Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer
Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
March 24, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32109
Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
As part of its proposed FY2015 budget, the Navy is requesting funding for the procurement of
two Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers. The 10 DDG-51s programmed for
procurement in FY2013-FY2017 (three ships in FY2013, one in FY2014, and two each in
FY2015-FY2017) are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract.
The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two DDG-51s requested for
procurement in FY2015 at $2,969.4 million, or an average of $1,484.7 million each. The two
ships have received a total of $297.9 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding.
The Navy’s proposed FY2015 budget requests the remaining $2,671.4 million to complete the
two ships’ combined procurement cost. The Navy’s proposed FY2015 budget also requests
$129.1 million to complete the cost of one of the three DDG-51s funded in FY2013 (where a
funding shortfall occurred as a result of the March 1, 2013, sequester on Department of Defense
[DOD] programs), and $134.0 million in advance procurement (AP) funding for DDG-51s to be
procured in future fiscal years, bringing the total requested for the DDG-51 program for FY2015
(excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $2,934.6 million.
The Navy’s proposed FY2015 budget also requests $419.5 million in procurement funding to help
complete the procurement cost of three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers procured in
FY2007-FY2009.
The current version of the DDG-51 is called the Flight IIA design. The Navy wants to begin
procuring a new version of the DDG-51 design, called the Flight III design, starting with the
second of the two ships scheduled for procurement in FY2016. The Flight III design is to feature
a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The Navy’s
proposed budget requests $144.7 million in research and development funding for the AMDR.
Potential FY2013 issues for Congress concerning destroyer procurement include the following:
• cost, schedule, and technical risk in the Flight III DDG-51 program;
• whether the Flight III DDG-51 design would have sufficient growth margin for a
projected 35- or 40-year service life;
• issues raised in a January 2014 report from DOD’s Director of Operational
Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E);
• whether the Flight III DDG-51 would have sufficient air and missile capability to
adequately perform future air and missile defense missions; and
• the lack of an announced Navy roadmap for accomplishing three things in the
cruiser-destroyer force: restoring ship growth margins; introducing large numbers
of ships with integrated electric drive systems or other technologies that could
provide ample electrical power for supporting future electrically powered
weapons (such as high-power solid state lasers); and introducing technologies
(such as those for substantially reducing ship crew size) for substantially
reducing ship operating and support (O&S) costs.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
DDG-51 Program ...................................................................................................................... 1
General ................................................................................................................................ 1
Procurement of First Flight III DDG-51 Planned for FY2016 ............................................ 3
Multiyear Procurement (MYP) in FY2013-FY2017 ........................................................... 4
DDG-1000 Program .................................................................................................................. 4
Surface Combatant Construction Industrial Base ...................................................................... 5
FY2015 Funding Request .......................................................................................................... 5
Issues for Congress .......................................................................................................................... 6
Flight III DDG-51: Cost, Technical, and Schedule Risk ........................................................... 6
October 2013 CBO Report .................................................................................................. 6
March 2013 GAO Report .................................................................................................... 7
Flight III DDG-51: Growth Margin ........................................................................................... 8
Flight III DDG-51: Issues Raised in January 2014 DOT&E Report ....................................... 11
Flight III DDG-51: Adequacy of AAW and BMD Capability ................................................. 14
Lack of Roadmap for Accomplishing Three Things in Cruiser-Destroyer Force .................... 15
Options for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 16
Adjunct Radar Ship ................................................................................................................. 16
Flight III DDG-51 With Increased Capabilities....................................................................... 17
DDG-1000 Variant With AMDR ............................................................................................. 18
New-Design Destroyer ............................................................................................................ 18
Legislative Activity for FY2015 .................................................................................................... 20
FY2015 Funding Request ........................................................................................................ 20
Figures
Figure 1. DDG-51 Class Destroyer .................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Navy Briefing Slide on DDG-51 Growth Margins .......................................................... 9
Figure 3. Cobra Judy Replacement Ship ....................................................................................... 17
Appendixes
Appendix A. Additional Background Information on DDG-1000 Program .................................. 21
Appendix B. Additional Background Information on CG(X) Cruiser Program ............................ 29
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 32
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
This report presents background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the
Navy’s Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) and Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer programs. The
Navy’s proposed FY2015 budget requests funding for the procurement of two DDG-51s.
Decisions that Congress makes concerning these programs could substantially affect Navy
capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
Background
DDG-51 Program
General
The DDG-51 program was initiated in the late 1970s.1 The DDG-51 (Figure 1) is a multi-mission
destroyer with an emphasis on air defense (which the Navy refers as anti-air warfare, or AAW)
and blue-water (mid-ocean) operations. DDG-51s, like the Navy’s 22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class
cruisers,2 are equipped with the Aegis combat system, an integrated ship combat system named
for the mythological shield that defended Zeus. CG-47s and DDG-51s consequently are often
referred to as Aegis cruisers and Aegis destroyers, respectively, or collectively as Aegis ships. The
Aegis system has been updated several times over the years. Existing DDG-51s (and also some
CG-47s) are being modified to receive an additional capability for ballistic missile defense
(BMD) operations.3
The first DDG-51 was procured in FY1985. A total of 70 have been procured through FY2014,
including 62 in FY1985-FY2005 and eight in FY2010-2015.4 During the period FY2006-
FY2009, the Navy procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers (see discussion below)
rather than DDG-51s.5 The first DDG-51 entered service in 1991, and a total of 62 were in service
1 The program was initiated with the aim of developing a surface combatant to replace older destroyers and cruisers
that were projected to retire in the 1990s. The DDG-51 was conceived as an affordable complement to the Navy’s
Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers.
2 A total of 27 CG-47s were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered service between
1983 and 1994. The first five, which were built to an earlier technical standard, were judged by the Navy to be too
expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005.
3 The modification for BMD operations includes, among other things, the addition of a new software program for the
Aegis combat system and the arming of the ship with the SM-3, a version of the Navy’s Standard Missile that is
designed for BMD operations. For more on Navy BMD programs, CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
4 The eight DDG-51s procured in FY2010-FY2014 include one in FY2010, two in FY2011, one in FY2012, three in
FY2013, and one in FY2014.
5 The Navy had planned to end DDG-51 procurement permanently in FY2005 and procure Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class
destroyers thereafter. In July 2008, however, the Navy announced that it had changed its mind—that it wanted to halt
procurement of DDG-1000s and resume procuring DDG-51s. The Navy announced this change in its plans at a July 31,
2008, hearing before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.
In explaining their proposed change in plans, Navy officials cited a reassessment of threats that Navy forces are likely
to face in coming years. As a result of this reassessment, Navy officials stated, the service decided that destroyer
procurement over the next several years should emphasize three mission capabilities—area-defense AAW, BMD, and
(continued...)
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
as of the end of FY2013. DDG-51s are built by General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of
Bath, ME, and Ingalls Shipbuilding of Pascagoula, MS, a division of Huntington Ingalls
Industries (HII).
Figure 1. DDG-51 Class Destroyer
Source: Navy file photograph accessed October 18, 2012, at http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=134605.
The DDG-51 design has been modified over time. The first 28 DDG-51s (i.e., DDGs 51 through
78) are called Flight I/II DDG-51s. Subsequent ships in the class (i.e., DDGs 79 and higher) are
referred to as Flight IIA DDG-51s. The Flight IIA design, first procured in FY1994, implemented
a significant design change that included, among other things, the addition of a helicopter hangar.
(...continued)
open-ocean ASW. Navy officials also stated that they want to maximize the number of destroyers that can be procured
over the next several years within budget constraints. Navy officials stated that DDG-51s can provide the area-defense
AAW, BMD, and open-ocean ASW capabilities that the Navy wants to emphasize, and that while the DDG-1000
design could also be configured to provide these capabilities, the Navy could procure more DDG-51s than reconfigured
DDG-1000s over the next several years for the same total amount of funding. In addition, the Navy by 2008-2009 no
longer appeared committed to the idea of reusing the DDG-1000 hull as the basis for the Navy’s planned CG(X)
cruiser. If the Navy had remained committed to that idea, it might have served as a reason for continuing DDG-1000
procurement.
The Navy’s FY2010 budget, submitted in May 2009, reflected the Navy’s July 2008 change in plans: the budget
proposed truncating DDG-1000 procurement to the three ships that had been procured in FY2007 and FY2009, and
resuming procurement of Flight IIA DDG-51s. Congress, as part of its action on the FY2010 defense budget, supported
the proposal: The FY2010 budget funded the procurement of one DDG-51, provided advance procurement funding for
two DDG-51s the Navy wants to procure in FY2011, completed the procurement funding for the third DDG-1000
(which was authorized but only partially funded in FY2009), and provided no funding for procuring additional DDG-
1000s.
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The Flight IIA design has a full load displacement of about 9,500 tons, which is similar to that of
the CG-47.
The Navy is implementing a program for modernizing all DDG-51s (and CG-47s) so as to
maintain their mission and cost effectiveness out to the end of their projected service lives.6 Older
CRS reports provide additional historical and background information on the DDG-51 program.7
Procurement of First Flight III DDG-51 Planned for FY2016
The Navy wants to begin procuring a new version of the DDG-51 design, called the Flight III
design, starting with the second of the two ships scheduled for procurement in FY2016.8 The
Flight III design is to feature a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense
Radar (AMDR). Compared to the Flight IIA DDG-51 design, the Flight III design is to feature a
new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The version of
the AMDR to be carried by the Flight III DDG-51 is smaller and less powerful than the one
envisaged for the CG(X): the Flight III DDG-51’s AMDR is to have a diameter of 14 feet, while
the AMDR envisaged for the CG(X) would have had a substantially larger diameter.9
6 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS22595, Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
7 See CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke (April 25, 1994; out of print and available directly from the author), and CRS Report 80-205, The Navy’s
Proposed Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Guided Missile Destroyer Program: A Comparison With An Equal-Cost
Force Of Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Guided Missile Destroyers, by Ronald O’Rourke (November 21, 1984; out of
print and available directly from the author).
8 The Navy’s FY2011 budget, submitted in February 2010, proposed terminating a planned cruiser called the CG(X) in
favor of procuring the Flight III version of the DDG-51. The Navy stated that its desire to terminate the CG(X)
program was “driven by affordability considerations.” (Department of the Navy, Office of Budget, Highlights of the
Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-7.) For more on the CG(X) program and its termination
in favor of procuring Flight III DDG-51s, see Appendix B.
9 Government Accountability Office, Arleigh Burke Destroyers[:] Additional Analysis and Oversight Required to
Support the Navy’s Future Surface Combatant Plans, GAO-12-113, January 2012, pp. 31 and 42. See also Zachary M.
Peterson, “DDG-51 With Enhanced Radar in FY-16, Design Work To Begin Soon,” Inside the Navy, February 8, 2010;
Amy Butler, “STSS Prompts Shift in CG(X) Plans,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, December 11, 2010: 1-2;
“[Interview With] Vice Adm. Barry McCullough,” Defense News, November 9, 2009: 38.
The written testimony of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) before the House Armed Services Committee on
February 16, 2012, and before the Defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on March 1, 2012,
stated that the Flight III design would use an all-electric propulsion system, in contrast to the mechanical propulsion
system used on the Flight IIA design and other Navy surface combatants. (See, for example, Statement of Admiral
Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services Committee [hearing] on FY2013
Department of the Navy Posture, February 16, 2012, which stated on page 10: “Our Lewis and Clark class supply ships
now employ an all-electric propulsion system, as will our new Zumwalt and Flight III Arleigh Burke class destroyers
(DDG).”) The written testimony of the CNO before the Defense subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee
on March 7, 2012, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 15, 2012, omitted the reference to the
Flight III DDG-51 being equipped with an all-electric propulsion system. In response to a question from CRS about the
change in the testimony, the Navy informed CRS on March 15, 2012, that the statement in the earlier testimony was an
error, and that the Flight III DDG-51 will likely not be equipped with an all-electric propulsion system.
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Multiyear Procurement (MYP) in FY2013-FY2017
As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2013 budget, Congress granted the Navy authority to use a
multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s to be procured FY2013-FY2017.10 The
Navy awarded the contract on June 3, 2013.11 The Navy plans to use an engineering change
proposal (ECP) to shift from the Flight IIA design to the Flight III design during this MYP
contract. If the Flight III design is not ready to support the procurement of the first Flight III ship
in FY2016, the Navy can delay issuing the ECP and shift the start of Flight III procurement to
FY2017 or FY2018.
DDG-1000 Program
The DDG-1000 program was initiated in the early 1990s.12 The DDG-1000 is a multi-mission
destroyer with an emphasis on naval surface fire support (NSFS) and operations in littoral (i.e.,
near-shore) waters. The DDG-1000 is intended to replace, in a technologically more modern
form, the large-caliber naval gun fire capability that the Navy lost when it retired its Iowa-class
battleships in the early 1990s,13 to improve the Navy’s general capabilities for operating in
defended littoral waters, and to introduce several new technologies that would be available for
use on future Navy ships. The DDG-1000 was also intended to serve as the basis for the Navy’s
now-canceled CG(X) cruiser.
The DDG-1000 is to have a reduced-size crew of 142 sailors (compared to roughly 300 on the
Navy’s Aegis destroyers and cruisers) so as to reduce its operating and support (O&S) costs. The
ship incorporates a significant number of new technologies, including an integrated electric-drive
propulsion system14 and automation technologies enabling its reduced-sized crew.
With an estimated full load displacement of 15,482 tons, the DDG-1000 design is roughly 63%
larger than the Navy’s current 9,500-ton Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and larger than any Navy
destroyer or cruiser since the nuclear-powered cruiser Long Beach (CGN-9), which was procured
in FY1957.
The first two DDG-1000s were procured in FY2007 and split-funded (i.e., funded with two-year
incremental funding) in FY2007-FY2008; the Navy’s FY2015 budget submission estimates their
combined procurement cost at $8,509.3 million. The third DDG-1000 was procured in FY2009
and split-funded in FY2009-FY2010; the Navy’s FY2015 budget submission estimates its
procurement cost at $3,560.1 million.
10 For more on MYP contracts, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in
Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Moshe Schwartz.
11 “DDG 51 Multiyear Procurement Contract Awarded,” Navy News Service, June 3, 2013, accessed July 1, 2013, at
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=74583. See also Mike McCarthy, “Navy Awards Multi-Year
Contracts For Destroyers,” Defense Daily, June 4, 2013: 1.
12 The program was originally designated DD-21, which meant destroyer for the 21st Century. In November 2001, the
program was restructured and renamed DD(X), meaning a destroyer whose design was in development. In April 2006,
the program’s name was changed again, to DDG-1000, meaning a guided missile destroyer with the hull number 1000.
13 The Navy in the 1980s reactivated and modernized four Iowa (BB-61) class battleships that were originally built
during World War II. The ships reentered service between 1982 and 1988 and were removed from service between
1990 and 1992.
14 For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
The estimated combined procurement cost for all three ships in the FY2015 budget is $12,069.4
million, compared to $11,618.4 million in the FY2014 budget, $11,470.1 million in the FY2013
budget, $11,308.8 million in the FY2012 budget, and $9,993.3 million in the FY2011 budget.
All three ships are to be built at GD/BIW, with some portions of each ship being built by Ingalls
Shipbuilding for delivery to GD/BIW. Raytheon is the prime contractor for the DDG-1000’s
combat system (its collection of sensors, computers, related software, displays, and weapon
launchers). The Navy awarded GD/BIW the contract for the construction of the second and third
DDG-1000s on September 15, 2011.15
For additional background information on the DDG-1000 program, see Appendix A.
Surface Combatant Construction Industrial Base
All cruisers, destroyers, and frigates procured since FY1985 have been built at General
Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) shipyard of Bath, ME, and Ingalls Shipbuilding of
Pascagoula, MS, a division of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII).16 Both yards have long
histories of building larger surface combatants. Construction of Navy surface combatants in
recent years has accounted for virtually all of GD/BIW’s ship-construction work and for a
significant share of Ingalls’ ship-construction work. (Ingalls also builds amphibious ships for the
Navy.) Navy surface combatants are overhauled, repaired, and modernized at GD/BIW, Ingalls,
other private-sector U.S. shipyards, and government-operated naval shipyards (NSYs).
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are generally considered the two leading Navy surface combatant
radar makers and combat system integrators. Northrop Grumman is a third potential maker of
Navy surface combatant radars. Lockheed is the lead contractor for the DDG-51 combat system
(the Aegis system), while Raytheon is the lead contractor for the DDG-1000 combat system, the
core of which is called the Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure (TSCE-I). Lockheed
has a share of the DDG-1000 combat system, and Raytheon has a share of the DDG-51 combat
system. Lockheed, Raytheon, and Northrop competed to be the maker of the AMDR to be carried
by the Flight III DDG-51. On October 10, 2013, the Navy announced that it had selected
Raytheon to be the maker of the AMDR.
The surface combatant construction industrial base also includes hundreds of additional firms that
supply materials and components. The financial health of Navy shipbuilding supplier firms has
been a matter of concern in recent years, particularly since some of them are the sole sources for
what they make for Navy surface combatants.
FY2015 Funding Request
The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two DDG-51s requested for
procurement in FY2015 at $2,969.4 million, or an average of $1,484.7 million each. The two
ships have received a total of $297.9 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding.
15 See, for example, Mike McCarthy, “Navy Awards Contract for DDG-1000s,” Defense Daily, September 16, 2011:
3-4.
16 HII was previously owned by Northrop Grumman, during which time it was known as Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding.
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The Navy’s proposed FY2015 budget requests the remaining $2,671.4 million to complete the
two ships’ combined procurement cost. The Navy’s proposed FY2015 budget also requests
$129.1 million to complete the cost of one of the three DDG-51s funded in FY2013 (where a
funding shortfall occurred as a result of the March 1, 2013, sequester on Department of Defense
[DOD] programs), and $134.0 million in advance procurement (AP) funding for DDG-51s to be
procured in future fiscal years, bringing the total requested for the DDG-51 program for FY2015
(excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $2,934.6 million.17
The Navy’s proposed FY2015 budget also requests $419.5 million in procurement funding to help
complete the procurement cost of three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers procured in
FY2007-FY2009, and $144.7 million in research and development funding for the AMDR. The
funding request for the AMDR is contained in the Navy’s research and development account as
Program Element (PE) 0604522N (“Advanced Missile Defense Radar [AMDR] System”), aka
line 118.
Issues for Congress
Flight III DDG-51: Cost, Technical, and Schedule Risk
One issue for Congress concerns cost, technical, and schedule risk for the Flight III DDG-51.
Some observers have expressed concern about the Navy’s ability to complete development of the
AMDR and deliver the first AMDR to the shipyard in time to support the construction schedule
for a first Flight III DDG-51 procured in FY2016. The Navy could respond to a delay in the
development of the AMDR by shifting the procurement of the first Flight III DDG-51 to FY2017
or a later year, while continuing to procure Flight IIA DDG-51s. (The MYP that the Navy has
awarded for FY2013-FY2017 is structured to accommodate such a shift, should it become
necessary.) Some observers have also expressed concern about the potential procurement cost of
the Flight III DDG-51 design.
October 2013 CBO Report
An October 2013 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on the cost of the Navy’s
shipbuilding programs stated:
Adding the AMDR [to the DDG-51 design] so that it could operate effectively would require
increasing the amount of electrical power and cooling available on a Flight III. With those
changes and associated increases in the ship’s displacement, a DDG-51 Flight III destroyer
would cost about $300 million, or about 20 percent, more than a new Flight IIA destroyer,
CBO estimates. Thus, the average cost per ship [for Flight III DDG-51s] would be $1.9
billion....
CBO’s estimate of the costs of the DDG Flight IIA and Flight III ships to be purchased in the
future is less than it was last year. Most of the decrease for the Flight III can be attributed to
updated information on the cost of incorporating the AMDR into the Flight III configuration.
The cost of the AMDR itself, according to the Navy, has declined steadily through the
development program, and the Department of Defense’s Cost Analysis and Program
17 The figures in this paragraph do not add exactly due to rounding of figures to the nearest tenth of a million dollars.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Evaluation (CAPE) office concurs in the reduced estimate. The Navy decreased its estimate
for the average price of a DDG-51 Flight III ship from $2.2 billion in the 2013 plan to $1.8
billion in the 2014 plan, primarily as a result of the reduced cost of the AMDR. CBO
reduced its estimate by a similar amount. Considerable uncertainty remains in the DDG-51
Flight III program, however. Costs could be higher or lower than CBO’s estimate, depending
on how well the restart of the DDG-51 program goes, on the eventual cost and complexity of
the AMDR, and on associated changes in the ship’s design to integrate the new radar.18
March 2013 GAO Report
A March 2013 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing selected DOD
acquisition programs stated the following in its assessment of the DDG-51 program: “To date, the
Navy has identified the AMDR as the only major new technology for Flight III, but more
technologies are under consideration. The integration of AMDR will require changes to the power
architecture.”19 Regarding the AMDR specifically, the report stated:
According to the program office, all four of AMDR’s critical technologies are approaching
maturity. Testing on scaled-down prototypes was conducted with the three contractors during
the summer of 2012 as part of their technology development contracts. The program
previously had six critical technologies; two are still tested but no longer considered critical.
According to the program, two technologies previously identified as the most challenging—
digital-beam-forming and transmit-receive modules—have been demonstrated in a relevant
environment. Program officials stated that no significant issues were identified at the
preliminary design review with the digital beamforming technology necessary for AMDR’s
simultaneous air and ballistic missile defense mission. The transmit-receive modules—the
individual radiating elements key to transmitting and receiving electromagnetic signals—are
a new design which utilizes gallium nitride semiconductor technology instead of the legacy
gallium arsenide technology. The new technology has the potential to provide higher
efficiency with smaller power and cooling demands. While gallium nitride has never been
used in a radar as large as AMDR, and long-term reliability and performance of this newer
material is unknown, the preliminary design reviews concluded that the contractors have
demonstrated good power and efficiency thus far. The other two critical technologies, related
to software and digital receivers and exciters, were also successfully demonstrated.
According to program officials, software development for AMDR will require a significant
effort. A series of software builds are expected to deliver approximately 1 million lines of
code, with additional testing assets also being developed. Software will be designed to apply
open system approaches to commercial, off-the-shelf hardware. Integration with the SPQ-9B
radar, and later the AMDR-X radar, will require further software development.20
18 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2014 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2013, pp.
25, 27.
19 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-13-
294SP, March 2013, p. 139.
20 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-13-
294SP, March 2013, p. 46.
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Flight III DDG-51: Growth Margin
Another issue for Congress is whether the Flight III DDG-51 design would have sufficient growth
margin for a projected 35- or 40-year service life. A ship’s growth margin refers to its capacity for
being fitted over time with either additional equipment or newer equipment that is larger, heavier,
or more power-intensive than the older equipment it is replacing, so as to preserve the ship’s
mission effectiveness. Elements of a ship’s growth margin include interior space, weight-carrying
capacity, electrical power, cooling capacity (to cool equipment), and ability to accept increases in
the ship’s vertical center of gravity. Navy ship classes are typically designed so that the first ships
in the class will be built with a certain amount of growth margin. Over time, some or all of the
growth margin in a ship class may be used up by backfitting additional or newer systems onto
existing ships in the class, or by building later ships in the class to a modified design that includes
additional or newer systems.
Modifying the DDG-51 design over time has used up some of the design’s growth margin. The
Flight III DDG-51 would in some respects have less of a growth margin than what the Navy
would aim to include in a new destroyer design of about the same size. A January 18, 2013, press
report stated, “In making decisions about the [Flight III] ship’s power, cooling, weight and other
margins, [DDG-51 program manager Captain Mark] Vandroff said [in a presentation at a
conference on January 15, 2013, that] the Navy wanted to ensure that there was room to grow in
the future, to allow for modernization as well as capability upgrades when new weapons such as
the electromagnetic railgun enter the fleet. Allowing for growth was balanced with cost, and
Vandroff said he thought the program did a great job of coming up with an affordable solution to
a leap-ahead capability for the fleet.”21 In his presentation, Vandroff showed a slide comparing the
growth margins of the Flight III design to those of Flight IIA DDG-51s procured or scheduled to
be procured in FY2010-FY2014; the slide is reproduced below as Figure 2.
21 Megan Eckstein, “Flight III DDGs To Cost About $2 Billion, Have Margins For Future Growth,” Inside the Navy,
January 18, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
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Figure 2. Navy Briefing Slide on DDG-51 Growth Margins
Flight III DDG-51 Design Compared to Flight IIA DDG-51s
FY10 Flt IIA – FY16* Flt III
Service Life Allowance Comparison
Weight SLA
KG SLA (ft)
12%
1.00
0.90
10%
0.80
0.70
8%
B
Cu
0.60
asel
6%
rr
SPQ-
AM
0.50
en
in
D
0.40
B
Cu
e
t
9
SPQ-
R
4%
B
asel
AM
-S
0.30
rr
∆
e
D
i
9
∆
0.20
n
n
B
R
2%
e
t
-S
0.10
∆
∆
0%
0.00
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
10
12
13
14
16
10
12
13
14
16
FY14 Flt IIA with SPQ-9B; FY16 Flt III with AMDR-S
FY14 Flt IIA with SPQ-9B; FY16 Flt III with AMDR-S
Electric Power SLA
Cooling SLA - Connected Loads
35%
25%
30%
20%
25%
B
Cu
450 V
45
450
416
15%
20%
as rr
0 V
B
Cu
5x20
5x20
5x20
5x300T
e
V
0 V
asel
15%
li
e
ne
n
A
A
A
10%
rr
t
C
C
C
A
en
0T
0T
0T
C
in
10%
e
t
ACs
ACs
ACs
A
5%
C
5%
s
0%
0%
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
FY
1
1
1
1
1
10
12
13
14
16
0
2
3
4
6
FY16 Flt III with change to 3x4MW GTGS & 4160 VAC
FY16 Flt III with change to 5x300T HES-C AC Units
Notes:
1. - * Second ship in FY16 is designated as the DDG 51 Flight III
2. - FY10 values are calculated, out year values are projections based on Not to Exceed Design Budget Estimates
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.
15
Source: Presentation of Captain Mark Vandroff to Surface Navy Association, January 15-17, 2013; a copy of the slides was provided to CRS by the Navy Office of
Legislative Affairs on January 28, 2013.
Note: SLA means service life al owance (i.e., growth margin).
CRS-9
Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
A June 7, 2013, blog post stated:
The Navy is confident it has enough space, power and cooling onboard the hull of its
planned new line of destroyers to accommodate the planned high-powered Air and Missile
Defense Radar (AMDR), Capt. Mark Vandroff, Naval Sea Systems Command program
manager for the DDG-51 shipbuilding program, told USNI News in an interview on
Thursday.
However, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer (DDG-51) Flight III would be limited in the
amount of additional weapons the ship could accommodate—including electromagnetic
railguns and high-energy lasers—without removing other capabilities.
“Depending on how heavy that railgun is, could you fit it on a DDG? My answer is what on
that DDG are you willing to live without right now?” Vandroff said.
“You wouldn’t have the space and weight to put on something very large without something
relatively sizable coming off.”22
Supporters of the Navy’s proposal to procure Flight III DDG-51s could argue that the ship’s
growth margin would be comparable to that of recently procured Flight IIA DDG-51s, and would
be adequate because the increase in capability achieved with the Flight III configuration reduces
the likelihood that the ship will need much subsequent modification to retain its mission
effectiveness over its projected service life. They could also argue that, given technology
advances, new systems added to the ship years from now might require no more (and possibly
less) space, weight, electrical power, or cooling capacity than the older systems they replace.
Skeptics could argue that there are uncertainties involved in projecting what types of capabilities
ships might need to have to remain mission effective over a 35- or 40-year life, and that building
expensive new warships with relatively modest growth margins consequently would be
imprudent. The Flight III DDG-51’s growth margin, they could argue, could make it more likely
that the ships would need to be removed from service well before the end of their projected
service lives due to an inability to accept modifications needed to preserve their mission
effectiveness. Skeptics could argue that it might not be possible to fit the Flight III DDG-51 in the
future with a high-power (200 kW to 300 kW) solid state laser (SSL), because the ship would not
have enough available electrical power or cooling capacity to support such a weapon. Skeptics
could argue that high-power SSLs could be critical to the Navy’s ability years from now to
affordably counter large numbers of enemy anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and anti-ship
ballistic missiles (ASBMs) that might be fielded by a wealthy and determined adversary. Skeptics
could argue that procuring Flight III DDG-51s could delay the point at which high-power SSLs
could be introduced into the cruiser-destroyer force, and reduce for many years the portion of the
cruiser-destroyer force that could ultimately be backfitted with high-power SSLs. This, skeptics
could argue, might result in an approach to AAW and BMD on cruisers and destroyers that might
ultimately be unaffordable for the Navy to sustain in a competition against a wealthy and
determined adversary.23
22 “NAVSEA on Flight III Arleigh Burkes,” USNI News, June 7, 2013, accessed July 1, 2013, at http://news.usni.org/
2013/06/07/navsea-on-flight-iii-arleigh-burkes.
23 For more on potential shipboard lasers, see CRS Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and
Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Flight III DDG-51: Issues Raised in January 2014 DOT&E Report
Another issue for Congress concerns issues raised in a January 2014 report from DOD’s Director
of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E’s annual report for FY2013. Regarding
the Flight III DDG-51 program, the report stated:
Executive Summary
• On May 22, 2013, DOT&E disapproved the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) Test
and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) because the proposed operational test approach did not
adequately assess the capability of that radar to support the DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer’s
self-defense mission.
- Safety restrictions preclude realistic testing on manned ships in this region of the
battlespace. Consequently, an unmanned test ship equipped with an AMDR and an Aegis
DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer Combat System is required for adequate operational testing and
assessment of the AMDR and DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer’s self-defense capabilities.
- This approach is similar to the Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS) currently used for testing the
self-defense capabilities of ships equipped with Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS)-based
combat systems
• On August 9, 2013, DOT&E disapproved the Aegis Modernization TEMP because the
proposed operational testing did not provide the credible modeling and simulation (M&S)
effort needed to fully assess the DDG 51’s combat system self-defense capability, nor a
means to validate the M&S (i.e., an unmanned SDTS equipped with an AMDR and the DDG
51 Flight III Combat System)....
Activity
• DOT&E issued two classified memoranda to USD(AT&L) (February 25 and May 5, 2013)
in preparation for the AMDR Milestone B decision. Both memoranda highlighted severe
shortfalls in the operational test plans in the AMDR and DDG 51 Flight III ship self-defense
test arena and stressed the requirement for an unmanned SDTS equipped with the AMDR
and DDG 51 Flight III Combat System for adequate operational testing of the radar and
ship’s combat system self-defense capability.
• DOT&E disapproved the AMDR TEMP on May 22, 2013, because the proposed
operational test approach did not adequately assess the capability of the AMDR to support
the DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer’s self-defense mission.
• DOT&E disapproved the Aegis Modernization TEMP on August 9, 2013, because the
proposed operational testing did not provide a credible M&S effort needed to fully assess the
ship’s combat system self-defense capability nor a means to validate the M&S (i.e., an
unmanned SDTS equipped with an AMDR and the DDG 51 Flight III Combat System).
Assessment
• The operational test programs for the AMDR, Aegis Modernization, and DDG 51 Flight III
Destroyer programs are not adequate to fully assess their self-defense capabilities in addition
to being inadequate to test the following Navy‑approved AMDR and DDG 51 Flight III
requirements.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
- The AMDR Capability Development Document describes AMDR’s IAMD mission, which
requires AMDR to support simultaneous defense against multiple ballistic missile threats and
multiple advanced anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) threats. The Capability Development
Document also includes an AMDR minimum track range Key Performance Parameter.
- The DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer has a survivability requirement directly tied to meeting a
self-defense requirement threshold against ASCMs described in the Navy’s Surface Ship
Theater Air and Missile Defense Assessment document of July 2008. It clearly states that
area defense will not defeat all the threats, thereby demonstrating that area air defense will
not completely attrite all ASCM raids and that individual ships must be capable of defeating
ASCM leakers in the self-defense zone.
• Conduct of operational testing with threat‑representative ASCM surrogates in the close-in,
self-defense battlespace using manned ships is not possible since current Navy test range
safety restrictions preclude testing on manned ships in this region because targets and debris
from intercepts will pose an unacceptable risk to personnel at ranges where some of the
engagements will take place.
- In addition to stand-off ranges (on the order of 2 to 5 nautical miles for subsonic and
supersonic surrogates, respectively), safety restrictions require that supersonic ASCM targets
not be flown directly at a manned ship, but at some cross-range offset (approximately 1
nautical mile), which unacceptably degrades the operational realism of the test.
- Similar range safety restrictions will preclude testing the AMDR minimum track range
requirement against supersonic, sea-skimming ASCM threat-representative surrogates at the
land-based AMDR test site at the Pacific Missile Range Facility.
• Due to the inherent complexity and safety limitations, live testing (without an SDTS)
cannot provide sufficient data to assess the self-defense capabilities of the AMDR and the
DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer.
- M&S will therefore play a major role in determining those capabilities. However, per
public law, M&S cannot be the only contributor to the assessment; realistic operational test
results are required.
- M&S can support an operational evaluation, but must be accredited not only with manned
test ship testing, but also through end-to-end testing against operationally realistic targets
equipped with an ADMR and the DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer Combat System in the close-
in, self-defense battlespace.
- The extent to which the Navy can use M&S to assess AMDR and DDG 51 Flight III’s self-
defense capability depends critically on whether the M&S can be rigorously accredited for
operational testing.
- Side-by-side comparison between credible live fire test results and M&S test results form
the basis for M&S accreditation. Without an Aegis SDTS, there will not be a way to gather
the operationally realistic live fire test data needed for comparison to accredit the M&S.
• The Air Warfare/Ship Self Defense Enterprise M&S accreditation paradigm being used in
the test programs for LHA-6, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), DDG 1000, LPD-17, LSD-41/49,
and CVN-78 ship classes was approved by the Navy and DOT&E in 2005. It is based on live
fire events conducted on manned ships and an SDTS, as well as M&S events conducted in
the same configuration.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
- The live firings conducted in the close-in, self-defense battlespace can only be
accomplished with an SDTS due to the range safety restrictions on testing with manned
ships.
- For the AMDR and DDG 51 Flight III, the paradigm will be the same; whatever end-to-end
M&S tool is developed must be accredited for use in operational testing by comparing live
fire results in the close-in battlespace to simulated events in the close-in battlespace.
- Those live fire events can only be conducted on an SDTS equipped with the AMDR and
the DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer Combat System. DOT&E considers that paradigm to be the
credible template for application by the AMDR and DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer operational
test programs.
• The Navy currently models the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) with Lockheed Martin’s
Multi-Target Effectiveness Determined under Simulation by Aegis (MEDUSA) M&S tool.
- MEDUSA encompasses several components of the AWS including the SPY-1 radar,
Command and Decision, and Weapon Control System. MEDUSA models AWS performance
down to the system specification and the Navy considers it a high-fidelity simulation of
AWS.
- However, it is not a tactical code model; so, its fidelity is ultimately limited to how closely
the specification corresponds to the Aegis tactical code (i.e., the specification is how the
system is supposed to work while the tactical code is how the system actually works). This
adds to the need for realistic live fire shots to support validation efforts.
- By comparison, the Air Warfare/Ship Self Defense Enterprise M&S test bed used for
assessing USS San Antonio’s (LPD-17) self-defense capabilities used re-hosted SSDS Mk 2
tactical code.
• Recent test events highlight the limitations of specification models like MEDUSA. During
Aegis Advanced Capability Build 08 testing in 2011, five AWS software errors were found
during live fire events and tracking exercises.
- Three software errors contributed to a failed SM-2 engagement, one to a failed ESSM
engagement, and one to several failed simulated engagements during tracking exercises.
- Since these problems involved software coding errors, it is unlikely that a specification
model like MEDUSA (which assumes no software errors in tactical code) would account for
such issues and hence it would overestimate the combat system’s capability.
• Since Aegis employs ESSM in the close-in, self-defense battlespace, understanding
ESSM’s performance is critical to understanding the self-defense capabilities of the DDG 51
Flight III Destroyer.
- Past DOT&E Annual Reports have stated that the ESSM’s operational effectiveness has not
been determined. The Navy has not taken action to adequately test the ESSM’s operational
effectiveness.
- Specifically, because safety limitations preclude ESSM firing in the close-in self-defense
battlespace, there are very little test data available concerning ESSM’s performance, as
installed on Aegis ships, against supersonic ASCM surrogates.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
- Any data available regarding ESSM’s performance against supersonic ASCM surrogates
are from an SSDS- based combat system configuration, using a completely different
guidance mode or one that is supported by a different radar suite.
• The cost of building and operating an Aegis SDTS is small when compared to the total cost
of the AMDR development/ procurement and the eventual cost of the 22 (plus) DDG 51
Flight III ships that are planned for acquisition ($55+ Billion). Even smaller is the cost of the
SDTS compared to the cost of the ships that the DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer is expected to
protect (~$450 Billion in new ship construction over the next 30 years).
- If DDG 51 Flight III Destroyers are unable to defend themselves, these other ships are
placed at greater risk.
- Moreover, the SDTS is not a one-time investment for only the AMDR/DDG 51 Flight III
IOT&E, as it would be available for other testing that cannot be conducted with manned
ships (e.g., the ESSM Block 2) and as the combat system capabilities are improved.
Recommendations
• Status of Previous Recommendations. There are no previous recommendations.
• FY13 Recommendations. The Navy should:
1. Program and fund an SDTS equipped with the AMDR and DDG 51 Flight III Combat
System in time for the AMDR/DDG 51 Flight III Destroyer IOT&E.
2. Modify the AMDR, Aegis Modernization, and DDG 51 Flight III TEMPs to include a
phase of IOT&E using an SDTS equipped with the AMDR and DDG 51 Flight III Combat
System.
3. Modify the AMDR, Aegis Modernization, and DDG 51 Flight III TEMPs to include a
credible M&S effort that will enable a full assessment of the AMDR and DDG 51 Flight III
Combat System’s self-defense capabilities.24
Flight III DDG-51: Adequacy of AAW and BMD Capability
Another issue for Congress is whether the Flight III DDG-51 will have sufficient AAW and BMD
capability to adequately perform future AAW and BMD missions. The Flight III DDG-51 would
have more AAW and BMD capability than the current DDG-51 design, but less AAW and BMD
capability than was envisioned for the CG(X) cruiser, in large part because the Flight III DDG-51
would be equipped with a 14-foot-diameter version of the AMDR that would have more
sensitivity than the SPY-1 radar on Flight IIA DDG-51s, but less sensitivity than the substantially
larger version of the AMDR that was envisioned for the CG(X). The CG(X) also may have had
more missile-launch tubes than the Flight III DDG-51.
The Navy argues that while the version of the AMDR on the Flight III DDG-51 will have less
sensitivity than the larger version of the AMDR envisioned for the CG(X), the version of the
24 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2013 Annual Report, January 2014, pp.
161-164. For additional discussion, see Olga Belogolova, “DDG-51 Program Still At Odds With DOT&E Over Self
Defense Test Ship,” Inside the Navy, March 24, 2014.
Congressional Research Service
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
AMDR on the Flight III DDG-51 will provide sufficient AAW and BMD capability to address
future air and missile threats. A March 2013 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
assessing selected DOD acquisition programs stated:
The Navy plans to install a 14-foot variant of AMDR on Flight III DDG 51s starting in 2019.
According to draft AMDR documents, a 14-foot radar is needed to meet threshold
requirements, but an over 20-foot radar is required to fully meet the Navy’s desired
integrated air and missile defense needs. However, the shipyards and the Navy have
determined that a 14-foot active radar is the largest that can be accommodated within the
existing DDG 51 deckhouse. Navy officials stated that AMDR is being developed as a
scalable design but a new ship would be required to host a larger version of AMDR....
The X-band portion of AMDR will be comprised of an upgraded version of an existing
rotating radar (SPQ-9B), instead of the new design initially planned. The new radar will
instead be developed as a separate program at a later date and integrated with the 13th AMDR
unit. According to the Navy, the SPQ-9B radar fits better within the Flight III DDG 51’s sea
frame and expected power and cooling. While program officials state that the upgraded SPQ-
9B radar will have capabilities equal to the new design for current anti-air warfare threats, it
will not perform as well against future threats.25
Lack of Roadmap for Accomplishing Three Things in Cruiser-
Destroyer Force
Another issue for Congress concerns the lack of an announced Navy roadmap for accomplishing
three things in the cruiser-destroyer force:
• restoring ship growth margins;
• introducing large numbers of ships with integrated electric drive systems or other
technologies that could provide ample electrical power for supporting future
electrically powered weapons (such as high-power solid state lasers); and
• introducing technologies (such as those for substantially reducing ship crew size)
for substantially reducing ship operating and support (O&S) costs. (The potential
importance of high-power solid state lasers is discussed in the previous section
on the Flight III DDG-51’s growth margin.)
The Navy’s pre-2008 plan to procure DDG-1000 destroyers and then CG(X) cruisers based on the
DDG-1000 hull design represented the Navy’s roadmap at the time for restoring growth margins,
and for introducing into the cruiser-destroyer force significant numbers of ships with integrated
electric drive systems and technologies for substantially reducing ship crew sizes. The ending of
the DDG-1000 and CG(X) programs in favor of continued procurement of DDG-51s leaves the
Navy without an announced roadmap to do these things, because the Flight III DDG-51 will not
feature a fully restored growth margin, will not be equipped with an integrated electric drive
system or other technologies that could provide ample electrical power for supporting future
electrically powered weapons, and will not incorporate features for substantially reducing ship
crew size or for otherwise reducing ship O&S costs substantially below that of Flight IIA DDG-
51s.
25 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-13-
294SP, March 2013, p. 46.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Options for Congress
In general, options for Congress concerning destroyer acquisition include the following:
• approving, rejecting, or modifying the Navy’s procurement, advance
procurement, and research and development funding requests for destroyers and
their associated systems (such as the AMDR);
• establishing conditions for the obligation and expenditure of funding for
destroyers and their associated systems; and
• holding hearings, directing reports, and otherwise requesting information from
DOD on destroyers and their associated systems.
In addition to these general options, below are some additional acquisition options relating to
destroyers that Congress may wish to consider.
Adjunct Radar Ship
The Navy canceled the CG(X) cruiser program in favor of developing and procuring Flight III
DDG-51s reportedly in part on the grounds that the Flight III destroyer would use data from off-
board sensors to augment data collected by its AMDR.26 If those off-board sensors turn out to be
less capable than the Navy assumed when it decided to cancel the CG(X) in favor of the Flight III
DDG-51, the Navy may need to seek other means for augmenting the data collected by the Flight
III DDG-51’s AMDR.
One option for doing this would be to procure an adjunct radar ship—a non-combat ship
equipped with a large radar that would be considerably more powerful than the Flight III DDG-
51’s AMDR. The presence in the fleet of a ship equipped with such a radar could significantly
improve the fleet’s AAW and BMD capabilities. The ship might be broadly similar to (but
perhaps less complex and less expensive than) the new Cobra Judy Replacement missile range
instrumentation ship (Figure 3),27 which is equipped with two large and powerful radars, and
26 Amy Butler, “STSS Prompts Shift in CG(X) Plans,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, December 11, 2009: 1-2.
27 As described by DOD,
The COBRA JUDY REPLACEMENT (CJR) program replaces the capability of the current United
States Naval Ship (USNS) Observation Island (OBIS), its COBRA JUDY radar suite, and other
mission essential systems. CJR will fulfill the same mission as the current COBRA JUDY/OBIS.
CJR will collect foreign ballistic missile data in support of international treaty verification.
CJR represents an integrated mission solution: ship, radar suite, and other Mission Equipment
(ME). CJR will consist of a radar suite including active S-Band and X-Band Phased Array Radars
(PARs), weather equipment, and a Mission Communications Suite (MCS). The radar suite will be
capable of autonomous volume search and acquisition. The S-Band PAR will serve as the primary
search and acquisition sensor and will be capable of tracking and collecting data on a large number
of objects in a multi-target complex. The X-Band PAR will provide very high-resolution data on
particular objects of interest.…
The OBIS replacement platform, USNS Howard O. Lorenzen (Missile Range Instrumentation Ship
(T-AGM) 25), is a commercially designed and constructed ship, classed to American Bureau of
Shipping standards, certified by the U.S. Coast Guard in accordance with Safety of Life at Sea, and
in compliance with other commercial regulatory body rules and regulations, and other Military
Sealift Command (MSC) standards. The ship will be U.S. flagged, operated by a Merchant Marine
(continued...)
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
which has an estimated total acquisition cost of about $1.7 billion.28 One to a few such adjunct
radar ships might be procured, depending on the number of theaters to be covered, requirements
for maintaining forward deployments of such ships, and their homeporting arrangements. The
ships would have little or no self-defense capability and would need to be protected in threat
situations by other Navy ships.
Figure 3. Cobra Judy Replacement Ship
Source: Naval Research Laboratory (http://www.nrl.navy.mil/PressReleases/2010/image1_74-10r_hires.jpg,
accessed on April 19, 2011).
Flight III DDG-51 With Increased Capabilities
Another option would be to design the Flight III DDG-51 to have greater capabilities than what
the Navy is currently envisioning. Doing this might well require the DDG-51 hull to be
lengthened—something that the Navy currently does not appear to be envisioning for the Flight
III design. Navy and industry studies on the DDG-51 hull design that were performed years ago
suggested that the hull has the potential for being lengthened by as much as 55 feet to
accommodate additional systems. Building the Flight III DDG-51 to a lengthened configuration
(...continued)
or MSC Civilian Mariner crew, with a minimum of military specifications. The ship is projected to
have a 30-year operating system life-cycle.
The U.S. Navy will procure one CJR for the U.S. Air Force using only Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation funding. CJR will be turned over to the U.S. Air Force at Initial Operational
Capability for all operations and maintenance support….
Program activities are currently focused on installation and final integration of the X and S-band
radars onto the ship at Kiewit Offshore Services (KOS) following completion of radar production
and initial Integration and Test (I&T) at Raytheon and Northrop Grumman (NG). Raytheon and its
subcontractors have completed I&T of the X-band radar and X/S ancillary equipment at KOS. The
S-band radar arrived at KOS on February 19, 2011. The United States Naval Ship (USNS) Howard
O. Lorenzen (Missile Range Instrumentation Ship (T-AGM) 25) completed at-sea Builder’s Trials
(BT) in March 2011. The ship is expected to depart VT Halter Marine (VTHM) and arrive at KOS
in the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2011 (3QFY11).
(Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), Cobra Judy Replacement, December
31, 2010, pp. 3-5.)
28 Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), Cobra Judy Replacement, December 31, 2010, p. 13.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
could make room for additional power-generation and cooling equipment, additional vertical
launch system (VLS) missile tubes, and larger growth margins. It might also permit a redesign of
the deckhouse to support a larger and more capable version of the AMDR than the 14-foot
diameter version currently planned for the Flight III DDG-51. Building the Flight III DDG-51 to
a lengthened configuration would increase its development cost and its unit procurement cost.
The increase in unit procurement cost could reduce the number of Flight III DDG-51s that the
Navy could afford to procure without reducing funding for other programs.
DDG-1000 Variant With AMDR
Another option would be to design and procure a version of the DDG-1000 destroyer that is
equipped with the AMDR and capable of BMD operations. Such a ship might be more capable in
some regards than the Flight III DDG-51, but it might also be more expensive to develop and
procure. An AMDR-equipped, BMD-capable version of the DDG-1000 could be pursued as either
a replacement for the Flight III DDG-51 or a successor to the Flight III DDG-51 (after some
number of Flight III DDG-51s were procured). A new estimate of the cost to develop and procure
an AMDR-equipped, BMD-capable version of the DDG-1000 might differ from the estimate in
the Navy’s 2009 destroyer hull/radar study (the study that led to the Navy’s decision to stop
DDG-1000 procurement and resume DDG-51 procurement) due to the availability of updated
cost information for building the current DDG-1000 design.
New-Design Destroyer
Another option would be to design and procure a new-design destroyer that is intermediate in size
between the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 designs, equipped with the AMDR, and capable of BMD
operations. This option could be pursued as either a replacement for the Flight III DDG-51 or a
successor to the Flight III DDG-51 (after some number of Flight III DDG-51s were procured).
Such a ship might be designed with the following characteristics:
• either the same version of the AMDR that is envisioned for the Flight III DDG-
51, or a version that is larger (but not as large as the one envisioned for the
CG[X]);
• enough electrical power and cooling capacity to permit the ship to be backfitted
in the future with a high-power SSL;
• more growth margin than on the Flight III DDG-51;
• producibility features for reducing construction cost per ton that are more
extensive than those on the DDG-51 design;
• automation features permitting a crew that is smaller than what can be achieved
on a Flight III DDG-51, so as to reduce ship O&S costs;
• physical open-architecture features that are more extensive than those on the
Flight III DDG-51, so as to reduce modernization-related life-cycle ownership
costs;
• no technologies not already on, or being developed for, other Navy ships, with
the possible exception of technologies that would enable an integrated electric
drive system that is more compact than the one used on the DDG-1000; and
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• DDG-51-like characteristics in other areas, such as survivability, maximum
speed, cruising range, and weapons payload.
Such a ship might have a full load displacement of roughly 11,000 to 12,000 tons, compared to
about 10,000 tons for the Flight III DDG-51, 15,000 or more tons for an AAW/BMD version of
the DDG-1000, and perhaps 15,000 to 23,000 tons for a CG(X).29
A March 18, 2013, press report states that
A recommended reevaluation of the next flights of LCSs [Littoral Combat Ships]30... is only
part of a classified memo, “Vision for the 2025 Surface Fleet,” submitted late last year by the
head of Naval Surface Forces, Vice Adm. Tom Copeman, to Chief of Naval Operations
Adm. Jon Greenert....
Copeman, according to several sources familiar with the document, also recommended
against building the DDG 51 Flight III destroyers, a modification of the Arleigh Burke class
to be fitted with the new Air Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) under development to replace
the SPY-1 radars used in Aegis warships. The AMDR, designed with higher power and
fidelity to handle the complex ballistic-missile defense mission, will require significantly
more electrical power than the current system. And, while the AMDR apparently will fit into
the DDG 51 hull, margins for future growth are severely limited.
Instead, sources said Copeman recommends creating a new, large surface combatant fitted
with AMDR and designed with the power, weight and space to field “top-end energy
weapons” like the electromagnetic rail gun under development by the Navy.
The new ship could also be developed into a replacement for today’s Ticonderoga-class
missile cruisers in the air defense mission of protecting deployed aircraft carriers—a mission
Copeman says needs to be preserved. All flattops have a “shotgun” cruiser that accompanies
them throughout a deployment, but the missile ships are aging and, by 2025, only four will
remain in service to protect the fleet’s 11 carriers.
The Navy prefers cruisers over destroyers for the role because of the bigger ships’ extra
missile fire control channels, their more senior commanders and a better ability to tow the
carrier should it be disabled.
29 The cost and technical risk of developing the new destroyer’s hull design could be minimized by leveraging, where
possible, existing surface combatant hull designs. The cost and technical risk of developing its combat system could be
minimized by using a modified version of the DDG-51 or DDG-1000 combat system. Other development costs and
risks for the new destroyer would be minimized by using no technologies not already on, or being developed for, other
Navy ships (with the possible exception of some integrated electric drive technologies). Even with such steps, however,
the cost and technical risk of developing the new destroyer would be greater than those of the Flight III DDG-51. The
development cost of the new destroyer would likely be equivalent to the procurement cost of at least one destroyer, and
possibly two destroyers.
The procurement cost of the new destroyer would be minimized by incorporating producibility features for reducing
construction cost per ton that are more extensive than those on the Flight III DDG-51. Even with such features, the new
destroyer would be more expensive to procure than the Flight III DDG-51, in part because the Flight III DDG-51 would
leverage many years of prior production of DDG-51s. In addition, the new destroyer, as a new ship design, would pose
more risk of procurement cost growth than would the Flight III DDG-51. The procurement cost of the new destroyer
would nevertheless be much less than that of the CG(X), and might, after the production of the first few units, be fairly
close to that of the Flight III DDG-51.
30 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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While recommending against the Flight III, Copeman would continue building the existing
DDG 51 Flight IIA variant until a new design is available.31
Legislative Activity for FY2015
FY2015 Funding Request
The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two DDG-51s requested for
procurement in FY2015 at $2,969.4 million, or an average of $1,484.7 million each. The two
ships have received a total of $297.9 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding.
The Navy’s proposed FY2015 budget requests the remaining $2,671.4 million to complete the
two ships’ combined procurement cost. The Navy’s proposed FY2015 budget also requests
$129.1 million to complete the cost of one of the three DDG-51s funded in FY2013 (where a
funding shortfall occurred as a result of the March 1, 2013, sequester on Department of Defense
[DOD] programs), and $134.0 million in advance procurement (AP) funding for DDG-51s to be
procured in future fiscal years, bringing the total requested for the DDG-51 program for FY2015
(excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $2,934.6 million.32
The Navy’s proposed FY2015 budget also requests $419.5 million in procurement funding to help
complete the procurement cost of three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers procured in
FY2007-FY2009, and $144.7 million in research and development funding for the AMDR. The
funding request for the AMDR is contained in the Navy’s research and development account as
Program Element (PE) 0604522N (“Advanced Missile Defense Radar [AMDR] System”), aka
line 118.
31 Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy Weighs Halving LCS Order,” Defense News, March 18, 2013: 1.
32 The figures in this paragraph do not add exactly due to rounding of figures to the nearest tenth of a million dollars.
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Appendix A. Additional Background Information
on DDG-1000 Program
This appendix presents additional background information on the DDG-1000 program.
Program Origin
The program known today as the DDG-1000 program was announced on November 1, 2001,
when the Navy stated that it was replacing a destroyer-development effort called the DD-21
program, which the Navy had initiated in the mid-1990s, with a new Future Surface Combatant
Program aimed at developing and acquiring a family of three new classes of surface
combatants:33
• a destroyer called DD(X) for the precision long-range strike and naval gunfire
mission;
• a cruiser called CG(X) for the air defense and ballistic missile mission; and
• a smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter
submarines, small surface attack craft (also called “swarm boats”), and mines in
heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.34
On April 7, 2006, the Navy announced that it had redesignated the DD(X) program as the DDG-
1000 program. The Navy also confirmed in that announcement that the first ship in the class,
DDG-1000, is to be named the Zumwalt, in honor of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, the Chief of
Naval operations from 1970 to 1974. The decision to name the first ship after Zumwalt was made
by the Clinton Administration in July 2000, when the program was still called the DD-21
program.35
New Technologies
The DDG-1000 incorporates a significant number of new technologies, including a wave-
piercing, tumblehome hull design for reduced detectability,36 a superstructure made partly of large
sections of composite (i.e., fiberglass-like) materials rather than steel or aluminum, an integrated
33 The DD-21 program was part of a Navy surface combatant acquisition effort begun in the mid-1990s and called the
SC-21 (Surface Combatant for the 21st Century) program. The SC-21 program envisaged a new destroyer called DD-21
and a new cruiser called CG-21. When the Navy announced the Future Surface Combatant Program in 2001,
development work on the DD-21 had been underway for several years, while the start of development work on the CG-
21 was still years in the future. The current DDG-1000 destroyer CG(X) cruiser programs can be viewed as the
descendants, respectively, of the DD-21 and CG-21. The acronym SC-21 is still used in the Navy’s research and
development account to designate the line item (i.e., program element) that funds development work on both the DDG-
1000 and CG(X).
34 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
35 For more on Navy ship names, see CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
36 A tumblehome hull slopes inward, toward the ship’s centerline, as it rises up from the waterline, in contrast to a
conventional flared hull, which slopes outward as it rises up from the waterline.
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electric-drive propulsion system,37 a total-ship computing system for moving information about
the ship, automation technologies enabling its reduced-sized crew, a dual-band radar, a new kind
of vertical launch system (VLS) for storing and firing missiles, and two copies of a 155mm gun
called the Advanced Gun System (AGS). The AGS is to fire a new rocket-assisted 155mm shell,
called the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP), to ranges of more than 60 nautical miles.
The DDG-1000 can carry 600 LRLAP rounds (300 for each gun), and additional rounds can be
brought aboard the ship while the guns are firing, creating what Navy officials call an “infinite
magazine.”
Planned Quantity
When the DD-21 program was initiated, a total of 32 ships was envisaged. In subsequent years,
the planned total for the DD(X)/DDG-1000 program was reduced to 16 to 24, then to 7, and
finally to 3.
Construction Shipyards
Under a DDG-1000 acquisition strategy approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) on February 24, 2004, the first DDG-1000
was to have been built by HII/Ingalls, the second ship was to have been built by GD/BIW, and
contracts for building the first six were to have been equally divided between HII/Ingalls38 and
GD/BIW.
In February 2005, Navy officials announced that they would seek approval from USD AT&L to
instead hold a one-time, winner-take-all competition between HII/Ingalls and GD/BIW to build
all DDG-1000s. On April 20, 2005, the USD AT&L issued a decision memorandum deferring this
proposal, stating in part, “at this time, I consider it premature to change the shipbuilder portion of
the acquisition strategy which I approved on February 24, 2004.”
Several Members of Congress also expressed opposition to Navy’s proposal for a winner-take-all
competition. Congress included a provision (§1019) in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for 2005 (H.R. 1268/P.L. 109-13 of May 11, 2005) prohibiting a winner-take-
all competition. The provision effectively required the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but did not specify the share of the program that is to go to the additional
shipyard.
On May 25, 2005, the Navy announced that, in light of Section 1019 of P.L. 109-13, it wanted to
shift to a “dual-lead-ship” acquisition strategy, under which two DDG-1000s would be procured
in FY2007, with one to be designed and built by HII/Ingalls and the other by GD/BIW.
Section 125 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163) again prohibited
the Navy from using a winner-take-all acquisition strategy for procuring its next-generation
destroyer. The provision again effectively requires the participation of at least one additional
37 For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
38 At the time of the events described in this section, HII was owned by Northrop Grumman and was called Northrop
Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).
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shipyard in the program but does not specify the share of the program that is to go to the
additional shipyard.
On November 23, 2005, the USD AT&L granted Milestone B approval for the DDG-1000,
permitting the program to enter the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. As
part of this decision, the USD AT&L approved the Navy’s proposed dual-lead-ship acquisition
strategy and a low rate initial production quantity of eight ships (one more than the Navy
subsequently planned to procure).
On February 14, 2008, the Navy awarded contract modifications to GD/BIW and HII/Ingalls for
the construction of the two lead ships. The awards were modifications to existing contracts that
the Navy has with GD/BIW and HII/Ingalls for detailed design and construction of the two lead
ships. Under the modified contracts, the line item for the construction of the dual lead ships is
treated as a cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) item.
Until July 2007, it was expected that HII/Ingalls would be the final-assembly yard for the first
DDG-1000 and that GD/BIW would be the final-assembly yard for the second. On September 25,
2007, the Navy announced that it had decided to build the first DDG-1000 at GD/BIW, and the
second at HII/Ingalls.
On January 12, 2009, it was reported that the Navy, HII/Ingalls, and GD/BIW in the fall of 2008
began holding discussions on the idea of having GD/BIW build both the first and second DDG-
1000s, in exchange for HII/Ingalls receiving a greater share of the new DDG-51s that would be
procured under the Navy’s July 2008 proposal to stop DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG-
51 procurement.39
On April 8, 2009, it was reported that the Navy had reached an agreement with HII/Ingalls and
GD/BIW to shift the second DDG-1000 to GD/BIW, and to have GD/BIW build all three ships.
HII/Iingalls will continue to make certain parts of the three ships, notably their composite
deckhouses. The agreement to have all three DDG-1000s built at GD/BIW was a condition that
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates set forth in an April 6, 2009, news conference on the FY2010
defense budget for his support for continuing with the construction of all three DDG-1000s
(rather than proposing the cancellation of the second and third).
Procurement Cost Cap
Section 123 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2006)
limited the procurement cost of the fifth DDG-1000 to $2.3 billion, plus adjustments for inflation
and other factors. Given the truncation of the DDG-1000 program to three ships, this unit
procurement cost cap appears moot.
39 Christopher P. Cavas, “Will Bath Build Second DDG 1000?” Defense News, January 12, 2009: 1, 6.
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2010 Nunn-McCurdy Breach, Program Restructuring, and
Milestone Recertification
On February 1, 2010, the Navy notified Congress that the DDG-1000 program had experienced a
critical cost breach under the Nunn-McCurdy provision. The Nunn-McCurdy provision (10
U.S.C. 2433a) requires certain actions to be taken if a major defense acquisition program exceeds
(i.e., breaches) certain cost-growth thresholds and is not terminated. Among other things, a
program that experiences a cost breach large enough to qualify under the provision as a critical
cost breach has its previous acquisition system milestone certification revoked. (In the case of the
DDG-1000 program, this was Milestone B.) In addition, for the program to proceed rather than be
terminated, DOD must certify certain things, including that the program is essential to national
security and that there are no alternatives to the program that will provide acceptable capability to
meet the joint military requirement at less cost.40
The Navy stated in its February 1, 2010, notification letter that the DDG-1000 program’s critical
cost breach was a mathematical consequence of the program’s truncation to three ships.41 Since
the DDG-1000 program has roughly $9.3 billion in research and development costs, truncating
the program to three ships increased to roughly $3.1 billion the average amount of research and
development costs that are included in the average acquisition cost (i.e., average research and
development cost plus procurement cost) of each DDG-1000. The resulting increase in program
acquisition unit cost (PAUC)—one of two measures used under the Nunn-McCurdy provision for
measuring cost growth42—was enough to cause a Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach.
In a June 1, 2010, letter (with attachment) to Congress, Ashton Carter, the DOD acquisition
executive (i.e., the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), stated
that he had restructured the DDG-1000 program and that he was issuing the certifications
required under the Nunn-McCurdy provision for the restructured DDG-1000 program to
proceed.43 The letter stated that the restructuring of the DDG-1000 program included the
following:
• A change to the DDG-1000’s design affecting its primary radar.
• A change in the program’s Initial Operational Capability (IOC) from FY2015 to
FY2016.
• A revision to the program’s testing and evaluation requirements.
Regarding the change to the ship’s design affecting its primary radar, the DDG-1000 originally
was to have been equipped with a dual-band radar (DBR) consisting of the Raytheon-built X-
40 For more on the Nunn-McCurdy provision, see CRS Report R41293, The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background,
Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz.
41 Source: Letter to congressional offices dated February 1, 2010, from Robert O. Work, Acting Secretary of the Navy,
to Representative Ike Skelton, provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on February 24, 2010.
42 PAUC is the sum of the program’s research and development cost and procurement cost divided by the number of
units in the program. The other measure used under the Nunn-McCurdy provision to measure cost growth is average
program unit cost (APUC), which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by the number of units in the
program.
43 Letter dated June 1, 2010, from Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
to the Honorable Ike Skelton, with attachment. The letter and attachment were posted on InsideDefense.com
(subscription required) on June 2, 2010.
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band SPY-3 multifunction radar (MFR) and the Lockheed-built S-band SPY-4 Volume Search
Radar (VSR). (Raytheon is the prime contractor for the overall DBR.) Both parts of the DBR
have been in development for the past several years. An attachment to the June 1, 2010, letter
stated that, as a result of the program’s restructuring, the ship is now to be equipped with “an
upgraded multifunction radar [MFR] and no volume search radar [VSR].” The change eliminates
the Lockheed-built S-band SPY-4 VSR from the ship’s design. The ship might retain a space and
weight reservation that would permit the VSR to be backfitted to the ship at a later point. The
Navy states that
As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification process, the Volume Search Radar (VSR)
hardware was identified as an acceptable opportunity to reduce cost in the program and thus
was removed from the current baseline design....
Modifications will be made to the SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR) with the focus of
meeting ship Key Performance Parameters. The MFR modifications will involve software
changes to perform a volume search functionality. Shipboard operators will be able to
optimize the SPY-3 MFR for either horizon search or volume search. While optimized for
volume search, the horizon search capability is limited. Without the VSR, DDG 1000 is still
expected to perform local area air defense....
The removal of the VSR will result in an estimated $300 million net total cost savings for the
three-ship class. These savings will be used to offset the program cost increase as a result of
the truncation of the program to three ships. The estimated cost of the MFR software
modification to provide the volume search capability will be significantly less than the
estimated procurement costs for the VSR.44
Regarding the figure of $300 million net total cost savings in the above passage, the Navy during
2011 determined that eliminating the SPY-4 VSR from the DDG-1000 increased by $54 million
the cost to integrate the dual-band radar into the Navy’s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class
aircraft carriers.45 Subtracting this $54 million cost from the above $300 million savings figure
would bring the net total cost savings to about $246 million on a Navy-wide basis.
A July 26, 2010, press report quotes Captain James Syring, the DDG-1000 program manager, as
stating: “We don’t need the S-band radar to meet our requirements [for the DDG-1000],” and
“You can meet [the DDG-1000’s operational] requirements with [the] X-band [radar] with
software modifications.”46
An attachment to the June 1, 2010, letter stated that the PAUC for the DDG-1000 program had
increased 86%, triggering the Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach, and that the truncation of the
program to three ships was responsible for 79 of the 86 percentage points of increase. (The
attachment stated that the other seven percentage points of increase are from increases in
development costs that are primarily due to increased research and development work content for
the program.)
44 Source: Undated Navy information paper on DDG-51 program restructuring provided to CRS and CBO by Navy
Office of Legislative Affairs on July 19, 2010.
45 Source: Undated Navy information paper on CVN-78 cost issues, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to
CRS on March 19, 2012.
46 Cid Standifer, “Volume Radar Contracted For DDG-1000 Could Be Shifted To CVN-79,” Inside the Navy, July 26,
2010.
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Carter also stated in his June 1, 2010, letter that he had directed that the DDG-1000 program be
funded, for the period FY2011-FY2015, to the cost estimate for the program provided by the Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office (which is a part of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense [OSD]), and, for FY2016 and beyond, to the Navy’s cost estimate for the program.
The program was previously funded to the Navy’s cost estimate for all years. Since CAPE’s cost
estimate for the program is higher than the Navy’s cost estimate, funding the program to the
CAPE estimate for the period FY2011-FY2015 will increase the cost of the program as it appears
in the budget for those years. The letter states that DOD “intends to address the [resulting]
FY2011 [funding] shortfall [for the DDG-1000 program] through reprogramming actions.”
An attachment to the letter stated that the CAPE in May 2010 estimated the PAUC of the DDG-
1000 program (i.e., the sum of the program’s research and development costs and procurement
costs, divided by the three ships in the program) as $7.4 billion per ship in then-year dollars
($22.1 billion in then-year dollars for all three ships), and the program’s average procurement unit
cost (APUC), which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by the three ships in the
program, as $4.3 billion per ship in then-year dollars ($12.8 billion in then-year dollars for all
three ships). The attachment stated that these estimates are at a confidence level of about 50%,
meaning that the CAPE believes there is a roughly 50% chance that the program can be
completed at or under these cost estimates, and a roughly 50% chance that the program will
exceed these cost estimates.
An attachment to the letter directed the Navy to “return for a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
review in the fall 2010 timeframe when the program is ready to seek approval of the new
Milestone B and authorization for production of the DDG-1002 [i.e., the third ship in the
program].”
On October 8, 2010, DOD reinstated the DDG-1000 program’s Milestone B certification and
authorized the Navy to continue production of the first and second DDG-1000s and commence
production of the third DDG-1000.47
Under Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s June 1, 2010, letter and attachment restructuring the
DDG-1000 program and DOD’s decision on October 8, 2010, to reinstate the DDG-1000
program’s Milestone B certification (see Appendix A) raise the following potential oversight
questions for Congress:
• Why did DOD decide, as part of its restructuring of the DDG-1000 program, to
change the primary radar on the DDG-1000?
• What are the potential risks to the DDG-1000 program of changing its primary
radar at this stage in the program (i.e., with the first ship under construction, and
preliminary construction activities underway on the second ship)?
• How will the upgraded MFR differ in cost, capabilities, and technical risks from
the baseline MFR included in the original DDG-1000 design?
• What is the net impact on the capabilities of the DDG-1000 of the change to the
DDG-1000’s primary radar (i.e., of removing the VSR and upgrading the MFR)?
47 Christopher J. Castelli, “Pentagon Approves Key Milestone For Multibillion-Dollar Destroyer,” Inside the Navy,
November 22, 2010.
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• Given change to the DDG-1000’s primary radar and the May 2010 CAPE
estimates of the program’s program acquisition unit cost (PAUC) and average
program unit cost (APUC), is the DDG-1000 program still cost effective?
• What impact on cost, schedule, or technical risk, if any, will the removal of the
VSR from the DDG-1000 design have on the Navy’s plan to install the dual-band
radar (DBR), including the VSR, on the Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers
CVN-78 and CVN-79?48
March 2013 GAO Report
A March 2013 GAO report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated
the following of the DDG-1000 program:
Technology Maturity
Three of the program’s 11 critical technologies are mature; the remaining 8 technologies will
not be demonstrated in a realistic environment until after ship installation. Program officials
stated that the Navy received the lead ship’s deckhouse in October 2012 and its integration
onto the hull was completed in December 2012. Cost and schedule impacts from Ingalls not
completing cabling, piping, and foundations prior to delivery are being assessed. Officials
reported successful completion of land-based testing to verify compatibility and
interoperability with the integrated power system and engineering control system in March
2012. Raytheon completed software coding and started integration and testing for release 6
of the total ship computing environment, and a follow-on software spiral is now under
contract. Releases 1 to 5 are complete and certified. Program officials stated that the gun
system’s long-range land-attack projectile’s motor redesign has been successfully tested
under various environmental conditions, and other subcomponents will be evaluated during
fiscal year 2013 guided flight tests.
Design and Production Maturity
As of December 2012, the first two ships were 80 percent and 48 percent complete
respectively, and third ship fabrication began in April 2012. While there have been few
design changes resulting from lead ship construction, the rework rate for the lead ship
composite deckhouse was 17 percent.
Other Program Issues
In December 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics (AT&L) delegated the authority for future acquisition decisions to the Navy. The
program attributed this shift to cost oversight and risk reduction, noting that average
procurement unit cost has decreased $690 million from the 2010 estimate.
The program relies on products, such as the aft peripheral vertical launching system and
deckhouse, being transferred from one prime contractor to another. As the integrator, the
Navy is responsible for ensuring on-time delivery of products and bears the costs if schedule
delays affect another contractor. In 2010 the Navy introduced a joint inspection process
whereby the primes and the Navy validate the level of completeness of products prior to
48 For more on these aircraft carriers, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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integration with the hull. Program officials believe that this reduces the risk of integration
issues and rework because the program office, the Gulf Coast and Bath Supervisors of
Shipbuilding, and contractors have a common understanding of the quality of the delivered
product.
The Navy has awarded contracts for all elements for the first two ships. Contracts for the
third ship deckhouse, hangar, aft peripheral vertical launching system, and mission systems
equipment are not yet finalized. Program officials note the Navy continues to leverage actual
cost data from the first two ships and other similar programs to inform contract pricing and is
considering cost efficient alternatives. The Navy is assessing alternative deckhouse
materials, such as steel, which both shipyards report is a feasible alternative to composite.
As requested, we reviewed whether individual subcontracting reports from the prime
contractor for the program were accepted on eSRS. The government uses subcontracting
reports on eSRS as one method of monitoring small business participation. As of December
2012, eSRS indicated that one of the subcontracting reports for DDG 1000’s six contracts
have been accepted.
Program Office Comments
The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget submission reduced the quantity of the DDG 1000
program to three ships and caused a Nunn-McCurdy breach. AT&L recertified the
restructured program in June 2010 and adjusted initial operating capability to 2016. Since
then, the Navy has awarded ship construction contracts and advanced gun systems contracts
for all three ships and all required software. All critical technologies have at least been
demonstrated in a relevant environment. More than 90 percent of the software has completed
design, code, unit test, and integration, and it is aligned to ship activation. AT&L stated in a
December 2011 acquisition decision memorandum that the Navy is executing the Nunn-
McCurdy certified program while recognizing, addressing, and retiring risks. A July 2011
Office of Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analyses review also found that the
Navy has taken steps in managing risks. The program office also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.49
49 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-13-
294SP, March 2012, p. 56.
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Appendix B. Additional Background Information
on CG(X) Cruiser Program
Background Information on CG(X) Program
The CG(X) cruiser program was announced by the Navy on November 1, 2001.50 The Navy
wanted to procure as many as 19 CG(X)s as replacements for its 22 CG-47s, which are projected
to reach the end of their 35-year service lives between 2021 and 2029. The CG-47s are multi-
mission ships with an emphasis on AAW and (for some CG-47s) BMD, and the Navy similarly
wanted the CG(X) to be a multi-mission ship with an emphasis on AAW and BMD. The CG(X)
was to carry the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), a new radar that was to be considerably
larger and more powerful than the SPY-1 radar carried on the Navy’s Aegis ships. Some press
reports suggested that a nuclear-powered version of the CG(X) might have had a full load
displacement of more than 20,000 tons and a unit procurement cost of $5 billion or more.51
The Navy’s FY2009 budget called for procuring the first CG(X) in FY2011. Beginning in late
2008, however, it was reported that the Navy had decided to defer the procurement of the first
CG(X) by several years, to about FY2017.52 Consistent with these press reports, on April 6, 2009,
50 The Navy on that date announced that that it was launching a Future Surface Combatant Program aimed at acquiring
a family of next-generation surface combatants. This new family of surface combatants, the Navy stated, would include
three new classes of ships:
•
a destroyer called the DD(X)—later redesignated DDG-1000—for the precision long-range strike and naval
gunfire mission,
•
a cruiser called the CG(X) for the AAW and BMD mission, and
•
a smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter submarines, small surface attack craft,
and mines in heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.
The Future Surface Combatant Program replaced an earlier Navy surface combatant acquisition effort, begun in the
mid-1990s, called the Surface Combatant for the 21st Century (SC-21) program. The SC-21 program encompassed a
planned destroyer called DD-21 and a planned cruiser called CG-21. When the Navy announced the Future Surface
Combatant Program in 2001, development work on the DD-21 had been underway for several years, but the start of
development work on the CG-21 was still years in the future. The DD(X) program, now called the DDG-1000 or
Zumwalt-class program, is essentially a restructured continuation of the DD-21 program. The CG(X) might be
considered the successor, in planning terms, of the CG-21. After November 1, 2001, the acronym SC-21 continued for
a time to be used in the Navy’s research and development account to designate a line item (i.e., program element) that
funded development work on the DDG-1000 and CG(X).
51 For a discussion of nuclear power for Navy surface ships other than aircraft carriers, see CRS Report RL33946, Navy
Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
52 Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Awards Technology Company $128 Million Contract For CG(X) Work,” Inside the
Navy, October 27, 2008. Another press report (Katherine McIntire Peters, “Navy’s Top Officer Sees Lessons in
Shipbuilding Program Failures,” GovernmentExecutive.com, September 24, 2008) quoted Admiral Gary Roughead, the
Chief of Naval Operations, as saying: “What we will be able to do is take the technology from the DDG-1000, the
capability and capacity that [will be achieved] as we build more DDG-51s, and [bring those] together around 2017 in a
replacement ship for our cruisers.” (Material in brackets in the press report.) Another press report (Zachary M.
Peterson, “Part One of Overdue CG(X) AOA Sent to OSD, Second Part Coming Soon,” Inside the Navy, September 29,
2008) quoted Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities
and Resources, as saying that the Navy did not budget for a CG(X) hull in its proposal for the Navy’s budget under the
FY2010-FY2015 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) to be submitted to Congress in early 2009.
An earlier report (Christopher P. Cavas, “DDG 1000 Destroyer Program Facing Major Cuts,” DefenseNews.com, July
14, 2008) stated that the CG(X) would be delayed until FY2015 or later. See also Geoff Fein, “Navy Likely To Change
(continued...)
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced—as part of a series of recommendations for the
then-forthcoming FY2010 defense budget—a recommendation to “delay the CG-X next
generation cruiser program to revisit both the requirements and acquisition strategy” for the
program.53 The Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget deferred procurement of the first CG(X) beyond
FY2015.
Cancellation of CG(X) Program
The Navy’s FY2011 budget proposed terminating the CG(X) program as unaffordable. The
Navy’s desire to cancel the CG(X) and instead procure Flight III DDG-51s apparently took shape
during 2009: at a June 16, 2009, hearing before the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, the Navy testified that it was conducting a study on destroyer procurement
options for FY2012 and beyond that was examining design options based on either the DDG-51
or DDG-1000 hull form.54 A January 2009 memorandum from the Department of Defense
acquisition executive had called for such a study.55 In September and November 2009, it was
reported that the Navy’s study was examining how future requirements for AAW and BMD
operations might be met by a DDG-51 or DDG-1000 hull equipped with a new radar.56 On
December 7, 2009, it was reported that the Navy wanted to cancel its planned CG(X) cruiser and
instead procure an improved version of the DDG-51.57 In addition to being concerned about the
projected high cost and immature technologies of the CG(X),58 the Navy reportedly had
concluded that it does not need a surface combatant with a version of the AMDR as large and
capable as the one envisaged for the CG(X) to adequately perform projected AAW and BMD
missions, because the Navy will be able to augment data collected by surface combatant radars
with data collected by space-based sensors. The Navy reportedly concluded that using data
collected by other sensors would permit projected AAW and BMD missions to be performed
(...continued)
CG(X)’s Procurement Schedule, Official Says,” Defense Daily, June 24, 2008; Rebekah Gordon, “Navy Agrees CG(X)
By FY-11 Won’t Happen But Reveals Little Else,” Inside the Navy, June 30, 2008.
53 Source: Opening remarks of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at an April 6, 2009, news conference on DOD
recommendations for the then-forthcoming FY2010 defense budget.
54 Source: Transcript of spoken remarks of Vice Admiral Bernard McCullough at a June 16, 2009, hearing on Navy
force structure shipbuilding before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
55 A January 26, 2009, memorandum for the record from John Young, the then-DOD acquisition executive, stated that
“The Navy proposed and OSD [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] agreed with modification to truncate the DDG-
1000 Program to three ships in the FY 2010 budget submission.” The memo proposed procuring one DDG-51 in
FY2010 and two more FY2011, followed by the procurement in FY2012-FY2015 (in annual quantities of 1, 2, 1, 2) of
a ship called the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) that could be based on either the DDG-51 design or the DDG-1000
design. The memorandum stated that the FSC might be equipped with a new type of radar, but the memorandum did
not otherwise specify the FSC’s capabilities. The memorandum stated that further analysis would support a decision on
whether to base the FSC on the DDG-51 design or the DDG-1000 design. (Memorandum for the record dated January
26, 2009, from John Young, Under Secretary of Defense [Acquisition, Technology and Logistics], entitled “DDG 1000
Program Way Ahead,” posted on InsideDefense.com [subscription required].)
56 Zachary M. Peterson, “Navy Slated To Wrap Up Future Destroyer Hull And Radar Study,” Inside the Navy,
September 7, 2009. Christopher P. Cavas, “Next-Generation U.S. Warship Could Be Taking Shape,” Defense News,
November 2, 2009: 18, 20.
57 Christopher J. Castelli, “Draft Shipbuilding Report Reveals Navy Is Killing CG(X) Cruiser Program,” Inside the
Navy, December 7, 2009.
58 Christopher J. Castelli, “Draft Shipbuilding Report Reveals Navy Is Killing CG(X) Cruiser Program,” Inside the
Navy, December 7, 2009.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
adequately with a radar smaller enough to be fitted onto the DDG-51.59 Reports suggested that the
new smaller radar would be a scaled-down version of the AMDR originally intended for the
CG(X).60
The Navy’s February 2010 report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan,
submitted to Congress in conjunction with the FY2011 budget, states that the 30-year plan:
Solidifies the DoN’s [Department of the Navy’s] long-term plans for Large Surface
Combatants by truncating the DDG 1000 program, restarting the DDG 51 production line,
and continuing the Advanced Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) development efforts. Over the
past year, the Navy has conducted a study that concludes a DDG 51 hull form with an
AMDR suite is the most cost-effective solution to fleet air and missile defense requirements
over the near to mid-term....
The Navy, in consultation with OSD, conducted a Radar/Hull Study for future destroyers.
The objective of the study was to provide a recommendation for the total ship system
solution required to provide Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) (simultaneous
ballistic missile and anti-air warfare (AAW) defense) capability while balancing affordability
with capacity. As a result of the study, the Navy is proceeding with the Air and Missile
Defense Radar (AMDR) program....
As discussed above, the DDG 51 production line has been restarted. While all of these new-
start guided missile destroyers will be delivered with some BMD capability, those procured
in FY 2016 and beyond will be purpose-built with BMD as a primary mission. While there is
work to be done in determining its final design, it is envisioned that this DDG 51 class
variant will have upgrades to radar and computing performance with the appropriate power
generation capacity and cooling required by these enhancements. These upgraded DDG 51
class ships will be modifications of the current guided missile destroyer design that combine
the best emerging technologies aimed at further increasing capabilities in the IAMD arena
and providing a more effective bridge between today’s capability and that originally planned
for the CG(X). The ships reflected in this program have been priced based on continuation of
the existing DDG 51 re-start program. Having recently completed the Hull and Radar Study,
the Department is embarking on the requirements definition process for these AMDR
destroyers and will adjust the pricing for these ships in future reports should that prove
necessary.61
In testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on February 24 and 25, 2010,
respectively, Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated:
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) incorporates all aspects of air defense against
ballistic, anti-ship, and overland cruise missiles. IAMD is vital to the protection of our force,
and it is an integral part of our core capability to deter aggression through conventional
means....
59 Amy Butler, “STSS Prompts Shift in CG(X) Plans,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, December 11, 2009: 1-2.
60 Cid Standifer, “NAVSEA Plans To Solicit Contracts For Air And Missile Defense Radar,” Inside the Navy,
December 28, 2009; “Navy Issues RFP For Phase II of Air And Missile Defense Radar Effort,” Defense Daily,
December 24, 2009: 4.
61 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011,
February 2010, pp. 12, 13, 19. The first reprinted paragraph, taken from page 12, also occurs on page 3 as part of the
executive summary.
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Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
To address the rapid proliferation of ballistic and anti-ship missiles and deep-water
submarine threats, as well as increase the capacity of our multipurpose surface ships, we
restarted production of our DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers (Flight IIA series).
These ships will be the first constructed with IAMD, providing much-needed Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) capacity to the Fleet, and they will incorporate the hull, mechanical,
and electrical alterations associated with our mature DDG modernization program. We will
spiral DDG 51 production to incorporate future integrated air and missile defense
capabilities....
The Navy, in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, conducted a
Radar/Hull Study for future surface combatants that analyzed the total ship system solution
necessary to meet our IAMD requirements while balancing affordability and capacity in our
surface Fleet. The study concluded that Navy should integrate the Air and Missile Defense
Radar program S Band radar (AMDR-S), SPY-3 (X Band radar), and Aegis Advanced
Capability Build (ACB) combat system into a DDG 51 hull. While our Radar/Hull Study
indicated that both DDG 51 and DDG 1000 were able to support our preferred radar systems,
leveraging the DDG 51 hull was the most affordable option. Accordingly, our FY 2011
budget cancels the next generation cruiser program due to projected high cost and risk in
technology and design of this ship. I request your support as we invest in spiraling the
capabilities of our DDG 51 Class from our Flight IIA Arleigh Burke ships to Flight III ships,
which will be our future IAMD-capable surface combatant. We will procure the first Flight
III ship in FY 2016.62
Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
62 Statement of Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, before the House Armed Services Committee on
24 February, 2010, pp. 10-11; and Statement of Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on 25 February 2010, pp. 10-11.
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