Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 11, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
95-1013
Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Summary
The uprising against Bahrain’s Al Khalifa royal family that began on February 14, 2011, amidst
other regional uprisings, has not toppled Bahrain’s regime or achieved the goals of the mostly
Shiite opposition to establish a constitutional monarchy. Demonstrations continue, although they
are smaller and less frequent since mid-2013, as Bahrain’s Shiites seek to bring pressure to bear
on the Sunni-dominated government to increase Shiite political influence and rights. And, there
are signs the opposition is radicalizing—bombings and other violent tactics against security
officials have become more frequent since 2012. The government has offered relatively modest
concessions to date, while continuing to arrest and intimidate Shiite leaders. The crisis has
demonstrated that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and
economic opportunities have not been satisfied by modest reforms.
The government and opposition have attempted to resolve the unrest through two “national
dialogues” (July 2011 and February to December 2013), but with limited results. A pivotal report
by a government-appointed “Independent Commission of Inquiry” (BICI), released November
23, 2011, was critical of the government’s actions against the unrest, but outside human rights
groups assessed that overall implementation of the 26 BICI recommendations has been modest.
Still, both sides have left the door open to further dialogue and engagement.
The Obama Administration has not called for an end to the Al Khalifa regime, but it has criticized
its use of repressive measures, urged compromise and dialogue, and halted the sale of some arms
that the government could potentially use against protesters. The U.S. criticism and arms sales
holds have angered some Al Khalifa officials but also dissatisfied the opposition, which asserts
that the United States is downplaying regime abuses in order to protect its extensive security
relationship with Bahrain. Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S.
naval headquarters for the Persian Gulf for over 60 years. The United States signed a formal
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated it a “major non-
NATO ally.” Both these agreements and designations have remained intact through the unrest,
and some sales to Bahrain of arms that could realistically only be used for external defense were
resumed in May 2012. The United States has continued to expand military facilities in Bahrain—
which now accommodate about 7,000 U.S. forces—despite calls by some outside experts to
consider relocating U.S. military personnel from Bahrain entirely.
Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has generally deferred to other GCC powers to resolve
political crises in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In part linking the Syria conflict to its own unrest,
Bahrain has strongly criticized the entry of the Iran-backed Shiite group Lebanese Hezbollah into
the Syria conflict on the side of President Bashar Al Assad.
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf
monarchies and therefore has lacked ample resources to easily and significantly improve Shiite
standards of living. In 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA);
legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further
strained, although not crippled, Bahrain’s economy.
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Contents
The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights ....................................................................... 1
The Ruling Family and Its Dynamics ........................................................................................ 1
Executive and Legislative Powers ............................................................................................. 2
Political Groups and Elections .................................................................................................. 3
Pre-Uprising Elections ........................................................................................................ 5
2011 Uprising: Origin, Developments, and Prognosis .............................................................. 6
Crown Prince Salman’s “Seven Principles” Reform Plan ................................................... 7
The Saudi-led Intervention .................................................................................................. 7
“National Dialogue” Begun and Inquiry Commission Established .................................... 8
Dialogue Recommendations Produce Constitutional Amendments .................................... 9
The BICI Report and Implementation Process .................................................................... 9
Second National Dialogue ................................................................................................. 12
2014 Developments ........................................................................................................... 13
Bomb Attacks Cloud Outlook ........................................................................................... 13
U.S. Posture on the Uprising ............................................................................................. 15
Other Human Rights Issues ..................................................................................................... 18
Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 19
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 19
Media Freedoms ................................................................................................................ 19
Labor Rights ...................................................................................................................... 20
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 20
Executions and Torture ...................................................................................................... 20
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations ..................................................................... 21
U.S. Naval Headquarters in Bahrain ....................................................................................... 21
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) ................................................................................. 23
U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid ..................................................................................... 24
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) .................................................................................... 24
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) ........................................................................................ 25
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET) .......................................... 25
Major Foreign Military Sales (FMS) From Bahrain National Funds ................................ 25
September 2011 Humvee and TOW Sale .......................................................................... 26
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation .................................................................................................... 27
Foreign Policy Issues ............................................................................................................... 28
GCC/Saudi Arabia ............................................................................................................. 28
Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran .................................................................... 30
Post-Saddam Iraq .............................................................................................................. 32
Arab-Israeli Issues ............................................................................................................. 33
Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 33
Figures
Figure 1. Bahrain ........................................................................................................................... 36
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Tables
Table 1. Comparative Composition of National Assembly.............................................................. 6
Table 2. Status of Prominent Dissidents/Other Metrics of the Uprising ........................................ 14
Table 3. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain ..................................................................................... 34
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain ............................................................................................... 35
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 36
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights1
The site of the ancient Bronze Age civilization of Dilmun, Bahrain was a trade hub linking
Mesopotamia and the Indus valley until a drop in trade from India caused the Dilmun civilization
to decline around 2,000 B.C. The inhabitants of Bahrain converted to Islam in the 7th century.
Bahrain subsequently fell under the control of Islamic caliphates based in Damascus, then
Baghdad, and later Persian, Omani, and Portuguese forces.
The Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni Muslim and generally not as religiously conservative as the
leaders of neighboring Saudi Arabia, has ruled Bahrain since 1783. That year, the family, a branch
of the Bani Utbah tribe, arrived from the Saudi peninsula and succeeded in capturing a Persian
garrison controlling the island. In 1830, the ruling family signed a treaty establishing Bahrain as a
protectorate of Britain, which was the dominant power in the Persian Gulf until the early 1970s.
As Britain began reducing its responsibilities in the Gulf in 1968, Bahrain and other Persian Gulf
emirates (principalities) began deciding on their permanent status. A 1970 U.N. survey (some
refer to it as a “referendum”) determined that Bahrain’s inhabitants preferred independence to
Iranian control. Despite that domestic sentiment, in 1971, Bahrain negotiated with other Persian
Gulf emirates that ultimately (end of 1971) formed the United Arab Emirates. Difficulties
throughout 1971 in reaching agreement on a broad federation caused Bahrain to decide to declare
itself independent on August 15, 1971. A U.S. Embassy in Manama, Bahrain’s capital, opened in
September 1971 in conjunction with Bahrain’s independence.
The Ruling Family and Its Dynamics
Bahrain is led by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (about 62 years old), who succeeded his father,
Shaykh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, upon his death in March 1999. Educated at Sandhurst Military
Academy in Britain, King Hamad was previously commander of the Bahraini Defense Forces
(BDF). The king is considered to be a reformer, but some observers consider him a relatively
weak leader unwilling to override hardline, anti-reform Khalifa family members.
The Kings’s son, Shaykh Salman bin Hamad, about 45 years old, is Crown Prince. On March 11,
2013, he was appointed first deputy Prime Minister concurrently. Shaykh Salman is U.S.- and
U.K.-educated and has long been considered a proponent of accommodation with Bahrain’s Shiite
majority—about 60% of the approximately 1.25 million person citizenry.2 Bahrain’s Shiite
Muslims have long perceived themselves as “second class citizens” who are deprived of a
proportionate share of political power and the nation’s economic wealth. There are, additionally,
an estimated 235,000 expatriates in Bahrain. About 25% of the population is age 14 or younger.
1 Much of the information in this section is from State Department reports: 2012 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper. CRS has no means to
independently investigate the human rights situation in Bahrain or confirm specific allegations of abuses there.
2 Government officials dispute that the Shiite community is as large a majority as the 70% figure used in most
factbooks and academic work on Bahrain. The Shiite community in Bahrain consists of the more numerous “Baharna,”
who are of Arab ethnicity and descended from Arab tribes who inhabited the area from pre-Islamic times. Shiites of
Persian ethnicity, referred to as Ajam, arrived in Bahrain over the past 400 years and are less numerous than the
Baharna. The Ajam speak Persian and generally do not integrate with the Baharna or with Sunni Arabs.
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The King’s uncle (the brother of the late Amir Isa), Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al
Khalifa, has been in position since Bahrain’s independence in 1971. He is about 82 years old but
believed to be in stable health. He is considered aligned with—although somewhat more
politically flexible than—a group of family hard-liners that include Minister of the Royal Court
Khalid bin Ahmad bin Salman Al Khalifa3 and his brother the Commander of the BDF Khalifa
bin Ahmad Al Khalifa. The two brothers are known as “Khawalids”—they hail from a branch of
the Al Khalifa family that is traced to an ancestor Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa—and are considered
implacably opposed to compromise with the Shiites.4 The Khawalids reportedly have allies
throughout the security and intelligence services and the judiciary, including for example the
Royal Court Minister’s protégé, Ahmad bin Ateyatallah Al Khalifa (Royal Court minister for
“follow-up affairs”). Hard liners within and outside the family assert that concessions made to the
Shiite majority since 1999 caused the Shiites to increase their political demands rather than
satisfied them. In September 2013, Bahrain appointed Lt. Col. Abdullah bin Muhammad bin
Rashid, a subordinate of the BDF commander and purported hardliner, to become Ambassador to
the United States.
The allies of the Crown Prince within the ruling family—which include a deputy Prime Minister,
Muhammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa (possible successor to the current prime minister)—assert
that the level of unrest reached in 2011 would have occurred long ago had the king’s reforms not
been enacted. The reformists within the family were strengthened by the March 2013
appointment of Crown Prince Salman as first deputy Prime Minister, a new position. The Foreign
Minister, Khalid bin Ahmad bin Muhammad Al Khalifa, is a moderate ally of the Crown Prince.5
The reforms instituted by King Hamad before the unrest began, although well short of the hopes
and expectations the Shiite majority had when he took office, were more extensive than those
made by his father, Amir Isa. In December 1992, Amir Isa established a 30-member appointed
Consultative Council to comment on proposed laws. In June 1996, he expanded it to 40 members.
These reforms did not come close to quieting the demands of either Shiites or Sunnis for the
restoration of an elected national assembly, even though Bahrain’s Sunnis are considered less
hungry for “democracy” than are the Shiites. An elected assembly was provided for under the
1973 constitution but abolished in August 1975 because of fear of sectarian competition and
tensions over control of the body. In the years just prior to Shaykh Hamad’s accession to rule,
there was daily anti-government violence during 1994-1998, mostly by Shiites.
Executive and Legislative Powers
The King, working through the Prime Minister and the cabinet, has broad powers. The King,
through the Prime Minister, makes all cabinet appointments. Al Khalifa family members have
consistently held about half of all ministerial slots, including all defense, internal security, and
foreign policy positions. Before the 2011 unrest, there were only 4 Shiite ministers out of 23
cabinet positions (plus one out of the four deputy prime ministers), and those ministries run by
Shiites have been considered less critical. The number of Shiite ministers was increased to six in
2012, in part as a gesture to the opposition. Shiites have also been highly underrepresented in the
3 The name of this official is similar to that of the Foreign Minister, Khalid bin Ahmad bin Mohammad Al Khalifa.
4 Differences between the khawalids and others in the family are discussed in, Charles Levinson. “A Palace Rift in
Persian Gulf Bedevils Key U.S. Navy Base.” Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2013.
5 The foreign minister’s name is similar to, but slightly different from, that of the hardline Royal Court Minister.
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security forces, serving mainly in administrative tasks. The King appoints all judges by royal
decree and he has the authority to amend the constitution.
As Hamad’s first reform steps upon taking office, he assumed the title of King, dropping the more
traditional rulership title “Amir,” to imply more accountability to the population. He held a
referendum on February 14, 2002, that adopted a “National Action Charter,” including the text of
a constitution. However, many Shiites criticized the constitution because it established that the
elected Council of Representatives (COR)6 and the all-appointed Shura (Consultative) Council
were of equal size (40 seats each). Together, they constitute a National Assembly (parliament).
The government has tended to appoint generally more educated and pro-Western members to the
Shura Council, and it is generally more supportive of the government than is the COR, which
explains why the opposition seeks maximum authority for the COR. There is no “quota” for
females in the National Assembly.
• The Assembly serves as only a partial check on government power, despite
constitutional amendments adopted in May 2012 that gave the Assembly greater
authority. The amendments declared the elected COR as the presiding chamber of
the Assembly, thereby giving it the lead when the two chambers disagree.
• The National Assembly have the power to confirm individual cabinet
appointments. However, as a consequence of the May 2012 amendments, it does
have the power to reject the government’s four-year work plan—and therefore
the whole cabinet. The COR has always had the power to remove sitting
ministers through a vote of no-confidence (requiring a two-thirds majority). The
COR can also, by a similar super-majority, declare that it cannot “cooperate”
with the Prime Minister, but the King then rules on whether to dismiss the Prime
Minister or disband the COR. None of these actions has ever been taken.
• Either chamber of the National Assembly can originate legislation but enactment
into law requires concurrence by the King.7 Prior to the May 2012 amendments,
only the COR could originate legislation. A royal “veto” can be overridden by a
two-thirds majority vote of both chambers. A decree issued by the king on August
23, 2012, gives the National Assembly the ability to recommend constitutional
amendments, which are then vetted by a “Legislation and Legal Opinion
Commission” before consideration by the king.
Political Groups and Elections
Government-opposition disputes over organizing the COR elections predate the 2011 uprising.
The Shiite opposition has sought to establish electoral processes that would allow Shiites to
translate their numbers into political strength. Elections have been held every four years since
2002, each time marked by substantial tension over perceived government efforts to prevent
election of a Shiite majority in the COR. In the COR elections, if no candidate in a contested
district wins more than 50% in the first round, a runoff is held one week later.
Formal political parties are banned, but factions organize, for the elections and other political
activity, as “political societies”—the functional equivalent of parties:
6 This body is also referred to as the Council of Deputies (Majles al-Nawwab).
7 Before the May 2012 constitutional amendments, only the COR could draft legislation.
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• Wifaq, formally, the Al Wifaq (Accord) National Islamic Society, is the largest
and most prominent Shiite political society. It is considered a relatively moderate
opposition faction and has participated in national dialogue with the government
and royal family. A number of Shiite factions are allied with Wifaq and have
similarly participated in dialogue with the regime; they include the National
Democratic Action Society, the National Democratic Assembly, the Democratic
Progressive Tribune, and Al Ekhaa. Wifaq’s leaders, including overall leader
Shaykh Ali al-Salman, have been pressured by the regime. Salman, who is about
45 years old, is a Shiite cleric who has adhered to a tradition in which Bahraini
clerics refrain from serving directly in government. He was slightly injured by
security forces during a protest in June 2012 and he was arrested in November
and in December 2013 for “insulting authorities” and “incitement to religious
hatred,” respectively. His deputy leader, Khalil al-Marzuq, was arrested on
September 18, 2013, for “inciting terrorism” in an anti-government speech.
Another of Wifaq’s top figures, the 75-year-old Shiite cleric Isa Qasim, is
considered a hardliner and has resisted many proposals to settle the crisis. His
home was raided by the regime in May 2013.
• Al Haq (Movement of Freedom and Democracy), another Shiite faction, is
outlawed because of its calls for outright change of regime and has boycotted all
the COR elections. However, it is smaller in membership than Wifaq. Its key
leaders are Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace, who is wheelchair-bound, and Hassan
Mushaima, both of whom are alleged by the government to have ties to Iran and
to Islamist movements in the Middle East. Both have been imprisoned since the
February 2011 uprising. Prior to the uprising, Alsingace had visited the United
States several times to discuss the human rights situation in Bahrain.
• The Bahrain Islamic Action Society, a small Shiite faction, also is an outlawed
faction. It is a successor to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
(IFLB), a party purportedly linked Iran-backed extremist actions in Bahrain the
1980s and 1990s. Another IFLB offshoot, Amal, is known as the “Shirazi
faction” for its ties to radical Shiite clerics in Iran linked to Ayatollah Shirazi.
Amal’s leader, Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Mafoodh, has been in prison since
2011 and Amal was outlawed in 2012.
• Waad (“promise”) is a left-leaning secular political society whose members are
both Sunni and Shiite and is generally aligned with Wifaq as an opposition party.
Waad’s leader, Ibrahim Sharif, has been in prison since 2011.
• Sunni opinion is generally represented by the government. There are some Sunni
political societies that support it, but in some cases criticize the government for
concessions to the Shiite majority. Two Sunni societies are considered Islamist:
Minbar (Arabic for “platform”), which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood,
and Al Asala, which is a harder-line “Salafist” political society. As noted below,
in the 2006-2010 parliament, Asala and Minbar members held a combined 15
seats. In June 2011, another Sunni grouping formed as a response to the Shiite-
led 2011 uprising, organized as a pro-government political society called the
National Unity Gathering/National Unity Association. Other Sunni factions that
support these groups include Al Saff, the Islamic Shura Society, and the Al Wasat
Al Arabi Islamic Society.
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Pre-Uprising Elections
Several elections were held during 2002-2010 which suggested to some outside observers that
political differences in Bahrain could be resolved electorally and legislatively.
• 2002 Election. The first elections under the Charter were held in October 2002.
In the 2002 election, many Shiite opposition political societies, including Wifaq,
boycotted the elections on the grounds that setting the COR and the Shura
Council at the same size dilutes popular will. The 2002 boycott lowered turnout
(about 52%) and helped Sunnis win two-thirds of the 40 COR seats. Of the 170
total candidates, 8 were women, but none of the women was elected.
• 2006 Elections Sunni-Shiite tensions escalated in advance of the November 25,
2006, parliamentary and municipal elections, aggravated by the Bahraini Shiite
perception that a Shiite majority came to power in Iraq through U.S.-backed
elections. The Bahrain election was clouded by allegations, publicly corroborated
by a government adviser (Salah al-Bandar) in August 2006, that the government
was adjusting election districts to favor Sunni candidates. It was also alleged the
government had issued passports to Sunnis in an attempt to shift the demographic
balance to the Sunnis’ advantage. Still, Wifaq and some other Shiite societies
participated, producing a 72% turnout. The Shiite opposition won 17 seats,
virtually all those it contested, becoming the largest single bloc in the COR
although still short of a majority. Sunni Muslims won 23 total seats, a slight
majority. Of those, eight were secular Sunnis and 15 were Islamists. One woman,
who was unopposed in her district, was elected out of 18 female candidates.
Wifaq boycotted the speakership contest and incumbent COR Speaker Khalifa al-
Dhahrani was reelected. The King subsequently named a new Shura Council with
20 Shiites, 19 Sunnis, and one Christian (a female). Ten of the appointees were
women. In a nod to the increased Shiite numbers in the COR, the government
appointed a Shiite as one of four deputy prime ministers and another, a Wifaq
supporter, as a minister of state for foreign affairs.
• The 2010 Elections. The two-round COR vote was held on October 23 and
October 30, 2010. Two Bahraini human rights watchdog groups, the Bahrain
Human Rights Society and the Bahrain Transparency Society, jointly monitored
the elections, along with some international observers. Municipal elections were
held concurrently. The electorate was about 300,000 persons, voting in 40
districts spread throughout five governorates. Shiite oppositionists again accused
the government of drawing boundaries to favor Sunni candidates. Of the 200
candidates registered, six were women, but only one of the women - oppositionist
Munira Fakhro - was endorsed by a political society (Waad). Wifaq participated
despite the arrests of 23 Shiite leaders the previous month under a 2006 anti-
terrorism law that gave the government broad powers. The tensions over this
election almost certainly contributed to the major unrest that began in February
2011, even though there was no major violence during the election. Turnout was
about 67%. The election increased Wifaq’s representation to 18 seats, although
still not a majority; reduced Sunni Islamists to five seats from 15; and
empowered by Sunni independents, who won 17 seats, up from nine in the 2006-
2010 parliament. The same one woman won who had won in 2006. In the
municipal elections conducted concurrently, one woman was elected in the
second round—the first woman to be elected to a municipal council.
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In advance of the December 14, 2010, start of the parliamentary term, the King reappointed 30 of
the 40 serving Shura Council members and ten new members. Of its membership, 19 were
Shiites, including the speaker, Ali bin Salih al-Salih. The Council has four women, substantially
fewer than the 2006-2010 Council that had nine. Among the four, one is Jewish (Nancy
Khadouri), out of a Jewish population in Bahrain of about 40 persons, and one is Christian (Hala
Qarrisah). Bahrain has an estimated 1,000 Christians.
Table 1. Comparative Composition of National Assembly
Post-By-Election
2006
2010
(October 2011)
Council of Representatives (COR)
Wifaq (Shiite Islamist)
17
18
0
Shi te
Independent
0 0 8
Sunni Independent (mostly
secular) in COR
8
17
27
Moderate Sunni Islamist
(Minbar, Muslim
Brotherhood) 7 2 2
Conservative Sunni
Islamist (Asala, Salafi)
8
3
3
COR Sect Composition
23 Sunni, 17 Shiite
22 Sunni, 18 Shiite
32 Sunni, 8 Shiite
Women in COR
1
1
4
Shura Council (Upper House, appointed)
Sectarian, Religious
Composition Upper
20 Shi te, 19 Sunni, 1
19 Shi te, 19 Sunni, 1
House (Shura Council)
Christian
Christian, 1 Jew
Same as before
Number of Women
9
4
same
2011 Uprising: Origin, Developments, and Prognosis
King Hamad’s efforts to satisfy Shiite aspirations were demonstrated to have failed when a major
uprising began on February 14, 2011, in the aftermath of the uprising that toppled Egypt’s
President Hosni Mubarak.8 After a few days of protests and minor confrontations with security
forces, mostly Shiite demonstrators converged on the interior of a major traffic circle, “Pearl
Roundabout,” named after a statue there depicting Bahrain’s pearl-diving past. The protesters
demanded altering the constitution to expand the powers of the COR; ending gerrymandering of
election districts to favor Sunnis; providing more jobs and economic opportunities; and replacing
hard-line Prime Minister Khalifa. On February 15, 2011, King Hamad formed a committee to
investigate the use of force against protestors, which had killed two by that time.
8 The events of the uprising, and the government’s political and security reaction, are examined in substantial detail in
the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report released November 23, 2011. Text of the report is at
http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf.
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The unrest escalated on February 17, 2011, when security forces used rubber bullets and tear gas
to remove thousands of demonstrators from Pearl Roundabout. Four demonstrators were killed.
Additional protests took place on February 18, 2011, with several protesters shot. Wifaq pulled all
18 deputies out of the COR, and Britain closed its embassy and banned arms exports to Bahrain.
In part at the reported urging of the United States, on February 19, 2011, the government pulled
security forces back, and demonstrators reentered the Roundabout. On February 22 and 25, 2011,
demonstrations said to be perhaps the largest in Bahrain’s history were held. These followed a
large demonstration on February 21, 2011, by government supporters. (Wifaq and other Shiite
groups boycotted a September – October 2011 special election to fill those seats, producing a
COR with 32 Sunni to only 8 Shiite-held seats.)
The government, with Crown Prince Salman leading the effort, invited the representatives of the
protesters to begin a formal dialogue. That effort was supported by a gesture by King Hamad on
February 22, 2011, to release or pardon 308 Bahrainis, including Al Haq leader Mushaima,
paving the way for him to return from exile. On February 26, 2011, the King dropped two Al
Khalifa family members from cabinet posts as a gesture to the opposition.
Crown Prince Salman’s “Seven Principles” Reform Plan
On March 13, 2011, Crown Prince Salman articulated “seven principles” that would guide a
national dialogue, including a “parliament with full authority”; a “government that meets the will
of the people”; fair voting districts; and several other measures.9 The articulation of the seven
principles gave Wifaq and other moderate oppositionists hope that many of their demands could
be met through dialogue. However, anger at the government’s use of force appeared to shift many
demonstrators closer to hardline groups such as Al Haq that demanded an end to the monarchy.10
The Saudi-led Intervention
With Shiite groups refusing to accept the offer of dialogue, protests escalated and sparked broader
Sunni-Shiite clashes. On March 13, 2011, protesters blockaded the financial district of the capital,
Manama, prompting governmental fears that this major economic sector could be harmed.
Bahrain requested that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which it is a member, send
security forces to protect key sites and, on March 14, 2011, a GCC force (from the GCC joint
Peninsula Shield unit) spearheaded by a reported 1,200 Saudi armored forces and 600 UAE
police crossed into Bahrain and took up positions at key locations. Kuwait sent naval forces to
help Bahrain secure its maritime borders. On March 15, 2011, King Hamad declared (Royal
Decree Number 18) a three-month state of emergency. Bahrain’s security forces, freed up by the
GCC deployment, cleared demonstrators from Pearl Roundabout and demolished the Pearl
Monument on March 18, 2011.11 That action caused Shiite ministers in the cabinet, many of the
Shiites in the Shura Council, and many other senior Shiites, to resign. Most public protests in
downtown Manama ceased.
9 BICI report, op. cit., p. 165.
10 “Bahrain Hard-Liners Call for Royal Family to Go.” Cable News Network website, March 9, 2011.
11 Some accounts differ on the involvement of the Peninsula Shield force, with some observers arguing that members of
the force participated directly in suppressing protests, and others accepting the Bahrain/GCC view that the GCC force
guarded key locations and infrastructure.
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Perceiving the regime had gained the upper hand, the King announced in May 2011 that the state
of emergency would end on June 1, 2011, two weeks earlier than scheduled. The government held
to the new schedule and the GCC forces began to depart in late June 2011. King Hamad spoke to
the population on May 31, 2011, to mark the end of the emergency, offering unconditional
dialogue with the opposition beginning July 1, 2011. Most of the GCC forces left, although some,
including some of the UAE police, remained to bolster Bahraini security force ranks. The GCC
intervention represented an escalation from earlier steps to help the Bahrain government. The
GCC states had earlier about $20 billion to help both Bahrain (and Oman, which also faced
unrest) by fueling job creation. In April 2013, Kuwait continued the effort by pledging an
additional $1.3 billion for development projects in Bahrain.
“National Dialogue” Begun and Inquiry Commission Established
On June 29, 2011, as a further gesture toward the opposition, the king named a five-person
“Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry,” (BICI) headed by highly regarded international
legal expert Dr. Cherif Bassiouni, to investigate the government’s response to the unrest that
began in February. It held a public forum on July 24, 2011, but came under criticism from Shiite
opposition figures who interpreted certain Bassiouni statements as exonerating top officials.
The naming of the BICI set the stage for the “National Dialogue” on political and economic
reform to begin on July 2, 2011, under the chairmanship of speaker of the COR Dhahrani. About
300 delegates participated, of which the Shiite opposition broadly comprised 40-50 delegates, of
which 5 belonged to Wifaq.12 Over several weeks, the dialogue addressed political, economic,
social, and human rights issues that senior Bahraini officials said was intended to outline a vision
of Bahrain rather than specific steps. The detention of many oppositionists hung over the
meetings, and Wifaq exited the talks on July 18, 2011. Others noted that the Crown Prince did not
chair the meetings, suggesting he was eclipsed by hard line figures within the royal family.
The dialogue concluded in late July 2011 after reaching consensus on the following
recommendations, which were endorsed by the government on July 29, 2011.
• an elected parliament (lower house) with expanded powers, including the power
to confirm or reject a nominated cabinet; the power to confirm or veto the
government’s four-year work plan; the right to discuss any agenda item; and the
power for the full COR to question ministers on their performance or plans. In
addition, the overall chairmanship of the National Assembly should be exercised
by the elected COR, not the Shura Council.
• a government “reflecting the will of the people.”
• “fairly” demarcated electoral boundaries.
• reworking of laws on naturalization and citizenship.
• combating financial and administrative corruption.
• efforts to reduce sectarian divisions.
12 Mohamed Hasni. “Bahrain Opens Dialogue Buoyed by Shiite Attendance.” Agence France Presse, July 2, 2011.
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There were reportedly 82 economic recommendations, including new mechanisms to provide
food subsidies to only the most needy citizens.
As a gesture of reconciliation after the dialogue concluded, in a speech on August 28, 2011, near
the conclusion of the holy month of Ramadan, King Hamad announced the pardoning of some
protesters and the reinstatement of some of the approximately 2,700 of those who had been fired
for alleged participation in unrest. On August 8, 2011, the government released the two jailed
Wifaq COR deputies, Matar and Fairuz, along with several other activists.
“Manama Document” Opposition Proposal. Wifaq and other Shiite opposition groups rejected
the outcome of the national dialogue as failing to fulfill even the Crown Prince’s offer of a
parliament with “full authority.” The groups, led by Wifaq and Waad, unveiled their own
proposals – the “Manama Document” - on October 12, 2011. The manifesto called for a fully
elected one-chamber parliament with legislative powers, the direct selection of the prime minister
by the largest coalition in the elected legislature, and the running of elections by an independent
election commission. The opposition also viewed the government’s pledge of “fairly demarcated”
election boundaries as vague, and likely to enable the government to continue to gerrymander
districts to ensure a Sunni majority in the lower house.
Dialogue Recommendations Produce Constitutional Amendments
Despite the opposition’s criticism of the dialogue results, the government appointed a committee,
headed by deputy Prime Minister Muhammad Mubarak Al Khalifa, to implement the consensus
recommendations. After rounds of meetings between both houses of the National Assembly and
various ministries, the King announced draft amendments to the Bahraini constitution on January
16, 2012. They were adopted by the National Assembly, and ratified by the King on May 3, 2012.
The amendments:
• Imposed limitations on the power of the king to appoint the members of the
Shura Council, and a requirement that he consult the heads of the two chambers
of the National Assembly before dissolving the COR.
• Gave either chamber of the National Assembly the ability to draft legislation or
constitutional amendments.
• Changed the overall chair of the National Assembly to the speaker of the elected
COR instead of the chairman of the appointed Shura Council.
• Gave the COR the ability to veto the government’s four-year work plan—
essentially an ability to veto the nomination of the entire cabinet—without the
concurrence of the Shura Council. This was an expansion of previous powers to
vote no confidence against individual ministers.
The BICI Report and Implementation Process
In addition to the national dialogue, the government looked to the release of the BICI report to
help resolve the crisis. The focus of the BICI mission was how the government handled the
unrest—and not on competing ideas for political reform. It was initially due by October 30, 2011,
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but was released on November 23, 2011. The 500+ page report provided some support for the
narratives of both sides in the crisis, and recommendations, including13
• There was “systematic” and “deliberate” use of excessive force, including torture
and forced confessions, against protesters.
• The opposition articulated additional demands as the uprising progressed.
• The government did not provide evidence to establish a link between the unrest
in Bahrain and the government of Iran. (p. 378)
• There was no evidence of human rights abuses committed by the GCC forces that
intervened at the request of the Bahraini government. (p. 378)
The report contained 26 recommendations (pp. 411-415) to try to prevent future violence against
peaceful protesters and to hold accountable those responsible for abuses against protesters. In
keeping with the BICI’s mandate, the recommendations did not address the political structure of
Bahrain. Apparently recognizing that it would be judged by the international community on its
response to the report, King Hamad issued a statement accepting the criticism and promising full
implementation of the recommendations. Wifaq supported the parts of the report that support its
accounts but criticized it as failing to state that abuse of protesters were deliberate government
policy. On November 26, 2011, King Hamad issued a royal order to establish a 19-member
National Commission to oversee implementation of the recommendations, chaired by Shura
Council Chairman Ali al-Salih (a Shiite). The King also announced that the “National Human
Rights Institution,” established in 2010, would be fully independent of the government.
On March 20, 2012, the National Commission issued its final report, generally supporting the
government’s assertions of its implementation steps to that date.14 In the cover letter to its report,
the National Commission stated that “the reader will see that in less than 100 days this
Commission has worked hard with the Government to reform the justice, human rights, policing,
security services and media sectors in a way that accords with best international practice.”
Subsequently, a “Follow-Up Unit,” headed by Ms. Dana Al Zayani, was established by the
Ministry of Justice.15 According to all of these governmental bodies, the regime implemented the
vast majority of the 26 BICI recommendations. However, a study by the Project on Middle East
Democracy (POMED), issued on the one-year anniversary of the BICI recommendations, found
that the government had fully implemented only three of the recommendations, partially
implemented 15, not implemented six at all, and two others had “unclear” implementation.16 This
more critical assessment was supported by BICI chair Bassiouni in public comments marking the
one-year anniversary of the report. The conference report on the FY2013 defense authorization
act (P.L. 112-239, signed January 2, 2013) directed the Secretary of State to report to Congress
within 180 days of enactment (by July 2, 2013) on Bahrain’s implementation of the BICI
recommendations. (A formal provision of the law to this effect was taken out in conference and
substituted with conference report language to the same effect.) The report was submitted but not
13 http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf.
14 The full text of the National Commission’s March 20, 2012, report is at http://www.biciactions.bh/wps/portal/BICI/.
15 The Follow-Up Unit’s June report can be found at http://www.iaa.bh/downloads/bici_followup_report_en.pdf.
16 POMED. “One Year Later: Assessing Bahrain’s Implementation of the BICI Report.” November 2012.
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made public;17 press reports indicate that it concluded that the government had fully implemented
five out of the 26 recommendations—a finding broadly similar to those of POMED.18
The recommendations that observers agree were fully implemented include
• Stripping the National Security Agency of law enforcement powers and limiting
it to purely intelligence gathering. That occurred with the issuing of an
amendment to the 2002 decree establishing that agency. The head of the
organization was removed and replaced by Adel bin Khalifa Al Fadhil, a non-
royal. The arrest powers were transferred to the Ministry of Interior.
• Drafting and providing training on a code of conduct for the police, based on
international best practices. The government hired former Miami police chief
John Timoney and former British police chief John Yates to teach Bahraini police
tactics and techniques that conform to international standards of human rights
practices. However, the State Department’s human rights report for 2012, issued
on April 19, 2013, said that the Ministry of Interior’s enforcement of the code of
conduct is unclear.19
• Training judiciary employees and prosecutors on preventing and eradicating
torture and ill-treatment.
There appears to be broad agreement among observers, including the State Department, human
rights groups, Bassiouni, and others, that the government has not implemented several
recommendations (5, 8, 10, 14, 22, and 24) that address investigation and prevention of torture,
detention without prompt access to legal counsel, dropping charges on those who protested but
did not use violence, and allowing the opposition free expression and access to media.
Most of the recommendations fall into an intermediate category of partial implementation:
• Holding security officials accountable for abuses (recommendations No. 2 and
No. 7). There appears to be agreement that the government has shielded high-
ranking officials from prosecution while allowing prosecution of lower-ranking
officers.
• Referral of all cases of security personnel who committed major abuses to the
public prosecutor for subsequent prosecution. On March 13, 2013, two police
officers were sentenced to 10 years in prison for fatally beating protesters in
2011. In July 2013, the government appointed Nawaf al-Maawdah as the
Ministry of Interior Ombudsman to examine complaints filed against security
personnel for causing death or physical harm. In late May 2014, the
Ombudsman’s officie issued its first report, stating that 45 Ministry personnel
had been referred for prosecution by various courts.20
• Abolition of the military court system and transfer of all cases to ordinary courts.
17 Author conversation with congressional staff, July 2013.
18 http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/14/the_peril_of_ignoring_bahrain_s_iron_fist.
19 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper. p.11.
20 http://ombudsman.bh/mcms-store/pdf/610-First%20Annual%20Report%20%202013-2014-2812251.pdf?
utm_source=Project+on+Middle+East+Democracy+-+All+Contacts&utm_campaign=1e97a6b50f-
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• Establishment of new procedures to record interrogations of detainees (No. 13).
• Integrating Shiites into the security services (No. 11). On September 17, 2012,
the government announced hiring of 500 police cadets “representing all
communities in Bahrain”—in an effort to address this recommendation.
• Reinstatement of fired workers, public sector employees, and students (No. 18,
No. 19, and No. 20). Almost all of the over 2,500 dismissed workers have been
reinstated.
• Establishment of a compensation fund for the victims of torture and families of
deceased victims (No.16 and No. 17). In August 2011, the King announced the
“Civil Settlement Initiative” fund setting aside over $25 million to compensate
these victims.
• The rebuilding of destroyed religious sites (No. 21). At least 5 of the more than
53 Shiite religious sites demolished by the regime during the course of the
uprising have been mostly rebuilt. Rebuilding of another 17 sites is in various
stages of construction.
Second National Dialogue
Continued demonstrations, use of force against them, and increasing incidents of anti-government
violence caused the government and the opposition to seek to resume dialogue. Moderates on
both sides stressed that the Crown Prince’s “Seven Principles,” the national dialogue consensus
recommendations, and the Manama Document had many points in common. The State
Department and partner countries including Britain sought to foster momentum for resumed
dialogue by promoting “Track 2” meetings that might examine ideas for a compromise. The
Bahraini government rejected a reported U.S. suggestion to name a high-level international
mediator to narrow the differences between the parties.
Momentum for renewed dialogue built in late 2012. The State Department praised the Crown
Prince’s speech at the December 7-8, 2012, Manama Dialogue (annual international security
conference sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies) calling for a resumption
of national dialogue. On January 22, 2013, the King formally reiterated his earlier calls for a
restart of the dialogue and, the same day, Wifaq and five allied parties (Waad, the National
Democratic Gathering Society, the Unitary National Democratic Assemblage, the Democratic
Progressive Tribune, and the Ekhaa National Society) accepted the invitation.
The new dialogue began on February 10, 2013, consisting of twice per week meetings attended
by: the Minister of Justice (an Al Khalifa family member) and two other ministers, eight
opposition representatives (Wifaq and allied parties), eight representatives of pro-government
organizations, and five members of the National Assembly (both the upper and lower house). To
facilitate progress, the King appointed Crown Prince Salman first deputy Prime Minister (March
11, 2013).
The second national dialogue quickly bogged down and ultimately produced few results. The
opposition insisted any consensus recommendations be put to a popular referendum, while the
government insisted that agreements be enacted by the National Assembly. The opposition
demanded that the dialogue include authoritative decision makers and representatives of the
King—higher-level figures than the ministers that participated. Opposition participants began
boycotting the talks in mid-September 2013, to protest lack of progress as well as the arrest of
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Khalil al-Marzuq, the deputy chief of Wifaq and Wifaq’s representative to the dialogue. The
government formally suspended the dialogue on January 8, 2014.
2014 Developments
In an unexpected development, Crown Prince Salman sought to revive the dialogue process by
meeting with Marzuq and overall Wifaq leader Shaykh Salman on January 15, 2014. The Crown
Prince convened the meeting despite the fact that both faced criminal charges in separate cases,
although a related travel ban on Salman was lifted subsequent to that meeting. The meeting
appeared to address a main Wifaq demand that political dialogue be conducted with senior Al
Khalifa members. The Minister of the Royal Court Shaykh Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa (see
above) subsequently met with opposition representatives in late January and February 2014 to
discuss their proposals for altering Bahrain’s governing structure—an effort to prepare for a so-
called “new look” national dialogue. The Royal Court Minister said any renewed dialogue would
include a greater number of senior officials than was the case previously. A renewed national
dialogue has not convened, to date.
Some experts express optimism that a political settlement is possible if and when dialogue
resumes. Both the government and the opposition have at times discussed an interim compromise
in which the opposition gains seats in a new cabinet—although they differ on how many seats the
opposition might get in such a scenario. Meetings between Saudi officials and Bahraini have
appeared to signal a softening of Saudi resistance to concessions to the Bahrain opposition. Still,
a widely discussed interim compromise, the replacement of Prime Minister Khalifa, with a more
moderate Al Khalifa member has not been implemented. Some oppositionists have said they
would even accept a Sunni, but not a member of the royal family, as a replacement for the
Khalifa. The government did not agree to this step even though, throughout the crisis, some
Bahrain government supporters appeared to be sympathetic to it.
Others assert that the climate is ripe for a settlement because demonstrations have become less
frequent and have been confined mainly to the Shiite villages ringing Manama. The opposition
held three days of large demonstrations (February 13-15, 2014) to mark the third anniversary of
the uprising, but the demonstrations were largely peaceful. There were no protester deaths,
although 29 demonstrators were arrested on February 14 for trying to converge on the downtown
area. Others maintained that the riot police fired tear gas at demonstrators, indicating that the
goals of the BICI process were not substantially achieved.
A possible indicator of the potential for a settlement will be the next COR elections. The
government has set the vote for an as-yet unspecified day in November 2014. On May 31, 2014,
the main opposition political factions, including Wifaq, announced they would boycott the
elections unless their demands for a fully-elected government (and other demands discussed
above) were met first.
Bomb Attacks Cloud Outlook
Others are pessimistic, asserting that the uprising might be evolving into a violent insurgency
conducted by increasingly organized groups. One hardline group, the “14 February Coalition”
(named for the anniversary of the Bahrain uprising) claims to be inspired by the “Tamarod”
(rebel)-led protests in Egypt that prompted the Egyptian military to remove Muslim Brotherhood
president Mohammad Morsi. The Bahraini government asserts that the 14 February Coalition is a
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terrorist movement that seeks to overthrow the state, and the movement gave some support to that
assertion when it claimed responsibility for an April 14, 2013, explosion in the Financial Harbour
district. On September 29, 2013, 50 Shiites were sentenced to up to 15 years in prison for alleged
involvement in the 14 February Coalition. Another group, the “Al Ashtar Brigades” claimed
responsibility for a March 3, 2014, bombing that killed three police officers who were
confronting protesters outside Manama. One of the officers killed was a UAE police officer—part
of the contingent that has helped Bahraini security forces since the 2011 GCC intervention.
Among other bombings carried out by unspecified cells or oppositionists: a November 5, 2012,
bombing killed two non-Bahrainis; several police officers were wounded by a roadside bomb on
January 31, 2013; two police officers were severely wounded by a bombing on December 28,
2013; one police officer was killed by a bomb on February 14, 2014, the third anniversary of the
uprising; and two Bahrain police were wounded by a bomb on March 11, 2014.
In concert with the emergence of groups that use violent tactics, the use, storage, and manufacture
of explosives against Bahraini security forces appears to be increasing. On April 9, 2012, an
improvised explosive device killed seven police. On June 14, 2012, the government discovered
bomb-making materials in several locations. On April 29, 2013, the government claimed to have
uncovered an arms warehouse used by oppositionists. On May 30, 2013, and July 14, 2013,
home-made bombs wounded a total of 11 police officers. On October 7, 2013, a Bahrain court
convicted nine Bahraini Shiites linked to the bomb-making facilities discussed above for
“forming a militant group” and making explosives for attacks to destabilize the Kingdom. On
December 30, 2013, following a two-day raid, authorities seized a ship, originating in Iraq,
allegedly carrying Iranian weaponry and bomb-making material for the Bahrain opposition.21
Wifaq and other mainstream opposition groups have denounced any use of violence, while at the
same time accusing the government of exaggerating some of the incidents above. Pro-government
Bahrainis say that the increasing instances of violence and bombings shows intent of the
opposition to overthrow the regime by any means necessary. Should the uprising evolve into a
violent uprising, the ascension of a Shiite-led regime is possible, although the GCC determination
to prevent this makes this outcome unlikely.
Table 2. Status of Prominent Dissidents/Other Metrics of the Uprising
Abdul Hadi al-
Arrested April 9, 2011, was one of 13 prominent dissidents tried by state security court
Khawaja, founder
May 8, 2011, and sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to overthrow the government
of Bahrain Center
and for espionage on June 22, 2011. He conducted a hunger strike in prison in early 2012
for Human Rights
but was force fed by Bahraini officials and remains alive. Daughters Zainab and Maryam
have been repeatedly arrested for opposition activities and released, and have campaigned
abroad for their father’s release and for the Shi te opposition generally. His brother, Salah
Abdullah al-Khawaja, was sentenced in June 2011 to five years in prison.
Hassan Mushaima and
Two of the 13 prominent dissidents tried by state security court May 8, 2011, sentenced
Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace,
to life in prison on June 22, 2011. Sentence upheld September 4, 2012. Mushaima’s son
Al Haq leaders
was one of the 31 whose citizenship was revoked in November 2012.
Other prominent
Along with the Khawaja brothers, Mushaima, and Alsingace, the June 22, 2011, sentences
oppositionists sentenced of nine other prominent dissidents were upheld on September 4, 2012, and reaffirmed by
on June 22, 2011
the Court of Cassation on January 8, 2013. Of the nine, four are sentenced to life in
prison—Abdulwahab Ahmed; Mohammad al-Saffaf; Abduljalil Mansour; and Said Mirza
Ahmad. State Department said on September 4, 2012, it was “deeply troubled” by the
21 Sandeep Singh Grewal. Arms Ring is Smashed by Police. Daily News, December 31. 2013.
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upholding of the sentences.
Nabeel Rajab
Successor to al-Khawaja as head of BCHR. Arrested February 15, 2012, for inciting illegal
assembly and organizing unlicensed demonstrations, released, and rearrested on April 1,
2012. Sentenced on August 16, 2012, to three years in jail but, on December 11, 2012,
sentence was reduced to two years on appeal. Released May 24, 2014.
Mohammad al Maskati
President of the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, arrested October 16, 2012, for
taking part in illegal gatherings. Released the following day.
Sayed Yousif al-
Member of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, has catalogued and reported on
Muhafdha
protests over social media. Arrested December 17, 2012, and detained for two weeks in
November 2012.
21 medical personnel
Twenty-one medical personnel were arrested in April 2011 and subsequently tried for
from Salmaniya Medical
inciting sectarian hatred, possession of illegal weapons, and forcibly occupying a public
Complex
building. The personnel argued that they were helping wounded protesters. They were
tried in a military court before the government announced their retrial in a civilian court.
All were eventually acquitted, most recently in late March 2013 by an appeals court.
However, they have not been able to regain their jobs at the medical center. In December
2013, two police officers were cleared of torturing the medics to obtain confessions.
Matar Matar and Jawad
Arrested May 2, 2011, and released August 8, 2011. Matar formal y acquitted on February
Fairuz, members of the
19, 2012. Fairuz was one of the 31 whose citizenship was revoked in Nov. 2012. His
COR, Ayatollah Najati
brother, Jalal Fairuz, was another stripped of citizenship, as was Shi te Ayatol ah Hussein
al-Najati. Najati was expel ed from Bahrain on April 23, 2014, for acting as a
representative of Iraqi senior Ayatol ah Ali al-Sistani “without permission.”
Deputy Secretary
Arrested in September 2013 for activities undermining security, but released. Trial has
General of Wifaq Khalil
been repeatedly postponed, but is scheduled to begin March 30, 2014.
al-Marzuq
Number killed in the
About 90
uprising to date
Sources: Various press and interest group reports.
U.S. Posture on the Uprising
The Administration has not at any time called for the Al Khalifa regime to step down, asserting
that Bahrain’s use of force against demonstrators has been limited and that the Bahrain
government has—prior to and since the uprising began—undertaken reform. The Administration
has repeatedly urged Bahraini authorities against using force against protesters, it opposed the
GCC intervention, and it has called on all parties to engage in sustained political dialogue on
reforms.22 After the GCC intervention, on March 19, 2011, then Secretary Clinton said:
Bahrain obviously has the sovereign right to invited GCC forces into its territory under its
defense and security agreements…. [The United States has] made clear that security alone
cannot resolve the challenges facing Bahrain. As I said earlier this week, violence is not and
cannot be the answer. A political process is. We have raised our concerns about the current
measures directly with Bahraini officials and will continue to do so.
President Obama’s May 19, 2011, speech on the uprisings in the Middle East said the prospects
for success of a Bahrain government dialogue with the opposition were compromised by the
jailing of opposition figures. This position was restated in separate June 7, 2011, meetings
22 Secretary of State Clinton Comments on the Situation in the Middle East. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
GbucMZUg3Gc.
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between the Crown Prince and then Secretary Clinton and President Obama. In his September 21,
2011, speech to the U.N. General Assembly, President Obama said:
In Bahrain, steps have been taken toward reform and accountability. We’re pleased with that,
but more is required. America is a close friend of Bahrain, and we will continue to call on the
government and the main opposition bloc—the Wifaq—to pursue a meaningful dialogue that
brings peaceful change that is responsive to the people. We believe the patriotism that binds
Bahrainis together must be more powerful than the sectarian forces that would tear them
apart. It will be hard, but it is possible.
The same day, Ambassador-nominee to Bahrain (later confirmed) Thomas Krajeski testified in
confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, saying the Bahrain
government “overreacted” to the unrest, but also praising the government’s record of reform.
After the release of the BICI report, then-Secretary of State Clinton said that the United States is
deeply concerned about the abuses identified in the report … and believe[s] that the BICI
report offers a historic opportunity for all Bahrainis to participate in a healing process that
will address long-standing grievances and move the nation onto a path of genuine, sustained,
reform.
During May 2012, Crown Prince Salman visited Washington, DC, and met with Secretary of
State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Panetta, and Vice President Biden. As discussed below, a
resumption of some U.S. arms sales to Bahrain was announced on May 11, 2012, which
represented an Administration effort to strengthen the reformist Crown Prince politically.
On June 6, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry met in Washington, D.C., with the Crown Prince
and a subsequent State Department statement said: the United States and Bahrain “agreed that all
sides should contribute constructively to reconciliation, meaningful dialogue, and reform that
meets the aspirations of all Bahrainis. Secretary Kerry reiterated [the U.S.] belief that all sides
must reject violence and pursue actions that will contribute to Bahrain’s future growth and
prosperity.” Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited Bahrain to speak before the 2013 Manama
Dialogue (IISS security conference discussed above), becoming the first U.S. cabinet member to
visit Bahrain since the 2011 uprising began. In late January 2014, acting Assistant Secretary of
State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Uzra Zeya visited Bahrain to meet with senior
officials there. On February 29, 2014, Deputy Secretary of State William Burns praised the efforts
of the Crown Prince to revive the national dialogue process.23
Although the Obama Administration has continued military and anti-terrorism assistance and
some arms sales to Bahrain, some U.S. aid and sales are on hold or are at reduced levels from
what was expected before the unrest began. For example, $25 million in military aid (Foreign
Military Financing, FMF) was requested for Bahrain for FY2012 (figures determined just before
the uprising began), but only $10 million was provided. $12.575 million in FMF was provided in
FY2013 and $10 million is being provided in FY2014. The Administration requested $7.5 million
for that function for FY2015.
23 http://www.state.gov/s/d/2014/221809.htm?utm_source=Project+on+Middle+East+Democracy+-+All+Contacts&
utm_campaign=027fa1d218-Bahrain_Weekly_Update_Nov_1_2012&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_75a06056d7-
027fa1d218-215946089
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Critics of the Administration—primarily human rights-oriented groups such as Human Rights
Watch and the Project on Middle East Democracy—say the U.S. response has been colored by the
vital U.S. security interests in Bahrain rather than a commitment to promoting human rights.24
Critics add that the Administration is concerned, excessively so in the view of these critics, that a
fall of the Al Khalifa regime and ascension of a Shiite-led government could increase Iran’s
influence and lead to an unwanted loss of the U.S. use of Bahrain’s military facilities.
Administration critics have said that continued military sales and aid to the government
represents a tacit endorsement of the government’s stance on the unrest. Some outside experts
criticized State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf’s September 18, 2013, reaction to the arrest
of Khalil al-Marzuq because her comments expressed disappointment not at the arrest but at the
opposition’s pullout from the national dialogue.
The Administration has not imposed any sanctions on Bahrain or on Bahraini officials for human
rights abuses. Some human rights-related groups have suggested that the United States should ban
travel to the United States or freeze any U.S.-based assets of Bahraini officials determined by the
Administration to have committed or authorized human rights abuses against peaceful protesters.
Such sanctions have been imposed on members of adversary governments such as Syria and Iran,
for example in the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(P.L. 111-195).
Pre-2011 U.S. Posture on Bahraini Democracy and Human Rights
Well before the 2011 unrest began, human rights groups and Bahraini Shiite oppositionists had
accused successive U.S. Administrations of downplaying government abuses. Critics point to then
Secretary of State Clinton’s comments in Bahrain on December 3, 2010, referring to the October
2010 elections, saying: “I am impressed by the commitment that the government has to the
democratic path that Bahrain is walking on. It takes time; we know that from our own
experience.”25
The Administration counters the criticism with assertions that, for many years prior to the 2011
unrest, the United States sought to accelerate political reform in Bahrain and to empower its
political societies through several programs. The primary vehicle has been the “Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI),” which began funding programs in Bahrain in 2003 such as those
to help Bahrain build an independent judiciary, to strengthen the COR, to empower women, to
conduct media training, and to promote legal reform. MEPI funds have also been used to fund
AFL-CIO projects with Bahraini labor organizations, and to help Bahrain implement the U.S.-
Bahrain FTA. In May 2006 Bahrain revoked the visa for the resident program director of the
National Democratic Institute (NDI), and did not allow the office to reopen. NDI was conducting
programs to enhance parliamentary capabilities through a local NGO. Successive State
Department International Religious Freedom reports have noted that the U.S. government
discusses religious freedom with the [Bahraini] government as part of its overall policy to
promote human rights. A U.S. Embassy Manama fact sheet on the Embassy website, accessed in
September 2013, notes that the United States funds a judicial reform program to improve the
transparency of the judicial system, and that the embassy works with the Ministry of Justice’s
24 Stephen McInerny. “Silence on Bahrain.” Washington Post op-ed. November 5, 2012.
25 Department of State. “Remarks With Foreign Minister Al Khalifa After Their Meeting.” December 3, 2010.
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Judicial and Legal Studies Institute (JLSI) to conduct specialized training for judges, lawyers, law
schools, and the bar association.
Other Human Rights Issues26
Most of the human rights problems identified in Bahrain are directly tied to the schism between
the Sunni-led regime and the Shiite majority, as noted in human rights reports such as those by
the State Department, Human Rights Watch, and other groups. The State Department human
rights report for 2013, released February 27, 2014, notes additional problems in Bahrain for non-
Muslims and for non-Shiite opponents of the government, as well as limitations in the rights of
laborers and labor unions.
There are several Bahraini human rights groups, mainly advocates for Shiite rights and causes.
The most prominent are the Bahrain Human Rights Society (the primary licensed human rights
organization), the Bahrain Transparency Society, and the Bahrain Center for Human Rights
(BCHR) and its offshoot, the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights (BYSHR). The latter
organization was officially dissolved but remain active informally. As noted above, the
government has arrested several leaders of these organizations.
Bahrain has drawn increasing attention from U.N. human rights bodies and other governments.
On June 28, 2012, 28 countries issued a joint declaration, during U.N. Human Rights Council
debate, condemning human rights abuses by the Bahrain government. The United States, Britain,
and eight other EU countries did not support the initiative. Human rights groups criticized the
Administration for refusing to block the September 28, 2012, vote in the U.N. Human Rights
Council to fill one of its advisory committee vacancies with a Bahraini representative, Saeed
Mohammad al-Faihani. That vote came nine days after the Human Rights Council accepted a
Universal Periodic Review of Bahrain’s human rights record, in which the government agreed to
fully accept 140 out of 176 recommendations of the review. On September 9, 2013, 47 countries,
including the United States, joined the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
in stating that the human rights situation in Bahrain remains an issue of serious concern.27
Opposition activists reportedly have requested that the U.N. team recommended the appointment
of a Special Rapporteur on human rights in Bahrain and the establishment of a formal U.N. office
in Bahrain that would monitor human rights practices there. These steps have not been taken, to
date.
26 Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2013 (released
February 27, 2014), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=
220348#wrapper; the International Religious Freedom Report for 2012 (May 20, 2013), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/
irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=208398#wrapper; and the Trafficking in Persons Report for 2013
(June 19, 2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210740.pdf. See also: Human Rights Watch: World
Report 2014.
27 http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Joint-Statement-on-the-OHCHR-and-the-human-rights-situation-in-
Bahrain-FINAL.pdf?utm_source=Project+on+Middle+East+Democracy+-+All+Contacts&utm_campaign=
52543e5858-Bahrain_Weekly_Update_Nov_1_2012&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_75a06056d7-52543e5858-
215946089.
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Women’s Rights
Bahrain has tended to be relatively progressive as far as law and regulations. However, as is the
case with its neighbors, Bahrain’s practices and customs tend to limit women’s rights. Women can
drive, own and inherit property, and initiate divorce cases, although religious courts may refuse a
woman’s divorce request. Some prominent women are campaigning for a codified family law that
would enhance and secure women’s rights, running into opposition from Bahraini clerics who are
against granting more rights for women. The campaign for the law is backed by King Hamad’s
wife, Shaykha Sabeeka, and the Supreme Council for Women, which is one association that
promotes women’s rights in Bahrain. Others include the Bahrain Women’s Union, the Bahrain
Women’s Association, and the Young Ladies Association.
To try to showcase its progressiveness, the government has promoted several women to high
positions. The number of women in both chambers of the National Assembly is provided in Table
1, above. Since 2005, there have been at least two female ministers—Minister of Human Rights
and Social Development Fatima bint Ahmad al-Balushi and Minister of Information and Culture
Mai bint Muhammad Al Khalifa. A third female, Samira Rajab, was added to the cabinet in 2012
as minister of state for media affairs. Huda Azar Nonoo, an attorney and formerly the only Jew in
the Shura Council, was ambassador to the United States during 2008-2013. As noted above, a
female—Dana Zayani—heads the “Follow Up Unit” that is continuing to oversee implementation
of the BICI recommendations.
Religious Freedom
The State Department report on international religious freedom for 2012 (released May 20, 2013)
says that the “trend in the government’s respect for religious freedom did not change significantly
during the year.” As in past State Department religious freedom reports on Bahrain, the report for
2012 focuses extensively on Sunni-Shiite differences and the unrest. According to past State
Department reports on religious freedom in Bahrain, the government allows freedom of worship
for Christians, Jews, and Hindus although the constitution declares Islam the official religion.
Non-Muslim groups must register with the Ministry of Social Development to operate and 19
non-Muslim religious groups are registered as of the end of 2012, including Christian churches
and a Hindu temple. During 2012, the government donated land for the Roman Catholic Vicariate
of Northern Arabia to relocate from Kuwait to Bahrain.
The Baha’i faith, declared blasphemous in Iran and Afghanistan, has been discriminated against
in Bahrain, although recent State Department human rights reports say that the Baha’i community
can gather and operates openly. According to the State Department human rights report for 2011,
there are about 40 Jews in Bahrain, and no recent reports of anti-Semitic acts.
Aside from sectarian differences, religious conservatives, both Sunni and Shiite, are active in
Bahrain. On September 14, 2012, about 2,000 Bahrainis demonstrated in the mostly Shiite district
of Diraz against the U.S.-produced video “The Innocence of Muslims.” Similar demonstrations
took place throughout the Middle East and South Asia.
Media Freedoms
Media freedoms have been curbed since the uprising began. The State Department human rights
report for 2012 states that, during 2012, the government suppressed critical speech. In April 2013,
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the government increased the recommended jail sentence for “insulting the King” to five years,
from two years.
Labor Rights
On labor issues, Bahrain has been credited with significant labor reforms, including a 2002 law
granting workers, including noncitizens, the right to form and join unions. The law holds that the
right to strike is a legitimate means for workers to defend their rights and interests, but their right
is restricted in practice, including a prohibition on strikes in the oil and gas, education, and health
sectors. There are about 50 trade unions in Bahrain, but all unions must join the General
Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU). As a sign of the degree to which the GFBTU is
dominated by oppositionists, during the height of unrest in 2011, the GFBTU called at least two
general strikes to protest excessive force by security forces. In apparent retaliation by the
government and employers, during March-May 2011, employers dismissed almost 2,500 workers
from the private sector, and almost 2,000 from the public sector, including 25% of the country’s
union leadership.
Human Trafficking
On human trafficking, the State Department “Trafficking in Persons Report” for 2013, released
June 19, 2013, again places Bahrain in “Tier 2: Watch List.” This is the second year in a row that
Bahrain is rated at that level—a downgrade from the Tier 2 placement of the 2011 report. The
Tier 2 Watch List ranking is based on the government’s failure to demonstrate increasing effort to
address the human trafficking issue. The report for 2013 asserts that Bahrain is a destination
country for migrant workers from India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Thailand, the Phillipines, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Eritrea to be subjected to forced labor and sex
trafficking.
Executions and Torture
Another issue that has been widely discussed in the context of the uprising, but which predated it,
is that of executions and torture. Human Rights Watch and other groups long asserted that
Bahrain had been going against the international trend of ending executions. In November 2009,
Bahrain’s Court of Cassation upheld the sentencing to death by firing squad of a citizen of
Bangladesh. That sentenced was imposed for a 2005 murder. From 1977 until 2006, there were no
executions in Bahrain.
Allegations of torture against Shiite opposition figures have been widespread. In February 2010,
more than one year before the uprising began, Human Rights Watch issued a study alleging
systematic use by Bahraini security forces of torture.28 Witnesses at the May 13, 2011, hearing of
the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission asserted that torture was being used regularly on
those (mostly Shiites) arrested in the unrest. The State Department human rights report for 2011
said there were numerous reports of torture and other cruel punishments during the state of
emergency (March-June 2011). The government cancelled the planned late May 2013 visit of the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Juan Mendez—the second cancellation of his visit since the unrest began. Mendez
28 Human Rights Watch. “Bahrain: Torture Redux.” February 2010.
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said he was “deeply disappointed” in the postponement. On June 7, 2013, 20 Senators and
Representatives signed a letter to the King urging him to allow a visit by Mendez in order to
demonstrate Bahrain’s “commitment to help put an end to such abuses.”29
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations30
The U.S.-Bahrain security relationship dates to the end of World War II and, since the late 1970s,
defense and security issues have been central to U.S.-Bahrain relations. In large part to keep
powerful neighbors in check, Bahrain has linked its security to the United States, and has placed
its facilities at U.S. disposal to address threats from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, international
terrorism, and piracy in the Gulf and Arabia Sea. Bahrain, as much as any GCC state, considers
Iran’s nuclear program a major potential threat. Since the U.S.-led ousting of Saddam Hussein in
Iraq, the perceived threat from Iraq has receded because Iraq’s military is far smaller and less
well-armed than it was during the rule of Saddam Hussein.
In addition to the long-standing U.S. naval headquarters presence in Bahrain, the two countries
signed a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in 1991. In March 2002, President Bush
(Presidential Determination 2002-10) designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a
designation that qualifies Bahrain to purchase the same U.S. arms that NATO allies can purchase.
There are about 7,000 U.S. military personnel, mostly Navy, deployed in Bahrain implementing
various missions and U.S.-Bahrain defense cooperation initiatives.31
However, since the Bahrain uprising began in 2011, Bahrain-U.S. political relations have been
somewhat strained. U.S. officials say that U.S.- Bahrain defense cooperation has not suffered
significantly, although the Bahrain government has become slightly less forthcoming with in-kind
support to the U.S. military presence in Bahrain than it was before the unrest began. U.S. officials
add that there are few, if any, security cooperation initiatives that the United States can use as
leverage to obtain Bahrain government flexibility on the unrest issue.
The opposition says that U.S.-Bahrain defense relations are not at risk should the Shiite
opposition achieve greater influence in Bahrain; Wifaq leader Salman has said in interviews that
he supports continuing the security relationship with the United States. Some observers assert that
the opposition sees the continued U.S. presence in Bahrain as leverage the United States can use
to persuade the Bahraini government to offer concessions to the opposition. Others observers say
that opposition figures privately maintain that, were the opposition to come to power, the U.S.
military would be expelled from Bahrain.
U.S. Naval Headquarters in Bahrain
The cornerstone of U.S.-Bahrain defense relations is U.S. access to Bahrain’s naval facilities.
February 2008 marked the 60th anniversary of a U.S. naval command presence in Bahrain;
MIDEASTFOR (U.S. Middle East Force), its successor, NAVCENT (naval component of U.S.
29 http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/HRF-King-Al-Khalifa-Letter.pdf.
30 Information in this section obtained from a variety of press reports, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA).
31 Hendrick Simoes. “Bahrain Expansion Latest Sign of Continued Presence.” Stars and Stripes, December 16, 2013.
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Central Command), as well as the Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in June 1995) are headquartered
there, at a sprawling facility called “Naval Support Activity-Bahrain.” It is also home to U.S.
Marine Forces Central Command, Destroyer Squadron Fifty, and three Combined Maritime
Forces.32 The “on-shore” U.S. command presence in Bahrain was established after the 1991 Gulf
war against Iraq; prior to that, the U.S. naval headquarters in Bahrain was on a command ship
mostly docked in Bahrain and technically “off shore.”
Some smaller U.S. ships (e.g., minesweepers) are home-ported there, but the Fifth Fleet consists
mostly of U.S.-homeported ships that are sent to the region on six- to seven-month deployments.
Ships operating in the Fifth Fleet at any given time typically include a carrier strike group, an
amphibious ready group, and some additional surface combatants, and operate in both the Persian
Gulf and Indian Ocean/Northern Arabian Sea. In mid-March 2012, the U.S. Navy announced it
was doubling its minesweepers in the Gulf to eight, and sending additional mine-hunting
helicopters, as tensions escalated over Iran’s nuclear program and its threatened reaction to new
sanctions. In May 2013, the U.S. Navy announced it is moving an additional five coastal patrol
ships to Bahrain, to join five already there. The naval headquarters serves as the command
headquarters for periodic exercises intended to signal resolve to Iran; a mine-sweeping exercise
involving 41 countries was held in the Gulf during May 5-30, 2013.
The naval headquarters also coordinates the operations of over 20 U.S. and allied warships in
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 and 152 that seek to interdict the movement of terrorists,
pirates, arms, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related technology and narcotics across the
Arabian Sea. In March 2008, Bahrain took a turn in a rotation to command CTF-152, and it
commanded again in December 2010. Bahrain commanded an anti-piracy task force in
Gulf/Arabian Sea waters in October 2010. These operations are offshoots of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, which ousted the Taliban after the September 11 attacks.
To further develop the naval facility (sometimes referred to as “Bahrain Island”), and other
military facilities, the U.S. military is implementing a planned $580 million military construction
program in Bahrain.33 That construction, which began in May 2010, will add 77 acres (the
decommissioned Mina (port) Al Salman Pier, leased by the Navy under a January 2008 lease
agreement) to the existing 80 acre facility. When completed in 2017, the expansion will provide a
new administration building and additional space for maintenance, barracks, warehousing, and
dining facilities. The expansion will support the deployment of additional U.S. coastal patrol
ships and the Navy’s new littoral combat ship, and permit larger U.S. ships to dock at the naval
facility.34 A separate deep water port in Bahrain, Khalifa bin Salman, is one of the few facilities in
the Gulf that can accommodate U.S. aircraft carriers and amphibious ships.35
Of the military construction program under way in Bahrain, $45 million is being used to expand
an apron at Shaykh Isa Air Base, where a variety of U.S. aircraft are stationed, including F-16s, F-
32 For an extended discussion of the U.S. military presence in Bahrain, see Brookings Institution, Center for 21st
Century Security and Intelligence, Policy Paper “No ‘Plan B’: U.S. Strategic Access in the Middle East and the
Question of Bahrain. June 2013, by Commander Richard McDaniel, U.S.N.
33 Among the recent appropriations to fund the expansion are: $54 million for FY2008 (Division 1 of P.L. 110-161);
$41.5 million for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117); $258 million for FY2011 (P.L. 112-10). $100 million was requested for
FY2012 for two projects, but was not funded in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 112-74).
34 Hendrick Simoes. “Bahrain Expansion Latest Sign of Continued Presence.” Stars and Stripes, December 16, 2013.
35 Ibid.
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18s, and P-3 surveillance aircraft. About $19 million is being used for a U.S. Special Operations
Forces facility.
Some say that the United States should begin examining alternate facilities in the Gulf region in
the expectation that continued Bahraini hosting of the U.S. naval headquarters has become
unstable. On July 22, 2011, the U.S. Navy in Bahrain issued a statement refuting a British press
report that the Navy is planning to relocate the facility. Should there be a decision to take that
step, likely alternatives in the Gulf would include Qatar’s New Doha Port (to open in 2016),
Kuwait’s Shuaiba port, and the UAE’s Jebel Ali.36 None of these countries has publicly expressed
a position on whether it would be willing to host such an expanded facility, but they have been
highly cooperative with U.S. defense efforts in the Gulf and presumably would be willing to host
the naval headquarters. U.S. officials say other Gulf state facilities, such as Jebel Ali in UAE, do
not currently provide large U.S. ships with the ease of docking access that Bahrain does, and that
many of the alternative possibilities inconveniently share docking and other facilities with large
commercial operations. Such facilities could be improved, if necessary, by further construction.
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
Bahrain was part of the U.S.-led allied coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. Bahrain
allowed the stationing of 17,500 U.S. troops and 250 U.S. combat aircraft at Shaykh Isa Air Base
that participated in the 1991 “Desert Storm” offensive against Iraqi forces. Bahraini pilots flew
strikes over Iraq during the war, and Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain during the war, of
which three hit facilities there.
Bahrain and the United States subsequently decided to institutionalize the expanded cooperation
by signing a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) on October 28, 1991, for an initial period of
ten years. The DCA remains in effect.37 The pact reportedly not only provides the United States
access to Bahrain’s air bases and to pre-position strategic materiel (mostly U.S. Air Force
munitions), but also requires consultations with Bahrain if its security is threatened, and it
expanded exercises and U.S. training of Bahraini forces.38 The pact includes a “Status of Forces
Agreement” (SOFA) under which U.S. military personnel serving in Bahrain operate under U.S.,
and not Bahraini, law.
The DCA was the framework for U.S.-Bahrain cooperation to contain Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
during the 1990s. Bahrain hosted the U.S.-led Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that
enforced a U.N. embargo on Iraq during 1991-2003. Since the early 1990s, the United States has
reportedly stationed two Patriot anti-missile batteries there.39 Separately, Bahrain hosted the
regional headquarters for U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq during 1991-1998.
36 Ibid.
37 “U.S.-Bahrain Defense Pact Renewed.” Agence France Presse, August 5, 2011.
38 Details of the U.S.-Bahrain defense agreement are classified. Some provisions are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S.
Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March
2002, p. 27. The State and Defense Departments have not provided CRS with requested information on the duration of
the pact, or whether its terms had been modified in recent years.
39 Walter Pincus. “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Washington Post, February 22,
2011.
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Under the DCA, U.S. pilots flew combat missions from Bahraini air bases (Shaykh Isa Air Base)
in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan (after the September 11, 2001 attacks
on the United States) and the war to oust Saddam Hussein in March-April 2003 (Operation Iraqi
Freedom, OIF). During both OEF and OIF, Bahrain publicly deployed its U.S.-supplied frigate
warship (the Subha) to help protect U.S. ships, and it sent ground and air assets to Kuwait in
support of OIF.
Bahrain and UAE have been the only Gulf states to deploy their own forces to provide aid to
Afghanistan. In January 2009, Bahrain sent 100 police officers to Afghanistan on a two-year tour
to help U.S./NATO-led stabilization operations there. Their tour was extended until the end of the
NATO mission at the end of 2014.
U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid
To assist Bahrain’s ability to cooperate with the United States on regional security issues, the
United States has taken into consideration Bahrain’s limited financial resources and provided
small amounts of military assistance. Because U.S. military aid has been relatively small, Bahrain
has mostly used national funds to buy the $1.4 billion worth of U.S. weaponry it bought from
2000-2013.40 The unrest has caused the Administration to put on hold sales to Bahrain equipment
that could easily be used against protesters, while continuing to provide equipment that is suited
to Bahrain’s external defense capabilities and its support for U.S. operations in the region. Sales
of small arms are generally commercial sales, licensed by State Department with Defense
Department concurrence. On September 10, 2011, the State Department licensed a sale of 250
pistols to the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) and other firearms for the protection of a high
ranking Bahraini official. Since 2012, the department has put “on hold” license requests for sales
to Bahrain of small arms, light weapons, and ammunition.41
The main recipient of U.S. military assistance has been the relatively small BDF—Bahrain’s
military force—which has less than 10,000 active duty personnel, including 1,200 National
Guard. The BDF, as well as Bahrain’s police forces, are run by Sunni Bahrainis, but supplement
their ranks with unknown percentages of paid recruits from Sunni Muslim neighboring countries,
including Pakistan, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Some human rights groups say that BDF
equipment, such as Cobra helicopters, have been used against protesters and that the United
States cannot be sure that sales to and training of the BDF is not being used to crush unrest.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was suspended for Bahrain in FY1994 but restarted in
appreciation of Bahrain’s support in OEF and OIF. According to the Administration, FMF (and
funds provided under “Section 1206” of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, P.L.
109-163) is provided to Bahrain to help it maintain U.S.-origin weapons, to enhance inter-
operability with U.S. forces, to augment Bahrain’s air defenses, to support and upgrade the
avionics of its F-16 combat aircraft (see below), and to improve counterterrorism capabilities. As
an example, the United States has supplied Bahrain with a coastal radar system that reportedly
40 Justin Elliott. “Revealed: America’s Arms Sales to Bahrain Amid Bloody Crackdown.” Propublica, January 15,
2013.
41 Email from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, May 20, 2013.
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provides Bahrain and the U.S. Navy a 360-degree field of vision around Bahrain.42 Some FMF
funds have been used to build up Bahrain’s Special Operations forces and, in April 2012, U.S.
military teams reportedly provided additional training to the BDF on the use of its Blackhawk
helicopters.43 The Defense Department estimates that, in part due to U.S. assistance, about 50% of
Bahrain’s forces are fully capable of integrating into a U.S.-led coalition.
The Administration’s FY2012 aid request, made at the start of the unrest, asked for $25 million in
FMF for Bahrain. As shown in Table 4 below, only $10 million was provided for FY2012, due in
large part to the Administration’s intent to retain leverage against Bahrain to compel it to make
reforms. The same lower amount, $10 million, was provided for FY2013 and is expected to be
provided in FY2014. The Administration has requested $7.5 million for Bahrain FMF for
FY2015.
Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
Bahrain is eligible to receive grant “excess defense articles” (EDA), and it has received over $400
million worth of EDA since the program began for Bahrain in 1993. In June 1995, the United
States provided 50 M-60A3 tanks to Bahrain as a “no cost” five-year lease. Bahrain later received
title to the equipment. In July 1997, the United States transferred the FFG-7 “Perry class” frigate
Subha (see above) as EDA. In the State Department’s FY2012 budget request, the Administration
supported providing another frigate (an “extended deck frigate”) to Bahrain as EDA because the
Subha is approaching the end of its service life. The Administration said on May 11, 2012, that it
continued to support that transfer, which is planned for 2014, subject to passage of authorizing
legislation.44 However, the FY2014 foreign aid budget justification says that the BDF has put
acquisition of a new frigate on hold, and would put U.S. military aid toward maintaining the
Subha instead.
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET)
As noted in Table 4, small amounts of International Military Education and Training funds
(IMET) are provided to Bahrain to inculcate principles of civilian control of the military,
democracy, and interoperability with U.S. forces. Approximately 250 Bahraini military students
attend U.S. military schools each year, either through the IMET program (57% of them), or using
FMF funds, in connection with the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program.
Major Foreign Military Sales (FMS) From Bahrain National Funds
Bahrain’s total government budget is about $6 billion per year, allowing modest amounts of
national funds to be used for purchases of major combat systems. About 85% of Bahrain’s
defense equipment is of U.S.-origin. In 1998, Bahrain purchased 10 U.S.-made F-16Cs from new
production, worth about $390 million. It later purchased 12 more of the system, bringing its F-16
fleet to 22. In 1999 and 2009, the United States sold Bahrain Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-
Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) to arm the F-16s.
42 “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep,” op. cit.
43 “Revealed: America’s Arms Sales to Bahrain Amid Bloody Crackdown,” op. cit.
44 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/189810.htm.
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An August 2000 sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs, a system of short-range
ballistic missiles fired from a multiple rocket launcher), valued at about $70 million, included an
agreement for joint U.S.-Bahraini control of the weapon. That arrangement was reached in part to
allay U.S. congressional concerns about possible U.S. promotion of missile proliferation in the
region. In 2007, the United States sold Bahrain several hundred “Javelin” anti-armor missiles
worth up to $42 million; 9 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters worth up to $252 million; and 6 Bell
search and recovery helicopters, valued at about $160 million. Section 581 of the FY1990 foreign
operations appropriation act (P.L. 101-167) made Bahrain the only Gulf state eligible to receive
the Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, and the United States has sold Bahrain about 70
Stingers since 1990. (This authorization has been repeated in subsequent legislation.)
Some of the recent sales to Bahrain are in accordance with State and Defense Department efforts
to promote greater defense cooperation among the GCC states and to deal with the GCC
collectively rather than individually. The core of these initiatives involves missile defense
integration, and it is primarily Bahrain’s wealthier neighbors, such as UAE, that are buying
advanced U.S. missile defense equipment. That prevents Bahrain from becoming a major factor
in the U.S. effort to assemble a Gulf-wide, coordinated missile defense network. That effort has
been discussed extensively with the Gulf states, most recently during Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel’s meeting with GCC defense ministers in Jeddah during May 13-14, 2014.
September 2011 Humvee and TOW Sale
One sale, notified on September 14, 2011, was announced seven months after the unrest began,
and has been agreed to despite U.S. criticism of Bahrain’s crackdown. It is for a proposed sale of
44 “Humvee” (M115A1B2) armored vehicles and several hundred TOW missiles of various
models, of which 50 are to be “bunker busters.” Along with associated equipment and support,
the proposed sale is worth an estimated $53 million. Although not considered large in dollar
terms, or of particularly sophisticated equipment, the sale incurred opposition from several human
rights groups and from the Bahraini opposition who assert that the sale represents U.S.
downplaying of the abuses committed by the Bahraini government in the course of the unrest.
Human rights groups and Bahraini opposition figures say the regime could use the Humvees, in
particular, in their efforts to crack down on protests. When the sale was announced, State
Department officials said the sale would not violate the intent of the “Leahy amendment”—a
provision of foreign aid and defense appropriations laws that forbids U.S. sales of equipment to
security units that have committed human rights abuses.45
Two joint resolutions were introduced in the 112th Congress to block the sale: S.J.Res. 28,
introduced by Senator Ron Wyden, and H.J.Res. 80, introduced by Representative James
McGovern. Both joint resolutions would have prohibited the sale unless the Administration
certifies that Bahrain is rectifying the alleged abuses connected to its suppression of the uprising
in 2011. To block a proposed arms sale would require passage of a joint resolution to do so, and
with a veto-proof majority, because President Obama could veto a joint resolution of disapproval
in order to complete the sale. The House bill attracted 14 co-sponsors, the Senate bill 2 co-
sponsors. On October 19, 2011, even though the sale had passed the period of congressional
review, and apparently addressing the criticism and legislative initiatives, the Administration told
Congress it would delay the sale until it could review the BICI report that was released November
45 James Lobe. “Bahrain: U.S. Congress Urged to Reject Arms Sales.” IPS News Service, September 29, 2011.
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23, 2011. Still, the State Department spokesperson stated on January 27, 2012, that “we are
maintaining a pause on most security assistance to Bahrain pending further progress on reform.”
At the same briefing, the department said it was releasing to Bahrain previously notified and
cleared spare parts and maintenance—worth a reported $1 million—needed for Bahrain’s external
defense and support of Fifth Fleet operations. None of the items can be used against protesters,
according to the State Department statement.46
May 11, 2012, Resumption of Some Arms Sales47
On May 11, 2012, in conjunction with a visit to Washington, DC, by Bahrain’s Crown Prince
Salman, the Administration announced that, despite continuing concerns about Bahrain’s handling
of the unrest, it would open up Bahrain to the purchase of additional U.S. arms for the BDF,
Bahrain’s Coast Guard, and Bahrain’s National Guard. The Administration stated that the
weaponry that would be sold is not typically used in crowd control or riot control, and that the
TOW and Humvee sale discussed, as well as any sales of equipment that could be used against
protesters (tear gas and rifles, for example), would remain on hold. The equipment sales were
asserted to be in line with U.S.-Bahrain decisions for Bahrain’s forces to focus more on broader
maritime defense. The Administration did not release a complete list of weapons to be sold, but it
gave a few examples as follows:
• The Perry-class frigate, as EDA, discussed above; but later mooted;
• Harbor security boats for the Bahrain Coast Guard, as EDA;
• An upgrade to the engines on Bahrain’s U.S.-made F-16s; and
• Additional AMRAAMs (see above), according to press reports quoting U.S.
officials knowledgeable about the decision.48
Some Members of Congress publicly criticized the May 11, 2012, decision as yielding U.S.
leverage on the government to enact more substantial reforms. Some said they might seek
legislation to block the proposed sales,49 but no such legislation was enacted. However,
subsequently, in a provision that appears in large part directed at U.S. arms sales policy toward
Bahrain, a provision of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 113-76) prohibits use of
U.S. funds for “tear gas, small arms, light weapons, ammunition, or other items for crowd control
purposes for foreign security forces that use excessive force to repress peaceful expression,
association, or assembly in countries undergoing democratic transition.”
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation
The United States works with Bahrain’s Interior Ministry on counter-terrorism issues, but U.S.
cooperation has been limited somewhat by the uprising. Not only are forces controlled by the
ministry responsible for many of the abuses against protesters, but the current director of the
internal security service is Shaykh Khalifa bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, considered a hardliner in the
46 Department of State. Taken Question: Bahrain’s Security Assistance. January 27, 2012.
47 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/189810.htm.
48 Nicole Gaouette. “U.S. Resumes Bahrain Arms Sales Citing Security Interests.” Bloomberg News, May 11, 2012.
49 Sara Sorcher. “Arms Sales to Bahrain Anger Senators.” National Journal Daily, May 14, 2012.
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royal family. Still, the ministry has reformed substantially since the late 1990s, when Bahrain’s
internal security services were run by a former British colonial police officer, Ian Henderson, who
had a reputation among Shiites for using repressive measures.
At the start of FY2012, the Administration “reviewed” the use of NADR-ATA support to Bahrain
to ensure that none was used “against protestors” in the 2011 unrest. The FY2014 and FY2015
budget justifications said that NADR-ATA support would continue to go to the Ministry of
Interior primarily to help it investigate and respond to the use of explosives by “terrorists.” The
budget document appears to be referring to the increased use of bombings and violence by
underground oppositionists, discussed above. The State Department, as noted above, has placed
on hold license requests for small arms and related equipment to the Bahraini government in
general. Some of the NADR-ATA funds have previously been used to provide training to its
counterterrorism institutions, to augment the ability of Bahraini forces to protect U.S. diplomatic
and military facilities in Bahrain, and to help train Bahrain’s police contingent in Afghanistan
guard Camp Leatherneck in Helmand Province.
The State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2013 (released April 30, 2014)50
continues to credit Bahrain with strongly cooperating with U.S. and international
counterterrorism efforts. Bahrain has hosted the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action
Task Force (MENA/FATF) secretariat, and its Central Bank, Financial Information Unit (within
the Central Bank), and local banks have cooperated with U.S. efforts against terrorism financing
and money laundering. In August and September 2013, the government amended the Charity
Fundraising Law of 1956 to tighten terrorism financing monitoring and penalties. The State
Department report for 2013 also credits Bahrain with working “proactively” to expand air, sea
and Saudi-Bahrain causeway border control points.
Foreign Policy Issues
Bahrain relies on its relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to protect it from
the internal threat to the ruling family. It relies on the United States, primarily, to protect it from
the external threat from Iran.
GCC/Saudi Arabia
Bahrain has close relations with the other GCC states, and in particular Saudi Arabia, as
evidenced by the Saudi-led GCC intervention in Bahrain in 2011. Virtually all the GCC states
have political structures similar to that of Bahrain, and several have substantial Shiite minorities,
although none of the others has a Shiite majority. Many Saudis visit Bahrain on weekends to
enjoy the relatively more liberal social atmosphere there and escape the restrictions of their own
country; to do so, Saudis cross a causeway constructed in 1986 that connects it to Bahrain. That
highway links to the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia, where most of the Kingdom’s Shiites
(about 10% of the population) live. Among all the other linkages, King Hamad’s fifth son, Khalid
bin Hamad, married a daughter of Saudi King Abdullah in 2011. Since the beginning of the
Bahrain unrest, Saudi Arabia reportedly has donated at least $500 million to help Bahrain’s
economy.
50 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224823.htm
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Well before intervening in Bahrain, the GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, had begun to fear
that the Bahrain unrest could spread to other GCC states and that Iran could exploit the situation
in Bahrain. Several GCC states, including Saudi Arabia, have substantial Shiite minorities. The
Saudi position is that it will not, under any circumstances, permit a Shiite takeover in Bahrain,
and the Saudi government is seen as backing hardline officials in the Bahrain ruling family.
To reinforce its stance on Bahrain, on May 14, 2012, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain announced they
supported a plan to form a close political and military union among the GCC states (“Riyadh
Declaration”)—a signal to Bahrain’s Shiite opposition that the Bahrain government has
unconditional Saudi backing. At a GCC leadership meeting in Riyadh that day, the other four
GCC states opposed such a union and the GCC as a whole formally deferred a decision on the
Saudi-Bahraini plan. Still, the GCC states agreed in December 2012 to a collective security
agreement that combats crime and terrorism through information exchanges. Bahrain’s cabinet
endorsed the agreement on December 30, 2012. Opposition from some GCC states, particularly
Oman, blocked agreement on the political unification plan again at the GCC summit in Kuwait
during December 10-11, 2013.
Because of historic ties between their two royal families, Kuwait has sometimes been touted as a
potential mediator in the Bahraini political crisis. Both royal families hail from the Anizah tribe
that settled in Bahrain and some of whom went on to what is now Kuwait. Kuwaiti Shiites in
Kuwait’s parliament have argued against Kuwait’s siding firmly with the Al Khalifa regime.
However, the Kuwaiti government did, as noted with its naval deployments, join the GCC
position on the side of the government and it is giving financial aid to Bahrain.
Bahrain has stayed within a GCC consensus on regional issues, although Bahrain’s resource
constraints—and focus on the internal situation—prevent it from taking as active a role as Saudi
Arabia, UAE, or Qatar. Bahrain did not play a significant role in assisting the Libyan opposition
to the rule of Muammar Al Qadhafi. Had Bahrain intervened in Libya, doing so could have been
viewed as a contradiction—supporting a revolutionary movement in another Arab state while
arguing that its domestic opposition’s grievances lacked legitimacy. As part of the GCC, Bahrain
also joined the GCC efforts, which yielded success in November 2011, to persuade Yemen’s
President Ali Abdullah Saleh to cede power to a transition process. He left Yemen in January
2012.
The GCC as a whole, and perhaps Bahrain most acutely, sees Syria as Iran’s main Middle Eastern
ally and seeks the ouster of President Bashar Al Assad. In August 2011, Bahrain joined the other
GCC countries in withdrawing their ambassadors to Syria. In November 2011, the GCC voted
with other Arab League states to suspend Syria’s membership in the body. In April 2012, the GCC
states also proposed giving the Syrian opposition $100 million in funding that it can use to buy
weaponry, although most of that funding reportedly is being provided by the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait,
and Saudi Arabia. Some of the GCC states, but not Bahrain, are said to be providing weapons as
well. Since June 2013, Bahrain has joined its GCC partners in threatening to expel sympathizers
of Lebanese Hezbollah following Hezbollah’s confirmation of its entry into the Syria conflict on
Assad’s side.
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Qatar51
Although they are both GCC states, the Bahrain-Qatar relationship has often been fraught with
disagreements and disputes. The United States cooperates closely with both states, which is why
their disputes are closely watched by U.S. policy makers. The resolution of their territorial
dispute in 2001 eased one major source of tension between them. The dispute had roots in the 18th
century, when the ruling families of both countries controlled parts of the Arabian peninsula. Both
sides agreed to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1991 after clashes in
1986 in which Qatar landed military personnel on a man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal) that was in
dispute, and took some Bahrainis prisoner. The ICJ ruled on March 16, 2001, in favor of Bahrain
on the central dispute over the Hawar Islands. It ruled in favor of Qatar on ownership of the Fasht
al-Dibal reef and the town of Zubara on the Qatari mainland, where some members of the Al
Khalifa family were long buried. Two smaller islands, Janan and Hadd Janan, were ruled not part
of the Hawar Islands group and were also awarded to Qatar. Qatar expressed disappointment over
the ruling but said it accepted it as binding, and the two have since cooperated on major regional
issues. Saudi mediation of the issue in the 1986-1991 period proved fruitless.
More recently, Bahrain and Qatar have been at odds on regional policies. In March 2014, Bahrain
joined its closer partner, Saudi Arabia, as well as UAE, in removing its ambassador from Qatar.
The disagreement centered on Qatar’s support for Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated opposition
movements in several Middle Eastern countries. Qatar views the Brotherhood as a constructive
movement that can help bring peaceful transition to democracy in the region. That stance runs
counter to the views of almost all the other GCC states who view it as a source of unrest within
the GCC states themselves.
Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran
Bahrain focuses its foreign policy intently on Iran, which the government asserts is supporting
Shiite opposition groups. Bahrain has supported U.S. and international efforts to increase
economic pressure on Iran to compel it to limit its nuclear program. In a joint news conference
with then Secretary Clinton on December 3, 2010, referenced earlier, Bahrain’s foreign minister
restated Bahrain’s support for Iran’s right to nuclear power for peaceful uses, but that “when it
comes to taking that [nuclear] power, to developing it into a cycle for weapon grade, that is
something that we can never accept, and we can never live with in this region.”52 Bahrain tepidly
supported publicly the November 24, 2013, interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the
international community, calling it “consistent with [Bahrain’s] stances and policies which
advocate diplomatic solutions to maintain stability.” However, some reports say the deal has
caused U.S.-Bahrain government friction in that Bahrain’s leaders are apparently concerned the
deal will cause the United States to reduce its commitment to the security of the Gulf. This might
explain Secretary of Defense Hagel’s December 7, 2013, speech at the Manama Dialogue in
which he attempted to reassure Bahrain and all the GCC states of U.S. resolve to maintain the
security of the region. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia were the only two GCC states that did not host a
visit by Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif or his associates after the interim
51 See The Estimate. Dossier: The Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute: The World Court Decision, Part 1 and Part 2. March
23, 2001, and April 6, 2001.
52 Department of State. Transcript of Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Al Khalifa. December 3,
2010.
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nuclear agreement was signed, although Saudi Arabia has said in May 2014 that it has invited
Zarif.
Bahraini leaders have consistently asserted that Iran is actively stoking the Bahrain unrest. On
March 21, 2011, King Hamad indirectly accused Iran of involvement in the unrest by saying a
“foreign plot” had been foiled by the GCC intervention. Iran and Bahrain withdrew their
ambassadors in mid-March 2011, but returned them in August 2012. On February 21, 2013, the
government said that Iran’s Revolutionary guard had helped form a Bahraini cell—part of a group
called the “Imam Army”—to recruit other agents and store weapons in Bahrain for possible
attacks on officials and key locations.53 In May 2013, the government declared Lebanese
Hezbollah a terrorist organization, accusing that organization of helping orchestrate a Shiite-led
insurgency in Bahrain.54 Bahrain’s accusations against Iran and Hezbollah, have not changed
since the August 4, 2013, inauguration of Iran’s relatively moderate President Hassan Rouhani.
Bahraini authorities used the ship interception of December 2013, discussed above, to underscore
their point about Iranian support for radical Bahrain oppositionists.
U.S. officials publicly do not differ dramatically with the Bahraini assertions on Iran. On April
14, 2011, U.S. officials, speaking on background, told journalists that there was some information
to indicate that Iran might have transferred small amounts of weapons to Bahraini
oppositionists.55 Ambassador Krajeski testified on September 21, 2011, that the United States
“saw no evidence of Iranian instigation” of the unrest, but that the United States is concerned
“about Iranian exploitation” of it. U.S. officials reportedly assert that Iran has urged hardline
Bahraini Shiite factions not to compromise.56 In his January 29, 2014, “Worldwide Threat
Assessment” testimony, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated that “In the
broader Middle East, Iran will continue to provide arms and other aid to Palestinian groups, Huthi
rebels in Yemen, and Shia militants in Bahrain to expand Iranian influence and to counter
perceived foreign threats.”57 The State Department report on terrorism for 2013, cited above,
states that Iran has attempted to smuggle arms to Shiite oppositionists in Bahrain.58
Well before the 2011 unrest, Bahrain’s fears about Iran had been infused by lingering suspicions,
sometimes fed by Iranian actions, that Iran never accepted the results of the 1970 U.N. survey
giving Bahrain independence rather than integration with Iran. Those findings were endorsed by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 278, which was ratified by Iran’s parliament. After these
official determinations, Bahrain had considered the issue closed, after over a century of Persian
contestation of Bahraini sovereignty. Those contests included an effort by Reza Shah Pahlavi of
Iran in the 1930s to deny Bahrain the right to grant oil concessions to the United States and
Britain. In December 1981, and then again in June 1996—a time when Iran was actively seeking
to export its Islamic revolution—Bahrain publicly accused Iran of trying to organize a coup by
pro-Iranian Bahraini Shiites (the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, IFLB). The group’s
53 “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Behind Terror Cell, Says Bahrain.” Saudi Gazette, February 22, 2013.
54 The United States designated Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, FTO, in 1997 when that list was
established by the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. 1189.
55 Adam Entous and Matthew Rosenberg. “U.S. Says Iran Helps Crackdown in Syria.” Wall Street Journal, April 14,
2011.
56 http://www.stripes.com/gates-protracted-bahrain-negotiations-allowing-greater-iran-influence-1.137532.
57 Director of National Intelligence. Statement for the Record. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2014.
58 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm
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successor is the Bahrain Islamic Action Society, which is outlawed. A July 2007 Iranian
newspaper article reasserting the Iranian claim to Bahrain. In March 2009, Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri,
an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, again referred to Bahrain as Iran’s 14th province. Iran’s
Foreign Ministry immediately tried to limit any diplomatic damage by asserting respect for
Bahrain’s sovereignty and independence, but some Arab governments sharply criticized the
comments; Morocco broke relations with Iran.
At the same time, Bahrain, like the other GCC states, tries not to openly or directly antagonize
Iran. Bahrain permitted then Iranian President Ahmadinejad to visit Bahrain on November 17,
2007. Despite its political difficulties with Iran, Bahrain maintains normal trade with Iran,
probably to avoid antagonizing Iran into undertaking more assertive action on behalf of Bahrain’s
opposition. There are no indications that Iran-Bahrain general commerce has been affected by the
unrest in Bahrain. On the other hand, in mid-September 2012, Bahrain confiscated carbon fiber
bound for Iran, an item that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear program.
Bahrain generally enforces U.S. sanctions against Iran, largely because the leadership agrees with
the strategy underpinning the sanctions. However, some Bahraini firms and traders maintain
relations with Iran in order not to harm longstanding trade relationships. Energy market observers
say that some Bahrain energy firms may still be supplying gasoline to Iran. No U.N. Security
Council Resolution bars such sales, but a U.S. law signed on July 1, 2010—the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195)—provides
for sanctions against foreign firms that sell more than $1 million worth of gasoline to Iran.59 No
Bahraini gasoline traders have been sanctioned.
Foreign banks that deal with sanctioned Iranian banks or Iran’s Central Bank are subject to U.S.
sanctions under several U.S. laws (see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth
Katzman). In March 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice sanctioned Future Bank, headquartered
in Bahrain, because it is controlled and partially owned by Iran’s Bank Melli. The sanctions,
under Executive Order 13382 (anti-proliferation), prevent U.S. citizens from participating in
transactions with Future Bank and require the freezing of any U.S.-based bank assets. The bank
remains in operation.
The Bahrain unrest has clouded the prospects for further energy cooperation between the two
countries. A 2007 Ahmadinejad visit to Bahrain resulted in a preliminary agreement for Bahrain
to buy 1.2 billion cubic feet per day (for 25 years) of Iranian gas via an undersea pipeline to be
built. The deal would have involved a $4 billion investment by Bahrain to develop Phases 15 and
16 of Iran’s South Pars gas field, which presumably would be the source of the gas that Bahrain
would import. The March 2009 comments of Nateq Nuri, discussed above, led to the suspension
of this deal, and there has been no movement on the arrangement since.
Post-Saddam Iraq
Bahrain’s participation in OIF, discussed above, came despite domestic opposition in Bahrain to
that war. Because of its limited income, Bahrain did not contribute funds to Iraq reconstruction,
but it attended the “Expanded Neighbors of Iraq” regional conference process which last met in
Kuwait on April 22, 2008. That process wound down in late 2008 as Iraq stabilized. On October
59 For a list of possible sanctions that could be imposed, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth
Katzman.
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16, 2008, Bahrain’s first post-Saddam ambassador to Iraq (Saleh Ali al-Maliki) presented his
credentials in Baghdad, in line with King Hamad’s pledge to President Bush in March 2008 to
appoint an ambassador to Iraq. However, Bahrain-Iraq relations have become tense to the extent
that Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government and population is perceived as sympathetic to Bahrain’s
opposition. On March 9, 2012, Iraqi Shiites rallied in support of Bahrain’s Shiites on the same
day as Bahrain’s opposition mounted a major demonstration. King Hamad did not attend the
March 27-29 Arab League summit in Baghdad, and Bahrain sent a relatively low-level
delegation, as did the other GCC states with the exception of Kuwait.
Arab-Israeli Issues
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has not been as significant a mediator or broker as have its
larger neighbors in the Gulf or broader Middle East. However, Bahrain has at times advanced
ideas to move the Arab-Israeli peace process forward. In July 2009, Crown Prince Salman
authored an op-ed calling on the Arab states to do more to communicate directly with the Israeli
people on their ideas for peaceful resolution of the dispute.60 In October 2009, Bahrain’s foreign
minister called for direct talks with Israel. Like most Arab states, Bahrain is supporting the efforts
of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to obtain U.N. recognition for a State of
Palestine, despite U.S. opposition to doing so prior to a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement.
Earlier, Bahrain participated in the 1990-1996 multilateral Arab-Israeli talks, and it hosted a
session on the environment (October 1994). Bahrain did not follow Oman and Qatar in
exchanging trade offices with Israel. In September 1994, all GCC states ceased enforcing
secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel while retaining the ban on direct trade (primary boycott).
In conjunction with the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Bahrain dropped the primary boycott and closed
boycott-related offices in Bahrain.
Still, the Arab-Israeli dispute always has the potential to become a political issue within Bahrain.
In October 2009, the elected COR passed a bill making it a crime (punishable by up to five years
in jail) for Bahrainis to travel to Israel or hold talks with Israelis. The bill, which did not become
law, apparently was a reaction to a visit by Bahraini officials to Israel in July 2009. The visit was
to obtain the release of five Bahrainis taken prisoner by Israel when it seized a ship bound with
goods for Gaza, which is controlled by Hamas. In June 2010, Sunni and Shiite Islamists in
Bahrain held a demonstration to denounce the Israeli seizure of a ship in a flotilla intended to run
the Israeli blockade of the Hamas-run Gaza Strip.
Economic Issues
Like the other Gulf states, Bahrain was affected by the international financial crisis of 2008-2009,
but perhaps to a lesser extent than the wealthier states of Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
Bahrain did not experience the construction and real estate “bubble” to the degree that this
occurred in, for example, UAE. It is also apparently being affected by the 2011 unrest; in May
2011 Moody’s, a bond rating agency, downgraded the quality of Bahrain’s bonds, thereby costing
the government more to borrow funds.
60 “Arabs Need to Talk to the Israelis.” Washington Post, July 16, 2009.
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Bahrain has little cushion to deal with economic downturns. It has the lowest oil and gas reserves
of the Gulf monarchy states, estimated respectively at 210 million barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion
cubic feet of gas. Some economic statistics are presented in Table 3. Without the ample oil or gas
resources of its neighbors, Bahrain has diversified its economy by emphasizing banking and
financial services (about 25.5% of GDP). At current rates of production (35,000 barrels per day of
crude oil), Bahrain’s onshore oil reserves will be exhausted in 15 years. However, Saudi Arabia
shares equally with Bahrain the 300,000 barrels per day produced from the offshore Abu Safa
field, which provides about 70% of the funds expended in Bahrain’s annual budget.
The United States buys virtually no oil from Bahrain; the major U.S. import from it is aluminum.
Aluminum and other manufacturing sectors in Bahrain account for the existence in Bahrain of a
vibrant middle and working class among its citizens. However, these classes are largely
composed of Shiites, and this has made many Shiites envious of the “ownership class” of Sunni
Muslims. On the other hand, many Shiites own businesses and have done well economically.
To encourage reform and signal U.S. appreciation, the United States and Bahrain signed an FTA
on September 14, 2004. Implementing legislation was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169).
However, in light of the unrest, the AFL-CIO has urged the United States to void the FTA on the
grounds that Bahrain is preventing free association of workers and abridging their rights.
In 2013, the United States exported about $1.017 billion in goods to Bahrain, lower than the
$1.21 billion exported in 2012. The United States imported $636 million in goods from Bahrain,
slightly lower than the $700 million imported in 2012. In 2005, total bilateral trade was about
$780 million, suggesting that trade has more than doubled since the U.S.-Bahrain FTA.
Table 3. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain
Population
About 1.25 million, of which about 1 million are citizens
Religions
81% Muslim, 9% Christian, 10% other
GDP (purchasing power parity)
$35 billion (2013)
Budget
$8.14 billion revenues, $9.23 billion expenditures (2013)
Inflation Rate
3% (2013)
Unemployment Rate
15%
GDP Real Growth Rate
4.4% in 2013
Size of Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF)
About 13,000, plus about 1,200 National Guard. Some personnel
are expatriates, including other Arab and Pakistani.
Source: CIA, The World Factbook.
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Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain
($ in millions)
FY2003
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
14 15
FMF
90.0
24.6 18.9 15.6 15 3.968 8.0 19.0 15.46 10 12.575 10 7.5
IMET
0.448
0.60 0.65 0.65 0.616 0.622 .661 .670 .435 .554 .487 .725 .801
NADR
1.49 2.76 .776 0.744 .500 1.10 1.5 .50 .45 .45 .45
“Section
1206”
5.3
24.54
4.3
16.2
ESF/Dem.
3.0
and Gov.
Notes: IMET = International Military Education and Training Funds, used mainly to enhance BDF military
professionalism and promote U.S. values. NADR = Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related
Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists. Section 1206 are DOD
funds used to train and equip Bahrain’s special forces, its coastal surveillance and patrol capabilities, and to
develop its counterterrorism assessment capabilities. (Named for a section of the FY2006 Defense Authorization
Act, P.L. 109-163.). FY2014 amounts from State Dept. documents and H.R. 3547 (P.L. 113-76).
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Figure 1. Bahrain
Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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