Critical Infrastructures:
Background, Policy, and Implementation
John D. Moteff
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
February 21, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL30153
Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation
Summary
The nation’s health, wealth, and security rely on the production and distribution of certain goods
and services. The array of physical assets, functions, and systems across which these goods and
services move are called critical infrastructures (e.g., electricity, the power plants that generate it,
and the electric grid upon which it is distributed).
The national security community has been concerned for some time about the vulnerability of
critical infrastructure to both physical and cyberattack. In May 1998, President Clinton released
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63. The Directive set up groups within the federal
government to develop and implement plans that would protect government-operated
infrastructures and called for a dialogue between government and the private sector to develop a
National Infrastructure Assurance Plan that would protect all of the nation’s critical
infrastructures by the year 2003. While the Directive called for both physical and cyber protection
from both man-made and natural events, implementation focused on cyber protection against
man-made cyber events (i.e., computer hackers). Following the destruction and disruptions
caused by the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the nation directed increased attention
toward physical protection of critical infrastructures. Over the intervening years, policy,
programs, and legislation related to physical security of critical infrastructure have stabilized to a
large extent. However, current legislative activity has refocused on cybersecurity of critical
infrastructure.
This report discusses in more detail the evolution of a national critical infrastructure policy and
the institutional structures established to implement it. The report highlights two primary issues
confronting Congress going forward, both in the context of cybersecurity: information sharing
and regulation.
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Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy: In Brief............................................................... 2
The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection ................................................. 3
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 ............................................................................................ 4
Restructuring by the Bush Administration ....................................................................................... 7
Pre-September 11 ...................................................................................................................... 7
Post-September 11 ..................................................................................................................... 8
The Obama Administration ............................................................................................................ 12
Department of Homeland Security ................................................................................................ 14
Initial Establishment ................................................................................................................ 14
Second Stage Review Reorganization ..................................................................................... 16
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 ................................................... 16
Policy Implementation ................................................................................................................... 17
Government-Sector Coordination............................................................................................ 17
Appointment of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council ............................................... 20
Internal Agency Plans .............................................................................................................. 20
National Critical Infrastructure Plan ........................................................................................ 22
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) ................................................................... 24
Identifying Critical Assets, Assessing Vulnerability and Risk, and Prioritizing
Protective Measures ............................................................................................................. 26
Cybersecurity Framework ....................................................................................................... 28
Issues and Discussion .................................................................................................................... 28
Information Sharing ................................................................................................................. 28
Regulation................................................................................................................................ 30
Tables
Table 1. Lead Agencies per PDD-63................................................................................................ 4
Table 2. Current Lead Agency Assignments .................................................................................. 18
Table 3. NIPP 2013: Guiding Tenets and Call to Action ............................................................... 25
Table A-1. Funding for the Infrastructure Protection and Information Security Program ............. 34
Appendixes
Appendix. Funding for Critical Infrastructure ............................................................................... 32
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 36
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Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation
Introduction
Certain socioeconomic activities are vital to the day-to-day functioning and security of the
country; for example, transportation of goods and people, communications, banking and finance,
and the supply and distribution of electricity and water. Domestic security and our ability to
monitor, deter, and respond to hostile acts also depend on some of these activities as well as other
more specialized activities like intelligence gathering and command and control of police and
military forces. A serious disruption in these activities and capabilities could have a major impact
on the country’s well-being.1
These activities and capabilities are supported by an array of physical assets, functions,
information, people, and systems, forming what has been called the nation’s critical
infrastructures. These infrastructures have grown complex and interconnected, meaning that a
disruption in one may lead to disruptions in others.2
Disruptions can be caused by any number of factors: poor design, operator error, physical
destruction due to natural causes, (earthquakes, lightning strikes, etc.) or physical destruction due
to intentional human actions (theft, arson, terrorist attack, etc.). Over the years, operators of these
infrastructures have taken measures to guard against, and to quickly respond to, many of these
threats, primarily to improve reliability and safety. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11
in 2001, and the subsequent anthrax attacks, demonstrated the need to reexamine protections in
light of the terrorist threat, as part of an overall critical infrastructure protection policy.3
This report provides an historical background and tracks the evolution of such an overall policy
and its implementation. However, specific protections associated with individual infrastructures is
beyond the scope of this report. For CRS products related to specific infrastructure protection
efforts, the reader is encouraged to visit the CRS Issues Before Congress webpage, click on
Homeland Security and Terrorism and follow links to Critical Infrastructure Security,
Transportation Security, and Cybersecurity.4
1 As a reminder of how dependent society is on its infrastructure, in May 1998, PanAmSat’s Galaxy IV satellite’s on-
board controller malfunctioned, disrupting service to an estimated 80-90% of the nation’s pagers, causing problems for
hospitals trying to reach doctors on call, emergency workers, and people trying to use their credit cards at gas pumps, to
name but a few.
2 The electricity blackout in August 2003 in the United States and Canada illustrated the interdependencies between
electricity and other elements of the energy market such as oil refining and pipelines, as well as communications,
drinking water supplies, etc.
3 Besides loss of life, the terrorist attacks of September 11 disrupted the services of a number of critical infrastructures
(including telecommunications, the internet, financial markets, and air transportation). In some cases, protections
already in place (like off-site storage of data, mirror capacity, etc.) allowed for relatively quick reconstitution of
services. In other cases, service was disrupted for much longer periods of time.
4 See http://www.crs.gov/Pages/clis.aspx?cliid=28.
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Federal Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy:
In Brief
As discussed further below, a number of federal executive documents and federal legislation lay
out a basic policy and strategy for protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure. According to
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, “it is the policy of the United States to strengthen the
security and resilience of its critical infrastructure against both physical and cyber threats.”5
Critical infrastructure is defined in statute as:
systems and assets, physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those matters.6
The federal government works with states, localities, and the owners and operators of critical
infrastructure (in both the private and public sector) to identify those specific assets and systems
that constitute the nation’s critical infrastructure. Together, these entities assess those assets’
vulnerabilities to the threats facing the nation (natural or manmade, i.e., all hazards), determine
the level of risk associated with possible attacks or the impacts of natural events on those assets,
and identify and prioritize a set of measures that can be taken to reduce those risks. Primary
responsibility for protection, response, and recovery lies with the owners and operators.7
However, the federal government holds open the possibility of intervening in those areas where
owners and operators are unable (or unwilling) to provide what it, the federal government, may
assess to be adequate protection or response.8
The reader who is not interested in the evolution of this policy and the organizational structures
that have evolved to implement it can proceed to the “Policy Implementation” and/or “Issues and
Discussion” sections of this report.
5 White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, February 12,
2013.
6 See P.L. 107-71, Sec. 1016. Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 7 (HSPD-7), Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, released December 17, 2003, went further to describe the level of impact
the loss of an asset must have to warrant considering the asset as “critical.” This included causing catastrophic health
effects or mass casualties comparable to those from the use of weapons of mass destruction; impairing federal
agencies’ abilities to perform essential missions or ensure the public’s health and safety; undermining state and local
government capacities to maintain order and deliver minimum essential public services; damaging the private sector’s
capability to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy; having a negative effect on the economy through
cascading disruption of other infrastructures; or undermining the public’s morale and confidence in our national
economic and political institutions. HSPD-7 has since been superseded by PDD-21.
7 See White House, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. 33, “Private firms bear
primary and substantial responsibility for addressing the public safety risks posed by their industries.” PPD-21, the
most recent policy document, states it more explicitly as “owners and operators are uniquely positioned to manage risks
to their individual operations and assets and to determine effective strategies to make them more secure and resilient.”
See White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, February 12,
2013.
8 Ibid., p. 33, “The plan will describe how to use all available policy instruments to raise the security of America’s
critical infrastructure and key assets to a prudent level.... In some cases the Department may seek legislation to create
incentives for the private sector to adopt security measures.... In some cases, the federal government will need to rely
on regulation.”
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The President’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection
This report takes as its starting point the establishment of the President’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in July 1996.9 Its tasks were to: report to the President the
scope and nature of the vulnerabilities and threats to the nation’s critical infrastructures (focusing
primarily on cyber threats);10 recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation
plan for protecting critical infrastructures; determine legal and policy issues raised by proposals
to increase protections; and propose statutory and regulatory changes necessary to effect
recommendations.
The PCCIP released its report to President Clinton in October 1997.11 Examining both the
physical and cyber vulnerabilities, the Commission found no immediate crisis threatening the
nation’s infrastructures. However, it did find reason to take action, especially in the area of
cybersecurity. The rapid growth of a computer-literate population (implying a greater pool of
potential hackers), the inherent vulnerabilities of common protocols in computer networks, the
easy availability of hacker “tools” (available on many websites), and the fact that the basic tools
of the hacker (computer, modem, telephone line) are the same essential technologies used by the
general population indicated to the Commission that both threat and vulnerability exist.
The Commission generally recommended that greater cooperation and communication between
the private sector and government was needed. The private sector owns and operates much of the
nation’s critical infrastructure. As seen by the Commission, the government’s primary role (aside
from protecting its own infrastructures) is to collect and disseminate the latest information on
intrusion techniques, threat analysis, and ways to defend against hackers.
The Commission also proposed a strategy for action:
• facilitate greater cooperation and communication between the private sector and
appropriate government agencies by: setting a top level policy-making office in
the White House; establishing a council that includes corporate executives, state
and local government officials, and cabinet secretaries; and setting up
information clearinghouses;
• develop a real-time capability of attack warning;
• establish and promote a comprehensive awareness and education program;
• streamline and clarify elements of the legal structure to support assurance
measures (including clearing jurisdictional barriers to pursuing hackers
electronically); and
9 Executive Order 13010. Critical Infrastructure Protection. Federal Register. Vol. 61, No. 138. July 17, 1996. pp.
3747-3750. Concern about the security of the nation’s information infrastructure and the nation’s dependence on it
preceded the establishment of the Commission.
10 Given the growing dependence and interconnectedness of the nation’s infrastructure on computer networks, there
was concern that computers and computer networks presented a new vulnerability and one that was not receiving
adequate attention.
11 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s
Infrastructures, October 1997.
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• expand research and development in technologies and techniques, especially
technologies that allow for greater detection of intrusions.
The Commission’s report underwent interagency review to determine how to respond. That
review led to a Presidential Decision Directive released in May 1998.
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 (PDD-63)12 set as a national goal the ability to protect the
nation’s critical infrastructure from intentional attacks (both physical and cyber) by the year 2003.
According to the PDD, any interruptions in the ability of these infrastructures to provide their
goods and services must be “brief, infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated, and
minimally detrimental to the welfare of the United States.”13
PDD-63 identified the following activities whose critical infrastructures should be protected:
information and communications; banking and finance; water supply; aviation, highways, mass
transit, pipelines, rail, and waterborne commerce; emergency and law enforcement services;
emergency, fire, and continuity of government services; public health services; electric power, oil
and gas production, and storage. In addition, the PDD identified four activities where the federal
government controls the critical infrastructure: internal security and federal law enforcement;
foreign intelligence; foreign affairs; and national defense.
A lead agency was assigned to each of these “sectors” (see Table 1). Each lead agency was
directed to appoint a Sector Liaison Official to interact with appropriate private sector
organizations. The private sector was encouraged to select a Sector Coordinator to work with the
agency’s sector liaison official. Together, the liaison official, sector coordinator, and all affected
parties were to contribute to a sectoral security plan which was to be integrated into a National
Infrastructure Assurance Plan. Each of the activities performed primarily by the federal
government also were assigned a lead agency who was to appoint a Functional Coordinator to
coordinate efforts similar to those made by the Sector Liaisons.
Table 1. Lead Agencies per PDD-63
Department/Agency Sector/Function
Commerce
Information and Communications
Treasury
Banking and Finance
EPA Water
Transportation Transportation
Justice Emergency
Law
Enforcement
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Emergency Fire Service
Health and Human Services
Emergency Medicine
12 See The Clinton’s Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63,
White Paper, May 22, 1998. Available at the Federation of American Scientists website: http://www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm.
13 Ibid.
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Department/Agency Sector/Function
Energy
Electric Power, Gas, and Oil
Justice
Law Enforcement and Internal Securitya
Director of Central Intelligence
Intelligencea
State Foreign
Affairsa
Defense National
Defensea
a. These are the functions identified by PDD-63 as being primarily under federal control.
The PDD also assigned duties to the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection,
and Counter-terrorism.14 The National Coordinator reported to the President through the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs.15 Among his many duties outlined in PDD-63, the
National Coordinator chaired the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group. This Group was the
primary interagency working group for developing and implementing policy and for coordinating
the federal government’s own internal security measures. The Group included high level
representatives from the lead agencies (including the Sector Liaisons), the National Economic
Council, and all other relevant agencies.
Each federal agency was made responsible for securing its own critical infrastructure and was to
designate a Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officer (CIAO) to assume that responsibility. The
agency’s current Chief Information Officer (CIO) could double in that capacity. In those cases
where the CIO and the CIAO were different, the CIO was responsible for assuring the agency’s
information assets (databases, software, computers), while the CIAO was responsible for any
other assets that make up that agency’s critical infrastructure. Agencies were given 180 days from
the signing of the Directive to develop their plans. Those plans were to be fully implemented
within two years and updated every two years.
The PDD set up a National Infrastructure Assurance Council. The Council was to be a panel that
included private operators of infrastructure assets and officials from state and local government
officials and relevant federal agencies. The Council was to meet periodically and provide reports
to the President as appropriate. The National Coordinator was to act as the Executive Director of
the Council.
The PDD also called for a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan. The Plan was to integrate the
plans from each of the sectors mentioned above and should consider the following: a vulnerability
assessment, including the minimum essential capability required of the sector’s infrastructure to
meet its purpose; remedial plans to reduce the sector’s vulnerability; warning requirements and
procedures; response strategies; reconstitution of services; education and awareness programs;
research and development needs; intelligence strategies; needs and opportunities for international
cooperation; and legislative and budgetary requirements.
14 The National Coordinator position was created by Presidential Decision Directive 62, “Combating Terrorism.” PDD-
62, which was classified, codified and clarified the roles and missions of various agencies engaged in counter-terrorism
activities. The Office of the National Coordinator was established to integrate and coordinate these activities. The
White House released a fact sheet on PDD-62 on May 22, 1998.
15 President Clinton designated Richard Clarke (Special Assistant to the President for Global Affairs, National Security
Council) as National Coordinator.
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The PDD also set up a National Plan Coordination Staff to support the plan’s development.
Subsequently, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO, not to be confused with the
agencies’ Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officers) was established to serve this function and
was placed in the Department of Commerce’s Export Administration. CIAO supported the
National Coordinator’s efforts to integrate the sectoral plans into a National Plan, supported
individual agencies in developing their internal plans, helped coordinate national education and
awareness programs, and provided legislative and public affairs support. Coordinating the
development of and maintaining the National Plan is now part of the Department of Homeland
Security Infrastructure Protection and Information Security (IPIS) program.
Most of the Directive established policy-making and oversight bodies making use of existing
agency authorities and expertise. However, the PDD also addressed operational concerns. These
dealt primarily with cybersecurity. The Directive called for a national capability to detect and
respond to cyberattacks while they are in progress. Although not specifically identified in the
Directive, the Clinton Administration proposed establishing a Federal Intrusion Detection
Network (FIDNET) that would, together with the Federal Computer Intrusion Response
Capability (FedCIRC), established just prior to PDD-63, meet this goal. The Directive explicitly
gave the Federal Bureau of Investigation the authority to expand its computer crime capabilities
into a National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). The Directive called for the NIPC to be
the focal point for federal threat assessment, vulnerability analysis, early warning capability, law
enforcement investigations, and response coordination. All agencies were required to forward to
the NIPC information about threats and actual attacks on their infrastructure as well as attacks
made on private sector infrastructures of which they become aware. Presumably, FIDNET16 and
FedCIRC would feed into the NIPC. According to the Directive, the NIPC would be linked
electronically to the rest of the federal government and use warning and response expertise
located throughout the federal government. The Directive also made the NIPC the conduit for
information sharing with the private sector through an equivalent Information Sharing and
Analysis Center(s) operated by the private sector, which PDD-63 encouraged the private sector to
establish. These functions have been transferred to and greatly expanded upon at the Department
of Homeland Security. The U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (U.S. CERT) now handles
the computer security incidents occurring on non-national security federal systems and the
National Operations Center (NOC) provides all hazard situation awareness.
Quite independent of PDD-63 in its origin, but clearly complimentary in its purpose, the FBI
established a program called INFRAGARD to interact with private sector firms. The program
facilitates information exchange between FBI field offices and the surrounding business
16 FIDNET initially generated controversy both inside and outside the government. Privacy concerns, cost and technical
feasibility were at issue. By the end of the Clinton Administration, FIDNET as a distributed intrusion detection system
feeding into a centralized analysis and warning capability was abandoned. A comparable capability has been
developed, called the EINSTEIN Program, that addressed the privacy concerns of FIDNET. Under EINSTEIN,
participating agencies retain complete control of network data in strict accordance with Federal laws and policies.
Agencies gather and subsequently share security data directly with DHS, based on reporting requirements established
by the Office of Management and Budget. In turn, DHS prepares a strategic, cross-agency assessment, which is then
shared back with all federal civilian agencies. As part of a broader cybersecurity initiative aimed at better securing
federal information systems, the EINSTEIN program has expanded to include all federal agencies and to use improved
sensors to monitor network traffic on federal systems. The current phase of the program, EINSTEIN III, would monitor
federal network traffic from sensors placed on internet service provider networks servicing federal agencies. These new
sensors would also provide the capability to counter intrusion attempts (i.e. intrusion prevention). Notwithstanding the
results of privacy impact statements, the involvement of the National Security Agency in developing and implementing
the EINSTEIN technology has resurrected privacy concerns.
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communities. Its initial focus was network security. After September 11, its focus included both
cyber and physical security. INFRAGARD is geographically oriented rather than sector-oriented.
Each FBI field office has a Special Agent Coordinator who gathers interested companies of
various sizes from all industries to form a chapter. Any company can join INFRAGARD. Local
executive boards govern and share information within the membership. Chapters hold regular
meetings to discuss issues, threats, and other matters that impact their companies. Chapters may
also engage in contingency planning for using alternative systems in the event of a successful
large scale attack on the information infrastructure. The program was transferred to the NIPC,
before it was absorbed by the Department of Homeland Security. The program is now managed
by the FBI’s Cyber Division.17
It should also be noted that the FBI had, since the 1980s, a program called the Key Assets
Initiative (KAI). The objective of the KAI was to develop a database of information on “key
assets” within the jurisdiction of each FBI field office, establish lines of communications with
asset owners and operators to improve physical and cyber protection, and to coordinate with other
federal, state, and local authorities to ensure their involvement in the protection of those assets.
The program was initially begun to allow for contingency planning against physical terrorist
attacks. According to testimony by a former Director of the NIPC, the program was
“reinvigorated” by the NIPC and expanded to include the cyber dimension.18 The Department of
Homeland Security is now responsible for creating a data base of critical assets.
Restructuring by the Bush Administration
Pre-September 11
As part of its overall redesign of White House organization and assignment of responsibilities, the
incoming Bush Administration spent the first eight months reviewing its options for coordinating
and overseeing critical infrastructure protection. During this time, the Bush Administration
continued to support the infrastructure protection activities begun by the Clinton Administration.
The Bush Administration review was influenced by three parallel debates. First, the National
Security Council (NSC) underwent a major streamlining. All groups within the Council
established during previous Administrations were abolished. Their responsibilities and functions
were consolidated into 17 Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs). The activities associated with
critical infrastructure protection were assumed by the Counter-Terrorism and National
Preparedness PCC. At the time, whether, or to what extent, the NSC should remain the focal point
for coordinating critical infrastructure protection (i.e., the National Coordinator came from the
NSC) was unclear. Richard Clarke, himself, wrote a memorandum to the incoming Bush
Administration advocating that the function be transferred directly to the White House.19
17 For more information on INFRAGARD, see http://www.infragard.net.
18 Testimony by Michael Vatis before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology and Terrorism.
October 6, 1999. This effort was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.
19 Senior NSC Official Pitches Cyber-Security Czar Concept in Memo to Rice. Inside the Pentagon. January 11, 2001.
p. 2-3.
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Second, there was a continuing debate about the merits of establishing a government-wide Chief
Information Officer (CIO), whose responsibilities would include protection of all federal non-
national security-related computer systems and coordination with the private sector on the
protection of privately owned computer systems. Shortly after assuming office, the Bush
Administration announced its desire not to create a separate federal CIO position, but to recruit a
Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget that would assume an oversight role of
agency CIOs. One of the reasons cited for this was a desire to keep agencies responsible for their
own computer security.20
Third, there was the continuing debate about how best to defend the country against terrorism, in
general. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission)
proposed a new National Homeland Security Agency. The recommendation built upon the current
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) by adding to it the Coast Guard, the Border
Patrol, Customs Service, and other agencies. The Commission recommended that the new
organization include a directorate responsible for critical infrastructure protection. While both the
Clinton and Bush Administration remained cool to this idea, bills were introduced in Congress to
establish such an agency. As discussed below, the Bush Administration changed its position in
June 2002, and proposed a new department along the lines of that proposed by the Hart/Rudman
Commission and Congress.
Post-September 11
Soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Bush signed two Executive Orders
relevant to critical infrastructure protection. These have since been amended to reflect changes
brought about by the establishment of the “Department of Homeland Security” (see below). The
following is a brief discussion of the original E.O.s and how they have changed.
E.O. 13228, signed October 8, 2001, established the Office of Homeland Security, headed by the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.21 Its mission was to “develop and coordinate
the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist
threats and attacks.” Among its functions was the coordination of efforts to protect the United
States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks. This included
strengthening measures for protecting energy production, transmission, and distribution;
telecommunications; public and privately owned information systems; transportation systems;
and the provision of food and water for human use. Another function of the Office was to
coordinate efforts to ensure rapid restoration of these critical infrastructures after a disruption by a
terrorist threat or attack. Many of the functions of the Office of Homeland Security were
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security when the latter was established (see
below).22
The EO also established the Homeland Security Council. The Council is made up of the
President, Vice-President, Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, Health and Human Services, and
20 For a discussion of the debate surrounding this issue at the time, see CRS Report RL30914, Federal Chief
Information Officer (CIO): Opportunities and Challenges, by Jeffrey W. Seifert.
21 President Bush selected Tom Ridge to head the new Office.
22 Some of the staff of the Office of Homeland Security migrated to the Homeland Security Council. For a discussion
of budget issues surrounding this, see CRS Report RS22840, Organizing for Homeland Security: The Homeland
Security Council Reconsidered, by Harold C. Relyea.
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Transportation, the Attorney General, the Directors of FEMA, FBI, and CIA and the Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security. The EO was later amended to add the Secretary of
Homeland Security. Other White House and departmental officials could be invited to attend
Council meetings.23 The Council advises and assists the President with respect to all aspects of
homeland security. The agenda for those meetings are set by the Assistant to President for
Homeland Security, at the direction of the President. The Assistant is also the official recorder of
Council actions and Presidential decisions.24
In January and February 2003, this E.O. was amended (by Executive Orders 13284 and 13286).
The Office of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President, and the Homeland Security
Council were all retained. However, the Secretary of Homeland Security was added to the
Council. The duties of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security remained the same,
recognizing the statutory duties assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security as a result of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (see below).
The second Executive Order (E.O. 13231) signed October 16, 2001, stated that it is U.S. policy
“to protect against the disruption of the operation of information systems for critical infrastructure
... and to ensure that any disruptions that occur are infrequent, of minimal duration, and
manageable, and cause the least damage possible.”25 This Order also established the President’s
Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. The Board, consisting of federal officials, was authorized
to “recommend policies and coordinate programs for protecting information systems for critical
infrastructure.” The Board also was directed to propose a National Plan on issues within its
purview on a periodic basis, and in coordination with the Office of Homeland Security, review
and make recommendations on that part of agency budgets that fall within the purview of the
Board.
The Board was chaired by a Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security.26 The
Special Advisor reported to both the Assistant to the President for National Security and the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Besides presiding over Board meetings, the
Special Advisor, in consultation with the Board, proposed policies and programs to appropriate
officials to ensure protection of the nation’s information infrastructure and to coordinate with the
Director of OMB on issues relating to budgets and the security of computer networks.
The E.O. 13231 also established the National Infrastructure Advisory Council. The Council
provides advice to the President on the security of information systems for critical infrastructure.
The Council’s functions include enhancing public-private partnerships, monitoring the
development of ISACs, and encouraging the private sector to perform periodic vulnerability
assessments of critical information and telecommunication systems.
23 For more information on how the Homeland Security Council and the Office of Homeland Security were structured,
see CRS Report RL31148, Homeland Security: The Presidential Coordination Office, by Harold C. Relyea.
24 In February 2009, President Obama ordered a review of the White House’s organization for homeland security and
counterterrorism. In May 2009 he directed that the staff of the two organizations be merged, but retained the
independence of the two Councils. See discussion below.
25 Executive Order 13231—Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age. Federal Register. Vol. 86. No.
202. October 18, 2001.
26 President Bush designated Richard Clarke.
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Subsequent amendments to this E.O. (by E.O. 13286) abolished the President’s Board and the
position of Special Advisor. The Advisory Council was retained, but now reports to the President
through the Secretary of Homeland Security.
In July 2002, the Office of Homeland Security released a National Strategy for Homeland
Security. The Strategy covered all government efforts to protect the nation against terrorist attacks
of all kinds. It identified protecting the nation’s critical infrastructures and key assets (a new term,
different as implied above by the FBI’s key asset program) as one of six critical mission areas.
The Strategy expanded upon the list of sectors considered to possess critical infrastructure to
include public health, the chemical industry and hazardous materials, postal and shipping, the
defense industrial base, and agriculture and food. The Strategy also added continuity of
government and continuity of operations to the list, although it is difficult to see how the latter
would be a considered sector. It also combined emergency fire service, emergency law
enforcement, and emergency medicine as emergency services, and it dropped those functions that
primarily belonged to the federal governments (e.g., defense, intelligence, law enforcement). It
also reassigned some of the sectors to different agencies, including making the then proposed
Department of Homeland Security lead agency for a number of sectors—postal and shipping
services, and the defense industrial base. It also introduced a new class of assets, called key
assets, which was defined as potential targets whose destruction may not endanger vital systems,
but could create a local disaster or profoundly affect national morale. Such assets were defined
later to include national monuments and other historic attractions, dams, nuclear facilities, and
large commercial centers, including office buildings and sport stadiums, where large numbers of
people congregate to conduct business, personal transactions, or enjoy recreational activities.27
The Strategy reiterated many of the same policy-related activities as mentioned above: working
with the private sector and other non-federal entities, naming those agencies that should act as
liaison with the private sector, assessing vulnerabilities, and developing a national plan to deal
with those vulnerabilities. The Strategy also mentioned the need to set priorities, acknowledging
that not all assets are equally critical, and that the costs associated with protecting assets must be
balanced against the benefits of increased security according to the threat. The Strategy did not
create any new organizations, but assumed that a Department of Homeland Security would be
established (see below). The Strategy was updated in October 2007.28 With the exception of a
somewhat greater recognition of the role improving resilience can play in reducing the nation’s
risk, the strategy related to critical infrastructure saw little change.
On December 17, 2003, the Bush Administration released Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 (HSPD-7). HSPD essentially updated the policy of the United States and the roles and
responsibilities of various agencies in regard to critical infrastructure protection as outlined in
previous documents, national strategies, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (see below). For
example, the Directive reiterated the Secretary of Homeland Security’s role in coordinating the
overall national effort to protect critical infrastructure. It also reiterated the role of Sector-Specific
Agencies (i.e., Lead Agencies)29 to work with their sectors to identify, prioritize, and coordinate
protective measures. The Directive captured the expanded set of critical infrastructures and key
27 The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.
February 2003. p. 71.
28 Homeland Security Council. National Strategy for Homeland Security. October 2007.
29 This report will continue to use the term “Lead Agency” to refer to the agency assigned to work with a specific
sector.
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assets and Sector-Specific Agencies assignments made in the National Strategy for Homeland
Security. The Directive also reiterated the relationship between the Department of Homeland
Security and other agencies in certain areas. For example, while the Department of Homeland
Security will maintain a cybersecurity unit, the Directive stated that the Director of the Office of
Management remains responsible for overseeing government-wide information security programs
and for ensuring the operation of a federal cyber incident response center within the Department
of Homeland Security. Also, while the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for
transportation security, including airline security, the Department of Transportation remains
responsible for control of the national air space system.
The only organizational change made by the Directive was the establishment of the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Policy Coordinating Committee to advise the Homeland Security
Council on interagency policy related to physical and cyber infrastructure security.
The Directive made a few other noticeable changes or additions. For example, the Department of
Homeland Security was assigned as Lead Agency for the chemical and hazardous materials sector
(it had been the Environmental Protection Agency). The Directive required Lead Agencies to
report annually to the Secretary of Homeland Security on their efforts in working with the private
sector. The Directive also reiterated that all federal agencies must develop plans to protect their
own critical infrastructure and submit those plans for approval to the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget by July 2004.
In February 2013, the Obama Administration released Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21),
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, which superceded HSPD-7. For a discussion of
PDD-21, see below.
The Bush Administration policy and approach regarding critical infrastructure protection can be
described as an evolutionary expansion of the policies and approaches laid out in PDD-63. The
fundamental policy statements were essentially the same: the protection of infrastructures critical
to the people, economy, essential government services, and national security. National morale was
added to that list. Also, the stated goal of the government’s efforts is to ensure that any disruption
of the services provided by these infrastructures be infrequent, of minimal duration, and
manageable. The infrastructures identified as critical were essentially the same (although
expanded and with an emphasis placed on targets that would result in large numbers of
casualties). Finally, the primary effort was directed at working collaboratively and voluntarily
with the private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure to identify critical assets and
provide appropriate protection.
Organizationally, there remained an interagency group for coordinating policy across departments
and for informing the White House (Homeland Security Council, supported by the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Coordinating Committee). Certain agencies were assigned certain
sectors with which to work. Sectors were asked to organize themselves to assist in coordination of
effort and information sharing. A Council made up of private sector executives, academics, and
State and local officials was established to advise the President. Certain operational units (e.g.,
the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and elements of the National Infrastructure
Protection Center (at the FBI)) were initially left in place, though later moved to and restructured
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), where, now, the Undersecretary for
National Protection and Programs is responsible for coordinating the implementation of policies
and programs (see below). However, DHS takes a much more active role in identifying critical
assets, assessing vulnerabilities, and recommending and supporting protective measures than did
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these earlier operational units. Also, the manpower and resources devoted to these activities have
greatly increased.
One major difference between PDD-63 and the Bush Administration’s efforts was a shift in focus.
PDD-63 focused on cybersecurity. While the post-September 11 effort is still concerned with
cybersecurity, its focus on physical threats, especially those that might cause mass casualties, is
greater than the pre-September 11 effort. This led to some debate and organizational instability
initially. The early executive orders discussed above segregated cybersecurity from the physical
security mission with the formation of the Office of Homeland Security and the President’s
Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. Dissolution of the Board and the subsequent
establishment of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Coordinating Committee,
responsible for advising the Homeland Security Council on both physical and cybersecurity
issues, appears to have reunited these two concerns within a single White House group.30
The Obama Administration
The Obama Administration has, to date, kept in place much of the policy and organization of the
Bush Administration. In February 2009, President Obama ordered a review of the homeland
security and counterterrorism structures within the White House (Presidential Security Directive
1).31 Debate centered on the merging of the Homeland Security Council and the National Security
Council. In May, the President directed that the staff of the two councils be merged into the
National Security Staff, while retaining the independence of the two councils.32 President Obama
also ordered a review of the federal government’s policies and activities on cybersecurity.33 The
results of that review were released on May 29, 2009.34 One result of the cybersecurity policy
review was to recommend the appointment of a White House official to coordinate cybersecurity
policies and activities across the federal government. The recommendation and subsequent
appointment reestablished a cybersecurity coordinating function within the White House.35
30 Computer security advocates have sought to highlight cybersecurity issues by maintaining a separate organization
high within the bureaucracy. There now exists both an Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications
and an Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, both reporting to the Undersecretary for National Protection
and Programs. While the latter is concerned with both physical and cybersecurity issues, the former is focused on
cybersecurity issues.
31 Presidential Security Directive 1. Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. Feb. 23, 2009. See
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/psd/psd-1.pdf. As part of this reorganization, a Resilience Directorate was established
that includes in its portfolio critical infrastructure protection and resilience.
32 White House, “Statement by the President on the White House Organization for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism,” press release, May 26, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-
President-on-the-White-House-Organization-for-Homeland-Security-and-Counterterrorism.
33 White House, “President Obama Directs the National Security and Homeland Security Advisors to Conduct
Immediate Cyber Security Review,” press release, February 9, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
AdvisorsToConductImmediateCyberSecurityReview.
34 White House, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications
Infrastructure, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf. For a discussion of
the Cyberspace Policy Review in the context of other efforts at that time, see CRS Report R40836, Cybersecurity:
Current Legislation, Executive Branch Initiatives, and Options for Congress, by Catherine A. Theohary and John W.
Rollins.
35 President Obama named Howard Schmidt to this position, who had served briefly as President Bush’s Special
Advisor on Cybersecurity before that position was abolished. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/22/
introducing-new-cybersecurity-coordinator).
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In May 2012, the Obama administration released proposed legislation aimed to strengthen
cybersecurity.36 Among the provisions was a proposed regulatory framework to enhance the
cybersecurity at those infrastructures sites considered by the Secretary of Homeland Security to
be critical to the nation. Owners and operators of designated infrastructure assets would be
required to develop cybersecurity plans, have those plans evaluated by accredited outside
evaluators, and to report to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The 112th Congress considered elements of the Obama Administration’s proposal in a number of
bills. The Senate debated a comprehensive bill (S. 3414), the House passed four more narrowly
designed bills (H.R. 2096, H.R. 3523, H.R. 3834, and H.R. 4257). However, neither the
Administration’s proposal nor any of the Congressional bills became law. For a discussion of
these efforts, and continued interest in cybersecurity legislation in the 113th Congress, see CRS
Report R42114, Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Overview and Discussion of Proposed
Revisions, by Eric A. Fischer.
In the absence of new legislation, the Obama Administration issued Executive Order 13636,
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, in February 2013. The Executive Order focused
primarily on information sharing and the development of a cybersecurity framework for critical
infrastructure. In regard to information sharing, the Executive Order instructed the Attorney
General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence to “ensure
the timely production of unclassified reports of cyber threats to the U.S. homeland that identify
specific targeted entities,” and to rapidly disseminate those reports to the targeted entity. The
Executive Order also expanded the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program to all critical
infrastructure sectors. The Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program shares federal classified
cybersecurity threat and technical information with infrastructure network service providers
which the service providers can use when monitoring the network traffic of their critical
infrastructure customers.
The Executive Order defined the cybersecurity framework to be a set of standards,
methodologies, procedures, and processes that critical infrastructure owners and operators could
use to reduce their cybersecurity risks. The Executive Order instructed the Director of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology to lead a voluntary consensus-making effort to
develop the framework. The Secretary of Homeland Security was instructed to establish a set of
incentives to promote participation in a Voluntary Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Program
designed to implement the framework. Agencies that have the responsibility of regulating the
security of critical infrastructure are instructed to review the sufficiency of their current
cybersecurity regulations and consider the adoption or tailored modification of the framework’s
set of standards. For a more thorough analysis of President Obama’s Executive Order 13636, see
CRS Report R42984, The 2013 Cybersecurity Executive Order: Overview and Considerations for
Congress, by Eric A. Fischer et al..
The Obama Administration also issued PPD-21 in February 2013. PPD-21, Critical Infrastructue
Security and Resilience, superseded HSPD-7 issued during the George W. Bush Adminstration
(see above). PPD-21 made no major changes in policy, roles and responsibilities, or programs, but
did order an evaluation of the existing public-private partnership model, the identification of
baseline data and system requirements for efficient information exchange, the development of a
36 The Administration Unveils Its Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/
12/administration-unveils-its-cybersecurity-legislative-proposal
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situational awareness capability (a continuous policy objective since President Clinton’s PDD-
63). PPD-21 also called for an update of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and a new
Research and Development Plan for Critical Infrastructure, to be updated every four years
(HSPD-7 also required and led to the development of a research and development plan).
While not yet making any changes in policy, roles and responsibilities, and programs, the text of
PPD-21 did reflect the increased interest in resilience and the all-hazard approach that has
evolved in critical infrastructure policy over the last few years. It also updated sector
designations, but made no major changes in Lead Agency designations (see “Government-Sector
Coordination,” below). However, PPD-21 did give the energy and communications sectors a
higher profile, due to the Administration’s assessment of their importance to the operations of the
other infrastructures. The directive also required the updated National Infrastructure Protection
Plan to include a focus on the reliance of other sectors on energy and communications
infrastructure and ways to mitigate the associated risks.
To date, the Obama Administration has kept or slowly evolved the policies, organizational
structures, and programs governing physical security of critical infrastructure assets. It has
focused much more effort to expand upon the cybersecurity policies and programs associated
with critical infrastructure protection.
Department of Homeland Security
Initial Establishment
In November 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296), establishing a
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The act assigned to the new Department the mission of
preventing terrorist attacks, reducing the vulnerability of the nation to such attacks, and
responding rapidly should such an attack occur. The act essentially consolidated within one
department a number of agencies that had, as part of their missions, homeland security-like
functions (e.g., Border Patrol, Customs, Transportation Security Administration). The following
discussion focuses on those provisions relating to critical infrastructure protection.
In regard to critical infrastructure protection the act transferred the following agencies and offices
to the new department: the NIPC (except for the Computer Investigations and Operations
Section), CIAO, FedCIRC, the National Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC),37 other energy
security and assurance activities within DOE, and the National Communication System (NCS).38
37 The NISAC was established in the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56), Section 1062. The Center builds upon
expertise at Sandia National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory in modeling and simulating
infrastructures and the interdependencies between them.
38 The NCS is not a single communication system but more a capability that ensures that disparate government agencies
can communication with each other in times of emergencies. To make sure this capability exists and to assure that it is
available when needed, an interagency group meets regularly to discuss issues and solve problems. The NCS was
initially established in 1963 by the Kennedy Administration to ensure communications between military, diplomatic,
intelligence, and civilian leaders, following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Those activities were expanded by the Reagan
Administration to include emergency preparedness and response, including natural disaster response. The current
interagency group includes 23 departments and agencies. The private sector, which own a significant share of the assets
needed to ensure the necessary connectivity, is involved through the National Security Telecommunication Advisory
Committee (NSTAC). The National Coordinating Center, mentioned later in this report, and which serves as the
(continued...)
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These agencies and offices were integrated within the Directorate of Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IA/IP) (one of four operational Directorates established by the act).39
Notably, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is responsible for securing all
modes of the nation’s transportation system, was not made part of this Directorate (it was placed
within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate); nor was the Coast Guard, which is
responsible for port security. The act assigned the rank of Undersecretary to the head of each
Directorate. Furthermore, the act designated that within the Directorate of Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection, there were to be both an Assistant Secretary for Information
Analysis, and an Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection.
Among the responsibilities assigned the IA/IP Directorate were:
• to access, receive, analyze, and integrate information from a variety of sources in
order to identify and assess the nature and scope of the terrorist threat;
• to carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of key resources
and critical infrastructure of the United States, including risk assessments to
determine risks posed by particular types of attacks;
• to integrate relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments in order
to identify priorities for protective and support measures;
• to develop a comprehensive national plan for securing key resources and critical
infrastructures;
• to administer the Homeland Security Advisory System;
• to work with the intelligence community to establish collection priorities; and
• to establish a secure communication system for receiving and disseminating
information.
In addition, the act provided a number of protections for certain information (defined as critical
infrastructure information) that non-federal entities, especially private firms or ISACs formed by
the private sector, voluntarily provide the Department. Those protections included exempting it
from the Freedom of Information Act, precluding the information from being used in any civil
action, exempting it from any agency rules regarding ex parte communication, and exempting it
from requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
The act basically built upon existing policy and activities. Many of the policies, objectives,
missions, and responsibilities complement those already established (e.g., vulnerability
assessments, national planning, communication between government and private sector, and
improving protections).
(...continued)
telecommunications ISAC, is an operational entity within the NCS.
39 As the result of reorganizations, the IA/IP Directorate no longer exists. The infrastructure protection activities
originally given to the IA/IP Directorate are now performed by the National Protection and Programs Directorate. See
below.
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Second Stage Review Reorganization
Secretary Chertoff (the second Secretary of Homeland Security), as one of his Second Stage
Review recommendations, proposed restructuring the IA/IP Directorate and renaming it the
Directorate of Preparedness. The IA function was merged into a new Office of Intelligence and
Analysis. The IP function, with the same missions as outlined in the Homeland Security Act,
remained, but was joined by other existing and new entities. The renamed Directorate included
elements from Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, including
its principal grant-making functions and some of the preparedness functions of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). A new position of Chief Medical Officer was created
within the Directorate and the U.S. Fire Administration and the Office of National Capital Region
Coordination were transferred into the Directorate. In addition, the restructuring called for an
Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications (a position sought by many
within the cybersecurity community following the termination of the position of Special Advisor
to the President for Cyberspace Security) and an Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection.
According to the DHS press release, the mission of the restructured Directorate was to “facilitate
grants and oversee nationwide preparedness efforts supporting first responder training, citizen
awareness, public health, infrastructure and cyber security, and [to] ensure proper steps are taken
to protect high-risk targets.”
Other recommendations resulting from the review that impacted infrastructure protection
included moving the Homeland Security Operations Center, now called the National Operations
Center, out of the old IA/IP Directorate and placing it within a new Office of Operations
Coordination; and a new Directorate of Policy, which is described as serving as the primary
Department-wide coordinator of policies, regulations, and other initiatives. The conference
committee report on the Department’s FY2006 appropriations (H.Rept. 109-241) approved these
changes.40
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (referred hereon as the Post-
Katrina Act) was passed as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2007 (P.L. 109-295). The Post-Katrina Act reunited the Department’s preparedness activities with
its response and recovery activities within a restructured Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). The Post-Katrina Act explicitly preserved the restructured FEMA as a distinct
entity within the Department. The Post-Katrina Act also transferred the Preparedness
Directorate’s Office of Grants and Training to the restructured FEMA. The Post-Katrina Act left
the remaining activities, including those associated with the Office of the Chief Medical Officer
and the critical infrastructure protection activities associated with the Assistant Secretary of
Infrastructure Protection and the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications,
in the Preparedness Directorate. The Post-Katrina Act also established the Office of Emergency
Communications and required that it report to the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications. The Office of Emergency Communications has within its responsibilities a
number of activities associated with assisting interoperable communications among first
responders.
40 See report language, H.Rept. 109-241, accompanying H.R. 2360, September 2005, p. 29.
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On January 18, 2007, Secretary Chertoff submitted to Congress a description of the Department’s
reorganization pursuant to the Post-Katrina Act, and additional changes made pursuant to the
Secretary’s authority provided in the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296, Section 872). Under
this latter authority, the Secretary renamed the Preparedness Directorate the National Protection
and Programs Directorate (NPPD), still to be headed by someone of Undersecretary rank. The
NPPD includes the Office of the Undersecretary, the Office of Cybersecurity and
Communications (including the new Office of Emergency Communications), the Office of
Infrastructure Protection, the Office of Risk Management and Analysis (formerly a division of the
Office of Infrastructure Protection), and the Office of Intergovernmental Programs. In addition,
the Secretary moved the U.S.-VISIT program into the NPPD.41
The Secretary also, pursuant to his Section 872 authority, transferred the Chief Medical Officer to
head a new Office of Health Affairs. This new Office reports to the Secretary through the Deputy
Secretary. This reorganization consolidated activities associated with the Department’s bio-
defense efforts, including the transfer of the Biosurveillance program, formerly part of the
Infrastructure Protection and Information Security (IPIS) Program (see the Appendix). Except for
the transfer of the Biosurveillance program, the IPIS program, which represents the core of the
Department’s effort to coordinate the nation’s critical infrastructure protection activities, remained
in the National Protection and Programs Directorate.
Policy Implementation
Government-Sector Coordination
The number and breakdown of sectors and lead, or sector specific agencies, have expanded and
changed since the assignments made by PDD-63 (see Table 1). As mentioned above, the Bush
Administration has expanded the number of sectors considered to possess critical infrastructure
and made some changes in assignments, and PPD-21 made some additional modifications.
In March 2008, DHS announced that it was designating what would be an 18th critical
infrastructure sector, Critical Manufacturing.42 The sector includes certain sub-groups from the
primary metal, machinery, electrical equipment, and transportation equipment manufacturing
industries.43 The designation was made by the Secretary by authority granted him in HSPD-7, and
represents the first exercise of that authority.
PPD-21 also made some adjustments to sector designations: National Monuments and Icons was
designated as a subsector of Government Facilities; Postal and Shipping was designated as a
subsector of Transportation; Banking and Finance was renamed Financial Services; and Drinking
Water and Water Treatment was renamed Water and Waste Water Systems. Table 2, below, shows
the current list of sectors and their lead agencies.
41 U.S.-VISIT was the Department’s effort to verify the identity of people entering and exiting the United States. The
effort is now the responsibility of the Office of Biometric Identity Management, still within the NPPD Directorate.
42 Department of Homeland Security. Designation of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan Critical Manufacturing
Sector. Federal Register. Vol 73, No. 84. April 30, 2008. pp23476-23478.
43 These include iron and steel, ferro alloys, alumina and aluminum, and other non-ferrous metal production; engine,
turbine, and power transmission equipment; and motor vehicle, aerospace products, railroad rolling stock, and other
transportation equipment.
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PDD-63 called for the selection, by each Lead Agency, of a Sector Liaison Official (representing
the Lead Agency) and a Sector Coordinator (representing the owners/operators of each sector).
While most agencies quickly identified their Sector Liaison Official, it took more time to identify
Sector Coordinators. Different sectors present different challenges for coordination. Some sectors
are more diverse than others (e.g., transportation includes rail, air, waterways, and highways;
information and communications include computers, software, wire and wireless
communications) and raised the issue of how to have all the relevant players represented. Other
sectors are fragmented, consisting of small or local entities. Some sectors, such as banking,
telecommunications, and energy have more experience than others in working with the federal
government and/or working collectively to assure the performance of their systems.
Table 2. Current Lead Agency Assignments
Department/Agency Sector/Subsector
Agriculture Agriculture
Food
Agriculture
Meat/Poultry
Health and Human Services
All other
Treasury
Financial Services (formerly Banking and Finance)
EPA
Water and Waste Water Systems
(formerly Drinking Water and Water Treatment Systems)
Health and Human Services
Public Health and Healthcare
Defense
Defense Industrial Base
Energy Energya
Homeland Security
Transportation Systemsb (now includes Postal and Shipping)
Homeland Security
Information Technology
Homeland Security
Communications
Homeland Security
Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste
Homeland Security
Chemical
Homeland Security
Emergency Services
Homeland Security
Dams
Homeland Security
Commercial Facilities
Homeland Security
Government Facilities (now includes National Monuments and Icons)
Homeland Security
Critical Manufacturing
a. While noted here as a single sector, in practice it is represented by two relatively separate sectors: electric
power (except for nuclear power facilities); and the production, refining, and some distribution of oil and
gas. The Department of Energy is the lead agency for both. However, the Department of Homeland
Security (through the Transportation Security Administration) is the lead agency for the distribution of oil
and gas via pipelines. Nuclear power is considered its own sector.
b. While noted here as a single sector, Transportation includes all modes of transportation: rail, mass transit
(rail and bus), air, maritime, highways, pipelines, etc. The Transportation Security Administration within the
Department of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the Department of Transportation, is the lead
agency for all but the maritime subsector, for which the Coast Guard, also within the Department of
Homeland Security, acts as lead agency.
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In addition to such structural issues were ones related to competition. Inherent in trying to
promote coordination is asking competitors to cooperate. In some cases it is asking competing
industries to cooperate. This cooperation not only raised issues of trust among firms, but also
concerns regarding anti-trust rules.
Over time, Sector Coordinators were selected for most of the sectors identified under PDD-63.
Typically, a representative from a relevant trade organizations was chosen to act as sector
coordinator. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency selected the Executive Director
of the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies to act as Sector Coordinator for the water
sector. In the case of the law enforcement sector (no longer identified as a separate sector), the
National Infrastructure Protection Center helped create a Emergency Law Enforcement Services
Forum, consisting of senior state, local, and non-FBI law enforcement officials. In the case of
banking and finance, the Sector Coordinator was chosen from a major banking/finance institution,
who doubled as the Chairperson of the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council, an
organization specifically set up by the industry to coordinate critical infrastructure protection
activities with the federal government.
In December 1999, a number of the sectors formed a Partnership for Critical Infrastructure
Security to share information and strategies and to identify interdependencies across sectoral
lines. The Partnership was a private sector initiative. The federal government was not officially
part of the Partnership, but the Department of Homeland Security (and CIAO before that) acted as
a liaison and provided administrative support for meetings. Sector Liaisons from lead agencies
were considered ex officio members. The Partnership helped coordinate its members input to a
number of the national strategies released to date and were to provide input into the National Plan
called for in PDD-63.
While initially working with this organizational structure, the Bush Administration promoted a
new Critical Infrastructure Protection Partnership Model. Resembling the Financial Services
Sector Coordinating Council approach, this newer Model expanded the sector liaison and sector
coordinator model of PDD-63 into Government Coordinating Councils and Sector Coordinating
Councils for each sector. The primary objective was to expand both owner/operator and
government representation within all sectors. For example, the Water Sector Coordinating
Council expanded to include two owner/operator representatives, along with one non-voting
association staff, from each of the following participating organizations: the Association of
Metropolitan Water Agencies, the American Water Works Association, the American Water Works
Association Research Foundation, the National Association of Clean Water Agencies, the
National Association of Water Companies, the National Rural Water Association, the Water
Environment Federation, and the Water Environment Research Foundation. The Water
Government Coordinating Council is chaired by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Lead
Agency, but also includes the Department of Homeland Security, the Food and Drug
Administration, the Department of Interior, and the Center for Disease Control. Government
Coordinating Councils can also include state, local, and tribal government entities. The Sector
Coordinating Councils are to establish their own organizational structures and leadership and act
independently from the federal government. Also, under this model, the Partnership for Critical
Infrastructure Security has been designated the Private Sector Cross-Sector Council. The Sector
Coordinating Councils are to provide input into both the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
and the individual Sector Specific Plans (see below). Many of the issues governing the progress
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made in identifying and working with the sector coordinators model of PDD-63 continue with the
sector coordinating councils.44
In March 2006, the Department of Homeland Security used its authority under the Homeland
Security Act (P.L. 107-296, Section 871) to form advisory committees that are exempt from the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (P.L. 92-463) to establish the Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Council (CIPAC).45 The Federal Advisory Committee Act requires advisory committees
generally to meet in open session and make written materials available to the public. The purpose
of waiving this act for the CIPAC is to facilitate more open discussion between the sector
coordinating councils and the government coordinating councils (if not with the public). DHS
acts as the Executive Secretariat. Members include owner/operators that are members of their
respective sector coordinating councils or belong to an association that is a member of the
coordinating council. Members also include federal, state, local, and tribal government entities
that belong to their respective government coordinating councils. While the CIPAC is exempt
from the Federal Advisory Committee Act, DHS stated in its public notice that it will make
meeting dates and appropriate agendas available. There is a CIPAC webpage on the DHS
website.46
Appointment of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council
The Clinton Administration released an Executive Order (13130) in July, 1999, formally
establishing the National Infrastructure Assurance Council. Just prior to leaving office, President
Clinton put forward the names of 18 appointees.47 The Order was rescinded by the Bush
Administration before the Council could meet. In Executive Order 13231,48 President Bush
established a National Infrastructure Advisory Council (with the same acronym, NIAC) whose
functions were similar to those of the Clinton Council. On September 18, 2002, President Bush
announced his appointment of 24 individuals to serve on Council.49 The E.O. amending 13231
makes some minor modifications to NIAC. Primarily, the Council now reports to the President
through the Secretary of Homeland Security.50
Internal Agency Plans
There had been some confusion about which agencies were required by PDD-63 to submit critical
infrastructure plans. The Directive required every agency to develop and implement such a plan.
A subsequent Informational Seminar on PDD-63 held on October 13, 1998, identified two tiers of
agencies. The first tier included lead agencies and other “primary” agencies like the Central
44 See U.S. Congress. General Accountability Office. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating
Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors’ Characteristics. GAO-07-39. October 2006.
45 See Federal Register. Vol. 71 No. 57. pp. 14930-14933. March 24, 2006.
46 See http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-partnership-advisory-council; http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/
committees/editorial_0843.shtm.
47 White House Press Release, dated January 18, 2000.
48 Executive Order 13231—Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age. Federal Register. Vol. 66. No.
202. October 18, 2001. pp. 53063-53071. The NIAC is established on page 53069.
49 See White House Press Release, September 18, 2002.
50 The current membership and activities of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council can be found on the DHS
website. See http://www.dhs.gov/national-infrastructure-advisory-council-members.
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Intelligence Agency and Veteran’s Affairs. These agencies were held to the Directive’s 180-day
deadline. A second tier of agencies were identified by the National Coordinator and required to
submit plans by the end of February 1999. The “secondary” agencies were Agriculture,
Education, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Interior, General Services Administration,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. All of
these “primary” and “secondary” agencies met their initial deadlines for submitting their internal
plans for protecting their own critical infrastructures from attacks and for responding to
intrusions. The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) assembled an expert team to
review the plans. The plans were assessed in 12 areas including schedule/milestone planning,
resource requirements, and knowledge of existing authorities and guidance. The assessment team
handed back the initial plans with comments. Agencies were given 90 days to respond to these
comments. Of the 22 “primary” and “secondary” agencies that submitted plans, 16 modified and
resubmitted them in response to first round comments.
Initially, the process of reviewing agency plans was to continue until all concerns were addressed.
Over the summer of 1999, however, review efforts slowed and subsequent reviews were put on
hold as the efficacy of the reviews was debated. Some within the CIAO felt that the plans were
too general and lacked a clear understanding of what constituted a “critical asset” and the
interdependencies of those assets. As a result of that internal debate, the CIAO redirected its
resources to institute a new program called Project Matrix. Project Matrix is a three step process
by which an agency can identify and assess its most critical assets, identify the dependencies of
those assets on other systems, including those beyond the direct control of the agency, and
prioritize. CIAO offered this analysis to agencies, including some not designated as “primary” or
“secondary” agencies, such as the Social Security Administration and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Participation by the agencies was voluntary.
In the meantime, other agencies (i.e., those not designated as primary or secondary) apparently
did not develop critical infrastructure plans. In a much later report by the President’s Council on
Integrity and Efficiency (dated March 21, 2001), the Council, which was charged with reviewing
agencies’ implementation of PDD-63, stated that there was a misunderstanding as to the
applicability of PDD-63 to all agencies. The Council asserted that all agencies were required to
develop a critical infrastructure plan and that many had not, because they felt they were not
covered by the Directive. Also, the Council found that of the agency plans that had been
submitted, many were incomplete, had not identified their mission-critical assets, and that almost
none had completed vulnerability assessments. Two years later, the Government Accountability
Office51 reported that four of the agencies they reviewed for the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce (HHS, Energy, Commerce, and EPA) had still not yet identified their critical assets
and operational dependencies, nor have they set any deadlines for doing so.52
HSPD-7 reestablished a deadline for agencies to submit critical infrastructure protection plans to
the Director of OMB for approval by July 2004. The Director of OMB provided guidance on how
agencies should meet their requirement (Memorandum M-04-15, June 17, 2004). The
memorandum stated that plans for the physical protection of assets would be subject to
51 Note: The General Accounting Office has had its name changed legislatively to the Government Accountability
Office.
52 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges for Selected Agencies and
Industry Sectors. Repot to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives. GAO-03-233. February
2003. pp. 4-5.
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interagency review coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security, with DHS providing a
written evaluation of each agency’s plans within 120 days. Agency cybersecurity plans would be
reviewed by OMB, as part of the requirements associated with the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002, included as Title III of E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347).
These plans are to provide information to be included in the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (see below). DHS and OMB have not been willing to provide CRS with the status of these
reports.
PPD-21 again reiterated the requirement that each federal agency be responsible for identifying,
prioritizing, assessing, and improving the security of their respective internal critical
infrastructure. PPD-21 did not include any specific reporting requirements, but mentioned that
these efforts are to be reflected in the plans and execution of the National Continuity Policy
(which is beyond the scope of this report).
National Critical Infrastructure Plan
PDD-63 called for a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan that would be informed by sector-
level plans and would include an assessment of minimal operating requirements, vulnerabilities,
remediation plans, reconstitution plans, warning requirements, etc. The National Strategy for
Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Act each have called for the development of a
comprehensive national infrastructure protection plan, as well, although without specifying
deadlines and what that plan should include. HSPD-7 called for a comprehensive National Plan
for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection by the end of 2004. According to HSPD-
7, the National Plan should include (a) a strategy to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the
protection of critical infrastructure and key resources, including how the Department will work
with other stakeholders; (b) a summary of activities to be undertaken in order to carry out the
strategy; (c) a summary of initiatives for sharing critical infrastructure information and threat
warnings with other stakeholders; and (d) coordination with other federal emergency
management activities.
In January 2000, the Clinton Administration released Version 1.0 of a National Plan for
Information Systems Protection.53 In keeping with the original focus of PDD-63, the Plan focused
primarily on cyber-related efforts within the federal government. The Bush Administration,
through the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, released The National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace in February 2003, which could be considered Version 2.0 of the Clinton-
released Plan. It addressed all stakeholders in the nation’s information infrastructure, from home
users to the international community, and included input from the private sector, the academic
community, and state and local governments. Also in February 2003, the Office of Homeland
Security released The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures
and Key Assets. This strategy took a broad perspective of the issues and needs associated with
organizing the nation’s efforts to protect its critical infrastructure; identifying roles and
responsibilities, actions that need to be taken, and guiding principles.
The Department of Homeland Security missed the December 2004 deadline for releasing the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan called for in HSPD-7. It did publish an Interim National
53 Defending America’s Cyberspace. National Plan for Information Systems Protection. Version 1.0. An Invitation to a
Dialogue. The White House. 2000.
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Infrastructure Protection Plan in February 2005. According to media reports, some in the private
sector complained they were not adequately consulted.54 The Department subsequently released
for public comment a “draft” National Infrastructure Protection Plan in November 2005.55 A final
version of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was approved June 30, 2006. The
NIPP was revised in early 2009 to reflect the evolution and maturation of the process, including
expanded integration of all-hazard and resiliency concepts.56 The changes did not appear to
represent major shifts in policy or programs.
The 2006 NIPP identified and integrated specific processes to guide an integrated national risk
management effort. For example, it defined and standardized, across all sectors, the process for
identifying and selecting assets for further analysis, identifying threats and conducting threat
assessments, assessing vulnerabilities to those threats, analyzing consequences, determining risks,
identifying potential risk mitigation activities, and prioritizing those activities based on cost-
effectiveness.57 The 2006 NIPP also called for implementation plans for these risk reduction
activities, with timelines and responsibilities identified, and tied to resources. Each lead agency
was to work with its sector to generate Sector Specific Plans, utilizing the processes outlined in
the NIPP. DHS was to use these same processes to integrate the sector specific plans into a
national plan that identifies those assets and risk reduction plans that require national level
attention because of the risk the incapacitation of those assets pose to the nation as a whole.58
According to the 2006 NIPP, Sector Specific Plans (SSPs) were due 180 days after release of the
NIPP (i.e., the end of 2006). Apparently, all 17 sectors met that deadline. However, they went
through a DHS review process before being released in May 2007. Of the 17 plans submitted, 7
were made available to the public, the rest were designated For Official Use Only.59 The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed 9 of the SSPs and found that while all
complied, more or less, with the NIPP process, some plans were more developed and
comprehensive than others.60 As a result, GAO was unable to assess how far along each sector
actually is in identifying assets, setting priorities, and protecting key assets. DHS viewed these
SSPs as a first step in the process, and planned to review the sectors’ annual progress reports, as
required by HSPD-7. Following the 2009 update, some of the SSP’s were also updated. In 2010,
54 See “Still Waiting: Plan to Protect Critical Infrastructure Overdue from DHS,” Congressional Quarterly. Homeland
Security-Transportation & Infrastructure Newsletter, January 28, 2005. The Newsletter is electronic and available by
subscription only. See http://homeland.cq.com/hs/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/hsnews/109/
hsnews109-000001507251.html@allnews&metapub=HSNEWS&seqNum=827&searchIndex=1.
55 See Federal Register, vol. 70, no. 212, November 3, 2005, pp. 66840-66841.
56 The 2013 version of the NIPP can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/national-infrastructure-protection-plan.
57 For a discussion of a basic risk management process in a critical infrastructure context, see CRS Report RL32561,
Risk Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Assessing, Integrating, and Managing Threats,
Vulnerabilities and Consequences, by John D. Moteff.
58 The Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Center (HITRAC), a joint effort by the Office of Infrastructure
Protection and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, through its Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment
(SHIRA) program prioritizes the risk across all sectors to produce an annual National Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources Risk Profile.
59 See http://www.dhs.gov/sector-specific-plans for a short discussion and to access those SSPs that are not designated
as For Official Use Only.
60 Government Accountability Office. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and Sector Councils Continue to
Evolve. GAO-07-706R. July 10, 2007.
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DHS and its sector partners decided that a four-year cycle was sufficient for updating the NIPP
and SSPs.61
The NIPP was updated in 2009 and again in 2013, as called for in PPD-21. The 2013 NIPP retains
much of what was contained in the two previous NIPPs, with some refinements such as more
explicit integration of resiliency and the all-hazard approach. Retained are the basic partnership
model and the risk management framework. While discussed to various degrees in the previous
NIPPs, the 2013 NIPP highlights seven core tenets and twelve action items to guide the national
effort over the next four years. See Table 3.
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)
PDD-63 envisaged a single ISAC to be the private sector counterpart to the FBI’s National
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), collecting, analyzing, and sharing incident and response
information among its members and facilitating information exchange between government and
the private sector. The idea of a single ISAC evolved into each sector having its own center.
ISACs differ somewhat from sector coordinating councils in that ISACs were to be 24/7/365
operations, where incidents experienced by owner/operators, as well as threat information from
the government, could be reported, analyzed, and shared. Many were conceived originally as
concentrating on cybersecurity issues, and some still function with that emphasis. However,
others have incorporated physical security into their missions.
ISACs were formed around two primary models. One model involved ISAC members legally
incorporating and establishing either their own ISAC operations or contracting operations out to a
security firm. The banking, information, water, oil and gas, railroad, and mass transit sectors
followed this approach.
The other model involved utilizing an existing industry or government-industry coordinating
group and adding critical infrastructure protection to the mission of that group. The electric power
(which uses North American Electricity Reliability Council [NERC]) and the telecommunications
sector (which uses the National Coordinating Center [NCC]) followed this model. The emergency
fire services sector incorporated ISAC functions into the existing operations of the U.S. Fire
Administration, which has interacted with local fire departments for years.
Different federal financial support models were developed for ISACs, too. In some cases, ISACs
received start up funding from their Lead Agency (e.g., drinking water received funding from
EPA). In some cases, that support continues, in some cases the support has not continued (e.g.,
DOE no longer supports the energy ISAC). Other ISACs have always been self-supporting. The
individual ISACs have formed a group called the ISAC Council.62 Their formation and function
experience some of the same variation as the coordinating councils, for some of the same reasons.
61 See Review and Revision of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Federal Register. Vol. 78. No. 109. June 6,
2013, p. 34114.
62 See http://www.isaccouncil.org.
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Table 3. NIPP 2013: Guiding Tenets and Call to Action
Tenets
Call to Action
Risk should be identified and managed in a coordinated
Build upon partnership efforts
and comprehensive way across the critical infrastructure
community
Understanding and addressing cross-sector
Set national focus through jointly developed priorities
(inter)dependencies is essential
Gaining knowledge of risks and interdependences
Determine collective actions through joint planning
requires information sharing
efforts
The partnership approach recognizes the unique
Empower local and regional partnerships to build
perspectives and comparative advantages of the diverse
capacity
critical infrastructure community
Regional and SLTT partnerships are crucial to improve
Leverage incentives to advance security and resiliency
security and resilience.
Infrastructure critical to U.S. transcends national
Innovate in managing risk
boundaries, requiring cross-border cooperation
Security and resilience should be considered during the
Enable risk-informed decision making through enhanced
design of assets, systems, and networks
situational awareness
Analyze infrastructure (inter)dependencies and cascading
effects
Identify, assess, and respond to unanticipated cascading
effects
Promote recovery fol owing incidents
Strengthen development and delivery of technical
assistance, training, and education
Improve security and resilience by research and
development
Focus on outcomes
Evaluate progress toward achieving goals
Learn and adapt
Source: CRS; text drawn from NIPP 2013.
While PDD-63 envisioned ISACs to be a primary conduit for exchanging critical infrastructure
information between the federal government and specific sectors, the Department of Homeland
Security has developed a number of other information sharing systems and mechanism. In
addition to the Sector Coordinating Councils discussed above, US-CERT (the U.S. Computer
Emergency Readiness Team, which took over many of the NIPC functions) publishes information
on the latest computer-related vulnerabilities and threats and information on how to respond to a
specific incident. U.S.-CERT also accepts incidents reports. It also manages the National Cyber
Alert System, to which any organization or individual can subscribe. The Department also has
developed a Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). HSIN initially served as the
primary communication network for communicating and analyzing threat information between
government law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. The HSIN now
provides real-time connectivity between all 50 states, 5 territories, and 50 urban areas and the
National Operations Center at DHS. The HSIN is being expanded to include each critical
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infrastructure sector (dubbed HSIN-CI) as part of the Critical Infrastructure Protection
Partnership Model (i.e., through each sector and government coordinating council).
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Department established what is now called the
Infrastructure Protection Executive Notification Service (ENS), which connects DHS directly
with the Chief Executive Officers of major industrial firms. The ENS is used to alert partners to
infrastructure incidents, to disseminate warning products, and to conduct teleconferences. The
Department is also responsible for operating the Critical Infrastructure Warning Network
(CWIN), which provides secure communications between DHS and other federal, state, and local
agencies, the private sector, and international agencies. CWIN does not rely on the Public Switch
Network or the internet.63
Identifying Critical Assets, Assessing Vulnerability and Risk, and
Prioritizing Protective Measures
Among the activities assigned to the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 were:
• access, receive, analyze, and integrate information from a variety of sources in
order to identify and assess the nature and scope of the terrorist threat;
• carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of key resources and
critical infrastructure, of the United States including risk assessments to
determine risks posed by particular types of attacks;
• integrate relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments in order to
identify priorities for protective and support measures.
Furthermore, according to the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets, the Department of Homeland Security: (a) “in collaboration with
other key stakeholders, will develop a uniform methodology for identifying facilities, systems,
and functions with national-level criticality to help establish protection priorities;” (b) “will build
a comprehensive database to catalog these critical facilities, systems, and functions;” and (c) “will
also maintain a comprehensive, up-to-date assessment of vulnerabilities and preparedness across
critical sectors.” Furthermore, these efforts “will help guide near-term protective actions and
provide a basis for long-term leadership focus and informed resource investment.”
Following September 11, 2001, owners/operators of critical infrastructure assets, to varying
degrees, began identifying critical assets, assessing their vulnerabilities to attack, and developed
security plans or beefed up protections. For example, the Federal Transit Authority assessed the
vulnerabilities of the nation’s largest mass transit systems. The freight rail companies developed
additional security measures to coincide with the level of threat identified by DHS’s color-coded
National Alert System. Drinking water authorities, through the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-188), were required to conduct vulnerability assessments
and to develop security plans based on those assessments. Port facilities and maritime vessels
were required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-295) to do the same. The
63 The President’s FY2011 budget request for the National Protection and Programs Directorate proposed terminating
NPPD’s operation of CWIN.
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American Petroleum Institute, the North American Electric Reliability Council, and other
industry associations offered guidance to their respective members on how to conduct
vulnerability assessments and to manage their risk from possible attack. However, DHS’s ability
to coordinate this activity developed more slowly, and its ability to develop a uniform
methodology that would allow it to generate a set of national priorities awaited the release of its
NIPP, described above.
Nevertheless, during this same time, DHS has engaged in at least two other sets of activities that
have, also to varying degrees, identified critical assets, assessed their vulnerabilities, and provided
assistance to increase protection of these sites.
Shortly before the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, as part of Operation Liberty
Shield64, what was then called the Protective Services Division of the newly formed Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, identified a list of 160 assets or sites,
including chemical and hazardous materials sites, nuclear power plants, energy facilities, business
and finance centers, and more, that it considered critical to the nation based on their vulnerability
to attack and potential consequences. During the course of the year, that list grew to 1,849 assets
or sites.65
According to testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on April 1, 2004, then-
Undersecretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Frank Libutti made
reference to 1700 sites identified by DHS as being high-priority sites.66 According to the
testimony, DHS intended to visit each of these sites to assess their vulnerabilities to various forms
of attack and to meet with local law enforcement officials to assist them in developing Buffer
Zone Protection Plans (BZPPs). BZPPs focus on protections that can be taken “outside the
fence,” including how to identify threatening surveillance, patrolling techniques, and how to
assert command and control if an incident should occur. DHS has provided training and technical
assistance to help state and local law enforcement entities develop their own BZPPs. The BZPP
activity is now integrated into the State and Local Grants Program. In addition to these “outside
the fence” activities, DHS has conducted Site Assistance Visits (SAVs) at selected sites, on a
voluntary basis, to discuss with owners and operators vulnerabilities and protective measures that
can be taken “inside the fence.” SAVs form an integral part of the “comprehensive reviews
(CRs)” which DHS is performing on both nuclear power facilities and high-priority chemical
facilities. Beginning in FY2009, through a Regional Resiliency Assessment Program, DHS
expanded its vulnerability assessments to consider clusters of critical infrastructures and key
resources within a region.
In addition to its selection of high-priority sites and subsequent site visits, vulnerability
assessments, and buffer zone protection plans, DHS, through the Federal Emergency
Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) Grants Program Directorate, also has been supporting
infrastructure protection at the state and local level through its State and Local Grant Programs.
Specific grant programs include the State Homeland Security Formula-based Grants, the Urban
Area Security Initiative (UASI) Grants (both of which primarily support first responder needs, but
64 Operation Liberty Shield was a comprehensive national plan to protect the homeland during operations in Iraq.
65 See Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Inspector General. Progress in Developing the National Asset
Database. OIG-06-04. June 2006.
66 According to the Department’s Inspector General report, these 1,700 assets refer to the 1,849 assets identified in its
research.
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include certain infrastructure protection expenditures), Port Security Grants, Rail and Transit
Security Grants, Intercity Bus Security Grants, and Highway (Trucking) Security Grants. The
Buffer Zone Protection Plan grants have been added to this set of programs. Before receiving
funds, grants recipients must identify specific critical infrastructure assets, conduct threat and
vulnerabilities assessments, and develop a plan for how they intend to use grant funds to reduce
those vulnerabilities through eligible expenditures.67
Cybersecurity Framework
As discussed above, President Obama’s EO 13636 gave NIST the responsibility for developing a
Cybersecurity Framework. The framework is to form the basis for a Voluntary Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity Program that would encourage critical infrastructure owners and
operators to improve the security of their information networks. Also, those agencies that have
regulatory authority over certain critical infrastructure owner and operators are to consider using
or modifying the Framework in any regulatory action. NIST release Version 1.0 of the
Framework February 12, 2014.68
Issues and Discussion
Over the last few years, Congressional interest in critical infrastructure protection has focused,
principally, on reviewing the progress and effectiveness of DHS’s efforts. However, two policy
issues remain in debate: how to improve information sharing to the mutual benefit of the federal
government and the owner/operators while maintaining privacy protections; and, the need for
further regulations. Congress continues to debate these issues primarily in the context of
cybersecurity. For a more detailed discussion of these efforts, see CRS Report R42114, Federal
Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Overview and Discussion of Proposed Revisions, by Eric A.
Fischer.
Information Sharing
Information sharing in the context of homeland security encompasses a very complex network of
proposed connections. There is information sharing between federal agencies, especially between
intelligence agencies, and between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. There is
information sharing between federal agencies and their state and local counterparts. There is
information sharing between federal, state, and local agencies and the private sector. There is
information sharing within and between the private sectors. And there is information sharing
between all of these entities and the public. A multitude of mechanisms have been established to
facilitate all of this information sharing. While the multitude of mechanism may cause some
concern about inefficiencies, a highly connected, in some cases redundant, network may not be a
bad thing. A primary concern is if these mechanisms are being used and are effective.
67 For more information on the grant programs, see CRS Report R40246, Department of Homeland Security Assistance
to States and Localities: A Summary and Issues for the 111th Congress, by Shawn Reese; and CRS Report R40632,
FY2010 Department of Homeland Security Assistance to States and Localities, by Shawn Reese.
68 See http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf.
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In the past, information flow between all of these stakeholders has been restrained, or non-
existent, for at least three reasons: a natural bureaucratic reluctance to share information,
technological difficulties associated with compatibility, and legal restraints to prevent the misuse
of information for unintended purposes. However, in the wake of September 11, given the
apparent lack of information sharing that was exposed in reviewing events leading up to that day,
many of these restraints are being reexamined and there appears to be a general consensus to
change them. Some changes have resulted from the USA PATRIOT Act (including easing the
restrictions on sharing of information between national law enforcement agencies and those
agencies tasked with gaining intelligence of foreign agents). The legislation establishing the
Department of Homeland Security also authorizes efforts to improve the ability of agencies
within the federal government to share information between themselves and other entities at the
state and local level. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458)
reorganized the entire intelligence community, in part to improve the level of communication and
coordination between the various intelligence organizations.69 The legislation also required the
President to establish an information sharing environment (ISE) for the sharing of terrorism
information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities, and the private sector.
As mentioned above, legislative efforts dealing with cybersecurity include proposals of how to
improve and incentivize information sharing between the federal government and the
owner/operators in the private sector, while protecting the privacy of average citizens and
providing some liability protection for the companies providing the information. See CRS Report
R42114, Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Overview and Discussion of Proposed
Revisions, by Eric A. Fischer.
While the federal government is trying to increase the amount of information shared among
appropriate stakeholders, it is also trying to maintain a tight control (short of classification) on
who gets to see what information. A variety of designations have been given to information the
federal government wishes to control (critical infrastructure information [see below], homeland
security information, terrorism information, sensitive security information). A catch-all term for
these and other designations of controlled information is “sensitive but unclassified.”
Since much of what is considered to be critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the
private sector, critical infrastructure protection relies to a large extent on the ability of the private
sector and the federal government to share information. However, it is unclear how open the
private sector and the government have been in sharing information. The private sector primarily
wants from government information on specific threats which the government may want to
protect in order not to compromise sources or investigations. In fact, much of the threat
assessment done by the federal government is considered classified. For its part, the government
wants specific information on vulnerabilities and incidents which companies may want to protect
to prevent adverse publicity or to keep confidential company practices. The private sector, too, is
concerned about whether providing this information might lead to future regulatory action or
other liabilities. Successful information sharing will depend on the ability of each side to
demonstrate it can hold in confidence the information exchanged.
Sharing information between government and the private sector is made more complex by the
question of how the information will be handled within the context of the Freedom of Information
69 See also CRS Report RL32366, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Under Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6, by William J. Krouse.
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Act (FOIA). In particular, the private sector is reluctant to share the kind of information the
government wants without it being exempt from public disclosure under the existing FOIA
statute. The Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296, Sec. 214) exempts information defined as
critical infrastructure information from FOIA (as well as providing other protections). Similar
FOIA exemptions are offered in other legislation. For example, the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-188, Sec. 401, see below) exempts certain security-
related information from FOIA. Even with these protections in statute, it is uncertain how much
information on assets, vulnerabilities, incidents, etc. is being shared with DHS, or how useful it
is.70
The FOIA exemptions for critical infrastructure information (CII) and other types of sensitive but
unclassified information is not without its critics. The non-government-organizations that actively
oppose government secrecy are reluctant to expand the government’s ability to hold more
information as classified or sensitive. These critics, and others, feel that the protections offered to
CII and other types of sensitive but unclassified information is too broad and believe that controls
are stifling public debate and oversight, as well as impeding technological advances that could
benefit both security and the economy.71
Regulation
As a general statement of policy, owners and operators of critical infrastructure are to work with
the federal government on a voluntary basis. Sharing information with the federal government
about vulnerability assessments, risk assessments, and the taking of additional protective actions
is meant to be voluntary.
However, the degree to which some of the activities are mandated varies across sectors. In some
cases, sectors are quite regulated. Nuclear power plants must meet very specific standards for
assessing their vulnerabilities to very specific types of attacks and to take the necessary actions to
address those vulnerabilities. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission enforces these regulations.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-295) requires facilities at ports, and certain
vessels, to conduct vulnerability assessments and to develop and implement security plans
(including naming a security officer who is responsible for developing and implementing these
plans). The vulnerability assessments and security plans are reviewed by the Coast Guard. The
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-188) requires community
drinking water systems to conduct vulnerability assessments and to incorporate the results of
those assessments into their emergency response plans. The vulnerability assessments must be
submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA must also receive
certification that the emergency response plans have been appropriately modified to reflect the
vulnerability assessments. This same Act also amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
70 In February 2005, DHS acknowledged the receipt of 29 submissions of CII documents, 22 of which were approved
as CII by DHS. See DHS Finally Speaks on CII at http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/2286t. In previously cited
testimony (before the Senate Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration,
July 12, 2007), the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection stated that since the final rule governing
implementation of the CII program was released, DHS has received about 5,400 submissions.
71 For a discussion of sensitive but unclassified information—not only science and technology information, but other
types of information held by, or given to, the federal government—see CRS Report RL33303, “Sensitive But
Unclassified” Information and Other Controls: Policy and Options for Scientific and Technical Information, by
Genevieve J. Knezo.
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Act to require all facilities engaged in manufacturing, processing, packing, or holding food for
consumption to register with the Department of Health and Human Services. In addition, the
Food and Drug Act was amended to require regulations specifying the types of information these
facilities needed to keep on record for a specified amount of time to assist the Secretary in
determining if a food product has been adulterated and represents a public health problem. The
FY2006 DHS appropriation bill (P.L. 109-295, Sec. 550), authorized the Secretary of Homeland
Security to issue interim final regulations requiring vulnerability assessments and security plans
for certain chemical facilities, except those covered by the Maritime Transportation and Security
Act, other relevant acts affecting drinking water authorities, or those operated by the Department
of Energy, the Department of Defense, or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
At the other end of the spectrum are sectors such as information and telecommunication, oil and
gas, and commercial (i.e., malls and office buildings) where similar activities (i.e., vulnerability
assessments, etc.) are encouraged but not mandated.
As mentioned above, the security community, the Obama administration, industry, and Congress
have debated the need to regulate more comprehensively the cybersecurity of critical
infrastructure assets. However, it has proven difficult to pass additional regulations. Some in the
security community suggest that strategic national needs are market externalities that require
regulation to encourage more owner/operators (in particular, those who may not be at the
forefront in cybersecurity capabilities or practices) to take the type of action that the security
community considers necessary. Industry groups are concerned about the costs and benefits and
the potential for duplicative reporting requirements associated with additional regulations.
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Appendix. Funding for Critical Infrastructure
Federal Funding for Critical Infrastructure Protection
It is difficult to determine how much funding the federal government devotes to the protection of
critical infrastructure. The Homeland Security Act requires the President’s Budget to include a
budget analysis of homeland security activities across the federal government. This analysis
appears in Chapter 3 of the Analytical Perspectives volume of the President’s Budget.72 However,
the FY2010 budget request made a change in the way homeland security activities are accounted
for, making the estimate of how much is spent on critical infrastructure less clear.
During the Bush Administration, OMB defined six categories of homeland security activities that
paralleled the mission areas defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. These were:
intelligence and warning; border and transportation security; domestic counter-terrorism; critical
infrastructure and key asset protection; defending against catastrophic events; and emergency
preparedness and response. The “critical infrastructure and key resources protection” category
included funding spent by agencies to protect their own critical infrastructure. It also included
funds that agencies may have spent working with states, local governments, and private
owners/operators to reduce their respective vulnerabilities. DHS activities included both of these,
as well as activities associated with coordinating the national effort.
Other mission areas included activities that could also be considered part of the effort to protect
critical infrastructure. For instance, the intelligence and warning mission area includes threat
analysis, risk analysis, and the sharing of that information with other stakeholders, including
states, localities, and the private sector, each of which factor into critical infrastructure protection.
Border and transportation security includes activities associated with protecting airports, sea
ports, and other transportation modes. Therefore, previous estimates for “critical infrastructure
and key resources protection” probably represented a minimum estimate of the total amount of
federal funding spent on critical infrastructure protection.
For FY2010, OMB reformulated the categories for tracking homeland security activity,
rearranging them into three new categories: prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; protect the
American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources; and respond to and recover from
incidents. As a result, it is not possible to compare the FY2010 figures with those from prior
budgets. The category “protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key
resources” now includes more activities than were counted in the “critical infrastructure and key
resources protection” category in FY2009 and before. These additional activities include ones
that were previously counted in the “defending against catastrophic events” category. The latter
represents a significant addition in funding, and includes activities meant to protect the general
population from weapons of mass destruction. Since this report does not cover many of the
activities associated with defending against or responding to catastrophic events, the OMB
accounting is no longer representative of the activities covered in this report.
72 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2014/assets/homeland_supp.pdf. An explanation of
the budget can be found in the Budget’s Analytical Perspective, Special Topics, pp 415-422 (see
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2014/assets/topics.pdf).
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FY2014 DHS Budget Request and Prior Year Appropriations for
Infrastructure Protection and Information Security Program and
Other Relevant DHS Budget Activities
Just as it is difficult to account for all the federal activities associated with critical infrastructure
protection in the federal government, it is also difficult to track the critical infrastructure
protection activities within the Department of Homeland Security. Funding for activities related
to critical infrastructure protection is found in numerous places within the Department, including
the National Protection and Programs Directorate, the Transportation Security Administration, the
Coast Guard, Secret Service, the Science and Technology Directorate, FEMA, and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection. However, much of the funding for the organizations and activities
discussed in the body of this report can be found in the Infrastructure Protection and Information
Security (IPIS) Program. See Table A-1, below.73
IPIS
The Infrastructure Protection and Information Security Program (IPIS) supports the activities of
the Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP), and the Office of Cybersecurity and
Communications. The latter includes the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD), the National
Communication System (NCS), and the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC). OIP
coordinates the national effort to reduce the risks associated with the loss or damage to the
nation’s critical infrastructure due to terrorist attack or natural events. This effort is a cooperative
one between the federal government; state, local, and tribal governments; and the private sector,
to identify critical elements of the nation’s infrastructure, their vulnerabilities, the potential
consequences of their loss or damage, and ways to mitigate those losses. The NCSD performs a
similar function, but specifically focuses on the nation’s information networks. The NCS also
performs a similar function, but specifically focuses on the nation’s communication systems, in
particular the communications systems and programs that ensure the President can communicate
with selected federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments, and certain private sector
entities during times of national emergencies. The OEC is responsible for promoting the ability of
state, local and federal emergency response providers to communicate with each other during an
emergency through the development and distribution of interoperable communication equipment.
Funding is aligned with this organizational structure and provided in a set of program/project
activities (PPAs) as noted in the table below.
The Administration requested $1,202 million for the IPIS program for FY2014, a net increase of
$44 million above the unsequestered amount enacted for FY2013. The Administration’s funding
request for Infrastructure Protection activities was essentially flat. The funding request for
cybersecurity-related activities was $53 million higher than the FY2013 enacted level and the
funding request for communications-related activities was $10 million less than the FY2013
enacted level.
To date, the House has approved $1,177 million for the IPIS program. Infrastructure Protection
activities and communication-related activities were each funded at approximately $1 million
73 The IPIS budget activity supports many of the same (though slightly restructured) infrastructure protection activities
that have evolved from the days of the “old” Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate.
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below the requested levels. The House provided $916 million for cybersecurity and
communications, $25 million below the request. The Senate Appropriations Committee
recommended $1,209 million for the IPIS program and $936 million for cybersecurity and
communications. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2014 (P.L. 113-76) provided $1,187
million for IPIS ($262 million for Infrastructure Protection and $924 million for Cybersecurity
and Communications). For further discussion of the differences in the different FY2014
appropriation proposals, see CRS Report R43147, Department of Homeland Security: FY2014
Appropriations, coordinated by William L. Painter.
Table A-1. Funding for the Infrastructure Protection and
Information Security Program
(budget authority in millions of dollars)
FY2013
Enacted
FY2014
FY2014
Program
(pre-
FY2014
House
Senate
Project Activity
sequestor)
Request
Passed
Reported P.L. 113-76
Infrastructure Protection
$260
$261
$261
$273
$263
Identification, Analysis, and Planning
59
58
66
66
63
Sector Management and Governance
67
60
60
65
63
Regional Field Operations
56
57
57
57
57
Infrastructure Security Compliance
78
86
77
86
81
Cybersecurity 756
810
786
804
792
Cybersecurity Coordination
4
4
4
4
4
US-CERT Operations
93
103
102
102
102
Federal Network Security
236
200
200
200
200
Network Security Deployment
329
406
382
393
382
Global Cybersecurity Management
26
19
19
26
26
Critical Infrastructure Cyber Protection and
63
73
73
73 73
Awareness
Business Operations
6
5
5
5
5
Communications 140
131
130
132
131
Office of Emergency Communications
39
37
36
38
37
Priority Telecommunications Services
53
53
53
53
53
Next Generation Networks
24
21
21
21
21
Programs to Study and Enhance
13
10
10
10 10
Telecommunications
Critical
Infrastructure Protection
11
9
9
9
9
Total, Infrastructure Protection and
1158
1,202
1,177
1,209 1,187
Information Security
Source: CRS analysis of P.L. 113-6, its accompanying Senate explanatory statement, P.L. 113-2, the FY2014 DHS
Congressional Budget Justifications, H.R. 2217, H.Rept. 113-91 and S.Rept. 113-77, and Explanatory Text for H.R.
3547, Division F.
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Notes: Columns may not add due to rounding. The Administration proposed funding the Office of Emergency
Communications outside the Communications line in their request—this table reorganizes the request to
conform with the House-passed and Senate-reported structures for purposes of comparison.
Other Infrastructure Related Programs
In addition to the IPIS program within the National Protection and Programs Directorate, other
areas in DHS support infrastructure protection. A major component of support for critical
infrastructure protection within the Department are the grant programs in the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA); prior to FY2014, funding for critical infrastructure-related
activities were provided through State Homeland Security grants, the Urban Areas Security
Initiative, Buffer Zone Protection Plans (BZZP), port security, and rail and transit grants. The
State Homeland Security grants and the Urban Areas Security Initiative grants primarily support
first responder capabilities, but funding can also be spent on critical infrastructure protection
expenses (such as the purchase of cameras, sensors, etc.). The BZPPs, port security, and rail and
transit security grants focus primarily on protecting infrastructure assets. For FY2014, the
Administration sought to consolidate a number of grant programs into two, National Preparedness
Grants and First-Responder Assistance Programs. Both the House and Senate appear to have
rejected this consolidation and continue to fund individual grant programs. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act, FY2014 provided $466 million for State Homeland Security Grants, $600
million for the Urban Area Security Initiative, $100 million for Public Transportation and
Railroad Security Assistance, and $100 million for Port Security Grants. For information on the
status of FEMA grant programs, see CRS Report R43147, Department of Homeland Security:
FY2014 Appropriations, coordinated by William L. Painter.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for overseeing the security of
the nation’s transportation sectors (as directed by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
P.L. 107-71). For FY2014 the Administration requested $4, 968 million in direct appropriations
(not counting offsetting receipts and capital fund accounts). Aviation security consumes a large
fraction of the TSA budget, including support for: passenger and baggage screening; the
purchase, installation, and operation of explosive detection equipment; and airport perimeter
security; air marshals; crew vetting; etc. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2014 provided
$4,983 million. TSA also receives funds for surface transportation security and security-related
support activities. For more information on issues associated with transportation security, see
CRS Report RL33512, Transportation Security: Issues for the 113th Congress, by David Randall
Peterman, Bart Elias, and John Frittelli. The Coast Guard, too, receives funding for its role in
protecting U.S. ports. However, funding for these functions cannot be found in a single line item.
The Science and Technology Directorate budget supports research and development in a number
of areas relevant to critical infrastructure protection. This includes research and development in
cybersecurity, risk analysis, explosive detection, blast protection, modeling and simulation, safe
cargo containers, and more. The Directorate also works with the Office of Infrastructure
Protection to develop and maintain a National Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D Plan. It is
difficult to determine how much funding is devoted overall to critical infrastructure protection-
related research, given the budget structure of the programs. For additional information regarding
DHS’s Science and Technology program, including legislation calling for a critical infrastructure
research and development plan, see CRS Report R43064, The DHS S&T Directorate: Selected
Issues for Congress, by Dana A. Shea.
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Author Contact Information
John D. Moteff
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
jmoteff@crs.loc.gov, 7-1435
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