U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement: Issues for Congress

Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
Mark Holt
Specialist in Energy Policy
Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
March 24, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43433


U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

Summary
U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation on nuclear energy and nonproliferation has grown in recent years
along with closer bilateral economic, military, and diplomatic ties. In 2010, the two countries
signed a Memorandum of Understanding that Obama Administration officials said would be a
“stepping stone” to a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. This agreement was signed by the
two countries in December 2013.
Under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended), this agreement is subject to
congressional review. The nuclear cooperation agreement is expected to comply with all the terms
of the Atomic Energy Act as amended and therefore will be a “non-exempt” agreement. This
means that it will enter into force upon the 90th day of continuous session after its submittal to
Congress (a period of 30 plus 60 days of review) unless Congress enacts a Joint Resolution
disapproving the agreement.
Vietnam would be the first country in Southeast Asia to operate a nuclear power plant. Vietnam
has announced a nuclear energy plan that envisions installing several nuclear plants, capable of
producing up to 14,800 megawatts of electric power (MWe), by 2030. Nuclear power is projected
to provide 20%-30% of the country’s electricity by 2050. Significant work remains, however, to
develop Vietnam’s nuclear energy infrastructure and regulatory framework.
Vietnam’s Law on Atomic Energy, passed in 2008, forbids the development of nuclear weapons
and all forms of nuclear proliferation. In 2007, Vietnam signed the IAEA Additional Protocol, a
significant nonproliferation safeguard for nuclear power, which entered into force in September
2012. Vietnamese officials have said they have no interest in developing domestic enrichment or
reprocessing capabilities, which can potentially be used to make fissile material for nuclear
weapons, but they have not made a binding commitment not to do so. Vietnam is exploring the
possibility of eventually mining domestic uranium reserves.
At least four issues are expected to be prominent when Congress takes up the agreement: (1)
whether the agreement should have included stronger nonproliferation commitments such as a
legally-binding commitment by Vietnam not to build uranium enrichment and reprocessing
facilities; (2) the extent to which Vietnam’s human rights record should affect the decision to
enter into a nuclear energy agreement; (3) the weight that should be given to the growing strategic
relationship between the United States and Vietnam; and (4) the extent to which U.S. companies
would benefit from an agreement.


Congressional Research Service

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

Contents
Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 1
U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation ................................................................................................. 1
Vietnam’s Current Nuclear Capacity ............................................................................................... 2
Vietnam’s Nuclear Energy Plans ..................................................................................................... 2
Role of the U.S. Nuclear Industry ............................................................................................. 5
Safety Concerns ......................................................................................................................... 7
Regional Energy Dynamics ....................................................................................................... 7
Vietnam and the Nonproliferation Regime ...................................................................................... 8
Enrichment and Reprocessing Debate ....................................................................................... 9
U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation in Context ............................................................................. 11
Bilateral Relations ................................................................................................................... 11
Human Rights Issues ............................................................................................................... 12
Human Rights in U.S.-Vietnam Relations ............................................................................... 12
Role of Congress and Legislation .................................................................................................. 13

Figures
Figure 1. Vietnam’s Nuclear Facilities ............................................................................................. 4

Tables
Table 1. Vietnam’s Membership in International Nonproliferation Agreements and
Regimes ........................................................................................................................................ 8

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 14

Congressional Research Service

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

Overview
Since the United States and Vietnam established diplomatic relations in 1995, the two countries
have expanded relations and cooperation across a wide range of sectors. As U.S.-Vietnam
bilateral economic, military, and diplomatic ties have grown, so has interest in strengthening
cooperation in the nuclear energy sphere. A civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was signed by
the two countries in December 2013 under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as
amended). Such “123 agreements” are necessary for the export of nuclear reactors and
components and can help facilitate the transfer of nuclear energy technology.1 The U.S.-Vietnam
123 agreement is subject to congressional review. It will enter into force upon the 90th day of
continuous session after its submittal to Congress (a period of 30 plus 60 days of review) unless a
Joint Resolution disapproving the agreement is enacted.
At least four issues are expected to be prominent when Congress takes up the agreement: (1)
whether the agreement should have included stronger nonproliferation commitments such as a
legally-binding commitment by Vietnam not to build uranium enrichment and reprocessing
facilities; (2) the extent to which Vietnam’s human rights record should affect the decision to
enter into a nuclear energy agreement; (3) the weight that should be given to the growing strategic
relationship between the United States and Vietnam; and (4) the extent to which U.S. companies
would benefit from an agreement.
Vietnam also has nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia, France, China, South Korea,
Japan, and Canada. The U.S. nuclear industry contends that billions of dollars of exports could
result from the Vietnam 123 agreement.2 While it is unclear what, if any, contracts the U.S.
nuclear industry would conclude with Vietnam’s nuclear energy sector, it is likely that U.S.
companies would provide services as part of a reactor supply agreement that Vietnam signed with
Japan in 2010. Such services would not necessarily require a U.S. 123 agreement, but transfers
might be facilitated if one were in place.
U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation
The first major step by the United States and Vietnam toward a 123 agreement was the signing of
an agreement to strengthen nuclear safety and the nascent nuclear regulatory framework in
Vietnam in 2008. Under that agreement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission experts have been
advising the Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety and Control (VARANS). The U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) train Vietnamese
officials on nonproliferation and nuclear safety best practices related to power plant operation,
and assisted with the drafting of Vietnam’s Atomic Energy Law, passed by Vietnam’s National
Assembly in June 2008. Vietnamese technicians have also attended nonproliferation safeguards
training programs at U.S. national laboratories.

1 See CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D.
Nikitin
2 Nuclear Energy Institute, “Nuclear Energy Industry Lauds US-Vietnam Cooperation Agreement,” news release,
October 10, 2013, http://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/Nuclear-Energy-Industry-Lauds-US-
Vietnam-Cooperati.
Congressional Research Service
1

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

In March 2010, the United States and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding
Concerning Cooperation in the Civil Nuclear Field that was designed to increase cooperation on
nuclear safety and facilitate development of an independent regulatory agency. Then-U.S.
Ambassador to Vietnam Michael Michalak said he anticipated the 2010 Memorandum would be a
“stepping stone” to a bilateral nuclear energy cooperation (section 123 agreement).
Vietnam’s Current Nuclear Capacity
Vietnam’s current nuclear infrastructure consists of a research reactor and several research
institutes. Under the Atoms for Peace program in the early 1960s, the United States provided
South Vietnam with a 250 kilowatt (kw) pool-type TRIGA Mark-II research reactor.3 This
research reactor, located at Dalat, used highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel and went critical in
1963. It was used for training, research, and radioisotope production. The research reactor was
shut down during the Vietnam War. After North Vietnam defeated the South in 1975 and reunified
the country, the Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission (VAEC) was established in 1976 for
civilian nuclear research. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has provided
technical cooperation (TC) assistance to Vietnam since it joined the Agency in 1978.4
In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union helped Vietnam restore and upgrade the research reactor to a
500 kw Russian VVR-M design. This research reactor was powered with highly enriched
uranium, weapons-usable material which is considered to be a potential nuclear security risk.
With U.S. assistance under the Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative, since
2007, Vietnam has converted the Dalat research reactor from HEU to low enriched uranium
(LEU) fuel, and returned the HEU fresh and spent fuel to Russia. The shipments, which removed
a total of 11 kg of HEU, were completed in July 2013.5 This activity advanced U.S.-Vietnam
cooperation in the nuclear nonproliferation sphere.
Vietnam’s Nuclear Energy Plans
As Vietnam’s economy has grown, so have its energy demands, which, according to one source,
grew by 15% annually in the first decade of the 2000s.6 To help keep pace, Vietnam plans to build
its first nuclear power plants in the coming decades. Nuclear power is projected to provide 20%-
30% of the country’s electricity by 2050.7 Vietnam first began considering nuclear power as an
option in a 1995 government study that recommended the introduction of nuclear energy by 2015.

3 From the mid-1950s until 1975, Vietnam was divided into communist-led North Vietnam and U.S.-backed South
Vietnam, which fought against a takeover by communist forces, both from within South Vietnam and from North
Vietnam. The United States provided significant military and economic assistance to South Vietnam until 1973, when
the United States withdrew most of its military forces and when Congress began cutting the Nixon Administration’s
requests for aid to South Vietnam.
4 For a list of TC projects in Vietnam, see the 2010 IAEA country profile for Vietnam, http://www-pub.iaea.org/
MTCD/publications/PDF/CNPP2010_CD/countryprofiles/VietNam/CNPP2010Vietnam.htm.
5 “US, International Partners Remove Last Remaining HEU from Vietnam, Set Nuclear Security Milestone,” NNSA
Press Release, July 2, 2013. http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/heuvietnam7213.
6 Economist Intelligence Unit, Vietnam: Energy Report, December 16, 2009.
7 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Vietnam,” January 2014, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-
Profiles/Countries-T-Z/Vietnam/.
Congressional Research Service
2

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

Feasibility studies were conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 2004, then-Prime
Minister Phan Van Khai endorsed the “Strategy for Vietnam’s Electricity Development 2004-
2010.”8 In 2006, the Prime Minister signed the “Strategy for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy up
to 2020,” which specified a nuclear power target of 2,000 megawatts of electric generating
capacity (MWe) by 2020, and an eventual 20,000 MWe by 2040. The latter would represent 25%-
30% of Vietnam’s electricity production.9
Vietnam’s National Assembly in November 2009 approved plans to build the first two 1,000
MWe reactors at Phuoc Dinh, Ninh Thuan province (Ninh Thuan 1 plant) which were to come on-
line by 2020. Two additional 1,000 MWe reactors are planned to be built in nearby Vinh Hai
(Ninh Thuan 2 plant) and be brought on-line by 2026 (see Figure 1 below). The country’s nuclear
energy plan envisioned a three-phase approach:10
• Phase I, 2010-2015: training technical specialists, setting up regulatory
frameworks and cooperation agreements, approval of licenses, etc.
• Phase II, 2015-2020: construction phase for first nuclear plants at Phuoc Dinh;
beginning construction at Vinh Hai.
• Phase III, 2020-2030: additional reactor construction, up to an additional 6,000
MWe.
The Vietnamese government issued a master plan in July 2011 that called for two additional
reactors to be constructed at Phuoc Dinh by 2025 and two more at Vinh Hai by 2027, plus two
larger reactors, possibly Korean, at another site to begin operating by 2029. Another 4,000
megawatts of planned capacity would bring the country’s generating capacity to 14,800
megawatts by 2030.11 However, Vietnam’s Prime Minister announced in January 2014 that it
might delay construction of the first plant, at Phuoc Dinh, until 2020, potentially pushing back the
planned completion of the first reactor to the mid-2020s. Difficulties in training staff for the
planned nuclear power program have been mentioned by news reports as a possible reason for the
delay.12

8 Decision No. 176/2004/QD-TTg of October 5, 2004, “Approving the Strategy on Development of Vietnam Electricity
Industry in the 2004-2010 Period, with Orientations Towards 2020”; “PM Approves Development Strategy for Power
Sector,” Vietnam Business Forum, http://vccinews.com/news_detail.asp?news_id=2772.
9 For an analysis of Vietnam’s electricity mix and projected growth, see the 2010 IAEA country profile for Vietnam,
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/CNPP2010_CD/countryprofiles/VietNam/CNPP2010Vietnam.htm.
10 IISS, Ibid.; “Vietnam Plans Ambitious Nuclear Program,” ASEAN Nuclear News, June 24, 2010, http://asean-
online.blogspot.com/2010/06/vietnam-plans-ambitious-nuclear-program.html.
11 World Nuclear Association, op. cit.
12 NucNet, “PM Says Vietnam Might Delay Construction of First Nuclear Plant,” January 16, 2014,
http://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2014/01/16/pm-says-vietnam-might-delay-construction-of-first-nuclear-plant.
Congressional Research Service
3


U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

Figure 1. Vietnam’s Nuclear Facilities

Source: By CRS with data from ESRI; “Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia,” IISS
Strategic Dossier, 2009.


Congressional Research Service
4

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

The Russian firm AtomStroyExport is to build two 1,200 MWe light-water reactors (standard
commercial reactors) at the Ninh Thuan 1 power plant at Phuoc Dinh. They will be built on a
turnkey basis,13 and will be operated by state-owned utility Electricity of Vietnam (EVN). As with
other Russian-built nuclear power plants in non-nuclear weapon states, the contract includes a
provision to both supply fuel and take back spent (used) fuel. The Russian atomic energy agency,
Rosatom, will set up a training center in Vietnam to help prepare nuclear specialists. Cost
estimates for the power plants vary; Rosatom reportedly has forecast the cost of the first two-
reactor plants as up to $8 billion, but some press reports that included related infrastructure
development estimate a total of $10 billion. Russia’s Ministry of Finance is expected to finance
the majority of these costs. Under the 2011 master plan, AtomStroyExport is to build two
additional reactors at the site as well.
Up to four light-water reactors at Ninh Thuan 2 are to be built by the Japanese consortium
International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Company (JINED).14 The Japanese
government has offered low-interest and preferential loans for the project, as well as assistance in
waste treatment and infrastructure support.
According to the IAEA, Vietnam has no plans for developing a full fuel cycle capability.15
Current plans would store spent nuclear fuel on-site for at least 30 years, and studies on more
permanent disposal are underway. As mentioned above, Russia will take back the spent fuel from
the Russian-built plants. Other suppliers, such as Japan, do not usually do so, so Vietnam will
need to explore spent fuel storage options.
Vietnam is now exploring how to exploit its domestic uranium reserves in the north of the
country, and is cooperating with Canadian and Japanese firms on initial exploration. Vietnam has
signed a memorandum of understanding with India on uranium ore processing technologies.
As of early 2014, Vietnam’s nuclear energy plans do not appear to have generated significant
domestic opposition. If accurate, it is unclear if this absence of opposition is due to widespread
support for the government’s energy vision, apathy or a lack of awareness, and/or a reluctance to
challenge the government on one of its significant priorities.
Role of the U.S. Nuclear Industry
The United States nuclear industry may have a role in the reactor projects in Vietnam. The
Japanese supply consortium, JINED, is offering boiling water reactor (BWR) and pressurized
water reactor (PWR) designs for Ninh Thuan 2, and Vietnam has not yet selected which type it
will use. Japanese BWR designs are based on General Electric (GE) technology, while Japanese
PWR designs originally came from Westinghouse (now mostly owned by Toshiba). Japan is

13 Plants built on a “turnkey” basis are designed and built by the manufacturer, without the local operator’s
involvement. Once the reactor is operational, the plant is turned over to the operator.
14 “Japan and Russia to Build Ninh Thuan Nuclear Power Plants for Vietnam,” Global Energy Magazine, November 3,
2010.
15 A full fuel cycle would generally include the ability to produce fuel (such as through uranium enrichment) and to
process waste into new fuel (through reprocessing). Some countries possess other parts of the fuel cycle such as fuel
fabrication or uranium mining but do not produce enriched product. For reference, see CRS Report RL34234,
Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power, coordinated by
Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
Congressional Research Service
5

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

largely self-sufficient in nuclear technology, but it is possible that some U.S. components and
services would be used for the Vietnam project. JINED member Hitachi, for example, conducts
nuclear business in Japan and around the world through joint ventures with GE. A U.S.-Vietnam
123 agreement would be helpful or even necessary for U.S. participation in Ninh Thuan 2,
depending on the types of components and services involved. This is because certain major
reactor components would require Nuclear Regulatory Commission export licenses that cannot be
approved without a 123 agreement, and approvals for other components and services that do not
require export licenses could be more complicated without a 123 agreement.
South Korea has also proposed building a nuclear power plant in Vietnam, for which the two
countries are jointly preparing a feasibility study.16 The proposed South Korean reactors are based
on designs licensed from the U.S. firm Combustion Engineering, which combined with
Westinghouse in 2000. As a result, Westinghouse now controls the marketing of the design that
South Korea plans to use in Vietnam. South Korea’s only previous nuclear power plant export
project, consisting of four reactors being built in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), is being
implemented by a consortium that includes Westinghouse. Westinghouse and other U.S.-based
firms are expected to receive 10% of the $20 billion UAE deal. If South Korea replicates that
consortium for the proposed Vietnam project, a U.S.-Vietnam 123 agreement would probably be
necessary. The UAE project also required a Part 810 technology transfer authorization by the
Secretary of Energy.17
The number of potential U.S. jobs that may result from nuclear power projects in Vietnam is
difficult to estimate, but the Barakah project now under construction by a Korean-led consortium
in the UAE could provide a model. As noted above, Westinghouse and other U.S. companies are
expected to carry out about 10% of the work on Barakah. The Export-Import Bank of the United
States in September 2012 approved $2 billion in financing for U.S. equipment and services for
Barakah, mostly to be provided by Westinghouse and its U.S. sub-suppliers. “The Barakah project
will allow us to maintain about 600 U.S. jobs,” Westinghouse said after the Ex-Im Bank financing
approval. The Ex-Im Bank estimated that, overall, the $2 billion in financing would “support
approximately 5,000 American jobs across 17 states.” Items to be supplied by Westinghouse and
other U.S. companies include reactor coolant pumps, reactor components, controls, engineering
services, and training.18

16 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Vietnam,” January 2014, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/
Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/Vietnam/.
17 “810 Authorizations” are issued by the Secretary of Energy under 10 CFR Part 810. These regulations implement
section 57 b.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by section 302 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of
1978, and control the export of unclassified nuclear technology and assistance for peaceful purposes. Such transfers of
nuclear technology under Part 810 do not include exports of nuclear reactors, components, and materials, which require
export licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Part 810 regulations differentiate activities that require
“specific authorization” by the Secretary of Energy from those that can be “generally authorized” by the Secretary. For
more background, see http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/programoffices/
officenonproliferationinternationalsecurity-3-0.
18 Export-Import Bank of the United States, “Ex-Im Approves $2 Billion in Financing for Nuclear Power Plant in
U.A.E.,” news release, September 7, 2012, http://www.exim.gov/newsandevents/releases/2012/ex-im-approves-2-
billion-in-financing-for-nuclear-power-plant-in-u-a-e.cfm.
Congressional Research Service
6

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

Safety Concerns
The nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daichi nuclear plant in Japan in March 2011 raised
concerns around the globe about the readiness of new nuclear energy countries to have sufficient
safety and regulatory infrastructure to prevent such disasters. The accident also raised worries
about Vietnam’s capacity to administer and regulate a nuclear energy sector. The authorities in
Vietnam reacted to the Fukushima disaster by reaffirming Vietnam’s commitment to pursuing
nuclear power.19 In general, the situation sparked a global reexamination of emergency
preparedness and risk assessment for nuclear power plants. Vietnam’s coast has been subject to
tsunamis in the past, and one study suggests more investigation is still needed on seismic
conditions and tsunami risk.20 Also, in climate modeling exercises, Vietnam is often listed as one
of the world’s most vulnerable countries to the possible effects of climate change, particularly to
rising sea levels. The nuclear disaster in Japan also heightened concerns about how to ensure
adequate infrastructure, planning, and technical expertise and personnel in new nuclear power
states.21
Vietnam is working closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet all international
safety standards and regulatory practices. The IAEA’s Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review
(INIR) mission has visited Vietnam multiple times and has developed milestones on the basis of
international standards and expert recommendations.22 After the latest visit in 2014, the
Vietnamese government announced a delay in the estimated start-up date for the first reactors,
which experts view as giving Vietnam more time to develop its nuclear regulatory infrastructure
and train technical personnel.
Regional Energy Dynamics
Vietnam would be the first country in Southeast Asia to operate a nuclear power plant. As of early
2014, it was unclear whether other countries in the region have expressed concerns about
Vietnam’s nuclear energy plans. It is also unclear to what extent Vietnamese nuclear power
planners are considering the energy needs and infrastructure projects of Vietnam’s neighbors.
Laos, for instance, is building or proposing to build dams for generating hydroelectric power
along tributaries and the main stem of the Mekong River, which terminates in Vietnam. Plants
such as these could generate power that could be sold to other countries in the region. Vietnam
generally has opposed these dams, in part because of their possible negative impacts on the
ecology, economies, and food security of downstream communities.

19 “Vietnam to Proceed with Nuclear Power Plants,” Thanh Nien News, March 17, 2011,
http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/Pages/20110317154038.aspx
20 “Overview on Tsunami Risk Evaluation and NPP Project in Vietnam,” Presentation by Lee Dai Dien, to the
Kashiwazaki International Symposium on Seismic Safety of Nuclear Installations, November 24-26, 2010,
http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/3_sessionB/B-09.pdf.
21 James Acton, et al., “After Fukushima: Early Implications for Nuclear Industry and Policy Makers,” Carnegie
Nuclear Policy Program Statement, March 2011.
22 http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2013/vietnamnp.html
Congressional Research Service
7

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

Vietnam and the Nonproliferation Regime
Obama Administration officials have stated that the prospect of concluding a nuclear cooperation
agreement with the United States spurred Vietnam to strengthen its nonproliferation policies.23
Vietnam has been a vocal supporter of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in international
fora, and as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Vietnam’s Law on Atomic Energy passed
in 2008 forbids the development of nuclear weapons and all forms of nuclear proliferation.24
Vietnam is party to the major nonproliferation treaties (see Table 1), including the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which it joined in 1982 as a non-nuclear weapon state. It has been an
IAEA member since 1978 and its comprehensive safeguards agreement has been in force since
1990. Vietnam signed the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement in 2007, and it entered
into force in 2012. Also, in cooperation with the IAEA and South Korea, Vietnam is developing a
real-time tracking system for the movement of radiological materials in the country.25
Table 1. Vietnam’s Membership in International Nonproliferation Agreements and
Regimes

Signature
Ratification
Entry into Force
Nuclear Non-
Acceded
6/14/82
Proliferation Treaty
(NPT)
Treaty of Bangkok or
12/15/95 11/26/96 3/28/97
Southeast Asian
Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone (SEANWFZ)
IAEA Comprehensive

2/23/90
Safeguards Agreement
IAEA Additional
08/10/07 09/17/12
Protocol
Comprehensive Nuclear
9/25/96 3/10/06

Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Chemical Weapons
1/02/98 9/30/98 10/30/98
Convention (CWC)
Biological and Toxin
Acceded
6/20/80
Weapons Convention
(BTWC)

23 Assistant Secretary of State Thomas M. Countryman, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January
30, 2014.
24 Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia, An IISS Strategic Dossier, The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009. http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/preventing-nuclear-dangers-in-
southeast-asia-and-australasia/read-the-dossier/.
25 “Highlights of Achievements and Commitments by Participating States,” Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, 2012,
http://www.thenuclearsecuritysummit.org/userfiles/
Highlights%20of%20the%20Seoul%20Nuclear%20Security%20Summit(120403).pdf.
Congressional Research Service
8

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress


Signature
Ratification
Entry into Force
Amendment to the
11/3/2012
Convention on the
Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material
Convention on Nuclear
Acceded
4/16/10
7/15/10
Safety

Vietnam is also a member of the U.S.-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), now called
the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC). Vietnam has also joined
the U.S.-led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. It does not participate in the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), because that effort is outside the United Nations system,
but official statements from Hanoi have supported PSI’s goals of stopping illicit trafficking of
weapons of mass destruction. As part of Vietnam’s pledges at Nuclear Security Summits, it has
removed all weapons-usable nuclear material from the country. In December 2010, the United
States and Vietnam established a legal framework for U.S.-Vietnam cooperation for full
conversion of its HEU-fueled research reactor to LEU fuel, and the return of HEU spent fuel from
Dalat to Russia under the Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI).26
As noted, fresh HEU fuel was removed in 2007. The research reactor has been converted to LEU
fuel, and the last shipment of HEU was completed in July 2013.27
Vietnam continues to develop its export control system. The U.S. State Department’s Export
Control and Border Security Program provides assistance to Vietnam to strengthen export
controls in the country. In 2010, Vietnam issued regulations that would make any trafficking of
nuclear materials in the country illegal.28 When reviewing the proposed agreement with Vietnam,
Congress may wish to examine the extent to which Vietnam’s export control system can prevent
illicit transfers of nuclear materials and technologies.
Enrichment and Reprocessing Debate
Enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology can be used both to make fuel for nuclear
reactors or material for nuclear weapons. For the past several years, there has been some debate
over whether the United States should ask countries, including Vietnam, to explicitly renounce
enrichment and reprocessing as part of a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. In early August
2010, the Wall Street Journal reported that the United States and Vietnam had discussed a
proposed nuclear cooperation agreement that would not specifically commit Vietnam to refrain
from enriching uranium.29 Responding to the Wall Street Journal report, the State Department
spokesman said that the United States would welcome a commitment by Vietnam to refrain from

26 U.S. Embassy Hanoi, “U.S. and Vietnam Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Dalat,” December 8, 2010.
27 US, International Partners Remove Last Remaining HEU from Vietnam, Set Nuclear Security Milestone,” NNSA
Press Release, July 2, 2013. http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/heuvietnam7213.
28 “Vietnam Bans Illegal Use, Storage of Nuclear Materials, Equipment,” Xinhua General News Service, June 15, 2010.
29 Jay Solomon, “U.S., Hanoi in Nuclear Talks,” The Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2010. Uranium enrichment
facilities can produce fuel for nuclear reactors, as well as fissile material for nuclear weapons. Highly enriched uranium
and plutonium are the types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.
Congressional Research Service
9

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

pursuing enrichment, but added that such a commitment would be Vietnam’s decision.30 A senior
DOE official said in September 2010, that it would be “inappropriate” at this stage to ask Vietnam
to forswear its fuel cycle options as part of a nuclear energy cooperation agreement.31 Vietnamese
Atomic Energy Institute Director Vuong Huu Tan has said that Vietnam does not plan to pursue
uranium enrichment.32
A commitment to forgo enrichment is not required for bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements
under U.S. law, and most past 123 agreements have not included such a pledge. The recent
agreement with the United Arab Emirates included a provision that would preclude enrichment or
reprocessing in the UAE, and the United States has pursued similar pledges from other states in
the Middle East. 33 However, whether this policy would apply to other regions of the world was
the subject of an Obama Administration interagency review from 2010-2013. Some Members of
Congress and outside experts have argued that including a promise not to build enrichment and
reprocessing facilities should be emulated in other agreements. The U.S.-Taiwan 123 agreement
submitted to Congress on January 7, 2014, includes such “gold standard” prohibitions on
enrichment and reprocessing within Taiwanese territory.
Administration officials announced in December 2013 that the internal review had been
completed, and there would be no change to U.S. policy. In other words, renouncing a domestic
fuel-making capability would not be a prerequisite to concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement
for all countries, and each partner country would be considered individually. At the same time,
U.S. officials emphasize that while civilian nuclear cooperation agreements are one possible way
to discourage additional countries from developing their own fuel-making (enrichment or
reprocessing) technology, the United States will continue to pursue other incentives such as
multilateral fuel banks to bolster partner countries’ confidence in fuel supply. The Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) has also tightened restrictions on transfers of these technologies.34
Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman testified on January 30, 2014:
Make no mistake, our policy is to pursue 123 agreements that minimize the further
proliferation of ENR technologies worldwide. The United States wants all nations interested
in developing civil nuclear power to rely on the international market for fuel services rather
than seek indigenous ENR capabilities. These capabilities are expensive and unnecessary,
and reliable supply alternatives are available in the global fuel cycle market.35
The agreement with Vietnam which was signed in December has not been transmitted to
Congress and the text has not been made public. However, Administration officials have said that
the agreement includes a side note that says Vietnam would rely on international markets for its
nuclear fuel supply. This implies that Vietnam would not seek its own fuel-making capability
through enrichment or reprocessing. In addition, the agreement itself is said to contain an

30 State Department Briefing, August 5, 2010.
31 Daniel Horner, “Lawmakers Eye Fixes to Law on Nuclear Pacts,” Arms Control Today, October 2010.
32 “US-Vietnam Nuke Deal Will Likely Allow Enrichment,” Associated Press, August 7, 2010.
33 CRS Report R40344, The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation, by
Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr.
34 See “Nuclear Suppliers Group” in CRS Report RL34234, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of
Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power
, coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
35 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Thomas M. Countryman on Administration Policy Related to Agreements
for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreements), Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 30, 2014, p. 12,
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Countryman_Testimony2.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
10

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

assurance by the United States that it would ensure a nuclear fuel supply for Vietnam.36 Although
Vietnam apparently does not forswear ENR in the text of its 123 agreement, neither does the
United States grant advance consent for those activities, according to the Administration. As a
result, Vietnam could not enrich or reprocess U.S.-obligated nuclear materials37 without specific
future U.S. consent.38
U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation in Context
Bilateral Relations
In recent years, overlapping strategic and economic interests have led the United States and
Vietnam to improve relations across a wide spectrum of issues.39 Obama Administration officials
identify Vietnam as one of the new strategic partners they are cultivating as part of their
“rebalancing” of U.S. priorities toward the Asia-Pacific, a move commonly referred to as the
United States’ “pivot” to the Pacific. In July 2013, President Obama and his Vietnamese
counterpart, President Truong Tan Sang, announced in Washington, DC, a bilateral
“comprehensive partnership” that is to provide an “overarching framework” for moving the
relationship to a “new phase” in many areas, including science and technology cooperation in the
field of nuclear energy.40
The United States and Vietnam share a concern over the rising strength of China, and they have
cooperated in opposing China’s perceived attempts to assert its claims to disputed waters and
islands in the South China Sea. In December 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry in Vietnam
announced that the United States would be providing Vietnam with $18 million in assistance,
including five fast patrol vessels, to enhance Vietnam’s maritime security capacity.
The rise in bilateral economic ties also has strengthened the countries’ interests in each other.
Bilateral trade in 2013 was over $29 billion, nearly a 20-fold increase since the United States
extended “normal trade relations” (NTR) treatment to Vietnam in 2001. The United States and
Vietnam are 2 of 12 countries negotiating a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement.41 In
order for the TPP agreement to go into effect, both houses of Congress would have to pass

36 Daniel Horner, “U.S. Policy on Nuclear Pacts Detailed,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2014.
http://armscontrol.org/act/2014_01-02/US-Policy-on-Nuclear-Pacts-Detailed
37 U.S.-obligated nuclear materials are nuclear materials transferred from the United States, as well as special nuclear
material produced overseas through the use of U.S.-supplied nuclear material or reactors. Even if the reactor is partially
supplied by the United States, the resulting spent fuel would be U.S.-obligated. Australia has similar conditions on its
uranium exports.
38 Controversy over the Vietnam ENR provisions, therefore, is different from the controversy over a new 123
agreement that is currently being negotiated with South Korea, which is seeking U.S. advance consent for ENR
activities within South Korea. Vietnam did not seek such consent. The United States has not publicly pressed South
Korea to forswear enrichment and reprocessing in its new 123 agreement.
39 See also CRS Report R40208, U.S.-Vietnam Relations in 2013: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy, by
Mark E. Manyin.
40 The White House, “Joint Statement by President Barack Obama of the United States of America and President
Truong Tan Sang of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” July 25, 2013.
41 For more on U.S.-Vietnam economic relations, see CRS Report R41550, U.S.-Vietnam Economic and Trade
Relations: Issues for the 113th Congress
, by Michael F. Martin.
Congressional Research Service
11

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

implementing legislation.42 The Obama Administration has also increased the priority given to
cleaning up sites contaminated by Agent Orange/dioxin used by U.S. troops during the Vietnam
War, an issue that several Members of Congress have championed.
The U.S.-Vietnam nuclear cooperation agreement has been the end-goal of engagement in the
nuclear field since the 2010 Memorandum of Understanding and is seen by many as expanding
another bridge in the growing network of links between the two countries. Thus, those who
question the direction, extent, or pace of recent improvements in U.S.-Vietnam relations may
oppose the 123 agreement. A rejection of the agreement by Congress could have an impact on
future U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation, including in the nuclear area, and could be interpreted by the
Vietnamese as a symbolic rebuke of the new U.S.-Vietnam comprehensive partnership.
Human Rights Issues
The biggest obstacle to the two countries taking a dramatic step forward in their relationship is
disagreement over Vietnam’s human rights record. For more than a decade and a half, the ruling
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) appears to have followed a strategy of permitting most
forms of personal and religious expression while selectively repressing individuals and
organizations that it deems a threat to the party’s monopoly on power. For the past several years,
according to many observers, repression against dissenters and protestors has worsened. The
government increasingly has targeted bloggers and lawyers who represent human rights and
religious freedom activists, particularly those linked to a network of pro-democracy activists.
Many of the targeted blogs, bloggers, and lawyers have criticized Vietnam’s policy toward China
or have links to pro-democracy activist groups.
In November 2013, the United Nations General Assembly elected Vietnam to a seat on the United
Nations Human Rights Council. That same month, Vietnam’s National Assembly ratified new
amendments to the country’s constitution. Many voices called for lessening the VCP’s role in
society and policy. However, according to many observers, the final changes did little to weaken
the Party’s and the government’s monopoly on power and legal ability to deny basic freedoms.
Some sources argued the changes strengthened the VCP’s authority and that new clauses added to
protect basic rights were negated by other provisions in the revised constitution.43
Human Rights in U.S.-Vietnam Relations
As was true of their predecessors, Obama Administration officials have continuously expressed
concerns—including via public criticisms—about human rights in Vietnam. Additionally, the two
countries reportedly have often disagreed in the formal human rights dialogue that generally
occurs every year. In general, however, bilateral differences over human rights have not prevented
the United States and Vietnam from improving the overall relationship. Barring a dramatic

42 Additionally, during the TPP negotiating process, Congress has a formal and informal role in influencing U.S.
negotiating positions, including through the process of granting new trade promotion authority (TPA) to the President.
TPA, which expired in 2007, is the authority that Congress gives to the President to negotiate trade agreements that
would receive expedited legislative consideration. In January 2014, legislation to renew TPA was introduced in the
House (H.R. 3830) and in the Senate (S. 1900). For more on TPA, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy
, by William H. Cooper.
43 See, for instance, Human Rights Watch, “Vietnam: Amended Constitution a Missed Opportunity on Rights,”
December 3, 2013.
Congressional Research Service
12

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

downturn in Vietnam’s human rights situation, U.S. officials appear to see the matter not as an
impediment to short-term cooperation on various issues, but rather as a ceiling on what might be
accomplished in the longer term.
Over the past five years, criticisms of Vietnam’s human rights record, including from Members of
Congress, appear to have played a significant role in convincing the Administration to delay or
oppose a number of items desired by Hanoi. Additionally, concerns about Vietnam’s human rights
record are likely to complicate Congress’ debate over a TPP agreement, if the current negotiations
are successful.44 It is unclear to what extent the Obama Administration has attempted to link the
TPP negotiations directly to Hanoi making changes in its human rights conditions. Analysts offer
different opinions about the extent to which such U.S. pressure would affect Vietnam’s domestic
policies, particularly when many in the Vietnamese polity view expressions of dissent as an
existential threat to the current regime.
Differences over human rights do not appear to have spilled over into the 123 agreement
negotiations between the two governments. Human rights activists and other Vietnam watchers
have argued that the United States should not advance bilateral ties with Vietnam on any level,
including a nuclear cooperation agreement, until progress is made on the human rights agenda.
Since Vietnam has other commercial partners in the nuclear energy field, however, a delay or lack
of agreement with the United States would not be likely to have a significant impact on its
nuclear energy plans.
Role of Congress and Legislation
The nuclear cooperation agreement is expected to comply with all the terms of the Atomic Energy
Act as amended and therefore will be a “non-exempt” agreement. This means that it will enter
into force upon the 90th day of continuous session after its submittal to Congress (a period of 30
plus 60 days of review) unless a Joint Resolution disapproving the agreement is enacted.45
Members of Congress have weighed in on the debate over the U.S.-Vietnam nuclear cooperation
agreement and section 123 agreements generally. In December 2013, Representatives Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen and Brad Sherman introduced a bill (H.R. 3766) that would strengthen congressional
approval procedures for agreements that did not include certain nonproliferation standards,
including the pledge not to enrich or reprocess. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a
hearing on January 30, 2014, on section 123 agreements. Debate during the hearing spent some
time on the issues surrounding the Vietnam nuclear cooperation accord. Some Senators said that a
human rights bill on Vietnam would need to be passed if a nuclear cooperation agreement was to
go forward.

44 During a December 16, 2013, joint press appearance with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh in Hanoi,
Secretary Kerry said about Vietnam’s human rights conditions that “I made it clear that TPP, the 123 agreement, the
congressional readiness to move forward on any number of initiatives will be, obviously, affected by the degree of
progress [on human rights] that is perceived.” State Department, “Joint Press Availability With Vietnamese Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh,” Government Guest House, Hanoi, Vietnam, December 16,
2013.
45 For detailed information, see CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by Paul
K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
Congressional Research Service
13

U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress

As required by section 123b of the Atomic Energy Act, the President announced in February 2014
his determination that a nuclear cooperation agreement with Vietnam “will promote, and will not
constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”46 The next step is for the
White House to transmit a package of documents to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to include the text of the agreement itself, a
Nonproliferation Assessment statement (unclassified and classified), the Presidential
determination, and letters of concurrence by the Secretaries of Energy and State, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Chairman. Once those have been received, the first review period of 30
days of continuous session begins, to be followed by another 60 days of review. Members of
Congress may introduce resolutions of disapproval (or approval) during this time. If no resolution
of disapproval is passed into law, then the agreement will automatically enter into force after the
90-day review period is concluded.

Author Contact Information

Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
Specialist in Asian Affairs
mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745
mmanyin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7653
Mark Holt

Specialist in Energy Policy
mholt@crs.loc.gov, 7-1704



46 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/24/presidential-determination-proposed-nuclear-agreement-
vietnam
Congressional Research Service
14