Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
February 6, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL34170
Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
This report provides an overview and analysis of U.S.-Yemeni relations amidst evolving political
change in Yemeni leadership, ongoing U.S. counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operatives at large in Yemen’s hinterlands, and international efforts to
bolster the country’s stability despite an array of daunting socio-economic problems. Congress
and U.S. policymakers may be concerned with prospects for stabilizing Yemen and establishing
strong bilateral relations with future Yemeni leaders.
On November 23, 2011, after eleven months of protests and violence that claimed over 2,000
lives, then President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen signed on to a U.S.-backed, Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC)-brokered transition plan. In line with the plan, Yemen held a presidential election
in February 2012 with one consensus candidate on the ballot—former Vice President Abed Rabbo
Mansour al Hadi. He received 6.6 million votes and, on February 25, 2012, he was inaugurated
before parliament.
Many Administration officials have declared that AQAP, the Yemeni-based terrorist organization
that has attempted on several occasions to attack the U.S. homeland, is the most lethal of the Al
Qaeda affiliates. In recent years, the Administration and Congress have supported an increased
U.S. commitment of resources to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts there. Many analysts
assert that Yemen is becoming a failed state and safe haven for Al Qaeda operatives and as such
should be considered an active theater for U.S. counterterrorism operations. Given Yemen’s
contentious political climate and its myriad development challenges, most long-time Yemen
watchers suggest that security problems emanating from Yemen may persist in spite of increased
U.S. or international efforts to combat them.
Overall, the Obama Administration remains cautiously optimistic about Yemen’s trajectory. The
State Department reports that the United States has committed $256 million in assistance to
Yemen to date in FY2013, in addition to the more than $356 million allocated in FY2012. In
December 2013, the Department of Defense notified Congress of its intent to spend $64 million
in FY2014 Section 1206 funds on precision strike aircraft, unmanned aerial surveillance, and
training for Yemen’s national military forces. P.L. 113-76, the FY2014 Omnibus Appropriations
Act, states that “None of the funds appropriated by this Act for assistance for Yemen may be
made available for the Armed Forces of Yemen if such forces are controlled by a foreign terrorist
organization, as designated pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”
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Contents
Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 1
Yemen’s Ongoing Political Transition ............................................................................................. 2
Restructuring the Yemeni Armed Forces ................................................................................... 4
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).................................................................................... 4
The Economy, Sustainable Development, and International Aid .................................................... 6
International and Saudi Arabian Aid to Yemen ......................................................................... 7
Iranian Involvement in Yemen? ................................................................................................. 7
Obama Administration Policy toward Yemen .................................................................................. 8
Yemeni Detainees at Guantanamo Bay ..................................................................................... 9
U.S. Assistance ........................................................................................................................ 10
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Yemen .................................................................................................................. 2
Figure 1. Yemen’s Political Transition ............................................................................................. 3
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid Allocations to Yemen, FY2009-FY2014 Request ................................ 11
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 11
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Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations
Overview
Violent unrest threatened to drag Yemen back into civil war in 2011, but in the years since, the
country has undergone one of the only relatively peaceful transitions in the wider region—from
the rule of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh1 to what many hope will be a pluralistic
democracy. Under interim President Abed Rabbo Mansour al Hadi and with the backing of the
international community, the transition process is moving forward. However, Yemen’s political
transition is incomplete, competing power brokers continue to shape events, and Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Shiite insurgents2 still threaten the security of the state. President
Hadi has somewhat curtailed the power of independent officers and Saleh relatives in the military.
During Hadi’s tenure, Yemen has completed a National Dialogue Conference (see below), one of
the most representative political bodies in its history.
Yemen is still threatened by terrorist and regional insurgent violence and racked by systemic
socio-economic and environmental problems, including food and water scarcity. Key
international actors—such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), European Union, Japan, and
the United States—appear to be largely united in seeking a successful transition in Yemen.
Donors pledged more than $7.5 billion to Yemen in late 2012, of which nearly half came from
Saudi Arabia, which has historically sought to limit the potential for its more populous neighbor
to threaten the kingdom’s security.
Though Yemen may be moving quietly forward, its long term, interrelated challenges remain
daunting. If the political transition3 does not proceed in a timely fashion, many analysts expect
regional insurrections in the north and south4 to intensify. Without physical security, the country
1 On November 23, 2011, after 11 months of protests and violence that claimed over 2,000 lives, then-President Ali
Abdullah Saleh of Yemen signed on to a U.S.-backed, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-brokered transition plan. As
part of the plan and in return for his resignation, Saleh and his family were granted immunity from prosecution and the
former president was able to retain his role as head of the General People's Congress (GPC), the former ruling party.
After a 90-day transition period, Yemen held a presidential "election" in February 2012 with one consensus candidate
on the ballot—former Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour al Hadi. Al Hadi received 6.6 million votes and, on
February 25, 2012, was inaugurated as president.
2 In the north, a revolt has been raging for nearly a decade in the northernmost governorate of Saa'da. This is often
referred to as the Al Houthi conflict because it is led by the Al Houthi family, a prominent Zaydi religious clan who
claim descent from the prophet Mohammed. Houthis believe that Zaydi Shiism and the Zaydi community have become
marginalized in Yemeni society for a variety of reasons, including government neglect of Saa'da governorate and Saudi
Arabian “Wahhabi” or “Salafi” proselytizing in Saa'da. They have repeatedly fought the Yemeni central government.
In 2009, the Houthis fought both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government staged a cross border military
intervention inside Yemen in response to reported infiltration by Al Houthi fighters into southern Saudi Arabia. Since
late 2013, Houthi-Salafi clashes have reignited in the north, leading to the death of over 200 people and raising the
possibility of wider civil conflict during a delicate period of transition. The town of Dammaj has been the focal point
for these clashes due to the presence there of a Saudi-backed Salafi seminary which often functions both as a religious
institution and military base.
3 A recent New York Times article notes that former President Saleh still plays a powerful political role from behind the
scenes. According to the report, “Even the current president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who was Mr. Saleh's deputy
for 18 years, has accused him of orchestrating the attacks on oil and power lines that scourge Yemen's economy and
cast an aura of incompetence on the new administration. Diplomats at the United Nations have accused '’elements of
the former regime’' of playing an obstructive role, and have even hinted at possible sanctions on the former president.”
See, “Even out of Office, a Wielder of Great Power in Yemen,” New York Times, January 31, 2014.
4 Southern Yemenis have long been disaffected because of their perceived second-class status in a unified state from
which many of their leaders tried to secede during the civil war in 1994. Civil unrest in Yemen's southern governorates
(continued...)
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cannot attract foreign investment, the government cannot spur economic growth, and political
unrest may recur.
Figure 1. Map of Yemen
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS (July 2010).
Yemen’s Ongoing Political Transition
In January 2014, after ten months of talks, Yemen’s National Dialogue, a forum intended to reach
broad national consensus on a new political order, officially concluded without agreement
between northern and southern politicians on how to organize a new federal system of
governance. Yemen was formerly divided into two states, northern and southern, and the two
regions fought a bitter conflict after unification in the early 1990s. The holding of a United
Nations-backed National Dialogue Conference has been part of Yemen’s overall political
(...continued)
reemerged in 2007, when civil servants and military officers from the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
(PDRY) began protesting low salaries and the lack of promised pensions. Since then, what started as a series of
demonstrations against low or non-existent government wages has turned into a broader "movement," known as the
Southern Mobility Movement (SMM or, in Arabic, Al Harakat al Janubi or Hirak). The SMM is divided between
secessionist forces, federalists, those seeking external aid, and southern nationalists who disavow foreign support for
their cause.
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transition from the regime of former President Saleh to a supposed democratic system of
governance. The conference brought 565 representatives from Yemen's various political groups
together to reach agreement on thorny political issues, such as power sharing between northern
and southern regions, among other things.
Figure 2. Yemen’s Political Transition
Source: CRS Graphics.
The conference, which was supposed to end four months earlier according to the official
transition timeline, concluded with President Hadi forming a committee (which he will lead) to
determine whether Yemen should be divided into two or six federal regions. Southern Yemenis
favor a two-region system, believing it will put them on more equal footing with the traditionally
more politically dominant north while securing their access to a larger share of Yemen’s oil
resources, which are located in the south. As the dialogue was wrapping up, one delegate from the
disaffected northern region of Sa’ada was shot dead on his way to the conference. On the same
day, another delegate from the country’s main Islamist party was targeted in a car bomb but was
unharmed.
Yemen’s entire political transition was to end in February 2014, but at the conclusion of the
National Dialogue, participants supported a presidential decree extending President Hadi’s term
by another year, presumably until February 2015. According to Jamal Benomar, the United
Nations Special Adviser on Yemen, “The old regime is still very deep and some elements feel that
they have been induced to give up a lot....They have a lot of resources and believe they can turn
back the clock. The gains achieved in this transition could easily evaporate.”5 Yemeni legislators
and other politicians have yet to write a new constitution, hold a public referendum on its
approval, write a new electoral law, and hold presidential and parliamentary elections. In sum,
Yemen’s transition could take several additional years.
5 “Yemen Transition aims for Consensus over Confrontation,” Financial Times, February 4, 2014.
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Restructuring the Yemeni Armed Forces
In addition to the challenge of reaching agreement on power sharing between regions and the
capital, one of the hardest tasks in Yemen’s incomplete transition is to tackle the issue of civil-
military relations. The United States and most other international actors favor helping move the
country away from a system in which control of the armed forces is in the hands of individual
warlords and toward centralized control by elected officials. President Hadi has adeptly and
gradually been removing former Saleh family members from the heads of Yemen’s various
security agencies. In 2013, Hadi appointed Saleh’s son Ahmed, who headed the Republican
Guard, as Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. Another potential rival, Major General Ali
Mushin al Ahmar, was appointed adviser to the president for military and security affairs. Hadi
then dissolved the Republican Guard entirely and merged its troops into the regular armed forces.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
The U.S. intelligence community continues to assess that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a
U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (designated in 20106) operating in Yemen, poses a
significant threat to homeland security and U.S. interests overseas.7 AQAP has attempted on
several occasions to bomb U.S. commercial aircraft and indoctrinate what the intelligence
community refers to as “homegrown violent extremists” or HVEs. For the past two years, AQAP
has been particularly focused on destabilizing the internationally backed interim Yemeni
government, which the group perceives as a tool of Western and Gulf Arab power.
Recent AQAP attempted plots and attacks, or attempts by U.S. citizens to assist AQAP, include:
• In December 2013, a Yemeni court convicted several AQAP members for
attempting to assassinate President Hadi by planting remote-activated road-side
bombs, which were found and dismantled by security forces.
• In December 2013, AQAP launched a massive assault against a Yemeni Defense
Ministry hospital, killing 52 people. However, the group issued an apology for
the attack, claiming that a rogue commander disobeyed the group’s orders not to
carry out the assault against the hospital. Qassim al Raim, AQAP’s military
commander, stated that “Now we acknowledge our mistake and guilt....We offer
our apology and condolences to the victims' families. We accept full
responsibility for what happened in the hospital and will pay blood money for the
victims' families.”8
6 In December 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control added Yemeni politician
Abdulwahab al Homayqani to its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, alleging that he has funneled money to
AQAP, helped it recruit new members, and directed attacks against the Yemeni armed forces. However, al Homayqni
has a significant degree of Yemeni public support and, according to one report, interim President Hadi has said that he
would not extradite al Homayqani if requested by the United States government. See, “US Treasury labels prominent
Yemeni Politician a Terrorist,” Christian Science Monitor, February 3, 2014.
7 Statement for the Record, James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the
US Intelligence Community,” Open Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on “Current and
Projected National Security Threats Against the United States,” January 29, 2014.
8 “Al Qaeda Branch in Yemen Regrets Hospital Attack,” New York Times, December 23, 2013.
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• In December 2013, 58-year-old Kansas resident Terry Loewen was arrested for
plotting to bomb the Mid-Continent Airport in Wichita, Kansas. Loewen was
arrested by undercover FBI agents while attempting to use his vehicle in what he
thought was a suicide mission. He has been charged with attempting to provide
material support to AQAP.
• In October 2013, U.S. officials arrested 25-year-old Marcos Alonso Zea for
attempting to travel to Yemen and join AQAP.
For the United States, eliminating the threat
posed by trans-national terrorism emanating
AQAP Plot against the U.S. Embassy in
from Yemen is a key national security priority.
Yemen
Numerous public reports have stated that the
Multiple news services have revealed that U.S.
U.S. government has employed unmanned
intelligence services intercepted a phone call in late July
2013 between the leader of Al Qaeda’s global network,
aerial aircraft and other military platforms to
Ayman al Zawahri and AQAP’s leader Nasser al
conduct kinetic strikes against high value
Wuhayshi, in which the former urged the latter to carry
targets from within the leadership of AQAP. In
out large scale terrorist attacks against the United States.
addition, United States military and
In response, Wuhayshi vowed to carry out an attack that
intelligence personnel have worked closely
would “change the face of history,” leading the U.S. State
Department to take immediate precautionary measures
with Yemeni counterparts to train, equip, and
of issuing a worldwide travel alert and suspending
assist Yemeni ground forces in reclaiming
operations in 19 Muslim countries including in Yemen.
territory seized in 2011 by AQAP militants.
Many analysts believe that the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a was
Over the past few years, Yemeni forces have
the main intended target of AQAP’s terrorist plot. The
somewhat succeeded in driving AQAP
State Department also sent home non-emergency
personnel and urged U.S. citizens currently living in
militants out of populated areas in certain
Yemen to depart immediately. Fol owing the intercept,
southern provinces, and alleged U.S. strikes
U.S. military and intelligence agencies reportedly carried
have degraded AQAP’s leadership, including
out multiple drone strikes against AQAP targets.9 In
the 2013 AQAP confirmation of the killing of
October 2013, militants killed a German security guard
employed by the German embassy as he was leaving a
its second-in-command—Saudi national Said
supermarket.
al Shihri.10 However, as a result of their
displacement from the southern provinces,
AQAP militants have trickled back into the capital and continue to fight asymmetrically.11
Some AQAP terrorists remain at large, including Saudi national Ibrahim Hassan al Asiri, who
reportedly constructed the “underwear bomb” in the attempted destruction of an airliner in 2009
and a parcel bomb intercepted by British and Saudi intelligence on its way to the United States in
2010. According to John Pistole, head of the U.S. Transportation Security Administration, Asiri
has trained other bombers in his methods, and another one of his plots, to destroy an aircraft
bound for the United States, was foiled in 2012.12
9 “Embassies Open, but Yemen Stays on Terror Watch,” New York Times, August 11, 2013.
10 According to Katherine Zimmerman of the American Enterprise Institute, “The U.S. has been extremely successful
at killing al Qaeda, AQAP, and TTP senior leadership.... In Yemen, it has killed senior leader Anwar al Awlaki, USS
Cole bombers Abdul Munim al Fathani and Fahd al Quso, AQAP senior operative Mohamed Said al Umdah, spiritual
leader Adil al Abab, and deputy leader Said al Shihri. AQAP and the TTP have both been able to regenerate leadership,
limiting the long-term impact of U.S. operations. See, Statement of Katherine L. Zimmerman Senior Analyst, Critical
Threats Project American Enterprise Institute, Committee on House Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, September 18, 2013.
11 Katherine Zimmerman, “Yemen Crisis Situation Reports: Update 142,” AEI Critical Threats Project, July 11, 2012.
12 “Saudi Suspect in Underwear Bomb Plots Trained Others, U.S. says,” Reuters, July 19, 2013.
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There is a debate over whether alleged U.S. targeted killing of AQAP militants on Yemeni
territory is causing a public backlash against the United States that could ultimately limit U.S.
counter-terrorism operations there. Several reported U.S. operations have resulted in the deaths of
civilians in Yemen over a period of several years and some Yemeni citizens and political leaders
have remained outspoken in their criticism of the United States and of the Yemeni government for
its cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism agencies. Most recently, in December 2013, a drone
strike killed 15 Yemenis traveling in a wedding party. The intended target had been AQAP
commander Shawqi Ali Ahmad al Badani, who had allegedly plotted to attack the U.S. Embassy
(see above). The British-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism claims that 61-99 people were
killed in 16 confirmed drone strikes in Yemen in 2013, and 11-29 of them may have been
civilians.13 After the alleged errant strike against the wedding party, Christof Heyns, United
Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, remarked that “if
armed drones are to be used, states must adhere to international humanitarian law, and should
disclose the legal basis for their operational responsibility and criteria for targeting.” In December
2013, Yemen's parliament voted to immediately end U.S. drone strikes in Yemen.
The Economy, Sustainable Development, and
International Aid
For years, government neglect, corruption, illiteracy, and population growth have led Yemenis to
pursue apparently unsustainable economic development policies. The country now faces extreme
water and food scarcity, as ground water reserves are being exhausted due to inefficient
agricultural usage and the cultivation of qat, a narcotic plant chewed throughout Yemen and the
Horn of Africa. In the capital Sana’a in 2011, the rate of water consumption from the local water
basin exceeded the rate of natural recharge by a factor of five, and many analysts predict that
Sana’a will lack its own ground water resources by 2025.14
Government subsidies of oil have led to wasteful consumption, oil smuggling, and huge fiscal
deficits. The country lacks the most basic infrastructure, and the economy relies almost
exclusively on small subsistence agriculture, remittances, and—most importantly—oil
production. Revenues from oil royalties account for between 50%-60% of state revenues. Energy
exports account for 87% of exports, making it effectively the only source of foreign currency
earnings. If oil production were to dramatically decline or if terrorist attacks hampered investment
in the energy sector, the Yemeni government would be deprived of its main source of revenue.
Repeated conflicts throughout the country also have led to widespread humanitarian suffering.
According to various figures from international agencies, 10.5 million Yemenis out of a
population of 24.8 million are designated as “food insecure.” Some 13.1 million Yemenis
reportedly lack access to safe drinking water and sanitation.15 In the province of Abyan, which
13 “US drones killed no more than 4 civilians in Pakistan in '13: study,” Reuters, January 21, 2014.
14 “How Yemen Chewed Itself Dry,” Foreign Affairs, July 23, 2013.
15 http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/07.11.13%20-%20USAID-
DCHA%20Yemen%20Complex%20Emergency%20Fact%20Sheet%20_9%20-%20FY%202013.pdf
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has been wracked by AQAP-instigated violence, an estimated 82% of the population is food
insecure.16
International and Saudi Arabian Aid to Yemen
Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world and due to government subsidies on water and
fuel, it runs high fiscal deficits which require external financing to support. Currently, the fiscal
deficit is projected to be nearly 6.8% of GDP, which grew by a mere 0.1% in 2012 after
contracting 10.5% in 2011.
Since taking office, President Obama has recognized that the United States cannot be solely
responsible for Yemen's development and security. In order to increase donor coordination and
widen the scope of support, the United States and Great Britain helped form the Friends of Yemen
Group, a multilateral forum of 24 concerned countries that was launched at a January 2010
conference in London. In late September 2012, donors pledged $1.5 billion for civil society and
development at the Friends of Yemen Conference held in New York. Earlier in the month, donors
pledged $6.4 billion for post-election economic reconstruction at a conference in Riyadh co-
hosted by Saudi Arabia (which pledged $3.25 billion), Yemen, and the World Bank. Donors
include China, France, Russia, Britain, the United States, and members of the GCC.
Despite these pledges, it remains unclear exactly how and along what time frame the funds will
be disbursed to a nascent government lacking infrastructure and authority. To date, only $2.2
billion of $7.9 billion pledged has been disbursed to Yemen. Disbursement of international aid
also is related to concerns of domestic corruption. The Yemeni economy, its political system, and
its tribal and military elites are intertwined in a political patronage system that makes reform
efforts difficult. Control over state resources provides power brokers with authority and creates
channels of influence and obligation that, if upset, can prove politically disruptive. Yemen was
ranked 156 of 176 countries in Transparency International’s 2012 corruption perception index.
Although the Friends of Yemen process indicates some degree of international support for
Yemen’s development, Saudi Arabia is, by far, Yemen’s most important economic benefactor.
Saudi Arabia has long sought to shape political and security conditions in Yemen as a means of
preventing discrete threats from emerging on the kingdom's southern flank. The Saudi royal
family has general concerns that a united Yemen, which is more populous than its northern
neighbor, could one day challenge Saudi hegemony on the Arabian Peninsula. In the more
immediate term, Saudi Arabia seeks to prevent Yemeni-based terrorists from conducting attacks
inside the kingdom, Houthi rebels from establishing a Zaydi Shiite theocracy in Yemen’s northern
Saa'da governorate, and Iran from meddling inside Yemen. Saudi Arabia contributed several
billion dollars in cash and fuel to Yemen between 2011 and 2012, but on October 22, the kingdom
said that its aid to Yemen was currently on hold until “things settle down there.” It is unknown
why Saudi Arabia chose to withhold its aid to Yemen.
Iranian Involvement in Yemen?
Iran may be exploiting long standing Yemeni regional grievances in the northern Houthi areas
and former Southern Yemen in order to counter Saudi influence in Yemen. For years, Yemeni
16 Humanitarian Bulletin Yemen: OCHA, Issue #19, September 5 – October 5, 2013.
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leaders claimed that Iran has meddled in Yemeni affairs by supporting secessionist movements.
Analysts long considered these claims to be exaggerated and aimed at attracting more financial
aid from Gulf Arab states opposed to Iran. However, in recent years, there have been U.S. reports
detailing alleged increased Iranian activity in Yemen. In the south, Ali Salim al Bid, the leader of
the secessionist Southern Mobility Movement, has boasted publicly of his movement's
willingness to accept assistance “from any regional actor”—a formulation widely interpreted to
refer to Iran.17 An unnamed U.S. official reportedly said in 2012 that Iranian smugglers backed by
the Quds Force (an elite unit of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps) are using small boats to ship
AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades and other arms to replace older weapons used by Houthi
rebels in the north, who belong to the Zaydi branch of Shi'ite Islam and have long sought regional
autonomy.18 In January 2013, the Yemeni Coast Guard intercepted a boat smuggling arms,
explosives and antiaircraft missiles. Yemeni authorities claimed that the weapons came from Iran,
and Yemeni and Western officials suspect the arms were bound for both southern and northern
militants.19 Moreover, Hezbollah has reportedly provided financial aid and media training to
southern Yemeni leaders in exile in Beirut, Lebanon.20
Obama Administration Policy toward Yemen
Overall, the Obama Administration remains cautiously optimistic about Yemen’s trajectory. The
Administration has encouraged the United Nations, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the
Friends of Yemen to take the lead in marshaling international support for Yemen’s transition
process. Upon the official completion of Yemen’s National Dialogue in January 2014, the State
Department issued a statement noting:
While significant progress has been made, the work of Yemen’s democratic transition is not
complete. The United States remains firmly committed to supporting the Yemeni people and
the government, under the leadership of President Hadi, as they work to implement the
National Dialogue recommendations and subsequent stages of the transition process,
including constitutional reform and national elections. We encourage all Yemenis to work in
the spirit of compromise to advance stability, prosperity and security now and for future
generations.21
Under the rule of former President Saleh, the United States and Yemen had a contentious
relationship with regard to terrorism-related issues. U.S. policymakers were repeatedly frustrated
by Saleh’s lack of attention to the issue or even direct obstruction of U.S. efforts to counter
AQAP. However, with the election of President Hadi, the United States has found a more willing
partner in the effort to disrupt AQAP’s ability to conduct international attacks and to fight a
domestic insurgency. According to Daniel Benjamin, former Coordinator for Counterterrorism at
17 Open Source Center Analysis: Yemen -- Southern Movement Overtures to Iran Spark Controversy, Document ID#
GMF20120117256001 Yemen -- OSC Analysis in English, January 17, 2012.
18 Eric Schmitt and Robert F. Worth, “With Arms for Yemen Rebels, Iran Seeks Wider Mideast Role,” New York
Times, March 15, 2012.
19 “Fears Grow Over Yemenis' Ties to Iran,” Wall Street Journal Europe, June 20, 2013.
20 Ibid.
21 U.S. Department of State, “Conclusion of National Dialogue in Yemen,” Press Statement, Marie Harf, Deputy
Department Spokesperson, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, January 25, 2014.
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the United States Department of State, “He [Hadi] is everything his predecessor wasn't in terms of
his determination, his understanding of the threat ... his determination to destroy Al Qaeda.”22
Counterterrorism in Yemen:To What End?
As in other global theaters for U.S. counterterrorism operations such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. involvement in
Yemen has raised broader questions related to both U.S. tactics and strategy, such as:
Do alleged U.S. air strikes against terrorist targets in Yemen alienate the local population, strengthen nationalist
and anti-American forces there, and cause too much col ateral damage—thereby exacerbating the terrorism
threat over the long term? What alternatives do U.S. policymakers have to pursuing terrorists targeting the
United States on foreign soil? How deep a terrorist network does AQAP have and will it be able to replenish its
ranks? Can AQAP be compromised by foreign intelligence services or co-opted by the Yemeni government?
Given al the chal enges facing Yemen, for how long do U.S. policymakers expect to wage counter-terrorism
operations there? How does the United States define success?
Yemeni Detainees at Guantanamo Bay
The continued incarceration of Yemeni prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has long been a
source of tension in U.S.-Yemeni relations. The Yemeni government has sought to repatriate and
rehabilitate Yemenis detained at Guantanamo; however, U.S. officials have indicated concern that
the Yemeni government, due to public pressure from Islamists, would be unable to properly
detain and/or monitor returnees. The Obama Administration suspended repatriations to Yemen
after the December 25, 2009, failed airline bomb attack by AQAP. In May 2013, President Obama
stated his intention to close the detention facility and lift the moratorium against repatriating
Yemenis. Amongst the 166 prisoners there, at least 89 are Yemeni nationals, of whom 55 have
been cleared to return to Yemen and are expected to be transferred on a case-by-case basis. Some
Yemeni prisoners were on hunger strikes to alert the public of their situation, and perhaps 17
Yemeni prisoners were reportedly force-fed by prison authorities.
According to one report, the United States and Yemen are conducting negotiations over the
construction of a detention facility inside Yemen that would potentially house some Yemeni
prisoners currently incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay.23 Reportedly, both sides disagree over the
funding for the facility and whether it would function as a traditional prison or as a “halfway
house” for detainees to transition back into society.
For years, the United States and Yemen have discussed establishing a rehabilitation program in
Yemen similar to the one operated by Saudi Arabia that uses clerics and social support networks
to de-radicalize and monitor prisoners. Between 2002 and 2005, former Yemeni Religious Affairs
Minister and Supreme Court Justice Hamoud al Hittar ran an unsuccessful “dialogue” program
with Yemeni Islamists in which he attempted to convince prisoners that jihad in Islam is for
defense, not for offensive attacks. More than 360 militants were released after going through the
program, but there was almost no post-release support, such as helping the detainees find jobs and
wives, key elements of the Saudi initiative. Several graduates of the program returned to violence,
including three of the seven men identified as participants in the September 2008 bombing of the
22 “Analysis: Yemen Leader basks in U.S. Favor as Drone Strikes Fuel Rage,” Reuters, August 13, 2013.
23 “U.S. Holds talks about Yemen Detention Center for Guantanamo Inmates,” Los Angeles Times, November 6, 2013.
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Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations
U.S. Embassy in Yemen. Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the world and has repeatedly
sought U.S. funding for any formal rehabilitation program.
U.S. Assistance
In annual foreign operations legislation, Congress does not typically earmark aid to Yemen, but
the Administration makes country-specific requests for congressional consideration. After the
passage of a foreign operations appropriations bill, federal agencies such as the State Department
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocate funds to Yemen from
multiple aid accounts. They then submit a country allocation report (653a Report) to Congress for
review. Unlike much larger regional recipients of U.S. assistance such as Israel, Egypt, Jordan,
and the Palestinians, which receive funds from two or three main aid accounts, U.S. aid to Yemen
in any given fiscal year can come from as many as 17 different aid programs managed by
multiple agencies, including the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Defense. In
June 2013, the Department of Defense notified Congress of its intent to spend $47.3 million in
FY2013 Section 1206 funding for counterterrorism security assistance in Yemen. This includes
funds for Seabird Seeker Aircraft, Jeeps, and electronic and communications equipment. In
December 2013, the Department of Defense notified Congress of its intent to spend $64 million
in FY2014 Section 1206 funds on precision strike aircraft, unmanned aerial surveillance, and
training for Yemen’s national military forces.
The State Department reports that the United States has committed $256 million in assistance to
Yemen to date in FY2013, in addition to the more than $356 million allocated in FY2012.
However, CRS can account for most but not all of these allocations. Program details are available
in congressional aid obligation notification documents provided to the authorizing and
appropriation committees of jurisdiction.
P.L. 113-76, the FY2014 Omnibus Appropriations Act, states that “None of the funds
appropriated by this Act for assistance for Yemen may be made available for the Armed Forces of
Yemen if such forces are controlled by a foreign terrorist organization, as designated pursuant to
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”
Congressional Research Service
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Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Aid Allocations to Yemen, FY2009-FY2014 Request
$s in millions
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
Account
FY2009
FY2010
FY2011
Est.
Est.
Est.
1206 (DoD)
67.0
155.3
0
37.426
47.3
64.0
P.L. 112-81
0
0
0
75.0
NA
0
FMF
(DoS)
3.0 13.0
20.0 20.0
18.989 20.0
INCLE (DoS)
0
1.0
1.8
11.0
5.001
3.0
NADR
(DoS)
2.225 6.025
4.5 3.750 6.098
0
IMET
(DoS)
1.00 1.153
1.100 1.064 1.044 1.1
ESF (DoS)
20.0
5.0
55.0
36.606
16.881
45.0
DA (USAID)
11.0
35.0
0
0
8.312
0
GHCS (USAID)
3.0
8.0
9.0
7.989
8.345
9.5
Food for Peace
2.0 13.0
20.0
67.856
75.046
0
(USAID)
CCF (DoS)
0
12.807
0
0
NA
0
MRA (DoS)
10.0
13.0
23.0
19.738
18.885
0
ERMA (DoS)
0
7.800
0
0
NA
0
IDA
(USAID)
.599 10.928
20.212 45.094 36.987
0
TI
(DoS)
0 5.492
3.850 3.050 NA
0
1207 0
10.034
0
0
NA
0
MEPI (DoS)
1.958
0.332
n/a
0
NA
0
CMM (USAID)
1.600
1.200
0
0
NA
0
DCHA
(USAID) 0 0 1.250 0
NA 0
Total
123.382
299.071
159.70
328.573
242.888
142.6
Source: U.S. State Department and Government Accountability Office, Report Number GAO-12-432R.
Notes: FY2012 and FY2013 totals are incomplete.
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
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