Burma’s
natural gas sector, making Thailand one of the largest investors in Burma. From Thailand’s
perspective, engagement served to minimize the danger of a large-scale military struggle and to
expand opportunities for Thai business in Burma. Thai-Burma trade totaled $7.4 billion in 2013,
according to the Bank of Thailand.20
18 “China Deploys Patrols Along the Mekong,” Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2011.
19 http://www2.bot.or.th/statistics/ReportPage.aspx?reportID=743&language=eng
20 http://www2.bot.or.th/statistics/ReportPage.aspx?reportID=743&language=eng
Congressional Research Service
12
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
During years when the Burmese regime was largely isolated from the international community,
this gave Thailand some greater degree of access to the regime. In 2008, for instance, as
international groups struggled for access to Burma to provide humanitarian relief following
Cyclone Nargis, Burma granted Thai officials and aid workers entry. In the wake of recent
reforms in Burma, Thailand, like much of the region, is assessing whether Burmese reforms are
real and sustainable, and seeking to build relationships in the country and encourage the
continuation of political reform. In 2013, Thailand led moves to invite two Burmese Army
officers to the multilateral Cobra Gold exercises, and some observers argue that Thailand could
take a leadership role in bringing the Burmese military into other regional security initiatives.
Some congressional leaders have criticized Bangkok for its treatment of Burmese refugees,
migrant workers, and political dissidents living in Thailand. Backed by human rights groups’
reports, some U.S. lawmakers have leveled charges of arrests and intimidation of Burmese
political activists, as well as the repatriation of Burmese who seek political asylum.21 In the past,
Congress has passed legislation that provides money to refugees who fled Burma, particularly
those in Thailand.22
ASEAN Relations
Thailand’s “local” foreign policy with fellow Southeast Asian nations who make up ASEAN
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and
Cambodia) consists of a web of complicated relations. As one of the largest and most
economically developed of the ASEAN countries, Thailand has much to gain for promoting
ASEAN’s significance in global affairs. With its favorable geographic location and broad-based
economy, Thailand has traditionally been considered among the most likely countries to play a
major leadership role in Southeast Asia and has been an aggressive advocate of increased
economic integration in the region.
Bangkok has developed strong relations with its mainland Southeast Asian neighbors through
infrastructure assistance and other aid. In turn, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia provide raw
materials, inexpensive manufacturing, and expanding markets for Thailand. Despite cooperative
elements, Bangkok’s relations with its neighbors are often characterized by tension and
diplomatic spats. Intermittent tension with Cambodia re-ignited in 2008 over competing territorial
claims of Preah Vihear, a temple situated along the Thai-Cambodian border and, in February
2011, several consecutive days of shelling left at least 10 people dead and prompted calls from
Cambodia for the United Nations to intervene. On November 11, 2013, the International Court of
Justice ruled that the temple and the area immediately surrounding it were Cambodia’s territory.
Though Thai and Cambodian troops remain in the area, the ruling has been greeted peacefully.
Relations with Malaysia have been complicated by the insurgency in Thailand’s majority-Muslim
southern provinces, which border Malaysia (see next section). Many Thai Muslims are ethnically
Malay and speak Yawi, a Malay dialect, and at times the Malaysian public has grown angry at the
perceived violence against Muslims in Thailand. Thailand and Malaysia have cooperated
periodically on efforts to seek talks with separatist groups in the South. However, many separatist
21 See Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Thai Policy Toward Burmese Refugees and Migrants, Human Rights Watch Report,
released February 2004. Also Abandoned on Arrival, Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the treatment of
Burmese refugees in Malaysia and Thailand.
22 H.R. 4818, Foreign Operations Appropriations, Section II, Bilateral Assistance.
Congressional Research Service
13
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
leaders reside in northern Malaysia, making the issue a point of concern as the violence
continues.
Violence in the Southern Provinces
Thailand has endured a persistent separatist insurgency in its majority-Muslim southern
provinces, which include the provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and—to a lesser extent—
Songhkla, while dealing with political instability in its capital. Since January 2004, sectarian
violence between insurgents and security forces in Thailand’s majority-Muslim provinces has left
around 6,000 people dead and over 11,000 wounded, according to press reports. The groups that
have led this surge in violence are generally poorly understood, and their motives are difficult to
characterize. Many believe they are mostly focused on local autonomy, but even the Thai
government has a poor understanding of the diverse groups active in the south. Successive Thai
governments have taken somewhat different approaches to curbing the violence in the south, but
none appear to have found a way to resolve the ongoing insurgency.
Most regional observers stress that there is has been no convincing evidence of serious Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI, a regional Al Qaeda affiliate) involvement in the attacks in the southern provinces,
and that the overall long-term goal of the movement in the south remains the creation of an
independent state with Islamic governance. Many experts characterize the movement as a
confluence of different groups: local separatists, Islamic radicals, organized crime, and corrupt
police forces. Some of the older insurgent organizations earlier were linked to JI, have reportedly
received financial support from foreign Islamic groups, and have leaders who have trained in
camps in Libya and Afghanistan. The insurgency has at times heightened tensions with Malaysia,
as many of the leaders are thought to cross the border fairly easily. Despite these links, foreign
elements apparently have not engaged significantly in the violence.
Background to the Current Conflict
The southern region has a history of separatist violence, though the major movements were
thought to have died out in the early 1990s. Thai Muslims have long expressed grievances for
being marginalized and discriminated against, and the area has lagged behind the rest of Thailand
in economic development. The dead include suspected insurgents killed by security forces, as
well as victims of the insurgents, including police and military forces. The overwhelming
majority of casualties, however, are civilian: both Buddhist Thais, particularly monks and
teachers, and local Muslims.
After a series of apparently coordinated attacks by the insurgents in early 2004, the central
government declared martial law in the region. Moreover, a pattern of insurgent attacks—targeted
shootings or small bombs that claim a few victims at a time and counterattacks by the security
forces—has developed. The 11-year insurgency has become the deadliest conflict in the Asia-
Pacific region: security forces sometimes engage in extra-judicial killings, and the insurgents
employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs), drive-by shootings, arson attacks, and,
occasionally, beheadings.23
23 Zach Abuza, “After the Coup: Grim Prospects for Peace in Thailand’s Restive South,” The Indo-Pacific Review, June
9, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
14
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
The central government, regardless of which party holds power, has been unable to devote
sustained attention to the south, and the military junta is considered unlikely to prioritize quelling
the violence. The region remains under martial law, which allows security forces to arrest
suspects without warrants and detain them for up to 30 days. Since June 2007, a more
concentrated counter-insurgency campaign known as “Operation Southern Protection” led to far
more arrests, but many analysts see the mass arrests as fueling local resentment. Observers note
an increase in more lethal and bold attacks. Human rights groups have continued to criticize the
military for its mistreatment of Muslim suspects.
Leadership of Insurgency Unclear
Identifying the groups directing the insurgency has been challenging, but most analysis suggests
that there is no one organization with authority over the others. The government’s inability to
establish an authority with whom to negotiate has limited its ability to resolve the conflict
peacefully. In February 2013, Yingluck’s government made an effort in this regard, announcing
that it would initiate peace talks with the Barisan Revolusi National (BRN), a group whose
leaders largely reside outside Thailand. BRN reportedly suspended the talks in August 2013. Had
the effort been successful, it is unclear how it would have influenced the actions of groups on the
ground.24
Human Rights and Democracy Concerns
International groups, some Members of Congress, and U.S. officials have criticized Thailand’s
record on human rights. Alleged abuses have ranged from extra-judicial killings and curtailment
of the press and non-governmental groups under Thaksin, direct military intervention in the
political system in the 2006 and 2014 coups, curtailment of the freedom of expression under strict
lese-majeste laws under subsequent governments, the bloody suppression of demonstrations in
2010, and a poor record on combating human trafficking as well as human rights violations in the
southern provinces throughout various administrations.
Throughout the turmoil, the state of Thailand’s democracy has become a concern for many
observers. Many believed that Thailand’s democratic processes had been firmly entrenched
through a 1997 constitution that sought to strengthen the stability of elected governments and
protect greater levels of human rights. However, the 2006 coup, and then a 2007 constitution that
many considered to be a move away from the ideals of the 1997 document, brought questions
about whether established power centers had truly accepted the democratic system. Those
questions have persisted, and the imposition of martial law by the military in 2014 has only
deepened those concerns.
Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Thailand is a source, destination, and transit country for human trafficking victims, according to
the State Department. Thailand is surrounded by considerably poorer countries that drive the
inflow of trafficking victims, refugees, and economic migrants. Within Thailand, foreign
24 International Crisis Group. Talking and Killing in Southern Thailand. August 9, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
15
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
migrants, particularly from neighboring countries such as Burma, members of ethnic minorities,
and stateless persons are at greatest risk of being trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation
and for forced labor in seafood-related industries, garment factories, and domestic work. Most
victims identified by Thai officials are found in sex trafficking, including children, who are
exploited for sex tourism. Children are also reportedly recruited and used by separatist groups to
carry out attacks in southern Thailand.
Thailand has been on the Tier 2 Watch List for four years and risks automatic downgrade to Tier 3
in the 2014 TIP Report. The State Department’s 2013 TIP Report described the government as not
fully in compliance with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Moreover, the
State Department concluded that Thailand has “not shown sufficient evidence” in the past year of
efforts to bring itself into compliance. The Thai government has sought to avoid downgrade to the
Tier 3 list, submitting a 78-page report on its human trafficking record to the State Department in
March 2014.25 The report documented substantial declines in the numbers of trafficked persons in
2013, as well as rising budgets for government anti-trafficking efforts. Despite the reported
increases in enforcement, some NGOs said Thailand’s report considerably understated trafficking
of non-Thai citizens, who have traditionally made up a large proportion of Thailand’s trafficking
victims.26
In 2013 and 2014, media reports alleged a growing problem with Thai government and military
involvement in the trafficking of members of Burma’s Muslim Rohingya minority, who have fled
persecution in Burma. A report from the Reuters news service described direct military
involvement in sending tens of thousands of Rohingya refugees into trafficking networks, and
won a 2013 Pulitzer Prize for international reporting.27 Thailand argues that many cross-border
issues, including the plight of Rohingya in Thailand, involve human smuggling rather than human
trafficking. Although there is a distinction (smuggling involves voluntary illegal cross-border
movements), undocumented migrants are often vulnerable to trafficking-type exploitation by
smugglers. Some observers argue that Thailand has avoided downgrade to the Tier 3 list at least
partly because of U.S. reluctance to anger a treaty ally. Others point to the difficulty of gathering
reliable data on trafficking in Thailand, given dramatic regional differences in trafficking patterns,
as an argument for caution.28
Refugees in Thailand
Thailand has been a magnet for economic and political refugees for many years, particularly from
the neighboring countries of Laos, Cambodia, and, most prominently, Burma. Displaced
populations of ethnic minorities from Southeast Asia have sought refuge across Thailand’s long
borders, attracted by relatively loose immigration controls and often lenient treatment by Thai
25 See http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/14/44555-Deputy-Prime-Minister-and-Minister-of-Foreign-
Affairs%27-press-conference-to-update-the-media-about-the-release-of-Thailand%E2%80%99s-2013-Trafficking-in-
Persons-Country-Report-2014.html.
26 Andrew R.C. Marshall and Amy Sawitta Lefevre, “Special Report: Flaws Found in Thailand’s Human Trafficking
Crackdown,” Reuters, April 10, 2014.
27 Jason Szep and Andrew R.C. Marshall, “Special Report: Thailand Secretly Dumps Myanmar Refugees into
Trafficking Rings,” Reuters, December 25, 2013.
28 Joshua Kurlantzick, Should Thailand be Downgraded to Tier 3 in Trafficking in Persons Report? Council on Foreign
Relations, March 7, 2014; Sam Derbali, “Trafficking in Thailand: What the Tip Doesn’t Say,” The Guardian, June 27,
2013.
Congressional Research Service
16
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
authorities. Thailand’s reputation for relative tolerance for refugees, as well as crackdowns in
other recipient countries, has attracted an increasing number of North Korean asylum-seekers. A
strong network of international humanitarian organizations exists in Thailand to provide
assistance to these populations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
estimates that around half a million “stateless” people live in Thailand, from over 30 different
nationalities.29
UNHCR estimates that about 120,000 Burmese refugees live in nine camps along the border with
Myanmar, about 40,000 of whom are not registered by the Thai government. The United States
recently concluded a program initiated in 2005 to resettle more than 73,000 Burmese refugees in
the United States.30 Although Thailand has been generally cooperative in helping Burmese
refugees, successive Thai governments have expressed frustration with the continuing presence of
refugees and periodically clamped down on the incoming asylum seekers. Thailand’s position is
that it does not want to become an indefinite host, nor does it want to absorb those Burmese who
do not qualify as refugees. Moreover, the government argues that the camps were intended for
temporary use and are not considered suitable for permanent habitation.
29 Thailand 2014 UNHCR Country Operations Profile, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e489646.html.
30 “US Wraps Up Group Resettlement for Myanmar Refugees in Thailand,” News Stories, UNHCR. January 29, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
17
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Figure 1. Map of Thailand
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
Congressional Research Service
18
Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations
Author Contact Information
Emma Chanlett-Avery
Ben Dolven
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Specialist in Asian Affairs
echanlettavery@crs.loc.gov, 7-7748
bdolven@crs.loc.gov, 7-7626
Congressional Research Service
19