Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
January 30, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL31718
Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
Qatar, a small peninsular country in the Persian Gulf, emerged as a partner of the United States in
the mid-1990s and currently serves as host to major U.S. military facilities. Qatar holds the third-
largest proven natural gas reserves in the world, and is the largest exporter of liquefied natural
gas. Its small citizenry enjoys the world’s highest per capita income. Since the mid-1990s, Qatari
leaders have overseen a course of major economic growth, increased diplomatic engagement, and
very limited political liberalization. The Qatari monarchy founded Al Jazeera, the first all-news
Arabic language satellite television network, in 1995. Over time, the network has proven to be as
influential and, at times, as controversial as the policies of its founders, including during recent
unrest in the Arab world.
In June 2013, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani abdicated in favor of his son Tamim bin Hamad,
marking the first voluntary and planned transition of power in Qatar since it became an
independent country in 1971. In an April 2003 referendum, Qatari voters approved a new
constitution that officially granted women the right to vote and run for national office. The
constitution envisions elections for two-thirds of the seats in a national Advisory Council.
However, such elections have not been scheduled, and the term of the current Advisory Council
has been extended to 2016. Central Municipal Council elections were last held in May 2011.
Following joint military operations during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Qatar and the United
States concluded a Defense Cooperation Agreement that has been subsequently expanded and
was renewed in 2013. In April 2003, the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East
moved from Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Qatar’s Al Udeid airbase southwest of
Doha, the Qatari capital. Al Udeid and other facilities in Qatar serve as logistics, command, and
basing hubs for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations. U.S. officials have
described Qatar’s counterterrorism cooperation since 2001 as significant. However, some
observers have raised questions about alleged support for Al Qaeda and other violent extremist
groups by some Qatari citizens, including historic support by members of Qatar’s ruling family.
According to the 2012 U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights in Qatar,
principal U.S. human rights concerns included the “inability of citizens to change their
government peacefully, restriction of fundamental civil liberties, and pervasive denial of
expatriate workers’ rights.” Political parties remain prohibited and civil liberties remain restricted.
According to the report, “the government made efforts to prevent and eliminate forced labor
during the year,” but “there were continuing indications of forced labor, especially in the
construction and domestic labor sectors.” These concerns are drawing increased attention as Qatar
implements large scale infrastructure projects in preparation for hosting the 2022 World Cup.
Qatari officials have positioned themselves as mediators and interlocutors in a number of regional
conflicts in recent years. Qatar’s deployment of military aircraft to support NATO-led operations
in Libya signaled a new assertiveness, as has reported Qatari support for armed elements of the
Syrian opposition. Some of Qatar’s positions have drawn U.S. scrutiny, including its willingness
to embrace Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban as part of its mediation initiatives and
allegations of its support for extremists in Syria. It remains unclear whether Qatar’s active and—
for the United States—at times vexing policies may change under Emir Tamim’s leadership. To
date, the Obama Administration has sought to expand military and counterterrorism cooperation
with the ambitious leaders of this wealthy, strategically located country.
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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Country and Leadership Profile ....................................................................................................... 1
U.S.-Qatar Relations and Issues before Congress ........................................................................... 4
U.S. Military Cooperation and Foreign Assistance ................................................................... 5
Counterterrorism Cooperation and Concerns ............................................................................ 7
Qatar’s Foreign Policy ..................................................................................................................... 8
Afghan Taliban Political Office in Qatar ................................................................................... 9
Qatar Hosts Hamas Leader, Aids Gaza, Supports Arab Consensus on Israel ............................ 9
Qatar’s Economy and U.S. Trade .................................................................................................. 10
Oil and Natural Gas ................................................................................................................. 11
U.S.-Qatar Trade ...................................................................................................................... 13
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 13
Figures
Figure 1. Qatar: Map and Country Data .......................................................................................... 1
Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure ........................................... 12
Tables
Table 1. Chiefs of State and Select Qatari Leaders .......................................................................... 3
Table 2. Proposed U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales 2012-2013 ..................................................................... 6
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 14
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Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations
Country and Leadership Profile
Qatar, a small peninsular state bordering Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf (see Figure 1),
declared its independence on September 3, 1971.1 It is a constitutional monarchy governed by the
Al Thani family, and the constitution reflects the previously contested principle that successors to
the throne will follow the hereditary line of the emir’s male offspring. The Emir of Qatar, Tamim
bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, began his rule in June 2013 when his father, Shaykh Hamad bin
Khalifah, abdicated, marking the first voluntary and planned transition of power in Qatar since its
independence. Shaykh Hamad raised the global profile and influence of the small, energy-rich
country after replacing his own father in a palace coup in 1995. Emir Tamim’s mother, Shaykha
Mohza, is active in leading education, health, and women’s initiatives.
Figure 1. Qatar: Map and Country Data
1 Treaties signed in 1868 and 1916 between the Al Thani family and the United Kingdom recognized the Al Thani
family’s authority in Qatar but placed mutually agreed restrictions on Qatari sovereignty from 1868 through 1971.
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Of the country’s approximately 2 million people, roughly 15% are citizens: the rest are foreign
residents and temporary laborers.2 Qatar’s small native population is not publicly restive, and
members of the fluid expatriate population of more than 1.7 million have no political rights.
Public debate on some issues has been encouraged, although recent U.S. State Department human
rights reports have noted Qatar’s ban on political parties and restrictions on freedom of speech,
press, assembly, association, and religion for citizens and noncitizens alike.
In practice, the emir’s personal authority as Qatar’s constitutional monarch is tempered only by
the need to maintain basic consensus within the Al Thani family and among other influential
interest groups. Most experts regard the Al Thani family as having some significant, if
manageable, internal rivalries. Religious conservatives have considerable social influence, and
Qatar’s military and security forces answer to the emir. Elections for a Central Municipal Council
were held in May 2011, and planned national Advisory Council elections were again delayed in
mid-2013 in conjunction with the leadership transition (see below).
A broad shift in government leadership accompanied the recent royal transition and suggests that
changes were managed in order to accommodate the interests of others than the emir and his
immediate family. The emir appoints members of his extended family and other leading figures to
a governing Council of Ministers, which serves as the national cabinet (see Table 1 below).
Emir Tamim has inherited the duties of leading a nation that transformed under his father's tenure
from a weak satellite of Saudi Arabia into an ambitious, independent regional power with large
financial resources and considerable global influence relative to the country’s small population. In
his initial public statements and actions, the new emir suggested that elements of both continuity
and change would characterize Qatar's official policies under his leadership. Upon taking office,
he said:
...we are people who are committed to our principles and values. We do not live on the
sidelines of life and we do not go adrift without a destination. We are not subservient waiting
for guidance from anyone. This independent pattern of behavior has become factual in Qatar
and people who deal with us. We are people with visions.
...we respect all sincere and active political trends in the region but we are not supportive of a
trend against another. We are Muslims and Arab; we respect the diversity of religious
schools of thoughts and respect all religions in our country and abroad. As Arabs, we reject
dividing the Arab communities based on sectarianism or doctrine because this affects social
and economic immunity and prevents its modernization and development on the basis of
citizenship regardless of religious sects or thoughts.
At a December 2013 event in London, Qatari Foreign Minister Khaled al Attiyah said, “We have
the same policy but it may be that our approach has changed.”3
2 The State Department 2013 Investment Climate Statement on Qatar estimated that there were approximately 250,000
Qatari citizens in November 2012, “less than one-sixth of the total population.”
3 Damien McElroy, “Assad should face war crimes trial… says Qatar,” Telegraph (UK), December 4, 2013.
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Table 1. Chiefs of State and Select Qatari Leaders
Emir and Defense Minister
Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
Prime Minister and Interior Minister
Abdul ah bin Nasser bin Khalifa Al Thani
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for the Council of Ministers
Ahmed bin Abdul ah Al Mahmoud
Foreign Minister
Khalid Bin Mohammad Al Attiyah
Minister of Energy and Industry
Mohammed bin Saleh al Sada
Minister of State for Defense Affairs
MG Hamad bin Ali Al Attiyah
Chief of Staff, Qatari Armed Forces
MG Ghanim bin Shaheen al Ghanim
Ambassador to the United States (Departing 2014)
Mohammed bin Abdul ah al Rumaihi
U.S. Ambassador to Qatar (September 2011-Present)
Susan L. Ziadeh
Qatar’s 2003 Constitution, Political Reform, and Possible Elections
The 2003 constitution states that national legislative authority will reside in the hands of a 45-member Advisory
Council (Majlis Al Shura), two-thirds of which will be directly elected and one-third appointed by the emir from among
ministers or others.4 Until the 2003 constitution is fully implemented, the emir appoints all of the members of the
current Advisory Council; members serve four-year terms at the emir’s discretion. A special electoral law for new
Advisory Council elections was passed in May 2008 after concerns about voter franchise extension were resolved.5
The Advisory Council would have oversight authority over the Council of Ministers and would be able to propose
legislation and review budgets. The constitution also would empower the Advisory Council to issue motions of no-
confidence against government ministers, subject to the approval of two-thirds of the Advisory Council. Council
members would serve four-year terms under the new arrangements.
Some observers doubt that the Qatari leadership intends to ful y implement the changes anticipated in the 2003
constitution because democratic decision making could disrupt existing patronage relationships that ensure support
for the monarchy from rival social and royal family factions.6 Although Qatar has not experienced domestic political
unrest since 2011, regional unrest has likely affected Qatari citizens’ views of the planned Advisory Council elections
and Qatari leaders’ calculations about instituting oversight changes outlined in the 2003 constitution. Citizens may
fear the consequences of unrest while sharing enthusiasm for increased oversight of government affairs. The
preponderance of non-citizen residents in Qatar and their transient status in the country suggests that regardless of
the degree of implementation of expected reforms, most inhabitants will not participate in democratic decision
making about the country’s development and orientation.
4 Prior to the establishment of a partially elected national assembly, Qatar had a fully appointed, 35-member advisory
council that could only make recommendations to the Council of Ministers. Qatar’s old Provisional Constitution
provided for a modified electoral procedure in choosing members of the Council and a three-year term; nevertheless,
the Council remained appointive in practice, and terms of the Council members were extended in three or four-year
increments since 1975.
5 Reportedly some members of the Al Thani family sought to restrict voting rights to so-called “native” Qataris whose
families have lived in Qatar since 1930 or before. The 2007 U.S. Department of State Human Rights report for Qatar
estimated that an electorate with that criteria could be “less than 50,000.” Under a compromise, post-1930 naturalized
citizens who have been citizens for ten years will have voting rights and will be eligible to run for office if their fathers
were born in Qatar. Economist Intelligence Unit, “Advisory Council approves new electoral law,” June 1, 2008.
6 Mehran Kamrava, “Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar,” Middle East Journal, Volume 63, Issue
3, July 1, 2009.
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U.S.-Qatar Relations and Issues before Congress
The United States opened its embassy in Doha in 1973, but U.S. relations with Qatar did not
blossom until after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In the late 1980s, the United States and Qatar
engaged in a prolonged diplomatic dispute regarding Qatar’s black market procurement of U.S.-
made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.7 The dispute froze planned economic and military
cooperation, and Congress approved a ban on arms sales to Qatar (§566(d), P.L. 100-461) until
the months leading up to the 1991 Gulf War, when Qatar allowed coalition forces to operate from
Qatari territory and agreed to destroy the missiles in question.8 In January 1991, Qatari armored
forces helped coalition troops repel an Iraqi attack on the Saudi Arabian town of Kafji, on the
coastal road leading south from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province.9 In June
1992, Qatar signed a defense cooperation agreement with the United States, opening a period of
close coordination in military affairs that has continued to the present. The United States
promptly recognized the assumption of power by Shaykh Hamad in June 1995 and welcomed
Qatar’s defense cooperation, as well as Shaykh Hamad’s modest political, economic, and
educational reform efforts.
President Obama congratulated Emir Tamim upon his accession to the throne in June 2013, and
Qatari-U.S. relations remain cordial and close, amid some differences over regional security
questions. Qatari-U.S. defense relations have expanded to include cooperative defense exercises,
equipment pre-positioning, and base access agreements. U.S. concerns regarding alleged material
support for terrorist groups by some Qataris, including reported past support by a prominent
member of the royal family, have been balanced over time by Qatar’s counterterrorism efforts and
its broader, long-term commitment to host and support U.S. military forces active in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the rest of the CENTCOM area of responsibility. In December 2013, U.S.
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited Doha, met with Emir Tamim, and signed a new 10-year
defense cooperation agreement with Qatar.
Qatari officials are quick to point out their commitment to the general goal of regional peace and
their support for U.S. military operations, even as they maintain ties to Hamas and others critical
of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. In June 2009, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar Joseph LeBaron
explained Qatar’s policy in the following terms: “I think of it as Qatar occupying a space in the
middle of the ideological spectrum in the Islamic world, with the goal of having doors open to it
across that ideological spectrum. They have the resources to accomplish that vision, and that’s
rare.”10 By all accounts, Qatar’s balancing strategy toward its relationship with the United States
and regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia is likely to persist, which may continue to
7 Qatar defended its procurement of the missiles in protest of the sale of similar missiles by the United States to
Bahrain, with which Qatar had an unresolved border dispute until 2001. Elaine Sciolino, “Qatar Rejects U.S. Demand
For Return of Illicit Stingers,” New York Times, June 28, 1988; Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Drawn Into Gulf Dispute—Stray
Stingers Tied To Qatar-Bahrain Tiff,” Washington Post, October 6, 1988.
8 The ban was formally repealed by the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act of 1991 (§568(b), P.L. 101-513). The conference report on H.R. 5114, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1991 (H.Rept. 101-968) inserted Senate language (Amendment No. 144) that
repealed the ban based on information provided by the Secretary of Defense “that it is in the national interest to
reestablish United States-Qatari security relations because of their support for United States troops in the Middle East.”
9 Thomas Ferraro, “Allies Retake Saudi City,” United Press International, January 31, 1991; and Joseph Albright,
“Marines Take Credit for Khafji Victory,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, February 3, 1991.
10 Carrie Sheffield, “Tiny nation, global clout,” Washington Times, June 24, 2009.
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place Doha and Washington on opposing sides of some important issues even amid close
cooperation on others.
The United States has provided limited counterterrorism assistance to Qatar to support the
development of its domestic security forces, and the Export-Import Bank has provided over $2
billion in loan guarantees to support various natural gas development projects in Qatar since
1996. The Obama Administration has phased out U.S. foreign assistance and has requested
military construction funds for facilities in Qatar. Qatar donated $100 million to victims of
Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. Gulf states, and Qatari state entities and private individuals
continue to make large investments in the United States. Several prominent U.S. universities have
established satellite campuses in Doha at Qatar’s Education City, where Qatari, American, and
other students pursue undergraduate and graduate coursework across a broad range of subjects.
In Congress, legislative action related to Qatar remains relatively limited with the exception of
appropriations and authorization legislation that affects U.S. defense programs and congressional
review of proposed foreign military sales to the Qatari military. Qatar’s foreign and domestic
policies are monitored by congressional foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence committees,
while Qatar’s resource wealth and associated economic clout fuels congressional interest in U.S.-
Qatari trade and investment ties. In the 113th Congress, H.Res. 297 would congratulate Emir
Tamim “on his ascension to the throne”; express “thanks and appreciation” to Sheikh Hamad bin
Khalifa Al Thani; and recognize “the continued friendship between the United States and the
people of the State of Qatar.” A Congressional Caucus on Qatari-American Economic Strategic
Defense, Cultural and Educational Partnership also remains active.
U.S. Military Cooperation and Foreign Assistance
With its small territory and narrow population base, Qatar relies to a large degree on external
cooperation and support for its security. With 11,800 personnel, Qatar’s armed forces are the
second smallest in the Middle East, and in November 2013, the government proposed mandatory
short-term military service for Qatari males.11
A series of major proposed U.S. arms sales to Qatar since 2012 has marked a shift in Qatar’s
defense planning toward the future use of advanced U.S. attack and transport helicopters and
other werapons systems, including items for air defense and missile defense (see below). France
has provided approximately 80% of Qatar’s arms inventory to date. Qatar’s purchase of U.S.
weapons systems, including U.S. air and missile defense systems, corresponds to trends that have
seen increased interest in such systems from other governments in the region, ostensibly to
defend against potential missile attacks from Iran.
Qatar invested over $1 billion to construct the Al Udeid air base southwest of Doha during the
1990s; it did not have an air force of its own at the time. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also
awarded over $100 million dollars in Military Construction Air Force (MCAF) contracts for the
construction of U.S. storage, housing, service, command, and communication facilities. Qatar’s
financing and construction of some of the state-of-the-art air force base at Al Udeid and its
granting of permission for the construction of U.S.-funded facilities facilitated gradually deeper
cooperation with U.S. military forces.
11 Bahrain, with an estimated 11,000-member force, has the smallest.
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The Al Udeid airbase now serves as a logistics, command, and basing hub for U.S. operations in
Afghanistan. Nearby Camp As Sayliyah houses significant U.S. military equipment pre-
positioning and command facilities for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
operations.12 Both Qatar and the United States have invested in the construction and expansion of
these facilities since the mid-1990s, and they form the main hub of the CENTCOM air and
ground logistical network in the AOR. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan put U.S. and partner
nation facilities in Qatar to greater use in recent years. These facilities may require further
investment to meet current and potential future needs. From FY2003 to FY2011, Congress
appropriated and authorized more than $457 million for U.S. military construction activities in
Qatar.13 The Administration’s FY2013 and FY2014 Military Construction requests did not include
funding for projects in Qatar.
Table 2. Proposed U.S.-Qatar Arms Sales 2012-2013
Items
Estimated Cost Notification Date
($, million)
UH-60M BLACK HAWK Helicopters
$1,112
June 13, 2012
MH-60R and MH-60S SEAHAWK Helicopters
$2,500
June 26, 2012
AH-64D APACHE Block III Longbow Helicopters; Related Missiles
$3,000
July 12, 2012
HELLFIRE Missiles
$137
July 12, 2012
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units
$6,500
November 5, 2012
PATRIOT Configuration-3 Missile Fire Units and Missiles
$9,900
November 7, 2012
M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS); M57 Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block 1A T2K Rockets; M31A1
$406
December 24, 2012
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Rockets
Javelin Guided Missiles
$122
March 28, 2013
Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) Systems
$110
May 15, 2013
C-17 Globemaster III Equipment and Support
$35
June 27, 2013
A/N FPS-132 Block 5 Early Warning Radar
$1,100
July 29, 2013
Source: U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
The Administration requested $10,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET)
assistance funds for Qatar in FY2010, and requested an additional $10,000 for FY2011 but did
not allocate funds for Qatar during that fiscal year. The nominal IMET assistance had the
administrative effect of making Qatar eligible to purchase other U.S. military training at the
12 According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “Qatar continues to host the Combined Air Operations Center, which
provides airpower command and control for Afghanistan. Qatar also hosts USCENTCOM’s forward headquarters,
which has a crucial command and control responsibility for Afghanistan.” U.S. Department of Defense, Report on
Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, (P.L. 110-181), April 2010, p. 85.
13 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) authorized $81.7 million in FY2008
spending to build new Air Force and Special Operations facilities in Qatar. The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417) authorizes $69.6 million in FY2009 spending to build new Air Force and Special
Operations facilities. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84) authorizes $117
million in FY2010 spending to build new Air Force recreational, dormitory, and other facilities at Al Udeid. P.L. 111-
383 authorized $64.3 million in FY2011 funds for Air Force facilities and a National Security Agency warehouse. The
FY2012 request included $37 million to continue the dormitory and recreation facility project, but P.L. 112-81 did not
authorize funds specifically for that use.
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reduced cost level available only to IMET recipients.14 The Obama Administration did not request
IMET assistance for Qatar from FY2012 through FY2014.
Counterterrorism Cooperation and Concerns
U.S.-Qatari counterterrorism cooperation has improved since the 1990s when, according to the
9/11 Commission Report and former U.S. government officials, Qatari royal family member and
later Interior Minister Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani provided support to Al Qaeda
figures, including the suspected mastermind of the September 11 attacks, Khalid Shaykh
Mohammed.15 The U.S. State Department has characterized Qatar’s counterterrorism support
since September 11, 2001, as “significant,”16 but noted in its August 2011 report on terrorism
issues that U.S. officials “continued to seek improved cooperation and information sharing” with
their Qatari counterparts.
The 2012 State Department report (released in May 2013) stated that “Qatar’s monitoring of
private individuals’ and charitable associations’ contributions to foreign entities remained
inconsistent,” (see below) and noted that the Qatari government “maintained public ties to Hamas
political leaders.”17 Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal continues to operate from Doha after
decamping there from Damascus in 2012. Yusuf al Qaradawi, an outspoken Egypt-born religious
cleric, also continues to operate in Qatar, where he advocates support for armed Islamist groups in
Syria and encourages Egyptians to rise up against the current government, which has sought his
arrest.
In recent years, U.S. counterterrorism concerns with regard to Qatar have focused on support
provided by some Qataris to extremist and terrorist groups abroad. The State Department reported
in 2011 that Qatari authorities “did not adequately enforce its laws and international standards to
track funds transfers to individuals and organizations (including charities) associated with
extremists and terrorist facilitators outside Qatar.” During 2012, the Middle East and North Africa
Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) completed a required review of Qatar after
determining that “Qatar had improved its anti-money laundering/combating the financing of
terrorism regime and was either ‘Compliant or Largely Compliant’ with all of the Task Force’s
recommendations.”18 The Qatari central bank operates a financial intelligence unit (FIU) that
14 The Senate version of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act would have amended existing law to make
Qatar eligible for such reduced cost purchases without having to receive IMET. §1204 of S. 2467 in the 112th Congress
would have amended Section 546(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347e(b)).
15 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission
Report), pp. 73, 147-8, 488-9. The former emir named Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani to the post of Minister of
Interior in January 2001. Shaykh Abdullah bin Khalid remained Qatar’s minister of interior from 2001 until being
replaced in mid-2013 by long-serving Minister of State for Interior Affairs Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifah al Thani.
See also, James Risen and David Johnston, “Qaeda Aide Slipped Away Long Before September 11 Attack,” New York
Times, March 8, 2003; Josh Meyer and John Goetz, “Qatar’s Security Chief Suspected of Having Ties to Al Qaeda,”
Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2003.
16 U.S. State Department—Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004, April
27, 2005.
17 U.S. State Department—Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2012, May
30, 2013. The Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA) is responsible for monitoring the activities of all
Qatari domestic and international charitable organizations, including prominent organizations such as the Qatar
Charitable Society and the Shaykh Eid bin Mohammed Al Thani Charitable Association. All international financial
charity transfers and project verification fall within the jurisdiction of the QACA.
18 The MENAFATF findings did not address the enforcement of Qatar’s AML-CFT laws. For details, see
(continued...)
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monitors activity in Qatar’s banking system and serves as a liaison office to similar units in the
United States and around the world.
In December 2013, the U.S. government designated Abdelrahman bin Umayr al Nuaymi, a Qatari
national and human rights activist, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) for
allegedly acting as an Al Qaeda financier.19 Nuaymi is the president of the leadership council of
the Switzerland-based Al Karama Foundation.
Qatar’s Foreign Policy
Qatar’s approach to regional affairs can be described as a multi-directional balancing act. To the
chagrin of Saudi Arabia and other regional powers, Qatar has sought in recent years to mediate
regional conflicts and political disputes by engaging a wide range of parties in Yemen, Lebanon,
Sudan, and Gaza, some of whom are hostile to the United States. Qatari leaders responded boldly
to the regional unrest that emerged in 2011, while increased Sunni-Shiite and Arab-Iranian
tensions in the Gulf region have led Qatar to close ranks with its Sunni Arab allies in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC). Qatari leaders have embraced political change in Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya, Syria, and Yemen, while offering support to their historic rivals in Bahrain’s ruling Al
Khalifa family.
The former emir took a measured approach to unrest in Syria during 2011, but he and the current
emir adopted a more confrontational approach as violence continued and worsened during 2012
and 2013. In December 2013, Qatari Foreign Minister Khaled al Attiyah said that Syrian
President Bashar al Asad and his government “should go to the Hague” for prosecution for war
crimes rather than to Geneva for peace talks and argued, “the friends of Syria must do as much as
we can to protect the people of Syria from the brutality of the regime.”20
While some regional voices clearly resent Qatar’s assertive diplomacy, the Qatari government’s
agility in the face of uncertainty and the soft power of its government-supported Al Jazeera
satellite television network have made Qatar a key player in regional unrest since 2011. Some
critics assert that despite Qatar’s active foreign policy, its regional diplomacy has actually yielded
few tangible results, with the exception of the 2008 Doha agreement that temporarily ended an
18-month long political crisis in Lebanon. Reported Qatari support for Sunni armed groups in
Syria has the potential to have a more lasting impact on the region, but has challenged the
traditional Qatari preference for remaining engaged with all sides in regional disputes.
Among the key questions for the region is whether or not Qatar's official embrace of some Sunni
Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, will change significantly under the
leadership of Emir Tamim. Yusuf al Qaradawi's controversial remarks on Syria and Egypt—
Qaradawi has called for “jihad” in Syria and urged Egyptians to revolt against what he deems to
have been a military coup against former president Mohammed Morsi—reportedly have led to
private rebukes from Emir Tamim. However, Qaradawi continues to appear publicly and delivers
(...continued)
MENAFATF, Mutual Evaluation Report - Fourth Follow‐Up Report for Qatar Anti‐Money Laundering and Combating
the Financing of Terrorism, April 28, 2012.
19 U.S. Treasury Department, “Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen,” December 18, 2013.
20 Damien McElroy, “Assad should face war crimes trial… says Qatar,” Telegraph (UK), December 4, 2013.
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sermons in Qatar. Reported Qatari support for armed Islamist groups in Syria remains a subject of
international scrutiny.
Afghan Taliban Political Office in Qatar
Multilateral diplomacy aimed at ending the insurgency in Afghanistan facilitated the opening in
June 2013 of a political office by the Afghan Taliban in the Qatari capital, Doha, to engage with
third parties. The Obama Administration supported the office initiative “for the purposes of
negotiations between the Afghan High Peace Council and the authorized representatives of the
Taliban.”21 However, a dispute over the nature of the office led to its closure weeks later in July
2013: Afghan government authorities protested the Taliban’s use of the name “Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan” and the display of the former Taliban government flag at the facility. The Obama
Administration reiterated its view that, “The office must not be treated as or represent itself as an
embassy or other office representing the Afghan Taliban as an emirate government or
sovereign.”22 Qatari officials took steps to remove the disputed placards and flag. Afghan
President Hamid Karzai had long been critical of plans for the office and said in December 2013
that “Qatar is no longer an option for us.”23 He has invited the Taliban to open a political office in
Afghanistan, and some observers have speculated that U.S.-Pakistan facilitated talks among
Afghans may be held in Saudi Arabia or another location without the formal opening of any
office by the Taliban movement in Qatar or otherwise.
Qatar Hosts Hamas Leader, Aids Gaza, Supports Arab Consensus
on Israel
Although Qatar and Israel do not have formal diplomatic ties, Qatar has supported the Arab
League position backing internationally supported negotiations between the Palestinian Authority
and Israel.24 In his first speech upon taking power, Emir Tamim said:
Qatar is committed to the solidarity with brotherly Palestinian people and struggles to
achieve the legitimate rights and considers the realization of these rights a condition for just
peace, which include the Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967
including East Jerusalem, establishment of independence of the Palestinian State, the right
for return for refugees as no settlement without a just peace.25
Qatari leaders regularly criticize Israeli decisions on settlements and Jerusalem that they feel
undermine prospects for a two-state solution. Qatar, like other Arab states, continues to support
21 U.S. State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki, Daily Press Briefing, June 19, 2013.
22 Ibid.
23 “Doha was not our choice in the first place, Doha, Qatar was an American choice and an American plan, we
negotiated for almost two years, we told from the very beginning the Americans that is not our place, we want the
peace process to be in Afghanistan and if not in Afghanistan, then Saudi Arabia or Turkey but the Americans insisted
on Qatar and then we put conditions, the Americans agreed to those conditions and again , the US President gave me a
letter of assurances but when the Office in Qatar opened, it was exactly the opposite to those assurances therefore Qatar
is no longer an option for us.” OSC Report SAR2013121244787755, “Transcript of Interview by President Karzai with
French Daily Le Monde News,” Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, December 12, 2013.
24 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Arabs support Palestinian call for peace conference,” February 12, 2012.
25 OSC Document IMN2013062669656496, “Qatar's New Emir Gives 1st Speech; Pledges To Continue Father's
Policy,” Al Jazirah Satellite Television (Doha), June 26, 2013.
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the Palestinian bid for recognition and full membership at the United Nations. Qatar is investing
hundreds of millions of dollars in construction projects in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip and
financed the Palestinian Authority’s purchase of a fuel shipment for the Gaza electricity
generation plant that Israel approved in December 2013.
In recent years, some observers have viewed Qatar’s diplomatic approach as supportive of
Hamas, particularly since Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal relocated to Doha at the Qatari
government’s invitation in 2012. In the past, some Members of Congress, including then-Senator
and now Secretary of State John Kerry, have criticized Qatar for providing financial and political
support to Hamas.26 Qatari officials have long argued that their relationship with Hamas reflects a
consistent policy of engagement with all sides in the interests of peace. Meshaal has been
reported by some sources to be searching for an alternate base of operations, but his relationship
with Emir Tamim has not shown any public signs of strain to date. Meshaal met with Emir Tamim
following the transfer of power in mid-2013 and travelled to Jordan with the emir in January 2012
when the emir was serving as crown prince.
Qatar has been in the forefront of Arab-Israeli talks on expanding Arab economic ties with Israel
during periods of progress in the peace process. Qatar’s position regarding the Arab boycott of
Israel is governed by the September 1994 decision by the GCC to terminate enforcement of the
indirect boycotts, while maintaining, at least in theory, the primary boycott. An Israeli trade office
in Doha was shuttered by the Qatari government in response to the January 2009 Gaza war and
has not been reopened.
Qatar’s Economy and U.S. Trade
Qatar has backed up its active diplomacy with increasing financial resources and economic
influence over the last decade—a period of “unparalleled prosperity.”27 Between 2000 and 2012,
Qatar’s nominal GDP skyrocketed from $35 billion to an estimated $185 billion. According to a
January 2013 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, annual GDP growth reached 16.7% in
2010 and 13% in 2011 before slowing to an estimated 6.6% in 2012.28 Hydrocarbon exports have
led the way, but non-oil and gas sector growth reached 9% in 2012. Oil and natural gas export
proceeds provide more than half of the government’s revenue, and private sector growth has been
robust in recent years, while slowing slightly from 2008 to present.
For the second fiscal year in a row, Qatar based its 2013-2014 budget on an assumed oil price of
$65 per barrel—well below current global market prices. In recent years, government spending
has exceeded budget projections, but conservative energy export price estimates have ensured
large surpluses. The IMF has estimated that Qatar’s fiscal surpluses will continue through at least
2015, but are likely to decrease in size. The government continues to invest surplus revenue
abroad for future generations and has increased public spending in support of domestic
infrastructure, housing, and health sector improvements. Qatari press outlets feature limited
26 For example, then-Senator John Kerry voiced specific concerns about alleged Qatari government and private support
to Hamas, arguing in April 2009 that “Qatar ... can’t continue to be an American ally on Monday that sends money to
Hamas on Tuesday.” US Fed News, “Sen. Kerry Speaks on Middle East to Brookings Institute,” April 2, 2009.
27 In February 2010, the Middle East Economic Digest judged that “Qatar is enjoying a period of unparalleled
prosperity.” Middle East Economic Digest, “Qatar’s peaking energy market,” February 12, 2010.
28 IMF, Qatar - 2012 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 13/14, January 2013.
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criticism of domestic budget transparency, spending priorities, foreign contractors, and
government efficiency.
Some observers have raised questions about the long-term ability of Qatar to attract private sector
investment and produce employment opportunities once the current phase of large state-supported
infrastructure investment is complete. By all accounts, Qatari officials remain confident in their
economic prospects and appear to have used the post-2008 downturn as an opportunity to assess
lessons learned during the country’s boom, to reconsider planned projects, and, where possible, to
take advantage of lower input costs by delaying project start dates or renegotiating contracts.
Managing the infrastructure and service needs created by the influx of laborers to the county
remains an immediate challenge. The country’s population, including expatriates, more than
tripled between 2000 and 2010, growing to over 2 million in 2013.29 As such, Qatar’s economic
successes have been accompanied by new challenges in the areas of social cohesion; education;
labor; national infrastructure; and energy, water, and food supplies. To respond to these
challenges, Qatari authorities have embarked on a series of parallel national development
strategies based on a comprehensive national vision document that seeks balanced, sustainable
growth by the year 2030.30 Emir Tamim bin Hamad chaired the implementation oversight body
for the Vision 2030 project in his role as heir apparent. The national development strategy for
2011 through 2016 sets ambitious infrastructure investment targets with over $65 billion in
planned spending on housing, roads, water, airports, and shipping facilities.31
Oil and Natural Gas32
With proven oil reserves of 25.4 billion barrels, Qatar has far less oil than the major Persian Gulf
producers, such as Kuwait (96.5 billion barrels), Iraq (112 billion barrels), and Saudi Arabia (252
billion barrels). However, Qatar has the third-largest gas reserves in the world, an estimated 25.2
trillion cubic meters (tcm).33 Qatar Petroleum (QP), the state-owned oil and natural gas company,
increased its crude oil output from 593,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 1999 to approximately
824,000 b/d in December 2008.34 However, production has been lowered as investments are made
in technology to extend the life of the country’s oil fields. In September 2013, Qatari officials
stated that crude oil production averaged 726,000 b/d in the first seven months of 2013.35
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Japan and South Korea are the top
importers of Qatari oil.
29 Based on figures available from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat, “World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision,” accessed May 2012.
30 For more information, see the General Secretariat for Development Planning website at http://www.gsdp.gov.qa/
portal/page/portal/GSDP_Vision_Root/GSDP_EN/What%20We%20Do/QNV_2030
31 See Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016, Chapter 3, Figure 3.2, p. 72, at http://www2.gsdp.gov.qa/
www1_docs/NDS_EN.pdf.
32 For more information and analysis, see U.S. Energy Information Administration, Qatar Country Analysis Brief,
January 2014.
33 Qatar’s supply of natural gas doubled in 2002, when surveyors discovered new gas deposits in Qatar’s North Field.
34 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Qatar has cut oil production in line with OPEC’s decision,” December 8, 2008.
35 Pratap John, “Qatar’s crude oil output to touch 800,000bpd by 2017,” Gulf Times (Doha), September 17, 2013.
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Figure 2. Map of Qatari Energy Resources and Select Infrastructure
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Qatar Country Analysis Brief, January 2014.
As part of a long-term development strategy, Qatar has tapped international financial markets and
invited foreign investment in order to finance the expansion of its gas extraction and liquefied
natural gas (LNG) production and export facilities.36 U.S. companies, particularly ExxonMobil,
are partners in most of Qatar’s LNG export projects. The Export-Import Bank of the United States
has provided over $1 billion in loan guarantees to support the development of Qatar’s gas
production facilities in cooperation with a range of U.S., European, and Asian companies, banks,
and export credit agencies.37 Qatar expanded its yearly natural gas production from 29.6 billion
cubic meters annually in 2002 to 157 billion cubic meters in 2012, and is now the world’s largest
exporter of LNG.38 Japan and India were the top importers of Qatari LNG in 2012. The large
36 Qatar’s government has a 60%-70% stake in two joint partnerships with foreign firms, including ExxonMobil (USA),
TotalFinaElf (France), KoGas (South Korea), and Matsui (Japan). In February 2005, Qatar Petroleum signed a $7
billion agreement with Shell and a $12 billion agreement with ExxonMobil to export natural gas to the United States
and Europe.
37 For example, since 1996, the Export Import Bank has provided loan guarantees to support the export of U.S.
equipment and services for the construction of facilities at Ras Laffan, including most recently the construction of
natural gas liquefaction plants and facilities associated with the QatarGas II and III projects. See Export Import Bank of
the United States, “Ex-Im Bank $930 Million Guarantee Supports U.S. Exports to Build LNG Plant in Qatar,”
November 18, 2004; and Export Import Bank of the United States, “Ex-Im Bank Finances QatarGas 3 Liquid Natural
Gas Complex, December 15, 2005.
38 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2013.
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natural gas production and shipping facilities at the coastal city of Ras Laffan in northern Qatar
serve as the main site for the country’s gas development projects, including the world’s largest
gas-to-liquids facility. Qatar owns numerous LNG import terminals in other countries, including
the United States. Qatar participates in and hosts the headquarters of the Gas Exporting Countries
Forum, an assembly of major gas exporting countries that some have described as a potential
natural gas OPEC.
Qatar has paused its rapid expansion of export-oriented natural gas projects through 2015 in
expectation of clearer market signals about long-term investment needs. However, limited off-
shore exploration activities are now underway. Global economic uncertainty and natural gas
market changes have complicated global demand projections for Qatari energy exports. However,
steady growth in regional energy consumption and the recent effects of regional unrest have
created new opportunities for growth. For example, Qatar and Jordan continue to discuss
potential Qatari LNG exports via a new LNG terminal at Aqaba to relieve pressure placed on
Jordanian supplies by unrest in Egypt.
U.S.-Qatar Trade
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the year-to-date value of U.S. exports to Qatar had reached
$3.8 billion through September 2013, consisting mainly of transport equipment, manufactured
goods, and machinery—up from $1.9 billion over the same period in 2012. The year-to-date value
of U.S. imports from Qatar, mainly oil, totaled $1 billion through September 2013 up from $763
million over the same period in 2012. U.S. oil imports from Qatar remained below 500,000
barrels per month in 2013. Reflecting the impact of the increase in domestic natural gas
production, U.S. liquefied natural gas imports from Qatar declined from a peak of 90.9 million
cubic feet in 2011 to 7.7 million cubic feet year-to-date through September 2013.39
According to the 2013 U.S. Investment Climate Statement for Qatar, “Qatar has not entered into a
bilateral investment, trade, or taxation treaty with the United States. However, Qatar and the
United States did sign a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in April 2004.”40
Qatar has made a series of large investments in the United States in recent years, including a real
estate investment in the City Center project in Washington, DC. In November 2013, Qatar
Airways signed a letter of intent to purchase 50 additional Boeing 777 airplanes in a deal that
may be worth more than $19 billion.
Outlook
The leadership transition in Qatar signaled the opening of a new chapter in U.S.-Qatari relations
that already had grown increasingly close in recent years, in spite of some abiding policy
differences. Emir Tamim and his government appear to be taking an equally active, if quieter
approach to diplomacy than that of the emir’s father and his counterparts. The new emir may be
seeking to bolster key relationships with the United States and others before considering more
39 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), U.S. Imports from Qatar of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products
(Thousand Barrels) and U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Imports from Qatar (Million Cubic Feet), December 16, 2013.
40 U.S. State Department Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Qatar 2013 Investment Climate Statement,
February 2013.
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controversial policies or positions. Most observers expect Qatari policy makers to favor policies
that will consolidate the political and economic gains Qatar has made in recent years and set the
country on a sustainable path. Decision makers in the United States may debate how best to
maintain improved defense and counterterrorism relations with Qatar while seeking to address
more challenging issues related to regional security, human rights, political reform, and labor
conditions.
Author Contact Information
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
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