Crisis in the Central African Republic
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
May 14, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43377
Crisis in the Central African Republic
Summary
This report provides background on the evolving political, security, and humanitarian crisis in the
Central African Republic (CAR). It includes a map of conflict-affected areas and a timeline of
key events (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). Violence in CAR has displaced hundreds of thousands of
people and is placing new strains on global humanitarian and peacekeeping resources. U.S. policy
responses to the situation in CAR include:
• humanitarian assistance;
• support to African and French troops that have deployed to CAR;
• anticipated contributions to a U.N. peacekeeping operation in CAR authorized to
begin in September 2014;
• aid for conflict mitigation and peacebuilding;
• public diplomacy initiatives; and
• an Executive Order authorizing targeted sanctions.
Possible issues for Congress include the authorization, appropriation, and oversight of U.S.
humanitarian assistance and contributions to international stabilization efforts. The crisis in CAR
also has implications for several broader issues of potential interest to Congress, including:
• stability in the wider central Africa region;
• the prevention of mass atrocities;
• the status of U.S. efforts to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a small
but brutal militia present in CAR and neighboring states; and
• the impact of instability in CAR on wildlife poaching and other cross-border
criminal activity in the region.
Congress has monitored the crisis in CAR and the U.S. response, including related fiscal
implications. Hearings on CAR have been held before the Africa subcommittees of, respectively,
the House Foreign Affairs Committee (November 2013 and April 2014) and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (December 2013). The FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-
76) includes provisions on foreign aid for CAR (see “Legislation”). S.Res. 375 (Senator Coons),
“A resolution concerning the crisis in the Central African Republic and supporting United States
and international efforts to end the violence, protect civilians, and address root causes of the
conflict,” was passed by the Senate in March 2014. Draft legislation includes S.Res. 413 (Senator
Coons), “A resolution recognizing 20 years since the genocide in Rwanda, and affirming it is in
the national interest of the United States to work in close coordination with international partners
to help prevent and mitigate acts of genocide and mass atrocities.”
Congressional Research Service
Crisis in the Central African Republic
Contents
Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 1
A Challenging Political Transition ............................................................................................ 4
Armed Groups: Analysis ........................................................................................................... 5
Muslim Exodus .......................................................................................................................... 5
Warnings of Genocide ............................................................................................................... 6
French Military Deployment ........................................................................................................... 6
The Role of Regional Actors ........................................................................................................... 7
Lord’s Resistance Army Presence .................................................................................................... 9
U.S. Responses ................................................................................................................................ 9
Legislation ............................................................................................................................... 11
Outlook and Issues for Congress ................................................................................................... 12
Figures
Figure 1. Map of CAR and Basic Data ............................................................................................ 2
Figure 2. Timeline of Key Events in CAR Since 2003 .................................................................. 14
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 15
Congressional Research Service
Crisis in the Central African Republic
Overview
The Central African Republic (CAR)—a landlocked, sparsely inhabited, and extremely under-
developed country—is in crisis. CAR has never had an effective central government, and it has
struggled with recurrent insurgencies and army mutinies since the late 1990s. In 2012, several
primarily Muslim-led rebel groups formed a coalition called “Seleka” (“alliance” in the local
lingua franca Sango). In March 2013, Seleka swept into the capital, Bangui, and seized control of
the government, deposing President François Bozizé.1 Once in power, Seleka leaders presided
over the collapse of an already fragile state, and they oversaw brutal attacks on rural Christian
communities in the northwest, Bozizé’s home region. Seleka fighters also targeted perceived
Bozizé supporters in Bangui, including members of the national security forces, which largely
disbanded. Mostly Christian-led militias known as “anti-balakas” (anti-machetes) then mobilized
and have attacked Muslims.2 Civilians have also taken up arms against each other. A transitional
government appointed in January 2014 has been unable to stop the violence.
Prior to the current crisis, CAR’s population of 5.2 million was estimated to be 15% Muslim and
85% Christian or followers of indigenous beliefs.3 Religious identity is often closely associated
with ethnic identity. In recent months, amid widespread anti-balaka attacks, tens of thousands of
Muslims have fled their homes; Muslim-owned properties and businesses have been looted and
seized; and mosques have been destroyed. The United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General reported
in March 2014 that “the ethnic and religious demography of the country has changed radically,”
with many areas “emptied” of their Muslim populations.4 Seleka factions have also continued to
attack civilians, in many cases targeting non-Muslims. Religious ideology was not the origin of
the crisis, which appears to reflect a complex struggle over access to resources and national
identity (see text box, “Muslim-Christian Tensions,” below). Indeed, many CAR religious leaders
have sought to calm tensions, often at great personal risk. However, overlapping and often
localized sources of tension and mutual fears have coalesced into mass violence, and many
residents now appear to see themselves locked in an existential battle along ethno-religious lines.
Over 100,000 residents have fled CAR since December 2013, bringing the total number of CAR
refugees in neighboring countries to about 350,000 as of April 2014.5 Some 600,000 more people
are internally displaced within CAR. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has
stated that the situation in CAR is outpacing the agency’s capacity to provide assistance.6 Some
2.5 million people in CAR, or at least half the population, are thought to need humanitarian aid.
Humanitarian conditions prior to the current crisis were already poor due to past conflicts and a
1 Bozizé had been in power since 2003, when he seized control in a rebellion.
2 On dynamics of Seleka and anti-balaka violence since early 2013, see Human Rights Watch (HRW), “I Can Still
Smell the Dead”: The forgotten human rights crisis in the Central African Republic, September 18, 2013; and HRW,
“They Came to Kill”: Escalating Atrocities in the Central African Republic, December 19, 2013.
3 CIA World Factbook (April 11, 2014). Demographic information on CAR may reflect rough estimations at best. The
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates CAR’s population at 4.6 million.
4 Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, March 3, 2014, U.N. doc. S/2014/142.
5 The latter figure includes CAR refugees who fled before 2012. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
Central African Republic Emergency Situation, April 17, 2014; UNOCHA, CAR Situation Report No. 22, April 23,
2014. Displacement figures have regularly fluctuated with population movements and international registration efforts.
6 UNHCR, “UNHCR and Partners Seeking $US274 Million to Meet Acute Needs of Those Fleeing the Central African
Republic,” April 16, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
1
Crisis in the Central African Republic
lack of basic social services. Rising violence since 2012—including attacks on aid workers—has
further constrained humanitarian access. Farmers appear unprepared for the mid-year planting
season, the flight of Muslim traders has led to severe shortages of basic goods, and many schools
appear not to be functioning.7 Separate in origin from the current crisis, the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA), a militia of Ugandan origin, continues to attack civilians in southeast CAR,
creating additional humanitarian needs (see “Lord’s Resistance Army Presence” below).
Figure 1. Map of CAR and Basic Data
7 UN News Service, “WFP Chief Declares ‘The Time Is Now’ for Central African Republic,” April 11, 2014; USAID,
Central African Republic—Complex Emergency, FY2014, April 25, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
2
Crisis in the Central African Republic
The situation in CAR has drawn international concern. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2127,
adopted on December 5, 2013, authorized the French military, which has long had a presence in
CAR, and an African Union (AU) operation, the African-led International Support Mission for
CAR (MISCA), to protect civilians, enable humanitarian access, support the disarmament of
militias, and contribute to security sector reform.8 About 2,000 troops from France—the former
colonial power—and some 5,500 MISCA soldiers and police are conducting operations under this
authorization. The European Union has also pledged to send up to 1,000 troops to secure the
airport (thereby relieving French forces), but they have been slow to deploy.9 On April 10, 2014,
the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2149, authorizing a U.N. peacekeeping operation
in CAR with up to 10,000 troops; 1,820 police; and a sizable civilian component. The U.N.
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
is authorized to start on September 15, 2014, subsuming MISCA and a U.N. political mission.10
French and MISCA contingents have been praised for protecting civilians in some areas and
securing routes for the delivery of humanitarian aid.11 Still, international troops face enormous
challenges on the ground. Militia members can melt into the population; local residents are
traumatized and bitterly divided; infrastructure is severely lacking; and effective state institutions
that might contribute to stabilization efforts are absent. In January 2014, France’s U.N.
ambassador stated that French and African forces are in “nearly an impossible situation” in terms
of “what to do, in very practical terms to be effective to prevent people from killing each other
when they desperately want to kill each other.”12 Some MISCA contingents have been implicated
in human rights abuses, while French troops have faced accusations that their efforts to disarm
Seleka combatants have left Muslim communities vulnerable to attack. Coordination among
international forces has also been hindered by mutual distrust and varying rules of engagement.13
Some observers have expressed concern that violent extremist organizations could seek safe-
havens or influence in CAR, particularly as fears have grown of a de facto partition of the country
along ethno-religious lines. The U.N. Secretary-General has referred to reports that members of
the Nigerian Islamist extremist group Boko Haram are present in CAR, an assertion echoed by
French officials.14 Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a terrorist and criminal network
8 MISCA was created in December 2013, subsuming an existing stabilization force deployed by the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which comprised several hundred troops. MISCA troops are from
Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Rwanda.
9 Council of the EU, Press Release, 3288th Council Meeting, Foreign Affairs, Brussels, January 20, 2014. The EU has
also provided humanitarian aid to CAR, as well as development assistance, and has allocated €50 million (about $69
million) in assistance for MISCA. See EU External Action, “Central African Republic [fact-sheet],” February 11, 2014.
10 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2121 (2013) expanded the mandate of the U.N. Integrated Peacebuilding Office in
CAR (BINUCA), a field office of the U.N. Department of Political Affairs and an initiative of the U.N. Peacebuilding
Commission.
11 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, March 3, 2014, op. cit., which states,
“Logistical constraints and capability gaps notwithstanding, MISCA has made a significant difference in its areas of
deployment in and outside Bangui, including with regard to the protection of civilians. [...] Although some interlocutors
have identified the perceived partiality of some MISCA contingents as a challenge... MISCA has prevented near
massacres and gross human rights violations and contributed to the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance.”
12 Reuters, “Central Africa Republic Religious Hatred Was Underestimated: France,” January 15, 2014.
13 Graeme Wood, “Hell is an Understatement: A report from the bloody, crumbling Central African Republic,” New
Republic, April 30, 2014.
14 Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, March 3, 2014, op. cit.; Associated Press (AP),
“France to Keep Troops in Africa Against Extremists,” May 8, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
3
Crisis in the Central African Republic
active in north and west Africa, has expressed solidarity with persecuted CAR Muslims, painting
France’s actions in CAR as part of a “global Crusade” against the Muslim community.15
Muslim-Christian Tensions
Complex tensions over access to resources, control over trade and financial networks, and national identity are being
expressed in CAR along ethno-religious lines.16 These tensions appear to be rooted in multiple factors:
•
CAR's precolonial history of slave-raiding by northern and Muslim groups.
•
Competition between (mostly Muslim) herders and (mostly Christian or animist) farmers over access to land and
other resources.
•
Christian and southerner dominance of the national government since independence—and corresponding
resentment among northerners and Muslims who perceive neglect, discrimination, and a denial of full citizenship.
•
Muslim dominance over trade and rudimentary financial networks, often enabled by cross-border mobility and
family ties—and corresponding frustrations among Christians over Muslims' perceived control over prices and
access to capital.
•
The fact that many CAR Muslims trace their family origins (however distant) to neighboring Chad, whose
government helped bring to power former President Bozizé and was seen as complicit in Seleka’s seizure of
power.
Non-Muslims and southerners often refer to Muslims and northeasterners as "foreigners,” while popular anger at
perceived foreign raiding of CAR’s natural resources appears to have grown over the past decade. Seleka leader
Michel Djotodia was the country's first Muslim president and the first from northeastern CAR, which may have led
some Muslims to support him and/or to view Seleka as protectors. However, there have also been clashes between
combatants identified as Seleka and mostly Muslim Peul/Fulani nomadic herder groups. These clashes highlight the
internal diversity of CAR’s Muslim community and point to additional potential fracture points ahead.
A Challenging Political Transition
Transitional President Catherine Samba-Panza, a businesswoman and former mayor of the
capital, Bangui, was appointed in January 2014 by CAR’s National Transition Council, an ad hoc
body constituted after the Seleka takeover. She replaced Seleka leader and self-declared President
Michel Djotodia, who was forced out of office and into exile on January 10, 2014, following
pressure from African and French leaders. Djotodia had ordered Seleka disbanded in September
2013, with little practical impact. Samba-Panza has called for national reconciliation and
attempted to reconstitute CAR’s national security forces. Yet, progress toward these goals appears
to have been minimal to date, and it does not appear that ongoing military recruitment under
Samba-Panza includes steps to screen out militia members and ensure ethno-religious balance.
Samba-Panza has also come under criticism for alleged nepotism in state appointments.17
A transitional road map backed by African heads of state and the U.N. Security Council calls for
national elections no later than February 2015. Election preparations face stark logistical and
security challenges, however, and an electoral campaign could heighten the stakes of ethno-
15 “AQIM Decries France’s ‘Crusade’ in Central Africa, Promises Revenge,” February 22, 2014, via U.S. government
Open Source Center. Such statements do not necessarily indicate an AQIM operational presence in CAR.
16 For background on complex ethnic, regional, and religious dynamics in CAR, see Louisa Lombard, Raiding
Sovereignty in the Central African Borderlands, Dissertation, Duke University, 2012.
17 New York Times, “In Troubled States, New Governments with the Same Old Problems,” April 1, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
4
Crisis in the Central African Republic
religious competition for power. The country may require a new constitution and new legal
framework for electoral processes. Any voter registration efforts could raise questions related to
legal residency and citizenship, which are at the heart of the current violence.
Armed Groups: Analysis
Anti-balaka groups and Seleka factions do not have clearly defined memberships or effective
chains of command that unite all combatants. In addition to ethno-religious animus, their
members may be motivated by various factors, such as a desire for communal protection, political
ambitions, and criminal intent. For example, many anti-balaka groups appear to have been formed
on an ad hoc basis. Some, however, are led by former military officers, display relatively
sophisticated capacities, and have voiced political demands, such as the reinstatement of former
President Bozizé (an evangelical Christian). Anti-balaka attacks on Muslims and on MISCA
troops have led the AU to refer to all anti-balaka groups as “terrorists and enemy combatants.”18
Seleka combatants mostly hailed from the remote northeast of CAR and from neighboring Chad
and Sudan. Seleka leaders initially called for greater state investment in the northeast and for
checks-and-balances on executive power; broadly, the movement drew on frustrations with the
Bozizé government. Yet Seleka’s actions appeared to reflect a desire for revenge against
individuals associated with prior regimes and an attempt to reap the material benefits of power,
including through looting, control over mining sites, and access to arable land. (CAR is rich in
natural resources, including diamonds, uranium, timber, and potential oil and gas deposits;
however, logistical challenges and perceived political risk have inhibited resource extraction and
related international investment.) Claims by some CAR Christians that the vast majority of Seleka
combatants in 2013 were foreign nationals19 are difficult to assess, in part because the alliance
was a fluid, ad hoc grouping of fighters of diverse origins, and because borders in the region are
porous. Moreover, many northeasterners’ stated grievances center around the state’s denial of
citizenship rights, including national identity papers. Moreover, southerners and non-Muslims
often refer to northeastern ethnic groups with cross-border family ties as “foreigners.”20
Muslim Exodus
The deployment of international troops mandated to counter armed groups and the ousting of
Seleka leader Djotodia from the presidency in January 2014 shifted the balance of power in CAR
from Seleka factions to anti-balaka groups. The latter vary wildly in capacity and degree of
internal organization, but they broadly appear to share a commitment to expelling Muslim
communities. As anti-balaka attacks escalated in early 2014, many of CAR’s Muslim inhabitants
fled to neighboring Chad and Cameroon, or to northeastern CAR, where some Seleka leaders are
now reportedly based. News reports indicate that some Seleka figures and Muslim civilians who
have fled to northeastern CAR may seek an independent state.
18 Reuters, “AU Brands Central African Republic Militia ‘Terrorists’ After Peacekeeper Killed,” March 25, 2014.
19 For example, testimony of Nestor-Desire Nongo Aziagbia, Roman Catholic Bishop of Bossangoa, House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, “Crisis in the Central African Republic,” November 19, 2013.
20 Louisa Lombard, “Is the Central African Republic on the Verge of Genocide?” Africa is a Country, December 5,
2013.
Congressional Research Service
5
Crisis in the Central African Republic
As of early 2014, thousands of Muslims were confined to improvised shelters in Bangui and in
the northwest, where they were protected from anti-balaka assault by international troops. U.N.
agencies and humanitarian groups initially debated whether to facilitate the evacuation of
Muslims from areas where they face imminent threats, with some expressing concern that
evacuations could contribute to de facto partition.21 In early April 2014, UNHCR stated it was
willing to assist in evacuating 19,000 Muslims trapped in Bangui and towns in the northwest,
emphasizing that evacuations would be conducted only on a voluntary basis and as a last resort.22
UNHCR has since facilitated several evacuations of Muslims, including of some 1,300 Muslims
from Bangui in late April, which was carried out with French and MISCA military escorts. CAR
authorities criticized the Bangui evacuation as having been undertaken “unilaterally.”23
In early 2014, Chadian troops, apparently serving under national (not MISCA) command,
escorted thousands of Muslims to northeast CAR, Chad, or Cameroon, protecting many from
anti-balaka assault. (Many of CAR’s Muslims trace their family origins, sometimes distantly, to
Chad; just over half of Chad’s population is Muslim.) Whether Chad can sustainably absorb this
population influx from CAR is uncertain. More broadly, Chad’s motivations with regard to the
CAR crisis and relationship with Seleka leaders are uncertain (see “The Role of Regional
Actors”).
Warnings of Genocide
International officials have warned of mass atrocities taking place or potentially taking place in
CAR, with some pointing to a risk of genocide.24 Such warnings appear prescient in light of anti-
balaka attacks against Muslims, often accompanied by anti-balaka assertions that their goal is to
forcibly expel or kill all Muslims in CAR. In January 2014, John Ging, director of operations for
the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), stated after a trip to
CAR that, “The elements are there, the seeds are there, for a genocide. There’s no question about
that.”25 Also in January, U.N. Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng stated
that, “In my assessment, the widespread, unchecked nature of attacks by ex-Séléka and anti-
Balaka militia, as well as by armed civilians associated with them, against civilians on the basis
of religion or ethnicity constitute crimes against humanity. If not halted, there is a risk of
genocide in this country.”26
French Military Deployment
On December 5, 2013, as soon as the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2127, France
rapidly deployed about 1,200 troops to CAR, bolstering its existing military presence to 1,600.
21 See, e.g., Peter Bouckaert (HRW), “The Central African Republic Has Become a Nightmare for Muslims [op-ed],”
The Washington Post, March 16, 2014.
22 UNHCR, “Violence in Bangui Triggers Fresh Displacement in Central African Republic,” April 1, 2014.
23 Le Monde, “En Centrafrique, l’exode des musulmans se poursuit,” April 27, 2014.
24 The text of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which defines the
term, is available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/res/260(III).
25 U.N. Radio, “UN Warns of Genocide in Central African Republic,” January 16, 2014.
26 U.N., The statement of Under Secretary-General/Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Mr. Adama Dieng
on the human rights and humanitarian dimensions of the crisis in the Central African Republic, January 22, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
6
Crisis in the Central African Republic
French troop levels have since risen to roughly 2,000. Previously, several hundred French forces
in CAR had focused on building the capacity of CAR’s military and, during the Seleka advance in
2012, on protecting French citizens and the international airport in Bangui. However, the French
government declined to intervene to protect President Bozizé against Seleka in March 2013, or in
response to the Seleka-led government’s appeal for assistance in stabilizing the country the
following month.27 France’s approach to CAR began to shift in August 2013 with reports of rising
Seleka-led attacks against civilians. In September 2013, French President François Hollande
highlighted the growing crisis in his remarks at the U.N. General-Assembly.28 The decision to
intervene may have been driven, in part, by concerns that ethno-religious violence in CAR could
destabilize neighboring states that maintain close commercial and security ties with France,
including Chad, Cameroon, and Republic of Congo (Brazzaville).
France was a key player in U.N. Security Council deliberations that ultimately culminated in the
authorization of MINUSCA. The French government may see the transition from MISCA to a
U.N. force as part of an eventual exit strategy from CAR, and as a necessary step to share the
financial and political burden of stabilization efforts—particularly as French domestic support for
CAR operations appears limited.
As CAR’s former colonial power, France has a freighted history that includes abuses during
colonial rule and support for authoritarian governments in the decades following independence.29
As with France’s ongoing military operation in Mali, President Hollande has sought to
differentiate France’s actions in CAR from earlier French interventions in Africa that were widely
viewed as shoring up dictatorial or corrupt regimes in order to preserve French influence and
commercial access. Hollande has stated that the goals of French intervention in CAR are to
restore security, prevent further massacres, and permit access to humanitarian aid; and that France
intends the operation “to end as soon as possible.” He has also stated, “We have no vocation for
choosing CAR’s leaders. France is helping but is not substituting itself. That time is over.”30
The Role of Regional Actors
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), a sub-regional intergovernmental
body, initially played a front-line role in responding to the crisis in CAR, mediating peace
accords, deploying troops, and influencing the selection of CAR’s political leadership.31
However, regional rivalries, divergent interests, and a lack of capacity have inhibited ECCAS’s
ability to channel international stabilization efforts. Although MISCA—an AU force—replaced a
preexisting ECCAS stabilization mission in December 2013, ECCAS member-states such as
Chad and Republic of Congo have remained key players.
Chad’s President, Idriss Déby, is widely viewed as among the most influential leaders in CAR,
but also as a problematic actor, due to his role in bringing ex-President Bozizé to power,
27 Global Insight, “CAR PM Appeals to France for Security Assistance,” April 18, 2013.
28 Hollande remarks at the General-Assembly on September 24, 2013, available at http://www.franceonu.org.
29 See International Crisis Group (ICG), Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State, December 2007.
30 New Year’s message to military personnel, January 8, 2014, via U.S. government Open Source Center; press
conference on January 14, 2014, via the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CRS translation.
31 ECCAS member states are: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and São Tomé & Príncipe.
Congressional Research Service
7
Crisis in the Central African Republic
allegations that he allowed Seleka to seize power (or even provided support) when he became
dissatisfied with Bozizé, and the fact that some key Seleka figures are reportedly Chadian
nationals or have other ties to Chad. Bozizé’s reliance on a Chadian security detail contributed to
perceptions that Chadians enjoyed impunity for abuses committed in CAR, such as looting and
banditry, during his presidency.32 Chadian troops were also accused of abetting or participating in
Seleka abuses.33 Though Chad was one of the founding troop contributors to MISCA, it withdrew
its roughly 800 troops from the AU force in April 2014 after they were criticized for shooting
unarmed civilians.
Many CAR Muslims trace their family origins to Chad (although many Chadians are not
Muslim), and many CAR residents appear to associate the two identities, broadly referring to
Muslims as “Chadians.” These overlapping identities appear to have driven anti-Muslim violence,
as anti-balaka groups have broadly targeted Muslim civilians while claiming to target
“foreigners... from the Chad and Darfur borderlands, who have looted and attacked their country
in conjunction with the last two coups (in 2003 and 2013), and who happen to be Muslim.”34 In
early 2014, as attacks against Muslims, Arabic-speakers, and foreign nationals increased,
neighboring states, including Chad, evacuated thousands of their citizens, with international
assistance. In doing so, as mentioned above, Chadian troops facilitated the evacuation of tens of
thousands of Muslims to the northeast and to Chad.35 It may be difficult to distinguish Chadian
migrants returning to their ancestral home from internationally recognized and protected refugees.
Cameroon, for its part, hosted former president Bozizé when he first went into exile, and is now
contending with an influx of refugees from CAR into its already fragile north. The flood of
refugees from CAR into Cameroon is adding to concerns about instability emanating from
northeastern Nigeria, due to the ongoing conflict with Boko Haram.
As of 2012, the government of South Africa was seen as cultivating growing ties with CAR, and
South African troops deployed to CAR, ostensibly for bilateral security cooperation. Some
analysts interpreted South Africa’s moves as part of a strategy to pursue and protect potential
mineral interests, and more broadly of seeking greater influence in francophone Africa.36 During
Seleka’s assault on Bangui in early 2013, Seleka clashed with South African forces, killing at
least 13 South African soldiers. The incident sparked controversy within South Africa about the
purpose of South African deployments to CAR, and South Africa withdrew its remaining forces.
32 See ICG, Central African Republic: Anatomy Of A Phantom State, December 2007.
33 See U.N. Office at Geneva, “United Nations Team Documents Grave Human Rights Violations in the Central
African Republic,” January 14, 2014. The report cites U.N. Human Rights Office findings that its investigators
“received multiple testimonies identifying certain ex-Séléka perpetrators as being Chadian nationals. Witnesses
consistently reported that ex-Séléka, wearing the armbands of Chadian FOMAC [MISCA’s predecessor operation]
peacekeepers, went from house to house searching for anti-Balaka, and shot and killed civilians. The team also said it
received credible testimonies of collusion between some Chadian FOMAC elements and ex-Séléka forces.”
34 Louisa Lombard, “Religious Rhetoric as a Cover [Room for Debate],” New York Times, April 20, 2014.
35 See, e.g., UNOCHA, Chad: Migrants from Central African Republic, Situation Report No. 3, March 30, 2014.
36 France24, “South Africa ‘Downplayed’ Casualties in CAR Fighting,” April 4, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
8
Crisis in the Central African Republic
Lord’s Resistance Army Presence
Separate in origin from the current crisis, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a small militia of
Ugandan origin, has operated in CAR’s remote southeast since at least 2008 (see map, Figure
1).37 LRA attacks on rural communities have displaced hundreds of thousands of people in CAR,
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan. CAR appears to have attracted LRA
commanders due to its remoteness, lack of an effective military, and location near territory
familiar to the group.38 In November 2013, then-President Djotodia claimed to be in contact with
reclusive LRA leader Joseph Kony, but U.S. officials downplayed the claim.39
The Ugandan military has conducted counter-LRA operations in CAR since 2009, with
significant U.S. support, including the deployment of U.S. military advisors to the field since late
2011. Since 2012, Ugandan operations in CAR have been considered part of a Ugandan-led AU
Regional Task Force (AU-RTF). Southeast CAR, where U.S. advisors are based, has been
relatively unaffected by the ethno-religious crisis in CAR. However, Ugandan operations and
U.S. support activities ceased for several months in 2013 after Seleka took power, due to security
concerns and political uncertainty. The operations restarted in August 2013, after the AU garnered
support from the Djotodia government. The Obama Administration has pointed to decreasing
numbers of LRA attacks and levels of displacement as evidence of the success of U.S.-supported
operations.40 However, LRA leaders could seek to leverage instability in CAR to find new safe-
havens. Recent LRA attacks have been reported to the north and west of its previous areas of
activity in CAR, beyond where Ugandan troops are able to operate.41
U.S. Responses
U.S. engagement in CAR has historically been limited. The U.S. diplomatic presence prior to
2013 consisted of a small embassy, with no bilateral U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) mission.42 U.S. military advisors have supported Ugandan-led counter-LRA operations
in the southeast since 2011, as mentioned above. In December 2012, during the Seleka offensive,
U.S. diplomatic personnel were evacuated from Bangui. Then-U.S. Ambassador Lawrence
Wohlers continued to fulfill his duties from outside the country through mid-2013, when he
retired from the U.S. Foreign Service.43 The Obama Administration then appointed a Washington,
DC-based Special Advisor on CAR, David Brown. In April 2014, the Administration appointed
Ambassador W. Stuart Symington as a Washington, DC-based Special Representative for CAR.
37 See CRS Report R42094, The Lord’s Resistance Army: The U.S. Response.
38 Enough Project, On the Heels of Kony: The Untold Tragedy Unfolding in the Central African Republic, June 2010.
39 State Department press briefing, November 21, 2013.
40 State Department, “U.S. Support to Regional Efforts to Counter the Lord’s Resistance Army,” March 24, 2014.
41 See LRA Crisis Tracker, at http://www.lracrisistracker.com.
42 Prior to the current crisis, U.S. aid to CAR was limited to humanitarian assistance, International Military Education
and Training (IMET) ($115,000 in FY2012), and programs administered on a regional or functional basis. The latter
included a USAID property rights project related to artisanal diamond mining, non-lethal military aid related to
counter-LRA efforts, and State Department assistance to counter human trafficking.
43 In April 2014, the U.N. Secretary-General appointed Ambassador Wohlers as his Deputy Special Representative for
MINUSCA.
Congressional Research Service
9
Crisis in the Central African Republic
Since the Seleka seizure of power in March 2013, U.S. officials have condemned atrocities in
CAR, welcomed African leaders’ efforts to respond to the crisis, praised the appointment of
Transitional President Samba-Panza, and called for “fair and inclusive elections as soon as
possible, but not later than February 2015.”44 Several senior U.S. officials have traveled to CAR
since late 2013. Visiting Bangui in April 2014, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N.
Samantha Power stated, “the Rwandan genocide taught us the price of delay in responding to
mass violence,” adding, “We must do more; and we must do it now.”45
The U.S. response to the crisis includes “up to” $100 million in logistical support and equipment
for MISCA and French forces;46 nearly $67 million in humanitarian assistance in FY2014 to date
(in addition to funds provided in FY2013);47 and about $7.5 million to support conflict mitigation,
reconciliation, and peacebuilding efforts.48 Public diplomacy initiatives, including a recorded
message from President Obama to the people of CAR, and a visit to CAR by an interfaith
delegation of U.S. religious leaders, have emphasized non-violence and reconciliation. Officials
have portrayed these efforts as part of the Administration’s commitment to preventing mass
atrocities.49 The United States also provides substantial financial support for, and influences the
decisions of, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, which have each recently
pledged new aid for CAR in the form of concessional loans and technical assistance.50
On May 13, 2014, President Obama signed an Executive Order declaring that conditions in CAR
constituted “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States,” amounting to a national emergency.51 He identified five individuals—former
president François Bozizé, former transitional president Michel Djotodia, Seleka leaders
Nourredine Adam and Abdoulaye Miskine, and anti-balaka “political coordinator” Levy Yakite—
to be subject to sanctions. The State Department is required to deny the designated individuals
entry into the United States; and the Secretary of the Treasury shall block access to their U.S.-
based property and interests in property. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, is further authorized to designate for sanctions any additional individual who
threatens the peace, security, or stability of CAR; threatens CAR’s political transition; undermines
democratic processes or institutions in CAR; violates international human rights or international
humanitarian law; recruits or uses child soldiers; obstructs humanitarian aid; or provides support
to designated persons or groups through the illicit trade in natural resources. On May 9, 2014, the
44 State Department, “Kerry on Violence in the Central African Republic,” December 27, 2013; Nancy
Lindborg/USAID, “Standing with the People of the Central African Republic for a Stronger Future,” Huffington Post,
January 31, 2014.
45 “Remarks to Troops of the African-Led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic,” April 9,
2014.
46 U.S. support to MISCA and French forces has been provided through State Department-administered Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO) funds, and through Defense Department equipment and services that the President authorized to be
transferred under Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended.
47 USAID, Central African Republic—Humanitarian Update #52, May 9, 2014.
48 State Department, “Appointment of U.S. Special Representative for the Central African Republic,” April 22, 2014.
49 State Department, “Remarks by Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in Bangui,
C.A.R.,” December 24, 2013.
50 IMF Press Release, “IMF Mission and the Central African Republic Reach Staff-level Agreement on Financial
Assistance Under The Rapid Credit Facility,” April 3, 2014; World Bank, “World Bank Group Announces US$100
Million in Crisis Response for the Central African Republic,” January 23, 2014.
51 The President, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Central African Republic,”
Executive Order of May 12, 2014; released by the White House on May 13, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
10
Crisis in the Central African Republic
U.N. Security Council sanctions committee on CAR designated Bozizé, Adam, and Yakite under
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2134, adopted on January 28, 2014, which imposed a travel
ban and asset freeze on individuals designated by a U.N. sanctions committee created under U.N.
Security Council Resolution 2127 (2013).52
In the U.N. Security Council, the United States voted in favor of authorizing a U.N. peacekeeping
operation in April 2014. Administration officials had earlier appeared reticent to support a U.N.
operation in CAR, noting that a transition of MISCA to U.N. control would be time-consuming,
and emphasizing that the Administration’s first priority was to support MISCA, which—they
suggested—could be more aggressive in conducting stabilization operations than U.N.
peacekeepers.53 Budgetary considerations may also have played a role in initial Administration
deliberations. The State Department’s budget request for FY2015 does not include funding to pay
anticipated U.S. assessed contributions to the U.N. peacekeeping operation in CAR, as
MINUSCA had not been authorized at the time the budget request was released. According to the
State Department, the anticipated U.S. share of MINUSCA’s budget is estimated at $283 million
to $340 million per year once the operation reaches full capacity (expected in FY2015), with the
initial cost in FY2014 expected to total roughly $85 million.54 In FY2015, the Administration has
requested congressional authorization and appropriation of $150 million for a new “peacekeeping
response mechanism” (PKRM), which could be used to pay part of these costs.55
Legislation
The FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76, Division K, §7042 (a)) states that
foreign assistance funds for CAR “shall be made available for reconciliation and peacebuilding
programs, including activities to promote inter-faith dialogue at the national and local levels, and
for programs to prevent crimes against humanity.” The act (§7042 (e)) prohibits International
Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance from being provided to CAR. The
appropriators’ explanatory statement accompanying the act states that the act provides
“additional” funds for CAR under the State Department Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account,
and that these funds are designated as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).
In March 2014, the Senate passed S.Res. 375 (Senator Coons), “A resolution concerning the crisis
in the Central African Republic and supporting United States and international efforts to end the
violence, protect civilians, and address root causes of the conflict.” Draft legislation includes
52 “Security Council Committee Concerning Central African Republic Lists Three Individuals Subject to Measures
Imposed by Resolution 2134 (2014),” May 9, 2014, U.N. doc. SC/11389. Grounds for U.N. sanctions include violating
a U.N. arms embargo; planning, directing, or committing acts that violate international human rights law or
international humanitarian law; using child soldiers; supporting armed or criminal groups through the illicit exploitation
of natural resources; obstructing humanitarian aid; and attacking U.N. missions or international troops. For analysis of
the role of natural resource extraction in CAR’s conflict, see Enough Project, Behind the Headlines: Drivers of
Violence in the Central African Republic, May 1, 2014.
53 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Linda Thomas-Greenfield before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on Africa, “Crisis in the Central African Republic,” December 17, 2013.
54 Congressional notification of intention to vote for a U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing a U.N.
peacekeeping operation in CAR, provided to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 24, 2014.
55 Testimony of U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Samantha Power, “FY2015 Budget Request for the United
Nations and International Organizations,” House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, April 2, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
11
Crisis in the Central African Republic
S.Res. 413 (Senator Coons), which references CAR while “affirming it is in the national interest
of the United States” to help “prevent and mitigate acts of genocide and mass atrocities.”
According to the State Department, the Seleka seizure of power did not trigger a legal provision
contained in foreign aid appropriations measures that restricts certain types of U.S. bilateral aid to
countries where a military coup or decree has overthrown a “duly elected” head of government.56
Outlook and Issues for Congress
As Congress continues to monitor the situation in CAR and the U.S. response, Members may
consider the immediate crisis, its complex roots, and its longer-term implications. In the short run,
Congress may influence the funding levels, duration, and mechanisms of U.S. humanitarian
assistance for CAR’s population and of U.S. support for international stabilization efforts.
Looking ahead, Congress may weigh the relative priority of the CAR crisis in the context of
competing priorities elsewhere in Africa and beyond.
Some Members have considered how to characterize the nature of the violence in CAR, and what
level and kind of response is warranted as a result, including in the context of a commitment by
the Obama Administration to seek to prevent “mass atrocities.”57 Amid commemorations of the
20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide on April 7, 2014, some have questioned whether the
situation in CAR undermines international declarations of “never again.”58 Ultimately, a legal
determination of whether or not genocide is taking place in CAR may rest on evidence gathered
in the months or years to come. In the meantime, African and French troops, and an eventual U.N.
peacekeeping operation, may not be able to contain the violence, while additional intervention
options appear limited and could have unintended consequences.
A related issue of potential interest to Congress is the effectiveness of MISCA, which is receiving
U.S. support in a difficult operating environment. MISCA contingents have been praised for
protecting civilians in some areas and securing routes for the delivery of humanitarian aid.59 Still,
MISCA troops exhibit shortfalls of equipment, capacity, interoperability, and financing, and some
(particularly Chadian troops prior to their withdrawal from MISCA) have been implicated in
abuses in CAR. Indeed, Congress has regularly imposed legal restrictions on certain types of U.S.
security assistance to several of the African states that have sent troops to CAR, due to human
rights concerns.
56 State Department press briefing, April 2, 2013. The provision is contained, most recently, in Sec. 7008 of Division K
of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 113-76. The briefer noted that Seleka forces were not affiliated
with the CAR military, but rather were non-state actors. Observers may also debate whether Bozizé was “duly elected.”
57 For example, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations held a hearing in May 2014 titled “The Central African Republic: From ‘Pre-Genocide’ to
Genocide?”
58 U.N. News, “At Brussels Conference, Ban Says Genocide Prevention is Global Responsibility,” April 1, 2014.
59 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, March 3, 2014, op. cit., which states,
“Logistical constraints and capability gaps notwithstanding, MISCA has made a significant difference in its areas of
deployment in and outside Bangui, including with regard to the protection of civilians. [...] Although some interlocutors
have identified the perceived partiality of some MISCA contingents as a challenge... MISCA has prevented near
massacres and gross human rights violations and contributed to the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance.”
Congressional Research Service
12
Crisis in the Central African Republic
In light of MISCA’s mixed performance, observers may assess the U.N. peacekeeping operation
in CAR in reference to an ongoing debate regarding the relative merits of AU versus U.N.-
conducted peacekeeping operations. This debate has been at play in Mali, Somalia, and
elsewhere. While neighboring states may have greater political commitment to resolving a crisis
in their backyard, regional operations in Africa are often hampered by a lack of capacity and
handicapped by political rivalries and competing interests. On the other hand, U.N.-conducted
peacekeeping operations, while better funded and vetted, can be slow to materialize and, often,
risk-averse to a point that can inhibit effectiveness.
In the long term, the internal political and security arrangements that could allow for stability and
improved governance in CAR may prove elusive. International actors have repeatedly attempted
military interventions, peace processes, state-building, and security sector reform efforts in
CAR—with mixed results, at best. At present, prospects for elections by early 2015, as called for
in CAR’s political transition roadmap, appear bleak. If electoral preparations advance, voter
registration and campaigning could further contribute to what is already a violent contestation
over political power and the meaning of citizenship. Nonetheless, an electoral process is
ultimately likely to be a component of internationally supported state-building efforts. The
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, the investigation and
prosecution of human rights abusers, and the creation of functional and representative state
security forces in CAR are likely to face severe challenges. A truth and reconciliation process,
similar to efforts pursued in other transitional states, may be sought as part of such processes.
Finally, the potential impact of the CAR crisis on regional stability is of concern to U.S. and other
policy makers, particularly as conflicts in nearby countries, such as South Sudan and DRC,
persist. To date, relatively little violence has been reported among border communities in
neighboring states, despite the fact that ethno-religious divisions in CAR are mirrored throughout
central Africa and elsewhere on the continent. Still, refugee flows are taxing scarce local
resources, while insecurity is hindering cross-border trade and the delivery of humanitarian aid.
Neighboring states have limited capacity to respond. These dynamics could inflame local tensions
and are likely to test the level of trust among political leaders. A de facto partition of CAR and
continued conflict could have far-reaching regional implications. As an imperfect comparison, the
1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the subsequent flight of Rwandan refugees into neighboring DRC,
laid the groundwork for an enduring regional security crisis. Concerns about whether
transnational violent extremist organizations could seek safe havens in CAR or radicalize affected
groups are also likely to persist among U.S. and other policy makers.
Congressional Research Service
13
Figure 2. Timeline of Key Events in CAR Since 2003
Source: CRS
CRS-14
Crisis in the Central African Republic
Author Contact Information
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459
Congressional Research Service
15