Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt
Marc Labonte
Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy
Jared C. Nagel
Information Research Specialist
June 16, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22331
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt

Summary
This report presents current data on estimated ownership of U.S. Treasury securities and major
holders of federal debt by country. Federal debt represents the accumulated balance of borrowing
by the federal government. To finance federal borrowing, U.S. Treasury securities are sold to
investors. Treasury securities may be purchased directly from the Treasury or on the secondary
market by individual private investors, financial institutions in the United States or overseas, and
foreign, state, or local governments. Foreign investment in federal debt has grown in recent years,
prompting questions on the location of the foreign holders and how much debt they hold.
This report will be updated annually or as events warrant.

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Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt

Contents
Selected Statistics on Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt ................................................................ 1
Foreign Investment in U.S. Federal Debt: Why Is It an Issue of Concern? ..................................... 3

Figures
Figure 1. Breakdown of Official vs. Private Foreign Holdings of U.S. Federal Debt ..................... 3

Tables
Table 1. Estimated Ownership of U.S. Treasury Securities ............................................................. 1
Table 2. The Top 10 Foreign Holders of Federal Debt, by Country ................................................ 2

Contacts
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 7
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................... 7

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Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt

Selected Statistics on Foreign Holdings of
Federal Debt

Federal debt represents, in large measure, the accumulated balance of federal borrowing of the
U.S. government. The portion of gross federal debt held by the public consists primarily of
investment in marketable U.S. Treasury securities.1 Investors in the United States and abroad
include official institutions, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve; financial institutions, such as
public banks; and private individual investors.
Table 1 provides December 2013 data, available as of June 2014, on estimated ownership of U.S.
Treasury securities by type of investment and the percentage of that investment attributable to
foreign investors.2
As the table shows, during the five years from December 2009 to December 2013, foreign
holdings of debt increased by $2.1 trillion to approximately $5.8 trillion. During the same period,
total publicly held debt increased by approximately $4.5 trillion to $12.3 trillion.
From the end of 2008 to the end of 2009, the share of the federal debt held by foreigners fell from
slightly over half to slightly less than half of the publicly held debt because the overall debt grew
more quickly than foreign holdings. Since then, the share has been relatively steady. In December
2013, foreigners held 47.1% of the publicly held debt.3
Table 1. Estimated Ownership of U.S. Treasury Securities
(in billions of dollars)
End of
Total Publicly Held
Foreign Holdings of
Foreign Holdings as a
Month
Debt
Publicly Held Debt
Share of Total Publicly
Held Debt
Dec. 2013
$12,328.3
$5,803.8
47.1%
Dec. 2012
$11,568.9
$5,573.8
48.2%
Dec. 2011
$10,428.3
$5,006.9
48.0%
Dec. 2010
$9,361.5
$4,458.8
47.6%
Dec. 2009
$7,781.9
$3,670.6
47.2%
Dec. 2008
$6,338.2
$3,253.0
51.3%
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors Flow of Funds, Table L.209 Treasury Securities, June 5, 2014
available at http://federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.

1 Figures on federal debt held by the public are available on the Department of Treasury Bureau of Public Debt website,
“The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It,” at http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np.
2 This report discusses foreign holdings of U.S. federal debt. Foreign investors also hold U.S. private securities. For
data on foreign holdings of U.S. private securities, see “Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities,” at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx, produced by the Treasury Department
International Capital System.
3 Data are excerpted from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Flow of Funds data, Table L209. State, local, and
foreign holdings include special issues of nonmarketable securities to municipal entities and foreign official accounts.
They also include municipal, foreign official, and private holdings of marketable Treasury securities.
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Notes: Although gross federal debt is the broadest measure of the debt, it may not be the most important one.
The debt measure that is relevant in an economic sense is debt held by the public. This is the measure of debt
that has actually been sold in credit markets and has influenced interest rates and private investment decisions.
See CRS Report RL31590, The Federal Government Debt: Its Size and Economic Significance, by Brian W. Cashell.
Data on major foreign holders of federal debt by country are provided in Table 2. According to
the data, the top three estimated foreign holders of federal debt by country, ranked in descending
order as of December 2013, are China ($1,270.0 billion), Japan ($1,182.5 billion), and Caribbean
Banking Centers ($295.3 billion). Based on these estimates, China holds approximately 21.9% of
all foreign investment in U.S. privately held federal debt; Japan holds approximately 20.4%; and
Caribbean Banking Centers hold approximately 5.1%.4
Table 2. The Top 10 Foreign Holders of Federal Debt, by Country
(data current as of June 6, 2014)

As of December 2013

As of December 2009
Percentage of all
Percentage of all
Country
Amount Held
($ billions) foreign holdings
Country
Amount Held
($ billions) foreign holdings
in federal debt
in federal debt
Mainland China
$1,270.0
21.9%
Mainland China
$ 894.8
24.3%
Japan $1,182.5
20.4%
Japan $
765.7
20.8%
Caribbean Banking
$295.3 5.1%
Oil Exporters
$ 201.1
5.5%
Centers
Belgium
$256.8
4.4%
United Kingdom
$ 180.3
4.9%
Brazil $245.4
4.2%
Brazil $
169.2
4.0%
Oil Exporters
$238.3
4.1%
Hong Kong
$ 148.7
4.0%
Taiwan $182.2
3.1%
Russia $
141.8
3.9%
Switzerland $176.7
3.1%
Caribbean Banking
Centers
$ 128.2
3.5%
United Kingdom
$163.7
2.8%
Taiwan
$ 116.5
3.2%
Hong Kong
$158.8
2.7%
Switzerland
$ 89.7
2.4%
Total Top 10
Total Top 10
Countries of
Countries of
Foreign Investors
$4,169.7 71.9%
Foreign Investors in
$2,836.0 77.0%
in Federal Debt
Federal Debt
Total All Foreign
Total All Foreign
Investment in
$5,802 100%
Investment in
$3685.1 100%
Federal Debt
Federal Debt
Source: Treasury Department International Capital System (TIC), at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfhhis01.txt.
Notes: Data, including estimated foreign holders of federal debt historically by month, in these Treasury
Department tables are periodically adjusted. Current monthly estimates are available at http://www.treas.gov/tic/

4 Foreign holdings are estimated by the Treasury Department based on the location of the holdings, not the nationality
of the holder. For certain countries, such as the Caribbean Banking Centers, many of the holdings are likely owned by
third country citizens.
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Foreign Holdings of Federal Debt

mfh.txt. Aggregate data totals in Table 1 vary slightly from aggregate data totals in Table 2 because of minor
technical differences between the two sources. Percentage approximations calculated by CRS. Percentages may
not sum to 100% due to rounding.
Foreign holdings as estimated by the Treasury Department can be divided into official
(governmental investment) and private sources. Figure 1 provides data on the current breakdown
of estimated foreign holdings in U.S. federal debt. As the figure shows, 70.0% ($4,054.5 billion)
of foreign holdings in U.S. federal debt are held by governmental sources. Private investors hold
the other 30.0% ($1,747.5 billion).
Figure 1. Breakdown of Official vs. Private Foreign Holdings of U.S. Federal Debt

Source: Treasury Department International Capital System, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-
chart-center/tic/Documents/mfhhis01.txt.
Notes: Data in the chart represent estimated December 2013 figures and are current as of June 5, 2014. Figures
are in billions of dollars. Data in the Treasury Department tables are periodically adjusted. For the most current
estimates, click on the URL address listed above.
The estimated combined total of all foreign holdings for December 2013 was $5802 billion. Data consist of
reported December 2013 figures from the TIC table listed above. The breakdown between estimated official and
private holdings is not publicly available on a country-by-country basis. Approximate percentages calculated by
CRS.
Foreign Investment in U.S. Federal Debt: Why Is It
an Issue of Concern?

From an economic perspective, foreign holdings of federal debt can be viewed in the broader
context of U.S. saving, investment, and borrowing from abroad. For decades, the United States
has saved less than it invests. Domestic saving is composed of saving by U.S. households,
businesses, and governments; by accounting identity,5 when government runs budget deficits, it
reduces domestic saving. By the same accounting identity, the shortfall between U.S. saving and
physical investment is met by borrowing from abroad. When the deficit rises (i.e., public saving

5 The accounting identity is (household saving + business saving + government saving) + (borrowing from abroad –
lending to abroad) = (public investment + private investment).
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falls), U.S. investment must fall (referred to as the deficit “crowding out” investment) or
borrowing from abroad must rise. If capital were fully mobile and unlimited, a larger deficit
would be fully matched by greater borrowing from abroad, and there would be no crowding out
of domestic investment. To be a net borrower from abroad, the United States must run a trade
deficit (it must buy more imports from foreigners than it sells in exports to foreigners). Since
2000, U.S. borrowing from abroad and the trade deficit each have exceeded $300 billion each
year. Borrowing from abroad peaked at $800 billion in 2006 and was $380 billion in 2013.
Borrowing from abroad has occurred through foreign purchases of both U.S. government and
U.S. private securities and other assets.
As a result of foreign purchases of Treasury securities, the federal government must send U.S.
income abroad to foreigners. If the overall economy is larger as a result of federal borrowing
(because the borrowing stimulated economic recovery6 or was used to productively add to the
U.S. capital stock, for example), then this outcome may leave the United States better off overall
on net despite the transfer of income abroad. In other words, without foreign borrowing, U.S.
income would be lower than it currently is net of foreign interest payments in this scenario. Since
2008, the output gap (the difference between actual gross domestic product [GDP] and potential
GDP) has been large, making the potential for government budget deficits to stimulate the
economy, putting idle capital and labor resources back to work, and increase total income greater
than usual. Because the federal government has run deficits almost every year since the 1960s,
the mainstream economic view is that these budget deficits have not led to a larger economy on
net over the long run for two reasons. First, the government has run deficits in many years when
the economy was near or at full employment, precluding the role of deficit stimulus. Second,
federal spending on capital is small7 relative to the overall budget.
It can be argued that the underlying long-term economic problem is the budget deficit itself, and
not that the deficit is financed in part by foreigners. This can be illustrated by the
counterfactual—assume the same budget deficits and U.S. saving rates without the possibility of
foreign borrowing. In this case, budget deficits would have had a much greater “crowding out”
effect on U.S. private investment, because only domestic saving would have been available to
finance both. The pressures the deficit has placed on domestic saving would have pushed up
interest rates throughout the economy and caused fewer private investment projects to be
profitably undertaken. With fewer private investment projects, overall GDP would have been
lower over time relative to what it would have been. The ability to borrow from foreigners avoids
the deleterious effects on U.S. interest rates, private investment, and GDP, to an extent, even if it
means that the returns on some of this investment now flow to foreigners instead of Americans. In
other words, all else equal, foreign purchases of Treasury securities reduce the federal
government’s borrowing costs and reduce the costs the deficit imposes on the broader economy.
The burden of a foreign-financed deficit is borne by exporters and import-competing businesses,
because borrowing from abroad necessitates a trade deficit. It is also borne by future generations,
because future interest payments will require income transfers to foreigners.8 To the extent that

6 For a discussion of how government deficits can stimulate the economy, see CRS Report R41578, Unemployment:
Issues in the 113th Congress
, by Jane G. Gravelle.
7 In 2013, non-defense capital investment was $46 billion and grants for capital investment were $78 billion. Source:
Office of Management and Budget, FY 2015 Budget of the United States Government, Historical Tables, March 2014,
Table 9.2.
8 See CRS Report RL30520, The National Debt: Who Bears Its Burden?, by Marc Labonte. Income transfers to
domestic debt holders have no net cost on the United States because they transfer income from one group of Americans
(continued...)
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the deficit crowds out private investment rather than is financed through foreign borrowing, its
burden is also borne by future generations through an otherwise smaller GDP. Because interest
rates are at historically low levels, this burden has not grown significantly given the increase in
borrowing. Were rates to rise, however, the burden would rise with some lag as new borrowing
was made at the new higher rates and old borrowing matured and “rolled over” into new debt
instruments with higher rates.9
Thus far, this report has considered the U.S. determinants of the market for U.S. Treasury
securities, namely the government’s budget deficit and the low U.S. saving rate, but not investor
demand. Since interest rates fell to historic lows at a time when the supply of Treasury securities
rose to historic heights, it follows that Treasury rates have been driven mainly by increased
investor demand in recent years. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, investor demand for
Treasury securities increased as investors undertook a “flight to safety.” Treasury securities are
perceived as a “safe haven” compared with other assets because of low perceived default risk and
greater liquidity (i.e., the ability to sell quickly and at low cost) than virtually any alternative
asset. For foreign investors, their behavior also implies that they view the risk from exchange rate
changes of holding dollar-denominated assets to be lower than alternative assets denominated in
other currencies. The reasons for this flight to safety are varied. For example, investors who had
previously held more risky assets may now be more averse to risk and are seeking to minimize
their loss exposure; investors may not currently see profitable private investment opportunities
and are holding their wealth in Treasury securities as a “store of value” until those opportunities
arise; or investors may now need Treasury securities to post as collateral for certain types of
transactions (such as repurchase agreements) where previously other types of collateral could be
used (or used at low cost). Flight-to-safety considerations are likely to subside if economic
conditions continue to normalize, reducing the incentive for foreigners to buy Treasuries and
raising their yields, all else equal. More normal economic conditions would also be expected to
increase domestic investment demand, which would either push up domestic interest rates or lead
to more foreign borrowing.
Finally, any discussion of foreign holdings of Treasuries would be incomplete without a
discussion of the large holdings of foreign governments (referred to as “foreign official holdings”
in Figure 1).10 Foreign official holdings are motivated primarily by a desire for a liquid and stable
store of value for foreign reserves; relatively few assets besides U.S. Treasury securities fill this
role well. Depending on the country, foreign reserves may be accumulated as a result of a
country’s exchange rate policy, the desire to reinvest export proceeds, or the desire to build a “war
chest” to fend off speculation against the country’s exchange rate and securities. If motivated by
any of these factors, rate of return may be a lesser consideration for foreign governments than it is
for a private investor.
Since 1986, the United States has had a net foreign debt, and that debt grew to $4.6 trillion in
2013. The growth in net foreign debt is unsustainable in the long run, meaning that it cannot
continuously grow faster than GDP, as it has generally done in recent decades. This net foreign
debt has not imposed any burden on Americans thus far, however, because the United States has

(...continued)
(taxpayers) to another (bond holders).
9 The average maturity length of the outstanding debt is about five years.
10 U.S. Treasury, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt.
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consistently earned more income on its foreign assets than it has paid on its foreign debt, even
though foreigners owned more U.S. assets than Americans owned foreign assets. Although it is
likely that the United States would begin to make net debt payments to foreigners at some point if
the net foreign debt were to continue to grow, it has not been a cause for concern yet. To date, the
primary drawback is the risk that its unsustainable growth poses, albeit slight in the short run.
Unsustainable growth in the net foreign debt could lead to foreigners at some point reevaluating
and reducing their U.S. asset holdings. If this happened suddenly, it could lead to financial
instability and a sharp decline in the value of the dollar. Alternatively, were the growth in the debt
to decline gradually, it is unlikely to be destabilizing.11
A related concern is whether the major role of foreigners in Treasury markets adds more risk to
financial stability. In other words, would financial stability be less at risk if the United States
borrowed the same amount from foreigners, but foreigners invested exclusively in private
securities instead of U.S. Treasury securities? Empirical evidence does not shed much light on
this question, although the fact that some foreign crisis countries, such as Ireland, had
accumulated mainly private, not government, debt might suggest that avoiding foreign ownership
of government debt is not a panacea. Although countries like Greece with large foreign holdings
of government debt have experienced financing problems, a large share of Italy’s large
government debt was held domestically, and it has nevertheless faced financing problems. The
major role of foreign governments as holders of U.S. Treasuries could reduce financial instability
if foreign governments are less motivated by rate of return concerns because that implies they
would be less likely to sell their holdings if prices started to fall. Finally, foreign official holdings
of U.S. debt may have foreign policy (as opposed to economic) implications that are beyond the
scope of this report.
What policy options exist if policymakers decided foreign ownership of federal debt was
undesirable? Absent strict capital controls, it is unlikely that foreigners could effectively be
prevented from buying Treasury securities. After Treasury securities are initially auctioned by
Treasury, they are traded on diffused and international secondary markets, and turnover is much
higher on secondary markets than initial auctions. A foreign ban on secondary markets would be
hard to enforce because secondary market activity could shift overseas, and even if it could be
enforced, the U.S. saving-investment imbalance would likely shift foreign investment into other
U.S. securities—perhaps even newly created financial products that allowed foreigners to
indirectly invest in Treasury securities. Thus, a ban would not address the underlying economic
factors driving foreign purchases. Economically, the only way government could reduce its
reliance on foreign borrowing is by raising the U.S. saving rate, which could be done most
directly by reducing budget deficits.


11 The “safe haven” role of Treasuries and “reserve currency” role of the dollar have led to counterintuitive outcomes—
lower Treasury yields in response to U.S. events with systemic risk potential, such as the subprime mortgage crisis and
the federal debt downgrade. These counterintuitive outcomes make it even harder to accurately predict when the debt
might become unsustainable and perhaps make a destabilizing reversal of capital flows less likely compared with other
countries.
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Author Contact Information

Marc Labonte
Jared C. Nagel
Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy
Information Research Specialist
mlabonte@crs.loc.gov, 7-0640
jnagel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2468

Acknowledgments
Previous versions of this report were coauthored by Justin Murray, information research specialist.

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