The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy:
In Brief
Jared T. Brown
Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy
February 10, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43396
The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: In Brief
Contents
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
E.O. 13632 and the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy (HSRS) ................................................ 2
Overarching Issues for Congress ..................................................................................................... 6
Monitoring the Progress of the Rebuilding Strategy ................................................................. 6
Applicability of Recommendations to Future Disasters ............................................................ 7
Future Management of Long-Term Disaster Recovery Efforts for Other Catastrophes ............ 8
Tables
Table 1. Categorization of Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy Recommendations as of
August 2013 .................................................................................................................................. 4
Contacts
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 9
Congressional Research Service
The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: In Brief
Background
On the evening of October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy, the second-largest Atlantic storm on
record, made landfall in southern New Jersey. The consequences of the storm included at least the
deaths of 159 people, over 23,000 people who required temporary shelters, 8.5 million customers
who were left without power, approximately $65 billion in damages, and 650,000 homes that
were damaged or destroyed.1
As with other major natural disaster events, some Members of Congress responded to Hurricane
Sandy by holding a series of hearings to gather information2 and visiting the affected region to
assess the damage and to confer with state and local officials. On January 29, 2013, Congress
passed the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-2), a $50.5 billion package of
disaster assistance largely focused on responding to Hurricane Sandy.3 The Disaster Relief
Appropriations Act, 2013, provided supplemental funding to over 66 different accounts and
programs, including $16.0 billion for the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)
program, $11.5 billion for the Disaster Relief Fund, $10.9 billion for the Public Transportation
Emergency Relief Program, and $5.4 billion total for disaster-related activities of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (pre-sequester).4 In addition, the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013
(SRIA), passed as Division B of P.L. 113-2, reformed key provisions of the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288 as amended).5 The
supplemental appropriation was also preceded by Congress providing an additional $9.7 billion in
borrowing authority for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in P.L. 113-1 on January 6,
2013.
This report briefly analyzes the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy (HSRS), which is the key
strategic document released by the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force established by
executive order. The HSRS has 69 different recommendations meant to guide the regions’
recovery from the disaster. This report also discusses overarching issues for Congress that may
arise in oversight of the Hurricane Sandy recovery process and how lessons learned from
Hurricane Sandy can be applied to future disasters. This report will be updated as warranted by
1 Extensive descriptions of Hurricane Sandy and its impacts can be found in Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force,
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: Stronger Communities, a Resilient Region, Washington, DC, August 2013, pp.
18-22, at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=HSRebuildingStrategy.pdf; and at Federal Emergency
Management Agency, Hurricane Sandy FEMA After-Action Report, Washington, DC, July 1, 2013, p. 7, at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33772.
2 As examples among many, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of
Homeland Security, Hurricane Sandy: Response and Recovery, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., December 5, 2012 (pre-
published) and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, A Review of the Preparedness,
Response to and Recovery from Hurricane Sandy, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., December 4, 2012 (pre-published).
3 Though a majority of the funding was specifically made available for Hurricane Sandy, some of the funding was
authorized to be used for disasters besides Hurricane Sandy. For example, funding provided to HUD for the
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program was authorized to be used for Hurricane Sandy and other
eligible disaster events occurring during calendar years 2011, 2012, and 2013.
4 For a full analysis of the supplemental funding enacted by Congress, and how it compares to the Administration’s
request submitted on December 7, 2012, please see CRS Report R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster
Relief, coordinated by William L. Painter and Jared T. Brown.
5 For a detailed review of SRIA, Division B of P.L. 113-2, please see CRS Report R42991, Analysis of the Sandy
Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, by Jared T. Brown, Francis X. McCarthy, and Edward C. Liu.
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The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: In Brief
significant events in the implementation of recommendations from the HSRS or the disaster
recovery process from Hurricane Sandy in general.
E.O. 13632 and the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding
Strategy (HSRS)
In response to the devastation resulting from Hurricane Sandy, President Barack Obama issued
Executive Order (E.O.) 13632, Establishing the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, on
December 7, 2012.6 The Task Force was charged with coordinating federal interagency efforts to
guide a successful rebuilding process following Hurricane Sandy. Chaired by the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, Shaun L. S. Donovan, the Task Force included members from
27 different federal executive branch agencies and White House offices.7 As Chairperson of the
Task Force, Secretary Donovan was tasked with, among other things, working with states, tribes,
local governments, Members of Congress, other stakeholders and interested parties, and the
public on matters pertaining to rebuilding in the affected region.8 The Task Force was supported
by an advisory group composed of many state, tribal, and local elected leaders from the most
severely impacted cities and towns in the region, with the majority of its members from New
York and New Jersey.9 The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also created
a Project Management Office (PMO) to help manage the activities of the Task Force.
The primary task of the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, as mandated by Section 5 of
E.O. 13632, was the development and issuance of the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy.
Released in August 2013, the HSRS is a wide-ranging, lengthy policy document that includes 69
different recommendations for a long-term recovery plan across eight major policy areas. As
shown in Table 1, 52 of the 69 recommendations reported in the HSRS were “adopted” by the
time the HSRS was released—generally meaning that they are currently in effect for the
Hurricane Sandy recovery process or soon will be applied for Sandy and other future disasters.
The remaining 17 recommendations were reported as being “in process” or “underway”—
generally meaning that they required significant further action by either executive branch
agencies or Congress to be applied to Hurricane Sandy or future disasters.
The HSRS’s recommendations vary from being relatively broad (e.g., “Ensure that Sandy
recovery energy investments are resilient”) to relatively specific (e.g., “Increase SBA’s [the Small
Business Administration’s] unsecured disaster loan limits and expedite the disbursement of small
dollar loans”).10 There is considerable breadth to the types of issues covered by the
recommendations: some recommendations are orientated to improving internal federal
government procedures for a better disaster recovery process;11 others relate to how federal
6 Executive Order 13632, “Establishing the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force,” 77 Federal Register 74341,
December 14, 2012.
7 For membership details, see Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: Stronger
Communities, a Resilient Region, Washington, DC, August 2013, pp. 196-198, at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
documents/huddoc?id=HSRebuildingStrategy.pdf. Henceforth referred to as the HSRS in footnotes.
8 Section 2(b)(i) of E.O. 13632.
9 HSRS, pp. 8-9.
10 Respectively, these are recommendations 12 (p. 62) and 42 (p. 103) of the HSRS.
11 For examples, see especially those relating to federal government data sharing, recommendations 62 to 67, pp. 140 -
(continued...)
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The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: In Brief
assistance should be expended;12 while some others address perceived vulnerabilities in the
region’s infrastructure;13 and other topics. In their totality, the set of 69 recommendations of the
HSRS represent the Administration’s strategic vision in support of the Hurricane Sandy
rebuilding process, including how federal funds should be expended, how federal agencies should
synchronize their efforts, and how the region can leverage the recovery process from Hurricane
Sandy to prepare for future disaster risks.
The Task Force terminated 60 days after the date of publication of the HSRS as it was required to
do so by E.O. 13632 (termination was on October 18, 2013).14 As mandated by executive order,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assumed the majority of the coordinating
role previously played by the Task Force. FEMA is working in cooperation with HUD and other
lead agencies for the Recovery Support Functions (RSFs) established by National Disaster
Recovery Framework (NDRF).15
Under the NDRF, there are six RSFs, each of which is coordinated by an interagency body called
the Recovery Support Function Leadership Group (RSFLG).16 The six RSFs are:
• Community Planning and Capacity Building, coordinated by FEMA;
• Economic, coordinated by the Department of Commerce;
• Health and Social Services, coordinated by the Department of Health and Human
Services;
• Housing, coordinated by HUD;
• Infrastructure Systems, coordinated by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and
• Cultural and Natural Resources, coordinated by Department of the Interior.
Thus, even though the Task Force itself has formally disbanded, considerable interagency
coordination remains necessary to implement of the recommendations of the HSRS.
(...continued)
147 of HSRS, but also the recommendation for the Small Business Administration to build a “Disaster Prepared ness
and Operations Team to help SBA district offices apply consistent support and access to assistance for disaster
survivors (recommendation 35, p. 96 of HSRS).
12 For examples, see the recommendation to use an allotment of federal public transportation emergency relief funds for
“supporting larger, stand-alone resilience projects in the region” (recommendation 18, p. 69 of HSRS) or the
recommendation to require grantees of the Community Development Block Grant program to support affordable public
housing units (recommendation 28, p. 85 of HSRS).
13 For examples, see the recommendation to create and manage an infrastructure resilient design competition to “help
provide solutions to problems that are too large or too complex for individual towns to solve themselves”
(recommendation 3, p. 44 of HSRS) or the recommendation to encourage increased hazard mitigation activities to
reduce future insurance and infrastructure losses (recommendation 54, p. 121 of HSRS).
14 Section 6(e) of E.O. 13632.
15 See Department of Homeland Security, National Disaster Recovery Framework, Washington, DC, September
2011, at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryFramework/ndrf.pdf.
16 RSFs are akin to the more commonly known “Emergency Support Functions” of the National Response Framework.
Support functions are essentially teams of federal agencies working together to accomplish a set of core capabilities in
a particular mission area. For more on the history of the NDRF and these conceptual models, see CRS Report R42073,
Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jared
T. Brown.
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Table 1. Categorization of Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy Recommendations as of August 2013
Number “in
process,”
Total Number of
Number
“underway,” or
Topic Area as Defined by Task Force
Recommendations
“Adopted”a
other
Example Recommendation from Topic Area
Promoting Resilient Rebuilding Through
3
3
0
(2) Develop a minimum flood risk reduction standard
Innovative Ideas and a Thorough Understanding
for major Federal investment that takes into account
of Current and Future Risk
data on current and future flood risk.
Ensuring a Regionally Coordinated, Resilient
22
16
6
(16) Develop a resilient power strategy for wireless
Approach to Infrastructure Investment
and data communications infrastructure and consumer
equipment.
Restoring and Strengthening Homes and
9
4
5
(31) Encourage and promote the Insurance Institute
Providing Families with Safe, Affordable Housing
for Business and Home Safety (“IBHS”) FORTIFIED
Options
home programs/Resilience STAR development
standards.
Supporting Smal Businesses and Revitalizing
16
12
4
(45) Raise awareness that Treasury’s State Small
Local Economies
Business Credit Initiative (“SSBCI”) Program can be
used for disaster recovery, including Hurricane Sandy
recovery.
Addressing Insurance Chal enges, Understanding,
6
6
0
(55) Continue to assess actuarial soundness of
and Affordability
decreasing premiums based on mitigation activities
other than elevation.
Building State and Local Capacity to Plan for and
5
5
0
(60) Package the variety of existing federal resources
Implement Long-Term Recovery and Rebuilding
and tools related to disaster recovery and create new
ones specific to community planning and capacity
building in order to establish a coordinated suite of
assistance that enhances and streamlines access to the
recovery expertise needed by impacted communities.
CRS-4
Number “in
process,”
Total Number of
Number
“underway,” or
Topic Area as Defined by Task Force
Recommendations
“Adopted”a
other
Example Recommendation from Topic Area
Improving Data Sharing Between Federal, State,
6
4
2
(65) FEMA, HUD, and SBA should adopt a common
and Local Officials
data sharing agreement template so that data
requestors do not have to familiarize themselves with
three separate forms. Attorneys and privacy officials
from these agencies should meet to compare their
current data sharing agreement formats and identify
common boilerplate language that can serve as the
basis for an interagency template. Once drafted, this
template should then be distributed by each agency’s
data sharing steward to the states.
Data Sharing and Accountability: The Program
2
2
0
(69) Document the functions and processes used by
Management Office (PMO)
the Task Force recovery in a “Program Management
Office toolkit,” which could be quickly deployed in the
event of future supplemental funding.
Total 69
52
17
Source: CRS analysis of the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: Stronger Communities, a Resilient Region, Washington, DC, August
2013.
Notes:
a. These numbers reflect the reported status of recommendations in the original publication of the HSRS in August 2013. Since that time, other recommendations may
have been deemed by the Administration as being “adopted.” CRS has requested a formal update from HUD regarding the current implementation status of these
recommendations but has not received one as of the date of publication of this document.
CRS-5
The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: In Brief
Overarching Issues for Congress
Each of the 69 recommendations included in the HSRS document may pose a set of unique issues
for Congress. It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss the particulars of each
recommendation, but several overarching issues for Congress relating to the HSRS and the Task
Force are discussed below.17
Monitoring the Progress of the Rebuilding Strategy
Part of the mandate for the HSRS, as identified in Section 5 of E.O. 13632, was to develop “a
plan for monitoring progress.” This objective is accomplished, as noted by the HSRS, through the
creation of “implementation plans with major milestones for each recommendation and regular
checkpoints for interagency coordination” as well as planned quarterly meetings co-chaired by
the Secretaries of DHS and HUD and attended by other federal agency principals.18
In order to facilitate congressional oversight of the Hurricane Sandy recovery process, Congress
may consider requesting from the Administration both regular briefings on these quarterly
meetings and any available implementation plans for the individual recommendations. Further,
the HSRS identified an entity called the “Sandy Recovery Tracking Team” as being responsible
for monitoring the implementation of the rebuilding strategy. This Tracking Team has assumed
significant responsibilities of the Project Management Office (PMO) of the Task Force.19 As with
the PMO, the Tracking Team is largely resourced by HUD with the support of detailed staff from
FEMA and other federal agencies. As outlined in the E.O. and discussed previously, the NDRF-
established RSFs and RSFLG will be supported by the Sandy Recovery Tracking Team as it
continues many of the responsibilities of the Task Force to coordinate and monitor recovery
progress. It may be of benefit to Congress to evaluate the structure and composition of this
Tracking Team to determine if it is sufficiently resourced to monitor the recovery progress.
Congress also included several provisions in the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L.
113-2), to help monitor the progress and expenditure of funds. Specifically, Section 904 of P.L.
113-220 required federal agencies to submit internal control plans to the Office of Management
and Budget, the Government Accountability Office, the agency’s Inspectors General and House
and Senate Appropriations Committees for all supplemental funding provided to guard against
waste, fraud, and abuse. In addition, the law designated all programs and activities funded
through the legislation as “susceptible to significant improper payments” under the provisions of
the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA).21 This designation requires federal
17 CRS is available to assist Members and Congressional staff as needed to discuss, analyze, or otherwise address
particular recommendations.
18 See p. 155 of the HSRS. Secretary Donovan has reaffirmed this statement in the HSRS that there are specific
implementation plans for each of the recommendations, and that he would be chairing cabinet meetings on quarterly
basis to review progress. See primarily U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development, Recovering from Superstorm Sandy:
Assessing the Progress, Continuing Needs, and Rebuilding Strategy, 113th Cong., 1st sess., September 18, 2013 (pre-
published).
19 For more on the activities Project Management Office, see pp. 148-154 of the HSRS.
20 127 Stat. 17
21 P.L. 107-300, Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, as amended by P.L. 111-204, Improper Payments
(continued...)
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The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: In Brief
agencies to estimate the annual amount of improper payments made under the program and
submit the estimates to Congress annually. Congress also authorized the Recovery and
Transparency Board, which was originally established to track funding through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, to develop and use information technology resources
and oversight mechanisms to detect and remediate waste, fraud, and abuse in the obligation and
expenditure of funds related to Hurricane Sandy.22 However, leadership for the Recovery and
Transparency Board has indicated there are existing challenges in obtaining accurate and
complete Hurricane Sandy spending data and sufficient sub-recipient data for Sandy-related
contracts.23 Despite these limitations, the Recovery and Transparency Board may help Congress
and the Administration monitor and evaluate the Sandy recovery progress in the future.
Applicability of Recommendations to Future Disasters
A majority of recommendations made by the Task Force in the HSRS have been adopted or are in
the process of being implemented for Hurricane Sandy. However, for the recommendations to
apply to future disasters, many of them would require further action either by the executive
branch, Congress, or state and local governments. For example, the Task Force recommended and
adopted a single minimum flood risk reduction standard (i.e., a flood elevation standard) for
major federal investments for Hurricane Sandy.24 To be applicable for future disasters, the HSRS
notes that the White House’s National Security Staff will “coordinate a policy effort to update
flood risk reduction standards for Federally-funded projects beyond the Sandy-affected region.”
This policy effort may involve significant revisions of existing rulemakings and internal policy
guidance across several federal agencies, including DOT, EPA, FEMA, HHS, and HUD, before
an effective minimum flood risk reduction standard is available for future disasters. For instance,
HUD published a final rule with regard to this initiative on November 15, 2013.25 This
recommendation relating to flood risk reduction is one of many lessons learned by the Task Force
that could, in theory, be applied by the executive branch to future disasters.26 Other
(...continued)
Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010. For more, see CRS Report R42878, Improper Payments and Recovery Audits:
Legislation, Implementation, and Analysis, by Garrett Hatch.
22 For more on the Recovery and Transparency Board’s activities related to Hurricane Sandy oversight, see one of their
quarterly reports to Congress, Recovery and Transparency Board, “Quarterly Report to Congress on Activities Related
to Hurricane Sandy Funds,” April-June 2013, at http://www.recovery.gov/About/board/Documents/
Quarterly%20Report%20to%20Congress%20April%20-June2013.pdf. For more on the history of the Recovery and
Transparency Board, see CRS Report R40572, General Oversight Provisions in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA): Requirements and Related Issues, by Clinton T. Brass.
23 See the testimony of Kathleen S. Tighe, Chairperson of the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board in U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Emergency
Management, Intergovernmental Relations and the District of Columbia, One Year Later: Examining the Ongoing
Recovery From Hurricane Sandy, 113th Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 2013 (pre-published).
24 See recommendation 2 (p. 41) of the HSRS, and Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, “Federal Government Sets
Uniform Flood Risk Reduction Standard for Sandy Rebuilding Projects,” press release, April 4, 2013,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/sandyrebuilding/FRRS.
25 Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Floodplain Management and Protection of Wetlands,” 78 Federal
Register 68719, November 15, 2013.
26 Other examples that may require further action by the executive branch to be applied to future disasters include, but
are not limited to: recommendations 21 and 22, on financing and valuing of green infrastructure (pp. 74-76);
recommendation 28, on the use of CDBG-DR monies to support public housing (pp. 85); recommendation 52, on
reducing consumer confusion over their risk and insurance coverage (pp. 116-118), and recommendation 62, on the
creation of a central data repository for disaster-related information (pp. 140-141) of the HSRS.
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The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: In Brief
recommendations may require congressional action to be applied to future disasters, especially
recommendations relating to small business recovery.27 Still others would require the cooperation
of the tribal, state, and local governments in the region affected or impacted by a disaster.28
Implementation of many of the recommendations for future disasters would require maintaining
the impetus and political will engendered by Hurricane Sandy. Though each recommendation is
subject to unique challenges, in general, effective implementation would require a coordinated
regulatory and policy-review process among numerous federal agencies. Given many known and
unknown future challenges that may arise in the next few years, Congress may wish to continue
its oversight of the Sandy recovery process with an appreciation for the recovery process’s impact
on the nation’s future disaster recovery capacity. Congress may also wish to develop specific
legislative proposals, or request them from the Administration, to address statutory challenges
raised during the process of implementing the recommendations of the HSRS. For instance, the
HSRS recommends that federal agencies work to “Mitigate future impacts to the liquid fuels
supply chain like those experienced during the Sandy recovery.”29 As the Administration
implements this recommendation for future disasters, Congress may determine that new statutory
authorities are required to encourage investments by the private sector to protect the liquid fuel
supply, or that more grant funding is required to invest in mitigation measures for the supply
chain, or that there are existing statutory impediments to the development of mitigation measures,
or other legislative requirements.
Future Management of Long-Term Disaster Recovery Efforts for
Other Catastrophes
Though the consequences and damages wrought by Hurricane Sandy were relatively
unprecedented in the recent history of the impacted Northeast region, they were not without
precedent. One of many lessons learned in responding to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes of 2005
(Katrina, Rita, and Wilma), was that the long-term disaster recovery process from a catastrophic
disaster could be just as difficult and daunting, if not more so, than the immediate response
process. In recognition of these challenges, Congress mandated, and the executive branch
ultimately produced, the National Disaster Recovery Framework to serve as a guide to recovery
efforts after major disasters and emergencies.30 The Administration saw the need to complement
the NDRF with the creation of the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force. As stated in the E.O.
establishing the Task Force, the Administration felt that a “disaster of Hurricane Sandy’s
magnitude merits a comprehensive and collaborative approach to the long-term rebuilding plans
for this critical region and its infrastructure.”31 Therefore, the Administration directed the Task
Force to collaborate with the leadership of the NDRF to “identify opportunities for achieving
rebuilding success, consistent with the NDRF’s commitment to support economic vitality,
27 For example, recommendations 38 and 39 of the HSRS call for changes to existing statutory authorities for SBA
programs (p. 100).
28 For example, recommendation 25 of the HSRS calls for the on the adoption of the most recent internationally
accredited building codes (p. 80).
29 Recommendation 13 of HSRS, p. 64.
30 6 U.S.C. §771.
31 Executive Order 13632, “Establishing the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force,” 77 Federal Register 74341,
December 14, 2012, p. 1.
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The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: In Brief
enhance public health and safety, protect and enhance natural and manmade infrastructure, and
ensure appropriate accountability.”32
With the objective of improving the nation’s preparedness for and recovery from future disasters,
Congress may wish to evaluate whether an entity in the nature of the Hurricane Sandy Task Force
is necessary to “achieve rebuilding success” from disasters with the magnitude of Hurricane
Sandy. This evaluation could begin with a review of the successes and failures of the Hurricane
Sandy Task Force. It may also involve an assessment of the sufficiency the organizational
structures and policies of the NDRF to manage the rebuilding process without the ad hoc creation
of Task Force entity for each catastrophic event. Notably, it was the NDRF’s strategic intention to
be “a guide to promote effective recovery, particularly for those incidents that are large-scale or
catastrophic.”33 There is no mention within the NDRF’s guidance of a projected need for such a
Task Force. If Congress finds that the Task Force was both necessary and successful, it may
encourage future Administrations to establish similar entities for future disasters (or increase the
robustness of the NDRF to provide the benefits of a Task Force). In reverse, if the evaluation is
less favorable to the Task Force, future Administrations may be less inclined to use the model
concept.
Author Contact Information
Jared T. Brown
Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy
jbrown@crs.loc.gov, 7-4918
32 Ibid.
33 Department of Homeland Security, National Disaster Recovery Framework, Washington, DC, September 2011, p. 1,
at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryFramework/ndrf.pdf.
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