NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and
Security Concerns in Central and Eastern
Europe
Paul Belkin, Coordinator
Analyst in European Affairs
Derek E. Mix
Analyst in European Affairs
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
April 16, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43478
NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine
Summary
Russia’s recent military incursions into Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea have caused
observers and policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic, including Members of Congress, to
reassess the security situation in Europe and the role of the United States and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in upholding European security. The security concerns of NATO’s
Central and Eastern European member states and non-NATO member states such as Moldova and
Ukraine are of particular concern.
NATO’s member states have strongly condemned Russian actions in Ukraine and have taken
steps aimed both at reassuring allies and partners in Central and Eastern Europe and at deterring
further Russian aggression. These include demonstrations of support for Ukraine and its territorial
integrity; actions to demonstrate the alliance’s commitment to the defense of its Central and
Eastern European member states; and measures aimed at rebuking Russia. NATO member states
have said they will continue to conduct previously planned military exercises in Ukraine and
elsewhere in the region.
The United States has been a key driver behind the NATO response and has taken additional
military measures intended to reassure its allies and partners in Central and Eastern Europe.
These include the deployment of U.S. fighter jets to Poland and the Baltic states, U.S. naval
vessels to the Black Sea, and Marines to Romania. The United States has supplied the Ukrainian
government with some nonlethal military assistance, but has thus far ruled out providing lethal
military aid.
Although these actions have been welcomed by supporters of the United States and NATO, some
analysts and allied governments have called for a more concerted military response. Among other
things, critics have called for more robust forward or permanent deployment of U.S. and NATO
forces in Central and Eastern Europe; additional military exercises in the region; and additional
military assistance to the Ukrainian government, including military training and anti-tank and
anti-aircraft weapons and other arms.
The U.S. Congress has played an active role in guiding the U.S. response to the crisis in Ukraine,
including by authorizing $150 million in financial assistance and a $1 billion loan guarantee to
the Ukrainian government and supporting sanctions against Russia (P.L. 113-95). However, some
Members of Congress have called on the Obama Administration and NATO to take additional
military action to reassure allies in Central and Eastern Europe and deter Russia. In addition,
some Members have called for a more resolute demonstration of NATO’s commitment to
enlargement, including to Georgia, a former republic of the Soviet Union, with which Russia had
a brief military conflict in 2008. For example, the proposed Forging Peace through Strength in
Ukraine and the Transatlantic Alliance Act (H.R. 4433), introduced on April 9, 2014, calls for
additional NATO and U.S. military assistance to Ukraine and calls for immediate NATO
membership for Montenegro and the granting of a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to
Georgia.
This report addresses the NATO and U.S. military response to the crisis in Ukraine. It does not
discuss political, economic, or energy policy responses. For information on these and other
aspects of the crisis response, see CRS Report RL33460, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S.
Policy, by Steven Woehrel.
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NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine
Contents
Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 1
NATO and U.S. Military Response to Russia’s Annexation of Crimea ........................................... 2
Security Situation and Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe ..................................................... 4
Poland and the Visegrád Four ................................................................................................... 4
The Baltic States ........................................................................................................................ 7
Moldova ..................................................................................................................................... 9
Ukraine .................................................................................................................................... 10
NATO-Russia Relations ................................................................................................................. 11
Prospects for NATO Enlargement ................................................................................................. 13
U.S. Policy ..................................................................................................................................... 14
Figures
Figure 1. Selected Countries in Central and Eastern Europe ........................................................... 5
Tables
Table 1. Visegrád Group Defense Information ................................................................................ 7
Table 2. Baltic States Defense Information ..................................................................................... 9
Table 3. Moldova Defense Information ......................................................................................... 10
Table 4. Ukraine Defense Information ........................................................................................... 11
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 17
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 17
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NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine
Overview
The U.S. Congress has expressed deep concern over Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the
ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Among other things, the crisis in Ukraine has heightened concerns in
the United States and in Europe about the future direction and scope of the transatlantic security
relationship and the cornerstone of that relationship, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Some policy makers and commentators have called for a reassessment of the
transatlantic community’s progress in realizing its goal of a Europe “whole, free, and at peace,”
citing security concerns in some of NATO’s Central and Eastern European member states and
ongoing territorial disputes in countries on the alliance’s borders, such as Moldova, Ukraine, and
Georgia. Questions about NATO’s commitment and capacity to defend its member states and
about the nature of the alliance’s relationship with Russia have moved to the forefront of
discussions about NATO’s future. These questions are expected to feature prominently at NATO’s
next summit of heads of state and government, scheduled to take place in Wales on September 4-
5, 2014.
The crisis in Ukraine has also exposed longer-standing tensions within NATO regarding its
strategic focus. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has evolved from an exclusive focus on
territorial defense and deterrence in Europe to overseeing a range of military and crisis
management operations across the globe. This transformation was predicated largely on the
perception that Russia no longer posed a security threat to NATO, and on a conviction that the
primary security challenges facing the allies emanated from beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.
However, some NATO members, including many former members of the communist bloc, have
consistently expressed concern that the alliance’s transformation could come at the expense of its
capacity to uphold its commitment to collective defense, enshrined in Article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty. After more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and against the backdrop of a
militarily resurgent Russia, some allies are calling for a renewed NATO focus on collective
defense.
Debates about NATO’s mission come against the backdrop of continued economic stagnation in
Europe and long-standing U.S. concerns about a downward trend in European defense spending,
shortfalls in European defense capabilities, and burden sharing within the alliance. In 2013, total
defense spending by NATO European allies as a percentage of GDP was about 1.6%; and just
three NATO allies (Greece, the UK, and the United States) exceeded the alliance’s goal of
spending 2% of GDP on defense. Since 2001, the U.S. share of total allied defense spending has
grown from 63% to 72%.1 Analysts in the United States have long asserted that defense spending
in many European countries is inefficient, with disproportionately high personnel costs coming at
the expense of much-needed research, development, and procurement. In 2013, only four allies
met a NATO guideline to devote 20% of defense expenditures to the purchase of major
equipment, considered a key indicator of the pace of military modernization.2 These trends
correlate with significant shortfalls in key military capabilities, including strategic air- and sealift;
aerial refueling; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).
1 NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, February 24, 2014.
2 The four allies are the United States, France, Turkey, and the UK. See NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating
to NATO Defence, February 24, 2014.
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NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and others have argued that the economic
constraints facing allied governments could spur much-needed defense cooperation among
European allies. At NATO’s May 2012 summit, the allies committed to a “Smart Defense”
initiative that calls for cooperation, prioritization, and specialization in pursuit of needed defense
capabilities.3 Some critics maintain that this is just the latest in a long line of post-Cold War
efforts to enhance capabilities that have had mixed success, at best. They argue that the limited
outcomes may reflect a general lack of public support for military engagement and divergent
threat perceptions both across the Atlantic and within Europe. As noted above, within Europe,
some allies have emphasized the need for territorial defense capabilities, while others have
stressed the importance of more flexible, rapidly deployable units and civilian-military crisis
management operations. An increasingly strained budget environment and heightened concerns
about the security threat from Russia appear to be amplifying these differences.
U.S. officials have consistently underscored their firm commitment to the transatlantic security
relationship and the collective defense of the alliance. However, far-reaching defense budget cuts
in the United States, the Obama Administration’s “rebalance” to Asia, and the withdrawal over
the past two years of two of the U.S. Army’s four Brigade Combat Teams based in Europe have
raised questions about future U.S. commitments to European security. Russia’s actions in Ukraine
have heightened these concerns.
NATO and U.S. Military Response to Russia’s
Annexation of Crimea
Reflecting the views of the United States and its European allies, NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen has characterized Russia’s recent military aggression as “the most serious crisis in
Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall,” and declared that NATO can “no longer do business as
usual with Russia.”4 NATO’s response to the situation thus far has included demonstrations of
support for Ukraine and its territorial integrity; actions to demonstrate the alliance’s commitment
to the defense of its Central and Eastern European member states; and measures aimed at
rebuking Russia. Specifically:
• The allies have agreed to strengthen political and military cooperation with the
government in Kyiv. This includes providing military trainers to assist in
Ukraine’s military modernization efforts and efforts to help improve the
interoperability of Ukrainian and allied armed forces through exercises and joint
operations.5 On April 1, the Ukraine’s Foreign Minister said Ukraine has not
requested and does not expect material military assistance from NATO, beyond
training.6 However, this may not preclude bilateral assistance from individual
3 NATO officials have announced 24 new multinational defense projects in which assets are pooled or shared,
including acquisition, training, force protection, and ISR initiatives. For more information, see NATO’s Smart Defense
webpage: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/78125.htm.
4 NATO, “A Strong NATO in a Changed World,” Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the
Brussels Forum,” March 21, 2014.
5 Small Ukrainian deployments contribute to NATO operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and off the Horn of Africa.
6 NATO, Press Conference by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, April 1, 2014.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/events_108401.htm?selectedLocale=en.
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NATO members, such as a reported request in March for U.S. military aid (see
“Ukraine,” below).
• NATO member states have deployed additional fighter jets to the alliance’s Baltic
Air Policing mission and NATO has begun to carry out aerial surveillance flights
over Poland and Romania. The United States is currently leading the Baltic Air
Policing mission, with Poland due to take command on May 1, 2014. The
mission has been led by NATO allies on a rotational basis since 2004, with
detachments of four fighter aircraft for four-month rotations operating from an air
base in Lithuania. In March, the United States deployed an additional six F-15
Eagle aircraft to the Air Policing mission. The UK, Denmark, and France are
among the other allies that have committed to deploying additional aircraft to the
mission in the near future. Since mid-March 2014, NATO airborne warning and
control system (AWACS) surveillance aircraft have been conducting twice daily
flights to monitor events in Ukraine, one over Poland and one over Romania.
• In early April, NATO announced the suspension of all “practical” civilian and
military cooperation with Russia in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council.
Political dialogue between the two sides will continue. Cooperative activities in
the NATO-Russia Council that could be affected include a helicopter
maintenance fund and a counternarcotics initiative in Afghanistan, and some joint
counter-terrorism initiatives.
On April 16, 2014, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen announced that the allies would take
further military measures “to reinforce our collective defense and demonstrate the strength of
allied solidarity.” He indicated that these measures could include expansion of the Baltic Air
Policing Mission, with a possible increase from 4 to 12 fighter jets; deployment of naval vessels
to the Baltic Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and elsewhere; deployment of ground forces to
Eastern Europe; development of updated military defense plans for Central and Eastern European
allies; and additional NATO military training and exercises in the region.7 Most allies in Central
and Eastern Europe have requested NATO take such measures to demonstrate more clearly the
alliance’s willingness and capacity to defend its member states (see “Security Situation and
Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe”). However, other allies have cautioned against a
“militarization” of NATO relations with Russia. Officials in Germany, for example, have said that
permanent troop deployments in member states formerly aligned with the Soviet Union could
represent an unnecessary and counter-productive provocation of Russia.8
NATO member states say they are moving forward with previously planned military exercises in
Ukraine and other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. In Ukraine, such exercises are not
conducted under the aegis of NATO, but rather as multinational exercises that may include NATO
allies. Military exercises scheduled to take place in Ukraine in 2014 reportedly include one U.S.-
led ground forces exercise, one U.S.-led naval exercise, a Polish-Ukrainian air force exercise and
a Polish-Ukrainian military police exercise, and three additional multinational ground exercises.9
The U.S. Army-led Rapid Trident 2014 is scheduled to take place in western Ukraine in July and
7 NATO, Doorstop Statement by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen Following the Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council, April 16, 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_109231.htm.
8 See, for example, “Ukraine Crisis Exposes Gaps between Berlin and NATO,” Spiegelonline, April 7, 2014.
9 Vladimir Socor, “Ukraine Seeks Closer Ties with NATO and its Member Countries,” Eurasia Daily Monitor,
Jamestown Foundation, April 7, 2014.
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will reportedly feature a combined U.S.-Ukrainian battalion headquarters practicing a
peacekeeping operation.10 Last year’s Rapid Trident exercise in Ukraine included 1,300 troops
from 17 nations. The U.S.-led annual naval exercise Sea Breeze has reportedly been the largest
annual maritime exercise in the Black Sea. The 2013 exercise, held in Odessa, involved naval, air,
and land forces from 14 countries, including NATO allies and partners.11
As well as being a key proponent of the NATO response thus far, the Obama Administration has
taken some additional military steps intended to reassure Central and Eastern European allies.
These include the aforementioned contribution to the Baltic Air Policing mission and the
deployment in March of an aviation detachment of 12 F-16s and 300 personnel to Lask Air Base
in Poland. In early April, the Defense Department also announced that it would deploy an
additional 175 marines to Romania to supplement the Black Sea rotational force, which will now
consist of about 400 marines.12 In addition, the Defense Department has deployed two naval
vessels, the USS Truxton and the USS Donald Cook, to the Black Sea for exercises to “reassure
American allies of the U.S. commitment to the region.”13 The United States has also suspended
all military-to-military activities with Russia, including two previously scheduled trilateral
exercises with Canada and Norway.
Security Situation and Concerns in Central and
Eastern Europe
Poland and the Visegrád Four
Following the annexation of Crimea, concerns have sharpened in Eastern Europe about Russia’s
possible future intentions. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary joined NATO in 1999, and
Slovakia followed in 2004. In addition to their membership in NATO and the EU, these four
countries cooperate on a range of regional issues and interests as the Visegrád Group (V4).14 All
four countries are generally considered by U.S. officials to be strong NATO allies, and all four
have participated in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. In recent years, there have been some
concerns in the United States and EU about an apparent backsliding on democracy in Hungary,
with the recently reelected government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán demonstrating
authoritarian tendencies and moving toward closer relations with Russia.
10 Nancy Montgomery, “U.S. Army to Proceed with Planned Exercises in Ukraine,” Stars and Stripes, March 13, 2014.
11 “Exercise Sea Breeze 2013 Draws to a Close,” U.S. Navy, July, 21, 2013,
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=75504.
12 The additional 175 Marines are technically being deployed to a rotational crisis response force of 500 based at
Moron Air base in Spain.
13 The USS Truxton was deployed to the Black Sea in early March for what the Department of Defense characterized as
a previously planned training event. The deployment has since been extended. Nick Simeone, “U.S. Sends More
Marines to Romania, Navy Vessel to Black Sea,” American Forces Press Service, April 2, 2014.
14 The governments of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia founded the Visegrád Group as a platform for regional
cooperation in 1991 in the city of Visegrád, Hungary.
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Figure 1. Selected Countries in Central and Eastern Europe
Source: CRS Geospatial Information Systems and CRS Graphics.
Geographical proximity and long-standing historical relationships, including the experience of
Soviet domination during the Communist era, color attitudes toward Russia in the V4 countries.
Energy dependence is also an important consideration in relations with Russia: about 59% of the
natural gas consumed in Poland, 80% in Hungary, 84% in Slovakia, and 57% in the Czech
Republic comes from Russia.15 In recent years, Russia has been actively trying to extend its
influence in the region through energy deals and the acquisition of energy infrastructure. While
business usually centers on natural gas, Hungary also agreed to a deal with Russia’s state nuclear
company in early 2014 for the upgrade of a Hungarian nuclear power plant, financed by a €10
billion (about $13.7 billion) loan from Moscow.
In late February 2014, the V4 foreign ministers released a statement reiterating “their strong
interest in maintaining the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of
Ukraine....”16 While the government of Poland has subsequently been at the forefront of
15 Eurogas, Statistical Report 2013, http://www.eurogas.org/uploads/media/Eurogas_Statistical_Report_2013.pdf.
16 Joint Statement of V4 Foreign Ministers on Ukraine, February 24, 2014, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/joint-
statement-of-v4.
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arguments calling for a robust response to Russia’s actions, the governments of the other three
Visegrád countries, especially Hungary, have been more reserved. Despite possible reservations
in those three countries about additional economic sanctions, all V4 members agreed to the
limited sanctions imposed thus far by the EU in response to the annexation. The EU’s common
position is that the Crimea referendum was illegal, and no EU member states recognize its
outcome.17
Poland stands out among the V4 group as having the most difficult relationship with Russia.
Despite a mild thaw in the relationship after the Polish president and nearly 100 high-level Polish
officials were killed in a 2010 airplane crash in Russia, Polish suspicions about the nature of
Putin’s Russia have long persisted. Poland is by far the most populous country, the largest
economy, and the most significant military actor of the V4.18 Like many European countries,
Poland is in the midst of a long-term transformation to a smaller, more capable, and more
deployable military. Despite budgetary pressures, Poland is pursuing a broad equipment
acquisition program linked to the need to phase out remaining Soviet-era material. In an effort to
upgrade its main battle tanks and other armored vehicles, helicopters, air defenses, drones, and
individual soldier equipment, Poland has reportedly significantly increased equipment
expenditures.19
Poland has been a leading allied participant in NATO’s “out of area” Afghanistan mission. At the
same time, given its enduring perception of Russia as a threat, Poland has also been a leading
voice in calls for NATO to focus on its traditional vocation as an alliance of territorial defense. In
the wake of the Crimea annexation, Polish officials have revived a long-standing wish to base
U.S. forces on their territory, calling for two NATO brigades (approximately 10,000 soldiers) to
be stationed in Poland as a security guarantee.20 The 12 U.S. F-16s and 300 airmen deployed to
Poland in March 2014 build on a small U.S. aviation detachment that was established in Poland in
2012, which has supported quarterly training rotations of 200 U.S. personnel operating F-16s and
C-130s. Poland also participates in the U.S./NATO European Phased Adaptive Approach missile
defense system, intended to guard against a possible Iranian missile threat. Aegis-ashore
interceptors are scheduled to be deployed in Poland in 2018.
The area posing the most direct threat to Poland is Kaliningrad, a 5,800 square mile Russian
exclave wedged between Poland and Lithuania. Kaliningrad has a heavy Russian military
presence, including the Baltic Sea Fleet and two airbases. In addition, Russia has reportedly
stationed, or at least threatened to station, Iskander short-range nuclear missiles there.21
Compared to Poland, the militaries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia are
significantly smaller and possess more modest capabilities. Each of the three countries also faces
substantial resource constraints and budget pressures: since 2008, the Czech Republic has cut its
17 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141601.pdf.
18 According to the CIA World Factbook, the population of Poland is approximately 38.3 million, the Czech Republic
10.6 million, Hungary 9.9 million, and Slovakia 5.4 million.
19 Wojciech Lorenz, EU Battle Group: A Chance for a Breakthrough in Visegrad 4 Cooperation, The Polish Institute of
International Affairs, April 16, 2013.
20 Neil Buckley, James Fontanella-Khan, and Jan Cienski, "Poland Calls for NATO Troop Deployment," Financial
Times, March 1, 2014.
21 Steve Gutterman, "Russia has Stationed Iskander Missiles in Western Region: Reports," Reuters, December 16,
2013.
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defense spending by 16%, Slovakia by 22%, and Hungary by 29%.22 Nevertheless, the Czech and
Hungarian forces are considered by military experts to be well-structured, well-equipped, well-
trained, highly capable for their size, and experienced from participation in international
deployments. Analysts observe that a low defense budget presents the Slovak military with an
especially difficult challenge because it faces a need to replace a large percentage of its ageing
equipment.
In recent years, the V4 countries have sought to expand their cooperation from largely political
matters to include security and defense. The four generally consult closely with one another in
attempting to present a unified regional stance within NATO and on issues related to the EU’s
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). In 2013, the V4 countries launched plans to form
an EU Battlegroup, a rapid reaction force consisting of 2,500 to 3,000 troops, to be operational by
2016. The V4 countries have also sought to increase military and industrial cooperation in line
with NATO’s Smart Defense and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiative. Current or prospective
areas of such cooperation include joint procurement of ammunition, armored vehicles, individual
soldier equipment, and battlefield imaging systems, as well as joint logistics programs, and joint
development of capabilities such as countering improvised explosive devices (IED); chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRN); joint training of helicopter pilots and air
traffic controllers; and cyber defense.23
Table 1. Visegrád Group Defense Information
2013
Defense
Army
Combat
Attack
Defense
Spending
Size
Tanks Artillery Aircraft
Helicopters
Budget
% of GDP
Czech
13,000 30
146
47
24
$2.18
billion 1.1
Republic
Hungary 10,300 30
68
14
11 $1.1
billion 0.8
Poland 48,200 893 783 106
28 $9.83
billion 1.9
Slovakia 6,250 30
68
20
15 $995
million 1.0
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2014.
The Baltic States
The three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, were formerly republics of the Soviet
Union, having been absorbed into the USSR in 1940 after achieving independence between the
two world wars. They became independent again with the breakup of the USSR in 1991 and
joined both NATO and the European Union in 2004.
In general terms, the view of the Baltic countries is comparable to that of Poland in perceiving
Russia as an enduring threat. Size, geographic location, and energy dependence make the Baltic
countries vulnerable to Russia, and events in Ukraine have significantly increased anxiety in the
22 Wojciech Lorenz, EU Battle Group: A Chance for a Breakthrough in Visegrad 4 Cooperation, The Polish Institute of
International Affairs, April 16, 2013.
23 Robert Kupiecki, Visegard Defense Cooperation: From Mutual Support to Strengthening NATO and the EU, Center
for European Policy Analysis, April 2, 2013.
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Baltics. All three Baltic countries also have minority populations of ethnic Russians, a significant
element in the threat calculation given that claims of persecution against Russian communities
have been a part of the pretext for Russia’s interventions in both Georgia and Ukraine. Language
issues have caused tensions between Russia and Latvia. In 2012, a referendum rejected naming
Russian as Latvia’s official second language, although it is the first language for about one-third
of the population. In Estonia, plans to relocate a Soviet war memorial led to clashes between
police and pro-Russian demonstrators in 2007. About one-quarter of Estonia’s population is
ethnically Russian. Estonia subsequently found itself the target of a large-scale coordinated
cyberattack thought to have originated from either pro-Russian groups or from within the Russian
government itself. Lithuania found itself singled out by Russia for trade sanctions in late 2013 as
an expression of Russia’s displeasure over energy issues and the EU’s Eastern Partnership. Ethnic
Russians comprise a smaller percentage of Lithuania’s population, about 7%.
The Baltic countries joined their NATO and EU partners in strongly condemning Russia’s
annexation of Crimea as illegal. All three initially called for the EU to impose harsh political and
economic sanctions, but Latvia and Lithuania have since moderated their stance on sanctions
considerably. Latvian and Lithuanian government enthusiasm for sanctions has been tempered by
the potential economic consequences of such measures. Economists have suggested that severe
EU sanctions against Russia, the Baltics’ largest non-EU trade partner, could push both countries
into a deep recession.24
The break-up of the USSR left the Baltic countries with virtually no national militaries, and their
forces remain small and limited. The defense planning of the Baltic countries consequently relies
heavily on NATO membership, and they have emphasized active participation in the alliance,
including by having contributed troops to the Afghanistan mission. Analysts suggest that recent
events in Ukraine are pushing the Baltic countries to recommit even more deeply to NATO.
Beyond NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission (see below), some Baltic officials have urged NATO
to establish a permanent base in the region. Rotating forces, increased exercises, and pre-
positioning of assets may be a more likely NATO response to bolster security in the region.25
Lacking their own fighter aircraft, the Baltic countries rely on their NATO allies to police and
defend their airspace. NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission was launched in 2004 and is based at
an airbase in Lithuania. About a dozen NATO members have taken part in the mission, including
the United States, UK, France, Germany, Poland, Denmark, and the Czech Republic, providing
four fighters at a time on rotating four-month deployment. In 2011, the Baltic countries pledged
to gradually increase their combined contribution to the mission from €2.2 million
(approximately $3 million) in 2011 to €3.5 million (approximately $4.8 million) in 2015 to pay
for the costs of accommodating the air policing contingents, providing ground services for their
aircraft, and contributing to the cost of aviation fuel.
Compared to most other members of NATO, Estonia spends a relatively high percentage of GDP
on defense. The country is seeking to add a second infantry brigade by 2022, upgrade its air
defense system, and modernize a range of ground warfare equipment. Estonia also hosts NATO’s
cyber defense center. Latvia’s forces are smaller and less well equipped, and the country’s defense
spending has suffered from severe budgetary pressures. Latvia aims to double its defense
spending as a percentage of GDP by 2020 and to procure new equipment including armored
24 "Crimea crisis causes unease in the Baltics," Economist Intelligence Unit, April 1, 2014.
25 Richard Milne, "Baltics Urge NATO to Base Permanent Force in Region," Financial Times, April 9, 2014.
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vehicles, transport helicopters, and air defense radar. Lithuania’s forces are likewise pursuing
restructuring and re-equipment programs, but efforts have been similarly hindered by funding
constraints. All three Baltic countries also contribute forces to the EU’s Nordic Battlegroup, a
rapid reaction unit of 2,400 troops expected to be ready and available for deployment in 2015
(additionally comprised of troops from Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Ireland).26
Table 2. Baltic States Defense Information
2013
Defense
Army
Combat
Attack
Defense
Spending
Size Tanks
Artillery
Aircraft
Helicopters
Budget
% of GDP
Estonia 5,300 --
334
--
--
$480
million
2.0
Latvia 1,250 3 76 --
--
$300
million
1.0
Lithuania 7,350
--
48
--
--
$355
million
0.8
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2014.
Moldova
Moldova’s pro-Western government has responded to recent events in Ukraine with great
concern. Moldova and Ukraine have stopped armed men trying to cross the border from
Transnistria to Ukraine to “participate” in demonstrations against Ukraine’s government.
Transnistria, Moldova’s breakaway region with a strongly pro-Russian government, has
redoubled its long-standing efforts to secure Russia’s recognition for its independence. Russia has
not yet done so, but may have little more to lose in doing so now, given international
condemnation of its annexation of Crimea. In March 2014, NATO’s top military commander,
General Breedlove, expressed concern that Russian forces could sweep across eastern and
southern Ukraine to link up with Transnistria. Such a move, while very ambitious, would have the
advantage of linking the region directly with Russia.
While Moscow has shown hostility toward the Moldovan government, especially its intention to
sign an Association Agreement with the European Union in June 2014, it is unclear whether
Russia would take military action against Moldova to prevent it from doing so. Most observers
believe Russia will continue to try to turn Moldova away from a pro-Western orientation by using
more indirect tactics such as imposing de facto trade sanctions, increasing support for Transnistria
and separatism in Moldova’s Gagauzia region, and supporting the Communist opposition to the
government in the run-up to Moldova’s parliamentary elections late this year. During a visit to
Moldova on March 30, 2014, Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland confirmed U.S. support
for Moldova’s path toward European integration and for anti-corruption efforts, strengthening
border security, boosting Moldovan exports, and energy security, among other areas.
Moldova does not seek NATO membership, but it does participate in NATO’s Partnership for
Peace program. Moldova currently receives very modest U.S. security assistance: an estimated
$1.25 million in Foreign Military Financing in FY2014, as well as $750,000 in International
Military Education and Training (IMET) funds.
26 See http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/about/our-mission-in-sweden-and-abroad/international-activities-and-
operations/nordic-battle-group/.
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Table 3. Moldova Defense Information
2013
Defense
Army
Combat
Attack
Defense
Spending
Size Tanks
Artillery
Aircraft
Helicopters
Budget
% of GDP
Moldova 3,250 --
148
--
-- $24
million 0.3
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2014.
Ukraine
Perhaps the most urgent challenges facing Ukraine’s government are Russia’s annexation of
Crimea and attempted destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. Over 20,000 Russian troops remain in
Crimea, according to Ukraine’s government, while the Ukrainian government is also struggling to
establish control over eastern and southern Ukraine, where Russian-language speakers
predominate. Thousands of pro-Russian protestors have demonstrated in the region, especially in
the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbas region, and Kharkiv. On April 6, demonstrators
in Donetsk and Luhansk stormed and occupied key government buildings. Possibly inspired by
the Crimean scenario, the demonstrators in Donetsk declared a Donetsk People’s Republic and
called for Russia to send troops to protect them. Ukrainian police, perhaps suffering from low
morale due to the events of the past three months, have generally tried to avoid conflict with both
pro-and anti-government demonstrators.
On April 13, armed men seized government and other key buildings in additional cities and towns
in the Donbas region. Ukrainian officials say they have arrested Russian intelligence operatives
who they say are organizing these activities. On April 15, Ukrainian leaders said the country’s
armed forces have begun operations to take back control of buildings controlled by the armed
groups and clear roadblocks. Russia has warned that any crackdown could lead to civil war.
Some observers believe Russia could use widespread violence in eastern Ukraine as a pretext for
military intervention. As noted earlier, NATO General Breedlove told journalists on April 2 that
the approximately 40,000 Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders were capable of attacking within
12 hours and of attaining their objectives within Ukraine within three to five days. In March
2014, Ukraine’s acting President Turchynov said that Ukraine had only 6,000 combat ready
troops. Ukraine is currently undergoing a partial mobilization to ready tens of thousands of
additional troops, but the state of their training and equipment is uncertain.
Respected Russian military observer Pavel Felgenhauer has said that Putin’s military window of
opportunity for an invasion of eastern and southern Ukraine is from now to about mid-May.
However, this window would soon start to close, as Russia’s spring conscript call-up started on
April 1. This will require last year’s recruits to be gradually mustered out as green replacements
arrive. Felgenhauer believes that combat readiness of Russian forces on Ukraine’s borders will
soon start to decline, and recover only around August or September 2014.27 If Felgenhauer’s
analysis is correct, Russia could make even greater efforts to create chaos in eastern and southern
Ukraine in order to disrupt Ukraine’s May 25 presidential election, and possibly also to provide
the pretext for an invasion. Other Russian military analysts point out that even if a Russian
27 See Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia’s Window of Opportunity in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, March 25, 2014.
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invasion was initially successful, many more troops would be needed to occupy large stretches of
eastern and southern Ukraine.
In March 2013, Ukraine requested military aid from the United States, according to several press
reports. A full list of what Ukraine is seeking has not been disclosed, but press reports claim that
Ukraine has asked for arms and ammunition, communications gear, intelligence support, aviation
fuel, night-vision goggles, mine-clearing equipment, vehicles, medical gear, and other items.
According to these reports, the Administration has declined so far to send lethal military aid to
Ukraine. In March 2014, the United States sent 300,000 Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) to Ukraine,
at a cost of about $3 million. More unspecified nonlethal aid is being considered for delivery,
according to the U.S. European Command.
Those arguing for military aid for Ukraine say the United States needs to show resolve in the face
of Russian aggression against Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. They argue such aid
could serve to deter Putin from invading eastern Ukraine. Some objections to military aid for
Ukraine are that it could foreclose a diplomatic solution to the crisis; that it could actually
provoke Putin to attack eastern Ukraine; and that it could end U.S.-Russian cooperation in such
issues as the withdrawal of U.S. equipment from Afghanistan. There could also be concerns in the
near term about the aid absorption capacity of Ukraine’s armed forces, which are in a poor state at
present.
Table 4. Ukraine Defense Information
2013
Defense
Army
Combat
Attack
Defense
Spending
Size
Tanks Artillery
Aircraft
Helicopters
Budget
% of GDP
Ukraine 64,750 1,150
2,170
231
139 $2.42
billion 1.3
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2014.
NATO-Russia Relations
Russian actions in Ukraine have prompted a reassessment of post-Cold War efforts to build a
cooperative relationship with Moscow. As noted above, NATO suspended all practical civilian
and military cooperation with Russia on April 2. In the words of NATO Deputy Secretary General
Alexander Vershbow, “For 20 years, the security of the Euro-Atlantic region has been based on
the premise that we do not face an adversary to our east. That premise is now in doubt.”28
According to some analysts, Russia’s annexation of Crimea validates the concerns long expressed
by some NATO member states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, regarding Russia’s
commitment to partnership, its unpredictability, acts of hostility toward NATO and its partners,
and perceived attempts to sow disunity within the alliance. On the other hand, while Russian
actions have succeeded in drawing uniform condemnation from across NATO and the European
Union, many in Europe and the United States emphasize that Europe’s long-term security will
depend on cooperative relations with Russia. As noted above, some NATO members in Western
28 NATO, “A New Strategic Reality in Europe,” speech by Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander
Vershbow to the 21st International Conference on Euro-Atlantic Security, April 4, 2014.
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Europe have expressed concern that a military response to Russian actions could significantly
hinder future attempts to boost cooperation with Russia.
The principal institutional mechanism for NATO-Russia cooperation has been the NATO-Russia
Council (NRC), established in May 2002, five years after the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act
provided the formal basis for bilateral cooperation. Most observers agree that despite having
advanced NATO-Russia cooperation in some areas—including in Afghanistan—the NRC has
failed to live up to its potential. These perceived shortcomings are often attributed to Russian
suspicion about NATO’s long-term intentions, including with respect to countries it long
considered within its sphere of influence such as Ukraine and Georgia.
NATO and European officials stress that they continue to aspire to cooperation and partnership
with Russia. However, analysts expect ties to continue to be marked by contention and mistrust,
at least for the time being. Moscow has objected to NATO and the United States’ military
responses to the crisis, calling into question the alliance’s commitment to a 1997 pledge—
codified in the NATO-Russia Founding Act—to refrain from permanently stationing substantial
combat forces in countries that joined NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although
NATO has not as yet made decisions about such deployments, Secretary General Rasmussen has
responded to Russian complaints by noting that Russia “has violated every principle and
international commitment it has made.”29
As yet, NATO and EU member states have not collectively committed to ending arms sales to
Russia, despite criticism from analysts and governments on both sides of the Atlantic. Compared
to other European arms sales, sales to Russia are relatively insignificant. However, over the past
several years, some critics have drawn attention to several high profile deals. Chief among these
is a 2011 French agreement to sell Russia two amphibious assault warships in a deal worth €1.1
billion (about $1.5 billion)—the first ever sale of a significant offensive military capability by a
NATO member to Russia. The first of these Mistral ships is scheduled to be delivered at the end
of this year. On March 6, French President François Hollande addressed the possibility of
suspending the arms sale, saying, “we honor contracts we have signed. We are not yet at the stage
[of imposing such sanctions] and we hope to avoid getting there.”30 Even before the annexation of
Crimea, some Members of Congress and European leaders have repeatedly criticized France’s
decision to sell the Mistral to Russia, expressing concern about Russia’s military intentions,31
while French commentators have noted the economic and associated political benefits of the sale
for France.32 Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Germany has cancelled the planned sale of a
29 NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen as quoted by Kathrin Hille and Peter Spiegel, “NATO Chief
Defends Eastern Advance,” Financial Times, April 4, 2014.
30 As quoted by Hugh Carney, “Spotlight on French Military Deal with Russia,” Financial Times, March 7, 2014.
31 They note, for example, that in August 2009, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, the commander-in-chief of the Russian
Navy, declared that the Mistral would have allowed “Russia’s Black Sea fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes,
not 26 hours, which is how long it took us” during the Georgia conflict.31 CEDR, September 13, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-
950041
32 When then-President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the sale in March 2011, he touted that the deal would bring “6
million hours of work and 1,200 jobs maintained over 4 years.” He added that he hoped to make the shipyard town of
Saint-Nazaire, which has faced high unemployment levels, a symbol of French industrial achievement. Nicolas
Sarkozy, as quoted in Open Source Center Analysis: European Officials, Media Concerned about French Sale to
Russia, EUF2011031863900, March 18, 2011.
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military training facility to Russia; the UK and United States have also halted all military
cooperation.33
Prospects for NATO Enlargement
Russian actions in Ukraine have prompted some U.S. observers and Members of Congress to call
for a more concerted NATO effort to enlarge the alliance, particularly to the east.34 Among other
things, they argue that continued enlargement would send an important signal to aspiring
members that NATO’s “open door” policy will not be scaled back in the face of Russian
opposition. Some proponents of enlargement add that Russia would be less willing and less able
to take the aggressive actions it has in Ukraine, Georgia, and elsewhere in its near-abroad if these
countries were members of the alliance. Despite these calls, most analysts consider NATO
unlikely to make any significant progress toward expanding over the next several years. They
point to a perception in some Western European countries that NATO has enlarged too quickly
and that the alliance should agree on how to resolve a complex range of issues, including
managing relations with Russia, before taking in new members. For some allied governments,
ongoing territorial disputes with Russia in countries such as Georgia and Ukraine could be a
strong deterrent to extending membership invitations to these countries.
Four countries are currently considered formal aspirants for NATO membership: Montenegro,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Georgia. Montenegro has had a Membership Action Plan
(MAP) since December 2009. Although it is considered the candidate with the most advanced
membership prospects, NATO officials have cautioned that Montenegrin security agencies and
the defense sector need to meet NATO standards and that further efforts need to be made to fight
corruption and organized crime in the country. Some have also questioned the level of public
support for NATO membership in Montenegro. Bosnia was formally invited to join the MAP in
April 2010, but was told that its Annual National Program under the MAP would not be accepted
until the country resolved the issue of immovable defense property (mainly former military bases
and barracks) on its territory. The country’s leaders have agreed in principle to resolve the issue,
but many doubt whether Bosnia can agree on whether to join NATO, as Bosnian Serb leaders
have given mixed signals on the issue and public opinion polls have shown very strong
opposition to membership among the Bosnian Serb population. NATO agreed that Macedonia
met the qualifications for membership in 2008, but its candidacy has been stalled due to a
protracted dispute with NATO ally Greece over the country’s official name. The two sides have
been unable to resolve the issue during talks sponsored by the United Nations.
Representatives of Ukraine’s current government have said the country is not seeking NATO
membership. This reflects long-standing indifference, if not opposition, to NATO membership in
the country. Under former President Yanukovych, the country renounced previously asserted
ambitions to join NATO. According to one March 2014 opinion poll, 34% of Ukrainians were for
NATO membership, and 44% opposed, with a regional split of 74% for membership in western
33 Pierre Tran, “Europe Ramps Up Defense Posture Amid Russia Crisis,” Defense News, March 23, 2014.
34 In February 2014, a bipartisan group of 40 Members of the House sent a letter to Secretary of State Kerry urging the
Administration to support granting NATO membership to Montenegro and Macedonia and a Membership Action Plan
(MAP) to Georgia at NATO’s September summit in Wales. The lawmakers also called for intensified progress on
advancing Bosnia-Herzogovina’s MAP.
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Ukraine and 67% opposed in the east.35 Some observers assert that the Ukrainian government
could be cautious about expressing ambitions to join NATO for a number of reasons, including
sensitivity to public opinion and possible opposition to membership from countries within the
alliance that would be reluctant to further antagonize Russia. In early April, in response to NATO
Secretary General Rasmussen’s assertion that the door to NATO membership for Ukraine
remained open, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier reportedly countered that
“NATO membership for Ukraine is not pending.”36
In September 2008, NATO and Georgia established the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) in an
effort both to both oversee NATO assistance to Georgia after its 2008 conflict with Russia and to
supervise progress toward eventual membership in the alliance, as called for at NATO’s 2008
Bucharest Summit. Since then, the two sides have deepened cooperation in a variety of areas,
especially on defense and security sector reform, and Georgia has contributed to ongoing NATO
operations, including by deploying the second-largest non-NATO contingent in Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, most observers believe that the unresolved situation in Georgia’s breakaway regions
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia could continue to pose a major obstacle to possible Georgian
membership for the foreseeable future. They contend that as long as the territorial dispute
persists, some allies could oppose defining a specific timeline for membership. Georgia has not
been granted a Membership Action Plan.
Some observers have argued that recent Russian military aggression could indirectly serve to
boost support for NATO membership in Sweden and Finland. Since joining NATO’s Partnership
for Peace Program in 1994, both countries have been active participants in NATO operations and
have taken significant steps to modernize their militaries. In a reflection of continuing
sensitivities regarding relations with Russia, both have also continued to maintain long-standing
policies of military “nonalignment.” In 2013, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that
Moscow would be forced to “respond” if Finland or Sweden joined NATO, and in the past year
Russian forces have performed air and land exercises near Swedish and Finnish territory. Recent
Russian actions and statements have led at least one Swedish government official to advocate a
“doctrinal shift” in defense policy; and Finnish government representatives reportedly have said
there should be an “open debate” about joining NATO.37 Nonetheless, public opinion in both
countries remains firmly opposed to NATO membership. Some analysts assert that at the least,
the two governments could continue to bolster defense spending and cooperation with other
Nordic states and the Baltics.
U.S. Policy
The crisis in Ukraine has renewed focus on the U.S. commitment to European security and on
overall U.S. force posture in Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, as NATO and the EU have
enlarged eastward and as both organizations have pursued partnership with Russia, the perceived
need for a robust U.S. military presence to defend the continent receded. Today, about 67,000
35 The International Republican Institute, Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine, March 14-26, 2014.
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20of%20Ukraine
%2C%20March%2014-26%2C%202014.pdf
36 “Ukraine Crisis Exposes Gaps between Berlin and NATO,” Spiegelonline, April 7, 2014.
37 Alistair Scrutton and Sakari Suoninen, “As Russia growls, Swedes, Finns Eye Defence Options, NATO,” Reuters,
April 1, 2014.
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U.S. forces are stationed in Europe, primarily in Germany, Italy, and the UK; this is down from a
Cold War high of about 400,000. Some allies in Central and Eastern Europe have consistently
expressed concerns about the reduced U.S. force posture, and especially the recent withdrawal of
two of the Army’s four Brigade Combat Teams. Other allies and U.S. policy makers supported the
shift, particularly given other security challenges facing the United States and NATO. The
adjusted U.S. force posture has coincided with U.S. calls for European allies and the EU to
develop enhanced military capabilities in order to boost NATO’s effectiveness and reduce
Europe’s dependence on the U.S. security guarantee. As discussed above, such efforts have had
mixed results, at best.
The Obama Administration and its supporters assert that the United States remains prepared and
able to honor its commitments to the defense and security of fellow NATO member states. In
addition to the aforementioned U.S. military responses to the crisis in Ukraine, they note that the
United States was a key proponent of NATO’s drafting of contingency plans for the defense of
Poland and the Baltic States in 2009, and they draw attention to recent U.S. calls for a new round
of NATO contingency planning. They add that the U.S. agreement in 2011 to establish an Air
Force Aviation detachment in Poland has paved the way for the recent deployment of 12 F-16s to
the country, and point out that to compensate for the reduction of U.S. Brigade Combat Teams in
Europe, the Department of Defense has committed a U.S.-based rapid reaction force to rotate to
Europe for joint training exercises.38
The current cornerstone of the U.S. commitment to NATO military capabilities in Europe is the
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach
(EPAA). The U.S. system, designed to defend alliance territory against possible missile attacks
from Iran and other potential adversaries, serves as the foundation for a new NATO missile
defense capability, based primarily on U.S. assets under NATO command and control. The United
States has deployed missile defense ships to the Mediterranean, ready to operate under NATO
control when necessary. A U.S. radar, based in Turkey, is also under NATO operational control.
Interceptor sites are to be deployed in Romania in 2015 and in Poland in 2018. The United States
and NATO have consistently emphasized, however, that the missile defense system is neither
intended to nor capable of defending against a potential missile attack from Russia.
While they have welcomed these steps, critics of the Administration’s and NATO’s response to
Russian actions in Ukraine have argued that more should be done to support Ukraine, reassure
allies in Central and Eastern Europe, and counter Russian aggression. Some have called for
bolstered and possibly permanent NATO and/or U.S. troop deployments in Central and Eastern
Europe, as well as more frequent military exercises, including in the Black Sea. For example, as
discussed above, the Polish government has requested the deployment of two heavy brigades of
NATO troops on its territory. In a March 26, 2014, letter to President Obama, House Armed
Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon and seven other Members of Congress called on
the President to “increase and enhance the alert posture and readiness of U.S. forces in Europe
without delay, including maintaining forward-deployed U.S. quick-reaction forces.”39 At an April
10, 2014, hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on European
38 See, for example, Samuel Charap and Lee Feinstein, “Obama’s Quiet Offensive,” ProjectSyndicate.org, April 3,
2014.
39 House Armed Services Committee, “Armed Services Leaders Urge President to Act on Ukraine,” March 26, 2014.
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?ContentRecord_id=AE52EEAE-20D7-4C07-AE4B-
1520D8287DD2.
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Affairs, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Derek Chollet said that
he did not foresee a significant adjustment to the U.S. military’s permanent footprint in Europe,
but added that forward or rotational deployments to Central and Eastern Europe were an ongoing
possibility.40
Critics of Administration policy draw attention to the fact that only 300 U.S. forces reportedly
participated in NATO’s November 2013 Steadfast Jazz exercise in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Poland. The 6,000-troop exercise—the largest NATO exercise to take place in the region in over
10 years—was intended to certify command and control elements of the NATO Response Force,
including in response to a possible attack on the territory of a NATO member state. Other analysts
have questioned the Administration’s commitment to missile defense, noting that in 2013, the
Administration dropped Phase 4 of the EPAA, which would have deployed in Europe land- and
possible sea-based versions of advanced naval BMD interceptors designed to destroy limited
numbers of first generation intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
As discussed above, the United States has provided the Ukrainian government with some
nonlethal military aid, including 300,000 Meals Ready to Eat (MREs), but has thus far declined to
provide lethal military aid. Some analysts, including a former NATO military commander, have
argued that the United States and other allies should consider providing additional military
assistance, including intelligence and surveillance capabilities and anti-aircraft and anti-tank
weapons.41
Congress could continue to play an important role in shaping U.S. and NATO responses to
Russia’s actions in Ukraine. In terms of U.S. defense policy, possible congressional action could
include reexamining U.S. force posture in Europe and assessing U.S. capacity and willingness to
uphold its collective defense commitments in Europe. Congress could also take an increasingly
active role in determining U.S. policy toward NATO and in guiding broader discussions about
NATO’s future, particularly ahead of the next NATO summit, scheduled to take place in Wales on
September 4-5, 2014. This could include holding hearings and/or drafting legislation on issues
such as development of allied military capabilities and military burdensharing within the alliance,
the allied commitment to NATO enlargement and its relations with partner countries such as
Ukraine and Georgia, NATO relations with Russia, and NATO involvement in areas such as
cybersecurity and energy security.
40 Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on European Affairs, Transatlantic Security
Challenges: Central and Eastern Europe, April 10, 2014. Transcript available at
http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-4459211.
41 See, for example, James Stavridis, “How to Fend off the Russians in Seven Simple Steps,” Foreignpolicy.com, April
10, 2014.
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Author Contact Information
Paul Belkin, Coordinator
Steven Woehrel
Analyst in European Affairs
Specialist in European Affairs
pbelkin@crs.loc.gov, 7-0220
swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291
Derek E. Mix
Analyst in European Affairs
dmix@crs.loc.gov, 7-9116
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Calvin DeSouza, Geospatial Information Systems Analyst at CRS, for creating the map
included in this report.
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