Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
January 27, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33546

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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Summary
This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in U.S.-Jordanian
relations. It provides a brief discussion of Jordan’s government and economy and of its
cooperation with U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East, including the promotion of Arab-
Israeli peace.
Several issues are likely to figure in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid
to and cooperation with Jordan. These include the stability of the Jordanian regime (particularly
in light of ongoing political change and/or unrest in several other countries in the region),
Jordan’s involvement in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the civil war in neighboring Syria, and
U.S.-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation.
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. The country’s small
size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and
friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious
vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel,
Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of more powerful
neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential
adversaries.
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and
1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2013 amounted to approximately $13.83 billion. Levels
of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to threats faced by Jordan and decreasing during
periods featuring political differences or reductions of aid worldwide. On September 22, 2008,
the U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement whereby the United States agreed to
provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a five-year period,
ending with FY2014. In the year ahead, both parties may try to reach a new five-year aid deal.
In recent months, Congress has taken additional steps to support Jordan. On August 2, 2013, the
House of Representatives passed H.Res. 222, which expressed lawmakers’ “firm commitment to
support the Government of Jordan as it faces regional challenges and works toward a more
peaceful and stable Middle East.” In order to bolster Jordan’s border security, Congress included
Section 1207 in H.R. 3304, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014. This section
authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide up
to $150 million on a reimbursable basis to Jordan for security along its border with Syria.
On January 17, 2014, the President signed into law P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2014 which Congress passed days earlier. The law provides Jordan $360 million in economic
aid and $300 million in military aid. It also stipulates that “from amounts made available under
title VIII designated for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism, not less than
$340 million above the levels included in the Memorandum of Understanding between the United
States and Jordan shall be made available for the extraordinary costs related to instability in the
region, including for security requirements along the border with Iraq.” The law also continues to
authorize foreign aid to be used for loan guarantees to Jordan and the establishment of an
enterprise fund. Finally, Congress also appropriated additional Migration and Refugee Assistance
funding (MRA) to help countries like Jordan cope with the Syrian refugee crisis.
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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Contents
Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 1
The Syrian Civil War and its Effects on Jordan ............................................................................... 2
The Humanitarian Crisis ..................................................................................................... 2
U.S.-Jordanian Military Cooperation Relating to the Syrian Civil War .............................. 3
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66) ............................................... 4
Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process ...................................................................................... 4
Overview ................................................................................................................................... 4
Jordan and the Status of Ongoing Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations ........................................... 5
Recent Reports of Israeli-Jordanian Cooperation ...................................................................... 6
Country Background ........................................................................................................................ 8
Domestic Politics and the Economy .......................................................................................... 8
The Hashemite Royal Family .............................................................................................. 9
Constitution, Parliament, Political Parties, and Judiciary ................................................. 10
The Economy........................................................................................................................... 11
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan ................................................................................................. 13
The Five-Year Aid Deal..................................................................................................... 13
Economic Assistance ......................................................................................................... 13
Food Aid ............................................................................................................................ 14
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) ............................................................................ 14
Military Assistance ............................................................................................................ 14
Recent U.S. Assistance to Jordan ...................................................................................... 15
U.S.-Jordanian Trade ..................................................................................................................... 16
Free Trade Agreement ....................................................................................................... 16
Qualifying Industrial Zones .............................................................................................. 16
Military Cooperation ............................................................................................................... 17
Joint Exercises and Training ............................................................................................. 17

Figures
Figure 1. Registered Syrian Refugees in Jordan .............................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Jordan and Its Neighbors .................................................................................................. 8
Figure 3. Gallup: Poll on Jordanian Wellbeing .............................................................................. 12

Tables
Table 1. Possible Foreign Military Sales to Jordan Notified to Congress ..................................... 17
Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis .................................................... 18

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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19

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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

Overview
Despite conflict on its borders, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan appears to remain internally
stable and a reliable partner for the United States in the Arab world. Nevertheless, Jordan is an
arid, resource-poor country that has been inundated with more than 500,000 Syrian refugees over
the past two years. As Syria’s civil war continues, how Jordan can cope with the humanitarian
fallout is an open question. Supporting the needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan and elsewhere has
been a major priority for U.S. and international aid agencies, and Members’ support for or
opposition to additional funding to the Jordanian government for humanitarian purposes may
depend on a variety of factors.
Promoting peace between Israel and the Palestinians is a major priority for Jordan, which signed a
peace treaty with Israel in 1994 (the second Arab country to do so—Egypt was the first). The
kingdom supports U.S. efforts to mediate a final settlement, which it believes should be based on
the 2002 Saudi Arabian-proposed Arab Peace Initiative—an independent Palestinian state with
East Jerusalem as its capital. Although Jordan unilaterally annexed the West Bank from 1950 to
1988, and maintains responsibilities in administering various holy sites in Jerusalem, it rejects
those who claim that “Jordan is Palestine,” and Jordanian officials routinely claim that Israeli
construction of settlements is illegitimate.
Domestically, Jordan’s lack of domestic energy and water resources places a constant strain on
the government budget, with fuel imports and subsidies driving deficit spending and borrowing in
recent years. When the government announced a reduction in fuel subsidies in November 2012 in
line with commitments made to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), widespread street unrest
ensued. The Jordanian government is trying to balance the need it apparently perceives to stave
off unrest through social spending with the need to finance the growing budget deficit that results
from such spending. Since it cannot do this alone, the government has turned to the IMF (a three-
year, $2.38 billion loan approved in August 2012), the United States ($660 million a year in
bilateral aid), Europe, and the Gulf States ($5 billion multi-year aid package pledged in December
2011) to keep it afloat until the overall political and economic situation improves.
Jordan’s domestic political system has endured, as King Abdullah II, now in his 14th year of rule,
attempts to appease domestic constituencies that serve as the foundation for his family’s rule,
while maintaining external ties to Jordan’s financial benefactors in the Arab Gulf and the West.
During the so-called Arab spring between 2011 and 2013, Jordan experienced periodic social
unrest, but not nearly at the same level as some of its neighbors. Overall, while many Jordanians
are struggling economically, popular movements for democratic reform have failed to galvanize
decisive support. Instead, the King himself has often tried to appear as the most fervent advocate
of a top-down reform process that many observers believe may be more politically expedient than
substantively effective.
Overall, popular economic grievances have spurred the most vociferous protests in Jordan. Like
elsewhere in the Middle East, youth unemployment is high, and providing better economic
opportunities for younger Jordanians is a major challenge outside of Amman. Large-scale
agriculture is not sustainable, so officials are left with the option of providing young workers with
low-wage, relatively unproductive civil service jobs. How the Jordanian education system and
economy can respond to the needs of its youth has been and will continue to be one of the
defining domestic challenges for the kingdom in the years ahead.
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The Syrian Civil War and its Effects on Jordan
The Humanitarian Crisis
Although fighting in Syria has not spilled over into Jordan, the continued inflow of Syrian
refugees is placing tremendous strains on the government. As of January 2014, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are 568,501 registered (or waiting to
be registered) Syrian refugees in Jordan. There may be tens of thousands more unregistered
Syrian refugees inside the country. Overall, the influx of Syrians into Jordan has increased the
country’s population by 10%. Some estimates suggest that if the war continues, the total Syrian
refugee population in Jordan will surge to over 800,000 by the end of 2014.1
Most Syrian refugees in Jordan have taken
Figure 1. Registered Syrian Refugees in
refuge in urban areas, especially in the
Jordan
northern part of the country. Nearly 20% of
all Syrian refugees live in refugee camps,

specifically in the 80,000-tent “city” of Al
Zaatari refugee camp in northern Jordan east
of the town of Mafraq. This camp opened in
July 2012 and, by some estimates, it is now
the fourth largest urban area in Jordan. The
United Arab Emirates has constructed a
smaller refugee camp in Jordan and a third
camp, the Azraq refugee camp 60 miles east
of Amman, is set to open soon.
Jordan has been widely praised
internationally for its “open door” policy,

though at times border authorities have
Source: UNHCR.
blocked some refugees’ entry into the
kingdom for days or even weeks either due to security concerns or the strains of the refugee
population on the government.2 In October 2013, Amnesty International published a report
charging that the Jordanian government had contravened international law by forcibly deporting
“scores of people” back to Syria.3 The Jordanian government claims that it has been welcoming
of all Syrians who have fled to the kingdom at great expense to the government, asserting that
over $2 billion in government funding has been allocated to support refugee needs for public
health, education, energy, and basic services. Government officials also note that Syrian refugees
residing in the north have strained water resources, which has led to shortages. According to
Jordanian Ambassador to the United States Dr. Alia Hatoug Bouran, “Jordan stands firm in its
commitment to keep its borders open. We see this as a humanitarian duty and we have no plans to

1 Statement of Andrew Harper, Representative, Jordan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Hearing
Before Committee on Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs,
December 10, 2013.
2 “Displaced Syrians Stranded along Jordanian Border; Humanitarian Crisis Feared,” Washington Post, July 23, 2013.
Additionally, reports indicate that Jordan has sought to prevent Palestinian refugees in Syria from entering Jordan.
3 “Jordan’s Restrictions on Refugees from Syria Reveal Strain on host Countries,” Amnesty International, October 30,
2013.
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shy away from this commitment.”4 According to the U.S. State Department, the United States has
allocated more than $61 million in multilateral humanitarian assistance to help Jordan cope with
the Syrian refugee crisis.5
Jordanian Concern over Cross-Border
U.S.-Jordanian Military Cooperation
Terrorism
Relating to the Syrian Civil War
From a security standpoint, the fighting in Syria poses a
number of risks for Jordan. Border guards have
Overall, Jordan and the United States support
exchanged fire with both Syrian government forces and
a political solution to the Syrian civil war, and
opposition groups. Numerous reports indicate that
in its absence, both countries seek to cooperate
Jordanians with Salafi-Jihadi beliefs are crossing into Syria
in ensuring that the fighting there does not
to join extremist rebel factions. Jordan also is concerned
that the southern Syrian province of Dera’a, where the
adversely affect Jordan. In order to achieve
rebellion against the Asad regime originally started, could
what could be considered a containment
be gradual y taken over by Al Qaeda-linked terrorist
strategy, the United States has made several
groups like the Nusra Front. Fear of terrorist
public deployments of personnel and
“blowback” into Jordan from Syria is also a concern
among security authorities. Nearly a decade ago,
equipment to the kingdom in 2012 and 2013.
Jordanian radicals who fought U.S.-led coalition forces in
According to Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of
Iraq turned their focus to conducting attacks inside
Staff General Martin E. Dempsey, the goal of
Jordan, such as the November 9, 2005, hotel bombings in
U.S. forces in Jordan is to demonstrate that “in
Amman, which killed 60 people. In October 2012, the
a very volatile region and at a very critical
government arrested 11 Jordanians found with explosives
from Syria that they reportedly intended to use against
time in their history, that they can count on us
various targets, including the U.S. Embassy in Amman.
to continue to be their partner.”6
In October 2012, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that the United States
military had sent a task force of “planners and other specialists” to Jordan. In April 2013, the
Defense Department announced that it would deploy an Army headquarters element (est. 200
personnel) to Jordan to help local forces defend their border with Syria. The Defense Department
noted that U.S. troops dispatched to Jordan would provide training and equipment to Jordanian
forces to “detect and stop chemical weapons transfers along Jordan's border with Syria, and
develop Jordan's capacity to identify and secure chemical weapons assets.” U.S. forces also have
been tasked with assisting border authorities with coordinating assistance to refugees.
In June 2013, after a two-week multilateral military training exercise in Jordan in which U.S.
forces participated, the President notified Congress that he was leaving some of the forces that
had participated in the exercise in Jordan indefinitely. The U.S. contingent includes a Patriot
missile battery and its associated support systems, F-16 fighter aircraft, and various command and
control personnel. President Obama noted that “The detachment will remain in Jordan, in full
coordination with the government of Jordan, until the security situation becomes such that it is no
longer needed.”7

4 Statement of Alia Bouran U.S. Assistance Jordan and Lebanon, Committee on Senate Appropriations Subcommittee
on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, December 10, 2013.
5 U.S. Department of State, “The Syrian Crisis: U.S. Assistance and Support for the Transition,” Fact Sheet, Office of
the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, January 17, 2014.
6 “With Eyes on Syria, U.S. Turns Warehouse Into Support Hub for Jordan,” New York Times, August 16, 2013.
7 “Letter from the President -- Regarding the War Powers Resolution, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
June 21, 2013.
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Moreover, several public statements by U.S. officials and numerous open source reports suggest
that the United States may be, under covert authorities, running a training program for armed
elements of the Syrian opposition generally perceived to be moderate (referred to as the Supreme
Military Council or SMC), possibly inside Jordan,8 in order to bolster non-al Qaeda-affiliated
opposition forces operating along Jordan’s northern borders. According to one report, Western
and Arab intelligence officials operating out of a command center in Amman channel sniper
rifles, mortars, heavy machine guns, and vehicles to SMC-affiliated fighters in Syria.9 The
government of Jordan denies any involvement either in the supplying of armaments or the
training of rebel forces. In response to alleged reports of Jordanian assistance to armed elements
of the Syrian opposition, Syrian state television and radio have broadcast warnings to the
Jordanian government, accusing Jordan of having “a hand in training terrorists and then
facilitating their entry into Syria.”
Overall, should the Jordanian government take a more direct role in supporting so-called
moderate Syrian opposition forces, such action would most likely reflect a shared U.S.-Jordanian
interest in boosting non-radical forces inside Syria amidst reports of continued gains from
possible al Qaeda-affiliated militias. According to one unnamed Western official, “It’s a race
between them [al Qaeda] and the regular rebels to Damascus.... And it’s in no one’s interests if Al
Qaeda wins.”10
FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66)
In order to bolster Jordan’s border security, Congress included Section 1207 in H.R. 3304, the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014. This section authorizes the Secretary of Defense
to provide assistance, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, on a reimbursement basis to
the Government of Jordan for purposes of supporting and maintaining efforts of the armed forces
of Jordan to increase security and sustain increased security along the border between Jordan and
Syria. The funds are to be drawn from the Coalition Support Fund account. According to the Act,
the total amount of assistance provided under this authority may not exceed $150 million and
may be provided in quarterly installments through December 31, 2015.
Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process
Overview
Helping secure a lasting end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the highest priorities of
the Jordanian government. Although Jordan joined other neighboring Arab states in a series of
military conflicts against Israel between 1948 and 1973, the late King Hussein (ruled 1952-1999)

8 According to one recent report, “Neighboring Jordan has quietly played a key role in helping coordinate divided FSA
[Free Syrian Army] forces in the south of Syria, channeling Western aid, guns and ammunition. Wounded fighters are
treated in Jordanian medical facilities. FSA commanders travel here to meet with US, European, and Arab military and
intelligence officials. As part of its covert aid to the Syrian opposition, the CIA is leading the training of Syrian fighters
in the south of the kingdom, US officials say privately.” See, “As Foreign Funds run Dry, Syrian fighters Defect to
Anti-Western Militias,” Christian Science Monitor, December 16, 2013.
9 “Secret HQ in Amman helps and directs Syrian Rebels in South, The National (UAE), December 28, 2013.
10 “Syria: Jordan to Spearhead Saudi Arabian Arms Drive,” The Guardian (UK), April 14, 2013.
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ultimately concluded that peace with Israel was in Jordan’s strategic interests due to Israel’s
conventional military superiority, the development of an independent Palestinian national
movement that threatened both Jordanian and Israeli security, and the need for Jordan to regain
Western support after it backed Saddam Hussein’s Iraq politically in the first Gulf War.11
Consequently, in 1994 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty,12 and King Abdullah II has used
his country’s semi-cordial official relationship with Israel to improve Jordan’s standing with
Western governments and international financial institutions, on which it relies heavily for
external support and aid.
Nevertheless, the persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major obstacle to
Jordan’s development. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, as
more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now
comprising the state of Israel. There are an estimated 2 million United Nations-registered
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and, while many no longer regard their stay in Jordan as
temporary, they have retained their refugee status both as a symbolic sign of support for
Palestinians living under Israeli occupation and in hope of being included in any future
settlement.13
Furthermore, for King Abdullah II and the royal Hashemite family, who are of Arab Bedouin
descent and whose legitimacy historically derives from the support of tribal families from the east
bank of the Jordan River, finding a solution to the conflict is considered a matter of political
survival. Although the Palestinians may be less rooted in Jordan than its East Bank citizens,
because they constitute a majority and express some grievances about their status within Jordan
relative to East Bankers, addressing their grievances regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of
critical importance to the monarchy. The royal family and their tribal constituents vehemently
reject periodic Israeli calls for the reunification of the West Bank with Jordan proper (dubbed the
“Jordanian Option”), a maneuver that could inevitably alter the demographic and political status
quo in Jordan. King Abdullah II has repeated the mantra that his father introduced after
relinquishing Jordan’s claims to the West Bank: “Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine.”
Jordan and the Status of Ongoing Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations
For over a decade, King Abdullah II has attempted to convince U.S. policy makers and Congress
to become more actively involved in mediating between Israelis and Palestinians. He has praised

11 In 1991, Congress suspended the delivery of U.S. economic and military aid to Jordan as a result of its support for
Iraq. See Section 502 of P.L. 102-27, the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Consequences of Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration, Veterans Compensation and
Pensions, and Urgent Needs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1991 and For Other Purposes.
12 Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors;
Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the parliament repealed laws
banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to
normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when
the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water
from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year—a little
over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).
13 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) maintains a large
presence in Jordan, including part of its headquarters (the other part is in Gaza City). UNRWA has 7,000 staff in
Jordan, comprising mostly teachers, doctors, and engineers. It operates 172 schools in Jordan (providing education
through 10th grade, then the remainder provided by government). According to UNRWA officials, their budget is $104
million a year. At this point, 83% of all U.N.-registered refugees live outside of UNRWA camps.
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U.S. efforts to mediate the latest final status negotiations, which began in July 2013 with a goal
for the parties to reach resolution within nine months. According to King Abdullah II, who
addressed the issue of Middle East peace during a speech at the United Nations in September
2013:
The talks that began in July show that progress can be made, with willing parties, determined
US leadership, and strong regional and international backing. We commend the President of
Palestine and the Prime Minister of Israel for the bold decision to resume final status
negotiations. We urge them to stay committed to reaching an agreement within the set time
frame. Let there be no actions that can derail what is still a fragile process. This means no
continued settlement construction, and no unilateral actions that threaten the status quo in
East Jerusalem and its Muslim and Christian holy sites. Such threats would be a flashpoint
for global concern. We know the right way forward. And the goal can be reached: a just and
final two-state settlement, based on international legitimacy and the Arab Peace Initiative.
For Israel: real security and normal relations with 57 Arab and Muslim countries. For the
Palestinian people, at long last, the rights they deserve, in a viable and independent
Palestinian State, on Palestinian national soil, based on the 1967 lines, and with East
Jerusalem as its capital.14
One unresolved issue in the negotiations, among many, concerns potential security arrangements
along Jordan’s border with a potential future Palestinian state. According to numerous public
reports, the United States government, led by Secretary of State John Kerry, has been working to
reassure Israel that any final peace deal would contain arrangements for either an Israeli or
international security presence in the Jordan Valley. Israel’s position is that it retains an army
presence along the border with Jordan in order to deter terrorist activity and counter smuggling.
According to Gadi Shamni, a former Israeli army general, “In the past, the issue of the eastern
front was worrisome. The scenario in which convoys of tanks and armored personnel carriers and
commandos head toward the border seems further off....Now, it's mainly [the] threat of terror.”15
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders speak frequently about the possibility
of rockets coming into the West Bank in the event of an Israeli military withdrawal, as they came
into Gaza and southern Lebanon after Israeli military withdrawals in both those places.
Recent Reports of Israeli-Jordanian Cooperation
The Dead Sea16: Recently, Jordan and Israel have pursued several potential resource and energy
cooperative agreements. On December 9, 2013, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority
signed a regional water agreement that could pave the way for the Red-Dead Canal, which is a
multi-billion dollar project to address declining water levels in the Dead Sea. The Red-Dead
Canal is a decades-old plan to provide freshwater to water-scarce countries in the surrounding
area while simultaneously restoring the Dead Sea. The “Red-Dead” concept is to pump water
from the Red Sea, desalinate some of it, and then transfer remaining saltwater north and below
sea level to the Dead Sea. The proposal has been extensively studied; however, its estimated high
cost ($10 billion to $12 billion) has hindered implementation. Moreover, since Israel, Jordan, and
the Palestinian Authority all govern territory or have claims to territory adjacent to the Dead Sea,

14 “Jordanian Paper Publishes Reports on King's Speech at UN General Assembly,” BBC Monitoring Middle East,
September 25, 2013.
15 “Altered Landscape Marks Mideast Talks,” Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2013.
16 See, Testimony of Jeremy M. Sharp, Hearing on Water as a Geopolitical Threat, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,
and Emerging Threats, January 16, 2014.
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continued political uncertainty caused by the lack of an Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement
also has hindered construction. Palestinians reject moving the canal project forward without a
conflict-ending agreement with Israel in place delineating their territorial and riparian rights
regarding the Dead Sea and its shore. Nevertheless, Jordan has pursued the Red-Dead Canal
concept. Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world and is constantly
searching for new water resources. In August 2013, the Jordanian government announced its
intent to construct a scaled-down version of the canal entirely on Jordanian territory. Jordan
would then send desalinated water to its southern city of Aqaba and possibly sell excess water to
Israel, while sending remaining seawater to the Dead Sea to replenish it. Environmentalists, who
have long criticized plans to restore the Dead Sea using Red Sea water, assert that rather than risk
damaging the Dead Sea’s ecosystem, countries should stop diverting water from the Jordan River,
which feeds the Dead Sea.
Under a December 2013 agreement, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority have agreed to a
water swap. Half of the water pumped from the Red Sea will be desalinated in a plant to be
constructed in Aqaba, Jordan, over the next three years. Some of this water will then be used in
southern Jordan. The rest will be sold to Israel for use in the Negev Desert. In return, Israel will
sell freshwater from the Sea of Galilee to northern Jordan and sell the Palestinian Authority
discounted freshwater produced by existing Israeli desalination plants on the Mediterranean. The
other half of the water pumped from the Red Sea (or possibly the leftover brine from
desalination) will be channeled to the Dead Sea.
Natural Gas: In December 2013, the Wall Street Journal reported that Israel and Jordan were
negotiating the terms of the sale of Israeli natural gas to Jordan.17 The kingdom depends on oil
and gas imports and, since 2011, cut-offs in the supply of Egyptian natural gas due to unrest in the
Sinai have cost the Jordanian government several billion dollars by compelling it to import more
expensive alternatives. In Egypt under Mubarak, energy cooperation with Israel had been a source
of controversy and a symbol of corruption, and the government of Jordan could face domestic
criticism if the deal moves forward.

17 “Energy Firms Near Deal to Sell Israeli Gas into Jordan Deal Would Move Israel Closer To Becoming an Energy
Exporter,” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2013.
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Figure 2. Jordan and Its Neighbors

Source: CRS Graphics.
Country Background
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have
cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. The country’s small size
and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and friendly
Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both
internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors, but has also
given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s
unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq disrupted its relations with the United States
and the Gulf states; however, relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an
increasing role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from the Iraqi regime of
Saddam Hussein.
Domestic Politics and the Economy
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or semi-desert
territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background. The
establishment of the state of Israel brought large numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which
subsequently unilaterally annexed a small Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River known as
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the West Bank.18 The original “East Bank” Jordanians, though probably no longer a majority in
Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and military establishments and form the
bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians of Palestinian origin comprise an
estimated 55% to 70% of the population and generally tend to gravitate toward the private sector
due to their exclusion from certain public sector and military positions.19
Jordan in Brief
The Hashemite Royal Family
Population:
6,482,081 (July 2013 est.)
Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy
Area:
89,213 sq. km. (34,445 sq. mi.,
under the prestigious Hashemite family, which
slightly smaller than Indiana)
claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad.
Ethnic Groups:
Arabs 98%; Circassians 1%;
King Abdullah II (age 51) has ruled the
Armenians 1%
country since 1999, when he succeeded to the
Religion:
Sunni Muslim 92%; Christian 6%;
throne upon the death of his father, the late
small Muslim sects 2%
King Hussein, after a 47-year reign. Educated
Literacy:
92.6% (male 95%, female 89.2%)
largely in Britain and the United States, King
Abdullah II had earlier pursued a military
GDP:
Per Capita $6,000 (2012 est.),
country comparison to the
career, ultimately serving as commander of
world: 144
Jordan’s Special Operations Forces with the
rank of Major General. The king’s son Prince
Foreign
Exchange
$10.7 billion (est. 2012)
Hussein (b. 1994) is the designated crown
Reserves:
prince.20
Youth
27%, country comparison to the
Unemployment world: 21
The king appoints a prime minister to head the
(ages 15-24):

government and the Council of Ministers
(cabinet).21 On average, Jordanian
External Debt:
$8.34 billion (December 2012
est.)
governments last no more than 15 months
before they are dissolved by royal decree. This
Sources: CIA World Factbook
seems to be done in order to bolster the king’s
reform credentials and to distribute patronage among a wide range of elites. The king also
appoints all judges and is commander of the armed forces.

18 Though there was very little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained
control of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War,
and maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.
19 Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948)
in Jordanian society tends to be a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2004 (the next
census may take place in 2014), and it is unclear whether or not the government maintains such statistics. Over time,
intermarriage has made it more difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions
do persist.
20 In July 2009, King Abdullah II named his then 15-year-old son, Prince Hussein Bin Abdullah, as crown prince. The
position had been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half-brother, Prince Hamzah.
21 In March 2013, King Abdullah II consulted with members of the 17th parliament before choosing a prime minister.
Although the King retains the constitutional authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, he has pledged to
reach a consensus with lawmakers before choosing a premier. The Muslim Brotherhood, which boycotted the election
leading to the formation of the current parliament, seeks a parliamentary system of government in which the prime
minister would be chosen by the largest block in parliament.
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Constitution, Parliament, Political Parties, and Judiciary
The Jordanian constitution (promulgated in 1952 and last amended in 2011) empowers the king
with broad executive powers. According to Article 35, “The King appoints the Prime Minister and
may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismisses them or
accepts their resignation, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.” The constitution also
enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house elections for
two years.22 The king also can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that
allows provisional legislation to be issued by the cabinet when parliament is not sitting or has
January 2013 Parliamentary Elections
Parliamentary elections on January 23, 2013, produced another overwhelmingly pro-palace parliament. The Muslim
Brotherhood’s Islamic Action Front party (IAF) boycotted the vote in protest of the lack of seats allocated for the
party list vote system (27 out of 150 total seats). The IAF sought to delegitimize the election through its boycott
and tarnish the palace’s image in the eyes of Western governments. Turnout figures for the election are somewhat
disputed. The government claims that 56.6% of registered voters participated, while others assert that the turnout
calculation should be based on the total number of eligible voters (both registered and unregistered), which, if taken
into account, would have equated to an estimated 40% turnout. King Abdul ah II has already cal ed for parliament to
amend the election law, which is widely considered to favor rural, traditional y pro-monarchy Bedouin
constituencies. For example, Amman is al otted 25 seats for 2.4 mil ion residents, while rural Tafileh has four seats
for 88,000 residents. In its preliminary assessment of the election, the National Democratic Institute concluded that
“systemic distortions remain. The unequal size of districts and an electoral system that amplifies family, tribal and
national cleavages limit the development of a truly national legislative body and challenge King Abdul ah’s stated aim
of encouraging full parliamentary government.” Nevertheless, Secretary of State John Kerry praised the electoral
process, saying that “The turnout is higher than any time previously, which shows a full and robust participation by
the Jordanian people in the election process.”
been dissolved.23 The king also can issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary
scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Finally, Article
195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté) with
criminal penalties of one to three years in prison.
Political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic
Action Front (IAF) is the only well-organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial
interests and are composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe.
Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are
independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other
than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: Civil courts, special courts (some of
which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. In Jordan, state security courts
administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery
of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and “security
offenses.” Overall, the king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a
palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and
retirements.

22 The king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “In the event of an emergency of such a serious
nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense
of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law
in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.”
23 New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue
temporary laws.
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The Economy
With few natural resources24 and a small industrial base, Jordan has an economy which is heavily
dependent on external aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker remittances,25 and the service
sector. Among the long-standing problems Jordan faces are poverty (15%-30%), corruption, slow
economic growth, and high levels of unemployment, nominally around 13% but thought by many
analysts to be in the 25%-30% range.26 Youth unemployment is nearly 30%. Corruption27 is
particularly pronounced in Jordan. Use of intermediaries, referred to in Arabic as “Wasta”
(connections), is widespread, and many young Jordanians have grown frustrated by the lack of
social and economic mobility that corruption engenders.28 Each year, thousands of Jordanians go
abroad in search of better jobs and opportunities. Like many poor countries, Jordan suffers from a
“brain drain” of its most talented workers, and the government has struggled to develop
incentives to keep its well-educated, highly skilled workers close to home. The government is by
far the largest employer, with between one-third and two-thirds of all workers on the state’s
payroll.

24 Jordan possesses substantial reserves of phosphates and potash. No significant oil and gas fields have been
discovered. However, Jordan has one of world’s largest reserves of oil shale. Officials estimate that the country
contains the world’s fourth-largest oil shale reserves. In 2006, Royal Dutch/Shell signed an oil shale exploration
agreement with the Jordanian government. Estonia’s Enefit Eesti Energia AS also has signed agreements on oil shale
projects. In 2012, the Canadian company, Global Oil Shale Holdings (GOSH), reached an agreement with the
Jordanian government to produce oil shale as well. For further background, see, “Amman Unlocks Energy Potential,”
Middle East Economic Digest, August 7, 2009.
25 It is estimated that up to 20% of GDP comes from remittances. Nearly 10% of Jordan’s population (600,000 est.)
reside and work in Arab Gulf countries.
26 One factor that exacerbates the unemployment situation in Jordan is the social stigma attached to menial labor jobs.
Referred to as the “culture of shame,” Jordanian tribal traditions look down on certain types of employment such as
construction. In fact, the government estimates that there are approximately 300,000 to 400,000 foreign laborers in
Jordan working as domestic laborers, bricklayers, and other tasks. According to the Jordanian Employment Ministry,
Egyptians make up 68% of foreign workers in Jordan.
27 Jordan was ranked 49 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions
Index.
28 In 2006, the Jordanian parliament passed a law establishing an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) which has taken
on several high level investigations in recent years, specifically looking into accusations of graft in a public housing
project (Decent Home for Decent Living) and a water works project (Disi Water Conveyance).
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Figure 3. Gallup: Poll on Jordanian Wellbeing

Source: Gal up, “Fewer Jordanians Than Ever Are "’Thriving,’" July 12, 2013.
The Government’s Chronic Fiscal Deficit
Due to sluggish domestic growth (In October 2013, the IMF forecasted GDP growth of 3.3% in
2013, rising to 3.5% in 2014), high energy/food subsidies and a bloated public sector workforce,
Jordan usually runs annual budget deficits (total public debt is $25 billion) which it partially
offsets by appealing to the international community for direct budget support. For 2014, the
government is projecting expenditures of $11.4 billion against domestic revenues of $5.86 billion.
The government anticipates that foreign grants will help off-set this shortfall, and according to the
Economist Intelligence Unit, Jordan’s total budget deficit in 2014 will be just over 4% of GDP.29
Credit agencies downgraded Jordan’s rating in 2013, projecting that the total debt-to-GDP ratio
will hit 84% in 2013 and reach close to 90% of GDP in 2014.30 Five years ago total debt to GDP
was 60%.
In order to keep Jordan fiscally stable, the International Monetary Fund agreed to a three-year, $2
billion loan in August 2012. As part of the IMF deal, Jordan is expected to cut spending and may
increase consumer electricity prices. It already has increased taxes on mobile phones and
contracts. However, when the government cut subsidies which raised the prices of cooking gas,
diesel, kerosene, and gasoline in 2012, large scale protests broke out across the country, and the
king subsequently reversed some cuts though others have remained in place. In Jordan, protests
over economic issues could be the likeliest trigger of changes to government policy, as well as
perhaps to its political system.

29 “2014 budget is Criticised by local Economists,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 20, 2013.
30 “Moody's Downgrades Jordan Credit Rating two Notches to B1,” Reuters, June 26, 2013.
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According to one member of Jordan’s parliament, “Unlike political protests and parties that lack
unity or a voice that represents Jordanians, the labor strikes have focused on demands that
improve their livelihoods.... They come with a list of specific demands and they have largely
succeeded.”31 Jordanian lawmakers also at times challenge the King’s decision-making on
subsidies. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, “On most political issues the legislature
can generally be counted on to support the regime, but MPs regularly challenge the government
on economic policy, and in particular on any attempts at structural reform and economic
liberalization.”32
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to Jordan since 1951 and
1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2013 amounted to approximately $13.83 billion.
The Five-Year Aid Deal
On September 22, 2008, the U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement whereby the
United States will provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a
five-year period (FY2010-FY2014). Under the terms of their non-binding Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), this first-of-its-kind deal commits the United States, subject to future
congressional appropriation and availability of funds, to providing $360 million per year in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $300 million per year in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF).33 According to the Jordanian government, the agreement “reaffirms the strategic
partnership and cooperation between the two countries.” Coming at a time when the overall
budget for foreign aid was constrained by U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the deal was a
testament to strong U.S.-Jordanian relations. In 2014, the United States and Jordan may negotiate
the terms of a new five-year aid deal.
Economic Assistance
The United States provides economic aid to Jordan as both a cash transfer and for USAID
programs in Jordan. The Jordanian government uses cash transfers to service its foreign debt.
Approximately 53% of Jordan’s ESF allotment goes toward the cash transfer. USAID programs in
Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance, water preservation, and
education (particularly building and renovating public schools). In the democracy sector, U.S.
assistance has supported capacity building programs for the parliament’s support offices, the
Jordanian Judicial Council, Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice. The International
Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also have received U.S. grants to train,
among other groups, some Jordanian political parties and members of parliament. In the water
sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce
water resources, as Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world. USAID is

31 “In Jordan, Protests Focus on Prices and Economy,” New York Times, May 30, 2012.
32 “Parliament puts Pressure on Government over Fuel Prices,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 7th 2013.
33 Under the terms of the MOU, annual foreign aid (non-supplemental) to Jordan will rise by nearly 50%, from an
estimated $460 million per year to $660 million.
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currently subsidizing several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian
cities of Amman, Mafraq, Aqaba, and Irbid.
Food Aid
Jordan periodically receives U.S. food aid administered by the Department of Agriculture
(USDA) under Title I of the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480), under the Section 416(b) program
permanently authorized by the Agricultural Act of 1949, and under the Food for Progress Act of
1985 as a grant. Between FY1999 to FY2006, Jordan received approximately $238.52 million in
food aid to purchase wheat. Jordan received no food assistance between FY2007 to FY2010. In
FY2011, the United States provided Jordan with $19 million aid to purchase 50,000 metric tons
of wheat. In September 2012, the United States agreed to provide Jordan with 50,000 metric tons
of wheat valued at $17 million.
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)
In FY2006, Jordan was listed by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as a Threshold
country in the lower middle-income bracket. On September 12, 2006, the MCC’s board of
directors approved up to $25 million in Threshold Program assistance for Jordan. Even prior to
the selection, the possible choice of Jordan had come under severe criticism. Freedom House, the
organization whose annual Index of Freedom is drawn upon for two of the “Ruling Justly”
indicators, urged the MCC board to bypass countries that had low scores on political rights and
civil liberties. It argued that countries like Jordan that fall below 4 out of a possible 7 on its index
should be automatically disqualified. Jordan, however, did well on 3 of the 6 other indicators in
this category. Several development analysts further argued that Jordan should not be eligible,
asserting that it is already one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid, has access to private sector
capital, and is not a democracy. In selecting Jordan, the MCC board appears not to have been
swayed by these arguments.
In September 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a five-year, $275.1 million
compact with Jordan to increase the supply of water available to households and businesses in the
cities of Amman and Zarqa. The compact also will help improve the efficiency of water delivery,
wastewater collection, and wastewater treatment. If estimates hold true, the clean drinking water
generated as a result of the MCC compact may be enough to supply almost 1 million Jordanian
citizens with freshwater.
Military Assistance
U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. In 1996, the United
States granted Jordan Major non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status, a designation that, among other
things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, and loans of
equipment for cooperative research and development. Since 2009, Jordan has received excess
U.S. defense equipment valued at approximately $81.69 million.34
U.S. military assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure
and maintain conventional weapons systems. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Jordan

34 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Country Information Paper, Jordan.
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enable its Air Force to maintain a modest fleet of F-16 fighters and purchase Advanced Medium
Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). FMF grants also provide financing for Jordan’s purchase
of U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in order to enhance Jordan’s border monitoring and counter-terror
capability. Jordan is currently the single largest provider of civilian police personnel and fifth-
largest provider of military personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide. In addition to
large-scale military aid grants for conventional weapons purchases, Jordan also receives grants of
U.S. antiterrorism assistance from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related
Programs account (NADR) and from International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLCE) account.
Recent U.S. Assistance to Jordan
• Appropriations: On January 17, 2014, the President signed into law P.L. 113-76,
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 which Congress passed days earlier.
The law provides Jordan $360 million in economic aid and $300 million in
military aid. It also stipulates that “from amounts made available under title VIII
designated for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism, not
less than $340 million above the levels included in the Memorandum of
Understanding between the United States and Jordan shall be made available for
the extraordinary costs related to instability in the region, including for security
requirements along the border with Iraq.” The law also continues to authorize
foreign aid to be used for loan guarantees to Jordan and the establishment of an
enterprise fund. Congress also appropriated additional Migration and Refugee
Assistance funding (MRA) to help countries like Jordan cope with the Syrian
refugee crisis.
• Excess Defense Articles: According to the Defense Department, in December
2013 the United States delivered 35 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles
(MRAPS) to Jordan as requested by the Jordanian military earlier in 2013.
• Loan Guarantee: In September 2013, the United States announced that it was
providing its first-ever loan guarantee35 to the Kingdom of Jordan. USAID
notified Congress of its intent to obligate up to $120 million in FY2013 ESF-
OCO to support a $1.25 billion, 7-year sovereign loan guarantee for Jordan.
According to the State Department, “this guarantee reinforces the firm U.S.
commitment to the people of Jordan by strengthening the Government of
Jordan’s ability to maintain access to international financing, while enabling it to
achieve its economic development and reform goals.
• Cash Transfer: During his visit to Jordan in March 2013, President Obama
pledged to work with Congress to deliver an additional $200 million in direct
budget support to Jordan to help it cope with the influx of Syrian refugees. In
April 2013, USAID notified Congress of a $200 million cash transfer in keeping

35 Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013
specified that such assistance should take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706 (j) of the same Act also
appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. The Department of State and
USAID intend to transfer and merge $120 million appropriated in FY 2013 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) OCO
funding, into ESF OCO for additional subsidy costs related to the bond issuance.
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with Obama’s pledge ($100 million in FY 2012 Economic Support Funds (ESF)
and $100 million in FY 2013 ESF-OCO).
U.S.-Jordanian Trade
Jordan ranked 73th among U.S. trading partners in volume of trade with the United States in 2012.
According to the United States Trade Commission, in 2012 Jordan exported over a billion dollars
in goods and services to the United States, a large percentage of which consisted of apparel and
clothing accessories. In 2012, Jordanian imports from the United States reached $1.6 billion.
Principal U.S. commodities imported by Jordan consisted of aircraft parts, machinery and
appliances, vehicles, and cereals. Two measures, in particular—the Free Trade Agreement and
Qualifying Industrial Zones—have helped expand U.S.-Jordanian trade ties and could create
more opportunities for U.S. investment in Jordan.
Free Trade Agreement
On October 24, 2000, then-President Clinton and King Abdullah II witnessed the signing of a
U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement, which eliminated duties and commercial barriers to
bilateral trade in goods and services originating in the two countries. Earlier, in a report released
on September 26, 2000, the U.S. International Trade Commission concluded that a U.S.-Jordan
Free Trade Agreement would have no measurable impact on total U.S. imports or exports, U.S.
production, or U.S. employment. Under the agreement, the two countries agreed to enforce
existing laws concerning worker rights and environmental protection. On January 6, 2001, then-
President Clinton transmitted to the 107th Congress a proposal to implement the Free Trade
Agreement. On July 23, then-U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick and then-Jordanian Ambassador
Marwan Muasher exchanged letters pledging that the two sides would “make every effort” to
resolve disputes without recourse to sanctions and other formal procedures. These letters were
designed to allay concerns on the part of some Members over the possible use of sanctions to
enforce labor and environmental provisions of the treaty. President Bush signed H.R. 2603, which
implemented the FTA as P.L. 107-43 on September 28, 2001, during King Abdullah’s visit to
Washington, DC, following the September 11, 2001, attacks. For additional information, see CRS
Report RL30652, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, by Mary Jane Bolle.
Qualifying Industrial Zones
One outgrowth of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was the establishment of “Qualifying
Industrial Zones” (QIZs), under which goods produced with specified levels of Jordanian and
Israeli input can enter the United States duty free, under the provisions of P.L. 104-234. This act
amended previous legislation so as to grant the President authority to extend the U.S.-Israel free
trade area to cover products from QIZs between Israel and Jordan or between Israel and Egypt.
QIZs were designed both to help the Jordanian economy and to serve as a vehicle for expanding
commercial ties between Jordan and Israel. Although QIZs have succeeded in boosting U.S.-
Jordanian trade, there has been only a modest increase in Jordanian-Israeli trade.
Currently there are 13 QIZs in Jordan employing approximately 43,000 people (working eight-
hour days, six days a week), 74% of whom are foreign workers from South and Southeast Asian
nations including Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Employers apparently view foreign
laborers as more skilled and productive than native Jordanians. In addition, it is difficult for
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employers to recruit native Jordanians since workers typically live on site, and many are hesitant
to separate from their families, though in some areas native Jordanians are provided with free
transportation to the QIZs. According to one Jordanian labor leader, foreign workers are attractive
to employers because “they are like slaves. They work them day and night.”36 Labor rights
activists also have complained that Jordanian workers in the QIZs are excluded from a new
minimum wage law.
Military Cooperation
The United States is helping Jordan modernize its armed forces. The Jordanian military, though
well trained and disciplined, has less personnel and weaponry than the militaries in each of
Jordan’s neighboring countries. In recent years, Jordan has used U.S. military assistance grants to
purchase Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles, upgrades for its fleet of F-16 fighters
(approximately 70-80), and Black Hawk helicopters. The United States also delivered three
Patriot anti-missile batteries to Jordan in early 2003 prior to the start of U.S. military operations
in Iraq.
Table 1. Possible Foreign Military Sales to Jordan Notified to Congress
Fiscal Year
Weapon System
$ Value of Sale
Prime Contractor
FY2006
National Command & Control System
$450 million Northrop
Grumman
Corporation
FY2006
Black Hawk Helicopters
$60 million
Sikorsky Co. and General Electric
FY2006
Armored Personnel Carriers
$156 million BAE
Company
FY2008
Border Security System
$390 million
DRS Technologies Corp
FY2009
AMRAAM Missiles
$131 million Raytheon
FY2009 Artillery Rocket Systems
$220 million
Multiple Companies
FY2010
Repair of F-16 Engines
$75 million
Pratt & Whitney
FY2010
JAVELIN Anti-Tank Guided Missiles
$388 million
Javelin Joint Venture
Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
Joint Exercises and Training
A U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission has functioned since 1974. Nearly 300 Jordanian
military personnel study in the United States each year. In recent years, Jordan has been among
the top three recipients of U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding. In
FY2013, approximately 257 Jordanian officers participated in this program.37 IMET also funds
the equipping of English language labs in Jordan. Combined training exercises by U.S. and
Jordanian military units continue to take place in Jordan (dubbed “Early Victor”), at least on an
annual basis and sometimes more often. In June 2013, U.S. troops participated in a multinational
training exercise in Jordan known as “Eager Lion.” In addition, the United States has supported
the construction of the King Abdullah II Center for Special Operations Training (KASOTC). The
center has been partially financed by the United States, including with $99 million in

36 “Industrial Zones Create Little Work for Jordanians,” Financial Times, February 9, 2009.
37 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Country Information Paper, Jordan.
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appropriations from the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 109-13). It serves as a
regional headquarters for counter-terrorism training.38 In 2003, Jordan built a Special Operations
Command and the Anti-Terrorism Center in order to boost counter-terrorism capabilities within
the military.
According to one recent report, the United States may be discussing plans with the Iraqi and
Jordanian governments to train Iraqi troops inside Jordan on techniques to combat Islamist
insurgents who have recently attempted to hold territory in Iraq’s Western Anbar province.39
Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis
($ in millions)
Economic Assistance
Military Assistance
Fiscal Year (FY)
EconSpt Food Devel PeaceCp
FMF
IMET Totals
1991 35.0a 0 0
0
20.0a 1.3 56.30
1992 30.0b 20.0
0
0
20.0b .6 70.60
1993c 5.0
30.0
0
0 9.0
.5
44.50
1994d 9.0
15.0
4.0
0 9.0
.8
37.80
1995 7.2
15.0
6.7
0 7.3
1.0
37.20
1996 7.2
21.0
7.9
0 200.0e 1.2 237.30
1997f 112.2
2.6
4.5
1.1
30.0
1.7
152.10
1998f 150.0
0
0
1.2 75.0g 1.6 227.80
1999 150.0
0
0
1.4 70.0g 1.6 223.00
1999 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
100.00
2000 150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.6
228.30
2000 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
150.0
0
200.00h
2001 150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.7
228.40
2002 150.0
0
0
1.6
75.0
2.0
228.60
2002 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
25.0
0
125.00
2003 250.0
0
0
1.0 198.0
2.4
451.40
2003 (Suppl.)
700.0
0
0
0
406.0
0
1,106.00
2004 250.0
0
0
2.3 206.0
2.9
461.20
2004 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
0
0
100.00
2005 250.0
0
0
1.6 206.0
3.0
460.60
2005 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
100.0
0
200.00

38 According to one description of the new U.S.-Jordanian facility, “If special forces have to conduct house-to-house
searches, KASOTC provides that infrastructure in a training environment.... If they have to rescue hostages on an
airplane, KASOTC provides the plane. If they have to rescue hostages from an embassy, KASOTC provides an
embassy structure.” See, Joan Kibler, “KASOTC,” Special Operations Technology Online Edition, volume 6, issue 2,
March 19, 2008.
39 “US developing plans to train Iraqis in Jordan,” Associated Press, January 23, 2014.
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Economic Assistance
Military Assistance
Fiscal Year (FY)
EconSpt Food Devel PeaceCp
FMF
IMET Totals
2006 247.5
0
0
1.6 207.9
3.0
460.00
2006 (Suppl.)
50.0
0
0
0
0
0
50.00
2007 245.0
0
0
0 206.0
3.1
454.10
2007 (Suppl.)
10.3
0
0
0
45.0
0
55.30i
2008 361.4
0
0
0 298.3
2.9
662.60
2008 (Suppl.)
200.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
250.00
2009
263.5
0
0
0
235.0
3.1
501.60
(150.0 in FY2010
2009 (Suppl.)
150.0
0
0
0
Advanced funding)
0
150.00
2010 363.0
0
0
0 300.0
3.8
666.8
2010 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
150.0
2011 362.0
0
0
0 299.4
3.7
665.1
2012
460.0
0
0
0
300.0
3.7
763.7
2013
443.529
0
0
0
284.829
3.608
731.966
Notes: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations, food aid between 1999-2006, or
amounts for de-mining assistance and counter-terrorism assistance.
a. Suspended in April 1991 under P.L. 102-27; released in early 1993.
b. Released in late July 1993.
c. Restrictions on FY1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, Sept. 17, 1993.
d. FY1994 funds released by PD 94-11, Jan. 13, 1994, waiving restrictions under P.L. 103-87.
e. Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF under
FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 million in special
drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).
f.
These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace and
Stability Fund ($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).
g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.
h. Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001 or FY2002).
i.
Total FY2007 supplemental aid to Jordan was $85.3 million. The above chart does not include $25 million in
NADR funds.


Author Contact Information

Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687

Congressional Research Service
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