United Nations Reform: Background and
Issues for Congress

Luisa Blanchfield
Specialist in International Relations
January 13, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33848


United Nations Reform: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations (U.N.) has undergone numerous reforms as
international stakeholders seek ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.N.
system. During the past two decades, controversies such as corruption in the Iraq Oil-For-Food
Program, allegations of sexual abuse by U.N. peacekeepers, and instances of waste, fraud, and
abuse by U.N. staff have focused attention on the need for change and improvement of the United
Nations. Many in the international community, including the United States, continue to promote
substantive reforms. The second session of the 113th Congress may focus on U.N. reform as it
considers appropriate levels of U.S. funding to the United Nations and monitors the progress and
implementation of ongoing and previously approved reform measures.
Generally, Congress has maintained a significant interest in the overall effectiveness of the United
Nations. Some Members are particularly interested in U.N. Secretariat and management reform,
with a focus on improving transparency and strengthening accountability and internal oversight.
In the past, Congress has enacted legislation that links U.S. funding of the United Nations to
specific U.N. reform benchmarks. Supporters of this strategy contend that the United Nations has
been slow to implement reforms and that linking payment of U.S. assessments to progress on
U.N. reform is the most effective way to motivate member states to efficiently pursue
comprehensive reform. Opponents argue that tying U.S. funding to U.N. reform may negatively
impact diplomatic relations and could hinder the United States’ ability to conduct foreign policy.
In September 2005, heads of U.N. member states met for the World Summit at U.N. Headquarters
in New York to discuss strengthening the United Nations through institutional reform. The
resulting Summit Outcome Document laid the groundwork for a series of reforms that included
enhancing U.N. management structures; strengthening the U.N. Security Council; improving
U.N. system coordination and coherence; and creating a new Human Rights Council. Since the
Summit, U.N. member states have worked toward implementing these reforms with varied
results. Some reforms, such as the creation of the Human Rights Council and improving system-
wide coherence, are completed or ongoing. Others reforms, such as Security Council enlargement
and changes to management structures and processes, have stalled or not been addressed.
One of the key challenges facing reform advocates is finding common ground among the
disparate definitions of reform held by various stakeholders. There is no single definition of U.N.
reform, and consequently there is often debate over the scope, appropriateness, and effectiveness
of past and current reform initiatives. U.N. member states disagree as to whether some proposed
reforms are necessary, as well as how to most effectively implement reforms. Developed
countries, for example, support delegating more power to the U.N. Secretary-General to
implement management reforms, whereas developing countries fear that giving the Secretary-
General more authority may undermine the power of the U.N. General Assembly and therefore
the influence of individual countries.
Generally, U.N. reform is achieved by amending the U.N. Charter or through various non-Charter
reforms. Charter amendment, which requires approval by two-thirds of the General Assembly and
ratification “according to the constitutional processes” of two-thirds of U.N. member states
(including the five permanent Security Council members), is rarely used and has been practiced
on only a few occasions. Non-Charter reforms—which include General Assembly action or
initiatives by the U.N. Secretary-General—are more common and comparatively easier to
achieve. This report will be updated as policy changes or congressional actions warrant.

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United Nations Reform: Background and Issues for Congress

Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Selected Reform Efforts: 2005-Present ........................................................................................... 2
Congress and U.N. Reform .............................................................................................................. 3
U.S. Funding as a Mechanism for U.N. Reform ....................................................................... 4
Possible Instruments for Furthering U.S. Reform Policy .......................................................... 6
Administration Policies.................................................................................................................... 7
Obama Administration ............................................................................................................... 7
George W. Bush Administration ................................................................................................ 9
Reform Perspectives and Priorities .................................................................................................. 9
The Secretary-General ............................................................................................................... 9
Developed and Developing Countries ..................................................................................... 10
U.N. Reform-Related Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups .............................................. 11
Mechanics of Implementing Reform ............................................................................................. 13
Amending the U.N. Charter ..................................................................................................... 13
Non-Charter Reform Process................................................................................................... 14
Looking Ahead: Possible Challenges to Reform ........................................................................... 14
National Self-Interest and Differing Reform Perspectives ...................................................... 14
Competing Priorities ................................................................................................................ 15
Organizational Structure and Bureaucracy .............................................................................. 15
Limited Resources ................................................................................................................... 15
External Influences .................................................................................................................. 15

Appendixes
Appendix A. Previous Reform Legislation .................................................................................... 17
Appendix B. Key U.N. Reform Recommendations and Proposals by Independent and
U.N. Affiliated Groups ............................................................................................................... 19
Appendix C. Organizational Chart of the U.N. System ................................................................. 20

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 21

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United Nations Reform: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
United Nations (U.N.) reform is an ongoing policy issue for the United States, and may continue
to be an area of focus during the second session of the 113th Congress. As the single largest
financial contributor to the U.N. system, the U.S. government has an interest in ensuring the
United Nations operates as efficiently and effectively as possible. Congress has the responsibility
to appropriate U.S. funds to the United Nations and can impose conditions on payments. On
several occasions, it has sought to link U.S. funding of the United Nations to specific reform
benchmarks.
Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, U.N. member states and past secretaries-
general have repeatedly attempted to reform the organization. These reform efforts tend to be
cyclical, with member states considering waves of new reform proposals every 5 to 10 years. The
reform attempts are often initiated by a member state, groups of member states, and/or the current
Secretary-General. They have generally focused on three areas of concern: (1) perceived
inefficiencies and lack of accountability in the U.N. Secretariat; (2) duplication and redundancy
of U.N. mandates, missions, and/or programs; and (3) evidence of fraud, waste, abuse, and/or
mismanagement of U.N. resources.
Proposed reforms often reflect the political, economic, and cultural climate of the time. In the
1950s and 1960s, member states focused on increasing membership on the U.N. Security Council
and the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to account for growing U.N.
membership.1 In the 1970s, as the economic and political gap between developed and developing
countries grew more pronounced, the General Assembly examined structural changes that would
help the United Nations address “problems of international economic co-operation.”2 Due in part
to pressure from the United States, U.N. reform initiatives in the 1980s and early 1990s addressed
financial and structural issues, with a particular focus on decision-making processes related to the
U.N. regular budget, which funds core U.N. activities.3 Since the early 2000s, reform efforts have
been driven by a combination of U.N. budgetary and financial challenges, controversy over
mismanagement of the Iraq Oil-For-Food Program, perceived ineffectiveness of U.N. human
rights mechanisms, and allegations of sexual abuse committed by U.N. staff and peacekeepers,
among other issues.
This report examines reform priorities from the perspective of several key actors, including
Members of Congress, the Obama Administration, selected member states, the U.N. Secretary-

1 U.N. membership grew from 51 countries in 1945, to 114 countries in 1963. Currently, the United Nations has 193
member states. Amendments to the Charter related to increased membership are discussed in the “Mechanics of
Implementing Reform” section of this report.
2 For more information on this group and other U.N. reform efforts prior to the 1980s, see “Reforming the United
Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress,” by Edward C. Luck, Academic Council on the United Nations System—
Occasional Papers Series
, 2003.
3 In 1986, under pressure from the United States and other industrialized countries, the General Assembly established a
high-level group of 18 intergovernmental experts to “review the efficiency of the administrative and financial
functioning” of the United Nations. The group made 71 recommendations to the General Assembly, including a revised
budgetary process that introduced the use of consensus-based budgeting. The group of experts was convened, in part,
because of U.S. legislation popularly known as the “Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment,” which directed that U.S.
contributions to the U.N. regular budget be reduced if countries making the largest financial contributions did not have
a more substantial influence in the U.N. budget process. See Appendix A for more information on Kassebaum-
Solomon and other U.N. reform-related legislation.
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General, and a cross-section of groups tasked with addressing U.N. reform. It also discusses
congressional actions related to U.N. reform and mechanisms for implementing reform, as well as
possible challenges facing U.S. policy makers as they consider existing and future U.N. reform
efforts.
Strengthening the U.N. Security Council
Selected Reform Efforts:
For several decades, many U.N. member states have
increasingly focused on the question of Security Council
2005-Present
reform. The Council is the primary U.N. organ dealing
with peace and security issues. As such, it has often
played a lead role in addressing conflict and other forms
In 2005, U.N. reform efforts gained momentum as
of insecurity throughout the world. Some member
heads of state and government met for a World
states, finding themselves committed to what they may
Summit at U.N. Headquarters in New York.5 The
consider Council-imposed decisions, believe the entire
U.N. membership needs to have a clearer understanding
Summit Outcome Document, which was adopted
of Council actions and greater access to the work of the
by consensus, laid the foundation for a series of
Council. Many also believe that the Council membership
reforms that included improving U.N.
should be enlarged from 15, a number established in the
management structures; strengthening the Security
1960s, to a number commensurate with the increase in
U.N. membership.
Council (see text box); enhancing U.N. system
coordination and coherence; and creating a new
Security Council reform and enlargement has been
Human Rights Council (see text box).6 U.N.
actively discussed within the U.N. General Assembly
since 1993, when it established an open-ended working
member states have worked toward implementing
group to address the issue. Over the years, consultations
these reform initiatives with varied results. Some
and discussions have continued over various aspects of
reforms are stalled or have not been addressed,
Council reform, including (1) increases in the number of
while others are underway or completed. Selected
permanent members; (2) increases in the number of non-
reform activities include the following:
permanent members; (3) the status of new permanent
members, including extension of the veto to such

members; (4) continuation of the veto; or (5) limits on
Mandate Review. The Outcome
veto use. The Obama Administration has stated that it is
Document negotiated by member states at
open, in principle, to “modest” expansion of both
the World Summit called for a systematic
permanent and non-permanent Council members.4 It
review of all U.N. mandates five years or
maintains that any proposals should be country-specific
older.7 Many experts were concerned that
and fol ow a step-by-step approach. It also opposes any
changes to the current veto structure. In November
existing mandates might be duplicative, no
2010, President Obama expressed support for India’s
longer relevant, or require unnecessary
inclusion as a permanent Security Council member.
reporting requirements. Since 2005,
member states have been reviewing mandates, but progress has stalled because
some countries fear that mandates important to them will be discarded.

4 Statement by Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo in the General Assembly Plenary Debate on the Security Council
Annual Report and Reform, New York, November 15, 2012.
5 The Summit convened to review the progress made in the fulfillment of the 2000 Millennium Summit goals and
commitments made in other earlier U.N. conferences. The 2000 Millennium Summit was held from September 6-8,
2000, in New York.
6 U.N. document, A/RES/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, September 16, 2005.
7 Mandates are resolutions adopted by members of each of the principal U.N. organs. (The six U.N. organs are the
General Assembly, Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, International Court of
Justice, and Secretariat.) Mandates can be both conceptual and specific; they can establish or interpret international
norms, provide policy direction on substantive and/or administrative issues, or request conferences, activities,
operations and reporting requirements.
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United Nations Reform: Background and Issues for Congress

Internal Justice Administration. In 2007, the General Assembly adopted a
framework resolution to create a new system of internal justice administration.
The previous system was criticized for being “slow, cumbersome, ineffective,
and lacking in professionalism.”9 Since
the new system became operational in
The U.N. Human Rights Council
2009, the Tribunal judges have worked
In March 2006, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
through a backlog of cases.
replacing the Commission on Human Rights with a new Human

Rights Council. Many governments, including the United States,
Internal Oversight. The Summit
viewed the Council’s establishment as a key component of U.N.
Outcome Document called for
reform. The Council was designed to be an improvement over
strengthening the U.N. Office of Internal
the Commission, which was criticized by many governments
Oversight (OIOS). Experts, however,
and human rights experts when widely perceived human rights
continue to question OIOS’s ability to
abusers were elected as members. Under the George W. Bush
Administration, the United States voted against the General
effectively evaluate U.N. activities in part
Assembly resolution creating the Council and did not run for a
because it depends on funding from the
seat. It argued that the Council lacked mechanisms for
programs that it audits. Some member
maintaining credible membership.
states maintain that this lack of operational
Since the Council was established, some policy makers have
independence could lead to a real or
expressed concern with the Council’s effectiveness in
perceived conflict of interest.
addressing human rights. Many contend that the Council has
focused disproportionately on Israel while failing to address
System-wide Coherence. To improve
other pressing human rights situations. In mid-2007, for
coordination and coherence within the
example, members agreed to make the “human rights situation
U.N. system, in 2007 member states
in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories” a permanent
part of the Council’s agenda. Israel is the only country singled
created the “Delivering As One” initiative
out in this manner. At the same time, others contend that
in eight pilot countries to harmonize U.N.
mechanisms such as the universal periodic review process,
system-wide activities at the country level;
which aims to evaluate each member state's fulfillment of its
and in 2011 they consolidated three
human rights obligations, are a potentially effective means for
addressing human rights in various countries. Many supporters
existing U.N. entities addressing women’s
are also encouraged by the Council's increased attention to
issues into “UN Women,” a specialized
human rights situations in countries such as Syria and Cote
agency to address gender equality and
d'Ivoire. The Obama Administration has criticized the Council
women’s empowerment.
for its focus on Israel, but maintains that it is better for the
United States to work from within to improve the Council. The
The long-term impact of these and other recent
United States was elected as a member in 2009 and 2012.8
activities remains to be seen. The overall success
of these efforts—and any future reform efforts—depends on how effectively the United Nations
and its member countries manage and follow through on the implementation of these reforms and
how, if at all, they work to correct possible weaknesses or issues that may arise over time.10
Congress and U.N. Reform
Generally, Congress supports the United Nations and its overall mission. It authorizes and
appropriates U.S. funds to the organization each year and often uses U.N. mechanisms to further

8 For more information on the Council, see CRS Report RL33608, The United Nations Human Rights Council: Issues
for Congress
, by Luisa Blanchfield.
9 U.N. document, A/RES/61/261, April 4, 2007.
10 For more information on U.N. reform activities, see the U.N. Secretariat Department of Management website at
http://www.un.org/en/hq/dm/.
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U.S. foreign policy objectives.11 Congress can also be critical of the United Nations—especially
when some Members believe that it may not be running as effectively as it could be. In such
instances, Congress may use a wide range of legislative tools to influence and direct U.S. policy
at the United Nations. Placing financial conditions or limits on U.S. funding to the United
Nations, described in more detail below, is a common congressional approach to U.N reform.
Other tools may include considering “sense of the Congress” resolutions; holding hearings to
investigate U.N. programs or oversee Administration policies; and considering U.S. nominations
for U.N. posts.
Palestinian Membership in UNESCO and the United Nations
UNESCO has received significant U.S. and international attention for member states’ decision to admit “Palestine” as a
member in October 2011. The Obama Administration and many Members of Congress opposed this action,
maintaining that Palestinian statehood can only be realized through direct negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians
rather than through membership in U.N. entities. The United States withheld approximately $80 million in FY2012 and
FY2013 funding to UNESCO under two laws enacted in the 1990s that prohibit funding to U.N. entities that admit the
PLO as a member (§414 of P.L. 101-246), or grant full membership as a state to any organization or group that does
not have the international y recognized attributes of statehood (§410 of P.L. 103-236). In late 2013, the United States
lost its vote in the UNESCO General Conference because it did not pay its dues for two consecutive years. The
Obama Administration has asked Congress to waive the legislative restrictions prohibiting funding to UNESCO, and
has stated that it does not intend to withdraw from the organization.12
Palestinian efforts to achieve UNESCO membership are part of broader efforts by PLO Chairman and Palestinian
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to achieve international recognition for Palestinian statehood. On November 29,
2012, the U.N. General Assembly voted to change Palestine’s observer status from “observer entity” to “non-member
observer state” by a vote of 138 in favor, 9 against (including the United States), and 41 abstaining. This change in
observer status is a largely symbolic act. Although Palestine has the term “state” in its current designation, it is not a
U.N. member. As such, it does not have the right to vote or call for a vote in the General Assembly. Palestine has
maintained many of the capacities it had as an observer entity—including participation in Assembly debates and the
ability to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions related to proceedings on Palestinian and Middle East issues.13
U.S. Funding as a Mechanism for U.N. Reform
In the past, Congress has used its authority to limit U.S. funds to the United Nations as a
mechanism for influencing U.N. policy.14 In some cases, Congress withheld a proportionate share
of funding for U.N. programs and policies of which it did not approve. It has withheld funds from
regular budget programs, including the U.N. Special Unit on Palestinian Rights and the
Preparatory Commission for the Law of the Sea. Currently, the only proportionate U.S.
withholding from the regular budget is for some activities and programs related to the PLO or
entities associated with it.15 In October 2011, the United States withheld funding from the U.N.
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) due to member states’ decision to
admit “Palestine” as a member (see text box).

11 For example, Congress has enacted laws supporting U.N. policies and/or requiring that U.N. member states comply
with U.N. Security Council resolutions or the directives of other U.N. bodies, such as the General Assembly and
Human Rights Council.
12 For more information, see CRS Report R42999, The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO)
, by Luisa Blanchfield and Marjorie Ann Browne.
13 For more information, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
14 For a more detailed examination of U.S. funding of the United Nations, see CRS Report RL33611, United Nations
System Funding: Congressional Issues
, by Marjorie Ann Browne.
15 Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2227), as amended.
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The overall impact of withholding a proportionate share of assessed payments depends on the
origin of the program’s funding. If a program is funded by the U.N. regular budget16 and the
United States withholds a proportionate share of its normal contributions, the cost of the program
will most likely be covered by surplus regular budget funds. Some U.N. programs are funded
from several budgets that may include the U.N. regular budget, specialized agency budgets, and
separate conference and administrative budgets. Because of this, it may be more difficult for U.S.
proportionate withholdings to have a significant impact because the program’s funding comes
from several sources. In such cases, a U.S. withholding would have little or no immediate impact
on the program’s operation or funding levels. If the United States withholds funds from a program
funded primarily by member state contributions, however, the impact of the United States
withholding or suspending contributions could be greater.
Enacted and Proposed U.N. Reform Legislation in the 112th and 113th Congresses
Members of the 112th and 113th Congresses have sought to tie U.S. funding to U.N. reform, with a particular interest
in improving U.N. transparency and management. Two examples of enacted and proposed legislation follow.
Enacted. Section 7049 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2012 (Division I of P.L. 112-74; the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012) states that the United States shal
withhold 15% of its contributions to any U.N. agency if the Secretary of State determines that the agency is not taking
steps to (a) publish regular financial and programmatic audits of the agency on a publicly available website and provide
the U.S. government with necessary access to such audits; and (b) implement best practices for protecting
whistleblowers from retaliation. The Secretary of State may waive these restrictions if it is determined that doing so is
in the best interest of the United States. The conditions in Section 7049 were included in the continuing resolution for
FY2013 foreign operations appropriations (P.L. 113-6). The Administration did not withhold FY2012 or FY2013
funding for any U.N. entities under this legislation.
Proposed. In October 2011, the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) reported out H.R. 2829, the United
Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011, which (1) supported shifting the funding mechanism
for the U.N. regular budget from assessed to voluntary contributions, and (2) tied U.S. contributions the United
Nations to specific reform benchmarks. (Similar versions of this act, S. 1313 and H.R. 3155, were introduced in the
113th Congress.) The Obama Administration stated that it had some “constitutional concerns” with the bill,
contending that “numerous provisions … would interfere with the President’s conduct of diplomacy by purporting to
declare ‘policy’ of the United States, or by purporting to direct United State diplomats to use their ‘voice’ or ‘vote’ to
advance certain positions, in international negotiations. The Constitution commits to the President the responsibility
for formulating the policy of the United States with respect to international bodies.”17
In addition to withholding a proportionate share of U.S. funding, Congress may consider enacting
legislation decreasing or increasing U.S. assessment levels or linking payment of U.S. arrears to
policies it favors. In October 1993, for example, Congress directed that the U.S. payments of
peacekeeping assessments be capped at 25% (lower than the assessment level set by the United
Nations).18 Congress has also used this strategy to further its U.N. reform policies. Enacted
legislation such as the Helms-Biden Agreement linked U.S. assessment levels and the payment of
U.S. arrears to reform benchmarks (see Appendix A for more information on legislation). As

16 The U.N. regular budget funds core U.N. activities for the General Assembly, Security Council, and other U.N.
bodies. It also supports human rights-related activities; staffing and administration at U.N. headquarters, funding and
staffing for international conferences, and special political missions, among other things.
17 October 21, 2011 letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to then-HFAC
Chairperson Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
18 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act for FY1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236), April 30, 1994. On September 30, 2002,
Congress lifted the 25% cap on the peacekeeping assessment to allow the United States to pay its current assessments
(P.L. 107-228, §402).
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noted in the previous text box, some current Members of Congress have proposed shifting U.S.
funding from assessed to voluntary contributions.
Perspectives on Linking U.S. Funding to U.N. Reform
Opponents of linking U.S. funding to progress on U.N. reform are concerned that doing so may
weaken U.S. influence at the United Nations, thereby undercutting the United States’ ability to
conduct diplomacy and make foreign policy decisions.19 Some argue that withholding U.S.
assessed payments to the United Nations infringes on U.S. treaty obligations and alienates other
U.N. member states. Opponents also note that withholding U.S. funds could have an impact on
diplomatic relations outside of the U.N. system. Additionally, some contend that U.N. reform
legislation proposals may be unrealistic because the scope and depth of reforms required by the
legislation cannot be adequately achieved in the proposed time frames.20
Supporters of linking U.S. funding to specific reforms argue that the United States should use its
position as the largest U.N. financial contributor to push for the implementation of policies that
lead to comprehensive reform. They note that despite diplomatic and political pressures from
many countries, the United Nations has been slow to implement substantive reform. Advocates
also argue that some previously implemented reforms have proved to be ineffective. They believe
that tying U.S. funding to U.N. reform may motivate countries to find common ground on
divisive issues. They also emphasize that past legislation that threatened to cut off U.S. funding of
the United Nations (such as the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment) was effective, and led to
substantive changes in U.N. operations and programs.
Possible Instruments for Furthering U.S. Reform Policy
Congress’s influence over U.S. funding of the United Nations is a powerful tool for furthering
U.S. reform policy at the United Nations. However, there may be other strategies for Congress to
consider when advocating its reform agenda. These strategies have been widely used by many
past and current Members of Congress and Administrations, and include, but are not limited to:
Resolutions—Members of Congress may propose and/or enact simple or
concurrent resolutions expressing an opinion, fact, or principle in one or both
chambers of Congress. Some Members have used these resolutions to voice an
opinion about U.S. policy in the United Nations/or the United Nations itself.
Working with the U.N. Secretary-General—Some previous and current
Members of Congress and Administrations have worked to earn the support of
U.N. secretaries-general to help advocate their positions. Developing a
relationship with the chief administrative officer of the United Nations can be
valuable during some negotiations, when the Secretary-General can act as a
bridge among member states that disagree on issues. U.S. citizens have also held

19 Additionally, some observers contend that if the United States were to delay or stop payment of its arrears, it may
risk losing its vote in the General Assembly—a generally undesirable outcome for many Members of Congress and the
Administration. In 1999, for example, the United States came very close to losing its General Assembly vote. Under
Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, a U.N. member state with arrears equaling or exceeding the member state’s assessments
for the two preceding years will have no vote in the General Assembly.
20 “The Right Approach to Achieving U.N. Reform,” Better World Campaign, Better World Campaign Fact Sheet.
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key U.N. reform-related posts at the United Nations, which some Members of
Congress believe may play a role in furthering U.S. reform policy interests.21
Collaborating with Other U.N. Member States—The United States may wish
to continue to reach out to other U.N. member states to build consensus and form
partnerships on reform policies, either within the framework of the United
Nations or bilaterally.22 Observers have noted that U.S. support for certain U.N.
reform initiatives can be a liability because some member states may view U.S.
support as self-serving. In these cases, the United States may consider
encouraging like-minded countries to advocate its reform agenda.
Identifying Key Priorities—The United States may wish to focus on a small
number of reform priorities and pursue them vigorously in both multilateral and
bilateral fora. It may also consider compromising with other member states on
U.N. reform issues that it has identified as lesser priorities.
Many experts have emphasized that U.N. reform is an ongoing process rather than a singular
event. With this in mind, the 113th Congress may wish to continue monitoring the implementation
and overall progress of ongoing reform initiatives. It may also consider future reforms proposed
by member states and the Administration, as well as by Members of Congress or the Secretary-
General.
Administration Policies
The United States generally supports the mission and mandate of the United Nations. It played a
key role in establishing the United Nations in 1945, and serves as one of five permanent members
of the Security Council. Some Administrations have been critical of the United Nations, however,
and have advocated sweeping reform of the organization.
Obama Administration
Since President Obama took office, his Administration has focused on “re-engaging” with the
United Nations.23 The Administration elevated the status of the U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations to a Cabinet-level position that reports directly to the President.24 It also paid a

21 Most recently, Christopher Burnham served as U.N. Under-Secretary for Management. He stepped down before
Secretary-General Annan’s term ended in 2007. Prior to Christopher Burnham, the post was held by Catherine Bertini,
also a U.S. citizen. The current Under-Secretary-General for Management is Yukio Takasu of Japan.
22 In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, the “Geneva Group” was formed to encourage dialogue and cooperation among
like-minded U.N. member states. It was composed mostly of Western countries that were the United Nations’ largest
financial contributors. The group focused mainly on financial and budgetary issues, and some contend it was
instrumental in bringing about budgetary restraint in some of the U.N. specialized agencies. For more information, see
The United States and Multilateral Institutions, edited by Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, Unwin Hyman
Publishers, 1990, p. 313; and United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, edited by Rudiger Wolfrum, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, pp. 70-71.
23 See (1) Remarks by the President to the United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 2009, White House Press
Office, and (2) Remarks by Ambassador Esther Brimmer delivered at the Brookings Institution, “Revitalizing the
United Nations and Multilateral Cooperation: The Obama Administration’s Progress,” February 1, 2011.
24 During the George W. Bush Administration, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations reported to the
Secretary of State. During the Clinton Administration, the Permanent Representative reported to the President.
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significant portion of U.S. arrears, and decided to run for a seat on the U.N. Human Rights
Council. Many of the Administration’s U.N. reform priorities focus on management issues—
particularly those related to budget processes and transparency. In various statements and
documents, the Administration has highlighted the following areas of priority:
enforcing budget discipline by taking cost-saving measures such as eliminating
vacant U.N. posts, freezing U.N. staff salaries, and exploring alternate budget
practices;
improving transparency and accountability by strengthening the effectiveness
of U.N. bodies charged with evaluating performance and investigating abuses,
including the Ethics Office, the Independent Audit Advisory Committee, the
Board of Auditors, and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS);
reforming human resources practices to create a more mobile and merit-based
workforce by further streamlining U.N. staff contracting and conditions of
service across the U.N. system; and
overhauling day-to-day business practices such as upgrading information
technology, and improving procurement procedures, accounting procedures, and
budgeting processes.25
The Obama Administration has also implemented initiatives within the State Department aimed at
evaluating and improving U.N. system transparency and effectiveness. It has continued to support
the U.N. Transparency and Accountability Initiative (UNTAI), a Bush Administration program
created by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations that tracks the adoption of management
reforms by U.N. funds and programs.26 Additionally, in September 2010, then-Assistant Secretary
for International Organization Affairs (IO) Esther Brimmer announced that the IO Bureau hired
an advisor on effectiveness, whose role is to “systematically review the effectiveness of
international organizations,” including U.N. entities.27
The Administration has generally resisted legislation tying U.S. contributions to specific U.N.
reforms due to concerns that it may interfere with the President’s ability to conduct diplomacy. In
an April 2011 statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, then-U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations Susan Rice remarked that failing to pay U.N. dues

25 Drawn from statements by Administration officials, including statement of then Ambassador Susan E. Rice to the
House Foreign Affairs Committee for a hearing entitled, “U.S. Policy Toward the United Nations,” April 7, 2011; U.S.
Mission to the United Nations, Statement on Transparency Initiatives at the U.N. by then-Ambassador Torsella,
September 14, 2011; State Department Fact Sheet, Advancing U.S. Interests at the United Nations, September 25,
2012; State Department Fact Sheet: Conclusion of the 67th General Assembly Session of the Fifth Committee,
December 28, 2012; and Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, at the Fifth Committee on the Final Budget Report for 2012-2013, December 16, 2013.
26 In 2011, the Obama Administration launched the second phase of UNTAI (UNTAI-II) to identify areas where
member states can increase oversight and accountability to ensure their contributions are used efficiently and
effectively.
27 The effectiveness advisor also promotes “rigorous evaluation standards that the organizations themselves can take
up, to expand their own capacity for self-improvement.” See Remarks by then-Assistant Secretary Brimmer to the
American Foreign Service Association, “The Role and Relevance of Multilateral Diplomacy in U.S. Foreign Policy,”
January 11, 2011.
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“undermines [U.S.] credibility and influence [in the United Nations]—not just on reform, but on a
range of U.S. national security policies.”28
George W. Bush Administration
The George W. Bush Administration was an active participant in U.N. reform efforts. It identified
several key priorities that it believed would help the United Nations improve its effectiveness,
including (1) management, budget, and secretariat reform; (2) increased oversight and
accountability; (3) review of all U.N. mandates and missions; and (4) fiscal discipline.
Prior to and after the adoption of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the Bush
Administration attempted to work with like-minded countries and the U.N. Secretary-General to
move a reform agenda forward. Some reform initiatives supported by President Bush, particularly
management and oversight reforms, were not approved or considered by the General Assembly.
Administration officials expressed dissatisfaction with the overall effectiveness of some
previously implemented reforms, as well as the pace of reform efforts. Nevertheless, the
Administration did not support mandatory withholding of U.S. payments to the United Nations.
Reform Perspectives and Priorities
A significant challenge for advocates of U.N. reform is finding common ground among the
disparate definitions of reform held by various stakeholders. There is no common definition of
U.N. reform and, as a result, there is often debate over the scope, appropriateness, and
effectiveness of past and current reform initiatives. One method for determining how a
stakeholder defines U.N. reform may be to identify policy priorities in the U.N. reform debate. In
some cases, common objectives among stakeholders have translated into substantive reform
policy, though shared goals do not always guarantee successful outcomes.
The Secretary-General
On December 14, 2006, Ban Ki-moon of South Korea took the oath of office to succeed outgoing
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. He was appointed to a second five-year term on June 21,
2011, and since his first term has stated that U.N. reform is one of his top priorities. He maintains
that progress needs to be made in three areas: (1) improving what and how the United Nations
delivers on the ground, (2) doing more with what the United Nations has, and (3) increasing
accountability. During his tenure, Ban’s reform efforts have included restructuring the
Department of Field Support and the Department of Disarmament Affairs; establishing a “Change
Management Team”29 to address management issues and future reform efforts; and proposals to
improve staff mobility.

28 Statement of then-Ambassador Susan E. Rice to the House Foreign Affairs Committee for a hearing entitled “U.S.
Policy Toward the United Nations,” April 7, 2011.
29 Ban appointed Assistant Secretary-General Atul Khare of India to lead the Change Management Team (CMT) in
May 2011. The CMT published its recommendations in December 2011 at http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/the-change-
plan.pdf.
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The extent and effectiveness of Ban’s reform efforts remain to be seen. On the one hand, some
experts and policy makers argue that Ban is not doing enough to press member states for
comprehensive reform or to institute reforms in the Secretariat. On the other hand, some
emphasize that like previous Secretaries-General, Ban’s success in achieving reform is limited by
the responsibilities of his office. Although the Secretary-General—as the “chief administrative
officer” of the United Nations—can facilitate and advocate reform, the power to implement wide-
ranging and comprehensive change lies primarily with U.N. member states. Many of these states
are concerned that reform activities initiated by the Secretary-General may undermine their
authority. For example, the Secretary-General’s aforementioned Change Management Team,
which was supported by the United States, has faced opposition from many developing countries
due to such concerns.30
Developed and Developing Countries
Past reform debates in the U.N. General Assembly and its committees have drawn attention to
fundamental differences that exist among some member states, particularly developing countries
(represented primarily by the Group of 77),31 and developed countries (particularly the United
States, Japan, and members of the European Union). Developed countries, which account for the
majority of assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget, tend to focus on the United
Nations’ role in maintaining international peace and security and the overall efficiency of the
organization. They would like the Secretary-General to have greater flexibility and authority to
implement reforms, specifically those related to oversight and human resources. Generally, they
make significantly larger financial contributions to the U.N. system than developing countries and
therefore want to ensure that their funds are used in ways they perceive as most effective.
Conversely, developing countries, which constitute the largest U.N. voting bloc, often focus on
development-oriented policies. They generally object to reforms that would enhance the power of
the Secretary-General and decrease the power of the General Assembly and its Fifth Committee
(which addresses budget and administrative issues). In the past, some developing countries have
expressed concern that reform initiatives might drain resources from development programs.
They have also suggested that reforms proposed by the Secretary-General tend to be influenced
by countries that are the largest financial contributors to the United Nations.
Many observers are concerned that the aforementioned difference in reform philosophy has
created deadlocks in the General Assembly and significantly delayed the implementation of
management and budget reforms. Such differences were highlighted in December 2005 when a
group of U.N. member states, led primarily by developed countries such as the United States and
Japan, sought to link the U.N. budget to progress on management reforms. The countries placed a
spending cap of $950 million (about six months of U.N. spending) on the two-year, $3.6 billion
budget in hopes that the General Assembly would adopt a series of management and budget
reform measures proposed by then-Secretary-General Annan. On May 8, 2006, the General
Assembly’s Fifth Committee bypassed the traditional practice of budget-by-consensus and voted
on a resolution, supported by the G-77, which approved some reforms but delayed the

30 For an overview of member state perspectives on this issue, see U.N. Department of Public Information document
GA/11222, April 9, 2012. Also see U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Statement by Ambassador Joseph Torsella,
U.S. Representative for U.N. Management and Reform, on Action Taken on Fifth Committee Resolutions from the
First Resumed Session of the 66th GA, General Assembly,” April 9, 2012.
31 Comprised of 133 members, the Group of 77 of (G-77) is the largest intergovernmental organization of developing
countries in the United Nations.
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consideration of several others. The developed nations that imposed the budget cap were
disappointed with the outcome. They eventually lifted the budget cap in June 2006 because they
were unwilling to cause a shutdown of the United Nations.32
U.N. Reform-Related Commissions, Task Forces, and Groups
Since the United Nations was established in 1945, many commissions, panels, committees, and
task forces (hereinafter referred to collectively as “groups”) have been created to examine ways to
improve the United Nations.33 These groups are established by a variety of stakeholders,
including past secretaries-general, individual member states, groups of member states, non-
governmental organizations, academic institutions, and others. The following sections address the
findings of a cross-section of these groups—the Volcker Commission, the U.S. Institute of Peace
U.N. Reform Task Force, and then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 2005 report, In Larger
Freedom: Toward Development, Security, and Human Rights for All.

Though the circumstances and mandates for each group are different, they made similar
recommendations for improving the United Nations. Notably, each group highlighted the need for
enhanced internal oversight and Secretariat reform, including staff buyouts and enhanced
financial disclosure requirements. The groups also emphasized the need for overall streamlining
and consolidation of the U.N. system (see Appendix B for a side-by-side comparison of the
recommendations).
The Volcker Commission
In April 2004, then-Secretary-General Annan, with the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council,
appointed an independent high-level commission to inquire into corruption in the U.N.-led Iraq
Oil-for-Food Program.34 The commission, led by former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul
Volcker, concluded that the failures of the Oil-For-Food Program were evidence of a greater need
for “fundamental and wide-ranging administrative reform” in the United Nations.35 The
commission recommended establishing an Independent Oversight Board to review U.N. auditing,
accounting, and budgeting activities; creating the position of Chief Operating Officer to oversee
administrative matters such as personnel and planning practices; providing fair compensation to
third parties involved in U.N. programs (while ensuring that the compensation does not lead to
inappropriate profit); and expanding financial disclosure requirements to cover a variety of U.N.
staff, including those working on procurement.

32 On July 7, 2006, the General Assembly approved the reforms recommended by the Fifth Committee. See U.N.
document, A/RES/60/283, July 7, 2006.
33 For a discussion on the effectiveness of various U.N. reform groups, see keynote speech at University of Waterloo
made by Edward C. Luck, Director of the Center on International Organization at Columbia University, “U.N. Reform
Commissions: Is Anyone Listening?” May 16, 2002.
34 U.N. document, A/RES/1538, April 21, 2004. The Committee was chaired by Paul Volcker and included Professor
Mark Peith of Switzerland, an expert on money laundering from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD); and Justice Richard Goldstone of South Africa, a former prosecutor with the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Commission’s final report was released on October 27,
2005.
35 “Briefing by Paul A. Volcker Chairman of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the U.N. Oil-For-Food Program
for the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate,” Washington, DC, October 31, 2005.
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U.S. Institute of Peace U.N. Reform Task Force
In December 2004, Congress directed the U.S. Institute of Peace to create a bipartisan task force
to examine ways to improve the United Nations so that it is better equipped to meet modern-day
security and human rights challenges.36 Congress appropriated $1.5 million to the task force and
required that it submit a report on its findings to the House Committee on Appropriations.37 The
task force identified improving internal oversight as its single most important reform
recommendation. It supported the creation of an independent oversight board to direct the budget
and activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). It also recommended several
management reforms, including establishing the position of Chief Operating Officer, creating a
U.N. Ethics Office, and enhancing whistle-blower protection. It supported broadening the U.N.
staff financial disclosure policy, and recommended the review of all U.N. mandates five years or
older, as well as the incorporation of sunset clauses into all new mandates. The task force
supported incorporating results-based budgeting into the U.N. system, and a one-time buyout for
all unwanted or unneeded staff. It recommended the creation of a new U.N. Human Rights
Council to replace the discredited Commission on Human Rights, but was unable to come to
consensus on Security Council reform.
Secretary-General Annan’s Report, In Larger Freedom
On March 21, 2005, then-Secretary-General Annan released his report, In Larger Freedom, in
response to the findings of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.38 The report
was presented to member states as a starting point for discussion at the 2005 U.N. World Summit,
and included the following management reform recommendations:
• the review of all U.N. mandates over five years old;
• a one-time staff-buyout to ensure U.N. Secretariat staff meets current needs;
• the establishment of a cabinet-style decision-making body in the Secretariat to
improve management and policy activities;
• the review of all budget and human resource operations; and

36 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-447, December 8, 2004). In the report accompanying the act,
conferees stated that they were “deeply troubled by the inaction of the United Nations on many fronts, especially in
regard to the genocide in Darfur, Sudan and the allegations of corruption regarding the United Nations Oil-For-Food
Program.” Conferees directed that the task force should include experts from the American Enterprise Institute,
Brookings Institution, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Hoover Institution,
and the Heritage Foundation.
37 The Task Force was co-chaired by former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader
George Mitchell, and released its first report, American Interests and U.N. Reform in June 2005. Following the 2005
U.N. World Summit in New York, the Task Force released an updated report entitled, The Imperative for Action, in
December 2005.
38 The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document called on the Secretary-General to improve U.N. system-wide
coherence and coordination by “strengthening linkages” between the U.N. system’s normative work and its operational
activities. Accordingly, in February 2006, the Secretary-General announced the creation of a High-Level Panel on
System-wide Coherence to examine how the U.N. system can work more effectively, especially in the areas of
development, humanitarian assistance, and the environment. The panel’s final report emphasized the overall value and
progress of the United Nations, but also noted that without substantial reforms the United Nations will be “unable to
deliver on its promises and maintain its legitimate position at the heart of the multilateral system.”
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• a comprehensive review of Office of Internal Oversight Services to examine
ways to enhance its authority and effectiveness.
In addition, Secretary-General Annan proposed a broad range of institutional and programmatic
reforms, including modifying the composition of the U.N. Security Council so that it more
adequately reflects current political realities, and replacing the Commission on Human Rights
with a new Human Rights Council. Annan also recommended streamlining the General Assembly
agenda and committee structure so that the Assembly can increase the speed of its decision-
making and react more swiftly and efficiently to events as they occur.
Mechanics of Implementing Reform
Previous and current U.N. reform initiatives encompass an array of organizational issues that may
require different processes for implementation. These reforms might be achieved by amending the
U.N. Charter or through various non-Charter reforms. Charter amendment is a rarely used
practice and has only occurred on three occasions. Non-Charter reforms are more common and
comparatively easier to achieve.
Amending the U.N. Charter
Articles 108 and 109 of the U.N. Charter provide for potential changes to the document. Article
108 states that a proposed Charter amendment must be approved by two-thirds of the full General
Assembly, and be ratified “according to the constitutional processes” of two-thirds of U.N.
member states, including all permanent members of the Security Council.39 The Charter was first
amended in 1963 to increase U.N. Security Council membership from 11 to 15 members, and to
increase the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) membership from 18 to 27. It was last
amended in 1973, when ECOSOC membership increased from 27 to 54.40 Examples of possible
reform initiatives that might involve amending the U.N. Charter include, but are not limited to,
increasing permanent and/or non-permanent Security Council membership; increasing
membership on ECOSOC; and adding or removing a principal organ.41
Article 109 of the Charter allows for a convening of a General Conference of U.N. members with
the purpose of “reviewing the present Charter.” The date and place of the conference would be
determined by a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly, and an affirmative vote from any nine
Security Council members. Potential revisions to the Charter would be adopted at the conference
by a two-thirds vote (with each country having one vote), and take effect when ratified by the

39 Article 108 of the U.N. Charter states, “Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of
the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and
ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the members of the United Nations,
including all the permanent members of the Security Council.”
40 Simma, Bruno, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. Second Edition, Vol. II. New York, Oxford
University Press, 2002, p. 1367-1357.
41 Principal organs of the United Nations include the Trusteeship Council (TC); Security Council; General Assembly;
Economic and Social Council; International Court of Justice; and the Secretariat. There is an ongoing effort to abolish
the TC, a system that was designed to administer and supervise U.N. trust territories. The TC suspended its operations
on November 1, 1994, with the independence of its last trust territory, Palau.
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governments of two-thirds of U.N. member states. A Charter review conference has never been
held.
Non-Charter Reform Process
Since 1945, the General Assembly has authorized reforms of its own processes and procedures—
as well as those of the Secretariat—without Charter amendment. The General Assembly has
established various fora for discussing reform issues, including a Committee on the Charter of the
United Nations42 and a Working Group on the Security Council.43 The General Assembly has also
implemented reforms on its own by adopting proposals introduced by member states or the
Secretary-General.44 The Secretary-General may also institute reform in his capacity as chief
administrative officer, as well as make administrative decisions regarding the organization of
some U.N. departments. Secretary-General Ban, for example, restructured the Departments of
Field Support and Disarmament Affairs and established a Change Management Team to consider
possible future reform efforts. Other non-Charter reforms have included the establishment of
consensus-based budgeting in 1986; the creation of an Office of Strategic Planning in the
Secretariat authorized by Secretary-General Annan in 1997; and the establishment of a
Peacebuilding Commission by the Security Council and General Assembly in 2006.45
Looking Ahead: Possible Challenges to Reform
Achieving meaningful and comprehensive U.N. reform is a significant and ongoing challenge for
U.N. member states. The 113th Congress may wish to take possible reform obstacles into account
when considering legislation that exercises oversight or supports a reform agenda.
National Self-Interest and Differing Reform Perspectives
Each U.N. member state has its own political agenda and foreign policy goals, and may also have
its own definition of U.N. reform. As a result, member states often hold differing views on when
reform is necessary, how best to implement reform, and how to measure the success or failure of
a given reform initiative. In some cases, failure to reach consensus can lead to significant delay,
or failure, of certain reform initiatives. Some member states package their policy priorities as
U.N. reform to further their own policy goals. This can cause distrust among member states as

42 The “Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the
Organization,” was established in 1974 to consider “any specific proposals that Governments might make with a view
to enhancing the ability of the U.N. to achieve its purposes,” as well as “suggestions for the more effective functioning
of the U.N. that might not require amendments to the Charter.” The Committee also makes recommendations for
possible Charter amendments. Most recently, in 1995 it proposed an amendment to delete “enemy state” clauses in the
Charter.
43 The “Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security
Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council,” was established in 1993.
44 For example, in March 2006 the Assembly negotiated and approved a resolution replacing the previous U.N.
Commission on Human Rights with a new Human Rights Council.
45 An example of a possible non-Charter reform could be the redistribution of regional seats on the Security Council or
ECOSOC. For further discussion on possible non-Charter reforms, see article by Louis B. Sohn, “Important
Improvements in the Functioning of the Principal Organs of the United Nations that Can be Made Without Charter
Revision,” American Journal of International Law, October 1997.
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countries question whether reform proposals by other member states are based on self-interest or
a genuine desire to improve the U.N. system.
Competing Priorities
Some observers cite the inability of U.N. member states or secretaries-general to effectively
prioritize reform initiatives as an obstacle to U.N. reform. When Secretary-General Annan
presented reform proposals in 2005, for example, he requested that they be adopted by the
General Assembly not in increments, but as a package of reforms.46 Instead of considering a large
series of reform proposals, some observers argue that member states should select only a few
reform priorities and work toward their adoption and implementation. Others contend that the
most efficient way to achieve reform may be for member states first to adopt reform initiatives
they can agree to and then gradually work toward tackling the more divisive and complicated
reform issues.
Organizational Structure and Bureaucracy
The United Nations is a highly complex and decentralized organization, and therefore may be
slow to consider or implement potential reforms. Some argue that there is a “culture of inaction”47
in the United Nations, and that U.N. managers and staff are resistant to the implementation of
new programs, changes to existing programs, and modifications to staffing and personnel
policies. Many contend that prospective and agreed-to reforms lack clear plans for
implementation, including deadlines and cost estimates. They stress that this overall lack of
planning may affect the progress and ultimate success of reforms already implemented, as well as
those reforms currently being considered by the General Assembly. Some also emphasize that
without proper implementation plans and follow-up, U.N. member states may be unable to
adequately gauge the overall effectiveness of reforms.
Limited Resources
Many observers note that a significant challenge for U.N. reform efforts may be the effective
implementation of reforms within the current U.N. budget. Some reform initiatives are
established by member states to operate “within existing resources.” Many argue that the existing
U.N. budget limits may not be able to support all of the reform initiatives currently being
considered. Some member states, including the United States, however, contend that money saved
from other reforms could create a funding source for further reforms and/or the creation of new
U.N. programs or bodies.
External Influences
The complex relationships that exist among member states outside of the U.N. system may be
another challenge affecting U.N. reform efforts. These relationships are entirely independent of
the United Nations but can affect how countries work together within the U.N. framework to

46 “The Secretary-General’s Statement to the General Assembly,” New York, March 21, 2005.
47 “Annan’s ‘Culture of Inaction.’” The Chicago Tribune, December 12, 2006.
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achieve reform objectives. Military conflict, religious and ethnic differences, political conflict,
trade and economic issues, and geography can all potentially impact reform priorities and
cooperation among U.N. member states.
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Appendix A. Previous Reform Legislation
When considering U.N. reform issues, Congress may wish to explore the nature and effectiveness
of past legislative approaches and the extent to which they may have influenced the adoption of
reform measures at the United Nations. There is some evidence that legislation such as the
Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment and the Helms-Biden Agreement may have led, either directly
or indirectly, to substantive changes in U.N. policies. The following sections highlight selected
reform legislation from 1986 to the present and note any subsequent changes to internal U.N.
policy.
Kassebaum-Solomon Amendment (1986-1987)48
In the mid-1980s, some Members of Congress expressed concern that U.S. influence over the
U.N. budget was not proportionate to its rate of assessment. In 1986 Congress passed legislation,
popularly known as the “Kassebaum-Solomon amendment,” which required that the U.S.
assessed contribution to the U.N. regular budget be reduced to 20% unless the United Nations
gave major U.N. financial contributors a greater say in the budget process.49 Subsequently, in
1986 the General Assembly adopted a new budget and planning process that incorporated
consensus-based budgeting as a decision-making mechanism, thus giving member states with
higher assessment levels a potentially greater voice in the budget process.
U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services (1993)
In the early 1990s, some Members of Congress and the Administration were concerned with the
apparent lack of oversight and accountability within the U.N. system. In 1993, as part of the
FY1994 State Department Appropriations Act, Congress directed that 10% of U.S. assessed
contributions to the U.N. regular budget be withheld until the Secretary of State certified to
Congress that “the United Nations has established an independent office with responsibilities and
powers substantially similar to offices of Inspectors General Act of 1978.”50 On July 29, 1994, the
U.N. General Assembly established the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) which
reports directly to the Secretary-General and provides “internal auditing, investigation,
inspection, programme monitoring, evaluation and consulting services to all U.N. activities under
the Secretary-General’s authority.”51
Helms-Biden Agreement (1999)
In the late 1990s, Congress and the Administration negotiated and agreed to legislation that would
further U.S. reform policy at the United Nations. The Helms-Biden bill authorized payment of
some U.S. arrears if specific reform benchmarks were met and certified to Congress by the

48 For a more detailed account of the Kassebaum-Solomon Provisions, see CRS Report RL33611, United Nations
System Funding: Congressional Issues
, by Marjorie Ann Browne.
49 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY1986 and 1987 (H.R. 2068, P.L. 99-93), Section 143, August 16, 1985.
50 U.S. Department of State Appropriations Act, 1994 (H.R. 2519, P.L. 103-121), October 27, 1993.
51 More information on OIOS is available at http://www.un.org/depts/oios/. See U.N. document, A/RES/48/218 B,
August 12, 1994, for a detailed description of its mandate.
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Secretary of State.52 Under the terms of Helms-Biden, the United States agreed to (1) pay $819
million in arrearages over fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000; and (2) forgive $107 million owed
to the United States by the United Nations in peacekeeping costs if the United Nations applied the
$107 million to U.S. peacekeeping arrears. For arrearage payments to occur, Congress required
that the U.S. assessment for contributions to the U.N. regular budget be reduced from 25% to
22% and that the peacekeeping contribution be reduced from 30% to 25%.53 In December 2000,
the U.N. General Assembly reduced the regular budget assessment level to from 25% to 22%, and
the Peacekeeping share from approximately 30.4% to 28%. In subsequent years, the U.S.
peacekeeping assessment continued to fall and is now close to 26.5%.

52 The Helms-Biden Agreement was incorporated into the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000 (H.R. 3194,
P.L. 106-113), November 19, 1999.
53 See archived CRS Report RL33700, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne,
for further information.
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Appendix B. Key U.N. Reform Recommendations
and Proposals by Independent and U.N. Affiliated
Groups

Report of the Task Force on

In Larger Freedom:

Report of the Independent
the United Nations
Towards Development,
Inquiry Committee into the
(June 2004,
Security and Human Rights
United Nations Oil-for-Food
December 2005)
for All
Program
(March 2005)
(October 2005)
Improved management reform,
Secretariat reform, including:
Strengthen U.N. management
including:
practices, including:
Establish an Independent
Review of the Office of Internal
Establish an Independent Oversight
Oversight Board to function as an
Oversight Services and general
Board with responsibility over
independent audit committee;
strengthening of internal
internal and external audits and
oversight;
investigations;
Establish the role of Chief
Creation of a cabinet-style
Create the position of Chief
Operating Officer (COO);
decision-making mechanism;
Operating Officer (COO);
Establish policies for improved
Authority/resources
for
Expand financial disclosure
financial disclosure standards,
Secretary-General to realign
requirements for U.N. staff,
whistle-blower protection; and
and/or buy-out Secretariat staff;
including the Secretary-General,
and full review of budget and
Deputy-Secretary-General, and
human resources operations; and
those involved in procurement
and/or disbursement;
Review of all U.N. mandates and
Review of all U.N. mandates five
Improve coordination and
sunset clauses for new mandates.
years or older.
framework for cross-agency U.N.
programs; and
Reorganization of the General
Streamlining the General
Ensure third party agencies involved
Assembly;
Assembly to speed-up decision-
in U.N. programs are entitled to fair
making processes;
compensation.
Replace the Commission on
Replace the discredited

Human Rights with a new Human
Commission on Human Rights
Rights Council;
with a new Human Rights
Council;
Identification of U.N. programs
Modify composition of the

that could be more effective if
Security Council to reflect
funded by voluntary contributions;
current political realities; and
and
Improving the Department of
Reform ECOSOC so it may

Peacekeeping Operations so that
better coordinate the U.N.
it becomes “a more independent
development agenda and guide
program” with its own rules and
other economic and social
regulations to address its unique
agencies in the United Nations.
mission.

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Appendix C. Organizational Chart of the U.N. System

Source: United Nations.
CRS-20

United Nations Reform: Background and Issues for Congress


Author Contact Information

Luisa Blanchfield

Specialist in International Relations
lblanchfield@crs.loc.gov, 7-0856


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