Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
May 8, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33546


Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary
This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in U.S.-Jordanian
relations. It provides a brief discussion of Jordan’s government and economy and of its
cooperation with U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East, including the promotion of Arab-
Israeli peace.
Several issues are likely to figure in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid
to and cooperation with Jordan. These include the stability of the Jordanian regime (particularly
in light of ongoing political change and/or unrest in several other countries in the region),
Jordan’s involvement in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the civil war in neighboring Syria, and
U.S.-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation.
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. The country’s small
size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and
friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious
vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel,
Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of more powerful
neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential
adversaries.
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and
1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2013 amounted to approximately $13.83 billion. Levels
of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to threats faced by Jordan and decreasing during
periods featuring political differences or reductions of aid worldwide. On September 22, 2008,
the U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement whereby the United States agreed to
provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a five-year period,
ending with FY2014. In the year ahead, both parties may try to reach a new five-year aid deal.
In recent months, Congress has taken additional steps to support Jordan. On January 17, 2014, the
President signed into law P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 which Congress
passed days earlier. The law provides Jordan $360 million in economic aid and $300 million in
military aid. It also stipulates that “from amounts made available under title VIII designated for
Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism, not less than $340 million above the
levels included in the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Jordan shall
be made available for the extraordinary costs related to instability in the region, including for
security requirements along the border with Iraq.” The law also continues to authorize foreign aid
to be used for loan guarantees to Jordan and the establishment of an enterprise fund. Finally,
Congress also appropriated additional Migration and Refugee Assistance funding (MRA) to help
countries like Jordan cope with the Syrian refugee crisis.
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Contents
Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 1
Foreign Relations ............................................................................................................................. 2
Jordan and Syria ........................................................................................................................ 2
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66) ............................................... 5
Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process ................................................................................ 6
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 6
Israeli-Jordanian Tensions ................................................................................................... 7
Israeli-Jordanian Cooperation ............................................................................................. 7
Jordan and Iraq .......................................................................................................................... 8
Country Background ........................................................................................................................ 9
Domestic Politics and the Economy ........................................................................................ 10
The Hashemite Royal Family ............................................................................................ 10
Constitution, Parliament, Political Parties, and Judiciary ................................................. 11
The Economy........................................................................................................................... 12
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan ................................................................................................. 14
The Five-Year Aid Deal..................................................................................................... 14
Economic Assistance ......................................................................................................... 14
Food Aid ............................................................................................................................ 15
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) ............................................................................ 15
Military Assistance ............................................................................................................ 15
Recent U.S. Assistance to Jordan ...................................................................................... 16
U.S.-Jordanian Trade ..................................................................................................................... 17
Free Trade Agreement ....................................................................................................... 18
Qualifying Industrial Zones .............................................................................................. 18
Military Cooperation ............................................................................................................... 18
Joint Exercises and Training ............................................................................................. 19

Figures
Figure 1. IRI Poll – December 2013 ................................................................................................ 2
Figure 2. Syria-Jordan Border ......................................................................................................... 4
Figure 3. Jordan and Its Neighbors .................................................................................................. 9
Figure 4. Gallup: Poll on Jordanian Wellbeing .............................................................................. 13

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan, FY2011-FY2015 Request ........................................ 16
Table 2. Possible Foreign Military Sales to Jordan Notified to Congress ..................................... 19
Table 3. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis .................................................... 20

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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 21

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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Overview
Despite conflict on its borders, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan appears to remain a relatively
stable and reliable partner for the United States in the Arab world. Jordan’s strategic importance
to the United States may be increasing given the ongoing civil war in Syria, fighting in western
and central Iraq, uncertainty over the trajectory of Palestinian and Egyptian politics, and ongoing
global counterterrorism operations. In each of these arenas, U.S.-Jordanian military, intelligence,
and diplomatic cooperation seeks to empower political moderates, reduce sectarian conflict, and
eliminate terrorist threats.
Jordan’s small size, lackluster economy, divided population, controlled political system,
geographic location, and cooperation with the West are inherent vulnerabilities that U.S. policy
makers seek to mitigate. Jordan has taken a cautious approach to Syria’s civil war, fearing that
deeper involvement could invite either retaliation by the Asad government or extremist attacks
from radicalized Islamist rebels. Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Jordanian officials
warn that the recent breakdown of U.S.-brokered Israeli-Palestinian negotiations could preclude a
two-state solution and lead to renewed Israeli right-wing claims that “Jordan is Palestine.” On a
broader level, as numerous Arab countries grapple with internal turmoil and terrorism, one
potential concern is a scenario in which anti-government unrest provokes a heavy-handed
response by Jordanian security forces, tarnishing Jordan’s carefully-cultivated image of tolerance
and moderation. As U.S. relations with other Arab states, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have
come under new strains, strong U.S. ties to a stable and moderate Jordanian government at peace
with Israel appear extremely valuable.
With nearly 600,000 Syrian refugees in a country where domestic youth unemployment is high,
water is scarce, and the budget is in chronic deficit (largely due to subsidies and an overweening
civil service), Jordan is more dependent than ever on external aid. The United States, Europe, and
Arab Gulf Countries have provided Jordan with significant financial assistance in recent years.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is currently lending $2.38 billion to Jordan over a three-
year period. The Arab Gulf states are providing the kingdom with a multi-year $5 billion aid
package. For FY2014, Congress has appropriated over $1 billion in total bilateral aid to Jordan,
and the President is requesting over $670 million for FY2015.
King Abdullah II, now in his 14th year of rule, is attempting to appease domestic constituencies
that serve as the foundation for his family’s rule, while maintaining external ties to Jordan’s
financial benefactors in the Arab Gulf and the West. Jordan has experienced periodic social unrest
since 2011, but not at nearly the same level as some other Arab countries. Overall, while many
Jordanians are struggling economically, popular movements for democratic reform have failed to
galvanize decisive support. Instead, the King himself has often tried to appear as the most fervent
advocate of reform. Many observers, however, assert that the King’s top-down reform process is
more politically expedient than substantively effective.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has been described as “loyal opposition” to the monarchy.
The group’s political wing boycotted the most recent parliamentary elections, though it continues
to be influential in unions, student groups, and professional associations.
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At the moment, public opinion on the general state of the country’s affairs would seem to be
improving slightly.1 According to a December 2013 International Republican Institute (IRI) poll,
this is mainly due to the public’s growing confidence in the stability of the country rather than
improvements to the economy or political system. Public confidence in the stability of the
kingdom rose 11% between March and December 2013 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. IRI Poll – December 2013

Source: International Republican Institute, December 2013.

Foreign Relations
Jordan and Syria2
The Humanitarian Crisis. The continued inflow of Syrian refugees is placing tremendous strains
on the Jordanian government. The United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees in
April 2014 estimated that there were 595,369 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan,3 increasing the
country's population by 10%. Some estimates suggest that the total Syrian refugee population in

1 http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-poll-jordanians-encouraged-stability-concerned-about-high-
prices-a
2 This section was prepared with the assistance of Carla Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs.
3 UNHCR, Syrian refugee data, at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107.
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Jordan could surge to over 800,000 by the end of 2014.1 Most Syrian refugees in Jordan have
settled in urban areas, with only 20% of refugees residing in camps—primarily the 80,000-
person tent “city” of Al Zaatari in northern Jordan. This camp opened in July 2012 and by some
estimates is now the fourth largest urban area in Jordan. The United Arab Emirates has
constructed a smaller refugee camp in Jordan, and a third camp, the Azraq refugee camp 60 miles
east of Amman, opened in April 2014.4
Jordanian border authorities at times have blocked some refugees from entering the kingdom and
forcibly deported others due to security concerns or the strains the refugee population has placed
on the country’s northern provinces.5 Rents have nearly tripled in border towns such as Mafraq
and Ramtha, making housing unaffordable for many Jordanians. Jordan’s hospitals, schools,
sanitation and water systems are facing similar strain.6 Some Jordanian observers are writing
articles openly questioning the wisdom of continuing to accept Syrian refugees and warning that
resource, budget, and demographic pressures may disrupt life in the kingdom for a decade or
more. According to the U.S. State Department, the United States has allocated more than $268
million in multilateral humanitarian assistance to help Jordan cope with the Syrian refugee crisis.

4 “Hundreds of Refugees arrive in new Jordan Camp,” Daily Star, April 29, 2014.
5 “Displaced Syrians Stranded along Jordanian Border; Humanitarian Crisis Feared,” Washington Post, July 23, 2013.
Additionally, reports indicate that Jordan has sought to prevent Palestinian refugees in Syria from entering Jordan.
6 “Jordan’s Urban Refugees,” New York Times, March 17, 2014.
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Figure 2. Syria-Jordan Border

Source: Graphic created by CRS. Borders and other elements generated by Hannah Fischer using Department
of State border and Syrian refugee data (2013), Esri (2013), and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
(2014).
Cross-Border Terrorism. Jordanian border guards have exchanged fire with both Syrian
government forces and Syrian opposition groups. Reports indicate that Jordanians with Salafi-
Jihadi beliefs are crossing into Syria to join extremist rebel factions, and Jordan is concerned that
the southern Syrian province of Dar'a could be gradually taken over by Al Qaeda-linked terrorist
groups. Salafi groups in Jordan claim to have recruited 1,800 Jordanians to fight in Syria.7
Fearing that citizens radicalized in Syria could return to conduct attacks at home, authorities have
sought to prevent Jordanian fighters from re-entering the country; those captured at the border are
frequently imprisoned after a military trial.8 In an unusual strike, Jordanian aircraft in April
destroyed three vehicles attempting to cross from Syria into Jordan, alleging that they contained
Syria-based militants seeking refuge. Amman maintains diplomatic and economic ties to
Damascus despite its assistance to rebel groups. Jordan has sought to prevent rebels from

7 “Jordan: Salafi trend active in Palestinian Refugee Camps to Recruit Youth for Fight in Syria,” AmmanNet, April 7,
2014.
8 “Jordanian Jihadis returning from Syria War rattle U.S.-Aligned Kingdom,” Reuters, April 17, 2014.
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attacking the Nasib border crossing, still run by the Syrian government, so as to not disrupt
bilateral trade.9
U.S.-Jordanian Military Cooperation Relating to the Syrian Civil War. The United States has
sought to ensure that fighting in Syria does not destabilize Jordan. In late 2012 the Defense
Department sent a task force of “planners and other specialists” to Jordan, and in April 2013
deployed an Army headquarters element (est. 200 personnel) to help Jordanian forces defend their
border with Syria. The Defense Department noted that the U.S. troops would train and equip
Jordanian forces to “detect and stop chemical weapons transfers along Jordan's border with Syria,
and develop Jordan's capacity to identify and secure chemical weapons assets.” U.S. forces also
have been tasked with assisting border authorities with coordinating assistance to refugees. In
June 2013, after a two-week multilateral military training exercise in Jordan in which U.S. forces
participated, President Obama notified Congress that he was leaving some of the forces that had
participated in the exercise in Jordan “until the security situation becomes such that it is no longer
needed.”10 The U.S. contingent includes a Patriot missile battery and its associated support
systems, F-16 fighter aircraft, and various command and control personnel. Public statements by
U.S. officials and numerous open source reports suggest that the United States may be, under
covert authorities, running a training program for moderate elements of the Syrian armed
opposition, possibly inside Jordan,11 in order to bolster non-al Qaeda-affiliated opposition forces
operating along Jordan's northern borders. According to reports, Western and Arab intelligence
officials operating out of a command center in Amman channel sniper rifles, mortars, heavy
machine guns, and vehicles to Supreme Military Council (SMC)-affiliated fighters in Syria.12 The
government of Jordan denies any involvement either in the supplying of armaments or the
training of rebel forces. CRS cannot confirm these reports.
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66)
In order to bolster Jordan’s border security, Congress included Section 1207 in H.R. 3304, the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014. This section authorizes the Secretary of Defense
to provide assistance, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, on a reimbursement basis to
the Government of Jordan for purposes of supporting and maintaining efforts of the armed forces
of Jordan to increase security and sustain increased security along the border between Jordan and
Syria. The funds are to be drawn from the Coalition Support Fund account. According to the Act,
the total amount of assistance provided under this authority may not exceed $150 million and
may be provided in quarterly installments through December 31, 2015.

9 “Jordanian Jets Strike Vehicles trying to enter from Syria,” New York Times, April 16, 2014.
10 “Letter from the President -- Regarding the War Powers Resolution,” White House Office of the Press Secretary,
June 21, 2013.
11 According to one recent report, "Neighboring Jordan has quietly played a key role in helping coordinate divided FSA
[Free Syrian Army] forces in the south of Syria, channeling Western aid, guns and ammunition. Wounded fighters are
treated in Jordanian medical facilities. FSA commanders travel here to meet with US, European, and Arab military and
intelligence officials. As part of its covert aid to the Syrian opposition, the CIA is leading the training of Syrian fighters
in the south of the kingdom, US officials say privately." See, "As Foreign Funds run Dry, Syrian fighters Defect to
Anti-Western Militias," Christian Science Monitor, December 16, 2013.
12 See for example, "Secret HQ in Amman helps and directs Syrian Rebels in South,” The National (UAE), December
28, 2013; and “Warily, Jordan assists rebels in Syrian war,” New York Times, April 10, 2014.
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Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process
Overview
Helping secure a lasting end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the highest priorities of
the Jordanian government. Although Jordan joined other neighboring Arab states in a series of
military conflicts against Israel between 1948 and 1973, the late King Hussein (ruled 1952-1999)
ultimately concluded that peace with Israel was in Jordan’s strategic interests due to Israel’s
conventional military superiority, the development of an independent Palestinian national
movement that threatened both Jordanian and Israeli security, and the need for Jordan to regain
Western support after it backed Saddam Hussein’s Iraq politically in the first Gulf War.13
Consequently, in 1994 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty,14 and King Abdullah II has used
his country’s semi-cordial official relationship with Israel to improve Jordan’s standing with
Western governments and international financial institutions, on which it relies heavily for
external support and aid.
Nevertheless, the persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major obstacle to
Jordan’s development. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, as
more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now
comprising the state of Israel. There are an estimated 2 million United Nations-registered
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and, while many no longer regard their stay in Jordan as
temporary, they have retained their refugee status both as a symbolic sign of support for
Palestinians living under Israeli occupation and in hope of being included in any future
settlement.15
Furthermore, for King Abdullah II and the royal Hashemite family, who are of Arab Bedouin
descent and whose legitimacy historically derives from the support of tribal families from the east
bank of the Jordan River, finding a solution to the conflict is considered a matter of political
survival. Although the Palestinians may be less rooted in Jordan than its East Bank citizens,
because they constitute a majority and express some grievances about their status within Jordan
relative to East Bankers, addressing their grievances regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of
critical importance to the monarchy. The royal family and their tribal constituents vehemently
reject periodic Israeli calls for the reunification of the West Bank with Jordan proper (dubbed the
“Jordanian Option”), a maneuver that could inevitably alter the demographic and political status

13 In 1991, Congress suspended the delivery of U.S. economic and military aid to Jordan as a result of its support for
Iraq. See Section 502 of P.L. 102-27, the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Consequences of Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, Veterans Compensation and
Pensions, and Urgent Needs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991 and For Other Purposes.
14 Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors;
Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the parliament repealed laws
banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to
normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when
the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water
from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year—a little
over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).
15 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) maintains a large
presence in Jordan, including part of its headquarters (the other part is in Gaza City). UNRWA has 7,000 staff in
Jordan, comprising mostly teachers, doctors, and engineers. It operates 172 schools in Jordan (providing education
through 10th grade, then the remainder provided by government). According to UNRWA officials, their budget is $104
million a year. At this point, 83% of all U.N.-registered refugees live outside of UNRWA camps.
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quo in Jordan. King Abdullah II has repeated the mantra that his father introduced after
relinquishing Jordan’s claims to the West Bank: “Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine.”
Israeli-Jordanian Tensions
Although Jordan formally remains at peace with Israel and bilateral cooperation on water and
energy has actually expanded in recent months, tensions remain, and several incidents in recent
months sparked outcries among Jordanians against continued diplomatic relations with Israel. In
February 2014, Israel’s Knesset (parliament) held a debate over a motion to assert Israeli
sovereignty over the Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem. Jordan’s monarch has claimed
to be the guardian of various Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem and Islamic trust
properties (awqaf), a role that that was recognized by Israel in the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace
treaty and reaffirmed by the Palestinians in 2013.16 Although the Knesset motion did not pass,
some Jordanian lawmakers voted to expel Israel’s Ambassador to Jordan and recall Jordan’s
Ambassador to Israel. Jordan’s parliamentarians have reacted that way before, most recently in
2013 when some Israeli settlers entered Al Haram Al Sharif, (Arabic for “The Noble Sanctuary,”
where the Al Aqsa mosque, the third holiest site in Islam is located) and obstructed worshipers.
In March 2013, Israeli soldiers shot and killed a Jordanian judge at the Allenby Bridge crossing
from Jordan into the West Bank, later claiming that the judge had attacked Israeli border guards
with a metal pole and attempted to seize a firearm. The killing of the judge sparked protests
outside the Israeli Embassy in Amman. The two countries are conducting a joint investigation of
the incident, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed “deep regret” over the
killing.
Israeli-Jordanian Cooperation
The Dead Sea:17 Recently, Jordan and Israel have pursued several potential resource and energy
cooperative agreements. On December 9, 2013, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority
signed a regional water agreement that could pave the way for the Red-Dead Canal, which is a
multi-billion dollar project to address declining water levels in the Dead Sea. The Red-Dead
Canal is a decades-old plan to provide freshwater to water-scarce countries in the surrounding
area while simultaneously restoring the Dead Sea. The “Red-Dead” concept is to pump water
from the Red Sea, desalinate some of it, and then transfer remaining saltwater north and below
sea level to the Dead Sea. The proposal has been extensively studied; however, its estimated high
cost ($10 billion to $12 billion) has hindered implementation. Moreover, since Israel, Jordan, and
the Palestinian Authority all govern territory or have claims to territory adjacent to the Dead Sea,
continued political uncertainty caused by the lack of an Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement
also has hindered construction. Palestinians reject moving the canal project forward without a
conflict-ending agreement with Israel in place delineating their territorial and riparian rights

16 Article 9, Clause 2 of the treaty says that “Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give
high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” In 2013, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
reaffirmed in a bilateral agreement with Jordan that the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will continue to
serve as the “Custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem,” a title that successive Jordanian monarchs have used since
1924.
17 See, Testimony of Jeremy M. Sharp, Hearing on Water as a Geopolitical Threat, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,
and Emerging Threats, January 16, 2014.
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regarding the Dead Sea and its shore. Nevertheless, Jordan has pursued the Red-Dead Canal
concept. Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world and is constantly
searching for new water resources. In August 2013, the Jordanian government announced its
intent to construct a scaled-down version of the canal entirely on Jordanian territory. Jordan
would then send desalinated water to its southern city of Aqaba and possibly sell excess water to
Israel, while sending remaining seawater to the Dead Sea to replenish it. Environmentalists, who
have long criticized plans to restore the Dead Sea using Red Sea water, assert that rather than risk
damaging the Dead Sea’s ecosystem, countries should stop diverting water from the Jordan River,
which feeds the Dead Sea.
Under a December 2013 agreement, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority have agreed to a
water swap. Half of the water pumped from the Red Sea will be desalinated in a plant to be
constructed in Aqaba, Jordan, over the next three years. Some of this water will then be used in
southern Jordan. The rest will be sold to Israel for use in the Negev Desert. In return, Israel will
sell freshwater from the Sea of Galilee to northern Jordan and sell the Palestinian Authority
discounted freshwater produced by existing Israeli desalination plants on the Mediterranean. The
other half of the water pumped from the Red Sea (or possibly the leftover brine from
desalination) will be channeled to the Dead Sea.
Natural Gas: In December 2013, the Wall Street Journal reported that Israel and Jordan were
negotiating the terms of the sale of Israeli natural gas to Jordan.18 The kingdom depends on oil
and gas imports and, since 2011, cut-offs in the supply of Egyptian natural gas due to unrest in the
Sinai have cost the Jordanian government several billion dollars by compelling it to import more
expensive alternatives. In Egypt under Mubarak, energy cooperation with Israel had been a source
of controversy and a symbol of corruption, and the government of Jordan could face domestic
criticism if the deal moves forward.
Jordan and Iraq
Jordan’s relationship with the Iraqi government, and in particular with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri
al Maliki, is complex and characterized by some sectarian competition coupled with limited
counter-terrorism cooperation. Jordan’s relations with Iraq during the Saddam Hussein era were
strong, and since 2003, Jordanians have repeatedly criticized what they call the political
marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni Arab population. Almost a decade ago, King Abdullah II warned
that if pro-Iran political groups came to dominate the Iraqi government, a “crescent” of Shiite
movements would stretch across a broad swath of the Middle East, stretching from Iran to
Lebanon.19 On the other hand, the two countries cooperate economically. They are negotiating the
construction of pipelines to carry oil and natural gas from Iraq to Jordan, a development that
would allow Jordan to keep 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil for domestic use out of a planned
total of 1 million bpd to be pumped to the port of Aqaba.20
Jordan’s role in the conflict in Iraq is multidimensional. For years, Jordanian intelligence has
permitted Iraqi anti-government groups to operate inside the kingdom, where tribal ties bind some

18 “Energy Firms Near Deal to Sell Israeli Gas into Jordan Deal Would Move Israel Closer To Becoming an Energy
Exporter,” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2013.
19 “Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran,” Washington Post, December 8, 2004.
20 “Iraq/Jordan politics: Jordan and Iraq on Track for Closer Ties, Economist Intelligence Unit, December 31, 2013.
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Sunni Jordanians and Iraqis.21 Yet, neither government wishes to see terrorist groups, such as The
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, sometimes called ISIS), grow in power. As a result,
Jordan has agreed to host U.S. Special Operations forces’ training for Iraqi soldiers inside the
kingdom. According to one report, the training includes less than 100 elite soldiers from the
United States, Iraq, and Jordan.22
Figure 3. Jordan and Its Neighbors

Source: CRS Graphics.
Country Background
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. The country’s small size
and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and friendly
Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both
internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors, but has also
given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s
unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq disrupted its relations with the United States

21 “Iraq’s Sunni tribal Leaders say Fight for Fallujah is Part of a Revolution,” Washington Post, March 12, 2014.
22 “U.S. Special Forces sent to Train Iraqi Special Forces in Jordan,” Reuters, March 7, 2014.
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and the Gulf states; however, relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an
increasing role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from the Iraqi regime of
Saddam Hussein.
Domestic Politics and the Economy
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World
War I, initially consisted of desert or semi-desert
Jordan in Brief
territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely

by people of Bedouin tribal background. The
Population:
6,482,081 (July 2013 est.)
establishment of the state of Israel brought large
Area:
89,213 sq. km. (34,445 sq. mi.,
numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which
slightly smaller than Indiana)
subsequently unilaterally annexed a small
Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River
Ethnic Groups:
Arabs 98%; Circassians 1%;
Armenians 1%
known as the West Bank.23 The original “East
Bank” Jordanians, though probably no longer a
Religion:
Sunni Muslim 92%; Christian 6%;
majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the
small Muslim sects 2%
country’s political and military establishments and
Literacy:
92.6% (male 95%, female 89.2%)
form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian
GDP:
Per Capita $6,000 (2012 est.),
monarchy. Jordanians of Palestinian origin
country comparison to the
comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the
world: 144
population and generally tend to gravitate toward
Foreign
the private sector due to their exclusion from
Exchange
$10.7 billion (est. 2012)
certain public sector and military positions.24
Reserves:
Youth
27%, country comparison to the
Unemployment world: 21
The Hashemite Royal Family
(ages 15-24):

Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy
External Debt:
$8.34 billion (December 2012
est.)
under the prestigious Hashemite family, which
claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad.
Sources: CIA World Factbook.
King Abdullah II (age 51) has ruled the country
since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein,
after a 47-year reign. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah II had
earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan’s Special Operations
Forces with the rank of Major General. The king’s son Prince Hussein (b. 1994) is the designated
crown prince.25

23 Though there was very little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained
control of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War,
and maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.
24 Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948)
in Jordanian society tends to be a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2004 (the next
census may take place in 2014), and it is unclear whether or not the government maintains such statistics. Over time,
intermarriage has made it more difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions
do persist.
25 In July 2009, King Abdullah II named his then 15-year-old son, Prince Hussein Bin Abdullah, as crown prince. The
position had been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half-brother, Prince Hamzah.
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The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of Ministers
(cabinet).26 On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are
dissolved by royal decree. This seems to be done in order to bolster the king’s reform credentials
and to distribute patronage among a wide range of elites. The king also appoints all judges and is
commander of the armed forces.
Constitution, Parliament, Political Parties, and Judiciary
The Jordanian constitution (promulgated in 1952 and last amended in 2011) empowers the king
with broad executive powers. According to Article 35, “The King appoints the Prime Minister and
may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismisses them or
accepts their resignation, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.” The constitution also
enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house elections for
two years.27 The king also can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that
allows provisional legislation to be issued by the cabinet when parliament is not sitting or has
been dissolved.28 The king also can issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary
scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Finally, Article
195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté) with
criminal penalties of one to three years in prison.
Political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic
Action Front (IAF) is the only well-organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial
interests and are composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe.

26 In March 2013, King Abdullah II consulted with members of the 17th parliament before choosing a prime minister.
Although the King retains the constitutional authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, he has pledged to
reach a consensus with lawmakers before choosing a premier. The Muslim Brotherhood, which boycotted the election
leading to the formation of the current parliament, seeks a parliamentary system of government in which the prime
minister would be chosen by the largest block in parliament.
27 The king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “In the event of an emergency of such a serious
nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense
of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law
in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.”
28 New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue
temporary laws.
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Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are
independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other
than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: Civil courts, special courts (some of
which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. In Jordan, state security courts
administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery
of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and “security
offenses.” Overall, the king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a
palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and
retirements.
January 2013 Parliamentary Elections
Parliamentary elections on January 23, 2013, produced another overwhelmingly pro-palace parliament. The Muslim
Brotherhood’s Islamic Action Front party (IAF) boycotted the vote in protest of the lack of seats allocated for the
party list vote system (27 out of 150 total seats). The IAF sought to delegitimize the election through its boycott
and tarnish the palace’s image in the eyes of Western governments. Turnout figures for the election are somewhat
disputed. The government claims that 56.6% of registered voters participated, while others assert that the turnout
calculation should be based on the total number of eligible voters (both registered and unregistered), which, if taken
into account, would have equated to an estimated 40% turnout. King Abdul ah II has already cal ed for parliament to
amend the election law, which is widely considered to favor rural, traditional y pro-monarchy Bedouin
constituencies. For example, Amman is al otted 25 seats for 2.4 mil ion residents, while rural Tafileh has four seats
for 88,000 residents. In its preliminary assessment of the election, the National Democratic Institute concluded that
“systemic distortions remain. The unequal size of districts and an electoral system that amplifies family, tribal and
national cleavages limit the development of a truly national legislative body and challenge King Abdul ah’s stated aim
of encouraging full parliamentary government.” Nevertheless, Secretary of State John Kerry praised the electoral
process, saying that “The turnout is higher than any time previously, which shows a full and robust participation by
the Jordanian people in the election process.”
The Economy
With few natural resources29 and a small industrial base, Jordan has an economy which is heavily
dependent on external aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker remittances,30 and the service
sector. Among the long-standing problems Jordan faces are poverty (15%-30%), corruption, slow
economic growth, and high levels of unemployment, nominally around 13% but thought by many
analysts to be in the 25%-30% range.31 Youth unemployment is nearly 30%. Corruption32 is
particularly pronounced in Jordan. Use of intermediaries, referred to in Arabic as “Wasta

29 Jordan possesses substantial reserves of phosphates and potash. No significant oil and gas fields have been
discovered. However, Jordan has one of world’s largest reserves of oil shale. Officials estimate that the country
contains the world’s fourth-largest oil shale reserves. In 2006, Royal Dutch/Shell signed an oil shale exploration
agreement with the Jordanian government. Estonia’s Enefit Eesti Energia AS also has signed agreements on oil shale
projects. In 2012, the Canadian company, Global Oil Shale Holdings (GOSH), reached an agreement with the
Jordanian government to produce oil shale as well. For further background, see, “Amman Unlocks Energy Potential,
Middle East Economic Digest
, August 7, 2009.
30 It is estimated that up to 20% of GDP comes from remittances. Nearly 10% of Jordan’s population (600,000 est.)
reside and work in Arab Gulf countries.
31 One factor that exacerbates the unemployment situation in Jordan is the social stigma attached to menial labor jobs.
Referred to as the “culture of shame,” Jordanian tribal traditions look down on certain types of employment such as
construction. In fact, the government estimates that there are approximately 300,000 to 400,000 foreign laborers in
Jordan working as domestic laborers, bricklayers, and other tasks. According to the Jordanian Employment Ministry,
Egyptians make up 68% of foreign workers in Jordan.
32 Jordan was ranked 49 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions
Index.
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(connections), is widespread, and many young Jordanians have grown frustrated by the lack of
social and economic mobility that corruption engenders.33 Each year, thousands of Jordanians go
abroad in search of better jobs and opportunities. Like many poor countries, Jordan suffers from a
“brain drain” of its most talented workers, and the government has struggled to develop
incentives to keep its well-educated, highly skilled workers close to home. The government is by
far the largest employer, with between one-third and two-thirds of all workers on the state’s
payroll.
Figure 4. Gallup: Poll on Jordanian Wellbeing

Source: Gallup, “Fewer Jordanians Than Ever Are ’Thriving,’" July 12, 2013.
The Government’s Chronic Fiscal Deficit
Due to sluggish domestic growth (In October 2013, the IMF forecasted GDP growth of 3.3% in
2013, rising to 3.5% in 2014), high energy/food subsidies and a bloated public sector workforce,
Jordan usually runs annual budget deficits (total public debt is $25 billion) which it partially
offsets by appealing to the international community for direct budget support. For 2014, the
government is projecting expenditures of $11.4 billion against domestic revenues of $5.86 billion.
The government anticipates that foreign grants will help off-set this shortfall, and according to the
Economist Intelligence Unit, Jordan’s total budget deficit in 2014 will be just over 4% of GDP.34
Credit agencies downgraded Jordan’s rating in 2013, projecting that the total debt-to-GDP ratio
will hit 84% in 2013 and reach close to 90% of GDP in 2014.35 Five years ago total debt to GDP
was 60%.

33 In 2006, the Jordanian parliament passed a law establishing an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) which has taken
on several high level investigations in recent years, specifically looking into accusations of graft in a public housing
project (Decent Home for Decent Living) and a water works project (Disi Water Conveyance).
34 “2014 budget is Criticised by local Economists,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 20, 2013.
35 “Moody's Downgrades Jordan Credit Rating two Notches to B1,” Reuters, June 26, 2013.
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In order to keep Jordan fiscally stable, the International Monetary Fund agreed to a three-year, $2
billion loan in August 2012. As part of the IMF deal, Jordan is expected to cut spending and may
increase consumer electricity prices. It already has increased taxes on mobile phones and
contracts. However, when the government cut subsidies which raised the prices of cooking gas,
diesel, kerosene, and gasoline in 2012, large scale protests broke out across the country, and the
king subsequently reversed some cuts though others have remained in place. In Jordan, protests
over economic issues could be the likeliest trigger of changes to government policy, as well as
perhaps to its political system.
According to one member of Jordan’s parliament, “Unlike political protests and parties that lack
unity or a voice that represents Jordanians, the labor strikes have focused on demands that
improve their livelihoods.... They come with a list of specific demands and they have largely
succeeded.”36 Jordanian lawmakers also at times challenge the King’s decision-making on
subsidies. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, “On most political issues the legislature
can generally be counted on to support the regime, but MPs regularly challenge the government
on economic policy, and in particular on any attempts at structural reform and economic
liberalization.”37
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and
1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2013 amounted to approximately $13.83 billion.
The Five-Year Aid Deal
On September 22, 2008, the U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement whereby the
United States will provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a
five-year period (FY2010-FY2014). Under the terms of their non-binding Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), this first-of-its-kind deal commits the United States, subject to future
congressional appropriation and availability of funds, to providing $360 million per year in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $300 million per year in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF).38 According to the Jordanian government, the agreement “reaffirms the strategic
partnership and cooperation between the two countries.” Coming at a time when the overall
budget for foreign aid was constrained by U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the deal was a
testament to strong U.S.-Jordanian relations. In 2014, the United States and Jordan may negotiate
the terms of a new five-year aid deal.
Economic Assistance
The United States provides economic aid to Jordan as both a cash transfer and for USAID
programs in Jordan. The Jordanian government uses cash transfers to service its foreign debt.
Approximately 53% of Jordan’s ESF allotment goes toward the cash transfer. USAID programs in

36 “In Jordan, Protests Focus on Prices and Economy,” New York Times, May 30, 2012.
37 “Parliament puts Pressure on Government over Fuel Prices,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 7th 2013.
38 Under the terms of the MOU, annual foreign aid (non-supplemental) to Jordan will rise by nearly 50%, from an
estimated $460 million per year to $660 million.
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Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance, water preservation, and
education (particularly building and renovating public schools). In the democracy sector, U.S.
assistance has supported capacity building programs for the parliament’s support offices, the
Jordanian Judicial Council, Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice. The International
Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also have received U.S. grants to train,
among other groups, some Jordanian political parties and members of parliament. In the water
sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce
water resources, as Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world. USAID is
currently subsidizing several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian
cities of Amman, Mafraq, Aqaba, and Irbid.
Food Aid
Jordan periodically receives U.S. food aid administered by the Department of Agriculture
(USDA) under Title I of the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480), under the Section 416(b) program
permanently authorized by the Agricultural Act of 1949, and under the Food for Progress Act of
1985 as a grant. Between FY1999 to FY2006, Jordan received approximately $238.52 million in
food aid to purchase wheat. Jordan received no food assistance between FY2007 to FY2010. In
FY2011, the United States provided Jordan with $19 million aid to purchase 50,000 metric tons
of wheat. In September 2012, the United States agreed to provide Jordan with 50,000 metric tons
of wheat valued at $17 million.
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)
In FY2006, Jordan was listed by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as a Threshold
country in the lower middle-income bracket. On September 12, 2006, the MCC’s board of
directors approved up to $25 million in Threshold Program assistance for Jordan. Even prior to
the selection, the possible choice of Jordan had come under severe criticism. Freedom House, the
organization whose annual Index of Freedom is drawn upon for two of the “Ruling Justly”
indicators, urged the MCC board to bypass countries that had low scores on political rights and
civil liberties. It argued that countries like Jordan that fall below 4 out of a possible 7 on its index
should be automatically disqualified. Jordan, however, did well on 3 of the 6 other indicators in
this category. Several development analysts further argued that Jordan should not be eligible,
asserting that it is already one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid, has access to private sector
capital, and is not a democracy. In selecting Jordan, the MCC board appears not to have been
swayed by these arguments.
In September 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a five-year, $275.1 million
compact with Jordan to increase the supply of water available to households and businesses in the
cities of Amman and Zarqa. The compact also will help improve the efficiency of water delivery,
wastewater collection, and wastewater treatment. If estimates hold true, the clean drinking water
generated as a result of the MCC compact may be enough to supply almost 1 million Jordanian
citizens with freshwater.
Military Assistance
U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. In 1996, the United
States granted Jordan Major non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status, a designation that, among other
things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, and loans of
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equipment for cooperative research and development. Since 2009, Jordan has received excess
U.S. defense equipment valued at approximately $81.69 million.39
U.S. military assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure
and maintain conventional weapons systems. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Jordan
enable its Air Force to maintain a modest fleet of F-16 fighters and purchase Advanced Medium
Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). FMF grants also provide financing for Jordan’s purchase
of U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in order to enhance Jordan’s border monitoring and counter-terror
capability. Jordan is currently the single largest provider of civilian police personnel and fifth-
largest provider of military personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide. In addition to
large-scale military aid grants for conventional weapons purchases, Jordan also receives grants of
U.S. antiterrorism assistance from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related
Programs account (NADR) and from International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLCE) account.
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan, FY2011-FY2015 Request
$s in millions
FY2013 (after
FY2014
FY2015
Account
FY2011
FY2012
sequestration)
Estimate
Request
ESF 362.0
460.0 564.404
700.0
360.0
FMF 299.4
300.0 284.829
300.0
300.0
IMET 3.7
3.7 3.608
3.8 3.8
Total
665.1
763.7
852.841
1,003.8
663.8
Notes: In FY2012, Jordan received a $100 million allotment of budget aid (notified to Congress on July 6) from
ESF designated as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). In FY2013, USAID notified Congress of a $200
million cash transfer to Jordan ($100 million in FY 2012 Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $100 mil ion in FY
2013 ESF-OCO).
Recent U.S. Assistance to Jordan
Syrian Refugees inside Jordan: U.S. officials have noted that of the $1.7 billion
in total U.S. multilateral funding for the Syrian humanitarian crisis, the United
States has provided more than $268 million toward the humanitarian needs of
Syrian refugees in Jordan.40
Loan Guarantee: In February 2014, during a visit to the United States by King
Abdullah II, the Obama Administration announced that it would offer Jordan an
additional five-year, $1 billion loan guarantee. The Administration has notified
Congress that $72 million out of the $340 million of OCO-ESF for Jordan in the
FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act will be used to support the subsidy
costs for the new loan guarantee.
Appropriations: On January 17, 2014, the President signed into law P.L. 113-76,
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 which Congress passed days earlier.

39 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Country Information Paper, Jordan.
40Statement of William J. Burns Deputy Secretary U.S. Department of State, Committee on Senate Foreign Relations,
March 6, 2014.
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The law provides Jordan $360 million in economic aid and $300 million in
military aid. It also stipulates that “from amounts made available under title VIII
designated for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism, not
less than $340 million above the levels included in the Memorandum of
Understanding
between the United States and Jordan shall be made available for
the extraordinary costs related to instability in the region, including for security
requirements along the border with Iraq.” The law also continues to authorize
foreign aid to be used for loan guarantees to Jordan and the establishment of an
enterprise fund. Congress also appropriated additional Migration and Refugee
Assistance funding (MRA) to help countries like Jordan cope with the Syrian
refugee crisis.
Excess Defense Articles: According to the Defense Department, in December
2013 the United States delivered 35 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles
(MRAPS) to Jordan as requested by the Jordanian military earlier in 2013.
Loan Guarantee: In September 2013, the United States announced that it was
providing its first-ever loan guarantee41 to the Kingdom of Jordan. USAID
notified Congress of its intent to obligate up to $120 million in FY2013 ESF-
OCO to support a $1.25 billion, 7-year sovereign loan guarantee for Jordan.
According to the State Department, “this guarantee reinforces the firm U.S.
commitment to the people of Jordan by strengthening the Government of
Jordan’s ability to maintain access to international financing, while enabling it to
achieve its economic development and reform goals.
Cash Transfer: During his visit to Jordan in March 2013, President Obama
pledged to work with Congress to deliver an additional $200 million in direct
budget support to Jordan to help it cope with the influx of Syrian refugees. In
April 2013, USAID notified Congress of a $200 million cash transfer in keeping
with Obama’s pledge ($100 million in FY 2012 Economic Support Funds (ESF)
and $100 million in FY 2013 ESF-OCO).
U.S.-Jordanian Trade
Jordan ranked 73th among U.S. trading partners in volume of trade with the United States in 2012.
According to the United States Trade Commission, in 2012 Jordan exported over a billion dollars
in goods and services to the United States, a large percentage of which consisted of apparel and
clothing accessories. In 2012, Jordanian imports from the United States reached $1.6 billion.
Principal U.S. commodities imported by Jordan consisted of aircraft parts, machinery and
appliances, vehicles, and cereals. Two measures, in particular—the Free Trade Agreement and
Qualifying Industrial Zones—have helped expand U.S.-Jordanian trade ties and could create
more opportunities for U.S. investment in Jordan.

41 Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013
specified that such assistance should take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706 (j) of the same Act also
appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. The Department of State and
USAID intend to transfer and merge $120 million appropriated in FY 2013 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) OCO
funding, into ESF OCO for additional subsidy costs related to the bond issuance.
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Free Trade Agreement
On October 24, 2000, then-President Clinton and King Abdullah II witnessed the signing of a
U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement, which eliminated duties and commercial barriers to
bilateral trade in goods and services originating in the two countries. Earlier, in a report released
on September 26, 2000, the U.S. International Trade Commission concluded that a U.S.-Jordan
Free Trade Agreement would have no measurable impact on total U.S. imports or exports, U.S.
production, or U.S. employment. Under the agreement, the two countries agreed to enforce
existing laws concerning worker rights and environmental protection. On January 6, 2001, then-
President Clinton transmitted to the 107th Congress a proposal to implement the Free Trade
Agreement. On July 23, then-U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick and then-Jordanian Ambassador
Marwan Muasher exchanged letters pledging that the two sides would “make every effort” to
resolve disputes without recourse to sanctions and other formal procedures. These letters were
designed to allay concerns on the part of some Members over the possible use of sanctions to
enforce labor and environmental provisions of the treaty. President Bush signed H.R. 2603, which
implemented the FTA as P.L. 107-43 on September 28, 2001, during King Abdullah’s visit to
Washington, DC, following the September 11, 2001, attacks. For additional information, see CRS
Report RL30652, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, by Mary Jane Bolle.
Qualifying Industrial Zones
One outgrowth of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was the establishment of “Qualifying
Industrial Zones” (QIZs), under which goods produced with specified levels of Jordanian and
Israeli input can enter the United States duty free, under the provisions of P.L. 104-234. This act
amended previous legislation so as to grant the President authority to extend the U.S.-Israel free
trade area to cover products from QIZs between Israel and Jordan or between Israel and Egypt.
QIZs were designed both to help the Jordanian economy and to serve as a vehicle for expanding
commercial ties between Jordan and Israel. Although QIZs have succeeded in boosting U.S.-
Jordanian trade, there has been only a modest increase in Jordanian-Israeli trade.
Currently there are 13 QIZs in Jordan employing approximately 43,000 people (working eight-
hour days, six days a week), 74% of whom are foreign workers from South and Southeast Asian
nations including Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Employers apparently view foreign
laborers as more skilled and productive than native Jordanians. In addition, it is difficult for
employers to recruit native Jordanians since workers typically live on site, and many are hesitant
to separate from their families, though in some areas native Jordanians are provided with free
transportation to the QIZs. According to one Jordanian labor leader, foreign workers are attractive
to employers because “they are like slaves. They work them day and night.”42 Labor rights
activists also have complained that Jordanian workers in the QIZs are excluded from a new
minimum wage law.
Military Cooperation
The United States is helping Jordan modernize its armed forces. The Jordanian military, though
well trained and disciplined, has less personnel and weaponry than the militaries in each of
Jordan’s neighboring countries. In recent years, Jordan has used U.S. military assistance grants to

42 “Industrial Zones Create Little Work for Jordanians,” Financial Times, February 9, 2009.
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purchase Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles, upgrades for its fleet of F-16 fighters
(approximately 70-80), and Black Hawk helicopters. The United States also delivered three
Patriot anti-missile batteries to Jordan in early 2003 prior to the start of U.S. military operations
in Iraq.
Table 2. Possible Foreign Military Sales to Jordan Notified to Congress
Fiscal Year
Weapon System
$ Value of Sale
Prime Contractor
FY2006
National Command & Control System
$450 million Northrop
Grumman
Corporation
FY2006
Black Hawk Helicopters
$60 million
Sikorsky Co. and General Electric
FY2006
Armored Personnel Carriers
$156 million BAE
Company
FY2008
Border Security System
$390 million
DRS Technologies Corp
FY2009
AMRAAM Missiles
$131 million Raytheon
FY2009 Artillery Rocket Systems
$220 million
Multiple Companies
FY2010
Repair of F-16 Engines
$75 million
Pratt & Whitney
FY2010
JAVELIN Anti-Tank Guided Missiles
$388 million
Javelin Joint Venture
Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
Joint Exercises and Training
A U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission has functioned since 1974. Nearly 300 Jordanian
military personnel study in the United States each year. In recent years, Jordan has been among
the top three recipients of U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding. In
FY2013, approximately 257 Jordanian officers participated in this program.43 IMET also funds
the equipping of English language labs in Jordan. Combined training exercises by U.S. and
Jordanian military units continue to take place in Jordan (dubbed “Early Victor”), at least on an
annual basis and sometimes more often. In June 2013, U.S. troops participated in a multinational
training exercise in Jordan known as “Eager Lion.” In addition, the United States has supported
the construction of the King Abdullah II Center for Special Operations Training (KASOTC). The
center has been partially financed by the United States, including with $99 million in
appropriations from the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 109-13). It serves as a
regional headquarters for counter-terrorism training.44 In 2003, Jordan built a Special Operations
Command and the Anti-Terrorism Center in order to boost counter-terrorism capabilities within
the military.

43 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Country Information Paper, Jordan.
44 According to one description of the new U.S.-Jordanian facility, “If special forces have to conduct house-to-house
searches, KASOTC provides that infrastructure in a training environment.... If they have to rescue hostages on an
airplane, KASOTC provides the plane. If they have to rescue hostages from an embassy, KASOTC provides an
embassy structure.” See, Joan Kibler, “KASOTC,” Special Operations Technology Online Edition, volume 6, issue 2,
March 19, 2008.
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Table 3. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis
($ in millions)
Economic Assistance
Military Assistance
Fiscal Year (FY)
EconSpt Food Devel PeaceCp
FMF
IMET Totals
1991 35.0a 0 0
0
20.0a 1.3 56.30
1992 30.0b 20.0
0
0
20.0b .6 70.60
1993c 5.0
30.0
0
0 9.0
.5
44.50
1994d 9.0
15.0
4.0
0 9.0
.8
37.80
1995 7.2
15.0
6.7
0 7.3
1.0
37.20
1996 7.2
21.0
7.9
0 200.0e 1.2 237.30
1997f 112.2
2.6
4.5
1.1
30.0
1.7
152.10
1998f 150.0
0
0
1.2 75.0g 1.6 227.80
1999 150.0
0
0
1.4 70.0g 1.6 223.00
1999 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
100.00
2000 150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.6
228.30
2000 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
150.0
0
200.00h
2001 150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.7
228.40
2002 150.0
0
0
1.6
75.0
2.0
228.60
2002 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
25.0
0
125.00
2003 250.0
0
0
1.0 198.0
2.4
451.40
2003 (Suppl.)
700.0
0
0
0
406.0
0
1,106.00
2004 250.0
0
0
2.3 206.0
2.9
461.20
2004 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
0
0
100.00
2005 250.0
0
0
1.6 206.0
3.0
460.60
2005 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
100.0
0
200.00
2006 247.5
0
0
1.6 207.9
3.0
460.00
2006 (Suppl.)
50.0
0
0
0
0
0
50.00
2007 245.0
0
0
0 206.0
3.1
454.10
2007 (Suppl.)
10.3
0
0
0
45.0
0
55.30i
2008 361.4
0
0
0 298.3
2.9
662.60
2008 (Suppl.)
200.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
250.00
2009
263.5
0
0
0
235.0
3.1
501.60
(150.0 in FY2010
2009 (Suppl.)
150.0
0
0
0
Advanced funding)
0
150.00
2010 363.0
0
0
0 300.0
3.8
666.8
2010 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
150.0
2011 362.0
0
0
0 299.4
3.7
665.1
2012
460.0
0
0
0
300.0
3.7
763.7
2013
564.404
0
0
0
284.829
3.608
852.841
2014 700.0
0
0
0 300.0
3.8
1,003.8
Notes: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations, food aid between 1999-2006, or
amounts for de-mining assistance and counter-terrorism assistance.
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

a. Suspended in April 1991 under P.L. 102-27; released in early 1993.
b. Released in late July 1993.
c. Restrictions on FY1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, Sept. 17, 1993.
d. FY1994 funds released by PD 94-11, Jan. 13, 1994, waiving restrictions under P.L. 103-87.
e. Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF under
FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 million in special
drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).
f.
These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace and
Stability Fund ($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).
g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.
h. Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001 or FY2002).
i.
Total FY2007 supplemental aid to Jordan was $85.3 million. The above chart does not include $25 million in
NADR funds.


Author Contact Information

Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687

Congressional Research Service
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