Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and
Government Performance
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
February 27, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21922
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Summary
The capacity, transparency, and legitimacy of Afghan governance are considered crucial to
Afghan stability as U.S.-led NATO forces turn over the security mission to Afghan leadership.
The size and capability of the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the
Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but the government remains weak and rife with corruption. Even
as the government has struggled to widen its writ, President Hamid Karzai has concentrated
substantial presidential authority through his powers of appointment at all levels. He is
constitutionally term-limited will leave office after presidential and provincial elections scheduled
for April 5, 2014. Several major figures—some close to Karzai and others opposed—have
registered to run for president; many of their slates include faction leaders long accused of human
rights abuses. Some observers are concerned that Karzai might try to use state machinery to favor
a particular candidate, although he has not openly tilted toward any candidate to date. Fraud in
two successive elections (for president in 2009 and parliament in 2010) was extensively
documented, but Afghan officials, civil society organizations, and key donor countries have taken
substantial steps to limit the potential for fraud in the April 2014 elections.
Fears about the election process are fanned by the scant progress in reducing widespread
nepotism and other forms of corruption. President Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build
emerging anti-corruption institutions, but these same bodies have faltered from lack of support
from senior Afghan government leaders who oppose prosecuting their political allies. At a donors’
conference in Tokyo on July 8, 2012, donors pledged to aid Afghanistan’s economy through at
least 2017, on the condition that Afghanistan takes concrete, verifiable action to rein in
corruption. Afghan progress on that issue was assessed relatively unfavorably at the end of a
Tokyo process review meeting in Kabul attended by major donors on July 3, 2013.
No matter the outcome of the Afghan leadership succession process, there is concern among
many observers that governance will founder as the United States and its partners reduce their
involvement in Afghanistan. An informal power structure consisting of regional and ethnic
leaders—in some cases the same figures running in the 2014 elections—has always been at least
as significant a factor in governance as the formal power structure. The faction leaders—likely to
gain influence after 2014—lead or can quickly recruit armed fighters, and several are reviving
their militias in the event the end of the international security mission in 2014 produces
instability. An increase in the influence of faction leaders could produce even more corruption,
arbitrary administration of justice, and human rights abuses than has been the case since the
international intervention in 2001.
President Karzai is appealing to nationalist sentiment to attract Taliban support to rejoin Afghan
politics, but Afghan civil society activists, particularly women’s groups, assert that a full
reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan politics could reverse some of the human and women’s
rights gains since 2001. Those gains have come despite the persistence of traditional attitudes and
Islamic conservatism in many parts of Afghanistan—attitudes that cause the judicial and political
system to tolerate child marriages and imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence. Islam
and tradition has also frequently led to persecution of converts from Islam to Christianity, and to
curbs on the sale of alcohol and on Western-oriented programming in the Afghan media. See also
CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector
Assistance, by Liana Rosen and Kenneth Katzman.
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Contents
Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority and Politics ........................................................ 1
Afghan Ethnicities, Communities, and Their Relationships...................................................... 2
Pashtuns ............................................................................................................................... 2
Tajiks/Northern Alliance ..................................................................................................... 3
Hazaras ................................................................................................................................ 4
Uzbeks ................................................................................................................................. 4
Other Minorities .................................................................................................................. 4
The Role of Political Parties ...................................................................................................... 5
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape ............................................................................. 6
Formal Government Structure: Elected but Centralized Leadership ......................................... 6
December 2001 Bonn Agreement ....................................................................................... 6
Permanent Constitution Adopted, Sets Up Presidency With Broad Powers ....................... 7
The Presidency: Karzai, His Leadership, Advisers, and Staff ............................................. 8
National Assembly (Parliament) Formation, Powers, and Assertion of Powers ................. 9
The Judiciary and Rule of Law ......................................................................................... 13
The Informal Power Structure: Power Brokers and Faction Leaders ...................................... 16
Vice President Muhammad Fahim .................................................................................... 16
Abdul Rashid Dostam: Uzbek Leader in Northern Afghanistan ....................................... 17
Atta Mohammad Noor: Balkh Province/Mazar-e-Sharif Potentate .................................. 17
Mohammed Mohaqiq: Hazara Stalwart ............................................................................ 18
Isma’il Khan: “Emir” of Herat/Western Afghanistan ........................................................ 18
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh: Helmand Province Power Broker ................................... 19
Karzai Family: Qandahar Province Stronghold ................................................................ 19
Ghul Agha Shirzai: Eastern Afghanistan/Nangarhar ......................................................... 20
Jirgas and Shuras: Traditional Processes of the Informal Power Structure ...................... 21
Emerging Power Centers: Civil Society and “Independent” Activists .................................... 21
Elections in 2009 and 2010 Harmed Confidence in the Electoral Process and Widened
Political Schisms .................................................................................................................. 22
2009 Presidential Election ................................................................................................. 22
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections ................................................................... 24
April 5, 2014, Presidential and Provincial Elections: Credibility Under Scrutiny ............ 27
Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance .............................................................................. 32
Expanding Central Government Capacity ............................................................................... 33
The Afghan Civil Service/Merit-Based Recruitment ........................................................ 34
The Afghan Budget Process .............................................................................................. 35
Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance ........................................................................... 36
The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) ............................................ 37
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils ................................................................. 37
District-Level Governance ................................................................................................ 38
Municipal and Village Level Authority ............................................................................. 39
Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption ............................................................. 39
High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism ............................................................ 40
Lower-Level Corruption.................................................................................................... 40
Administration Views and Policy on Corruption .............................................................. 41
Kabul Bank Scandal and Continuing Difficulties ............................................................. 45
Moves to Penalize Lack of Progress on Corruption .......................................................... 47
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Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society ........................................................................... 47
Institution-Building: The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
(AIHRC) and Outside Human Rights Organizations ..................................................... 48
Religious Influence on Society: National Ulema Council ................................................ 49
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 50
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms ........................................................ 51
Harsh Punishments/Torture ............................................................................................... 52
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 52
Advancement of Women ................................................................................................... 53
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues .......................... 56
Effects of a Settlement with the Taliban .................................................................................. 56
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities ............................................................................................. 59
Tables
Table 1. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations .............................................................................. 57
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 59
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 59
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority
and Politics
Through differing regimes of widely varying ideologies, Afghanistan’s governing structure has
historically consisted of weak central government unwilling or unable to enforce significant
financial or administrative mandates on all of Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic communities or on the
80% of Afghans who live in rural areas. These communities, many of which are separated by
mountains and wide expanses, have often looked to local faction leaders for their governance. At
the same time, there has always been a struggle between urban, educated “modernizers” and the
rural, lesser-educated traditionalists who adhere to strict Islamic customs. The Taliban
government (1996-2001) opposed modernization, but there has been substantial modernization
and urbanization since the Taliban were ousted—factors that might help Afghanistan remain
stable after the international security mission winds down at the end of 2014.
At the national level, Afghanistan had few, if any, Western-style democratic institutions prior to
the international intervention that took place after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United
States. Under the constitution of 1964, King Zahir Shah was to be a constitutional monarch, and
an elected lower house and appointed upper house were set up. The parliament during that era
never reached the expectation of becoming a significant check on the king’s power, although the
period from 1964 until the seizure of power by Mohammad Daoud in a 1973 military coup was
considered a flowering of Afghan democracy. The last lower house elections during that period
were held in 1969. The parliament was suspended outright following the April 1978 Communist
seizure of power. The elected institutions and the 2004 adoption of a constitution were part of a
post-Taliban transition roadmap established by a United Nations-sponsored agreement of major
Afghan factions signed in Bonn, Germany, on December 5, 2001 (“Bonn Agreement”),1 after the
Taliban had fallen. Karzai is the first directly elected Afghan president.
Since the fall of the Taliban, there has also been the growth of civil society, populated largely by
educated Afghans, many of whom returned to Afghanistan from exile when the Taliban fell.
Organizations and groups centered on various issues, including women’s rights, law and justice,
media freedoms, economics and business issues, the environment, and others, have proliferated.
U.S. and international partner policy has been to try to empower these groups as a check on
government power and to entrench Afghan democracy.
These newly emerging interest groups have still not been able to displace—or even necessarily
substantially influence—the informal power structure of ethnic, regional, tribal, clan, village, and
district structures that exercise authority at all levels. At the local level, these structures governed
and secured Afghanistan until the late 1970s but were weakened by decades of subsequent war
and Taliban rule. Some traditional local authority figures fled or were killed; others were
displaced by mujahedin commanders, militia leaders, Taliban militants, and others. The local
power brokers who displaced some of the tribal structures are far less popular and are widely
accused of selectively applying Afghan law and of using their authority to enrich themselves.
Some of the traditional tribal councils, which are widely respected but highly conservative in
orientation, remained intact. Some of them continue to exercise their writ rather than accept the
authority of the central government or even local government appointees. Still other community
1 For text, see http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm.
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authorities prefer to accommodate local insurgents, whom they often see as potentially
reconcilable members of the community, rather than help the government secure their areas.
Afghan Ethnicities, Communities, and Their Relationships
Even though post-Taliban Afghanistan, particularly in urban areas, is modernizing politically and
economically, patterns of political affiliation by family, clan, tribe, village, ethnicity, region, and
comradeship in past battles often supersede relationships based on ideology or views. These
patterns have been evident in every post-Taliban Afghan election. Candidates, including at the
national level, often pursue campaign strategies designed primarily to assemble blocs of ethnic
and geographic votes, although some candidates have sought to advance specific new programs
and ideas. The traditional patterns have been even more pronounced in province-based campaigns
such as those for provincial councils and the parliament. In these cases, electorates (voters of a
specific province) are small and candidates can easily exploit clan and familial relationships.
While Afghans continue to follow traditional patterns of affiliation, there has been a sense among
Afghans that their country now welcomes members of all political and ethnic groups and factions.
There have been very few incidents of ethnic-based violence since the fall of the Taliban, but
jealousies over relative economic and political positions of the different ethnic communities have
sporadically manifested as clashes or political disputes. Some non-Pashtun minority members
have suggested that their identity cards indicate their ethnicity on the grounds that the word
“Afghan” connotes Pashtun ethnicity.
Although they largely accept that an ethnic Pashtun is most likely to hold the top slot in the
Afghan government, non-Pashtuns insist on being—and are—represented at all levels of the
central government. Ethnic minorities have demanded, and have achieved, a large measure of
control over how government programs are implemented in their geographic regions. Although
Karzai has the power to appoint provincial and district governors, in practice he has not generally
appointed governors of a different ethnicity than the majority of residents of particular provinces.
The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), which recommends to the presidential
palace local appointments, often consults notables of a province on appointments. The major
groups are discussed below.
Pashtuns
Ethnic Pashtuns (pronounced POSH-toons, sometimes referred to as Pathans—pah-TAHNS), as
the largest single ethnicity, have historically asserted a “right to rule” Afghanistan. The Pashtuns
speak Pashtu (or Pashto), but most in the government also speak Dari, a language akin to Persian.
Pashtuns are widely believed to constitute 42%-45% of the population. With few exceptions, it
has been a Pashtun holding the top governing position in Afghanistan. The sentiment of the “right
to rule” is particularly strong among Pashtuns of the Durrani tribal confederation, which
predominates in the south and is a rival to the Ghilzai confederation, which predominates in the
east and has historically close ties to Pakistan. Protests erupted in December 2013 when a Pashtun
former intelligence official said on a television show that “Pashtuns are the rulers and owners of
Afghanistan...” That comment led Karzai to order his arrest for stirring up ethnic divisions.
Karzai is a Durrani Pashtun, and his cabinet and advisory circle is dominated by other Pashtuns,
both Ghilzai and Durrani. Karzai is credited by many observers for consulting with other
communities, particularly the Tajiks, before issuing decrees or reaching decisions. The Taliban is
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composed almost completely of Pashtuns; they oppose Karzai on the grounds that his government
does not enforce all aspects of Islamic law and is supported by international forces. A table on
major Pashtun clans is provided below (see Table 1), as is a map showing the distribution of
Afghan ethnicities (see Figure 1).
Tajiks/Northern Alliance
Tajiks, who speak Dari, are the second-most numerous and second-most powerful community in
Afghanistan. Tajiks are an estimated 25% of the population. Tajiks have ruled Afghanistan on
only a few occasions, and Burhanuddin Rabbani served as president of the mujahedin government
(1992-1996), and led briefly again during November-December 2001, before Karzai became
interim leader. Although many Tajiks oppose Karzai, some cooperate with him. Karzai’s first Vice
President, Muhammad Fahim, is a Tajik, as is Defense Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammedi.
During the anti-Soviet war and Taliban period, many Tajik leaders grouped around the prominent
mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masoud and the Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society) mujahedin
political party led by Burhanuddin Rabbani (assassinated September 20, 2011). Rabbani was
technically Masoud’s political leader, but Masoud had a large following because of his success in
preventing Soviet occupation forces from conquering the Panjshir Valley. During Taliban rule,
Tajik leaders formed the core of a broader, non-Pashtun dominated “Northern Alliance” that is
discussed in detail later. Masoud was killed by Al Qaeda supporters two days before the
September 11 attacks on the United States, possibly in conjunction with that plot. Many Tajik
leaders, such as Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and former parliament speaker Yunus Qanooni, have
prospered politically because of their close association with the slain commander. Some refer to
Tajik leaders as “Panjshiris” because many of them are, like Masoud, from the Panjshir Valley
north of Kabul. It should be noted that some Tajik commanders during the anti-Soviet and anti-
Taliban wars fought with Pashtun parties including Hezb-i-Islamii.
Although Rabbani was the elder statesman of the Northern Alliance, he had been largely
displaced in recent years by other Tajiks such as the overall “leader of the opposition”—former
Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. Dr. Abdullah is about 56 years old; his mother is Tajik
and father is Pashtun from Qandahar, but his identity as the foreign envoy of the late Ahmad Shah
Masoud gives him Tajik political identity. He was dismissed from his foreign minister post by
Karzai in a March 2006 cabinet reshuffle, causing him to break with Karzai. Aside from his
political activities, Abdullah heads a private foundation named after Ahmad Shah Masoud.
Abdullah emerged as Afghanistan’s opposition leader after his unsuccessful challenge against
Karzai for president in the August 2009 election. The cornerstone of his ideology is to establish a
parliamentary system in which the National Assembly would select a powerful prime minister,
although Karzai often accuses him of simply seeking to bring the Tajiks to ultimate power in
Afghanistan. As noted below, he is running again in 2014.
Some Northern Alliance figures have emerged as competitors of Dr. Abdullah. Some did not join
his 10-party “National Coalition of Afghanistan” in December 2011; the coalition advocates a
parliamentary system of government, and it does not rule out a peace agreement with the Taliban.
Ahmad Zia Masoud (Ahmad Shah Masoud’s brother), for example, belongs to an opposition
group called the National Front of Afghanistan. It advocates “federalism”—a high degree of
autonomy for Afghan provinces, including appointment of provincial governors by elected
provincial councils. The National Front grouping also is more skeptical of a peace agreement
with the Taliban than is Dr. Abdullah.
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Hazaras
The Hazara Shiite minority (about 10% of the population) is advancing economically and
politically through education. The Hazaras have historically been looked down upon by the
Pashtuns, who have tended to employ Hazaras as domestic workers and other lower and lower
middle class occupations. Observers report that many Hazaras, including Hazara women, are
earning degrees or pursuing training in information technology, medical, and other highly skilled
professions and that they are becoming dominant in many of these higher paying sectors of the
Afghan economy.2 Hazaras are slightly underrepresented in the ANSF officer corps (about 7%).
One major Hazara figure is Mohammad Mohaqiq, who was a prominent mujahedin commander
during the Soviet occupation. Another is Second Vice President Karim Khalili. Other prominent
Hazaras include prominent anti-corruption parliamentarian Ramazan Bashardost and the
chairwoman of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), Sima Simar.
Possible envy of Hazara advancement could have been a factor in the December 6, 2011,
bombings of Hazaras in three cities, killing 60, while they were visiting their mosques to
celebrate the Shiite holy day of Ashura. Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi—
generally allied to the almost purely Pashtun Taliban—claimed responsibility, possibly in an
effort to stir up sectarian conflict in Afghanistan. There are also tensions between the Hazaras and
the Tajiks, even though both oppose Pashtun dominance. A clash took place between the two
communities on September 9, 2012, when a car in a procession of Tajiks commemorating the
September 9, 2001 death of Ahmad Shah Masoud ran over a Hazara bicyclist. The clash was said
to reflect lingering Hazara resentment of Masoud’s 1993 offensive against then Hazara rivals
during the 1992-1996 period of civil warfare that preceded the accession of the Taliban regime.
Uzbeks
Uzbeks, like the Hazaras, are about 10% of the population. The Uzbek community is Sunni
Muslim and speaks a language akin to Turkish. Most Uzbeks speak Dari as well. The most well-
known Uzbek leader in Afghanistan is Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was allied with Soviet
occupation forces but later defected and helped bring down the Communist regime in Afghanistan
in April 1992. As noted below, the speaker of the lower house of parliament is an ethnic Uzbek.
Because of their alliance with the Soviet Union during the occupation period, many Uzbeks in
Afghanistan are leftwing and highly secular. Uzbeks are slightly underrepresented in the ANSF
officer corps—about 4.5% as of September 2012.
Other Minorities3
There are several other religious and ethnic minorities in Afghanistan, members of which are
sometimes discriminated against or targeted for attacks. Northeastern provinces have a substantial
population of Isma’ilis, a Shiite Muslim sect often called “Seveners” (believers in the Seventh
Imam as the true Imam). They constitute about 5% of the population. Many Ismailis follow the
Agha Khan IV (Prince Qarim al-Husseini), who chairs the large Agha Khan Foundation that has
2 Richard Oppel Jr. and Abdul Waheed Wafa, “Hazara Minority Hustles to Head of the Class in Afghanistan,” New
York Times, January 4, 2010.
3 Some of this information is taken from the State Department International Religious Freedom Report for 2012,
released May 20, 2013, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/.
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invested heavily in Afghanistan. An estimated 350 Sikh families and 30 Hindu families are
present as well, concentrated in the area of Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province. The Christian
community is estimated at between 500 and 8,000 persons, and the Bahai community, considered
heretic by Afghan Muslim clerics, is about 2,000.
The Role of Political Parties
During the era of the Soviet occupation and the 1992-1996 civil war, many of the mujahedin
parties were based on ethnicities, loyal to major ethnic and factional commanders. These parties,
such as Jamiat-Islami and the Uzbek group Junbush Melli Islami Afghanistan, were largely
funded and armed by outside powers, producing a popular aversion to formal political parties in
post-Taliban Afghanistan. Since 2009, there apparently has been some evolution in these attitudes
and parties and electoral coalitions have strengthened. Even though many parties still are
relatively homogenous ethnically, they do not advertise themselves as “ethnic” parties per se,
because Article 35 of the Afghan constitution bans parties based on ethnicity or religious sect.
From the fall of the Taliban until 2009, 110 political parties were established. A September 2009
political parties law required all parties to re-register by demonstrating their support with 10,000
signatures spanning at least 22 provinces. That limited the number of parties registered before the
September 18, 2010, parliamentary election to only five. By late 2011, 38 parties had completed
the process, and 21 parties are represented in the lower house of parliament. A July 11, 2012,
regulation eased registration rules somewhat by requiring parties to have offices in at least 20
provinces in order to register, and 56 parties were registered as of the end of 2013.
Partly because parties are viewed with suspicion, President Hamid Karzai never formed a party.
However, many of his supporters in the National Assembly (parliament)—and several officials in
his office—belong to a moderate faction of Hizb-e-Islami. The party, composed almost totally of
ethnic Pashtuns, is the only one of the mujahedin parties that formally registered. This wing of the
Hizb-e-Islami is committed to working within the political system. It is led by Minister of
Economy Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, whose leadership was reaffirmed at a party conference during
October 3-4, 2012. The militant wing of Hizb-e-Islam is loyal to pro-Taliban insurgent leader
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar; it is called Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). The other mujahedin parties
have mostly merged into broader coalitions, as discussed below. Another mostly Pashtun party is
Afghan Millat (Afghan Nation), which was headed until October 2012 by the current Minister of
Commerce Anwar ul-Haq Ahady; he was displaced at an October 4, 2012, party congress by its
secretary-general Stana Gul Sherzad.
It was hoped that post-Taliban Afghanistan would produce a substantial number of secular, pan-
ethnic democratic parties. That process has evolved only gradually. Since 2004, Dr. Abdullah has
formed several parties in succession, although generally composed of other ethnic Tajiks, and
rival Tajiks have formed their own parties. However, these mostly Tajik groupings are
increasingly working with other parties of varying ethnicities and ideologies to increase
government accountability. One prominent secular, pan-ethnic party, the Rights and Justice Party,
was formed by ex-Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar and other allies in October 2011; it
is discussed further below. Another party, the Coalition for Reform and Development, formed in
early 2012 to try to ensure that the presidential election in 2014 is fair.
Prior to 2011, the secular parties were mainly small and received little national attention—often
centered around the personalities of their founders rather than enduring ideas. These parties
include the Afghanistan Labour and Development Party, the National Solidarity Party of
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Afghanistan’s Youth, the Republican Party, and the National Congress Party of Afghanistan.
Other secular parties are left wing, such as the National United Party of Afghanistan. However,
some believe that all the smaller, idea-based parties remain weak because the Single, Non-
Transferable Vote (SNTV) system—in which each voter casts a ballot for only one candidate—
favors candidates running as independents rather than as members of parties.
Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
U.S. policy since 2001 has been to help expand the capacity of formal Afghan governing
institutions, most of which were nearly nonexistent during Taliban rule. However, the formal
governing structure continues to compete, often unsuccessfully, with the traditional power
structures discussed above.
Formal Government Structure: Elected but Centralized Leadership
The ouster of the Taliban government paved the way for the success of a long-stalled U.N. effort
to form a broad-based Afghan government and for the international community to help
Afghanistan build legitimate governing institutions. During Taliban rule (1996-2001),
Afghanistan was run by a small, Qandahar-based group (“Shura”) of Pashtun clerics loyal to
Mullah Mohammad Umar, who remained there. No parliament was functioning, and government
offices were minimally staffed and without modern equipment. There were no formal processes to
review Mullah Omar’s decision, for example, to host Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.
In the formation of the first post-Taliban transition government, the United Nations was viewed
as a credible mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation.
During the 1990s, a succession of U.N. mediators adopted proposals for a government to be
selected by a traditional assembly, or loya jirga, even though U.N.-mediated cease-fires between
warring factions did not hold. Non-U.N. initiatives made little progress, particularly the “Six Plus
Two” multilateral contact group that began meeting in 1997 (the United States, Russia, and the
six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan).
December 2001 Bonn Agreement
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, former U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi was brought
back (he had resigned in frustration in October 1999). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378
(November 14, 2001) called for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing a
transitional administration. After the fall of Taliban rule in November 2001, the United Nations
invited major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former
King—but not the Taliban—to an international conference in Bonn, Germany. There, on
December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement.”4 It was endorsed by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001). Other provisions of the agreement:
• authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security in Kabul,
and Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from the capital. Security
4 Text of Bonn agreement is at http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/files/petersberg.htm.
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Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001, and renewed yearly thereafter)
gave formal Security Council authorization for the international peacekeeping
force (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF);
• referred to the need to cooperate with the international community on counter
narcotics, crime, and terrorism; and
• applied the constitution of 1964 until a permanent constitution could be drafted.5
On December 5, 2011, there was an international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, marking
the 10th anniversary since the 2001 Bonn Conference. The meeting, in part, evaluated governance
progress in Afghanistan since the original convention.
Permanent Constitution Adopted, Sets Up Presidency With Broad Powers
A June 2002 “emergency” loya jirga put a representative imprimatur on the transition; it was
attended by 1,550 delegates, of which about 200 were women. Subsequently, a 35-member
constitutional commission drafted a constitution, unveiling it in November 2003. It was debated
by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during
December 13, 2003-January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by prominent Islamic scholar and former
interim Afghan leader Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, approved the draft constitution.
The constitution set up a presidential system, with an elected president having relatively broad
powers and a separately elected National Assembly (parliament). Opponents of centralized power
that would likely favor Pashtuns, the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, a grouping discussed
throughout, failed in its effort to set up a prime ministership in which the elected parliament
would select a prime minister. In such a system, a prime minister would run the day-to-day
workings of government. In the constitution, the faction did achieve some limitation to
presidential powers by assigning major authorities to the parliament, as discussed below. The
Northern Alliance assumed that, in a prime ministerial system, the post of elected president would
be held by a Pashtun but, in a tradition of power sharing, the prime minister post would likely be
held by a Tajik. The election system (a two round election if no majority is achieved in the first
round) strongly favors the likelihood that an ethnic Pashtun will be president of Afghanistan.
The president serves a five-year term, with a two-term limit (Article 62). There are two vice
presidents. The president has broad powers. Under article 64, he has the power to appoint all
“high-ranking officials,” which has been interpreted by Karzai to include not only cabinet
ministers but also members of the Supreme Court, judges, provincial governors and district
governors, local security chiefs, and members of supposedly independent commissions such as
the Independent Election Commission and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
(AIHRC). The latter body was set up by Article 58 to refer cases of human rights violations to
“the legal authorities.” (See further below on this commission.) However, these appointments are
constitutionally subject to confirmation by the National Assembly. The president also is
commander-in-chief of the Afghan armed forces. At the CLJ, the opposition did not achieve the
right of elected provincial and district councils to choose their governors—an outcome the
5 The last pre-Karzai loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution.
Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies, but that gathering was widely viewed by
Afghans as illegitimate.
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opposition continues to seek to reverse. The constitution made former King Zahir Shah honorary
“Father of the Nation,” a title that was not heritable; he died on July 23, 2007.6
The Presidency: Karzai, His Leadership, Advisers, and Staff
Security conditions precluded the holding of the first post-Taliban elections simultaneously. The
first election, for president, was held on October 9, 2004, missing a June constitutional deadline.
Turnout was about 80%. On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote)
over his 17 challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. He was sworn in to office in
December 2004, about one year before the swearing in of an elected National Assembly; he ruled
by decree during that one-year period.
As president, Karzai is advised by what some observers believe is a narrow spectrum of Pashtuns
in the cabinet and in his presidential office. Many of them are considered hardline Pashtuns who
want to assert Afghan sovereignty; some observers say their advice has contributed to the stream
of Karzai statements in 2012 and 2013 accusing the United States of causing excessive civilian
casualties, committing human rights abuses of Afghans, and impinging on Afghan sovereignty
through continued holding of Afghan detainees. Some see in these statements an effort by Karzai
to establish his legacy as a nationalist leader and parry criticism by many Afghans (and the
Taliban) that he is a “puppet.”
Some Karzai advisers are affiliated with the moderate wing of Hezb-e-Islami. Among them is his
chief of staff, former Minister of Information and Culture Abdul Karim Kurram, who was
appointed in April 2011 and serves as key gatekeeper of access to Karzai. In July 2013, he alleged
that the United States is colluding with the Taliban and Pakistan to pressure the Afghan
government. Kurram replaced Mohammad Umar Daudzai, another member of the moderate wing
of Hezb-e-Islami and also a skeptic of Western/U.S. influence over Afghan decision making.7
Daudzai subsequently was appointed Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Pakistan, and, in late August
2013, became Interior Minister. Another top palace aide is minister-counselor Tajj Ayubi.
Some observers assert that the apparatus around Karzai require improved focus and organization.
One idea that has periodically surfaced is to create a new position akin to a “chief administration
officer” who can break through administrative bottlenecks. One of Karzai’s 2009 election
challengers and a major candidate in 2014, Ashaf Ghani, was not formally given this role but
advises Karzai on government reform and institution building. He also oversees the transition
from the United States and NATO to Afghan lead. Another close Karzai confidant, “Senior
Minister” Hedayat Amin Arsala, heads government reform efforts.
National Security Council
Some of the advisers Karzai most trusts are well-educated and Westernized officials, mostly
Pashtuns, who serve in the National Security Council. The National Security advisory staff is
located in the presidential palace complex and heavily populated by ethnic Pashtuns. Karzai is
6 Text of constitution is at http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/ConstitutionAfghanistan.pdf.
7 On October 23, 2010, The New York Times asserted that Daudzai was the presidential office’s liaison with Iran for
accepting the approximately $2 million per year in Iranian assistance that is provided as cash. Karzai acknowledged
this financial arrangement. Daudzai was appointed Ambassador to Pakistan in April 2011.
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said to rely heavily on French-educated physician Zalmay Rassoul, who was National Security
Adviser to Karzai until his appointment in 2010 as Foreign Ministers. Karzai also reportedly
relies heavily on current National Security Adviser Rangin Spanta, who served as Foreign
Minister during 2006-2010. Both are Pashtuns. Another highly trusted official is first deputy
National Security Adviser Ibrahim Spinzada, also a Pashtun. However, many NSC officials at all
levels are from other ethnicities.
Office of Administrative Affairs/General Administrative Office
An administrative unit that has attracted increasing international attention as a center of organized
policymaking is the Office of Administrative Affairs (OAA), referred to by some as the General
Administrative Office (GAO). Some experts say that the office, headed by a Hazara Shiite named
Sadiq Mudabir, is primarily administrative, and without any policy coordination role. However,
some Afghan observers say it is increasingly taking on a policymaking role by helping the
National Assembly draft laws and advising Karzai on what legislation to sign or to veto. The
office also is purported to be taking on an informal judicial role by assessing the legitimacy of
citizen, group, and corporate petitions and assigning those to the appropriate ministries for action.
The office is a holdover from the Communist era, and contains many longtime bureaucrats.
During the 1990s it may have had as many as 1,800 personnel, but has been trimmed during the
Karzai era to about 700 staff members. The operations of the unit are funded primarily by the
United Kingdom, but U.S. military and civilian officials have been assigned to provide advice
and assistance to the office as well.
National Assembly (Parliament) Formation, Powers, and Assertion of Powers
The National Assembly outlined by the constitution consists of a 259 all-elected lower house
(Wolesi Jirga, House of the People, of which ten seats are elected by Kuchi nomads) and a
selected 102 seat upper house (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders). The upper house is selected as
follows: one-third, or 34 seats, appointed by the president (for a five-year term); one-third
appointed by the elected provincial councils (four-year term); and one-third appointed by elected
district councils (for a three-year term). Of the president’s appointments, half (17) are mandated
to be women.8
Because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district
boundaries, formal elections for the 407 district councils have not been held to date. Each district
boundary is likely to be contentious because it will inevitably separate tribes and clans. Until
there are elected district councils, two-thirds of the Meshrano Jirga are selected by the provincial
councils for four-year terms. The lower house is mandated to be at least 28% female (68 women),
an average of two for each of the 34 provinces.
Elections to establish the National Assembly and the provincial councils were originally intended
for April-May 2005 but were delayed until September 18, 2005. The elections were based on a
“Single Non-Transferable Vote” System; candidates stood as individuals, not part of a party list.
Voting was for one candidate only, although the number of representatives varied by province,
8 The size of the two bodies is slightly smaller than the size of the same two bodies provided for in the 1964
constitution (214 members in the Wolesi Jirga and 84 members in the Meshrano Jirga, of which one-third were
appointed by the King, one-third appointed by the provincial councils, and one-third directly elected.
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ranging from 2 (Panjshir Province) to 33 (Kabul Province). Other examples include Herat, 17;
Nangahar, 14; Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni, 11 seats each.
Powers of the National Assembly
The National Assembly has become the key formal institution for non-Pashtuns and political
independents to express political opposition to and influence Karzai. The Assembly was set up by
the constitution as a relatively powerful body that can, to some extent, check the powers of the
president, although many observers assert that it has been unable to break presidential authority.
The lower house has the power to vote no-confidence against ministers (Article 92)—based on a
proposal by 10% of the lower house membership (25 parliamentarians). Both the upper and lower
houses are required to pass laws. Under Article 98 of the constitution, the national budget is taken
up by the Meshrano Jirga first and then passed to the Wolesi Jirga for its consideration. Both
houses of parliament, whose budgets are controlled by the Ministry of Finance, are staffed by
about 275 Afghans, reporting to a National Assembly “secretariat.” There are 18 oversight
committees, a research unit, and a library. A USAID program called the Afghanistan
Parliamentary Assistance Project (APAP) has helped build the National Assembly’s outreach
efforts, communications, and information technology use, and advises on legislative reform and
national budget review.
The National Assembly has, at times, asserted institutional strength since it was first inaugurated
on December 19, 2005. It is the lower house’s younger, more technocratic independent bloc that
has consistently pushed to assert authority. One of its first tasks was to review, and either endorse,
amend, or void, the decrees Karzai had issued prior to the formation of the National Assembly. In
March 2006, it achieved a vote to require Karzai’s cabinet to be approved individually, rather than
en bloc, increasing opposition leverage. However, Karzai was able to obtain confirmation for all
but 5 of his first 25 nominees. In May 2006, the opposition within the lower house compelled
Karzai to change the nine-member Supreme Court, the highest judicial body, including ousting
74-year-old Islamic conservative Fazl Hadi Shinwari as chief justice. The proximate justification
for the ouster was Shinwari’s age, which was beyond the official retirement age of 65. He was
succeeded as chief justice by Abdul Salam Azimi. (Shinwari later headed the Ulema Council,
discussed below, until his death in 2011.)
The process of confirming Karzai’s second-term cabinet—in which many of Karzai’s nominees
were voted down in several nomination rounds during 2010—reaffirmed the Assembly’s
institutional strength. The lower house again asserted itself on August 4, 2012, by voting to oust
Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak and Interior Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammedi,
ostensibly for failing to reduce corruption in their ministries. Some experts asserted the move was
an effort to ensure that security contracts were opened to a broader range of bidders. Karzai
abided by the vote, although he subsequently appointed and achieved confirmation of Khan as
defense minister. On January 14, 2013, the lower house summoned 11 ministers to explain why
they had executed only about 50% of their budgetary authority in 2012. In mid-May 2013, the
lower house questioned Finance Minister Omar Zakhilwal for alleging that several
parliamentarians were smuggling goods across Afghanistan’s borders. After he presented specific
information to support his charges, the lower house voted not to impeach Zakhilwal.9 In July
2013, the lower house voted no-confidence against Interior Minister Ghulam Mujtaba Patang for
9 “Afghanistan’s Cycle of Corruption,” Thedailybeast.com, May 16, 2013.
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security lapses around Afghanistan. Karzai opposed the move and instead consulted with
Afghanistan’s Supreme Court over constitutional options to block it, but in late August 2013
relented and appointed his close ally Umar Daudzai as the new Interior Minister.
Karzai’s Allies in the Lower House of the National Assembly
In addition to his aides in the presidential palace and allies in the government writ large, as of
2012 Karzai has about 70-80 supporters, mostly Pashtuns, in the Wolesi Jirga. This is slightly
lower than the 90 or so supporters he had in the 2006-2010 parliament, before the September 18,
2010, parliamentary elections. Of his lower house supporters, about half are members of the
Hizb-e-Islam party, and several others are followers of Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, a prominent
Pashtun Islamic conservative mujahedin era party leader.10 Karzai was unable to engineer the
selection of Sayyaf to become lower house speaker in 2011. Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi, an Uzbek
who is perceived as weak, won that post as a compromise candidate.
Many of Karzai’s supporters in the lower house are from Qandahar, Karzai’s home province, and
from Helmand province. For example, one pro-Karzai Pashtun who was reelected in the 2010
elections is former militia leader Hazrat Ali (Nangarhar Province), who led the Afghan
component of the failed December 2001 assault on Osama bin Laden’s purported redoubt at Tora
Bora. On the other hand, the 2010 elections resulted in the loss in parliament of Karzai cousin
Jamil Karzai and other Karzai allies such as Pacha Khan Zadran of Paktia Province.
10 Sayyaf led the Ittihad Islami (Islamic Union) mujahedin party during the war against the Soviet occupation.
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Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Hamid Karzai, born December 24, 1957, was selected to lead Afghanistan at the Bonn Conference because he was a
prominent Pashtun leader who had been involved in Taliban-era political talks among exiled Afghans and was viewed
as a compromiser rather than a “strongman.” However, some observers consider his compromises as Afghanistan’s
leader a sign of weakness and criticize him for indulging members of his clan and other allies with appointments. His
term expires in 2014 and he is constitutionally barred from running again; he told parliamentarians in August 2011
that he would abide by the constitutional requirement to step down at that time.
From Karz village in Qandahar Province, Karzai has led the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns since 1999,
when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan. Karzai’s grandfather was head of the
consultative National Council during King Zahir Shah’s reign. He attended university in India and supported the
mujahidin party of Sibghatullah Mojadeddi during the anti-Soviet war. He was deputy foreign minister in the mujahidin
government of Rabbani during 1992-1995, but he resigned and supported the Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to
Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and forged alliances with other anti-Taliban factions,
including the Northern Alliance. Karzai entered Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun
resistance to the Taliban, supported by U.S. Special Forces. He became central to U.S. efforts after Pashtun
commander Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without U.S. support and was captured and hung by the
Taliban. Karzai was slightly injured by an errant U.S. bomb in late 2001.
With heavy protection, Karzai has survived several assassination attempts since taking office, including rocket fire or
gunfire at or near his appearances. His wife, Dr. Zenat Karzai, is a gynecologist by profession. They have two children.
Family Dealings
Controversy has surrounded his siblings for allegedly profiting from Karza’is presidency. His half-brother, Ahmad Wali
Karzai, was the most powerful political figure in Qandahar Province until his assassination on July 12, 2011. He was
key to President Karzai’s information network in Qandahar. Ahmad Wali was widely accused of involvement in or
tolerating narcotics trafficking, but reportedly also was a paid informant for the CIA; some of his property has been
used by U.S. Special Forces. After Ahmad Wali’s death, Karzai appointed another brother, Shah Wali Karzai, as
Popolzai chief. Shah Wali reputedly has become involved in business dealings in Qandahar that have run him afoul of
another brother, Mahmoud Karzai. Their dispute centered around $50 million impounded by Shah Wali to complete
the large upscale housing development in Qandahar called Ayno Maina. The dispute was settled in September 2013
and the complex has been completed. Mahmoud is reportedly under U.S. Justice Department investigation for al eged
corruption involving other business interests in Qandahar and Kabul, including auto dealerships, a coal mine, a cement
factory, and his borrowings from Kabul Bank (see below). Another brother, Qayyum Karzai, served in parliament
during 2005-2008 but resigned in October 2008 for health reasons. He has reportedly been involved in negotiations
with Taliban figures on a political settlement and attempted but failed to get President Karzai’s support to run for
president in 2014. Other Karzai relatives have profited extensively from international contracts, including a $2.2
billion U.S. “Host Nation Trucking” contract. The United States banned contracts to one such firm, Watan Risk
Management, as of January 6, 2011; the firm is co-owned by two Karzai second cousins—Rashid and Rateb Popal. The
Popal brothers reorganized the company as Watan Group and this firm is the local partner of China National
Petroleum Company on a $3 billion investment, awarded in 2012, to develop oil fields in northern Afghanistan.
U.S.-Karzai Relations
Karzai has periodical y lashed out at what he sees as U.S. and international pressure on him to reduce corruption and
ensure electoral fairness, as well as what he characterizes as infringements on Afghan sovereignty from U.S.-led
combat operations and prisoner detentions. On April 4, 2010, Karzai suggested that Western meddling in Afghanistan
was fueling support for the Taliban as a legitimate resistance to foreign occupation. In October 2011, Karzai said that
Afghanistan would side with Pakistan in the event of a war between Pakistan and the United States. During the March
2013 visit of Secretary of Defense Hagel, Karzai said that Taliban attacks were helping the United States prolong its
military presence in Afghanistan. Some U.S. officials assert that his refusal to date to sign a negotiated Bilateral
Security Agreement that would keep some U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014 is jeopardizing that post-2014
mission. Related differences emerged in February 2014 over an Afghan release of 68 detainees the United States
identified as major security threats.
Source: CRS.
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Karzai Support Significant in the Upper House
Karzai has substantial support in the 102-seat upper house of the National Assembly, partly
because of his bloc of 34 appointments (one-third) to that body. His allies have consistently
chaired the body, including Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, who led it from 2005 until 2010, and the
current upper house chair, Fazl Hadi Muslim Yaar. Because it is composed of more elderly,
established, notable Afghans who are traditionalist in their political outlook, the upper house has
tended to be more Islamist conservative than the lower house, advocating a legal system that
accords with Islamic law, and restrictions on press and Westernized media broadcasts.
Karzai also has used his bloc of appointments to the upper house to co-opt potential antagonists
or reward his friends. In 2006, he appointed Northern Alliance military leader Muhammad Fahim
to the upper body, although he resigned after a few months. He was Karzai’s primary running
mate in the 2009 elections and is now first vice president. In 2006, Karzai also named a key ally,
former Helmand Governor Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh, to the body.
Karzai was scheduled to make his 34 new upper house appointments (five-year terms) prior to the
January 26, 2011, seating of the 2011-2015 parliament. However, the appointments were delayed
by the 2010 Assembly election dispute. On January 27, 2011, the body reaffirmed Muslim Yaar as
upper house chair. In his selections on February 19, 2011, Karzai reappointed 18 incumbents and
appointing 16 new members to the body, including the mandated appointment of 17 women.
The Judiciary and Rule of Law11
The Afghan constitution provides for an independent judiciary, led by a nine-member Supreme
Court. The members are appointed by the president, but subject to confirmation by the lower
house of the National Assembly. Of the nine, three judges are appointed to 10-year terms, three
are appointed for 7 years, and three are appointed for four years. In May 2006, the National
Assembly voted to start the appointment cycle anew. Most recently, two of those whose seats had
expired were confirmed by the Wolesi Jirga on December 25, 2013. Yet, the chief justice, Abdul
Salaam Azimi (whose term expired in August 2010), and three other associates justices with
expire terms continue to serve as “acting justices.”
As the highest body in the judiciary, the Supreme Court appoints judges at the provincial and
district level. In mid-2012, the Supreme Court swore in 181 judges, many of whom were women,
leaving only 38 out of Afghanistan’s 407 districts lacking an assigned judge. Some female
judicial officials, for example, Maria Bashir—chief prosecutor in Herat Province (the only female
chief prosecutor in the country)—have been criticized by some groups for enforcing laws that are
heavily skewed against women.12
The judiciary works closely with the Office of the Attorney General, who is the highest ranking
law enforcement officer in Afghanistan. The position has been held by Mohammad Ishaq Aloko,
a Pasthun, since 2010. President Karzai removed him in late August 2013 for purportedly
conducting an unauthorized meeting with Taliban representatives in the UAE, but Aloko was
reinstated after negotiations between him and Karzai.
11 Information on the judiciary can be found at http://supremecourt.gov.af/en/page/614/619#baha.
12 Graham Bowley, “Afghan Prosecutor Faces Criticism for Her Pursuit of “Moral Crimes,” New York Times,
December 29, 2012.
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International, including U.S., funding is helping the formal Afghan judicial system expand its
capacity and competence. The writ of the judicial system has, by all accounts, expanded
significantly since 2001, particularly in the urban areas. U.S. funding supports training and
mentoring for Afghan justice officials, direct assistance to the Afghan government to expand
efforts on judicial security, legal aid and public defense, gender justice and awareness, and
expansion of justice in the provinces. USAID’s “Rule of Law Stabilization Program” has trained
over 700 Afghan judges and expanded the Afghan Supreme Court’s training for new judges.
Since July 2010, the U.S. Embassy has had a senior official heading a Rule of Law Directorate.
NATO missions to support rule of law in Afghanistan, including operating the Justice Center in
Parwan, ceased operations in August and September 2013.
Despite the years of international support and assistance, there is broad international agreement
that the Afghan judicial system remains weak and its independence is questionable. The Afghan
government has completed few of the benchmarks for judicial reform agreed at the July 20, 2010,
Kabul conference and the “Tokyo Framework” established at the Tokyo donor’s conference of
July 8, 2012, which required Afghanistan to:
• Enact its draft Criminal Procedure Code into law by the end of 2010 (one of the
37 laws the Afghans pledged at the Kabul Conference to enact). A draft of a new
code was presented to the National Assembly on June 30, 2012, and debate began
in the Wolesi Jirga in late 2012. However, the code has not been enacted to date.
On October 13, 2012, the Wolesi Jirga adopted a law on the structure and
authority of the Attorney General’s Office.
• Improve legal aid services by the end of 2011. A March 5, 2013, U.N. Secretary
General’s report on Afghanistan said the Ministry of Justice had established 29
legal aid offices as of the end of 2012, up from 16 in 2011.
• Strengthen judicial capabilities to facilitate the return of illegally seized lands.
This commitment was made partly to address the ability of well-connected
individuals to appropriated land—either through the legal process or through
force—for their homes and projects. USAID provided $56 million during
FY2005-2009 to facilitate property registration. An additional $140 million is
being provided from FY2010-FY2014 to inform citizens of land processes and
procedures, and to establish a legal and regulatory framework for land
administration.
• Align strategy toward the informal justice sector with the National Justice Sector
Strategy.
As a result of the Tokyo conference, Afghanistan committed to present donors with plans to
depoliticize the judiciary and assure rule of law—elements of a National Priority Program (NPP).
In mid-October 2012, the EU judged that not enough progress had been made, and about $26
million in EU aid for judiciary reform was withheld. The July 3, 2013, senior officials meeting in
Kabul, held to review Afghan performance of the Tokyo benchmarks, did not assess that there had
been substantial progress on these rule of law issues.
Some institutional barriers to the independence of the judiciary will be difficult to overcome. On
matters involving interpreting the constitution, the Supreme Court has sparred with a rival
institution, a constitutionally mandated “Independent Commission for the Supervision of the
Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC).” The ICSIC consists of seven commissioners
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appointed by the president, subject to confirmation by the lower house of the National Assembly.
To date, two of the required seats remain unfilled.
Informal Justice System and Traditional Dispute Mechanisms
Despite the international focus on the formal justice sector, some experts estimate that as many as
80% of cases are decided in the informal justice system. Many Afghans view the formal sector as
riddled with corruption and unfairness, and continue to use local, informal mechanisms (shuras,
jirgas) to adjudicate disputes—particularly with cases involving local property, familial or local
disputes, or personal status issues. In the informal sector, Afghans can usually expect traditional
practices of dispute resolution to prevail, including the traditional Pashtun code of conduct known
as Pashtunwali. Some of these customs include traditional forms of apology (“nanawati” and
“shamana”) and compensation for wrongs done.13
While much of the informal justice system consists of shuras and jirgas, there is also a history of
Islamic courts operating in some provinces. These courts predate the accession of the Taliban, and
some reemerged after the international intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. Some experts believe
this informal Islamic court system could provide a stabilizing effect after 2014 by attracting the
trust of Afghans and drawing them away from informal justice mechanisms run by Taliban
insurgents.14
However, the informal justice system is dominated almost exclusively by males. For example,
some disputes, including over debts or other financial obligations, are resolved by families’
offering to make young girls available to marry older men from the family that is the counter-
party to the dispute. This practice is known as baad.
Some informal justice shuras take place in Taliban-controlled territory, and some Afghans may
prefer Taliban-run shuras when doing so means they will be judged by members of their own
tribe or tribal confederation. U.S. officials say they do not oppose the widespread use of the
informal justice sector as such, but they do oppose it when it is administered by Taliban members
because of the Taliban’s often extreme interpretations of Islamic law.
One concern is how deeply the international community should become involved in the informal
justice sector. U.S. programs have focused primarily on the formal justice system, but there has
been increasing attention to the informal system because its use is so prevalent.
USAID has implemented programs to link the formal and informal justice sector. As part of a
program begun in 2011, USAID has assisted local shuras (informal justice sector) in four districts
to establish a system to transmit their judicial rulings, in writing, to the district government. The
rule of law issue is discussed in CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice
Sector Assistance, by Liana Rosen and Kenneth Katzman.
13 http://www.khyber.org/articles/2004/JirgaRestorativeJustice.shtml.
14 Casey Garret Johnson, “Afghan Islamic Courts: A Pre-Taliban System With Post-2014 Potential?,” At War, April 17,
2013.
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The Informal Power Structure: Power Brokers and Faction Leaders
An informal power structure exists outside the formal governing institutions, consisting mainly of
locally popular and sometimes well-armed faction leaders. Some observers refer to such figures
as “warlords,” and several of them are discussed in the sections below. This power structure has
begun to reemerge in anticipation of the departure of most international forces in 2014, as Afghan
constituencies look for protection from a potential Taliban comeback. Karzai has worked with
this informal power structure even while heading the formal power structure, maintaining that
confronting faction leaders outright would cause their followers to rebel. Some faction leaders,
both Northern Alliance figures and Pashtun leaders, operate in both spheres—holding official
positions while also exercising informal influence in their home provinces. Recognizing the
ability of the faction leaders to mobilize not only militias, but also voters, many of these faction
leaders are on tickets that registered on October 6, 2013, to run in the presidential elections in
April 2014. The United States and its partners have forged working relations with the informal
power structure—often causing resentment among civil society activists and other emerging
Afghan modernizers. A number of faction leaders own or have investments in Afghan security or
other firms that have won business from U.S. and other donors and fuel allegations of nepotism
and other corruption.
Some argue that U.S. policy since 2007 has further empowered local faction leaders and even
created new factions and militias. Local security initiatives, including the Afghan Local Police
Program and the Critical Infrastructure Police, have created new security organs that sometimes
operate outside the full control of central security authority. On the other hand, Northern Alliance
leaders maintain that the international community’s early dismantling of local power structures in
favor of a monopoly of central government control over armed force—which often targeted
Northern Alliance militias for demobilization—caused the security deterioration in 2006-2011.
In February 2007, both houses of parliament passed a law (officially titled the National
Reconciliation, General Amnesty, and National Stability Law) giving amnesty to faction leaders
and others who committed abuses during Afghanistan’s past wars. Karzai sent back to parliament
an altered draft to give victims the right to seek justice for any abuses. In December 2009, the
Afghan government published an amended version of the law—containing a provision giving
victims the right to seek redress for abuses—in the official gazette (a process known as
“gazetting”), giving it the force of law.
Vice President Muhammad Fahim
Karzai’s choice of Northern Alliance figure Muhammad Fahim as his first vice presidential
running mate in the August 2009 elections reflected Karzai’s reliance on faction leaders as well as
his effort to divide the Northern Alliance. Fahim is a Tajik from the Panjshir Valley region who
was named military chief of the Northern Alliance after Ahmad Shah Masoud’s death. However,
the Fahim choice as vice president was criticized by human rights and other groups. During 2002-
2007, he reportedly withheld turning over some heavy weapons to U.N. disarmament officials.
He allegedly was involved in facilitating narcotics trafficking in northern Afghanistan, according
to a New York Times story of August 27, 2009. Other allegations suggest he has engineered
property confiscations and other benefits to feed his and his faction’s business interests. Fahim’s
brother, Abdul Hussain Fahim, was a beneficiary of concessionary loans from Kabul Bank, which
is discussed below, and he has also partnered with Mahmoud Karzai on coal mining and cement
manufacturing ventures. In September 2012, he said that the mujahedin—presumably referring to
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the Northern Alliance fighters—should reorganize after 2014 if Afghan forces are unable to fend
off the Taliban. He will leave office along with Karzai later in 2014.
Abdul Rashid Dostam: Uzbek Leader in Northern Afghanistan
Prominent Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam heads a faction called Junbush Melli Islami
Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan), although it is not a registered political
party for the purposes of elections. A former Communist ally of the Soviet occupying forces,
Dostam later joined the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. He placed at its disposal his
numerous armed partisans from his redoubt in northern Afghanistan (Jowzjan, Faryab, Balkh, and
Sar-I-Pol provinces). There, during the Soviet and Taliban years, he was widely accused of
human rights abuses of political opponents. He was also known for lack of emphasis on Islam and
support for Western-style values, such as alcohol consumption and promotion of women, in areas
under his influence. To try to reduce his influence in the north, in 2005 Karzai appointed him to
the post of chief military adviser—a largely ceremonial post he still holds. Dostam supported
Karzai’s 2009 reelection bid, perhaps in part to limit the influence of a strong rival figure in the
north, Balkh Province Governor Atta Mohammad Noor, who governs a province inhabited by
many Uzbeks. Two years later, Dostam joined with Karzai’s opposition in the National Front of
Afghanistan and Truth and Justice Party, discussed above. He is a vice presidential candidate in
the April 2014 election on a ticket headed by Ashraf Ghani.
Dostam has had numerous feuds and altercations with other Afghan figures. On February 4, 2008,
Afghan police surrounded Dostam’s villa in Kabul in response to reports that he attacked an
ethnic Turkmen figure who had broken with him. Dostam temporarily went into exile in Turkey
in exchange for the dropping of the charges.15 In June 2012, the Karzai government prosecuted
Dostam for allegedly insisting the China National Petroleum Co. (CNPC) hire Dostam loyalists
on its oil development project in northern Afghanistan. Dostam and his allies alleged that the
prosecution was a Karzai effort to favor Karzai’s relatives’ firm, Watan Group, which is the
partner of CNPC on the project. In mid-June 2013, about 50 of Dostam’s armed aides reportedly
clashed with those of the deputy leader of Junbush Melli, the Karzai-appointed governor of
Jowzjan Province, for refusing Dostam’s plan to revive an Uzbek militia.
Dostam’s reputation is further clouded by his actions during the U.S.-backed war against the
Taliban. On July 11, 2009, the New York Times reported that allegations that Dostam had caused
the death of several hundred Taliban prisoners during the major combat phase of OEF (late 2001)
were not investigated by the Bush Administration. President Obama said any allegations of
violations of laws of war need to be investigated, responding to assertions that there was no
investigation of the Dasht-e-Laili massacre because Dostam was a U.S. ally.16 Dostam responded
to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (which carried the story) that only 200 Taliban prisoners died
and primarily because of combat and disease, not intentional actions of his forces.
Atta Mohammad Noor: Balkh Province/Mazar-e-Sharif Potentate
Atta Mohammad Noor, another figure generally considered part of the Northern Alliance, has
been the governor of Balkh Province, whose capital is the vibrant city of Mazar-e-Sharif, since
15 CRS email conversation with a then-National Security aide to President Karzai, December 2008.
16 This is the name of the area where the Taliban prisoners purportedly died and were buried in a mass grave.
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2005. He is an ethnic Tajik and former mujahedin commander who openly endorsed Dr. Abdullah
in the 2009 presidential election. However, Karzai has kept Noor in place because he has kept the
province secure, allowing Mazar-e-Sharif to become a major trading hub, and because displacing
him could cause ethnic unrest. Mazar-e-Sharif is one of the four cities transitioned to Afghan
security leadership in June 2011. It is unique in that 60% of the residents of the city have access
to electricity 24 hours per day, a far higher percentage than most other cities in Afghanistan, and
higher even than Kabul. His critics say that Noor exemplifies a local potentate, brokering local
security and business arrangements that enrich Noor and his allies while ensuring stability and
prosperity.17 Some reports say that he commands two private militias in the province that, in at
least two districts (Chimtal and Charbolak), outnumber official Afghan police, and which prompt
complaints of land seizures and other abuses primarily against the province’s Pashtuns.
Mohammed Mohaqiq: Hazara Stalwart
Another faction leader is Mohammad Mohaqiq, a Hazara leader. During the war against the
Soviet Union and then Taliban, Mohaqiq was a commander of Hazara fighters in and around
Bamiyan Province, and a major figure in the Hazara Shiite Islamist party Hezb-e-Wahdat (Unity
Party). The party was supported by Iran during those periods. Mohaqiq, a member of the lower
house of parliament, was the apparent target of an assassination attempt in mid-June 2013. In July
2012, Mohaqiq demanded Karzai fire the head of the Academy of Sciences for publishing a new
national almanac that Mohaqiq said overstated the percentage of Pashtuns in Afghanistan at 60%.
Karzai fired the Academy head and three others at that institution.
In recent years, Mohaqiq has aligned with Dostam and some hardline Tajik figures in the National
Front of Afghanistan party. However, for the 2014 election, he has joined the ticket headed by the
relatively more moderate Tajik, Dr. Abdullah.
Isma’il Khan: “Emir” of Herat/Western Afghanistan
Another Northern Alliance strongman that Karzai has sought to both engage and weaken is
prominent Tajik political leader and former Herat Governor Ismail Khan. Khan played a key role
in the March 1979 killing of 50 Soviet advisors in western Afghanistan. Then a captain in the
Afghan military, the attack by military personnel loyal to Khan marked the start of the mujahedin
uprising that triggered the December 1979 Soviet invasion. In 1995, he was captured and
imprisoned by the Taliban but escaped. Khan is a religious conservative despite his Tajik
ethnicity, and has generally sought to limit women’s rights and influence in Herat province.
Often referred to as “Emir” (ruler) of the Herat area, Khan remains influential in western
Afghanistan. Karzai’s ties to Khan helped Karzai win Herat Province in the 2009 election.
Because of his ability to deliver votes from his region, Abdi Rab Rasoul Sayyaf put Khan on his
ticket for the 2014 presidential elections. Still, Khan has opponents in Herat; a bombing there on
September 26, 2009, narrowly missed his car. Herat is one of the first cities that was transitioned
to Afghan security leadership in July 2011 and is generally considered secure and economically
vibrant. In 2006, Karzai appointed Khan minister of energy and water, taking him away from his
political base in the west. Despite U.S. concerns about Khan, Karzai renominated him in his
ministry post on December 19, 2009. The renomination was initially voted down by the National
17 Carlotta Gall, “In Afghanistan’s North, Ex-Warlord Offers Security,” New York Times, May 17, 2010.
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Assembly, but he remained in an acting capacity and was re-confirmed in March 2012. Since
2010, Khan also has served on the High Peace Council, the body overseeing reconciliation with
Taliban leaders.
U.S. concerns about Khan’s continuing role as a faction leader—and a sign of the reemergence of
traditional authority forms—were reinforced in November 2012. Anticipating greater Taliban
strength after the international forces draw down at the end of 2014, Khan rallied thousands of his
followers in the desert outside Herat, calling on them to reactivate their networks to prepare for
possible eventual battle with the Taliban. As has Dostam, Khan reportedly has begun enlisting
new recruits for a reviving militia force. Karzai’s office criticized the gathering and Khan’s efforts
as contrary to government policy.18 Khan may have been trying to reassure the Herat business
community that the province will be secure after the international troop drawdown in 2014. In
November 2010, Afghan television broadcast audio files purporting to show Khan insisting that
election officials alter the results of the September 2010 parliamentary elections.19
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh: Helmand Province Power Broker
One of the most influential Pashtun tribal leaders in southern Afghanistan is Sher Mohammad
Akhunzadeh. A close associate of Karzai when they were in exile in Quetta, Pakistan, during
Taliban rule, Karzai appointed him governor of Akhunzadeh’s home province of Helmand when
the Taliban government fell in late 2001. Akhunzadeh controls many loyalists in Helmand who
helped international forces secure the province during his governorship of the province. However,
his followers reportedly exercised power arbitrarily and engaged in illicit economic activity,
contributing to Britain’s demand that he be removed as a condition of Britain taking security
control of Helmand in 2005. Karzai acceded to the demand, even though he subsequently asserted
that Akhundzadeh was more successful against militants in Helmand using his local militiamen
than was Britain with its modern force. Akhunzadeh promoted Karzai’s reelection in Helmand
Province in the 2009 election. Akhunzadeh and other traditional Helmand leaders apparently won
their power struggle with Helmand governor Ghulab Mangal, who is from eastern Afghanistan,
when Karzai replaced him on September 20, 2012.
Karzai Family: Qandahar Province Stronghold
Governing Qandahar, a province of about 2 million, of whom about half live in Qandahar city, is
a sensitive issue in Kabul because of President Karzai’s active political interest in his home
province. On July 12, 2011, Karzai’s half brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, was assassinated, reducing
Karzai family influence in Qandahar. Ahmad Wali was chair of the Qandahar provincial council,
a post with relatively limited formal power, but he was more powerful than any appointed
governor of Qandahar and constituents and interest groups sought his interventions on their
behalf. Qandahar governance suffered an additional blow in July 2011 when the appointed mayor
of Qandahar city, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, was assassinated.
Following Ahmad Wali’s death, President Karzai installed another of his brothers, Shah Wali
Karzai, as head of the Popolzai clan after Ahmad Wali’s death. Shah Wali at first lacked the
acumen and clout of Ahmad Wali, but reports since mid-2012 say he has become highly
18 Graham Bowley, “Afghan Warlord’s Call to Arms Rattles Officials,” New York Times, November 13, 2012.
19 Joshua Partlow, “Audio Files Raise New Questions About Afghan Elections,” Washington Post, November 11, 2010.
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influential, while also becoming involved in significant business dealings that continue to cast
aspersions on the Karzai family. Also active in the province is another Karzai brother, Qayyum,
who has served in the National Assembly and is a candidate to succeed his brother in the April
2014 election. The Karzai clan has consistently overshadowed and marginalized the governors of
the province, including the current governor, Tooryalai Wesa, a Canadian-Afghan academic
appointed in late 2008.
The family’s influence in the province suffered from a rift between Shah Wali and Karzai’s elder
brother Mahmoud. The rift is due, in large part, to a financial dispute over the upscale Mino Aina
housing development that Mahmoud established. That dispute was resolved in August 2013, and
the project has been completed. Other elements of the Karzai clan, fearing loss of influence to
other clans, reportedly want Hamid Karzai to extend his term and not hold elections in April
2014.20
Another power center is Qandahar’s police chief, Colonel Abdul Razziq. He is perceived as
having increasing weight, as well as a reputation for corruption, including siphoning off customs
revenues at the key Spin Boldak crossing from Pakistan. He was appointed to his current post in
March 2011 after his predecessor was killed in an insurgent attack.
Ghul Agha Shirzai: Eastern Afghanistan/Nangarhar
A key gubernatorial appointment has been Ghul Agha Shirzai in Nangarhar. He is a Pashtun from
the powerful Barakzai clan based in Qandahar Province, previously serving as governor and
exercising influence in that province. Shirzai had considered running against Karzai in 2009 but
then opted not to run as part of a reported “deal” that yielded unspecified political and other
benefits for Shirzai. He is a candidate for president in the 2014 election.
In Nangarhar, Shirzai is generally viewed as an interloper. But, much as has Noor in Balkh,
Shirzai has exercised relatively effective leadership, particularly in curbing poppy cultivation
there. However, Shirzai is also widely accused of arbitrary action against political or other
opponents, and he reportedly does not remit all the customs duties collected at the Khyber
Pass/Torkham crossing to the central government. U.S. officials say that he has kept some of the
funds, and moves substantial funds around in cash rather than the Afghan banking system. He
was briefly questioned in July 2012 in Germany about several suitcases of cash he was carrying,
but was allowed to proceed. His supporters say he uses much of the funds—deposited in an
account called the “Shirzai Fund”—for the benefit of the province, not trusting that funds
remitted to Kabul would be spent in the province. A Kabul effort to stop the illicit fund siphoning
is discussed in the section on corruption below. Some U.S. reports say he has intervened in the
province’s judicial process to win freedom for Taliban suspects with whom he might have
commercial ties. Shirzai denies the allegations.21
20 Yaroslav Trofimov, “As U.S. Pulls Out, Feuds Split Afghanistan’s Ruling Family,” Wall Street Journal, July 1,
2013.
21 Nathan Hodge, “U.S. Finds Graft by Favored Afghan Leader,” Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2012.
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Jirgas and Shuras: Traditional Processes of the Informal Power Structure
The informal power structure has decision-making bodies and processes that do not approximate
Western-style democracy but yet have participatory and representative elements. Meetings called
shuras, or jirgas (consultative councils),22 often composed of designated notables, are key
mechanisms for making or endorsing authoritative decisions or dispensing justice. Some of these
mechanisms are practiced by Taliban insurgents in areas under their control or influence. On the
other hand, some see the traditional patterns as competing with and detracting from the
development of the post-Taliban formal power structure—a structure that, with Western guidance,
has generally tried to meet international standards of democratic governance.
At the national level, one traditional mechanism has carried over into the post-Taliban governing
structure. The convening of a loya jirga, an assembly usually consisting of about 1,500 delegates
from all over Afghanistan, has been used on several occasions. The Afghan constitution provides
for a constitutional loya jirga as the highest decision-making body, superseding government
decisions and even elections, and the constitution specifies the institutions that must be
represented at the constitutional loya jirga. If a constitutional jirga cannot be held or is blocked, a
traditional loya jirga can be convened by the president to discuss major issues, although it cannot
render binding decisions. In the post-Taliban period, traditional loya jirgas have been convened to
endorse Karzai’s leadership, to adopt a constitution, and to discuss a long-term defense
relationship with the United States. A special loya jirga, called a peace jirga, was held on June 2-
4, 2010, to review government plans to offer incentives for insurgent fighters to end their armed
struggle and rejoin society. Another loya jirga was held during November 16-19, 2011, to endorse
proposed Afghan government conditions on a Strategic Partnership Agreement between
Afghanistan and the United States (which subsequently was signed). Another loya jirga in
November 2013 approved a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) needed for some U.S. troops to
stay in Afghanistan after 2014, although Karzai did not abide by the jirga’s recommendation to
sign the BSA .
Emerging Power Centers: Civil Society and
“Independent” Activists
The fall of the Taliban and international intervention has enabled an entire new center of
influence to emerge—a power center with the potential to sustain modernization and progress
after the 2014 transition. Civil society activists and “independents” in the National Assembly and
other institutions are a growing force in Afghan politics. Civil society activists populate the
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, as well as such private activists and watchdog
groups as the Afghanistan Women’s Network, the Afghan Anti-Corruption Network, Integrity
Watch, Equality for Peace and Democracy, “Afghanistan 1400,” and the Afghanistan Analysis
and Awareness (“A3”). Activists in these groups are familiar with and have easy access to media
outlets. Some own new media outlets: the Mohseni family that owns Moby Media (Tolo
Television) are said to be close to the Karzai administration but have often criticized its
performance as well as restrictions on media content. Independent newspapers, such as Eight
Sobh (8 AM), have been established to advocate for transparent government.
22 Shura is the term used by non-Pashtuns to characterize the traditional assembly concept. Jirga is the Pashtun term.
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However, civil society activists continue to struggle against traditional faction leaders—many of
whom use their armed supporters to intimidate opponents—to try to exert influence over policy.
In the 2005-2010 parliament, Malalai Joya (Farah Province) was a leading critic of war-era
faction leaders. Ms. Fawzia Koofi, at one time a deputy lower house speaker, remains in the
Assembly and is an outspoken leader on Afghan women’s rights. Others in this independent camp
have included Ms. Fauzia Gailani (Herat Province, not returned to parliament in 2010); Ms.
Shukria Barekzai, chairwoman of the lower house Defense Committee during 2011; and Mr.
Ramazan Bashardost, a former Karzai minister who champions parliamentary powers and has
highlighted official corruption. He ran for president in the 2009 elections on an anti-corruption
platform and drew an unexpectedly large amount of votes. Bashardost was returned to parliament
in the September 2010 election.
Some other leading independents are present in the 2011-2015 lower house. They include Rafiq
Shahir from Herat, a well-known civil-society activist; Dr. Saleh Seljuki; and Ahmad Behzad (all
from Herat). Other independents reelected include Shakiba Hashemi and Khalid Pashtun, both
from Qandahar. U.S.-based International Republican Institute (IRI) and National Democratic
Institute (NDI) have assisted civil society leaders in and outside the National Assembly.
Elections in 2009 and 2010 Harmed Confidence in the Electoral
Process and Widened Political Schisms
Elections are widely considered a key harbinger of the durability and extent of Afghanistan’s
political development and a barometer for measuring the effects of factional, political, ethnic, and
sectarian rivalries. The 2009 presidential and provincial elections were the first post-Taliban
elections run by the Afghan government itself through its Afghanistan Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC). Both it and the September 2010 National Assembly elections were highly
flawed and the international community has been working with Afghan leaders to reduce such
flaws in the presidential and provincial elections on April 5, 2014.
2009 Presidential Election
The 2009 election was plagued by assertions of a lack of credibility of the Independent Election
Commission (IEC), whose commissioners were selected by and politically close to Karzai. A
separate U.N.-appointed Elections Complaints Commission (ECC), which reviews election
complaints and validates candidacies, had somewhat more credibility than the IEC because the
2005 election law provided for three ECC seats to be held by foreign nationals. The three were
appointed by the head of U.N. Assistance Mission–Afghanistan (UNAMA); the two Afghans on
the ECC23 were appointed by the Supreme Court and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission, respectively.
Disputes over the election date were resolved. On February 3, 2009, Afghanistan’s Independent
Election Commission (IEC) set an August 20, 2009, election date—later than the April 21, 2009,
date mandated by Article 61 of the Constitution to allow at least 30 days before Karzai’s term
expired on May 22, 2009. The IEC decision cited Article 33 of the Constitution as mandating
universal accessibility to the voting, saying that an April date was precluded by logistical and
23 ECC website, http://www.ecc.org.af/en/.
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organizational difficulties as well as security issues.24 On March 4, 2009, the IEC reaffirmed the
August date and the Afghan Supreme Court backed it on March 28, 2009. The Obama
Administration publicly backed these rulings.
Despite the political dispute between Karzai and his opponents, enthusiasm among the public
appeared high. Voter registration during October 2008-March 2009 added about 4.5 million new
voters, bringing total registered voters to about 17 million. However, there were widespread
reports of registration fraud (possibly half of all new registrants), with some voters registering on
behalf of women who do not, by custom, show up without a male escort at registration sites, and
others selling registration cards.
A total of 32 candidates ran, and 3,200 people competed for 420 provincial council seats
nationwide. Although about 80% of the provincial council candidates ran as independents, some
of Afghanistan’s parties, including Hezb-i-Islami, fielded multiple candidates in several
provinces. About 200 women competed for the 124 provincial council seats reserved for women
(29%), although in two provinces (Qandahar and Uruzgan) there were fewer women candidates
than reserved seats. In Kabul Province, 524 candidates competed for the 29 seats of the council.
Security was a major issue for all the international actors supporting the Afghan elections process.
In the first round, about 7,000 polling centers were to be established but, of those, about 800 were
deemed too unsafe and did not open. The European Union, supported by the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) sent a few hundred observers, and the International
Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute sent observers as well. The total cost of
the Afghan elections in 2009 was about $300 million. Other international donors contributing
funds to close the gap left by the U.S. contribution of about $175 million.25
The Political Contest and Campaign
The presidential competition took shape in May 2009. In the election-related deal-making,26
Karzai obtained an agreement from Fahim to run as his first vice presidential running mate,
thereby splitting the Northern Alliance. The second Vice President Karim Khalili (a Hazara)
agreed to run with Karzai again. Anti-Karzai Pashtuns failed to rally around the one major
Pashtun who did run, Ashraf Ghani. The Northern Alliance backed Dr. Abdullah, who ran with a
little-known Hazara and a Pashtun as his vice presidential picks.
Taliban intimidation and voter apathy appear to have suppressed the total turnout to about 5.8
million votes cast, or about a 35% turnout—far lower than expected. Twenty-seven Afghans,
mostly security forces personnel, were killed on election day. Some observers said that turnout
among women was low primarily because there were not sufficient numbers of female poll
workers to make women feel comfortable in voting. In general, however, the process was orderly.
Clouding the election substantially were the widespread fraud allegations coming from all sides.
The final, uncertified total was released on September 16, 2009, and showed Karzai at 54.6% and
24 Statement of the Independent Election Commission Secretariat, February 3, 2009, provided to CRS by a Karzai
national security aide.
25 Report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), September 9, 2010.
26 Some of the information in this section obtained in CRS interviews with a Karzai national security aide, December
2008.
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Dr. Abdullah at 27.7%. Anti-corruption candidate Ramazan Bashardost, a Hazara, received 9%,
and Ashraf Ghani received 3%.
The constitution requires that a second-round runoff, if needed, be held two weeks after the
results of the first round are certified. On October 20, 2009, the ECC determined that about 1
million Karzai votes, and about 200,000 Abdullah votes, were fraudulent and were deducted from
their totals. The final, certified, results therefore left Karzai short of the 50% needed to avoid a
runoff. Karzai ultimately acquiesced to a runoff against the next highest vote-getter, Dr. Abdullah,
but on November 1, 2009, Dr. Abdullah refused to participate on the grounds that problems that
plagued the first round were unresolved. On November 2, 2009, the IEC issued a statement
saying that, by consensus, the body had determined that Karzai, being the only candidate
remaining in a two-person runoff, should be declared the winner. The Obama Administration
accepted the outcome on the grounds that the fraud had been investigated. As noted above, the
elections for the provincial council members were not certified until December 29, 2009. The
council members took office in February 2010.
September 18, 2010, Parliamentary Elections
The split over the conduct of the 2009 presidential elections widened in the run-up to the
September 18, 2010, parliamentary elections. Mechanisms to prevent fraud were not fully
implemented and the results were disputed until July 2011, largely paralyzing the National
Assembly. On January 2, 2010, the IEC had initially set National Assembly elections for May 22,
2010, in line with a constitutional requirement for the election to be held well prior to the expiry
of the existing Assembly’s term. The international community argued that the election should be
held later in 2010 because the IEC lacked sufficient staff and funds to hold the election under that
timetable. Bowing to these considerations, on January 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the
parliamentary elections would be held on September 18, 2010.
About $120 million was budgeted by the IEC for the parliamentary elections, of which at least
$50 million came from donor countries, giving donors leverage over when the election might take
place. The remaining $70 million was funds left over from the 2009 elections. Donors had held
back the needed funds, possibly in an effort to pressure the IEC to demonstrate that it is
correcting the flaws identified in the 2009 election. With the compromises and Karzai
announcements below, those funds were released as of April 2010.
Election Decree/Reform
The Karzai government and international donors disputed means for ensuring a free and fair
election. In February 2010 Karzai signed an election decree that would supersede the 2005
election law and govern the 2010 parliamentary election,27 even though the constitution requires
that any new election law (or decree) not be adopted less than one year prior to the election to
which that law will apply. Some of the provisions of the election decree—particularly the
proposal to make the ECC an all-Afghan body—alarmed some in the international community.
On March 14, 2010, Karzai agreed that there would be two “international seats” on the ECC—at
least one of which must concur on all decisions—and dropped his insistence that all five be
27 Joshua Partlow, “Afghanistan’s Government Seeks More Control Over Elections,” Washington Post, February 15,
2010.
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Afghans. The Wolesi Jirga voted against the election decree but the Meshrano Jirga did not act,
thus allowing the decree to stand. Even though the compromise was implemented, the
communique of the July 20, 2010, Kabul donors conference included an Afghan government
pledge to initiate, within six months, a strategy for long-term electoral reform.
Among other steps to correct the mistakes of the 2009 election, the Afghan Interior Ministry
planned instituted a national identity card system to curb voter registration fraud. However,
observers say that registration fraud still occurred. On April 17, 2010, Karzai appointed a new
IEC head, Fazel Ahmed Manawi, a Tajik, who drew praise from many factions (including
“opposition leader” Dr. Abdullah, who is half Tajik and identifies with that ethnicity) for
impartiality. The IEC also barred 6,000 poll workers who served in the 2009 election from
working the 2010 election.
Preparations and the Vote
Preparations for the September 18 election proceeded without major disruption, according to the
IEC. Candidates registered during April 20-May 6, 2010. A list of candidates was circulated on
May 13, 2010, including 2,477 candidates for the 249 seats.28 A final list of candidates, after all
appeals and decisions on the various disqualifications, was issued June 22; it included 2,577
candidates, of which 406 were women. Sixty-two candidates were invalidated by the ECC,
mostly because they did not resign their government positions, as required. Voter registration was
conducted June 12-August 12. According to the IEC, over 375,000 new voters were registered,
and the number of eligible voters was about 11.3 million.
On August 24, 2010, the IEC announced that the Afghan security forces say they would only be
able to secure 5,897 of the planned 6,835 polling centers. Therefore it was decided that the 938
stations not securable would not open, in order to prevent so-called “ghost polling stations”—
stations open but where no voters can go. After further security evaluation, on election day, 5,355
centers were opened. About 5.6 million votes were cast out of about 17 million eligible voters.
Turnout was therefore about 33%; a major issue suppressing turnout was security.
Parliamentary Election Outcome
Preliminary results were announced on October 20, 2010, and final, IEC-certified results were to
be announced by October 30, 2010, but were delayed until November 24, 2010, due to
investigation of fraud complaints. While the information below illustrates that there was
substantial fraud, the IEC and ECC have been widely praised by the international community for
their handling of the fraud allegations.
Of the 5.6 million votes cast, the ECC invalidated 1.3 million (about 25%) after investigations of
fraud complaints. The ECC prioritized complaints filed as follows: 2,142 as possibly affecting the
election, 1,056 as unable to affect the result, and 600 where there will be no investigation. Causes
for invalidation most often included ballot boxes in which all votes were for one candidate.
28 The seat allocation per province is the same as it was in the 2005 parliamentary election—33 seats up for election in
Kabul; 17 in Herat province; 14 in Nangarhar, 11 each in Qandahar, Balkh, and Ghazni; 9 in Badakhshan, Konduz, and
Faryab, 8 in Helmand, and 2 to 6 in the remaining provinces. Ten are reserved for Kuchis (nomads).
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The results, as certified by the IEC, resulted in substantial controversy within Afghanistan and led
to a political crisis. The certified results were as follows.
• About 60% of the lower house (148 out of 249) winners were new members.
• As noted, Karzai’s number of core supporters was reduced from about 90 to 60-
70. This was in part because the number of Pashtuns elected was 94, down from
120 in the outgoing lower house. Several pro-Karzai candidates lost in Qandahar
Province, and because many Pashtuns did not vote due to security reasons, in
mixed Ghazni Province. Several prominent pro-Karzai deputies were defeated.
• Some local militia commanders won election, including Amanullah Guzar
(Kabul) who may have been behind May 2006 rioting in Kabul against NGO
offices; and Haji Abdul Zahir (Nangarhar), a member of the well-known “Eastern
Shura” once headed by the assassinated Hajji Abdul Qadir. Two ex-Taliban
figures, Mullah Salam Rocketi, and Musa Wardak, were defeated.
• A date of the inauguration of the new parliament was set for January 20, 2011, at
which time, under Afghan law, President Karzai would formally open the session.
Special Tribunal, Related Political Crisis, and Resolution
The certified results triggered a major political crisis, caused primarily by Pashtuns who felt they
lost the election due to fraud. The issue brought the operations of the National Assembly to a
virtual halt, with Karzai ruling by decree, with seven cabinet posts and a few Supreme Court seats
remaining unfilled by permanent appointees. Karzai took steps to address Pashtun grievances, but
with his own interest in increasing the number of Pashtuns elected. In December 2010, the office
of the Attorney General urged election results to be voided and the Afghan Supreme Court to
order a recount. There were weekly demonstrations against the fraud by about 300 candidates
who asserted they were deprived of victory.
On December 28, 2010, at the instruction of the Supreme Court, Karzai issued a decree
empowering a five-member tribunal to review fraud complaints. Many Afghans maintained that
the tribunal had no legal authority under the constitution to review the election. The IEC and
ECC, backed by UNAMA and the international community, asserted they are the only bodies
under Afghan electoral law that have legitimate jurisdiction over election results. Still, on January
19, 2011, the day before the parliament was to convene, the tribunal leader, Judge Sediqullah
Haqiq, announced it would need another month to evaluate the fraud allegations. On that basis,
Karzai postponed the inauguration of the new parliament by a month.
Defying Karzai and the special tribunal, about 213 of the certified winners met at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul on January 20, 2011, and reportedly decided to take their seats on
Sunday, January 23, 2011, without Karzai’s formal inauguration. This rendered unclear the legal
status of a self-convened parliament but Karzai agreed to inaugurate the lower house on January
26, 2011. However, he insisted the fraud investigation by the special tribunal remain active. The
lower house elected a compromise candidate, Abdul Raouf Ibrahimi, from the Uzbek community,
as speaker. This fell short of Karzai’s goal of engineering selection of Sayyaf but accomplished
his aim of denying Qanooni reselection to that post. The upper house was completed as of
February 19, 2011, when Karzai made his 34 appointments.
The crisis became acute on June 23, 2011, when the special tribunal ruled that 62 defeated
candidates be reinstated. The National Assembly—containing the 62 people who would lose their
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seats if the tribunal’s order were followed—subsequently passed a no-confidence vote against
Attorney General Aloko. On August 10, 2011, Karzai tried to defuse the crisis with a decree
declaring that special court does not have jurisdiction to change election results, and that such
changes are the role of the IEC. Subsequently, on August 21, 2011, the IEC implemented
elements of a compromise by ruling that nine winners had won their seats through fraud and must
be removed—fewer than the 17 that UNAMA had urged. The newly declared winners were sworn
in on September 4, 2011, and the National Assembly to resumed full function shortly thereafter.
The exposure of widespread fraud in the 2009 and 2010 elections increased strains between
Karzai and the National Assembly. In the confirmation process of his post-2009 election cabinet,
National Assembly members objected to many of his nominees as having minimal qualifications
or as loyal to faction leaders. Karzai’s original list of 24 ministerial nominees (presented
December 19) was generally praised by the United States, but only 7 were confirmed. Another
five were confirmed on June 28, 2010, and on March 12, 2012, the Assembly confirmed most of
those ministers who were serving in an acting capacity as well as some new nominees.
April 5, 2014, Presidential and Provincial Elections: Credibility Under
Scrutiny29
U.S. officials and many Afghans have been concerned that the fraud uncovered in the 2009 and
2010 elections could recur in the 2014 presidential elections, which takes place as international
forces are drawing down. Another fraud-filled election is assessed by many experts as likely to
cloud Afghanistan’s ability to govern beyond the 2014 transition. The international community
has been generally avoiding holding the election to a standard of “free and fair.” During an April
9, 2013, phone call, Karzai reaffirmed to President Obama his support for a “fair and inclusive”
election, according to a White House statement. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns said in
Kabul on May 11, 2013, that the election should be “transparent, credible, and inclusive.” Still, as
discussed below, there is growing optimism that the problems of the previous elections are being
adequately addressed and that the election process might exceed previous expectations.
USAID plans to spend about $200 million to support the 2014 election process in Afghanistan,
including $95 million to support Afghan institutions directly and promote voter education and
election observer groups; $80 million in the form of a donation to U.N. Development Program
election support efforts (see below); and about $15 million to support civil society groups.
Timing of the Elections
Under the constitution, the presidential elections have to be held 30 to 60 days before the May 22,
2014, expiration of Karzai’s second and final term. On October 31, 2012, the IEC set the election
date as April 5, 2014, overruling objections from some Northern Alliance figures that the election
should be postponed slightly to allow for the northern part of the country—where support for
non-Pashtun candidates is strong—to thaw after the winter. Provincial elections were due in 2013,
but the IEC set these elections concurrent with the presidential elections because of the logistical
difficulties and costs involved in holding a separate election. There are 420 provincial council
seats up for election in 2014. The next parliamentary elections are expected to be held in 2015.
29 For additional information on the upcoming elections and their implications, see International Crisis Group.
Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the 2014 Transition. October 8, 2012.
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Until late 2013, some Karzai critics asserted he plans to postpone the elections, pointing to
agitation for Karzai to extend his term by some members of Karzai’s clan and other southern
Pashtuns in the south. They based these judgments in part on meetings of tribal figures in
Helmand Province that concluded that the security situation precludes many Pashtuns from
voting, and would unfairly favor non-Pashtun candidates in the race.
Election Process Milestones and Reforms
The July 8, 2012, “Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework” stipulated that Afghanistan
“develop, by early 2013, a comprehensive election timeline through 2015 for electoral
preparations and polling dates.”30 Among the other key benchmarks of election preparations and
their status are as follows:
• Election-Related Dates. As noted, the first major benchmark was met on
October 31, 2012, with the IEC’s setting of an election date. The IEC also set a
timeframe of September 16-October 6, 2013, as the deadline for candidate
registration. That time frame was observed.
• Election Laws. Two laws to govern the 2014 election—one (IEC Structural Law)
to structure the IEC and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) and
another one to stipulate election procedures and policies (Electoral Law)—were
to be adopted within the first quarter of 2013. That deadline was not met.31 In
mid-April 2013, the National Assembly passed draft election laws that included
lower house provisions to deprive the president of sole discretion over IEC
appointments and provide for two ECC officials to be non-nationals (as was the
case for the 2010 parliamentary election). Karzai insisted that the ECC be
replaced by an Afghan Supreme Court-run election tribunal and he returned the
draft unsigned (a veto). On May 22, 2013, the lower house passed the laws again
with the same ECC provision. The drafts were passed by the upper house and,
despite containing the ECC provisions he opposed. Karzai signed the IEC
Structural Law on July 17, 2013, and the Electoral Law on July 20, 2013. The
signing satisfied the statement of a July 3, 2013, the Tokyo Mutual
Accountability Framework review meeting that the election laws be passed and
signed before the National Assembly’s July 22, 2013, recess.
• Voter Registration and Other Preparations. In accordance with a January 2013
IEC decision, updating voter registration rolls began on May 26, 2013, and will
run until mid-March 2014. The IEC planned to register 4 million additional
voters, consisting of the issuance of voter registration cards, and it appears that
that goal was met. The government had decided in November 2012 to issue 14
million biometric ID cards (“e-taskera”) by March 2014 to reduce voter fraud.
But, this system was later deemed too difficult and expensive ($115 million) to
implement for the 2014 vote. It might apply to the 2015 parliamentary elections.
In September 2013, the IEC determined that 260 out of 6,800 polling centers are
deemed too insecure to open—but far fewer than those deemed unsafe in 2009 or
2010.
30 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/article/the-tokyo-declaration-partnership-for-self-reliance-in-afghanistan-
from-transition-to-transf.
31 USAID and State Department briefing for congressional staff, March 11, 2013.
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• IEC and ECC Membership. The enactment of election laws paved the way for
IEC and ECC appointments. On July 17, 2013, acting under the newly signed
election laws, Karzai’s office announced that the required committee of lawyers,
human rights activists, the speakers of the two chambers of the National
Assembly, and judicial officials would convene to nominate to Karzai
prospective IEC and ECC appointees. On September 17, 2013, Karzai named the
nine IEC commissioners, including former Herat Governor Yusuf Nuristani, an
ethnic Tajik, as IEC chairman. He named three women as IEC commissioners.
Karzai subsequently named the five ECC members, of which one is a female.
The IEC gets assistance from UNDP under a program called ELECT II (Legal
and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow). The IEC has representative offices in each
province; the provincial commissioner for Konduz was killed on September 19,
2013, although the killing might have been unrelated to his IEC duties.
• Quotas for Women. The election laws passed by the National Assembly in 2013
reduce to 20% from 25% the required percentage of women to be elected to
provincial and district councils (when district elections are held). Human rights
advocates say they fear that this provision could foreshadow eliminating similar
quotas for women in the National Assembly elections. Those who favored the
reduction argued that the 25% requirement was unfair because women can win
election with very few votes.
• The voter registration process has attempted to target women to improve their
participation in the election. About 30.3% of newly registering voters are women,
a slightly higher percentage than in the previous election cycle and in line with
UNAMA goals. A U.N. report of December 6, 2013 (U.N. document A/68/645-
S/2013/721) reports that a U.N. trust fund (Law and Order Trust Fund for
Afghanistan) approved a Ministry of Interior request to fund the hiring of 13,000
female election security officers—a force intended to support female turnout for
the vote. However, 40 out of Afghanistan’s 407 districts do not have female
election staff because of security concerns. The efforts to encourage female
participation and other measures above could potentially satisfy S.Res. 151,
adopted July 11, 2013, which urges the Secretary of State to condition some U.S.
aid on Afghan implementation of measures to prevent fraud and to encourage
women’s participation in the electoral process.
In part because of the developments discussed above, many express optimism that the election
will be more credible than expected. In addition, Afghan civil society is exercising more scrutiny
of the government’s handling of the election. In October 2012, the “Free and Fair Election
Foundation of Afghanistan” domestic observation body held a meeting at which 50 political
parties endorsed detailed demands for election reform. Subsequently, several political parties,
such as the National Front, the National Coalition, the Truth and Justice Party, and Hizb-e-Islam,
have formed a “Cooperation Council of Political Parties and Coalitions of Afghanistan”
(CCPPCA) to ensure that there is a free and fair election. On December 9, 2013 a delegation from
the National Democratic Institute expressed “guarded optimism” that the April 2014 elections
will not be as marred by fraud as were previous Afghan elections.
Candidate Field
There is no clear frontrunner to succeed Karzai. In the interests of unity approaching the 2014
security transition, some senior figures of varying ethnicities tried unsuccessfully to rally around
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a single candidate. Presidential candidates were required to gather 100,000 valid voter signatures,
and file an $18,000 deposit. By the close of candidate registration on October 6, 2013, 26
presidential tickets had registered, fewer than the 32 in 2009. The IEC vetted the candidates to
ensure their eligibility and on October 22 it disqualified 16 candidates, including the only woman
(Khadija Ghaznawi), on the basis of lack of valid signatures or citizenship issues. After an appeal
period, the final candidate list was announced by the IEC on November 20—restoring one
disqualified candidate, Daoud Sultanzoi. No Taliban or other insurgent figure is competing in the
presidential election, although in early January 2014 the leader of insurgent group Hezb-e-Islami
Gulbuddin (HIG), Gulbuddin Hekmatyar instructed his party leadership to tell its members inside
Afghanistan to vote. For the 420 provincial council seats, 2,713 candidates have been approved to
run, including 308 women. The formal campaign period began on February 5, 2014.
The major approved presidential tickets, mostly following the tradition of balancing different
ethnicities, include the persons below. Some of the tickets include cabinet ministers, who had to
resign in order to run. They have been replaced by acting ministers. Several purportedly credible
opinion polls published in late December 2013 appeared to present the state of the race to date;
Afghan polling was sparse in previous elections.32 Some observers noted that high profile polling
data could reduce the potential for Karzai to use local election machinery to favor a particular
candidate
Because Afghan presidential elections require 50%+ in the first round to avoid a runoff, and it is
likely at least one Pashtun will proceed to the runoff round, conventional wisdom is that a
Pashtun is favored to win the presidency. However, the poor security situation mainly in Pashtun-
inhabited areas could cause conventional wisdom to be incorrect. Many observers assess that
because the field contains several prominent figures, it is likely that no candidate will receive
more than 50% of the first round vote. The runoff would be held two weeks after a certified vote
tally from the first round—which is to be issued about a month after the vote, following a
complaint evaluation period. That would place the second round vote, if needed, some time in
mid-May, and certification of the second round by mid-June, with the inauguration of the next
president several weeks after that (late June at the earliest).
As noted below, the major candidate draw on different support bases, and mobilizing those bases
is likely key to the election. The policy differences among them are not generally dramatic,
although Dr. Abdullah’s representation of non-Pashtun minorities could significantly affect the
allocation of domestic resources were he to become President. All of the candidates in the race
have publicly supported the Bilateral Security Accord (BSA) with the United States and have said
they would sign it.
In past Afghan elections, candidates have often dropped out or changed one or both of their vice-
presidential running mates almost up to the day of the election. There are indications that the field
could yet change, as discussed below. Still, the candidate field thus far is as follows:
• .Ashraf Ghani. Ghani’s reputation for affiliation with global organizations such
as the United Nations and the World Bank have contributed in the past to a
perception that Ghani is out of touch with average Afghans’ problems. He
obtained only about 2% of the vote in the 2009 election. However, Ghani’s
32 Matthew Rosenberg. “Polling Comes to Afghanistan, Suggesting Limit to Sway of President Karzai.” New York
Times, December 28, 2013.
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running mates in 2014 are well known, particularly Dostam, who will almost
certainly deliver this ticket a large number of Uzbek votes. The other running
mate is former Justice Minister Sarwar Danish, a Hazara Shiite who studied in
Iran and who can perhaps win many Hazara votes for the ticket. And, his role in
supervising the security transition and his greater involvement in domestic issues
might be helping him overcome past perceptions. The published polls place him
as the front-runner among Pashtun candidates, with about 25% support.
• Dr. Abdullah. Dr. Abdullah is running again apparently in the view that, if he can
garner enough votes to enter a runoff, he might be able to prevail against a non-
incumbent Pashtun. He is campaigning not only in Northern Alliance strongholds
but also in Pashtun provinces, stressing there his Pashtun heritage on his father’s
side. His other advantage is that his supporters mainly in the north and west
presumably will have an easier time getting to the voting stations than do
Pashtuns who likely will still lean toward his Pashtun competitors. Abdullah’s
first vice presidential running mate is Hizb-e-Islam member Mohammad Khan (a
Pashtun) and his second vice presidential running mate is Mohammad Mohaqiq,
a Hazara faction leader discussed earlier. Opinion polls put him as either slightly
behind or virtually even with Ghani.
• Zalmay Rassoul. Foreign Minister Rassoul was considered an early front-runner
because of his generally close relations with Karzai, but polls have shown him
trailing Ghani and Abdullah, sometimes substantially. He is relatively moderate
and Western-educated, although some doubt whether he has the toughness to
govern Afghanistan. In an attempt to obtain some Northern Alliance votes, he
named Ahmad Zia Masoud, brother of Ahmad Shah Masoud, as first vice
presidential candidate. One of Rassoul’s running mates is female — Bamiyan
governor Habiba Sohrabi, an ethnic Hazara. (Two other females are vice-
presidential candidates.) In February 2014, Afghan press reports indicated that
President Karzai was seeking to improve Rassoul’s chances by unifying powerful
families in Qandahar around his candidacy in part by convincing Karzai’s elder
brother Qayyum (see below) to drop out of the race.
• Qayyum Karzai. Despite President Karzai’s repeated statements that he did not
want his elder brother to run, Qayyum is running nonetheless. One of his vice
presidential running mates is former Minister of Mines Wahidullah Shahrani, an
Uzbek. Qayyum has had substantial support in the Karzai clan’s political base in
Qandahar Province, but opinion polling nationwide puts him in the single digits.
President Karzai is said to believe that a Pashtun who can unify the Qandahari
vote would be able to best Ashraf Ghani in the vote, who Karzai apparently does
not favor. (Ghani’s strongest support is among Pashtuns from the eastern
provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost.) This calculation explains President
Karzai’s reported efforts to persuade his brother to drop out and throw his support
behind Rassoul. Qayyum, for his part, reportedly is lobbying powerful figures in
Qandahar to persuade Rassoul to be the one to drop out in favor of Qayyum.
• Abdi Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Sayyaf’s candidacy reportedly concerns U.S. and
international officials because of his past ties to radical Islamist Arab volunteers
in the anti-Soviet war who ultimately formed Al Qaeda.33 As a parliamentarian,
33 Yaroslav Trofimov, “For President, Karzai Floats Islamist with Bin Ladin Tie,” Wall Street Journal, August 14,
(continued...)
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Sayyaf has consistently opposed legislation codifying the rights of women or
weakening the authority of the Islamic clergy. Afghan women’s groups reportedly
fear his candidacy more than any of the other contestants. One of his vice
presidential running mates is Ismail Khan, a faction leader discussed above,
suggesting that this ticket might garner large numbers of votes from Tajiks in
western Afghanistan. Khan resigned from his post as Minister of Water and
Energy to join this ticket and has been replaced in an acting capacity by Arif
Noorzai, who is from a clan that is prominent in Qandahar. The ticket apparently
is polling in the single digits.
• Other candidates. Other approved candidates are not considered by experts as
having significant chances of winning and are polling in the low single digits.
They include Nangarhar governor Ghul Agha Shirzai; former Defense Minister
Abdul Rahim Wardak; Daoud Sultanzoi, a former Communist and
parliamentarian; former King Zahir Shah’s grandson Mohammad Nadir Naeem;
Karzai adviser Hedayat Amin Arsala; and Qotboddin Helal.
Afghan Governing Capacity and Performance34
There are risks that Afghanistan could revert to a terrorist haven unless effective governance is
established before the transition to Afghan leadership is completed by 2014. U.S. and U.N.
reports assess that there has been progress in the capacity of Afghan institutions to manage
national finances and provide services, but that significant deficiencies remain. Many of the
shortcomings in governance are attributed to all of the political disputes, alleged corruption,
nepotism and favoritism, and the lack of trained or skilled workers discussed below—as well as
the widespread security issues that continue to plague Afghanistan. The U.S.-Afghanistan
Strategic Partnership Agreement, signed in Afghanistan on May 1, 2012, commits the United
States (beyond 2014) to “support the Afghan government in strengthening the capacity, self-
reliance, and effectiveness of Afghan institutions and their ability to deliver basic services.”
Earlier, the Obama Administration developed about 45 different metrics to assess progress in
building Afghan governance and security, as it was required to do (by September 23, 2009) under
P.L. 111-32, an FY2009 supplemental appropriation.35 UNAMA, headed in Kabul by Jan Kubis,
also evaluates Afghan governance according to numerous metrics. Afghan progress according to
these metrics is presented in reports of the Secretary-General to the U.N. General Assembly, such
as a report released March 5, 2013 (U.N. document number: A/67/778-S/2012/133).
The Tokyo Framework of Mutual Accountability, cited above, provides aid incentives for
Afghanistan (portions of $16 billion pledged through 2015) if it improves on several measures
including:36
(...continued)
2013.
34 Some information in this section is from the State Department report on human rights in Afghanistan for 2011, May
24, 2012.
35 “Evaluating Progress in Afghanistan-Pakistan” Foreign Policy website, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/
09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan.
36 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/article/the-tokyo-declaration-partnership-for-self-reliance-in-afghanistan-
(continued...)
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• The holding of credible, inclusive, and transparent elections in 2014 and 2015.
• Improved access to justice, and respect for human rights, particularly for women
and children.
• Improved integrity of public financial management and the commercial banking
sector.
• Improved revenue systems and budget execution, including establishment of a
provincial budgeting policy.
The incentive structure of the Tokyo Framework is to raise the percentage of donor funds
channeled through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) as Afghan governance
improves. That fund gives money directly to Afghan ministries and thus gives the Afghan
government substantial discretion as compared to other donated funds.
In part to demonstrate that Afghanistan would uphold those commitments, the Karzai
administrative reform decree issued July 26, 2012, required virtually every ministry and
government body to develop a work plan, complete unfinished tasks, file specified reports, or
carry out specified reforms.37 The final communique of the July 3, 2013, “senior officials”
meeting in Kabul to review progress since the July 2012 Tokyo meeting presented a mixed review
of progress:38 it strongly praised government progress on budget transparency, revenue growth,
and achieving Millenium Development Goals, including school enrollment and health care
access, but noted varying degrees of progress on election reform, some minor anti-corruption
measures, and local governance policies. It called for substantial improvement on other of the
benchmarks, including human rights and accountability for the Kabul Bank scandal (discussed
below). The meeting did not result in withholding of any aid.
Expanding Central Government Capacity
The international community has had mixed success in helping Afghanistan build transparent and
effective state institutions. Since 2001, Afghan ministries have greatly increased their staffs, their
presence in Afghan provinces, and their technological capabilities; most ministry offices in
Kabul, and many in the provinces, have modern computers and communications. Afghan-led
governmental reform and institution-building programs under way, all with U.S. and other donor
assistance, include training additional civil servants, instituting merit-based performance criteria,
basing hiring on qualifications rather than kinship and ethnicity, and weeding out widespread
governmental corruption.
However, the government still faces a relatively small recruitment pool of workers with sufficient
skills and many are reluctant to serve in the provincial offices of the central government
ministries, particularly those provinces that are restive. U.S. mentors and advisers have served in
virtually all the Afghan ministries. Afghanistan has also tried to address the problem of
(...continued)
from-transition-to-transf.
37 Text of the decree “On the Execution of Content of the Historical Speech of June 21, 2012, in the Special Session of
the National Assembly. Provided to CRS by the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, DC, July 16, 2012.
38 http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/co-chairs-statement-tokyo-mutual-accountability-framework-tmaf-senior-officials-
meeting-kabul-afghanistan-3-july-2013.
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international donors luring away Afghan talent with higher salaries, by pledging at the July 20,
2010, Kabul conference to reach an understanding with donors, within six months, on a
harmonized salary scale for donor-funded salaries of Afghan government personnel. Discussions
have been held between the Afghan government and donors on this issue, with minor progress.
The Afghan Civil Service/Merit-Based Recruitment
The low level of Afghan bureaucratic capacity is being addressed in a number of ways, but
slowly. There are about 500,000 Afghan government employees, although the majority of them
are in the security forces. A large proportion of the remainder work as teachers. On several
occasions, the United States has funded jobs fairs that have recruited some new civil servants.
To increase the proficiency of government, during late 2010-early 2011, the government instituted
merit-based appointments for senior positions, such as deputy provincial governors and district
governors, and converted those positions to civil servants rather than political appointees. After a
halting start, this process has been accelerating: merit-based recruitment was responsible for
selecting about half of the 34 provincial governors; 32 out of the 34 deputy provincial governors,
and 189 out of the 407 district governors, according to the March 5, 2013, U.N. report mentioned
earlier (p. 10). Sixty district governors and 17 deputy provincial governors were appointed in
January 2013 alone, based on merit. This increase in merit-based recruitment implements the July
26, 2012, Karzai administrative reform decree directing the Independent Directorate of Local
Governance, discussed below, to open all deputy provincial governorships to competition within
two months.
The key institution that is deciding on merit-based appointments and standardizing job
descriptions, salaries, bonuses, and benefits is the Afghan Independent Administrative Reform
and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC). The commission has thus far redefined more than
80,000 civil servant job descriptions. The Afghan cabinet drafted a revised civil service law to
institute merit-based hiring and give the IARCSC a legal underpinning; it was ratified by the
National Assembly in late 2011 and replaced a less-specific September 2005 civil service law.
Under a USAID program called the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan, the United States is
providing technical assistance to Afghan ministries and to the IARCSC. From January 2010 until
January 2011, USAID, under a February 2010 memorandum of understanding, gave $85 million
to programs run by the commission to support the training and development of Afghan civil
servants. One of the commission’s subordinate organizations is the Afghan Civil Service Institute,
which trained over 16,000 bureaucrats during 2010-2011, and which has instituted an internship
program for 1,000 interns in national civil service jobs and 2,000 interns in provincial and district
offices. On-going training for civil servants is provided by an arm of the Civil Service Institute
called the National Training Directorate (NTD).
According to the March 5, 2013, U.N report referenced above, the international community is
running a $350 million five-year program (“Capacity-Building for Results Program”) to enhance
the Afghan government’s ability to deliver services to its population through key ministries.
USAID programs, for example, are helping employees of the state-owned Afghan power
company (DABS) to manage Afghanistan’s power grid and bill its customers. USAID programs
have also trained 250 Ministry of Mines personnel in geology to try to help develop Afghanistan’s
extractive industries sector.
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Many Afghan civil service personnel undergo training in India, building on growing relations
between Afghanistan and India. Japan and Singapore also are training Afghan civil servants on
good governance, anti-corruption, and civil aviation. Singapore and Germany, in 2011, jointly
provided technical assistance in the field of civil aviation. Some of these programs were
conducted in partnership with the German Federal Foreign Office and the Asia Foundation.
The Afghan Budget Process
The international efforts to build up the central government are reflected in the Afghan budget
process. At the July 3, 2013, senior officials meeting in Kabul, donors strongly praised the
government’s performance in establishing budget transparency. U.S. official reports assess the
Afghan government as increasingly able to execute parts of its budget, and say that some
ministries—particularly the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
and Devleopment—are able to deliver services relatively effectively.39 The Afghan government
controls its own funds as well as those of directly supplied donor funds. The Afghan budget year
has followed the solar year, which begins on March 21 of each year, which also corresponds to
the Persian New Year (Nowruz). However, as of the 2013 budget, Afghan budgets run from
December 21 to December 20 of each year. The 2013 budget was approved by the National
Assembly on January 20, 2013, and the 2014 budget process is under way.
U.S. reports continue to criticize the Afghan budget process for a high degree of centralization.
Once a budget is adopted by the full National Assembly (first the upper house and then the lower
house, and then signed by Karzai), the funds are allocated to central government ministries and
other central government entities. Some of the elected provincial councils, appointed provincial
governors, and district governors formulate local budget requirements and help shape the national
budget process, but no locality controls its own budget. These local organs do approve the
disbursement of funds by the central entities (called mustofiats, accounting offices in each of
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces).
The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework included as one of its benchmarks the
establishment of a provincial budgeting process that provides provincial input into the national
budget process. The July 3, 2013, senior officials meeting statement indicated that Afghanistan
needed to finalize and begin implementing a provincial budgeting policy. The U.N. report of
December 6, 2013, cited earlier, says that the government circulated a draft provincial budget
policy on October 7, 2013. The draft builds on several pilot programs put in place, including the
Provincial Budget Pilot (PBP) program that sought to improve budgetary planning integration
between the national and provincial levels. Four ministries were included in the program in 2013,
but only one, the Ministry of Education, received funding in the program. It received $5 million
in funding in the current Afghan budget year, and an additional $17 million is allocated to that
ministry for the following budget year.
All revenue is, by law, to be remitted to the Afghan central government. However, local officials
sometimes seek to retain or divert locally collected revenues. That diversion has reportedly
increased in 2013 as governors of border provinces grow nervous about an economic downturn
after 2014; the diversion contributed to a 20% government revenue shortfall (compared to
government projections) in 2013.
39 http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Section_1230_Report_July_2013.pdf;
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf
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Many international development experts concur with the Afghan government that only through
direct funding will the Afghan government be able to develop the capacity and eventually the
transparency to govern and deliver services effectively. Although still wary of misuse, the United
States has been accommodating that view; more than 47% of U.S. aid was channeled through the
Afghan government during FY2012—close to the target of 50% that was endorsed at the July 20,
2010, Kabul conference and the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. The percentages are
up from 21% in FY2009. U.S. direct support is based on assessments of the ability of individual
ministries to accurately and transparently administer donated funds; in 2012, 14 Afghan
ministries received USAID and State Department funds directly.
Expanding Local (Subnational) Governance
Since 2007, U.S. and allied policy has increasingly emphasized building local or “subnational”
governance. During 2009-2012, the Administration sent about 500 additional U.S. civilian
personnel from the State Department, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, and several other
agencies to advise Afghan ministries, and provincial and district administrations. That effort
raised the number of U.S. civilians in Afghanistan to about 1,330 by August 2011, of which
nearly 400 were serving outside Kabul (up from 67 in early 2009). However, the Obama
Administration plans to reduce civilian personnel in Afghanistan by about 20% when the
transition to Afghan lead is completed in 2014.40
U.S. and partner country officials, as well as observers, say that Afghan local governance is
improving and expanding, particularly in areas secured by the 2010 U.S. “troop surge.” U.S.
officials say that Afghans are increasingly forming local councils and building ties to appointed
local leaders in these cleared and secured areas. However, forming these linkages has been
slowed by centralized decision making processes; localities have their own governing bodies but
the central government ministries in the provincial capitals of each province actually implement
national programs. Local officials often disagree with the Kabul ministry representatives on
priorities and implementation.
Karzai has long complained that donor-run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have
preventing the Afghan government from expanding its own responsibilities and capacity at the
local level. There are PRTs in about 80% of Afghan provinces, and they have far more funding
and capability than the Afghan governor in those provinces. The Tokyo Framework largely
endorses Karzai’s complaints by calling for the PRTs to be transferred to Afghan control. Karzai
administrative decree of July 26, 2012, provides for Afghan institutions to begin taking over the
roles of the PRTs, and, since mid-2012, the United States and partner countries have been closing
down PRTs and handing them over to Afghan control.
Some further enhancements to local governance await Afghan parliamentary action. As of late
2013, the National Assembly is considering several laws including a local government law, a
municipality law, and a provincial councils law. The Assembly has not voted on these draft laws,
to date.
40 Karen DeYoung, “Plans For Big Civilian Force in Postwar Afghanistan to Be Cut,” Washington Post, December 6,
2012.
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The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)
In terms of local governance institution-building, a key institution was empowered in August
2007 when Karzai placed the selection process for local leaders (provincial governors and below)
in a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)—and out of the Interior
Ministry. However, some international officials say that the IDLG has served as an instrument for
Karzai to mobilize voters and voter mobilization machinery. It is headed by Abdul Khaliq Farahi,
a former diplomat who was kidnapped in Peshawar, Pakistan, and held for nearly three years
(2008-2011), allegedly by militants linked to Al Qaeda.
The IDLG is an implementing partner for the District Delivery Program (DDP), which now
operates in at least 32 of the 407 districts of Afghanistan. The program was created to improve
government presence and service delivery at the district level, and has been funded by the United
States, Britain, Denmark, and France. U.S. funding for the program was suspended in July 2011
pending accountability of expenditures and a request for the IDLG and Ministry of Finance to
satisfy several conditions, and has not reactivated to date.41 The IDLG also gets assistance from
the U.N. Development Program’s (UNDP’s) Afghanistan Subnational Governance Program II
(ASGP-II). That program provided $83.6 million to the IDLG from the European Community,
Italy, Switzerland, and Britain.
Provincial Governors and Provincial Councils
One issue that has plagued local governance has been the difficulty in recruiting staff. The July
26, 2012, Karzai administrative reform decree required the IDLG to fill open positions in the
provinces within six months, including in the ministry offices in each provincial capital. It also
requires a review of the performance of provincial governors’ performance in combating
corruption and improving governance.
Many believe that, even more than institutional expansion, the key to effective provincial
governance is the appointment of competent and incorruptible governors in all 34 Afghan
provinces. U.N., U.S., and other international studies and reports all point to the beneficial effects
(reduction in narcotics trafficking, economic growth, lower violence) of some of the strong
Afghan civilian appointments at the provincial level. A key example of a successful gubernatorial
appointment was the March 2008 appointment of Gulab Mangal as Helmand governor. He drew
praise from the United States and the international community for taking actions that reduced
poppy cultivation in Helmand. However, he is from Laghman Province (eastern Afghanistan) and
was never fully accepted by the local power-brokers of the south, who successfully persuaded
Karzai to replace him in September 2012. Other governors, such as Ghul Agha Shirzai and Atta
Mohammad Noor (discussed above), are considered effective, but have been criticized for
exercising excessive independence of central authority.
Despite the progress on merit-based appointments and the widely noted importance of having
competent provincial governors, about half of the provincial governors continue to be political
appointees selected mostly for loyalty to Karzai. On September 20, 2012, Karzai shuffled 10 out
of the 34 provincial governors (including Mangal), asserting that those taken out of their positions
had fallen short on improving governance or combating corruption. However, many observers
suspected the reshuffle was intended to place Karzai loyalists in key local positions ahead of the
41 DOD report on Afghanistan stability, April 2012, p.73.
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2014 election. Some of the ousted governors were assigned to different provinces. Other than
Helmand, the nine provinces where governors were changed include Wardak, Kabul, Takhar,
Faryab, Baghlan, Nimruz, Laghman, Lowgar, and Badghis.
Provincial Councils
One problem noted by governance experts is that the role of the elected provincial councils is
unclear. In most provinces, the provincial councils do not act as true local legislatures and are
considered weak compared to the power and influence of the provincial governors. Legislation to
expand the councils’ roles is under consideration by the National Assembly, but the version of a
provincial councils law that is under consideration was stripped by the cabinet of provisions to
assign to the councils supervisory duties. But, the Assembly reportedly is considering restoring
those provisions.
Perhaps the most significant role the provincial councils play is in choosing the upper house of
the National Assembly (Meshrano Jirga). In the absence of district councils (no elections held or
scheduled), the provincial councils elected in 2009 have chosen two-thirds (68 seats) of the 102-
seat body. Karzai appointed the remaining 34 seats in February 2011.
The elections for the provincial councils in all 34 provinces were held on August 20, 2009,
concurrent with the presidential elections. The next provincial elections will be held concurrent
with the presidential election in April 2014. The first provincial council elections were held
concurrent with the parliamentary elections in September 2005.
District-Level Governance
U.S. officials say there has been “measured progress” in developing effective district governance.
District governors are appointed by the president, at the recommendation of the IDLG, and more
than half of all district governors in place have been appointed based on merit, as noted above.
Some districts had no formal governance at all until the 2009 U.S. troop surge. Some of the
district governors in Helmand Province, including in Nawa and Now Zad districts, returned after
the U.S.-led expulsion of Taliban militants.
The difficulty plaguing the expansion of district governance, in addition to security issues, is lack
of resources. Many district governors have virtually no staff or vehicles. In about 40 districts, the
United States and partner countries have established District Support Teams (DSTs) to assist in
district-level governance and service delivery. However, like the PRTs, the DSTs are to be turned
over to Afghan control as the transition to complete Afghan control proceeds.
District Councils
Another problem in establishing district level governance has been the fact that no elections for
district councils have been held due to boundary and logistical difficulties. In his November 19,
2009, inaugural speech, Karzai said the goal of the government is to hold these elections along
with the 2010 parliamentary elections. However, that was not accomplished and no date for these
elections has been set. As a result, there is no one authoritative district-level representative body,
but rather a collection of groupings established by donor programs. The Afghan government has
agreed in principle to a roadmap leading to a single district level body, but implementation has
been slow.
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Municipal and Village Level Authority
As are district governors, mayors of large municipalities are appointed. There are about 42
mayors nationwide, many with deputy mayors. Karzai pledged in his November 2009 inaugural
that “mayoral” elections would be held “for the purpose of better city management.” However, no
municipal elections have been held and none is scheduled. It is likely that these await passage of a
municipalities law, referenced above.
As noted throughout, there has traditionally been village-level governance by councils of tribal
elders and other notables. That structure remains, particularly in secure areas, while village
councils have been absent or only sporadically active in areas where there is combat. As noted
above, a U.S. official in southern Afghanistan, Henry Ensher, said in January 2011 that councils
have been formed in areas where security has been established by the 2010 U.S. “troop surge.”
The IDLG and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), with advice from
India and other donors, also are empowering localities to decide on development priorities. The
MRRD has formed about 28,000 Community Development Councils (CDCs) nationwide to help
suggest priorities, and these bodies are eventually to all be elected.
Reforming Afghan Governance: Curbing Corruption42
The Obama Administration has tried not only to expand Afghan governing capacity but to push
for its reform, transparency, and oversight. Many Afghans have come to view the central
government as “predatory.” Reducing corruption in government constitutes several of the 17
benchmarks of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework which requires Afghanistan, in
general, to “enact and enforce the legal framework for fighting corruption.” Karzai has repeatedly
consistently acknowledged that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan. In a June 21, 2012,
speech, he called on his government to step up the fight against corruption, and fighting
corruption was a cornerstone of Karzai’s July 26, 2012, administrative decrees.
However, concerns center on Karzai’s apparent reluctance to prosecute officials for corruption—
particularly those related to or aligned with him politically. This stands in contrast to his attempts
to vigorously prosecute those politically opposed to him. Some international officials have also
questioned Karzai’s repeated placement of blame for Afghan corruption on international donor
contracting practices. He repeated that criticism in advance of his January 2013 U.S. visit,
blaming corruption on the NATO/ISAF practices of contracting with firms linked to traditional
faction leaders.
On the other hand, some say that U.S. policy on corruption has been inconsistent. Karzai
confirmed U.S. press reports in April 2013 saying that the Central Intelligence Agency continues
to provide cash payments directly to the Karzai government, through the Afghan National
Security Council, for purposes such as compensating faction leaders.43 Karzai said the payments
were relatively small, but U.S. and other experts say the payments circumvent standard controls
on U.S. foreign aid and help fuel Afghan corruption. Neither CIA nor other U.S. officials
confirmed or denied the reports, when asked by journalists.
42 For more information, particularly on Rule of Law programs, see CRS Report R41484, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of
Law and Justice Sector Assistance, by Liana Rosen and Kenneth Katzman.
43 Matthew Rosenberg, “Karzai’s Office Gets Bags Full of C.I.A. Cash,” New York Times, April 29, 2013.
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High Level Corruption, Nepotism, and Cronyism
At the upper levels of government, some observers have asserted that Karzai deliberately tolerates
officials who are allegedly involved in illicit activity and supports their receipt of lucrative
contracts from donor countries, in exchange for their political support. Karzai’s brother,
Mahmoud, as discussed above, has apparently grown wealthy through various ventures,
purportedly by fostering the impression he can influence his brother. Some observers who have
served in Afghanistan say that Karzai has appointed some provincial governors to “reward them”
and that these appointments have gone on to “prey” economically on the populations of that
province. Several high officials, despite very low official government salaries, have acquired
ornate properties in Kabul in part by appropriating private land in which the ownership was
unclear. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported in May
2013 that $50 million in stolen U.S. aid funds—which U.S. investigators discovered in an Afghan
bank account—was missing because the Afghan government did not implement U.S. requests to
freeze the account. The SIGAR issued an audit in January 2014 that asserted there was risk of
misuse of U.S. funds because of the Ministry of Public Health’s payment of salaries in cash and
the possible overpayment for commodities and services by the Ministry of Mines—overpayments
that could possibly be used to finance bribes or kickbacks.44
On the other hand, accusations of corruption are often used as a political weapon. One former
official accused National Security Adviser Spanta of corruption after being fired from an Afghan
government position. An Afghan court ruled against the Afghan accuser on September 25, 2012,
and fined him $300. Some observers say that the National Assembly’s accusations of corruption
against Finance Minister Zakhilwal in May 2013 were intended to prompt him to release
additional funding to parliamentarians’ districts and causes. He was not removed by the
Assembly.
Lower-Level Corruption
Observers who follow the issue say that most of the governmental corruption takes place in the
course of performing mundane governmental functions, such as government processing of official
documents (e.g., passports, drivers’ licenses), in which processing services routinely require
bribes in exchange for action.45 Other forms of corruption include Afghan security officials’
selling U.S./internationally provided vehicles, fuel, and equipment to supplement their salaries. In
other cases, local police or border officials may siphon off customs revenues or demand extra
payments to help guard the U.S. or other militaries’ equipment shipments. Other examples
include security commanders placing “ghost employees” on official payrolls in order to pocket
their salaries. Corruption is fed, in part, by the fact that government workers receive very low
salaries (about $200 per month, as compared to the pay of typical contractors in Afghanistan that
might pay as much as $6,500 per month). Many observers say there is a cultural dimension to the
corruption—that it is commonly expected by relatives and friends that those Afghans who have
achieved government positions will protect those relations with favors, appointments, and
contracts.
44 Matthew Rosenberg and Azam Ahmed. “Report Says Afghanistan Can’t Be Trusted to Prevent Misuse of U.S. Aid”
New York Times, January 30, 2014.
45 Filkins, Dexter, “Bribes Corrode Afghan’s Trust in Government,” New York Times, January 2, 2009; Kevin Seiff,
“Greasing the Wheels in Kabul,” Washington Post, February 18, 2013.
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Administration Views and Policy on Corruption
There has been a consensus within the Obama Administration on the wide scope of the corruption
in Afghan government and the deleterious effect the corruption has on government popularity and
effectiveness. In 2010, the Administration debated the degree to which to press anti-corruption
issues with the Afghan government. In 2011, the Administration reportedly decided to prioritize
reducing low-level corruption instead of investigations of high-level allies of Karzai.46 High level
investigations not only risked a Karzai backlash, but were judged to potentially complicate efforts
to obtain the cooperation of Afghans who can help stabilize areas of the country. Some of these
Afghans are said to be paid by the CIA for information and other support, and the National
Security Council reportedly issued guidance to U.S. agencies to review this issue.47
Yet, U.S. and international officials believe that anti-corruption efforts must be pursued because
corruption is contributing to a souring of Western publics on the mission as well as causing some
Afghans to embrace Taliban insurgents. Obama Administration officials have credited Karzai
with allowing the United States and other donors to help develop oversight bodies to curb
corruption. At the July 20, 2010, Kabul conference—following onto the January 28, 2010,
London conference—the Afghan government finalized a National Anti-Corruption Strategy
(“Azimi report”) and committed to enacting 37 laws to curb corruption. Very few of these laws
have been enacted, although the Afghan cabinet has drafted new anti-corruption and auditing laws
and some regulations have been issued by Karzai decree. The July 3, 2013, senior officials
meeting in Kabul determined that there was only minor progress on the anti-corruption
benchmarks of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. The anti-corruption institutions, and
some examples of their efforts, are discussed below.
• High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption. In August 2008 Karzai, with
reported Bush Administration prodding, set up the “High Office of Oversight and
Anti-Corruption” (commonly referred to as the High Office of Oversight, HOO)
with the power to identify and refer corruption cases to state prosecutors, and to
catalogue the overseas assets of Afghan officials. It has been headed by former
IEC head Azizullah Ludin, but he and another senior HOO official stepped down
to become vice-presidential candidates in the April 2014 elections. On March 18,
2010, Karzai, as promised at the January 28, 2010, international meeting on
Afghanistan in London, issued a decree giving the HOO power to investigate
corruption cases rather than just refer them to other offices. The July 26, 2012,
Karzai administrative decree directed the HOO to, within six months, assess
“private institutions’ and government officials’ suspicious wealth” and report
those findings to the president’s office every two months. On February 7, 2013,
the HOO issued a report that Afghans had paid $3.9 billion in total bribes during
2012. USAID provided the HOO $30 million total during FY2011-FY2013 to
build capacity at the central and provincial level. USAID pays for salaries of six
HOO senior staff and provides some information technology systems as well.
• Assets Declarations and Verifications. During December 15-17, 2009, Karzai
held a conference in Kabul to combat corruption and decided to require deputy
ministers and others to declare their assets, not just those at the ministerial level.
46 Strobel, Warren and Marisa Taylor, “U.S. Won’t Pursue Karzai Allies in Anti-Corruption Campaign,” McClatchy
Newspapers, January 6, 2011.
47 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “A Subtler Takc to Fight Afghan Corruption,” Washington Post, September 13, 2010.
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Karzai declared his assets on March 27, 2009. The July 20, 2010, Kabul
Conference communiqué48 included an Afghan pledge to verify and publish these
declarations annually, beginning in 2010. A SIGAR report of April 30, 2012, said
that the government’s progress for verification of the declarations “fall[s] short of
U.S. expectations.” The March 5, 2013, U.N. report, referenced earlier, says that
the HOO would verify at least 10% of the assets declarations by June 2013. The
July 3, 2013, senior officials meeting in Kabul acknowledged that “progress” had
been made on the declaration and publication of assets, but that movement was
minimal on verifying the declarations.
• Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee
(MEC) to evaluate the government’s performance in combating corruption was
mandated by the Kabul conference communiqué to be established within three
months of the conference (by October 2010). The MEC, supported by UNDP,
was inaugurated on May 11, 2011. It was enshrined in a Karzai decree and is
composed of three Karzai nominees and three international nominees. It is
headed by Slovenian diplomat Drago Kos, and issues reports every six months.
Its latest report was issued on September 28, 2013, an alleged that corruption in
the U.S. funded Civilian Technical Assistance Program (CTAP) for the Afghan
Ministry of Finance was plagued by nepotism and fraud that had not been
investigated by the Afghan oversight bodies. USAID has provided about $40
million to the CTAP program and has commissioned a review of the program.
• Major Crimes Task Force and Sensitive Investigations Unit. Since 2008, several
additional investigative bodies have been established under Ministry of Interior
authority. The most prominent is the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) tasked
with investigating public corruption, organized crime, and kidnapping. A
headquarters for the MCTF was inaugurated on February 25, 2010, and it has
been funded and mentored by the FBI, the DEA, the U.S. Marshal Service,
Britain’s Serious Crimes Organized Crime Agency, the Australian Federal Police,
EUPOL (European police training unit in Afghanistan), and the U.S.-led training
mission for Afghan forces. The MCTF has 169 investigators, according to U.S.
officials.
A related body is the Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU), run by several dozen
Afghan police officers, vetted and trained by the DEA.49 This body led the arrest
in August 2010 of a Karzai NSC aide, Mohammad Zia Salehi, on charges of
soliciting a bribe from the New Ansari Money Exchange in exchange for ending
a money-laundering investigation of the firm. The middle-of-the-night arrest
prompted Karzai, by his own acknowledgment on August 22, 2010, to obtain
Salehi’s release. In November 2010, the Attorney General’s office ended the
prosecution of Salehi.
• Anti-Corruption Unit and Anti-Corruption Tribunal. These investigative and
prosecution bodies were established by decree in 2009. Eleven judges have been
appointed to the tribunal, which is under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It
tries cases referred by an Anti-Corruption Unit of the Afghan Attorney General’s
48 Communiqué text at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/asia/21kabultext.html.
49 Ron Nordland and Mark Mazzetti, “Graft Dispute in Afghanistan Is Test for U.S.,” New York Times, August 24,
2010.
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office. However, of the approximately 2,000 cases investigated by the Anti-
Corruption Unit, only 28 officials have been convicted to date. The Department
of Justice suspended its training program for the Anti-Corruption Unit in early
2012 because of the unit’s “lack of seriousness,” according to the SIGAR report
of April 30, 2012. One of the laws pledged during the July 20, 2010, Kabul
conference would be enacted (by July 20, 2011) included one to legally empower
the Anti-Corruption Tribunal and the Major Crimes Task Force. That has not
been enacted by the National Assembly to date.
• Prosecutions and Investigations of High-Level Officials. The HOO head Ludin
said in July 2013 that his office had sent 190 cases of alleged high level official
corruption to the Attorney General’s office over the past two years, but had seen
few indictments follow. The Attorney General’s office has investigated at least 20
senior officials, but with virtually no convictions. Some of those investigated
previously—but not convicted—included Commerce Minister Amin Farhang (for
allegedly submitting inflated invoices for reimbursement); former Minister of
Mines Mohammad Ibrahim Adel (who reportedly accepted a $30 million bribe to
award a key mining project to a Chinese firm);50 and former Minister of the Hajj
Mohammad Siddiq Chakari (for allegedly accepting bribes to steer Hajj-related
travel business to certain foreign tourist agencies). Chakari fled to Britain.
• EITI. Relatedly, Afghanistan has signed up as a candidate to the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) which is intended to ensure that
contracting for Afghanistan’s mineral resources is free of corruption. Afghanistan
hopes to become fully EITI compliant by April 2012 and the July 3, 2013, senior
officials meeting in Kabul commended Afghanistan’s progress toward EITI
compliance. The World Bank gave Afghanistan a three-year grant of $52 million
to manage its natural resources effectively.
• Salary Levels. The government has tried to raise salaries, particularly of security
forces, in order to reduce their inclination to solicit bribes. In November 2009,
the Afghan government announced an increase in police salaries (from $180 per
month to $240 per month). During his term as Interior Minister, Bismillah Khan
attempted to institute transparency and accountability in promotions and
assignments. However, the results of these initiatives remain unclear.
• Bulk Cash Transfers Out of Afghanistan. At the July 2010 Kabul conference, the
government pledged to adopt regulations and implement within one year policies
to govern the bulk transfers of cash outside the country. This was intended to
grapple with issues raised by reports, discussed below, of officials taking large
amounts of cash out of Afghanistan (an estimated $4.5 billion taken out in 2011).
U.S. officials say that large movements of cash are inevitable in Afghanistan
because only about 5% of the population use banks and 90% use informal cash
transfers (“hawala” system). The late Ambassador Holbrooke testified on July 28,
2010 (cited earlier), that the Afghan Central Bank has begun trying to control
hawala transfers; 475 hawalas have been licensed, to date, whereas none were
licensed as recently as 2009. On August 21, 2010, it was reported that Afghan
and U.S. authorities would implement a plan to install U.S.-made currency
50 Joshua Partlow, “Afghanistan Investigating 5 Current and Former Cabinet Members,” Washington Post, November
24, 2009.
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counters at Kabul airport to track how officials had obtained their cash (and
ensure it did not come from donor aid funds).51 On March 19, 2012, Central Bank
Governor Noorullah Delawari said the Bank had imposed a $20,000 per person
limit on cash transfers out of the country. However, a report by the SIGAR issued
December 11, 2012, found that the provided currency counters at Kabul airport
were not being used, nor were procedures to ensure that notable Afghan figures
were not taking large amounts of cash out of Afghanistan being enforced. Other
reports say that Afghans are taking significant amounts of gold out of
Afghanistan, possible to hedge against instability after the 2014 transition.
• Customs Revenue Diversion. As noted above, some governors of border
provinces are siphoning off customs duties that are supposed to be remitted to the
central government. In December 2012, a commission created by Karzai
investigated the issue in twelve provinces and shut down some of these
operations. One scheme shut down was a surtax levied illegitimately at the
Torkham Gate (Khyber Pass) crossing by the provincial government of Ghul
Agha Shirzai (see above on Shirzai above).
• Auditing Capabilities. The SIGAR has previously assessed that the mandate of
Afghanistan’s Control and Audit Office is too narrow and lacks the independence
needed to serve as an effective watch over the use of Afghan government funds.52
At the Kabul conference, the government pledged to submit to parliament an
Audit Law within six months, to strengthen the independence of the Control and
Audit Office, and to authorize more auditing by the Ministry of Finance. The
government drafted an audit law but the National Assembly has not enacted it.
• Legal Review. The Kabul conference communiqué committed the government to
establish a legal review committee, within six months, to review Afghan laws for
compliance with the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. Afghanistan ratified
the convention in August 2008.
• U.S. Defense Department Efforts. In 2009, a key U.S. military official, General
H.R. McMaster, formed several DOD task forces to focus on anti-corruption
(Shafafiyat, Task Force Spotlight, and Task Force 2010) from a U.S.
military/counter-insurgency perspective. These task forces, in part, review U.S.
contracting strategies to enhance Afghan capacity and reduce the potential for
corruption. The Shafafiyat task force announced in February 2012 that it had
caused the restitution of $11.1 million, $25.4 million in fines, and $3.4 million in
seizures from allegedly fraudulent contractors, and has debarred or suspended
more than 125 American, Afghan, and international workers for alleged fraud.53
• Local Anti-Corruption Bodies. Some Afghans have taken it upon themselves to
oppose corruption at the local level. Volunteer local inspectors, sponsored
originally by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, are reported to monitor and report on
the quality of donor-funded, contractor implemented construction projects.
However, these and other “watchdog” groups do not have an official mandate,
and therefore their authority and ability to rectify inadequacies are limited.
51 Greg Miller and Joshua Partlow, “Afghans, U.S. Aim to Plug Cash Drain,” Washington Post, August 21, 2010.
52 Aamer Madhani, “U.S. Reviews Afghan Watchdog Authority,” USA Today, May 12, 2010.
53 John Ryan, “Task Force Rooting Out Corruption in Afghanistan,” Army Times, February 20, 2012.
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Kabul Bank Scandal and Continuing Difficulties
The near-collapse of Kabul Bank is a prime example of how well-connected Afghans have
avoided regulations and other restrictions in order to garner personal profit. Mahmoud Karzai was
a major (7%+) shareholder in the bank, which was used to pay Afghan civil servants and police,
and he reportedly received large loans from the bank to buy his position in it. Another big
shareholder was Abdul Hussain Fahim, the brother of the First Vice President. The relationships
were exposed in August 2010 when Kabul Bank reported large losses primarily from shareholder
investments in Dubai properties, prompting President Karzai to appoint a Central Bank official to
run the the Bank. However, large numbers of depositors withdrew their money from it.
In response to the crisis, the United States and other donors refused to recapitalize the bank, but it
offered to finance an audit of Afghan banks, including Kabul Bank. The Finance Ministry decided
instead in November 2010 to hire its own auditor—a move that suggested to some that high
Afghan officials sought to hide the audit results. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
suspended its credit program for the Afghan government in November 2010, demanding that the
entire Afghan banking industry undergo an outside forensic audit and that those responsible be
held accountable. That held $70 million World Bank/Afghan Reconstruction Fund (ARTF) in
donor funds. Other donors followed suit and suspended as much as $1.8 billion in economic aid.
Amid Afghan confirmation that the questionable loans of the bank total over $925 million
(including interest due), the IMF—as a condition of resuming its credit program—subsequently
pushed for the bank to be sold. The Central Bank instead agreed to separate the bank’s
performing from nonperforming assets and then dissolve or restructure the bank.54 A version of
the plan, which was subject to approval by an Afghan government committee, was formally
approved and announced on April 21, 2011.
The “good bank” (part of the bank with deposits and which still functions) was financed by a
Central Bank loan of $825 million. It was renamed “New Kabul Bank.” The Afghan Finance
Ministry has promised to pay back the loan with recovered assets and tax revenues. On October
16, 2011, the National Assembly voted on a supplemental budget that enabled the Finance
Ministry to reimburse the Central Bank loan over eight years. The Central Bank governor
announced in April 2012 plans to sell New Kabul Bank. No qualified bidders answered the early
2013 solicitation and a new round of bidding was begun on September 3, 2013.
The Afghan government, through its “Financial Dispute Resolution Commission,” continues to
try to recoup the lost funds. Of the estimated $925 million in losses, about $300 million of the
losses are judged by the Afghans as untraceable because of a lack of documentation. As of late
2013, about $150 million in cash and $215 million in property (mostly luxury villas in Dubai) and
other assets.55 The MEC, discussed above, said in its September 28, 2013, report that none of the
$121 million owed to the bank by the Afghan company Gas Group had been recovered. The
Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, discussed above, requires Afghanistan to continue
54 Ernesto Londono, “Afghan Officials Opt to Dissolve Bank Draped in Scandal,” Washington Post, March 27, 2011.
55 Joshua Partlow, “Afghan Bureaucrat Tasked With Recovering Millions in Bad Loans,” Washington Post, July 7,
2012. Afghanistan Plans to Sell Scandal-Scarred Kabul Bank in June, Bloomberg.com, April 11, 2012;
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf
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asset recovery and to strengthen banking supervision though the Central Bank (Da Afghanistan
Bank).
Attempting Accountability
The political fallout also produced some resolution. On January 15, 2011, the office of Afghan
Attorney General Ishaq Aloko announced an investigation into the near-collapse of the bank. The
investigating commission briefed reporters on its findings on May 30, 2011, placing much of the
blame on lax controls by the Central Bank and its governor, Abdul Qadir Fitrat. The government
commission also largely absolved Mahmoud Karzai of any wrongdoing, saying he had paid off
his loans, and naming other key figures, such as Dostam, as taking out $100,000 in unsecured
loans. The following day, Central Bank governor Fitrat disputed the commission’s conclusions. In
part because of his feuding with figures such as Mahmoud Karzai, Fitrat fled Afghanistan for the
United States and announced his resignation on June 27, 2011. On December 11, 2011, Karzai
called for the United States to extradite Fitrat to Afghanistan and blamed U.S. officials for
knowing of the Bank’s problems at an early stage but failing to alert Afghan authorities.
In a step toward holding principals accountable, on June 30, 2011, the government announced the
arrest of two former Kabul Bank executives, Sherkhan Farnood and Khalilullah Frouzi, who
allegedly allowed the concessionary loans to the high-level Afghans and their relatives. However,
by late 2011, the detentions of the two had been relaxed and they were frequently sighted at
various public places in Kabul.56 On August 1, 2011, the Attorney General’s office sent the names
of about 15 people allegedly responsible for the scandal to Afghan courts for trial. On April 3,
2012, Karzai ordered a special prosecutor appointed and a special tribunal created to try those
involved. On June 2, 2012, at the urging of Karzai’s office, 21 people were indicted by the special
tribunal, including Farnood, Frouzi, Fitrat, nine other government officials, and nine other bank
employees who were allegedly in positions to have known of the fraud while it was occurring.
The trial of Farnood, Frouzi, and about 20 others allegedly involved began on November 10,
2012, under the leadership of a three judge panel. All 21 defendants were found guilty, and
Farnood and Frouzi received five-year sentences and financial penalties. The Attorney General
has appealed the sentences as too light; he wanted them found guilty of the original charges of
embezzlement and money laundering rather than fraud; the former charges carry longer jail terms
if convicted. In addition, the Attorney General is appealing the sentences of the other 19
defendants who the Attorney General believes were not involved in the misfeasance and should
not have been tried. The July 3, 2013, senior officials meeting in Kabul stated that “Participants
[Afghanistan participated in the meeting] agreed that continued efforts were needed” to hold
parties accountable in the Bank scandal.
Conclusions and Fallout
On November 27, 2012, the New York Times reported on the Central Bank’s audit of Kabul Bank
by Kroll Associates. The Kroll investigation called Kabul Bank a virtual “Ponzi scheme”
involving numerous deliberate efforts to deceive the bank’s original auditors. Two days later, the
Joint Evaluation and Monitoring Committee, discussed above, released its 87-page report on the
Bank scandal, detailing how Bank funds were smuggled out of the country surreptitiously and
56 Matthew Rosenberg and Graham Bowley, “Intractable Afghan Graft Hampering U.S. Strategy,” New York Times,
March 8, 2012.
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alleging high level Afghan government political interference in handling the scandal and in
deciding whom to hold accountable.57
The investigations, the recovery of some lost funds, and the forensic audits of the bank suggested
Afghanistan was moving to meet the IMF conditions for the restart of its credit program. In
November 2011, the IMF resumed its program by approving a $133 million loan to Afghanistan.
That move restored the flow of some previously blocked donor funds, including U.S.
contributions to the World Bank-run Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).
The IMF also wants a timetable for another bank found by the Central Bank to be vulnerable to
collapse, Azizi Bank, to shore up its finances. Another Afghan entity suspected of corruption is
the New Ansari Money Exchange, a large money-trading operation. On February 18, 2011, the
Treasury Department designated the New Ansari, and persons affiliated with it, as major money
laundering entities under the “Kingpin Act,” a designation that bans U.S. transactions with the
designees.
Moves to Penalize Lack of Progress on Corruption
Several of the required U.S. “metrics” of progress, cited above, involve Afghan progress against
corruption. In part because of reports that as much as $3 billion in funds had been allegedly
embezzled by Afghan officials over the past several years,58 an Administration certification of
progress against corruption was included as a condition of providing aid to Afghanistan in the
FY2011 continuing appropriations (P.L. 112-10). Aid conditionality based on Afghan
performance against corruption, on incorporation of women in the reconciliation process, and on
reports on progress on the Kabul Bank scandal was included in the FY2012 Consolidated
Appropriation (P.L. 112-74). No U.S. funding for Afghanistan has been permanently withheld
because of this or any other legislative certification requirement.
Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society59
Since 2001, U.S. policy has been to build capacity in human rights institutions in Afghanistan and
to promote civil society and political participation. As do previous years’ State Department
human rights reports, the report on Afghanistan for 2013 analyzed numerous human rights
deficiencies, attributing most of them to overall lack of security, loose control over the actions of
Afghan security forces, pervasive corruption, and cultural attitudes including discrimination
against women.
57 Matthew Rosenberg, “Audit Says Kabul Bank Began as “Ponzi Scheme,” New York Times, November 17, 2012;
Pamela Constable, “Report Cites Interference in Afghan Bank Probe,” Washington Post, November 29, 2012.
58 Rosenberg, Matthew, “Corruption Suspected in Airlift of Billions in Cash From Kabul,” Wall Street Journal, June
28, 2010.
59 Information in this section is primarily from Department of State. Human Rights Report for 2013: Afghanistan,
February 27, 2014.
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220386#wrapper
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Institution-Building: The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission (AIHRC) and Outside Human Rights Organizations
One of the institutional human rights developments since the fall of the Taliban has been the
establishment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). It is headed
by a woman, Sima Simar, a Hazara Shiite from Ghazni Province. It acts as an oversight body over
alleged human rights abuses but its members are appointed by the government and some believe
it is not as aggressive or independent as some had hoped. However, its members are appointed by
the president and, as an indication of government interference, in December 2011, Karzai
dismissed its deputy chairman Ahmad Nader Nadery for his outspoken writings alleging abuses
by allies of Karzai. Nadery heads another civil society watchdog organization, the Free and Fair
Election Foundation of Afghanistan, which was highly critical of Karzai and his allies for the
2009 and 2010 election fraud and is serving as a watchdog group for the 2014 elections.
In the course of the senior officials meeting in Kabul on July 3, 2013, donors criticized several of
Karzai’s 2013 appointments to the AIHRC. Some of the five new appointees reportedly are linked
to Afghan faction leaders or have otherwise not demonstrated a commitment to upholding or
enforcing international standards of human rights.60 On a visit to Afghanistan in September 2013,
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navinathem Pillay failed to persuade Karzai to
replace the controversial AIHRC appointees. The appointments are likely to become a factor in
the five-year accreditations review process by the International Coordinating Committee of
National Human Rights Institutions, which began on November 18, 2013.
The July 20, 2010, Kabul conference communiqué contained a pledge by the Afghan government
to begin discussions with the AIHRC, within six months, to stabilize its budgetary status. The
March 5, 2012, report of the U.N. Secretary General said the National Assembly has not
regularized the AIHRC status within the national budget framework. In recent years, most of the
AIHRC budget of $7.5 million is provided by European donors, Canada, Australia, and the
United Nations.61
Since 2002, there has been a proliferation of Afghan organizations that demand transparency
about human rights deficiencies. Prominent examples of Afghan NGO’s that monitor and agitate
for improved human rights practices include the Afghanistan Human Rights and Democracy
Organization, and the Equality for Peace and Democracy organization. The December 5, 2011,
Bonn Conference was preceded by meetings (December 2-3, 2011, in Bonn) of Afghan civil
society activists, intended to help assess the progress of Afghan governance and highlight the role
of civil society in governance.
It is in part the work of these groups that has produced responses by the government. For
example, Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (intelligence directorate but with arrest
powers), which has widely been accused of detainee abuse and torture, established in late 2011 a
“human rights unit” to investigate abuse allegations and train NDS staff not to conduct such
abuses. In 2012, the Human Rights Support Unit of the Ministry of Justice conducted twelve
human rights training sessions for NDS and Afghan National Policy officers. In June 2012,
Karzai tasked the Interior Ministry to report on prison conditions. On June 2, 2012, Karzai
ordered disarmed a local security unit whose members were accused of raping an 18-year old
60 Ron Nordland, “Donors Are Likely to Ask Karzai to Rethink Rights Panel Choices,” New York Times, July 3, 2013.
61 Rod Nordland, “Critics Question Karzai Choices for Human Rights Panel,” New York Times, July 2, 2013.
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woman in Konduz Province. On July 9, 2012, Afghan forces were sent to track down Taliban
militants who had executed a woman for adultery in Parwan Province.
Religious Influence on Society: National Ulema Council
Counterbalancing the influence of post-Taliban modern institutions such as the AIHRC are
traditional bodies such as the National Ulema Council. The Council consists of the 150 most
respected and widely followed clerics throughout Afghanistan, and represents a network of about
3,000 clerics nationwide. It has taken conservative positions on free expression and social
freedoms, such as the type of television and other media programs available on private media
outlets. Clerics sometimes ban performances by Afghan singers and other performers whose acts
the clerics consider inconsistent with conservative Islamic values. On the other hand, some rock
bands have been allowed to perform high profile shows since 2011. Because of the power of
Islamist conservatives, alcohol is increasingly difficult to obtain in restaurants and stores,
although it is not banned for sale to non-Muslims.
In August 2010, 350 clerics linked to the Council voted to demand that Islamic law (Sharia) be
implemented (including such punishments as stoning, amputations, and lashings) in order to
better prevent crime. The government did not implement the recommendation, which would
require amending the Afghan constitution that does not implement Sharia. The Council’s March
2, 2012, backing of Sharia interpretations of the rights of women is discussed below in the section
on women’s rights.
The government (Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs) is also involved in regulating religious
practices. Of Afghanistan’s approximately 125,000 mosques, 6,000 are registered and funded by
the government. Clerics in these mosques are paid about $100 per month and, in return, are
expected to promote the government line. In April 2012, the Ministry decreed that it would fire
government-funded clerics who refuse to heed warnings and preach violence or incitement.
As an illustration of Afghanistan’s inherent Islamic conservatism, riots broke out in two
successive years over what some Afghans perceived as U.S. disrespect of Islam. On April 2,
2011, hundreds of Afghans rioted in the normally quiet (and non-Pashtun) city of Mazar-e-Sharif
to protest the burning of a Quran by a Florida pastor a few weeks earlier. The rioters stormed the
U.N. compound in the city and killed at least 12 people, including 7 U.N workers. A more serious
eruption occurred in late February 2012 over the mistaken U.S. discarding of Qurans used by
detainees at Bagram Airfield. Riots and protests occurred in several cities, including the normally
peaceful and pro-U.S. north. The public reaction to the Quran burning was more intense than it
was following the March 11, 2012, killing of 16 Afghans allegedly by a U.S. soldier, Robert
Bales, who is in U.S. military custody. On September 17, 2012, several hundred Afghans rioted
outside a U.S. training facility east of Kabul city to protest a video produced in the United States
(“Innocence of Muslims”) that mocks the Prophet Muhammad. Afghan police protected the
facility from assault from the crowd.
These perceived U.S. slights may account for some of the killings of U.S. military personnel by
Afghan security forces over the past few years. The so-called “green on blue” attacks have caused
tensions between Afghan forces and their U.S. mentors, and prompted U.S. commanders to
impose counter-measures that potentially complicate the U.S. effort to accelerate the transition to
Afghan security before the end of 2014.
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Religious Freedom
The International Religious Freedom report for 2012 (released May 20, 2013) asserts that Afghan
law and policy does restrict religious freedom, and that the government’s respect for religious
freedom did not change during 2012.62 Members of minority religions, including Christians,
Sikhs, Hindus, and Baha’i’s, often face discrimination, but members of these communities
sometimes serve at high levels. Karzai has had a Hindu as an economic advisor and one member
of the Sikh community serves in the Meshrano Jirga. In early September 2013, Karzai, by decree,
created a special parliamentary seat allocation for a Sikh and a Hindu. There are four Isma’ilis in
the National Assembly, elected without a quota. Baha’is fare worse than members of some of the
other minorities because the Afghan Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be a form of
blasphemy in May 2007. There are no public Christian churches and four synagogues, although
the synagogues are not used because there is only one Afghan national who is Jewish. There are
three active gurdwaras (Sikh places of worship) and five Hindu mandirs (temples). Buddhist
foreigners are free to worship in Hindu temples.
One major case that drew international criticism was a January 2008 death sentence, imposed in a
quick trial, against 23-year-old journalist Sayed Kambaksh for allegedly distributing material
critical of Islam. On October 21, 2008, a Kabul appeals court changed his sentence to 20 years in
prison, a judgment upheld by another court in March 2009. He was pardoned by Karzai and
released on September 7, 2009.
The Hazaras and other Afghan Shiites tend to be less religious and more socially open than their
co-religionists in Iran. Afghan Shiite leaders appreciated the July 2009 enactment and “gazetting”
of a “Shiite Personal Status Law” that gave Afghan Shiites the same degree of recognition as the
Sunni majority, and provided a legal framework for Shiite family law issues. Afghan Shiites are
able to celebrate their holidays openly and some have held high positions, but some Pashtuns
have become resentful of the open celebrations and some clashes have resulted. The former
Minister of Justice, Sarwar Danesh, was the first Hazara Shiite to hold that post. In June 2012,
Karzai denounced a book published by the Afghanistan Academy of Science that portrayed
Hazaras as un-Islamic. In November 2012, Pashtun students at four universities in Kabul attacked
Hazara students who were trying to commemorate the Shiite day of mourning (Ashura),
prompting the temporary closing of the universities. The clashes occurred even though Shiite
public observance of the holy month of Muharram has progressively expanded.
Afghan Christians can worship in small congregations in private homes, but several conversion
cases have earned international attention. An Afghan man, Abd al-Rahman, who had converted to
Christianity 16 years ago while working for a Christian aid group in Pakistan, was imprisoned
and faced a potential death penalty trial for apostasy—his refusal to convert back to Islam. Facing
international pressure, Karzai prevailed on Kabul court authorities to release him (March 29,
2006). His release came the same day the House passed a bill (H.Res. 736) calling on protections
for Afghan converts. In May 2010, the Afghan government suspended the operations of two
Christian-affiliated international relief groups claiming the groups were attempting to promote
Christianity among Afghans, an assertion denied by the groups (Church World Service and
Norwegian Church Aid). Another case arose in May 2010, when an amputee, Said Musa, was
imprisoned for converting to Christianity from Islam, an offense under Afghan law that leaves it
open for Afghan courts to apply a death sentence under Islamic law (Shariah). The arrest came
62 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=208422#wrapper.
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days after the local Noorin TV station broadcast a show on Afghan Christians engaging in their
rituals. Following diplomatic engagement by governments and human rights groups, Musa was
quietly released from prison on February 24, 2011, and he obtained asylum in Italy.
Media and Freedom of Expression/Social Freedoms
Afghanistan’s conservative traditions have caused some backsliding in recent years on media
freedoms. Since 2001, numerous television channels, newspapers, and other media forms have
been established, giving Afghanistan one of the freest presses in the region. Media has expanded
to the point where the government, in 2012, began a process of launching a communications
satellite to help with broadcast speed and breadth of dissemination. However, a Mass Media Law
adopted in 2009 gave independence to the official media outlets but also contained a number of
content restrictions and required that new newspapers and electronic media be licensed by the
government. The Ministry of Information and Culture is attempting to draft a new media law to
replace it, although some early drafts contained provisions that drew opposition from human
rights groups in and outside Afghanistan.
According to the State Department report on human rights for 2012, there continues to be
intimidation and sometimes violence against journalists who criticize the central government or
powerful local leaders, and some news organizations and newspapers have occasionally been
closed for incorrect or derogatory reporting on high officials. In October 2012, the Afghan
government threatened to expel the staff of the International Crisis Group because of a report it
issued that warned that Afghanistan might slide into civil war if the 2014 presidential elections
are not free and fair. Supporters of the government position reportedly threatened the senior Crisis
Group expert in Kabul, Candace Rondeaux, prompting her to leave the country.
USAID programs have trained investigative journalists to do more reporting on official
corruption and other issues. The United States has provided funding and advice to an Afghan
Government Media Information Center that the Afghan government uses to communicate with
the public. Possibly as part of an effort to transition more tasks to the Afghans, U.S. advisers
ended their work there in December 2011.
Separately, Islamic conservatives on the Ulema Council and in the National Assembly, as well as
prominent clerics such as Shiite Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, have sometimes asserted control over
media content. This has been an attempt to curb the popularity of such networks as Tolo
Television. With the Ulema Council’s backing, in April 2008 the Ministry of Information and
Culture banned five Indian-produced soap operas on Tolo on the grounds that they are too risqué,
although the programs were restored in August 2008 under a compromise that brought in Islamic-
oriented programs from Turkey. In June 2011, pressure from the Ulema Council caused Tolo to
remove a soap opera called “Forbidden Love.” Tolo has also aired programs about official
corruption. In April 2013, Karzai reportedly agreed with a call by the Ulema Council to ban
programs considered “vulgar, obscene, or un-Islamic.”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s “Radio Azadi” service for Afghanistan has distributed 20,000
solar powered radios to poor (and usually illiterate) Afghans to improve their access to
information. In general, the government does not restrict access to the Internet, but it does ban
access to pornographic web sites.
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Harsh Punishments/Torture
The State Department reports widespread examples of torture, rape, and other abuses by officials,
security forces, detention center authorities, and police. In September 2011, U.S. and partner
transfers of prisoners to some Afghan facilities were suspended because of alleged torture by
Afghan prison authorities. Afghanistan’s Interior Ministry and National Directorate of Security
denied the allegations, which included assertions that prisoners were being beaten with rubber
hoses or given electric shocks. Earlier, in October 2007, Afghanistan resumed enforcing the death
penalty after a four-year moratorium, executing 15 criminals. In August 2010, the issue of stoning
to death as a punishment arose when Taliban insurgents ordered a young couple who had eloped
stoned to death in a Taliban-controlled area of Konduz Province. Although the punishment was
not meted out by the government, it was reported that many residents of the couple’s village
supported the punishment.
A UNAMA report issued January 20, 2013, documented numerous cases of torture and ill
treatment for detainees at the hand of Afghan security forces,63 and the U.N. report of December
6, 2013, cited earlier, said that UNAMA visits Afghan-run detention facilities to monitor
implementation of presidential decree No. 129 preventing torture and ill-treatment of detainees.
UNAMA supported the redrafting of 173 prison-related operational directives to be completed by
the end of 2013. As of the December 6 U.N. report, 114 such revised directives were issued,
although there continue to be concerns about new incidents of alleged torture and ill-treatment.
Human Trafficking
For the fourth year in a row, Afghanistan was again placed in Tier 2: Watch List in the State
Department Trafficking in Persons Report for 2013, issued on June 19, 2013.64 However,
Afghanistan was again given a waiver for an automatic downgrade to Tier 3 (the downgrade is
automatic after a country is “watch-listed” for three consecutive years). The waiver was again
based on the government’s writing of a plan that, if implemented, would qualify as a significant
effort to comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government is
assessed in the 2013 report as not complying with minimum standards for eliminating trafficking,
and not showing evidence of increasing efforts to satisfactorily address the issue.
The State Department report says that women from China, some countries in Africa, Iran, and
some countries in Central Asia are being trafficked into Afghanistan for sexual exploitation,
although, according to the report, trafficking within Afghanistan is more prevalent than
trafficking across its borders. The report asserts that some families knowingly sell their children
for forced prostitution, including for bacha baazi, a practice in which wealthy men use groups of
young boys for social and sexual entertainment. The report added that some members of the
Afghan National Security Forces have sexually abused boys as part of the bacha baazi practice.
Other reports say that many women have resorted to prostitution, despite the risk of social and
religious ostracism or punishment, to cope with economic hardship.65 Since 2001, the United
States has spent about $500,000 on programs to eliminate human trafficking in Afghanistan.
63 http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VsBL0S5b37o%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US.
64 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210738.pdf.
65 Azam Ahmed, “An Afghan City’s Economic Success Extends to Its Sex Trade,” New York Times, April 18, 2013.
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Advancement of Women
Women and women’s groups are a large component of the burgeoning of civil society in post-
Taliban Afghanistan. Freedoms for women have greatly expanded since the fall of the Taliban
with their elections to the parliament and their service at many levels of government. The Afghan
government pursues a policy of promoting equality for women under its National Action Plan for
Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework requires
Afghanistan to implement the NAPWA and all of its past commitments and laws to strengthen the
rights of women and provide services to them.
The major institutional development since 2001 was the formation in 2002 of a Ministry of
Women’s Affairs dedicated to improving women’s rights. It is headed by Husn Banu Ghazanfar.
Its primary function is to promote public awareness of relevant laws and regulations concerning
women’s rights. It plays a key role in trying to protect women from domestic abuse by overseeing
the running of as many as 29 women’s shelters across Afghanistan. Women’s rights groups in
Afghanistan expressed outrage over a June 2012 statement by Afghanistan’s justice minister that
the shelters encourage “immorality and prostitution.” The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of
2002 (AFSA, P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per year (FY2003-FY2006) for the Ministry
of Women’s Affairs. Those monies were donated to the Ministry from Economic Support Funds
(ESF) accounts controlled by USAID. The United States has continued to fund the Ministry since
AFSA expired, although with less than $15 million per year.
One of the most prominent civil society groups operating in post-Taliban Afghanistan is the
Afghanistan Women’s Network. It has at least 3,000 members and its leaders say that 75
nongovernmental organizations work under its auspices. In addition, the AIHRC and outside
Afghan human rights groups focus extensively on rights for Afghan women.
Among the most notable accomplishments since 2001, women are performing jobs that were
rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996. The civil service is 19%
female, although that is down from 24% in 2004 and below the 30% target level set in the Tokyo
Mutual Accountability Framework. Women serve in the police force and military, and the first
Afghan female pilots arrived for training in the United States in July 2011. There are over 150
female judges, up from 50 in 2003, and nearly 500 female journalists working nationwide.
Women constitute over one-third of the seats of the nationwide Community Development
Councils (CDC’s discussed above) and each CDC is required to have two women in their
executive bodies.
Women are legally permitted to drive, and press reports say an increasing number of Afghan
women, although mainly in Kabul and other main cities, are learning how to drive and exercising
that privilege. The wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, and
fewer women are wearing it than was the case a few years ago. In November 2010, the
government opened a USAID-funded women-only park in Kabul called “Women’s Garden”
where women can go, without male escort, and undertake fitness and job training activities.
Some groups, such as Human Rights Watch, report backsliding on women’s rights since 2008,66
although the State Department human rights report for 2012 says that the situation of women in
66 “We Have the Promises of the World: Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, December 2009,
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/hrw_report_2009.pdf.
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Afghanistan improved “marginally” during 2012. Numerous abuses, such as denial of educational
and employment opportunities, continue primarily because of Afghanistan’s conservative
traditions. This is particularly prevalent in rural areas, and less so in larger urban areas. Along
with the assertion of authority of conservative Islamic institutions, on March 2, 2012, the Ulema
Council issued a pronouncement saying women should be forced to wear the veil and be
forbidden from traveling without a male chaperone. The pronouncement did reiterate support for
the rights of women to inherit and own property, and to choose their marital partners. On March
6, 2012, Karzai endorsed the Ulema Council statement.
Among the most widespread abuses reported:
• More than 70% of marriages in Afghanistan are forced, despite laws banning the
practice, and a majority of brides are younger than the legal marriage age of 16.
• The practice of baad, in which women are given away to marry someone from
another clan to settle a dispute, remains prevalent.
• There is no law specifically banning sexual harassment, and women are routinely
jailed for zina—a term meaning adultery, and a crime under the penal code, and
that includes running away from home, defying family choice of a spouse,
eloping, or fleeing domestic violence. These incarcerations are despite the fact
that running away from home is not a crime under the penal code. That code is
often relatively lenient towards males—a man convicted of “honor killing” (of a
wife who commits adultery) cannot be sentenced to more than two years in
prison. One case that received substantial attention in December 2011 involved a
woman who was jailed for having a child outside wedlock even though the child
was a product of rape.
• Women’s rights activists have been assassinated on several occasions. On
December 10, 2012, the head of the Women’s Affairs Ministry department in
Laghman Province was gunned down. Her predecessor in that post was killed by
a bomb planted in her car four months earlier. A prominent women’s rights
activist and author, Sushmita Banerjee, a citizen of India, was abducted by
Taliban militants from her home in Paktika province and found killed. Two
Taliban suspects were subsequently arrested.
In an effort to prevent these abuses, on August 6, 2009, Karzai issued, as a decree, the
“Elimination of Violence Against Women” (EVAW) law that makes many of the practices above
unlawful. However, enforcement of the EVAW decree has been weakened by some Supreme
Court rulings and other Afghan legal decisions. The U.N. report of March 5, 2013, mentioned
above, said that prosecutions of abuses against women are increasingly obtaining convictions.
The report adds that a “High Commission for the Elimination of Violence Against Women” has
been established to oversee implementation of the EVAW law. Still, only a small percentage of
reports of violence against women are registered with the judicial system, and about one-third of
those proceed to trial.67 The number of women jailed for “moral crimes” has increased by 50%
since 2011. A December 2010 attempt by the National Assembly to enact the EVAW failed, as did
a more recent effort in May 2013. The legislative efforts have failed due to opposition from
Islamic conservatives and others who do not want to limit the ability of male elders to decide
67 Alissa Rubin, “Slow Gains in Justice for Afghan Women,” New York Times, December 12, 2012,
http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Qy9mDiEa5Rw%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US.
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family issues. On May 22, 2013, about 200 male Islamist students demonstrated in Kabul
demanding repeal of the EVAW decree outright.
Women in Key Positions
Despite conservative attitudes, women have moved into prominent positions in all areas of
Afghan governance, although with periodic setbacks. Three female ministers were in the 2004-
2006 cabinet: former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal (Ministry of Women’s Affairs), Sediqa
Balkhi (Ministry for Martyrs and the Disabled), and Amina Afzali (Ministry of Youth). Karzai
named three women to cabinet posts on January 9, 2010, including Afzali (to Labor and Social
Affairs). Of the three, only Afzali was immediately confirmed; the other two (Minister of Health
and Minister of Women’s Affairs) were kept on in acting capacities and confirmed in subsequent
years. Afghanistan has one female ambassador and Karzai has a female deputy chief of staff,
Homaira Ludin-Etemadi. In the December 16, 2009, nomination list, Karzai proposed a woman to
head a new Ministry of Literacy, but parliament did not vote on this nomination because it had
not yet acted to approve formation of the ministry. In March 2005, Karzai appointed a former
minister of women’s affairs, Habiba Sohrabi, as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly
by Hazaras.
One woman (Masooda Jalal) ran in the 2004 presidential election, and two ran for president in the
August 20, 2009, election. In the latter, each received less than one-half of 1%. As noted above,
one woman filed to run for president in 2014, but her candidacy was disqualified by the IEC
apparently for an insufficient number of nominating signatures. Three women, including Sohrabi,
are vice presidential candidates in the April 2014 election.
In the National Assembly, the constitution reserves for women at least 17 of the 102 seats in the
upper house and 68 of the 249 seats in the lower house of parliament. There were 69 women
elected in the 2010 parliamentary elections, one more than the quota. (400 women ran for those
seats—about 16% of all candidates.) The target ratio is ensured by reserving an average of two
seats per province (34 provinces) for women—the top two female vote getters per province.
(Kabul province reserves 9 female seats.) There are 28 women in the upper house, substantially
more than the minimum number. However, some NGOs and other groups believe that the women
elected by the quota system are not viewed as equally legitimate parliamentarians.
About 300 women were delegates to the 1,600-person “peace jirga” that was held during June 2-
4, 2010, which endorsed an Afghan plan to reintegrate insurgents who want to end their fight. The
High Peace Council to oversee the reconciliation process, which met for the first time on October
10, 2010, has 9 women out of 70 members, although these women report that their views are not
taken into account to any significant extent in the Council. At U.S. and other country urging, a
woman was part of the official Afghan delegation to the major international conference on
Afghanistan in Bonn on December 5, 2011; she was selected at a meeting of civil society activists
in Bonn, a day before the major conference began.
U.S. and International Posture on Women’s Rights
U.S. officials say that its policy is to promote women’s rights in Afghanistan rigorously. The
Administration has and is following its “Strategy for Assistance to Women in Afghanistan, 2010-
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2013.”68 U.S. officials said aid allocations are geared toward that strategy. Specific earmarks for
use of U.S. funds for women’s and girls’ programs in Afghanistan are contained in recent annual
appropriations, and these earmarks have grown steadily. The United States provided $159 million
to programs for Afghan women in FY2009, slightly more than the $150 million earmarked, and
about $225 million for FY2010, more than the $175 earmarked.69 For FY2010, assistance for
women was provided in the following “pillars” of the U.S. Strategy: health ($87 million);
education ($31 million); economy, work, and poverty ($54.6 million); legal protection and human
rights ($12 million); and leadership and political participation ($43 million). Total U.S. funding
for women’s programs for Afghanistan were similar for FY2011, FY2012, and FY2013. Among
the funding streams has been U.S. Ambassador small grants to support gender equality (FY2009-
FY2012), which was used to help finance over 830,000 microloans to women during 2004-2011
for the establishment of 175,000 small businesses, according to an SRAP report released
November 2011. These strategy pillars, and specific programs funded by them, are discussed in
annual State Department reports on U.S. aid to women and girls.
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance, and Elections Funding Issues
U.S. funding for democracy, governance, and rule of law programs has grown, in line with the
Obama Administration strategy for Afghanistan. During FY2002-FY2012, USAID spent about
$1.5 billion on democracy, governance, rule of law and human rights, and elections support. For
FY2013, the ESF amounts provided for democracy and governance are $578.2 million, including
• $447.2 million for good governance,
• $31.5 million for rule of law and human rights (not including INCLE),
• $64.3 million for political competition and consensus-building, and
• $35.2 million for civil society.
For FY2014, the Administration has requested $1.665 billion in ESF and $475 in INCLE funding
for Afghanistan—the broad accounts from which democracy, governance, and rule of law
funding—as well as funding for a wide range of other functions—are drawn. For tables on U.S.
aid to Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security,
and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Effects of a Settlement with the Taliban
A major U.S. and Afghan initiative—to reach a conflict-ending settlement with the Taliban—is
likely to affect all of the issues discussed in this paper: Afghan politics, future elections, the
performance of the government along all its metrics, and the human rights situation. Many in the
international community, including within the Obama Administration, initially withheld
endorsement of the concept, fearing it might result in the incorporation into the Afghan political
system of insurgent leaders who retain ties to Al Qaeda and will roll back freedoms instituted
since 2011. The minority communities in the north, women, intellectuals, and others remain
skeptical that their freedoms can be preserved if there is a political settlement with the Taliban.
68 A draft of this strategy document was provided to CRS by the State Department, April 21, 2011.
69 For prior years, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by
Kenneth Katzman, in the section on aid to Afghanistan, year by year.
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These groups fear that the Taliban could be given major ministries, seats in parliament, or even
tacit control over territory as part of any deal. Most insurgents are highly conservative Islamists
who oppose the advancement of women that has occurred and women have been a target of
attacks by Taliban supporters, including attacks on girls’ schools and athletic facilities.
To respond to those fears, Afghan and U.S. officials say that the outcome of a settlement would
require the Taliban to drop at least some of its demands that (1) foreign troops leave Afghanistan;
(2) a new “Islamic” constitution be adopted; and (3) Islamic law be imposed. This issue is
covered in greater depth in CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
Table 1. Major Pashtun Tribal Confederations
Clan/Tribal
Confederations
Location Example
Durrani
Mainly southern Afghanistan:
Qandahar, Helmand, Zabol, Uruzgan,
Nimruz
Popalzai
Qandahar
Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan; Jelani Popal,
former head of the Independent Directorate of
(Zirak branch
Local Governance; Mul ah Bradar, the top aide to
of Durrani
Mullah Umar, captured in Pakistan in Feb. 2010.
Pashtun)
Two-thirds of Qandahar’s provincial government
posts held by Zirak Durrani Pashtuns
Alikozai
Qandahar
Mullah Naqibullah (deceased, former anti-Taliban
faction leader in Qandahar)
Barakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Ghul Agha Shirzai (Governor, Nangarhar Province)
Achakzai
Qandahar, Helmand
Abdul Razziq, Police Chief, Qandahar Province
Alozai
Helmand (Musa Qala district)
Sher Mohammad Akhunzadeh (former Helmand
governor); Hajji Zahir, former governor of Marjah
Noorzai
Qandahar
Noorzai brothers, briefly in charge of Qandahar
after the fall of the Taliban in November 2001
Ghilzai
Eastern Afghanistan: Paktia, Paktika,
Khost, Nangarhar, Kunar
Ahmadzai
Mohammed Najibullah (pres. 1986-1992); Ashraf
Ghani, Karzai adviser, Finance Minister 2002-2004
Hotak
Mullah Umar, but hails from Uruzgan, which is
dominated by Durranis
Taraki
Nur Mohammed Taraki (leader 1978-1979)
Kharoti
Hafizullah Amin (leader September-
December1979); Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, founder of
Hezb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin), former mujahedin party
leader now anti-Karzai insurgent.
Zadran
Paktia, Khost
Pacha Khan Zadran; Insurgent leader Jalaluddin
Haqqani
Kodai
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Clan/Tribal
Confederations Location
Example
Mangal
Paktia, Khost
Ghulab Mangal (Governor of Helmand Province)
Orkazai
Shinwari
Nangarhar province
Fasl Ahmed Shinwari, former Supreme Court Chief
Justice
Mandezai
Sangu Khel
Sipah
Wardak
Wardak Province
Abdul Rahim Wardak (Defense Minister)
(Pashtu-speaking
non-Pashtun)
Afridis
Tirah, Khyber Pass, Kohat
Zaka khel
Jawaki
Adam khel
Malikdin, etc
Yusufzais
Khursan, Swat, Kabul
Akozais
Malizais
Loezais
Khattaks
Kohat, Peshawar, Bangash
Akorai
Terai
Mohmands
Near Khazan, Peshawar
Baizai
Alimzai
Uthmanzais
Khawazais
Wazirs
Mainly in Waziristan
Darwesh khel
Bannu
Source: This table was prepared by Hussein Hassan, information research specialist, CRS.
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Figure 1. Map of Afghan Ethnicities
Source: 2003, National Geographic Society, http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted
by Amber Wilhelm, graphics specialist, Publishing and Editorial Resources Section, CRS.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of
Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
Acknowledgments
The table of major Pashtun tribes was prepared by Hussein Hassan, information research specialist, CRS.
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