Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions
Michael F. Martin
Specialist in Asian Affairs
January 24, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42363

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Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions

Summary
The release of all Burma’s political prisoners is one of the fundamental goals of U.S. policy.
Several of the laws imposing sanctions on Burma—including the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-61) and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-
Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-286)—require the release of all political prisoners
before the sanctions can be terminated. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-
76) requires the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) to “support programs for former political prisoners” in Burma, as well as “monitor the
number of political prisoners in Burma.”
Burma’s President Thein Sein pledged during a July 2013 trip to the United Kingdom to release
all the political prisoners in his country by the end of the year. Since his announcement, he has
granted amnesties or pardons on seven occasions in an effort to fulfill his promise. While
President Thein Sein has asserted that all political prisoners have been freed, several Burmese
organizations maintain that dozens of political prisoners remain in jail and that new political
prisoners continue to be arrested and sentenced.
Hopes for a democratic government and national reconciliation in Burma depend on the release of
prisoners associated with the country’s ethnic groups. Several ethnic-based political parties have
stated they will not participate in parliamentary elections until their members are released. Also,
prospects for stable ceasefires and lasting peace with various ethnic-based militias may require
the release of their members currently in detention.
Estimates of how many political prisoners are being detained in Burma vary. According to the
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), a non-profit organization
dedicated to identifying and locating political prisoners in Burma, the Burmese government is
holding about 40 political prisoners in its prisons and labor camps scattered across the country.
Differences in the estimates of the number of political prisoners in Burma can be attributed to two
main factors. First, Burma’s prison and judicial system is not transparent, making it difficult to
obtain accurate information. Second, there is no consensus on the definition of a “political
prisoner.” Some limit the definition of “political prisoner” to “prisoners of conscience” (people
who are detained for peaceful political opposition); others include members of the ethnic militias
as political prisoners. President Thein Sein established the Political Prisoner Review Committee
(PPRC) in February 2013 to identify all political prisoners in Burma, but the committee
reportedly cannot agree on a common definition.
The State Department is actively discussing the political prisoner issue with the Burmese
government, opposition political parties, and representatives of some ethnic groups. In these
discussions, U.S. officials emphasize the importance of the release of all political prisoners for
the further easing or removal of U.S. sanctions on Burma.
The status of Burma’s political prisoners is likely to figure prominently in any future
congressional consideration of U.S. policy in Burma. Congress may choose to examine the
political prisoner issue in Burma either separately or as part of a broader review of U.S. policy
towards Burma. Congress may also consider taking up legislation—on its own or in response to a
request from the Obama Administration—to amend, modify, or remove some of the existing
sanctions on Burma. This report will be updated as circumstances require.
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Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Defining Political Prisoners ............................................................................................................. 2
Current Estimates ............................................................................................................................. 5
Political Prisoners Review Committee ............................................................................................ 6
Prisoner Releases ............................................................................................................................. 8
Recent Releases ....................................................................................................................... 10
Conditional or Not? ................................................................................................................. 10
Continuing Arrest of Political Prisoners .................................................................................. 11
Political Prisoners, Parliamentary Elections, and National Reconciliation ................................... 12
U.S. Sanctions, Laws, and Political Prisoners ............................................................................... 13
U.S. Efforts Regarding Political Prisoners .................................................................................... 15
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 16

Tables
Table 1. Burma’s Announced Prisoner Releases .............................................................................. 9
Table 2. Specified Conditions for the Removal of U.S. Sanctions on Burma ............................... 14
Table A-1. Summary of Prisoner Releases by Thein Sein Government ........................................ 20

Appendixes
Appendix. Reverse Chronology of Prisoner Releases by Thein Sein Government ....................... 19

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 22

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Introduction
On July 15, 2013, Burma’s President Thein Sein gave a speech at Chatham House in London in
which he raised the issue of political prisoners, stating:
Thousands of prisoners have been freed. A special committee, comprised in part of former
prisoners, is working diligently to ensure that no one remains in prison due to his or her
political beliefs or actions. We are reviewing all cases. I guarantee to you that by the end of
this year there will be no prisoners of conscience in Myanmar.1
Since making this pledge, President Thein Sein has granted pardons or amnesties to a total of 258
political prisoners on seven separate occasions, the last taking place on January 2, 2014. That
same day, in a radio address, President Thein Sein said, “I would also like to inform all of you
that with the aim of national reconciliation together with the hard work of the Political Prisoner
Review Committee, and in keeping with my promise, all political prisoners have been freed by
the end of last year [emphasis added].2
However, several individuals and organizations quickly disputed the president’s assessment. Ye
Aung, a member of the Political Prisoners Review Committee (PPRC)3 created by President
Thein Sein, stated on December 31, 2013, that 35 political prisoners remained in prison because
of other charges than those included in the presidential pardon.4 Three weeks later, Ye Aung
reduced the number of remaining political prisoners to 33.5 On January 3, 2014, the Kachin
National Organization (KIO) issued a statement calling for the release of two of its members still
in jail, and criticizing the Thein Sein government for “continuing to arrest and sentence fellow
Kachins for their political belief.”6 The European Burma Network, a coalition of Burmese
political action organizations in Europe, released a statement on January 16, 2014, indicating that
“around 33 political prisoners” remain in prison, more than 100 people are awaiting trial for their
political activities, and several hundred Rohingyas are being illegally detained.7
The status of Burma’s political prisoners is a critical issue for U.S. policy. The full removal of
many of the U.S. sanctions on Burma is contingent on certain conditions being met, including the
unconditional release of all political prisoners. Moreover, no single issue may play a more pivotal
role in Burma’s possible transition to a free and democratic country than the release of its political
prisoners. Several opposition parties and organizations have stated that they will not participate in

1 Thein Sein, “Myanmar’s Complex Transformation: Prospects and Challenges,” speech given at Chatham House,
London, United Kingdom, July 15, 2013.
2 President Office, “Committee for Scrutinizing the Remaining Political Prisoners Healthy Constitution Must Be
Amended from Time to Time to Address National, Economic, Social Needs of Society,” press release, January 2, 2014,
http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=briefing-room/news/2014/01/02/id-3135.
3 The committee is also frequently referred to as the Political Prisoner Scrutiny Committee, or PPSC.
4 “Thirty-five Political Prisoners Still in Jail Despite Amnesty for ‘Other Offenses’,” Eleven Myanmar, January 2,
2014.
5 Aye Myint San, “33 Political Prisoners Still in Jail, Says Committee,” Mizzima, January 21, 2014.
6 Kachin National Organization, “Kachin National Organization Demand Unconditional Release of All Kachin Political
Prisoners,” press release, January 3, 2014.
7 European Burma Network, “No End in Sight for Political Prisoners in Burma—Permanent Review Mechanism
Needed,” press release, January 16, 2014.
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parliamentary elections or agree to a national ceasefire until their members are unconditionally
freed from detention.
At present, there is no consensus on how many political prisoners there are in Burma. One major
reason for the disagreement is the lack of transparency of the records of Burma’s 42 prisons and
109 labor camps. Another major cause for the variation in the estimates is the use of different
definitions of whom to include as political prisoners. In addition, reports of new political
prisoners being arrested and detained periodically appearing in the press make the number of
political prisoners a moving target.
State Department officials have held talks with senior officials of the Burmese government,
representatives of Burma’s leading opposition parties, and major ethnic groups in an effort to
move towards a shared understanding of the scope of the political prisoner situation in Burma.
Neither the White House nor the State Department has issued a comment on President Thein
Sein’s supposed fulfilment of his promise to release all political prisoners by the end of 2013.
The 113th Congress has demonstrated a continuing concern about Burma’s political prisoners. The
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (H.R. 3547, P.L. 113-76), enacted on January 17, 2014,
requires the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to
“support programs for former political prisoners” in Burma, as well as “monitor the number of
political prisoners in Burma.” The political prisoner issue was also raised in hearings held by the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in September and
December 2013.8
Defining Political Prisoners
As noted above, one major factor complicating the determination of the number of political
prisoners in Burma is a lack of agreement on the definition of a political prisoner. While the
concept of political prisoner—a person who is detained by authorities principally for her or his
political opinions rather than the commission of a crime—has a long history, there is no
international standard for defining political prisoners. Prisoners detained for political reasons are
afforded some protection by international agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The State
Department has a general definition of political prisoner that it uses, but the Thein Sein
government and other interested parties have their own, differing definitions.
For Burma, one of the more critical issues in defining political prisoners is whether or not to
include individuals who have been detained for their alleged association with Burma’s ethnic-
based militias or their associated political parties. Because these militias have been periodically
involved in armed conflict with the Burmese military, some analysts exclude detainees allegedly
associated with the militias from their estimates of Burma’s political prisoners. In addition,
certain groups being detained or subjected to serious oppression by the Thein Sein government or
officials may also be considered “political prisoners.”

8 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, An Unclear Roadmap:
Burma’s Fragile Political Reforms and Growing Ethnic Strife, 113th Cong., 1st sess., September 19, 2013; and U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Oversight of U.S. Policy
Toward Burma, 113th Cong., 1st sess., December 4, 2013.
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President Thein Sein has consistently confined his definition to only include “prisoners of
conscience,” and has generally used that phrase when discussing the issue. He has repeatedly
stated that individuals who have committed criminal acts are not considered “prisoners of
conscience,” and are expected the serve out their prison sentences. However, in announcing a
prisoner amnesty in July 2013, he stated that individuals were released on “humanitarian grounds
and encouraging them to be able to serve the national interest.”9 This may indicate a willingness
to accept a broader definition in practice, especially if it serves to facilitate negotiations with
ethnic minority organizations seeking a nation-wide peace agreement and progress toward
national reconciliation. According to one source, the Thein Sein government is restricting the
definition of political prisoners to “prisoners of conscience.”10
The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), an independent
organization founded in 2000 by ex-political prisoners,11 and Human Rights Watch (HRW) use a
relatively broad definition of political prisoners. The AAPP(B) defines a political prisoner as
“anyone who is arrested because of his or her perceived or real involvement in or supporting role
in opposition movements with peaceful or resistance means.”12 Other groups, such as Amnesty
International (AI) and the International Crisis Group (ICG), seemingly prefer a narrower
definition that only includes so-called “prisoners of conscience”—people who are detained for
peaceful political opposition.
The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor considers someone a
political prisoner if:
1. the person is incarcerated in accordance with a law that is, on its face,
illegitimate; the law may be illegitimate if the defined offense either
impermissibly restricts the exercise of a human right; or is based on race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular group;
2. the person is incarcerated pursuant to a law that is on its face legitimate, where
the incarceration is based on false charges where the underlying motivation is
based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular group; or
3. the person is incarcerated for politically motivated acts, pursuant to a law that is
on its face legitimate, but who receives unduly harsh and disproportionate
treatment or punishment because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion,
or membership in a particular group; this definition generally does not include
those who, regardless of their motivation, have gone beyond advocacy and
dissent to commit acts of violence.13
In applying this definition, the State Department recognizes that being accused of violent acts and
committing violent acts are two different matters, and considers the circumstances pertaining to a
particular person when determining if she or he is to be considered a political prisoner.

9 “Amnesty Granted to 73 Prisoners,” New Light of Myanmar, July 24, 2013.
10 “Burma Prisoner Amnesty—13 Feb [sic] Releases,” Democratic Voice of Burma, January 13, 2012.
11 The AAPP(B) describes itself as being dedicated to identifying and locating political prisoners in Burma, and
providing support for the prisoners and their families.
12 AAPP(B), “The Recognition of Political Prisoners: Essential to Democratic and National Reconciliation Process,”
press release, November 9, 2011.
13 Definition provided to CRS by the State Department.
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The AAPP(B) rejects the limitation of political prisoners to “prisoners of conscience” for several
reasons. First, the AAPP(B) maintains that the Burmese government frequently detains political
dissidents with false allegations that they committed violent or non-political crimes. Restricting
the definition to “prisoners of conscience” would exclude many political prisoners. Second, the
AAPP(B) maintains that the decision to participate in armed resistance against the Burmese
government should be “viewed with the backdrop of violent crimes committed by the state,
particularly against ethnic minorities.”14 In short, the AAPP(B) views armed struggle as a
reasonable form of political opposition given the severity of the violence perpetrated by the
Burmese military and police.
The importance of the distinction between “prisoners of conscience” and a broader definition of
political prisoners was highlighted by the sentence suspension of January 13, 2012. Only a few of
the prisoners released on that date were associated with the ethnic militias or their affiliated
political parties. Following his release, Min Ko Naing, a pro-democracy activist, stated many
political activists associated with ethnic armed groups remained in custody.15 However, Home
Affairs Minister Lieutenant General Ko Ko told reporters that some dissidents remained in
detention because they had committed criminal acts or have links with the Taliban.16
The Political Prisoners Review Committee (PPRC, also known as the Political Prisoner Scrutiny
Committee) is reportedly attempting to develop a consensus definition of political prisoners. Bo
Kyi, the Committee’s AAPP(B) representative, told the press in May 2013 that the 19 members
have agreed to a definition, but that the Thein Sein government had not formally adopted the
definition.17 However, confidential sources have indicated that the PPRC still remains divided
over the proper definition of political prisoner.18
The plight of two segments of Burmese society has also been raised in association with the issue
of political prisoners. First, local Burmese officials are notorious for corruption, and reportedly
frequently use their official power to detain people on falsified charges in order to confiscate
property or otherwise exact revenge on their opponents. In addition, officials have reportedly
used provisions in old and new laws to arrest and detain people protesting alleged violations of
their legal rights. These abuses of power by officials have been portrayed as creating a special
group of “political prisoners.” Second, the Burmese government continues to single out the
Rohingyas, a predominately Muslim ethnic minority residing in northern Rakhine State along the
border with Bangladesh, and subject them to more extensive and invasive political repression.
According to the Burmese government, the Rohingyas are not Burmese citizens, but illegal
immigrants from Bangladesh and India. The Rohingyas are subjected to severe oppression,
including restrictions on movement, employment, education, and marriage. To some observers,
the Rohingyas are effectively political prisoners in their own country.19

14 AAPP(B), “The Recognition of Political Prisoners: Essential to Democratic and National Reconciliation Process,”
press release, November 9, 2011.
15 “Burma’s Remaining Jailed Dissidents,” Irrawaddy, January 17, 2012.
16 Aye Aye Win, “Praise for Myanmar Release of Political Prisoners,” Associated Press, January 15, 2012.
17 “Burma Releases Political Prisoners Ahead of US State Visit,” Irrawaddy, May 17, 2013.
18 Author’s confidential communication with source close to the PPRC in December 2013.
19 For example, U.N. Special Rapporteur to Myanmar Tomás Ojea Quintana has stated that the relocation camps in
Rakhine State for Rohingyas displaced by the rioting in June and October 2012 “felt more like a prison than a camp.”
(“Rohingya Camps ‘More Like Prisons,’ Says UN Envoy,” Mizzima, February 18, 2013.)
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Current Estimates
Following the most recent prisoner pardons and amnesty, Bo Kyi, general secretary of the
AAPP(B) and PPRC member, told reporters, “There are still more than 40 political prisoners
behind bars.”20 However, the AAPP(B)’s December 2013 report on political prisoners states that
following the presidential pardon of December 30, “at least roughly 33 political prisoners” remain
in prison, and “around 136 people” are awaiting trial for their political activities.21
Different groups provide varying estimates of the number of political prisoners being detained in
Burma. Until May 2013, the AAPP(B) maintained on its webpage (http://www.aappb.org/) an
updated list of political detainees whose location has been verified. As of May 11, 2013, the
AAPP(B) listed 183 political prisoners in detention.22 The AAPP(B) previously published a list of
political prisoners whose locations have not been verified,23 but that list is no longer included on
the association’s webpage.
Other interested organizations in Burma also have released estimates of the number of political
prisoners in Burma, but these estimates generally reflect their focus on the detention of their own
members and are not necessarily comprehensive tallies. Just prior to the January 13, 2012,
release, the NLD reportedly provided the Burmese government with a list of 604 political
prisoners.24 However, the NLD estimates are reportedly based on information obtained by NLD
members, and are not generally viewed as an exhaustive list of political detainees in Burma.
A group of released political prisoners formed the Former Political Prisoners Society (FPPS)—
also known as the Organization of Former Political Prisoners (OFPP)—and have surveyed
Burma’s prisons and labor camps to compile a list of political prisoners still in detention. In April
2012, the FPPS released a list (in Burmese) of 345 political prisoners.25 It is not known what
definition the FPPS used in determining who qualifies as a political prisoner.
The Thein Sein government previously vacillated on recognizing the presence of political
prisoners in Burma. President Thein Sein told reporters in Bali, Indonesia, on November 20,
2011, that there were no political prisoners in Burma and that “all prisoners have broken the
law.”26 Subsequent statements by government officials implicitly conceded the existence of
political prisoners. For example, Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann reportedly said in February
2012, “The remaining political prisoners are those who have committed criminal activities in this
country. Those who are on that list, if they have been involved in terrorist activities or harmed the
public, they will not be included.”27 The Thein Sein government has never provided an official
estimate of the number of political prisoners.

20 Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Activists Say Political Prisoners Remain in Jail,” Myanmar Times, January 6, 2014.
21 Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), Monthly Chronology of Burma’s Political Prisoners for
December, 2013, January 13, 2014, http://www.aappb.org/AAPP_December_chronology_2013..pdf.
22 The complete list of names is available online at http://www.aappb.org/Updated__PP_list.html.
23 The most recent list of this sort was published on September 15, 2012.
24 “How Many Political Prisoners Remain in Jail?,” Mizzima, January 16, 2012.
25 Individual in country.
26 “Myanmar President Insists No Political Prisoners in Jails,” Asia-Pacific News, November 20, 2011.
27 Martin Petty, “Myanmar By-elections Vital for EU Sanctions Move—Official,” Reuters, February 13, 2012.
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Obtaining an accurate and current tally of the number of political prisoners in Burma is
complicated by the lack of transparency of Burma’s judicial and prison system. Burma has 42
prisons and 109 labor camps scattered across the country, with no publicly accessible records of
who is being detained and where they are being detained. To estimate the number of political
prisoners, groups rely on a network of sources to provide information concerning each of the
prisons and labor camps. The AAPP(B), for example, reports that it uses inside networks,
confidential sources, court trial files, recently released prisoners, and families of prisoners to
compile its list of political prisoners.28
Maintaining an accurate tally of the number of political prisoners is also difficult because the
Burmese government and military continue to arrest and detain new political prisoners, or
otherwise infringe on their civil liberties. According to the AAPP(B), the Thein Sein government
indicted 12 people, sentenced 15 other people in December 2013, and “around 136 people” are
awaiting trial for their political activities.29
Political Prisoners Review Committee
On February 6, 2013, President Thein Sein announced plans to form a committee “to scrutinize
the remaining political prisoners serving their terms in prisons throughout the country so as to
grant them liberty.”30 The original 16-member Political Prisoners Review Committee (PPRC, also
known as the Political Prisoners Scrutiny Committee) was chaired by Union Minister Soe Thein,
and included representatives from opposition groups with a history of supporting the release of
political prisoners, such as the 1988 Generation Students Group, AAPP(B), and the National
League for Democracy (NLD). The committee has met several times, but significant differences
emerged regarding the definition to be used and, by extension, the estimates of the number of
political prisoners in Burma. On May 8, 2013, President Thein Sein reconstituted the committee
with 19 members and Soe Thein remaining as chair. The committee reportedly continues to
disagree about the proper definition and number of political prisoners in detention in Burma.
President Thein Sein’s decision in February 2013 to form a committee to advise his government
on resolving the issue of the country’s alleged political prisoners was widely welcomed, but has
become a source of some controversy during its existence. The State Department and other
commentators praised the creation of the committee and the selection of individuals representing
a broad spectrum of organizations interested in the status of political prisoners in Burma.
However, reports indicate that its members have struggled to reach agreement of critical aspects
of their committee’s mandate. In addition, it is unclear what influence the committee’s
recommendations have had with President Thein Sein or Burma’s National Defence and Security
Council (NDSC), which has the constitutional authority to recommend prisoner amnesties to the
President.31

28 AAPP(B), “Political Prisoner List is Now 1,572—Location of 918 Confirmed and Documented,” press release,
December 23, 2011.
29 Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), Monthly Chronology of Burma’s Political Prisoners for
December, 2013, January 13, 2014, http://www.aappb.org/AAPP_December_chronology_2013..pdf.
30 President Office, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, “Committee to be Formed to Grant Liberty to Remaining
Political Prisoners,” press release, February 6, 2013.
31 Section 204 of the constitution grants the NDSC the authority to recommend prisoner amnesties to the President.
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As previously mentioned, President Thein Sein announced his decision to form the committee on
February 6, 2013. In his announcement, he indicated that Union Minister Soe Thane would be the
committee chair, and that the other members of the committee would be “representatives from
government ministries, civil society
organizations and some political parties.” The
Members of Political Prisoners Scrutiny
other 15 members are notable for the inclusion
Committee
of representatives of three organizations
(members added on May 8, 2013, in italics)
known for their work to free Burma’s political
•
Soe Thane (aka Soe Thein) (Chair), Pyidaungzu
prisoners.
Minister, President Office
•
Brigadier General Kyaw Kyaw Tun, Police Chief,
The State Department welcomed the
Deputy Minister, Ministry of Home Affairs
formation of the committee and pointed to its
•
Tun Tun Oo, Deputy Chief Justice, Supreme Court
creation as evidence that the Thein Sein
of Burma
government is taking serious steps to address
•
Aung Saw Win, Director General, Bureau of Special
the political prisoner problem.32 Domestic and
Investigation
international human rights organizations also
supported the creation of the committee,
•
Than Htay, Director General, Correctional
Department
although in some cases with some skepticism.
•
Sit Myaing, Myanmar National Human Rights
The committee first met on February 13, 2013,
Commission
at the Myanmar Peace Center in Rangoon. It
•
U Kyi, Myanmar Red Cross
has met several times since then, working on
•
Bo Kyi, Assistance Association for Political
developing a common definition of political
Prisoners (Burma) (AAPP)
prisoners, compiling a list of possible political
prisoners in detention, and drafting
•
Nyo Tun, League of Former Political Prisoners
(LFPP)
recommendations for President Thein Sein on
how to expedite the release of identified
•
Ye Aung, Former Political Prisoners Society (FPPS)
political prisoners.
•
Thura (Zarganar), House of Media Entertainment
On May 8, 2013, President Thein Sein
•
Khun Tun Oo, Shan Nationalities Democratic Party
(SNLD)
reconstituted the PPRC, expanding its
membership to 19 people (see text box,
•
Ko Ko Gyi, 88 Generation Students Group
“Members of Political Prisoners Scrutiny
•
Nyan Win, National League for Democracy Party
Committee”).33 The decision to augment the
(NLD)
membership of the committee was reportedly
•
Hla Maung Shwe, Myanmar Egress
not discussed with the original 16 members
before the President’s announcement.34
•
Win Naing, National Democratic Forces
•
Thein Nyunt, New National Democracy Party
Among the difficulties the group has faced is
•
Kaung Myint Htut, Myanmar National Congress Party
developing a common definition of political
prisoners. Sources indicate that some
committee members prefer a narrow definition that would only include prisoners of conscience,

32 On February 11, 2013, the State Department issued a statement welcoming the formation of the committee, stating
that the Union Government “has taken an important step towards national reconciliation,” and that the State
Department looked forward “to supporting the implementation of this process.” (State Department, “Progress on
Political Prisoners in Burma,” press release, February 11, 2013.)
33 President Office, “Committee for Scrutinizing the Remaining Prisoners of Conscience Reconstituted,” Notification
No. 43/2013, May 8, 2013.
34 Naw Say Phaw Waa, “Activists Slam Reshuffle of Prisoner Body,” Myanmar Times, May 13, 2013.
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while other members support a broader definition (see “Defining Political Prisoners”). On March
14, 2013, the FPPS gathered a group of Burmese political activists and lawyers to discuss the
definition of political prisoner. It is assumed that Ye Aung, the FPPS representative on the PPRC,
shared the results of the meeting with the other committee members. An agreement on the
definition is critical for compiling a list of political prisoners in detention.
Another issue for the committee is its ability to work as a group. According to an FPPS
spokesperson, his organization had submitted a longer list of people to be released prior to the
April 23, 2013, amnesty, but the committee chose to ignore some of those on the list, and to
include a number of people not considered political prisoners by the FPPS.35 Prior to announcing
the amnesty, the committee members were reportedly asked to endorse the committee’s
recommendations, but several refused to do so because many of the people recommended by the
committee were not considered political prisoners and many people who were considered
political prisoners were not on the committee’s list. The FPPS spokesperson stated that the
committee’s leadership was not interested in the views of the civil society organizations, and was
using the committee for political purposes, such as fostering better relations with the European
Union.36
On December 31, 2013, the PPRC released a statement on its work to date that was printed in the
New Light of Myanmar on January 1, 2014.37 The statement recounts that the PPRC had met a
total of 12 times between its creation and December 21, 2013, and had submitted the names of
354 people to receive presidential amnesty—which is 33 more than the number of political
prisoner released during that time period (see Table 1 below). On January 14, 2014, the PPRC
announced that it would continue to meet because, in the words of one of its members, “there are
still political prisoners in Burma.”38
Prisoner Releases
Since his appointment in April 2011, President Thein Sein has granted amnesty to selected
prisoners on 17 separate occasions, the latest occurring on January 2, 2014 (see Table 1). In total,
the Thein Sein government has released an estimated 36,761 prisoners, of whom at least 1,165
were political prisoners, according to the AAPP(B).
The several of the prisoner releases have occurred near the time of a major political development
between Burma and the United States (see Appendix for details). In some cases, the prisoners
may have been released in an effort to obtain a desired response from the U.S. government or the
international community. In other cases, the prisoners may have been released in response to an
action by the U.S. government. This pattern is causing some concern at the State Department and
by other observers as it may imply that the prisoners are being used as political pawns.

35 “Prisoner Release Draws Criticism from Activists,” Myanmar Times, April 24, 2013.
36 Ibid.
37 “Press Release on Work Progress Report of Committee for Scrutinizing the Remaining Political Prisoners,” New
Light of Myanmar, January 1, 2014.
38 Feliz Solomon, “'Not Finished Yet—Political Prisoner Committee to Continue,” Democratic Voice of Burma,
January 14, 2014.
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Table 1. Burma’s Announced Prisoner Releases
(In reverse chronological order)
Political
Prisoners
Prisoners
Percentage of
Government Date
Released
Released
Political Prisoners
Union Government
January 2, 2014
13,274
3
negligible
December 30, 2013
5 5 100.0%
(amnesty)
December 30, 2013
~100 16 ~16.0%
(pardon)
December 11, 2013
44
41
93.2%
November 15, 2013
69
66
95.7%
October 8, 2013
56
56
100.0%
July 23, 2013
73
68
93.2%
May 17, 2013
23
21
91.3%
April 23, 2013
93
69
74.2%
November 19, 2012
66
51
77.3%
November 15-16, 2012
452
0
0.0%
September 17, 2012
514
88
17.1%
July 3, 2012
46
25
54.3%
January 13, 2012
336
302
89.9%
January 2, 2012
651
34
5.2%
October 11, 2011
6,359
247
3.9%
May 16, 2011
14,600
73
0.5%
State Peace and
September 17, 2009
7,114
128
1.8%
Development Council
February 20, 2009
6,313
24
0.4%
September 23, 2008
9,002
10
0.1%
January 3, 2007
2,831
50
1.7%
July 6, 2005
334
253
75.7%
January 3, 2005
5,588
26
0.5%
December 13, 2004
5,070
21
0.4%
November 29, 2004
5,311
12
0.2%
November 18, 2004
3,937
28
0.7%
Sources: AAPP(B); Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (Altsean), Burma Bulletin, Issue 79, July 2013.

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Recent Releases
On December 30, 2013, President Thein Sein granted amnesty for five prisoners “on
humanitarian grounds” who were reportedly on the PPRC list of political prisoners,39 and issued
Order No. 51/2013, pardoning all persons who had been convicted, awaiting trial, or under
investigation as of December 31, 2013, for the following crimes:
• Violations of the Unlawful Association Act;
• Treason (Code of Criminal Procedure Article 122);
• Sedition (Code of Criminal Procedure Article 124(a));
• Violations of the Law to Safeguard the State from Danger of Subversive
Elements;
• Violations of the Peaceful Gathering and Peaceful Procession Law;
• “Harming public interests” (Code of Criminal Procedure Article 505); and
• Violations of the 1950 Emergency Act.40
An estimated 100 prisoners were released under Order No. 51/2013, of which 16 have been
identified as political prisoners by the AAPP(B).
On January 2, 2014, President Thein Sein issued Order No. 1/2014, commuting all death
sentences to life in prison, cutting all sentences of over 40 years to no more than 40 years, and
reducing all sentences of under 40 years by one-fourth of the proscribed term “with the aim of
honouring the 66th Anniversary Independence Day.”41 On January 6, 2014, the government-run
newspaper, The New Light of Myanmar, reported that 13,274 prisoners had been released under
Order No. 1/2014.42 According to the AAPP(B) and the FPPS, only 3 of the released prisoners
were political prisoners.43
Conditional or Not?
The use of Section 401 authority for some of the recent prisoner releases raises the issue of
possible conditions on the prisoners’ sentence suspension. Burma’s Code of Criminal Procedure
grants the president authority to suspend or remit sentences, with or without conditions, as well as
cancel the suspension or remission if the person in question fails to fulfill the conditions for her or
his release. As a result, a person released from detention under Section 401 may be required to
serve out the rest of his or her suspended sentence if she or he is convicted of another crime or
fails to fulfill the conditions of her or his release. At least one pardoned political prisoner, Nay

39 “Amnesty Granted for Five Prisoners,” New Light of Myanmar, December 31, 2013.
40 “Order No. 51/2013—Pardon,” New Light of Myanmar, December 31, 2013.
41 President Office, “Order No. (1/2014)—Presidential Pardon,” January 2, 2014, published in the New Light of
Myanmar, January 3, 2014.
42 “13,274 Prisoners Released Under Pardon,” New Light of Myanmar, January 6, 2014.
43 Ei Ei Toe Lwin, “Activists Say Political Prisoners Remain in Jail,” Myanmar Times, January 6, 2014.
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Myo Zin, had been sentenced to serve the rest of his previous sentence (six years) after being
convicted of a crime after his release, until he was granted a second pardon in May 2013.44
Following their release on January 13, 2012, several former political prisoners indicated that they
had been provided unconditional pardons, but a few said that they were instructed to limit their
political activities. None of the prisoners released were placed under house arrest. However, Sithu
Zeya said to reporters that he was told that if he committed any crime, he would have to serve the
remainder of his 18-year sentence. “It is like we are being freed with leashes still attached to our
necks,” he reportedly said.45
The use of Section 401 may also indicate some opposition to the release of political prisoners
within the Thein Sein government and/or within the Burmese military. Because President Thein
Sein based the sentence suspensions on Section 401, he did not need to obtain the approval of
Burma’s National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), a constitutional body with significant
power, consisting of Burma’s president; its two vice presidents; the speakers for each chamber of
its parliament; the commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief of defense services; and
the ministers of border affairs, defence, foreign affairs, and home affairs.46 President Thein Sein
may have decided to use Section 401 authority to avoid NDSC review, given the reported fate of
a previous proposed prisoner release.
Continuing Arrest of Political Prisoners
While President Thein Sein claims that there are no political prisoners in Burma, his government
reportedly continues to arrest and detain new political prisoners for alleged illegal activities. As
previously mentioned, the AAPP(B) reports that as of the end of December around 136 people
have been detained and are awaiting trial for what it considers to be political actions. The Asian
Human Rights Commission (AHRC), a non-profit non-governmental organization located in
Hong Kong, is also tracking the detention of political prisoners in Burma. According to the
AAPP(B) and AHRC, many have been detained for violations of Section 505 of Burma’s Penal
Code and/or Section 18 of the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law of 2011—two of
the laws President Thein Sein identified in his pardon of December 30, 2013. To many observers,
the Union Government’s response to popular protests has raised questions about the sincerity of
its support of democracy and human rights, and its rejection of Burma’s history of a culture of
political repression.
As the year 2013 ended, several prominent voices of opposition where arrested, detained and/or
sentenced for what were seemingly political reasons. For example, three people released under
the December 11, 2013, presidential amnesty – Aye Thein, Htin Kyaw, and Thein San—were
reportedly re-arrested within hours of their release for alleged violations of local offenses.47 On
November 29, 2013, six activists were convicted for violating Article 18 of the Peaceful

44 Nay Moe Zin was released in January 2012, with six more years to serve on his sentence. He was originally
sentenced to 10 years in prison in August 2011 for breaking the Electronic Transactions Act, a law that is highly
criticized by free speech advocates. In May 2013, he chose to serve a three-month sentence for allegedly defaming a
police officer. The Ministry of Home Affairs subsequently decided to reinstate his previous sentence. (“Burma Cancels
Amnesty for Former Political Prisoner,” Irrawaddy, May 8, 2013)
45 “Burma Frees High-Profile Dissidents in Amnesty,” BBC, January 13, 2012.
46 Hla Hla Htay, “Myanmar Prisoner Release Delayed,” Agence France Press, November 14, 2011.
47 “Pardoned Prisoners Re-arrested within Hours, Says Activist Group,” Mizzima, December 11, 2013.
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Gathering and Peaceful Procession Law for organizing unauthorized demonstrations in Pegu and
Rangoon.48 On December 2, 2013, nine activists against a copper mine in Letpadaung were also
charged for violating Article 18 of the Peaceful Gathering and Peaceful Procession Law.49
Another prominent case is that of Naw Ohn Hla, who was sentenced in August 2013 to two years
in prison for organizing a demonstration without a permit, but was granted amnesty on November
15, 2013. Naw Ohn Hla is one of the leaders of the anti-copper mine demonstration Sagaing
Division. On December 11, 2013, lawyers for Naw Ohn Hla said that she was re-arrested on
November 29, 2013, for organizing another demonstration, and has subsequently been charged
with disturbing the peace in 2007 by publicly praying for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi.50
Political Prisoners, Parliamentary Elections, and
National Reconciliation
The release of political prisoners has potentially important implications for future parliamentary
elections and prospects for national reconciliation. The NLD’s decision to participate in the April
2012 parliamentary by-elections was apparently based in part on the October 11, 2011, amnesty,
which included 39 NLD members, according to the AAPP(B).51 At the same time, several
political parties (including the Chin National Party, the Mon National Democratic Front, the
Rakhine National Democratic Party, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), and
the Zomi National Congress) said they would not participate in the by-elections because some of
their members remained in detention.52 While the January 2012 and July 2013 prisoner releases
included a significant number of NLD members and people associated with ethnic organizations,
neither amnesty included members of political parties boycotting or barred from the April by-
election. Regardless of how the by-elections were conducted, it can be argued that any future
parliamentary elections will not be free and fair so long as some political parties are unwilling to
participate because of what they perceive to be the detention of their members for political
reasons.
The NLD decision to participate in the by-election gave rise to some tension with some ethnic
groups, who saw the move as an abandonment of solidarity among opposition groups. One of the
reasons the NLD and several ethnic political parties did not participate in the November 2010
elections that brought the Union Government into power was the continued detention of some of
their party leaders and members. Some ethnic groups who still had members in detention at the
time were unhappy with the NLD’s decision to participate in the by-elections. As such, Aung San

48 Shwe Aung, “Activists Convicted Under Article 18 in Rangoon, Pegu,” Democratic Voice of Burma, December 3,
2013.
49 Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), Monthly Chronology of Burma’s Political Prisoners for
December, 2013, January 13, 2014, http://www.aappb.org/AAPP_December_chronology_2013..pdf.
50 Kyaw Hsu Mon, “Burma Activist Naw Ohn Hla Faces ‘Religious Disturbance” Complaint,” Irrawaddy, December
11, 2013.
51 Another, and probably more important, factor in the NLD decision was the amendment of election laws to allow
Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD members to run for office.
52 Tun Tun, “Newly Formed Parties to Contest in Burmese By-Election,” Mizzima, November 17, 2011; and Wai Moe,
“NLD Decides to Re-Register, Compete in Coming Elections,” Irrawaddy, November 18, 2011.
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Suu Kyi and the NLD may be less able to play the role of intermediary in discussions between the
Burmese government and various ethnic groups to forge a path towards national reconciliation.
It is unclear how committed the Thein Sein government and Burma’s military, the Tatmadaw, are
in trying to pursue national reconciliation at this time. To some observers, their current strategy
appears to be designed to improve relations with primarily Burman organizations, such as the
NLD, while maintaining a more hard-line stance toward Burma’s ethnic minorities, particularly
those with active militias. Proposals to hold a third Panglong Conference have been repeatedly
rebuffed by the Thein Sein government.53 Ceasefire talks with the ethnic militias frequently falter
after initial success over such issues as release of detained members, disarmament of the militias,
and preservation of the de facto autonomy of militia-controlled territory.
U.S. Sanctions, Laws, and Political Prisoners
Burma’s detention of political prisoners was a major reason for the United States to impose
sanctions on Burma.54 The Customs and Trade Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-382), which required the
President to impose “such economic sanctions upon Burma as the President determines
appropriate,” was passed after Burma’s ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC), refused to honor the results of May 1990 parliamentary elections and detained
Aung San Suu Kyi and many other opposition leaders. Similarly, the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA) (P.L. 108-61) was passed after the SPDC cracked down on
opposition parties, and once again detained Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders. The
Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act)
(P.L. 110-286) was passed after the violent suppression of the autumn 2007 popular protests and
the subsequent arrest and imprisonment of many of the protest leaders, including a number of
Buddhist monks.
The release of all political prisoners is also one of the preconditions for the removal of many of
the U.S. sanctions on Burma (see Table 2).55 The economic sanctions required by Section 138 of
the Customs and Trade Act of 1990 are to remain in place until the President certifies to Congress
that certain conditions have been met, including “[p]risoners held for political reasons in Burma
have been released.” Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act of 1997 (Section 570, P.L. 104-208) authorizes the President to ban
new investments in Burma if “the Government of Burma has physically harmed, rearrested for
political acts [emphasis added] or exiled Daw Aung Suu Kyi or has committed large-scale
repression of or violence against the Democratic opposition.” The BFDA requires a ban on all
imports from Burma, a ban on the products of certain Burmese companies, a freeze of the assets
of certain Burmese officials and U.S. opposition to “any loan or financial or technical assistance

53 The first Panglong Conference was held in March 1946, at which Prime Minister U Saw, on behalf of the British
government, met with representatives of the Chin, Kachin, Karen, and Shan to discuss the status of the border areas in
the future independent Burma. The second Panglong Conference was held in February 1947, at which Aung San (father
of Aung San Suu Kyi) met with representatives of the Chin, Kachin, and Shan and signed the Panglong Agreement,
which gave autonomy to the frontier states as part of a larger Union of Burma. The Panglong Agreement is seen as
critical to the establishment of an independent and unified Burma in 1948.
54 For more about the history of U.S. sanctions on Burma, see CRS Report R41336, U.S. Sanctions on Burma, by
Michael F. Martin.
55 For a description of the waiver provisions of U.S. sanctions on Burma, see CRS Report R41336, U.S. Sanctions on
Burma, by Michael F. Martin.
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to Burma” until certain conditions are met, including the release of “all political prisoners.”56
Finally, the JADE Act bans the issuance of visas to certain Burmese officials and their supporters,
freezes the assets of certain Burmese officials and their supporters, and prohibits the provision of
financial services to certain Burmese officials and their supporters until specific conditions have
been met, including the unconditional release of all political prisoners.
Table 2. Specified Conditions for the Removal of U.S. Sanctions on Burma
(Text extracted from relevant legislation unless otherwise noted; emphasis added)
Law Conditions
Section 138 of the
(1) Burma meets the certification requirements listed in Section 802(b) of the Narcotics
Customs and Trade Act
Control Act of 1986
of 1990
(2) The national government legal authority has been transferred to a civilian
government
(3) Martial law has been lifted in Burma
(4) Prisoners held for political reasons in Burma have been released.
Section 570 of the
President determines and certifies to Congress that the Government of Burma has not
Foreign Operations,
physical y harmed, rearrested for political acts, or exiled Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and
Export Financing, and
has not committed large-scale repression of or violence against the Democratic
Related Programs
Opposition.a
Appropriations Act of
1997
Burmese Freedom and
(A) The SPDC has made substantial and measurable progress to end violations of
Democracy Act of 2003
international y recognized human rights including rape, and the Secretary of State, after
consultation with the ILO Secretary General and relevant nongovernmental
organizations, reports to the appropriate congressional committeesb that the SPDC no
longer systematically violates workers’ rights, including the use of forced and child labor,
and conscription of child-soldiers.
(B) The SPDC has made measurable and substantial progress toward implementing a
democratic government, including—
(i) releasing all political prisoners;
(ii) al owing freedom of speech and the press;
(ii ) allowing freedom of association;
(iv) permitting the peaceful exercise of religion; and
(v) bringing to a conclusion an agreement between the SPEC and the democratic
forces led by the NLD and Burma’s ethnic nationalities on the transfer of power to
a civilian government accountable to the Burmese people through democratic
elections under the rule of law.
(C) Pursuant to Section 706(20 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
2003 (P.L. 107-228), Burma has not been designated as a country that has failed
demonstrably to make substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under international
counternarcotics agreements and to take other effective counternarcotics measures…

56 The general import ban and company-specific import ban in the BFDA lapsed in July 2013, when Congress did not
pass the required annual resolution to renew the trade restrictions. The other sanctions specified in the law remain in
effect.
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Law Conditions
The Tom Lantos Block
(T)he President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committeesc
Burmese JADE (Junta’s
that the SPDC has—
Anti-Democratic Efforts)
Act of 2008
(1) Unconditionally released all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu
Kyi and other members of the National League for Democracy;
(2) Entered into a substantive dialogue with democratic forces led by the National
League for Democracy and the ethnic minorities of Burma on transitioning to
democratic government under the rule of law; and
(3) Allowed humanitarian access to populations affected by armed conflict in all regions
of Burma.
Notes:
a. The law required the imposition of sanctions if the President determines and certifies to Congress that the
Government of Burma has committed these acts. It is assumed that removal requires a presidential
determination that the Government of Burma no longer commits these acts.
b. “Appropriate congressional committees” are Senate Appropriations Committee, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, House Appropriations Committee, and House Foreign Affairs Committee.
c. “Appropriate congressional committees” are Senate Finance Committee, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, House Ways and Means Committee, and House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Beyond the laws imposing sanctions on Burma, Congress has also enacted legislation addressing
the issue of political prisoners in Burma. Section 7043(b)(3)(A) of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2014 (H.R. 3547, P.L. 113-76) stipulates:
Not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the USAID Administrator, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
comprehensive strategy for the promotion of democracy and human rights in Burma, which
shall include support for civil society, former prisoners, monks, students, and democratic
parliamentarians [emphasis added].
The accompanying explanatory statement for the law elaborates further regarding the required
support for former prisoners, stating:
In addition to programs specified in section 7043(b)(2) of this Act, the Department of State
and USAID shall support programs for former political prisoners (including health,
education, and vocational training activities); … and programs to monitor the number of
political prisoners in Burma.57
U.S. Efforts Regarding Political Prisoners
U.S. officials have consistently called for the release of all political prisoners in Burma. As
previously mentioned, President Obama spoke of the continued detention of prisoners of
conscience during his speech at the University of Yangon. National Security Advisor Tom
Donilon stated in a presentation in Washington prior to the President’s trip to Burma that:

57 “Explanatory Statement by Mr. Rogers of Kentucky, Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations regarding
the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment on H.R. 3547, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014,”
Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 160, No. 9 - Book II (January 15, 2014), p. H1169.
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The President’s meetings—as well as his speech to the people of Burma—will also be an
opportunity to reaffirm the progress that still must be made. This includes the unconditional
release of remaining political prisoners [emphasis added], an end to ethnic conflicts, steps
to establish the rule of law, ending the use of child soldiers, and expanded access for
humanitarian assistance providers and human rights observers in conflict areas.58
In her testimony for the December 4, 2013, hearing on U.S. policy in Burma, held by the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the State Department’s
Senior Advisor on Burma Judith Cefkin stated:
We are committed to working with the government, Aung San Suu Kyi and political
opposition, and with civil society to fully implement commitments announced before
President Obama’s visit just a year ago. In particular, we are watching closely the
commitment to release all political prisoners by the end of the year.… We are committed to
assisting the reintegration of these heroic individuals back into society and ensuring that they
are released without conditions.59
The State Department has also raised the issue of political prisoners with other governments. U.S.
Ambassador to Burma Derek Mitchell traveled to China, Japan, and South Korea following
Secretary Clinton’s 2011 trip to Burma to discuss the status of U.S. policy towards Burma during
his time as U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma. The issue of political
prisoners was reportedly raised during his meetings on that trip. Similar discussions have been
held with other governments and the European Union. Following his visit to Burma, British
Foreign Secretary William Hague told reporters that EU sanctions on Burma should not be lifted
while political prisoners remain in detention.60
In addition to leading an international campaign for the release of all political prisoners in Burma,
senior U.S. officials indicate that the State Department has also had talks with senior Burmese
officials, Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders, several opposition parties, and
representatives of some ethnic groups about compiling a complete and accurate list of political
prisoners currently in custody.61 One of the key factors in these discussions is finding a common
understanding of who is to be considered a political prisoner. Such discussions are reportedly
ongoing.
Issues for Congress
The continued detention of political prisoners in Burma—as well as the state of human rights in
general—are likely to figure prominently in congressional consideration of U.S. policy towards
Burma. In the coming months, Congress may decide to examine the status of the implementation
of existing U.S. sanctions on Burma. It may also assess the political prisoner issue, either in
isolation or as part of a broader consideration of human rights in Burma and sanctions policy.
Congress may take up legislation to amend or alter U.S. sanctions on Burma, depending on the

58 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “President Obama’s Asia Policy and Upcoming Trip to Asia,” press
release, November 15, 2012.
59 Department of State, “Oversight of U.S. Policy Toward Burma: Testimony of Judith Beth Cefkin,” press release,
December 4, 2013.
60 Ba Kaung, “EU Sanctions Remain Until Burmese Prisoner Release: Hague,” Irrawaddy, January 6, 2012.
61 Interview with CRS, January 2012.
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evolving conditions in the country. In addition, the Obama Administration may ask Congress for
additional funding for humanitarian programs in Burma to address the serious humanitarian needs
of Burma’s internally displaced people (IDPs), refugees, and other vulnerable populations.
Existing U.S. sanctions on Burma are based on several laws specifically focused on the country,
as well as other laws that sanction nations that fail to comply with U.S. standards of conduct
related to specific issues. The changing political situation in Burma, including the status of
political prisoners, may warrant congressional consideration of whether alteration or removal of
sanctions should be considered. Similarly, the President has the authority—which he has used
several times—to waive or suspend some of the existing sanctions on Burma if he determines that
the necessary conditions have been met. If the President were to once again exercise this
executive authority, Congress may choose to review the President’s determination.62
Congress may also choose to monitor and evaluate the Obama Administration’s efforts to address
the political prisoner and human rights situation in Burma. As previously mentioned, the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (H.R. 3547, P.L. 113-76) requires the Department of
State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) “support programs for former
political prisoners,” as well as “monitor the number of political prisoners in Burma.” Congress
may decide to use its oversight authority to check the Obama Administration’s compliance with
these legal obligations.
Some Members of Congress have been critical of a lack of communication by the Obama
Administration about the conduct of U.S. policy toward Burma, including its efforts to address
the political prisoner problem. The JADE Act explicitly requires that the Special Representative
and Policy Coordinator for Burma “consult with Congress on policies relevant to Burma and the
future and welfare of all the Burmese people, including refugees.”63 However, the post of Special
Representative has been vacant since June 2013. The nomination of a new Special Representative
could provide Congress with an opportunity to weigh in on the conduct of U.S. policy in Burma
and the issue of political prisoners. Congress may choose to press President Obama to nominate a
Special Representative to address the perceived lack of communication. In addition, Congress
may decide to consult with non-Administration sources and/or hold hearings to ascertain the
human rights situation in Burma, including the issue of political prisoners.
Beyond its oversight function, Congress may decide that circumstances warrant consideration of
new legislation related to U.S. policy towards Burma. Section 7043(b) of P.L. 113-76—which
places new requirements and restrictions on State Department Economic Support Funds in
Burma, including support for former political prisoners—may reflect a determination that
Congress wishes to play a more active role in the formation of U.S. policy towards Burma. In
addition, some observers maintain that the provisions in the JADE Act pertaining to political
prisoners may be unobtainable, and are overly restrictive of U.S. policy given the changes that
have occurred Burma since April 2011. Alternatively, legislation may be considered in response
to a request from the Obama Administration to amend existing laws to facilitate adjustments in
U.S. policy.

62 The current U.S. sanction laws specifically focused on Burma provide for a presidential waiver of some sanctions,
generally if the President determines that it is “in the national interest of the United States.” In most cases, the President
also has to “determine and certify” to Congress or the specified “appropriate congressional committees” that the waiver
is in the national interest of the United States.
63 JADE Act, Section 7(c)(4).
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Congress may also be called upon to consider additional funding for humanitarian assistance to
Burma. For FY2014, the Obama Administration requested $51.2 million for humanitarian
projects inside Burma “ to promote national reconciliation, democracy, human rights, and the rule
of law; foster economic opportunity; increase food security; and meet other basic human needs to
enable Burma’s population to contribute to and sustain reforms.”64

64 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 2: Foreign Operations - Fiscal Year 2014, May 16,
2013.
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Appendix. Reverse Chronology of Prisoner Releases
by Thein Sein Government
Since his appointment in March 2011, President Thein Sein has granted pardons or amnesties to
prisoners in Burma on 17 separate occasions, resulting in the release of 36,761 prisoners, of
whom at least 1,165 were political prisoners, according to the AAPP(B). The following table
provides a quick summary of each of those prisoner releases in reverse chronological order.
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Table A-1. Summary of Prisoner Releases by Thein Sein Government
in reverse chronological order
Date & Type
Description
January 2, 2014
President Thein Sein issues Order No. 1/2014, commuting all death sentences to life
imprisonment, reducing al sentences of over 40 years to 40 years, and reducing al
Pardon
sentences under 40 years by 25%. The pardon results in the release of a reported 13, 274
prisoners, of which only 3 are considered political prisoners by the AAPP(B).
December 30, 2013
Using authority granted by Section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(i)
Amnesty
of Burma’s Criminal Procedure, President Thein Sein granted amnesty to five people, all of
which are considered political prisoners by the AAPP(B).
December 30, 2013
President Thein Sein issues Order No. 51/2013, pardoning al prisoners sentenced on or
before December 31, 2013, under seven specific laws (see “Recent Releases” above). An
Pardon
estimated 100 prisoners are released under the pardon, of which 16 have been identified
as political prisoners by the AAPP(B).
December 11, 2013
President Thein Sein granted amnesty to “41 prisoners who were in the list of the
committee for scrutinizing remaining political prisoners.” The amnesty was granted using
Amnesty
authority provided by Section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(i) of
Burma’s Criminal Procedure. Two of those released, however, were reportedly
rearrested within hours of their release. In addition to the 41 prisoners included in the
official amnesty announcement, three child soldiers were reportedly released from prison
on the same day. The amnesty announcement coincided with the opening of the 27th
Southeast Asian Games, which were being held in Burma.
November 15, 2013
Using authority granted by Section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(i)
of Burma’s Criminal Procedure, President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 69 people.
Amnesty
Among the released were nine activists who had organized demonstrations in support of
the Rohingyas in Rakhine State and an activist who had organized protests against the
expansion of the Letpadaung copper mine in Sagaing Division.
October 8, 2013
President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 56 prisoners using authority granted by Section
204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(i) of Burma’s Criminal Procedure.
Amnesty
Nearly half of those released—27 people—were reportedly alleged members of the
Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the militia associated with the Kachin Independence
Organization (KIO). Another 24 people were either alleged members of the Restorative
Council of the Shan State (RCSS) or its affiliated militia, the Shan State Army (SSA). Most
of the people granted amnesty had been convicted of violating Section 17(1) of Burma’s
Unlawful Associations Act, among other charges. Some observers think the release was
designed to promote progress in ongoing ceasefire talks with the KIO and the RCSS. The
amnesty announcement came just before Brunei formal y transferred the chair of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to Burma during the 23rd ASEAN
Summit held on October 8-10, 2013.
July 23, 2013
President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 73 prisoners using authority granted by Section
204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(a) of Burma’s Criminal Procedure.
Amnesty
Some sources considered all 73 of the released prisoners as political prisoners. According
to AAPP(B) and the FPPS, however, only 68 of those released were political prisoners,
including at least 30 people associated with Kachin Independence Army and the Shan State
Army–South. A week after the release, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs Brigadier
General Kyaw Zan Myint reportedly told the Union Parliament that the prisoners had
been granted a conditional release, and that they may have to serve out the remainder of
the sentence if they break the law in the future.
May 17, 2013
Four days before his historic trip to the United States in May 2013, President Thein Sein
granted amnesty to 23 prisoners, of whom 21 were considered political prisoners by the
Amnesty
AAPP(B). Among those released was Nay Myo Zin, who had been previously released, but
subsequently returned to prison to serve out the remaining six years of his sentence after
his arrest for insulting a police officer. Nay Myo Zin was the first ex-political prisoner re-
imprisoned after being granted amnesty.
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Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions

Date & Type
Description
April 23, 2013
President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 93 prisoners. According to AAPP(B), 69 of those
released were political prisoners. Also included among the 69 political prisoners were 40
Amnesty
“Shan rebel soldiers,” according to the opposition publication, Irrawaddy. The prisoner
release was announced the day after the European Union voted to terminate all its
sanctions on Burma, except for the arms embargo. In addition, the Political Prisoners
Review Committee reportedly recommended a number of people to be released, but
President Thein Sein apparently chose to release other individuals, raising questions about
the influence of the committee.
November 19, 2012
Using authority granted by section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(a)
of Burma’s Criminal Procedure, President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 66 prisoners on
Amnesty
November 19, 2012, during President Obama’s visit to Burma. The AAPP(B) identified 51
of those released as being political prisoners.
November 15-16, 2012
President Thein Sein granted amnesty to 452 prisoners using authority granted by section
204(a) of Burma’s 2008 constitution and Section 401(a) of Burma’s Criminal Procedure.
Amnesty
None of the prisoners released were identified as political prisoners by AAPP(B).
September 17, 2012
Shortly before President Thein Sein was scheduled to visit the United States to speak
before the United Nations General Assembly, he granted amnesty to 514 people. The
Amnesty
AAPP(B) identified 88 political prisoners among those released. According to some
observers, the prisoner release was intended to bolster the chances that the Obama
Administration would announce a further easing of sanctions during President Thein Sein’s
visit to the United States.
July 3, 2012
Using authority granted by section 204(a) of Burma’s 2008 Constitution, President Thein
Sein granted amnesty to 46 domestic prisoners and 34 foreign nationals. The AAPP(B)
Amnesty
identified 25 of the domestic prisoners as political prisoners.
January 13, 2012
President Thein Sein suspended the sentences of 651 prisoners “who were serving their
appropriate prison terms” using authority granted by Section 401 of Burma’s Code of
Amnesty
Criminal Procedure. The AAPP(B) identified 302 political prisoners among the 336 people
released. The release came at the tail end of the fourth visit by U.S. Special Representative
and Policy Coordinator for Burma Derek Mitchell and a week after British Foreign
Minister William Hague’s first trip to Burma.
January 2, 2012
President Thein Sein issued Presidential Order No. 1/2012, granting a partial amnesty to
all existing Burmese prisoners “[a]s a gesture of hailing the 64th Anniversary Independence
Amnesty
Day and for the sake of State peace and stability.” The AAPP(B) considered 34 of the 651
people released as political prisoners.
October 11, 2011
President Thein Sein issued Order No. 49/2011, terminating the prisoner sentence for
6,359 individual y named persons, including 247 political prisoners.
Amnesty
May 16, 2011
President Thein Sein issued Order No. 28/2011, commuting al death sentences to life in
prison, and reduced all other sentences by one year in duration (exclusive of remission
Amnesty
days). As a result, 14,600 prisoners are released, but only 73 are identified as political
prisoners by the AAPP(B).
Source: CRS.

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Burma’s Political Prisoners and U.S. Sanctions

Author Contact Information

Michael F. Martin

Specialist in Asian Affairs
mfmartin@crs.loc.gov, 7-2199

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