The European Parliament
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
February 4, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS21998


The European Parliament

Summary
The 766-member European Parliament (EP) is a key institution of the European Union (EU), a
unique political and economic partnership composed of 28 member states. The EP is the only EU
institution that is directly elected. Although the EP does not formally initiate EU legislation, it
plays a significant role in the EU’s legislative and budgeting processes, and works closely with
the two other main EU bodies, the European Commission and the Council of the European Union
(also known as the Council of Ministers).
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are organized into political groups, which caucus
according to political ideology rather than nationality. The EP’s standing committees are key
actors in the adoption of EU legislation, and EP delegations maintain international parliament-to-
parliament relations. The EP is led by a President, who oversees its work and represents the EP
externally. MEPs serve five-year terms. The last EP elections were held in June 2009; the next EP
elections are expected in May 2014. Voting for the EP takes place on a national basis. Some
analysts suggest that the recent rise of anti-EU populist parties in several EU member states may
have significant implications for the upcoming EP elections and the composition of the next EP.
Once limited to being a consultative assembly, the EP has accumulated more power over time.
Experts assert that the EU’s latest effort at institutional reform—the Lisbon Treaty, which entered
into force on December 1, 2009—increases the relative power of the EP within the EU
considerably. The EP now shares legislative power with the Council of Ministers in most policy
areas, giving the EP the right to accept, amend, or reject the vast majority of EU laws (with some
exceptions in areas such as tax matters or foreign policy). The Lisbon Treaty also gives the EP the
power to decide on the allocation of the EU budget jointly with the Council, the right to approve
or reject international agreements, and greater decision-making authority on trade-related issues.
At the same time, some analysts contend that the EP still lacks the legitimacy of national
parliaments and that many European citizens remain unaware of the EP’s role within the EU.
The EP has not been shy about exerting its new powers under the Lisbon Treaty, and in some
areas, with implications for U.S. interests. EP concerns about U.S. data privacy safeguards
contributed to the EP’s initial rejection in February 2010 of a U.S.-EU agreement aimed at
tracking terrorist financing (although a revised accord was eventually approved in July 2010), and
necessitated a new round of U.S.-EU negotiations on another counterterrorism measure that
permits the sharing of airline Passenger Name Record (PNR) data. Following the initial
revelations in June 2013 of U.S. National Security Agency surveillance programs and subsequent
allegations that U.S. intelligence agencies have monitored EU diplomatic offices and engaged in
other surveillance activities in Europe, many analysts worry about whether future U.S.-EU
information-sharing agreements will be able to secure the necessary EP approval. In addition, EP
approval will ultimately be required to allow any eventual U.S.-EU agreement on a Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to enter into force.
Ties between the EP and the U.S. Congress are long-standing, and institutional cooperation
currently exists through the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD). In light of the EP’s
growing role as an actor in the conduct of U.S.-EU relations, the EP and its activities may be of
increasing interest to the 113th Congress. Also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union:
Questions and Answers
, by Kristin Archick.

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The European Parliament

Contents
The European Parliament: A Key EU Institution ............................................................................. 1
Role of the European Parliament ..................................................................................................... 2
Legislative Process .................................................................................................................... 2
Budgetary Process ..................................................................................................................... 3
Supervision and Oversight Responsibilities .............................................................................. 4
Organization of the European Parliament ........................................................................................ 5
Political Groups ......................................................................................................................... 6
The EP President ..................................................................................................................... 10
Committees .............................................................................................................................. 10
Delegations .............................................................................................................................. 11
Administration ......................................................................................................................... 11
Location and Schedule ............................................................................................................ 11
Languages ................................................................................................................................ 11
Growing Influence and Ongoing Challenges ................................................................................. 11
The United States and the European Parliament ............................................................................ 13
Implications of the EP’s Evolution for U.S. Interests .............................................................. 13
Congress-Parliament Relations................................................................................................ 15

Tables
Table 1. Political Groups and Seats in the European Parliament: Results of the
2009 Election and Current Seat Allocations ................................................................................. 7

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 17

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The European Parliament

The European Parliament: A Key EU Institution
The 766-member European Parliament (EP) is a key institution of the European Union (EU). The
EU is a political and economic partnership that represents a unique form of cooperation among its
28 member states.1 The EU is the latest stage of a process of European integration begun in the
1950s to promote peace and economic prosperity in Europe; the EU has been built through a
series of binding treaties, and its members have committed to harmonizing laws and adopting
common policies on an extensive range of issues. EU member states work together through
common institutions to set policy and promote their collective interests.
As the only EU institution that is directly elected, the European Parliament represents the citizens
of the EU. Once limited to being a consultative assembly, the EP has accumulated more power
over time. Successive EU treaties have enhanced the EP’s role and responsibilities in an attempt
to improve democratic accountability in the EU policymaking process.
Experts assert that the EU’s most recent treaty, the Lisbon Treaty—which took effect on
December 1, 2009—has increased the relative power of the EP within the EU significantly. The
Lisbon Treaty contains a wide range of internal reforms aimed at improving the effectiveness of
the EU’s governing institutions, increasing democratic transparency within the EU, and giving the
EU a more coherent voice and identity on the world stage. Among other measures, the Lisbon
Treaty strengthens the EP’s role in the EU’s legislative and budgeting processes, gives the EP the
right to approve or reject international agreements, and bolsters the EP’s decision-making
authority on trade-related issues. Many Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) view the
EP as one of the big “winners” of this latest round of EU institutional reform.
The EP also works closely with the two other main EU institutions—the European Commission
and the Council of the European Union (also known as the Council of Ministers). Despite the
EP’s growing power and influence, the EP is not widely considered a legislative body in the
traditional sense because it cannot initiate legislation; that right rests largely with the
Commission, which functions as the EU’s executive. However, the EP shares the power to adopt
most EU legislation jointly with the Council, composed of ministers of the 28 member states.
Some analysts contend that the EP has a limited power of legislative initiative in that the EP can
ask the Commission to introduce a legislative proposal, but others note that the Commission is
not required to comply with the EP’s request.

1 The 28 member states of the EU are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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Other EU Institutions
The European Council brings together the Heads of State or Government of the member states and the President
of the European Commission at least four times a year (in what are often termed ”EU Summits”). It acts principal y as
a strategic guide and driving force for EU policy. The European Council is headed by a President, who serves as the
coordinator and spokesman for the work of the 28 Heads of State or Government.
The European Commission upholds the common interest of the Union as a whole. It is independent of the member
states’ national governments. As the EU’s executive, the Commission has the sole right of legislative initiative in most
cases and implements EU decisions and common policies. It also serves as the guardian of the EU’s treaties, ensuring
that member states adopt and abide by their provisions. The 28 Commissioners, one from each EU country, are
appointed by agreement among the member states to five-year terms. One Commissioner serves as Commission
President. Each of the other Commissioners holds a distinct portfolio (e.g., agriculture, energy, trade), similar to U.S.
department secretaries and agency directors.
The Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers) represents the national governments of the 28
member states. The Council enacts legislation based on proposals put forward by the Commission and agreed to (in
most cases) by the Parliament; in some sensitive areas such as taxation and foreign policy, however, the Council
retains decision-making authority. A minister from each country takes part in Council meetings, with participation
configured according to the subject under consideration (e.g., agriculture ministers would meet to discuss farm
subsidies). The Presidency of the Council rotates among the member states, changing every six months.
The Court of Justice interprets EU law, and its rulings are binding. The Court of Auditors monitors the Union’s
financial management. A number of other advisory committees represent economic, social, and regional interests.
Role of the European Parliament
Legislative Process
The role of the European Parliament in the legislative process has expanded steadily over time as
the scope of EU policy has grown. Initially, the EP was limited to offering nonbinding opinions in
a “consultation procedure.” The EP began to gain more power to affect EU legislation in the
“cooperation procedure” of the 1986 Single European Act.
The introduction of the “co-decision procedure” in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, however,
significantly enhanced the EP’s role in the EU’s legislative process in some areas, especially
those related to the EU’s common internal market. In the “co-decision procedure,” the EP and the
Council of Ministers share legislative power and must both approve a Commission proposal for it
to become EU law; through “co-decision,” the EP has the right to accept, amend, or reject
proposed EU legislation. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 extended the use of “co-decision” to
many additional policy areas (ranging from the environment to social policy). As more decisions
within the Council of Ministers have become subject to a complex majority voting system rather
than unanimity to allow for greater speed and efficiency of decision-making, the Parliament’s
right of “co-decision” has come to be viewed as an increasingly important democratic
counterweight at the European level to the Commission and Council.
As noted above, the Lisbon Treaty strengthens the EP’s responsibilities, especially in the EU’s
legislative process. It roughly doubles the Parliament’s right of “co-decision” to almost 80 policy
areas, including agriculture and justice and home affairs issues such as immigration and police
cooperation. In doing so, the Lisbon Treaty gives the EP a say—equal to that of the member states
in the Council of Ministers—over the vast majority of legislation passed in the EU. Tax matters,
social security, and most aspects of foreign policy, however, are among the areas in which EU
member states retain decision-making authority and to which the “co-decision procedure” does
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not apply. The Lisbon Treaty technically renames the
“co-decision procedure” as the “ordinary legislative
The “Co-decision Procedure”
procedure,” although the term “co-decision”
The EU’s “ordinary legislative procedure,” or
continues to be used frequently in practice.
“co-decision,” can be summarized as follows:
(1) if Parliament and the Council of Ministers
agree on a Commission proposal, it is approved;
Additionally, in the “consent procedure,” the EP
(2) if they disagree, the Council forms a common
must, by a simple “yes” or “no” majority, approve
position; the EP can then either accept the
the accession of new EU member states and the
Council’s common position, or reject or amend
conclusion of agreements with third parties, such as
it, by an absolute majority of its members; (3) if
association and trade agreements with non-member
the Council cannot accept the EP’s amendments,
a conciliation meeting is convened, after which
states.2 If the Parliament does not give its consent,
the EP and the Council approve an agreement if
such agreements cannot enter into force. The EP may
one can be reached. If they are unable to agree,
also issue nonbinding resolutions, subject to a simple
the proposal is not adopted.
majority.
Budgetary Process
The EP and the Council of Ministers together constitute the EU’s budget authority and are
responsible for allocating the EU’s annual budget; they decide, for example, on the amount of
funding dedicated to infrastructure as opposed to education. However, neither the EP nor the
Council can affect the size of the EU’s annual budget; that amount is fixed periodically by
agreement among the EU’s member states as a percentage of the Union’s combined gross national
income (GNI).3 The EU’s 2014 budget is EUR 143 billion (roughly $195 billion) in commitments
and EUR 136 billion (or $186 billion) in payments.4
With the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament has the right to decide on the
allocation of the entire EU budget jointly with the Council. Previously, the EP had the last word
on “non-compulsory” expenditures, such as development aid, but the Council had the final say on
“compulsory” expenditures, such as spending related to agriculture or international agreements.
The Lisbon Treaty eliminates the distinction between “compulsory” and “non-compulsory”
expenditures. Of particular importance, the EP gains more control over agricultural spending,
which usually accounts for over one-third of the EU’s annual budget.
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s annual budgetary procedure begins with the Commission
proposing a draft budget. The Council adopts its position on the draft budget, including any
amendments, and sends it to the EP for its consideration. The Parliament then has 42 days to
either approve the draft budget or amend it and send it back to the Council. If the Council agrees
with the EP’s amendments, the budget is adopted; if the Council disagrees with the EP’s changes,
a Conciliation Committee is convened to resolve differences and reach agreement on a joint text
within 21 days. The joint text must then be approved by both the Council and the EP; however, if
the joint text is rejected by the Council, the EP—subject to certain conditions—ultimately has the
right to approve the budget. In the event that both the EP and the Council reject the joint text or

2 Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the “consent procedure” was known as the “assent procedure.”
3 Currently, EU member states have set an annual budget ceiling of 1.23% of the Union’s gross national income. The
EU budget comes from three main sources: external customs duties; a share of each member state’s value added tax
(VAT) revenue; and a further contribution from each member state based on the size of its individual GNI.
4 The level of commitment appropriations is the maximum value of commitments to pay future bills, whereas the
payment appropriations is the actual amounts to pay for previous commitments.
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fail to decide, the Commission must submit a new draft budget. Some EP advocates assert that the
EP’s position in the annual budgetary process is now stronger than that of the Council, as the
Council may never impose a budget against the will of the EP, but under some circumstances, the
EP may impose a budget against the will of the Council; at the same time, most experts agree that
in practice, the EP would likely only exert this right in exceptional situations.5
In determining the EU’s annual budget, the EP and the Council must also adhere to annual
spending limits laid out in the EU’s multi-annual financial framework, which defines the long-
term political priorities for the EU and sets annual maximum amounts for each priority and
expenditure category.6 According to the Lisbon Treaty, the Council must agree unanimously on
each multiannual financial framework, after having obtained the Parliament’s consent. As such,
the Parliament has a degree of input into the EU’s overall budgetary direction and the ability to
help shape the EU budget to reflect its own political priorities.
In addition, the EP examines the European Commission’s implementation of previous annual
budgets through the “discharge procedure.” In order to close the budget books of a given year, the
EP must vote to grant “discharge” based on reports of the EU Court of Auditors and a
recommendation of the Council. With its decision, the EP also presents the Commission with
binding recommendations and observations regarding implementation of the budget. The EP’s
budgetary powers are considerably greater than those exercised by most parliaments in EU
member states.
Supervision and Oversight Responsibilities
The Parliament has a supervisory role over the European Commission and exercises some limited
oversight over the activities of the Council of Ministers. The EP monitors the management of EU
policies, can conduct investigations and public hearings, and may submit oral and written
questions to the Commission and the Council. The Presidency of the Council, which rotates
among the member states every six months, presents its program to the Parliament at the
beginning of its term and reports on results achieved at the end of its mandate.
Of particular note, the EP plays a role in the approval process of each new Commission and
Commission President every five years. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the member states agree
together (usually during a meeting of the European Council) on who to designate as the
Commission President, and their selection must take into account the results of the most recent
EP elections. Thus, the relative strengths of the political groups in the EP (see “Political Groups”
below for more information) can affect who is nominated by the member states to this post. The
nominee for Commission President then must be “elected” by a majority vote in the EP.
Some analysts note that this “election” procedure is largely intended to raise public awareness of
the importance of EP elections and the EP’s role in choosing the Commission President; in
practice, they assert, it differs very little from the previous parliamentary “approval” process. For
example, in both 2004 and 2009—that is, before the Lisbon Treaty’s entrance into force—the
EP’s strongest political group successfully demanded that the Commission President be of the
same political stripe. At the same time, given that no single political group in the EP has ever held

5 See Fact Sheets on the European Union, “The Budgetary Procedure,” available on the website of the European
Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu.
6 The EU’s current multiannual financial framework covers the period 2014-2020.
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a majority on its own, the support of other political groups has always been needed in order to
approve the nomination. In September 2009, the EP supported the re-appointment of 2004-2009
Commission President José Manuel Barroso for the 2009-2014 term (by a vote of 382 to 219,
with 117 abstentions).7
Recently, both the European Parliament and the European Commission have recommended that
each EP political group should nominate a candidate for Commission President ahead of EP
elections. This proposal aims to improve voter turnout in future EP elections and to better inform
voters about the issues at stake. Many hope that establishing a “concrete and visible” link
between voting in EP elections and having a say in determining future presidents of the European
Commission will also enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy. To date, two EP political groups
have nominated candidates for Commission President ahead of the May 2014 EP elections.8
Beyond its role in approving the Commission President, the EP also has the power to accept or
reject a newly proposed Commission as a whole, but not individual nominees. Since 1995, the EP
has held U.S. Senate-style confirmation hearings for newly designated Commissioners, who are
nominated by the member states. In February 2010, the EP voted to approve the so-called Barroso
II Commission for the term ending in 2014. Although a new Commission was supposed to have
been in place by November 2009, it was held up because of delays in the ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty by some member states. The confirmation process for the new Commission was
further slowed when the initial Bulgarian nominee withdrew her candidacy in mid-January 2010
after a contentious hearing before the Parliament amid concerns about her past financial dealings
and her competence for her portfolio. A similar situation occurred in 2004, when the EP
essentially forced the original Italian nominee to the Commission to withdraw due to concerns
about his views on homosexuality and women’s rights. Some observers view these episodes as
signs of the EP’s growing confidence and institutional clout.
In addition, the EP may dismiss the entire Commission (although, again, not individual
Commissioners) through a vote of censure. To date, the EP has never adopted a motion of
censure. However, in 1999, the entire Commission opted to resign rather than face a formal
censure by the EP over alleged corruption charges.
Organization of the European Parliament
Members of the European Parliament serve five-year terms, and have been directly elected since
1979.9 Voting for the EP takes place on a national basis, with the number of MEPs elected in each
country based roughly on population size. Germany, for example, has the largest number of MEPs
(currently 99), while Cyprus, Estonia, and Malta have the smallest (with 6 each).

7 Barroso, from Portugal, is a former prime minister from a conservative Portuguese political party. As such, he was
backed in both 2004 and 2009 for Commission President by the EP’s largest political group, which is center-right in
political orientation. See also, Sebastian Kurpas, “The Treaty of Lisbon: How Much ‘Constitution’ Is Left?,” CEPS
Policy Brief
, December 2007.
8 European Commission, “Preparing for the 2014 European Elections: Further Enhancing Their Democratic and
Efficient Conduct,” March 12, 2013; Luke Baker, “Jockying To Head European Commission Picks Up Pace,” Reuters,
January 21, 2014.
9 Prior to direct elections, MEPs were appointed by their national parliaments.
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The most recent EP elections were held on June 4-7, 2009, with 736 seats at stake. Roughly 375
million European citizens were eligible to cast a ballot in 2009. In EP elections, EU citizens may
vote—or run for a seat—in their country of residence, without necessarily holding citizenship in
that country. Turnout has declined in every EP election, from 63% in 1979 to a new low of 43%
in 2009. Although the overall number is comparable to turnout in U.S. mid-term elections, some
analysts contend that relatively low voter participation compared to European national elections
indicates a lack of awareness and understanding about the EP.
In December 2011, 18 new MEPs (from 12 member states) joined the EP, temporarily raising the
total number of MEPs for the current term to 754. The Lisbon Treaty gave some countries
additional seats in the EP to account for population growth, but these new MEPs were unable to
assume their posts at the start of the 2009 term because the Lisbon Treaty had not yet been
ratified. In July 2013, 12 MEPs from Croatia assumed their seats, following Croatia’s accession
to the EU. The addition of the Croatian MEPs increases the total number of MEPs to 766 until the
end of the EP’s current term in mid-2014. After that, the Lisbon Treaty fixes the total number of
MEPs at 751.
The next EP elections will be held May 22-25, 2014. Many observers suggest that the recent rise
of anti-EU or “euroskeptic” populist parties in several EU member states may have significant
implications for the upcoming EP elections and the composition of the next EP. Most of these
parties are nationalistic and far-right in political orientation, and have been gaining traction in
Austria, France, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, among
others. Their ascendancy has been fueled by a combination of factors, including: Europe’s
financial crisis and economic downturn; fears about immigration, globalization, and lost national
identities; and concerns in some member states about the continued relinquishing of national
sovereignty to the EU. Although there is a wide spectrum of these “euroskeptic” parties—ranging
from those that advocate an end to the EU to others that seek to reform the Union into a looser
entity in which member states would retain greater sovereignty—some analysts estimate that such
“euroskeptic” parties combined could make up to 30% of the next EP.10
Political Groups
Once elected, Members of the European Parliament caucus according to transnational groups
based on political ideology, rather than by nationality. A political group must consist of at least 25
MEPs from a minimum of seven EU member states. The EP currently has seven political
groups—containing over 100 individual political parties—plus a number of “non-attached” or
independent members.





10 Joshua Chaffin, “Europe: United By Hostility,” Financial Times, October 15, 2013; Naftali Bendavid and Gabriele
Parussini, “Anti-EU Parties Gather Strength in Europe,” Wall Street Journal, January 1, 2014.
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Table 1. Political Groups and Seats in the European Parliament:
Results of the 2009 Election and Current Seat Allocations
(adjustments reflect the addition of new MEPs in 2011 and 2013)

2009 Election
Current Seat
Results
Allocations
European People’s Party [Christian Democrats] (EPP; center-right)
265
274
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D;
center-left/socialists)
184 194
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE; centrist/liberals)
84
85
Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA; greens and regionalists)
55
58
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR; right-wing, anti-Federalist)
54
57
European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL; far-left and former communists)
35
35
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD; euroskeptics)
32
31
Non-attached members
27
32
Total # of Seats in the EP
736
766
Sources: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/index_en.html;
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/eu/search.html.
Each group appoints a chair or co-chairs, and maintains a bureau and secretariat to manage its
internal organization. Prior to a vote, MEPs within each group study the legislative proposals in
question with the support of committee reports, discuss prospective amendments, and seek to
arrive at a consensus group position. However, individual MEPs are not bound to vote according
to their group’s position.
As noted previously, no single group has ever held an absolute majority in the European
Parliament, making compromise and coalition-building important elements of the legislative
process. Some analysts assert that distinct ideological definitions between groups are becoming
more complicated, as voting blocs form increasingly according to specific issues and interests.
Nevertheless, the two largest groups have tended to dominate the Parliament historically.
In the 2009 elections, the Group of the European People’s Party [Christian Democrats] (EPP)
retained its position as the largest political group in the EP. The EPP is center-right in political
orientation. In relative terms, the strength of the EPP in the 2009 elections increased significantly
due to a sizeable drop in support for center-left parties. Although circumstances and issues
differed in each EU member state, some analysts interpreted these results as indicating greater
public preference for the approaches of conservative and center-right parties in handling the
global financial crisis and recession. However, the center-left Group of the Progressive Alliance
of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D)
remains the EP’s second-largest
political group following the 2009 elections.
The EPP and the S&D have a history of cross-ideological legislative partnership. As in the 2004-
2009 EP (in which the S&D was called the PES—the Socialist Group in the European
Parliament), the two parties continue to cooperate closely in an unofficial “Grand Coalition” and
together frequently shape politics in the EP. Critics argue that the consensus-seeking of the
“Grand Coalition” makes politics in the EP stale and paradoxical. Other observers note that
maximizing consensus and unity lends the EP greater institutional weight. As a general rule, most
MEPs prefer consensus outcomes that are endorsed by a large and broad majority.
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The third-largest group in the EP is the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
Europe (ALDE)
. ALDE is centrist and liberal in political orientation (in European political
terminology, “liberal” connotes an emphasis on free market economics, individual rights, social
equality, and de-centralized government). In the past, ALDE was often viewed as the
“kingmaker,” able to exercise a decisive swing vote for a majority in the EP. However, as a result
of some losses suffered by ALDE in the 2009 elections and the shift of the political balance in the
EP largely to the right, some analysts assert that ALDE’s political capital has decreased. Other
observers contend that as the third-largest group, ALDE’s position on a given issue is still a
crucial factor in the outcome of many EP votes.
The remaining four political groups in the EP are smaller in size. On the left side of the political
spectrum are the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA); and the Confederal
Group of the
European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL). The Greens-EFA is largely
comprised of numerous European Green parties—leftist in political orientation with a strong
emphasis on pro-environment politics and human rights—and several regional parties (e.g.,
Scottish, Welsh, Basque, and Catalonian) with a leftist or center-left outlook. Despite the overall
trend in the EP to the right in the 2009 elections, the Greens-EFA attracted many voters who
sought change, resulting in a significant increase in the number of their seats. The GUE-NGL
consists of parties that are even farther left in orientation; some have a Green emphasis while
others have roots in communism. The GUE-NGL is pro-EU and pro-integration, but strongly
critical of existing EU structures, policies, and overall direction.
On the right side of the political spectrum are two groups formed at the start of the current EP: the
European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR); and the Europe of Freedom and
Democracy Group (EFD)
. The ECR was formed in 2009, after the UK Conservative Party broke
with the EPP amid growing unease with the EPP’s support for continued EU integration. The
ECR is right-wing in political orientation and strongly opposed to a “federalist” Europe. Even
farther to the right is the EFD, composed of “euroskeptics” and critics of the EU who oppose
further European integration.
Many of the “non-attached” or independent members in the current EP hail from far-right
extremist parties, which made gains in the 2009 EP elections in a number of countries, such as the
Netherlands, Austria, and Hungary. However, these far-right MEPs hold a relatively small number
of seats in the current Parliament and appear to have little cohesion among themselves. Analysts
note that they have been unable to form a political group and, as a result, their impact in the
current EP has been minimal; membership in a political group gives MEPs more influence as
groups receive more funding and more speaking time in the EP than do non-attached members.11
As noted above, the recent rise of anti-EU or “euroskeptic” populist parties throughout the EU
could have significant implications for the political composition of the next EP. Some EU
officials and mainstream MEPs are concerned that should these populist parties gain enough seats
and are able to form a political group, they could block legislative initiatives and hamper efforts
toward further EU integration. At the same time, many experts point out that these various
populist parties are extremely disparate and that their policies and outlooks vary considerably
based on different nationalities and traditions. In addition, those populist parties that do not have

11 “Voters Steer Europe to the Right,” BBC News, June 8, 2009; Stephen Castle, “Far Right Is Left Out at EU’s
Assembly,” International Herald Tribune, July 15, 2009; Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, “The New European Parliament: All
Change or Business as Usual?,” CEPS Special Report, August 2009.
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roots in the fascist far right are keen to distance themselves from those that do. Thus, it remains
questionable whether such populist parties could come together to form a political group. The
UK’s Independence Party (UKIP) and Italy’s Northern League have rejected overtures to work
with France’s National Front because of its racist and anti-Semitic past, while the National Front
(which has been attempting to reinvent itself) asserts that it will not work with parties that are
considered even more extreme, such as Hungary’s Jobbik and Greece’s neo-fascist Golden Dawn.
If such populist parties are unable to forge an effective alliance and meet the EP’s requirements
for establishing a political group, some commentators contend that these parties may not have
much influence in the next EP. Others suggest, however, that even without a political group, a
large number of anti-EU populists in the EP could still be obstructionist and wreak havoc by
using the EP as a venue from which to espouse their views. Some populist parties also hope that
electoral success in the upcoming EP elections will provide a platform they can use to advance
themselves in national politics in their home countries.12

Composition of Political Groups in the European Parliament
European People’s Party (EPP). The center-right EPP contains MEPs from Germany’s Christian
Democratic/Christian Social Union (CDU-CSU), France’s Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), Spain’s
Partido Popular (PP), Italy’s People of Freedom, Poland’s Civic Platform, and numerous other Christian Democratic,
conservative, center-right, and centrist national parties. The chair of the EPP is French MEP Joseph Daul.
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D). The center-left S&D
includes MEPs from Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD), France’s Socialist Party, the UK Labour Party, Spain’s
Socialist Party, and numerous other Socialist, Social Democratic, and center-left parties. The chair of S&D is Austrian
MEP Hannes Swoboda.
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). MEPs in the centrist ALDE hail from the UK Liberal
Democrats Party, Germany’s Free Democrat Party (FDP), and Ireland’s Fianna Fail. The chair of ALDE is Belgian MEP
(and former Belgian Prime Minister) Guy Verhofstadt.
Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA). The leftist and pro-environment Greens-EFA includes MEPs from
Germany’s Alliance ‘90/The Greens, France’s Europe Ecologie, and the Scottish National Party. The co-chairs of the
Greens-EFA are French MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit and German MEP Rebecca Harms.
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). The right-wing ECR includes MEPs from the UK Conservative
Party, Poland’s Law and Justice Party, and the Czech Republic’s Civic Democratic Party. The chair of ECR is UK MEP
Martin Callanan.
European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL). The far-left GUE-NGL contains MEPs from Germany’s Die
Linke, the French Communist Party, the Portuguese Communist Party, and the all-Ireland party Sinn Fein. The chair of
GUE-NGL is German MEP Gabriele Zimmer.
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD). The largest contingents in the euroskeptic EFD are from the UK
Independence Party (UKIP), which advocates UK withdrawal from the EU, and Italy’s Lega Nord. The co-chairs of
EFD are British MEP Nigel Farage and Italian MEP Francesco Enrico Speroni.
Note: This box is meant for illustrative purposes; it is not a definitive or exhaustive list of all the political parties
comprising each political group in the European Parliament.


12 Andrew Higgins, “Right Wing’s Surge in Europe Has the Establishment Rattled,” New York Times, November 8,
2013; Naftali Bendavid and Gabriele Parussini, “Anti-EU Parties Gather Strength in Europe,” Wall Street Journal,
January 1, 2014; “Turning Right,” The Economist, January 4, 2014.
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The EP President
Every two-and-a-half years (twice per parliamentary term), MEPs vote to elect a President of the
European Parliament. The majority coalition in the EP (previously and currently an unofficial
“Grand Coalition” between the EPP and the Socialists) has traditionally agreed to split the
position of EP president over each five-year term. At the opening session of the current EP in
mid-July 2009, Members elected Polish MEP Jerzy Buzek of the EPP as President for the first
half of the 2009-2014 parliamentary term. Buzek, a former prime minister of Poland, was the first
ever EP President from one of the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in
2004. In January 2012, German MEP Martin Schulz of S&D took over as EP President for the
second half of the EP’s current term. Schulz has been an MEP since 1994 and was the leader of
S&D until his election as EP President.
The President of the EP represents the Parliament externally and in relations with the other EU
institutions. The President oversees the work of the Parliament and is responsible for ensuring
that its rules of procedure are followed. The President is assisted in managing the Parliament’s
internal organization and affairs by a Bureau composed of 14 Vice-Presidents and five Quaestors
(responsible for administrative and financial matters) drawn from across the EP’s political groups.
The signature of the EP President is the final step in approval of the EU budget, and the EP
President co-signs, together with the appropriate representative of the Council of Minister’s
rotating presidency, legislation adopted under the co-decision procedure.
Committees
The EP has 20 standing committees, each addressing specific issues such as education, the
environment, and economic and monetary affairs. The EP may also set up subcommittees and
special committees, which investigate or oversee specific issues for a limited period of time. For
example, in 2006, the EP established a special committee to examine the role of EU member
states in hosting secret CIA detention facilities and aiding CIA flights related to the rendition of
terrorism suspects. Only the EP’s foreign affairs committee currently has subcommittees (one
focuses on human rights, the other on security and defense issues).
EP committees vary in size, usually containing from 20 to 80 MEPs. Each committee has a
chairman, four vice-chairmen, and a secretariat to guide its work. The political make-up of the
committees reflects that of the EP as a whole, and committee posts are allocated proportionally to
the respective size of the political groups; for example, the EPP currently chairs nine committees,
the S&D six, and the ALDE two.
EP committees are key actors in the adoption of EU legislation. In terms of their importance and
strength, EP committees rival those in the U.S. Congress and surpass the role of committees in
most national European legislatures. EP committees consider legislative proposals put forward by
the Commission and the Council of Ministers. The appropriate committee (e.g., the Committee on
the Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety would deal with legislation on pollution)
appoints a MEP as “rapporteur” to draft a report on the legislative proposal under consideration.
The rapporteur submits a draft report to the committee for discussion, which the committee then
votes on and possibly amends. The committee’s report is then considered in a plenary session of
the entire Parliament, amended if necessary, and put to a vote. The EP thus adopts its position on
the proposed EU legislation. Committees may also draw up their “own initiative” reports, in
which they recommend action in a particular area by the Commission or the member states.
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Delegations
The European Parliament plays a role in the EU’s international presence through a total of 41
delegations that range in size; most have between 20 and 50 MEPs. These delegations maintain
parliament-to-parliament contacts and relations with representatives of many countries and
regions around the world. For example, the EP has interparliamentary delegations for relations
with the United States and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, as well as with Russia, Iran,
Israel, the Palestinian Legislative Council, China, India, and the Korean Peninsula.
Administration
A Secretariat of almost 5,000 non-partisan civil servants provides administrative and technical
support to the Parliament. In addition, MEPs and political groups have their own staffs.
Location and Schedule
Strasbourg, France (near the German border), is the official seat of the EP; plenary sessions are
held there for one week a month. For two weeks a month, the EP’s standing committees meet 300
miles to the northwest in Brussels, Belgium, where the European Commission and the Council of
Ministers are located. There are also occasional “part plenary” sessions (two days) in Brussels.
One week each month is set aside for meetings of the political groups, which are usually held in
Brussels. MEPs must have offices and lodgings in both cities. The EP’s Secretariat is based in
both Brussels and Luxembourg, which is about mid-way between Strasbourg and Brussels.
Languages
Simultaneous interpretation of all parliamentary and committee debates is provided in the EU’s
24 official languages. All parliamentary documents are translated into 22 of these languages (Irish
and Maltese are sometimes excepted), and some documents must be translated into all 24. Such
extensive translation and publication services represent significant administrative costs. However,
many EU and EP officials consider such costs to be a price worth paying, both on democratic
grounds—to enable MEPs to scrutinize and vote on draft EU laws in the languages they
understand best—and on grounds of cultural and linguistic diversity within the Union.
Growing Influence and Ongoing Challenges
As noted previously, EP advocates assert that “co-decision” and its institutional supervisory roles
have substantially enhanced the Parliament’s influence. The Lisbon Treaty, in effect, gives the EP
veto authority over the vast majority of EU legislation and a greater say over the EU’s budget. In
addition, the Lisbon Treaty gives the EP the right to approve or reject all international agreements
by a simple majority and expands the EP’s decision-making authority over trade-related issues.
Analysts observe that the EP has not been shy about exerting its new powers under the Lisbon
Treaty. Over the last two years, for example, the annual budget negotiations between the EP and
the Council of Ministers have gone down to the wire and MEPs are increasingly (and
successfully) demanding greater input during the drafting and negotiation stages of the EU
legislative process.
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Supporters also claim that the EP’s influence has been growing even in consultative areas, such as
the EU’s common foreign policy, where the “co-decision procedure” does not apply and where
decisions rest largely with the member states. They maintain that the EP has become a forum for
debate on international issues, and uses its power of consent on cooperation accords with third
parties and Parliamentary resolutions to promote its views and highlight issues such as human
rights. For example, many observers credit the EP’s opposition in 2005 to ending the EU’s arms
embargo on China (on both human rights and strategic grounds) as one factor that eventually
dissuaded member states from lifting the embargo. More recently, some experts assert that the
agreement reached between the EP and the other EU institutions on the establishment of the
European External Action Service (EEAS)—the new EU diplomatic corps called for by the
Lisbon Treaty—has the potential to greatly increase the EP’s voice in the foreign policy realm.
The EP fought for and largely won considerable oversight of the EEAS by demanding scrutiny
over its political appointments, staffing, and budget.
At the same time, a number of analysts suggest that the enhanced powers granted to the EP by the
Lisbon Treaty, and the EP’s resulting newfound assertiveness, could lead to greater
interinstitutional rivalry. This could make the EU’s legislative and decision-making processes
even more complex as the EP, the European Commission, and the Council of Ministers all vie to
protect their own institutional turf. For example, some observers contend that wrangling between
the EP and the other EU institutions regarding the EEAS delayed its establishment. Others
counter that a main aim of the Lisbon Treaty was to improve democratic accountability within the
EU, and that the EP is merely seeking to defend its parliamentary prerogatives and the interests of
EU citizens. As such, they view the debate among the various EU institutions over the
establishment of the EEAS as part of the democratic process.
Despite the EP’s new powers and growing influence following the Lisbon Treaty, the EP still
faces several challenges of public perception. A November 2011 opinion poll found that 45% of
people across all EU member states had a “neutral” opinion of the EP, but that 26% had a
“negative” view (up 9 percentage points compared to a similar 2008 poll).13 Some skeptics
contend that the EP, despite being a directly elected body, lacks the legitimacy of national
parliaments. They argue that the EU’s legislative process is overly complex and often focused on
highly technical issues, leading to a lack of public understanding about the role of the EP. Limited
public awareness of the EP’s activities, they maintain, is reflected in the consistently declining
turnout in European Parliament elections. And while studies on voting behavior in the EP show
that ideology holds greater influence than nationality (with MEPs voting with their party groups
the vast majority of the time), many MEPs campaign for the European Parliament on national
rather than European issues. Many voters also tend to view EP elections as national mid-term
elections—an indication of voter opinion on the performance of the national government—rather
than as a vote on Europe-wide issues.14
Another major concern is costs, which the EP has long been under public pressure to reduce. The
fact that MEPs and their staffs regularly shuttle between three cities leads to sizeable travel and
hotel bills; current outside estimates suggest that such commuting costs total roughly $285

13 Eurobarometer, Parlemeter 2011; http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2012/76-3/report_EN.pdf.
14 Simon Hix and Abdul Noury, “After Enlargement: Voting Patterns in the Sixth European Parliament,” Legislative
Studies Quarterly
, May 2009; Julia De Clerck-Sachsse and Piotr Maciej Kaczynski, “The European Parliament: More
Powerful, Less Legitimate,” CEPS Working Document, May 2009.
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million a year.15 Yet, the suggestion that the EP should consolidate its operations in one city
continues to meet with strong opposition in the host countries of France, Belgium, and
Luxembourg, which fear the loss of symbolism and prestige, in addition to jobs and other
economic benefits. The French city of Strasbourg, which is close to the German border, was
originally chosen as the seat of the EP to serve as a symbol of peace and reconciliation between
the two countries, and both argue it should continue to do so. Construction of multi-million-dollar
buildings in Brussels and Strasbourg in the late 1990s to accommodate the growth in MEPs
following the addition of 10 new members in 2004 also stirred public controversy.
In addition, the EP continues to battle against a “gravy train” image and charges that it lacks
transparency. Until 2009, for example, the EP had a flat-rate expense regime and MEPs did not
have to submit for reimbursement for business and travel expenses. Recently, the EP has been
beset by a “cash-for-amendments” scandal, in which several MEPs have been accused of
accepting money in exchange for introducing amendments on legislation pending in the EP. In
response, the EP approved a new code of conduct in December 2011 aimed at tightening rules on
MEPs’ financial declarations and on their contacts with lobbyists. Critics contend, however, that
the new code of conduct contains a number of loopholes, with MEPs still able to engage in some
paid outside activities and permitted to accept certain gifts of hospitality without having to
disclose them.16
The United States and the European Parliament
Implications of the EP’s Evolution for U.S. Interests
Policymakers and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic assert that the European Parliament’s
enhanced powers following the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 has
made the EP an increasingly important actor in the conduct of U.S.-EU relations. As noted
previously, the EP has been keen to exert its new powers under the Lisbon Treaty, and this has
had implications for U.S. interests, especially with respect to the approval of several U.S.-EU or
international agreements. In February 2010, for example, by a vote of 378 to 196 (with 31
abstentions), the EP rejected a U.S.-EU accord aimed at countering terrorism; the so-called
SWIFT agreement, negotiated by the European Commission and approved by the Council of
Ministers, would have continued allowing U.S. authorities access to European financial data in an
effort to help prevent or investigate terrorist attacks. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the EP did not
have the authority to veto such an accord.
Observers attribute the EP’s rejection of the U.S.-EU SWIFT accord to several factors. Many
MEPs had long claimed that the U.S.-EU SWIFT agreement did not contain sufficient protections
to safeguard the personal data and privacy rights of EU citizens; thus, many saw the “no” vote as
unsurprising on substantive grounds. In addition, however, some MEPs reportedly sought to send
a message to the Commission and Council, conveying that the EP’s position—in light of the
changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty—must now be taken into account during (and not

15 As quoted in Suzanne Daley and Stephen Castle, “A Parliament on the Move Grows Costly,” New York Times, June
28, 2011.
16 “MEPs Approve New Code of Conduct,” EurActiv.com, December 2, 2011; James Kanter, “Europeans Losing Faith
in Their Parliament,” New York Times, November 5, 2012.
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after) the negotiation of international agreements or the drafting of new legislative proposals.
Although the EP eventually approved a revised U.S.-EU SWIFT agreement in July 2010, it did so
only after several EP demands related to strengthening data privacy protections were agreed to by
the United States, the European Commission, and the Council of Ministers.
Some experts also worried that another U.S.-EU anti-terrorism measure related to sharing
Passenger Name Record (PNR) flight data might be rejected by the EP. Since 2004, the United
States and the EU had concluded several agreements permitting airlines operating flights between
Europe and the United States to provide U.S. counterterrorism and law enforcement authorities
with PNR data. These PNR accords were controversial in Europe, and especially in the EP,
because of privacy and data protection concerns. Until the Lisbon Treaty, however, the EP did not
have a role in approving these accords.
After the Lisbon Treaty, it became evident that a PNR agreement dating from 2007, which had
been provisionally in force, required EP approval (by majority vote) in order for it to remain in
force. In December 2010, the Obama Administration agreed to renegotiate some elements of the
2007 PNR accord, largely in recognition of the fact that the EP was unlikely to approve the
existing 2007 agreement. U.S.-EU negotiations on a revised PNR accord were concluded in
November 2011. After some contentious debates, the EP approved the revised U.S.-EU PNR
agreement in April 2012 (by a vote of 409 to 226, with 33 abstentions). U.S. officials assert that
while the new PNR agreement includes several innovations aimed at meeting EP concerns and
better safeguarding passengers’ personal information, it also preserves and in some cases
improves the accord’s operational effectiveness.
EP concerns about data privacy have been heightened further in the wake of the June 2013
revelations of U.S. National Security Agency surveillance programs, press reports suggesting that
U.S. intelligence agencies have monitored EU diplomatic offices, and subsequent allegations of
other U.S. intelligence operations in Europe (including reported phone record collection efforts in
France and Spain as well as the past monitoring of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile
phone). Consequently, many analysts worry that future U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements
may not be able to secure the necessary EP approval. The U.S.-EU SWIFT accord will be up for
renewal in 2015, and the PNR agreement in 2019. EP approval will also be required for any
eventual U.S.-EU data privacy and protection agreement (DPPA), under negotiation since 2011;
the DPPA is intended to bridge U.S.-EU differences in the application of privacy rights and make
the negotiation of future data-sharing accords easier in the law enforcement context.17
In response to the NSA programs and other spying allegations, the EP established a special
working group (within the EP’s civil liberties committee) to conduct an in-depth investigation
into U.S. surveillance activities (as well as similar, related activities by EU member states) and
their implications for the privacy rights of EU citizens. In early January 2014, the EP’s civil
liberties committee released the draft report on its investigation. The draft report was deeply
critical of the NSA’s alleged mass surveillance programs, as well as those purportedly carried out
by the UK’s signals intelligence agency, and asserted that such mass surveillance activities could
have potentially severe implications on fundamental freedoms. Among a long list of
recommendations, the draft report: called on the United States to revise its legislation to
recognize the privacy rights of EU citizens and to provide judicial redress; urged the European

17 “For more information on the SWIFT and PNR accords, and on the DPPA negotiations, see CRS Report RS22030,
U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism, by Kristin Archick.
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Commission to suspend the U.S.-EU SWIFT agreement; and called for EU institutions to
improve their information security practices. The civil liberties committee is expected to vote on
whether to approve the draft report in February; the full EP will likely take it up in March.18
The alleged surveillance activities have also led some MEPs to demand that EU data protection
reforms, which have been under discussion in the EP since January 2012, include even stronger
safeguards than those initially proposed for personal data transferred outside of the EU. Many
U.S. officials are concerned that such changes to EU data protection rules could be overly
burdensome for U.S. businesses, especially those in the digital and telecommunications
industries, and could also call into question existing bilateral agreements governing the
processing and sharing of personal data between U.S. law enforcement authorities and their
counterparts in EU member states.19
Meanwhile, a key U.S.-EU-led effort to protect intellectual property rights (IPR), especially as
they apply in the digital environment, has been complicated by the EP. In July 2012, the EP
rejected the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), by a vote of 478 to 39, with 168
abstentions. ACTA was negotiated over the course of three years by the United States, the EU,
and several other countries to strengthen IPR protection and enforcement measures worldwide.
MEPs opposed to ACTA cited concerns that it was too vague and could jeopardize civil liberties,
including Internet free speech. The EP’s rejection of ACTA prevents the EU and its member states
from joining the agreement in its current form, and the accord’s future prospects are unclear.20
In addition, EP approval will ultimately be required to allow a future U.S.-EU accord on a
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to enter into force. The EP has strongly
supported the TTIP concept as a way to boost economic growth and stimulate job creation on
both sides of the Atlantic. Following the revelations of the NSA surveillance programs, however,
MEPs have cautioned European Commission officials to ensure that EU data protection standards
are not undermined by any potential measures agreed to as part of TTIP, such as those governing
transatlantic trade in services delivered over the Internet. U.S.-EU negotiations on TTIP were
launched in July 2013.21
Congress-Parliament Relations
Ties between the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress date back to 1972, when a U.S.
congressional delegation first visited the EP in Brussels and Luxembourg. Since then, with a few
exceptions, congressional-EP exchanges have taken place twice a year, and have provided the
opportunity for sustained dialogue. The U.S. Congress-EP exchange is the oldest and widely
considered the most prestigious of the EP’s interparliamentary dialogues.

18 For more information, see the European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Draft
Report on the U.S. NSA Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States and their Impact on
EU Citizens’ Fundamental Rights and on Transatlantic Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, January 8, 2014.
19 James Fontanella-Khan, “MEPs Call for Clause to Limit American Internet Snooping,” Financial Times, June 19,
2013; Michael Birnbaum, “EU Fury on Allegations of U.S. Spying,” Washington Post, June 30, 2013.
20 For more information, see CRS Report R41107, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Background
and Key Issues
, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.
21 For more information on TTIP, see CRS Report R43158, Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP): In Brief
, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Vivian C. Jones.
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In 1999, the EP and the U.S. Congress launched the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD) as
their official response to the U.S.-EU commitment in the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda to
enhance parliamentary ties between the EU and the United States. With the TLD, the two sides
have committed to regular meetings twice a year to discuss a wide range of topical political and
economic issues. In the EP, the TLD is led by a chairman and EP participants in the semi-annual
TLD meetings are drawn from the EP’s Delegation for Relations with the United States. In
Congress, the TLD is headed by a chair and vice-chair and U.S. participants are from the House
only. The most recent TLD meeting took place May 31-June 1, 2013 in Dublin, Ireland (the venue
for the TLD usually alternates between the United States and Europe). However, some U.S.
analysts observe that the TLD remains relatively obscure in Congress, with ambiguity regarding
which Members actually belong, and no role given to the U.S. Senate.
Many MEPs would like to enhance cooperation with the U.S. Congress further. In March 2009,
the EP adopted a resolution, which among other measures, asserted that the U.S. Congress and the
EP should promote closer ties between legislative committees and should create a reciprocal
legislative “early-warning” system to identify potential legislative activities that could affect
relations between the United States and the EU. In January 2010, the EP established a liaison
office with the U.S. Congress in Washington, DC; EP staffers deployed as part of this office seek
to keep the EP better informed of legislative activity in the U.S. House and Senate by attending
hearings, following legislation, and establishing working relationships with Members of
Congress, committees, and their staffs.22
Especially in light of the EP’s new powers as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, some U.S. officials
and analysts suggest that it is in U.S. interests for Congress to forge stronger ties with the EP.
Those of this view note that in the past, there have been instances in which legislation passed by
either Congress or the EU has contributed to U.S.-EU tensions. In 2002, for example, U.S.-EU
frictions surfaced over the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to reform corporate accounting practices; EU
officials claimed that the U.S. legislation did not take into account differences in European
corporate governance and financing mechanisms. More recently, U.S. officials and many
Members of Congress have strongly objected to the inclusion of aviation in the EU’s Emissions
Trading System (ETS) and oppose its application to U.S. air carriers. Some experts assert that
tensions over such issues could have perhaps been avoided—or at least reduced—if both sides’
legislative bodies had consulted more ahead of time.
On the other hand, skeptics doubt the need to establish a closer relationship between Congress
and the EP. They assert that structural and procedural differences could make effective legislative
coordination difficult, and that there are some issues in which the EP may have a legislative say,
but Congress does not, and vice-versa. For example, the EP had to give its consent to the U.S.-EU
agreements on SWIFT and PNR, but these accords were not subject to equivalent congressional
approval because they were negotiated by the United States as executive agreements under
existing U.S. law. Others maintain, however, that even in matters in which only one side has a
direct legislative role, closer ties and personal relationships between Members of Congress and
their counterparts in the EP could help sway the debate and perhaps produce more favorable
outcomes. Some believe that the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, as
well as data privacy issues, may help to heighten Congress-EP engagement in the years ahead.23

22 European Parliament resolution A6-0114/2009, adopted March 26, 2009.
23 For more information, see CRS Report R41552, The U.S. Congress and the European Parliament: Evolving
Transatlantic Legislative Cooperation
, by Kristin Archick and Vincent L. Morelli.
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Author Contact Information

Kristin Archick

Specialist in European Affairs
karchick@crs.loc.gov, 7-2668

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