Marine Corps Drawdown, Force Structure
Initiatives, and Roles and Missions:
Background and Issues for Congress

Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
January 9, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43355


Marine Corps Drawdown, Force Structure Initiatives, and Roles and Missions

Summary
The Marine Corps characterizes itself as a crisis response expeditionary force which is task
organized and able to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of military operations. The
Corps is a “middleweight force” that is designed to fill the void in our Nation’s defense structure
between light Special Operations Forces (SOF) and heavier conventional units. The Marines’
missions are codified in U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 5063, United States Marine Corps:
Composition and Functions, and marines are the nation’s primary amphibious force, capable of
conducting amphibious assault operations in both permissive and non-permissive environments.
Marine operational forces are organized for specific tasks and consist of four elements; a
command element; a ground combat element; an aviation element; and a logistics combat
element. There are four types of Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs): the Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF); the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB); the Marine Expeditionary
Unit (MEU); and the Special Purpose MAGTF.
A number of decisions pertaining to national security strategy, force structure, and declining
defense budgets have resulted in a drawdown of the active Marine Corps from 202,000 in 2011 to
174,000 by 2017. Some believe that if sequestration continues, the Marines could be compelled to
draw down to a force of 150,000 Marines—a strength level Marine Corps leadership has
characterized as unviable to execute our current defense strategy.
The Marines have instituted a number of force shaping programs to reach the 174,000
endstrength. They believe this force level can be achieved through natural attrition as well as
voluntary separation programs where Marines who leave the service early can receive financial
compensation. Officials caution that if the Marines are required to drawdown to 150,000,
involuntary separation programs might need to be enacted.
The Marines have instituted a number of force structure initiatives including creating Special
Purpose MAGTFs - Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) to respond to a variety of regional crises,
including attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel. In the wake of the September 11,
2012, Benghazi attack, Congress authorized 1,000 additional Marine security guards beginning
FY 2014. In response, the Marines are in the process of expanding their Marine Corps Embassy
Security Group. The Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is also regionally-
aligning its operational units and taking steps to begin deploying small MARSOC teams with
MEUs.
A sampling of academic discussions focusing on the Marine Corps of the future suggests the
Marines and Special Operations Forces (SOF) could be given the lead responsibility for
worldwide ground engagement. Another proposal suggests that Marines should operate in small,
decentralized units and that the Marines’ focus could shift to company and battalion-sized units,
the so-called “sweet spot” for joint ground forces. Others contend that more Marine major war
fighting units, such as armor, be moved into the Marine Corps Reserves and that Marine Aviation
should be reorganized.
A potential issue for Congress includes should the Marines be given the leading role in the Pacific
and should their primary focus be crisis response? Other possible issues for examination include
how much amphibious assault capability does the Marine Corps need; should MEUs be
reorganized; and should more of the Marines’ major warfighting capability be placed in the
Reserves?
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Marine Corps Drawdown, Force Structure Initiatives, and Roles and Missions

Contents
Importance to Congress ................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Marine Corps Roles and Missions ............................................................................................. 1
Marine Corps Reserve ............................................................................................................... 2
How the Marines Organize their Operational Forces ................................................................ 3
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) .......................................................................... 3
Types of MAGTFs .............................................................................................................. 3
Decisions Impacting Marine Corps Size and Force Structure ................................................... 5
January 6, 2011, News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen ......................................................................... 5
March 14, 2011 Report of the 2010 Marine Corps Force Structure Review Group ............ 5
January 26, 2012, Administration Major Budget Decision Briefing ................................... 6
2013 Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) ............................................... 7
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) ......................................................................... 7
Current Marine Force Posture ................................................................................................... 8
Current Planned Drawdown Levels ........................................................................................... 8
Force Reduction and Shaping Programs .......................................................................................... 9
Force Structure Initiatives .............................................................................................................. 10
Special Purpose MAGTFs - Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) ............................................. 10
Expansion of Marine Security Guard Program ....................................................................... 10
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) Regional Assignments and
Potential Return to Sea ......................................................................................................... 11
Selected External Perspectives: Marine Corps Roles, Missions, and Force Structure .................. 11
The Marines and Special Operations Forces (SOF) Responsible for Worldwide
Ground Engagement ............................................................................................................. 12
Restructuring the Operational Force ........................................................................................ 12
Distributed and Decentralized Forces ............................................................................... 12
Focus on Company and Battalion-Sized Forces ................................................................ 13
Marine Aviation ................................................................................................................. 13
Move Selected Capabilities into the Reserves .................................................................. 14
Potential Issues for Congress ......................................................................................................... 14
Marine Corps Roles and Missions ........................................................................................... 14
Should the Marines be Given the Leading Role in the Pacific? ........................................ 14
Should the Marines’ Focus be Primarily Crisis Response? ............................................... 15
How Much Amphibious Assault Capability Does the Marine Corps Need? ..................... 16
Marine Corps Force Structure ................................................................................................. 17
Marine Forces Afloat ......................................................................................................... 17
Emphasis on Battalion and Company-Sized Units ............................................................ 17
Should More of the Marines’ Major Warfighting Capability be Placed in the
Reserves? ....................................................................................................................... 18

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 18

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Importance to Congress
The Administration’s proposal to reduce the size of the Marine Corps has national security
implications that Congress may consider as part of its oversight and authorizations and
appropriations roles. In terms of size of the force, Congress sets the endstrength1 for both the
active Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Reserve. Congress also authorizes and appropriates
funds needed for Marine force structure initiatives, training exercises, equipment, basing, and
infrastructure, as well as the various manpower management tools which could be used to
drawdown the force. Administration decisions about the recommended size and basing of the
Marine Corps can have a significant impact on Marine bases in a Member’s district or state,
which can also have economic ramifications for communities near affected bases. The
Administration’s downsizing and force structure proposals also can have a significant impact on
local and state defense-related industries. Lastly, Marines and their families who might be
affected by the Administration’s decisions constitute a unique element of Members’
constituencies.
Background
Marine Corps Roles and Missions
According to the Marine Corps:
The Marine Corps is a crisis response expeditionary force which is task organized and able
to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of military operations. Fundamentally, the
Corps is a “middleweight force” that fills the void in our Nation’s defense structure between
light Special Operations Forces (SOF) and heavier conventional units. The Corps provides
scalable and adaptive forces that complement the lighter and heavier forces.2
The Marines serve in a variety of capacities but are perhaps best known as America’s amphibious
force, with various Marine units embarked on U.S. Navy ships that patrol oceans, littorals, and
maritime choke points. The Marines’ missions are codified in U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 5063,
United States Marine Corps: Composition and Functions, dated January 3, 2012, which states:
The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of
combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the
seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as
may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall
provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall
provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases,
and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional

1 Endstrength is the number of military personnel needed to accomplish a service’s statutory mission. It is also the
number of personnel that a service is authorized to have by the end of a fiscal year. For additional information on
endstrength see CRS Report R43184, FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues,
coordinated by Don J. Jansen.
2 U.S. Marine Corps Concepts & Programs 2013, America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness, 2013, p. 11.
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duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is
primarily organized.
(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those
phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by
landing forces.3
The Marines two fundamental core missions are assuring littoral access and conducting highly
complex and difficult crisis response operations.4 In addition to these missions, the Marine Corps
has also provided security for overseas U.S. diplomatic missions since 1799 and the Marine
Corps Embassy Security Group (MCESG) is responsible for the internal security of these
facilities worldwide.5 In addition to the aforementioned missions, the Marines also have nuclear,
chemical, biological incident response responsibilities, conduct security cooperation activities,
and are responsible for presidential security and transportation missions.
Marine Corps Reserve
The Marine Corps Reserve was established in 1916 and provides trained units and individual
Marines that can be mobilized for active duty in time of war, national emergency or contingency
operations. The endstrength of the Marine Corps Reserves was at 39,600 Marines at the end of
September 2013.6 The 4th Marine Division headquartered in New Orleans, LA is the Marine
Corps Reserve division and consists of Marine infantry regiments, an aircraft wing, a logistics
group, tank units, force reconnaissance, units, and civil affairs units to name but a few of the
organizations resident in the Marine Corps Reserve. The Marine Corps Reserve saw active
service in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and
continues to participate in operations world-wide.
Size of Selected Marine Corps Units7
Marine Infantry Squad: 13
Marine Infantry Platoon: 43
Marine Infantry Company: 182
Marine Infantry Battalion: 963 personnel
Marine Infantry Regiment: 3,129 personnel
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU): Approximately 2,200 personnel
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB): 14,000 – 17,000 personnel
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF): 40,000 – 80,000 personnel


3 U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 5063, United States Marine Corps: Composition and Functions, January 3, 2012, p. 1962.
4 Marine Corps Operating Concepts, Third Edition, June 2010, p. 9.
5 U.S. Marine Corps Concepts & Programs 2011, America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness, 2011, p. 54.
6 James K. Sanborn, “Restructuring of Active Force Likely Means Big Changes for the Reserves,” Marine Corps
Times,
September 30, 2013.
7 Information is from Marine Corps Operating Concepts, Third Edition, June 2010 and Marine Legislative Liaison
Office. Note these numbers include attached Navy personnel: (corpsmen, religious personnel, etc.)
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How the Marines Organize their Operational Forces8
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
The MAGTF is the Marine Corps primary organizational construct for conducting military
operations. They range in size from a few hundred to many thousands of Marines and can be
embarked on amphibious ships but can also be deployed by other means. They are organized for
specific tasks and are comprised of four deployable elements:
• The Command Element (CE) which contains the MAGTF headquarters as well
as operations, intelligence, logistics, communications, and administrative
support.
• The Ground Combat Element (GCE) which includes infantry, artillery,
reconnaissance, armor, light armor, assault amphibian, engineer, and other forces
as needed. In the case of non-combat missions, other types of Marine units can be
substituted for combat units.
• The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is comprised of a variety of aircraft and
support units needed to support MAGTF operations. Types of support include
assault support, anti-air warfare, offensive air support, electronic warfare, control
of aircraft and missiles, and reconnaissance. The ACE is also capable of
providing support for humanitarian relief and disaster relief operations.
• The Logistics Combat Element (LCE) is organized to provide a full range of
combat logistics functions and capabilities needed to sustain the MAGTF.
Types of MAGTFs
There are four types of MAGTFs: the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF); the Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB); the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU); and the Special Purpose
MAGTF.
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
The MEF is the principal warfighting organization for large crises or contingencies. During the
2003 invasion of Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) the 1st MEF was the major Marine Corps unit
deployed as part of the U.S. invasion force. The MEF is normally commanded by a lieutenant
general, consists of approximately 40,000 to 80,000 personnel, and can range in size from one
division and an air wing to multiple divisions and air wings supported by one or more logistics
groups. The Marine Corps is organized with three standing MEFs in both peacetime and wartime,
with each comprised of a Marine division, aircraft wing, and logistics group. The 1st MEF is
located at bases in California and Arizona; the 2nd MEF at bases in North Carolina and South
Carolina; and the 3rd MEF at bases in Okinawa, mainland Japan, and Hawaii with future plans for

8 Information in this section is taken from U.S. Marine Corps Concepts & Programs 2013, America’s Expeditionary
Force in Readiness, 2013, pp. 12-15.
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bases in Guam and Australia.9 As previously noted, the Marine Corps Reserve 4th MEF is
headquartered out of New Orleans, LA.
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)
The MEB is a mid-sized MAGTF which consists of from 14,000 to 17,000 personnel and is
normally commanded by a brigadier general. The MEB is scalable and can respond to a full range
of contingencies. The MEB, when at sea, is normally embarked on 17 amphibious ships and
carries with it 30 days of supplies, meaning it can operate ashore for 30 days before it requires
resupply. The MEB is normally comprised of a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine
Aircraft Group, and a Combat Logistics Regiment. MEBs do not have permanently assigned units
but instead maintain a habitual relationship with subordinate units through planning and
exercises.
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
MEUs are embarked on Amphibious Readiness Groups (ARG)10 and operate on a continuous
basis in the areas of responsibility of certain Geographic Combatant Commanders. A MEU is
commanded by a Colonel, can include up to about 2,200 Marines, and deploys with 15 days of
accompanying supplies. Before a MEU deploys, it undergoes an intensive six month training
program and the MEU is then evaluated and certified for deployment. The types of operations
that a MEU is trained and equip to conduct include:
• Amphibious assault landing;
• Amphibious raid;11
• Small boat raid (in selected MEUs only);
• Maritime interception operations;
• Advance force operations;
• Noncombatant evacuation operations;
• Humanitarian assistance;
• Stability operations;
• Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel;
• Joint and combined operations;
• Aviation operations from expeditionary sites;
• Theater security cooperation activities; and
• Airfield and port seizures.

9 For information on U.S. naval vessels associated with embarked Marine forces see Appendix A of CRS Report
RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
10 For information on ARGs see, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=148, accessed November 7, 2013.
11 Raids are small, short duration combat operations against specific targets.
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Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF)
A SPMAGTF is organized to accomplish a specific mission, operation, or regionally-focused
activity. They can be organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a variety of operations ranging
from peacetime missions, training exercises, and responses to contingencies and crises. Because
of unique mission requirements, there is no set size or structure associated with SPMAGTFs.
Decisions Impacting Marine Corps Size and Force Structure
January 6, 2011, News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen12

On January 6, 2011, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and then Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen held a news briefing “announcing a number of decisions
and measures that mark the next major step in this department’s reform agenda.” These decisions
and measures, largely taken in response to fiscal pressures, involved a variety of cross-service
actions, including consolidating and eliminating headquarters and organizations, modifying or
eliminating weapon systems programs, and force reductions. During this briefing, it was
announced the Marines would drawdown between 15,000 and 20,000 Marines - depending on the
recommendations of a Marine Force Structure Review Group - with a goal of eventually reducing
the Marine Corps to 175,000.
March 14, 2011, Report of the 2010 Marine Corps Force Structure Review
Group13

In March 2011, the Marines released the results of a force structure review focused on the post-
Afghanistan Marine Corps, which was intended to preserve capabilities developed since
September 11, 2001; expand on engagement efforts; respond to crisis; and still be capable of
projecting power to respond to the most dangerous threats to the nation. In order to achieve this
desired end state, the Marines stated they would accept a degree of risk by reducing the active
component capacity “for conducting multiple, major sustained operations ashore, relying on an
operationalized reserve component to mitigate the risk.”14 Key recommendations from the review
included:
• Reduce the endstrength of the active component from 202,000 to approximately
186,800 following the completion of Marine operations in Afghanistan;
• Resource five regionally-focused MEB command elements, with habitually
aligned subordinate elements in order to improve effectiveness and
responsiveness;
• Reduce infantry battalions from 27 to 24;

12 Information from this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, “DOD News Briefing with
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen from the Pentagon,” January 6, 2011.
13 Information in this section is taken from “Reshaping America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness,” Report of the
2010 Marine Corps Force Structure Review Group, March 14, 2011.
14 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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• Reduce artillery battalions from 11 to 9;
• Reduce flying squadrons from 70 to 61;
• Reorganize Marine logistics groups; and
• Increase Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC)15 by more than
1,000 Marines.
January 26, 2012, Administration Major Budget Decision Briefing16
On January 26, 2012, senior DOD leaders unveiled a new defense strategy, based on a review of
the defense strategy at the time and budgetary constraints. This new strategy envisioned:
• A smaller, leaner military that is agile, flexible, rapidly deployable, and
technologically advanced;
• Rebalancing global posture and presence, emphasizing where potential problems
are likely to arise, such as the Asia-Pacific region17 and the Middle East;
• Maintaining presence elsewhere in the world (Europe, Africa, and Latin
America), using innovative partnerships, strengthening key alliances, and
developing new partnerships;
• Being able to quickly confront and defeat aggression from any adversary
anytime, anyplace; and
• Protecting and prioritizing key investments in technology and new capabilities as
well as the capacity to grow, adapt, mobilize, and surge when needed.
During this briefing, a number of decisions related to the Marine Corps were announced,
including:
• The Marines would be a middleweight expeditionary force with reinvigorated
amphibious capabilities;
• The Active Marine Corps would decrease from 202,000 Marines to 182,000 over
five years (2017);
• There would be no decrease in the size of the Marine Corps Reserve;
• This new strategy envisioned a Navy and Marine Corps that was postured
forward; and

15 For additional information on Marine Special Operations Command see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special
Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress
, by Andrew Feickert.
16 Information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Major Budget Decisions
Briefing from the Pentagon,” presented by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Martin E. Dempsey, January 26, 2012; U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, “Major Budget
Decisions Briefing from the Pentagon,” presented by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter and Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., January 26, 2012; and U.S. Department of
Defense Publication, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012.
17 For additional information on the Pacific strategy see CRS Report R42448, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama
Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia
, coordinated by Mark E. Manyin.
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• The Marines would sustain their level of presence in the Pacific and enhance
their presence by partnering with Australia and others, such as the Philippines.
2013 Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR)18
In April 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that DOD would conduct a Strategic
Choices and Management Review (SCMR) to help insure that the Defense Department would be
prepared to face what he called “unprecedented budget uncertainty.”19 The three stated specific
objectives of the SCMR were to:
• Help DOD prepare for how to deal with sequestration if it continues into FY
2014;
• Inform the fiscal guidance given to the Services for their FY 2015 through FY
2019 budget plans; and
• Anchor the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which plans to assess
our defense strategy in light of new fiscal realities and the many threats and
complexities and uncertainties of this new century.
In a July 31, 2013, statement, Secretary Hagel, commenting on the results of the SCMR,
described two strategic approaches to reducing force structure and modernization that
would be used to inform planning for sequester-level cuts. These approaches would trade
off capacity—measured in Army brigades, Navy ships, Air Force squadrons, and Marine
battalions—and capability, i.e., the ability to modernize weapon systems and maintain the
military’s technological edge. In the approach that would trade away size for high-end
capacity, Secretary Hagel suggested that the Marines would draw down from 182,000 to
between 150,000 and 175,000 active Marines.
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)20
The Quadrennial Defense Review or QDR, “a congressionally mandated21 review of national
defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plans, and other
elements of defense strategy,” is presently underway and is due to Congress in February 2014.
The 2014 QDR will likely have very specific guidance as to Marine Corps force size and
organization, among other things, and results from the 2013 SCMR will likely heavily influence
decisions coming from the 2014 QDR. Congress is also required to conduct an independent

18 Information in this section is taken from U.S. Department of Defense, “Statement on Strategic Choices and
Management Review,” July 31, 2013.
19 Ibid.
20 Information in this section is taken from Donna Miles, “Senate Appoints Four Members to the QDR Panel,”
American Forces Press Service, March 6, 2013.
21 The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1997 established the requirement for a QDR in
1997. “The Secretary of Defense shall every four years, …conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a
“quadrennial defense review”) of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans,
infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view
toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the
next 20 years. Each such [QDR] shall be conducted in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”
USC 10, §118(a). http://www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR_101_FACT_SHEET_January_2010.pdf, accessed November 12,
2103.
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review of the QDR’s force structure and resource requirements and submit an assessment to the
congressional defense committees no later than May 2014.
Current Marine Force Posture22
As of the end of October 2013, the Marines had approximately 22,200 Marines deployed with
about 14,000 on operations and about 6,700 Marines afloat in support of operations. Marines are
also supporting the various combatant commands (less U.S. Special Operations Command) as
follows (all force levels approximate):
• U.S. Northern Command: 50
• U.S. European Command: 2,700
• Afghanistan: 8,000
• Other U.S. Central Command: 3,650
• U.S. Southern Command: 100
• U.S. Africa Command: 1,100
• U.S. Pacific Command: 6,600
The Marines also have three MEUs embarked—the 26th MEU in the U.S. European
Command region; the 13th MEU in the U.S. Central Command Region; and the 31st MEU
in the U.S. Pacific Command region.
Current Planned Drawdown Levels
In a November 7, 2013, Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) hearing on the effects of
sequestration, Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Amos testified:
The President’s National Security Strategy is optimized with a Marine Corps of 186.8K. The
BCA [Budget Control Act of 2011, P.L. 112-25] forced us to 182.1K. Our examination
determined that an end strength of 174K was the best we could do in addressing the
operational requirements of steady state deployments, crisis response activities, and potential
major combat operations, while preserving institutional health and readiness. As we actively
participate in the QDR, this is the force that the Marine Corps will use as the recommended
basis for our contribution to the nation’s defense. Based on extensive analysis, falling below
this force structure number will significantly increase risk in to our steady state security
posture, crisis response and major combat operations.23
The 174,000 Active Marine Corps endstrength figure cited by General Amos will be the Marines’
planning endstrength as the QDR process progresses. While the Marines did not offer specifics
about force structure reductions needed to reach the 174,000 active Marine endstrength by 2017,
reports suggest that an additional five infantry battalions would be eliminated and, at this force

22 Briefing given by LTG R.T. Tryon, Expeditionary Warfare Conference, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command,
October 30, 2013.
23 Statement of General James F. Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on Sequestration, November 7, 2013, p. 7.
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level, the Marines would only be able to respond to one major contingency.24 Also at this level,
any planned growth in the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC)25 would reportedly
be frozen and the three-star Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquarters—II MEF from
Camp Lejeune, NC—would be absorbed by Marine Forces Command in Norfolk, VA.26
As previously noted, Secretary Hagel in discussing the SCMR suggested Marines could draw
down from 182,000 to between 175,000 - 150,000 active Marines. Marine officials have
reportedly concluded that a 150,000 Marine force would be a “dangerously small force” and
“unviable” for accomplishing the Marine’s current mission.27
Force Reduction and Shaping Programs
Reportedly, Marine officials believe they can achieve this 174,000 active duty level without
having to force Marines out of service before their contracts expire.28 To date, the drawdown has
reportedly been achieved through normal attrition and early out incentives; including premature
retirements and cash buyouts which have permitted the service reduce active endstrength by
about 5,000 personnel per year.29 In order to retain key capabilities such as special operations and
cyber operations, cuts would primarily come from infantry and artillery battalions and aviation
squadrons.
Marine officials suggest, however, if force cuts are accelerated or if the Marines are required to
cut to a 150,000 active endstrength, that involuntary measures would need to be taken in addition
to voluntary programs currently being used.30 Some involuntary measures include:
• Ending a “de facto” guarantee of 20 years of service for all enlisted Marines who
reach the grade of staff sergeant;
• Convening an early retirement board for senior enlisted Marines;
• Using enlisted retention boards to cut Marines before their contracts expired;
• Ending a 20 year service promise to all Marine officers who make the grade of
major; and
• Selective Early Retirement Board for lieutenant colonels and colonels.

24 James K. Sanborn, “A Force of 174,000,” Marine Corps Times, September 30, 2013.
25 For additional information on MARSOC see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):
Background and Issues for Congress
, by Andrew Feickert.
26 Hope Hodge Seck, “What Stays, What Goes at 174,000 Marines,” Marine Corps Times, November 4, 2013.
27 Ibid.
28 James K. Sanborn, “A Force of 174, 000,” Marine Corps Times, September 30, 2013.
29 Ibid.
30 Information in this section is taken from James K. Sanborn, “Cutting to 174,000—Or Below,” Marine Corps Times,
October 28, 2013.
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Force Structure Initiatives
As the Marines drawdown, a number of force structure-related initiatives are underway or under
consideration. These initiatives are seen as a means to address both a post-Afghanistan world and
reduced force levels resulting from budgetary constraints.
Special Purpose MAGTFs - Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR)31
In the wake of the September 11, 2012, attack on the U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities in
Benghazi, Libya, DOD reportedly approved the creation of a new 550 person Marine crisis-
response force centered on a reinforced Marine rifle company, six MV-22B Ospreys and two KC-
130J Hercules tanker planes. This unit is under the control of the Commander of U.S. Africa
Command (USAFRICOM) and has elements based in Moron Airbase in Spain and Sigonella
Naval Air Station in Italy. This response force is not reliant on U.S. naval ships and is designed to
be able to fly quickly for missions such as embassy reinforcement to humanitarian assistance. In
July 2013, during a period of intense tension in Egypt, this unit was reportedly put on alert to help
secure the U.S. embassy in Cairo or to help U.S. citizens leave the country, if required.
Reports further suggest that additional SPMAGTF-CRs might be stood up for South America and
the Middle East as well. It is not known if these additional SPMAGTF-CRs be smaller than 550
personnel, where they will be stationed or when or if these units will be established. In all cases,
these SPMAGTF-CRs are not viewed as replacements for MEUs or other Marine forces but are
instead envisioned as assets that a geographic combatant commander can call upon with little or
no notice to help respond to a potential crisis or in the aftermath of an attack or humanitarian
crisis.
Expansion of Marine Security Guard Program
As a result of September 11, 2012, Benghazi attack, Congress authorized 1,000 additional Marine
security guards beginning FY 2014.32 From a CRS Report:33
A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, P.L. 112-239
[Title IV, Subtitle A, Section 404] directs the Secretary of Defense to grow the Marine
Security Guard Program in order to increase the number of detachments at U.S. embassies,
consulates, and other diplomatic facilities by up to 1,000 Marines during fiscal years 2014
through 2017, and reassess program’s focus on the protection of classified information. The
measure also requires the President to separate the Program’s budget request from that of the
Marine Corps as a whole, and it requires reexamination of the Marine units’ rules of
engagement.

31 Information in this section is taken from Dan Lamothe, “3-Star Details New Marine Crisis-Response Force,” Marine
Corps Times,
April 21, 2013; Dan Lamothe, “Crisis-Response Force Put on Alert for Egyptian Unrest,” Marine Corps
Times,
July 15, 2013; Gina Harkins, “U.S. Crisis-Response Force Coming to Central, S. America,” Marine Corps
Times,
August 29, 2013; and Dan Lamothe, “Preparing for Chaos,” Marine Corps Times, September 30, 2013.
32 Gina Harkins, “Expert: USMC Embassy Guard Boost Will be Tough,” Marine Corps Times, December 21, 2012.
33 CRS Report R42834, Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues, by
Alex Tiersky and Susan B. Epstein, May 7, 2013, p. 20.
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These additional guards are to be assigned to the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group in
Quantico, Virginia and will augment the approximately 1,200 Marine security guards currently
assigned to U.S. diplomatic facilities in over 130 countries.34 In theory, these Marines are to be
used to increase the size of the Marine Corps Security Detachments at embassies and consulates
in what the State Department deems high threat countries. Given the potential and current levels
of unrest in some countries in the USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM regions, it is likely that
additional Marines will be sent to U.S. diplomatic facilities in selected countries in Africa and the
Middle East. A report suggests that three such posts already identified for enhanced Marine
presence include Juba, South Sudan; Casablanca, Morocco; and Freetown, Sierra Leone.35
Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) Regional
Assignments and Potential Return to Sea36

The Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is a component command of the U. S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and constitutes the Marine Corps' contribution to
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). MARSOC is reportedly realigning the responsibilities of
its three operational battalions to better support geographical combatant commanders. As part of
this realignment, the 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion (MSOB) from Camp Pendleton, CA
will align to the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) region while the 2nd and 3rd MSOBs out of
Camp Lejeune, NC will align with USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM respectively. These units
are to receive appropriate language and cultural training so they will be better attuned to their
areas of operation. In another initiative designed to get special operations forces back at sea with
MEUs—a common practice prior to September 11, 2001 when Navy SEALs would deploy with
MEUs—MARSOC began training with the 11th MEU to facilitate future deployments with
Marine expeditionary forces. A timetable for when MARSOC units will be integrated with
deploying MEUs has not yet been made public and the relationship with Marine Force
Reconnaissance units (who had assumed special operations missions in the absence of the Navy
SEALs) has not yet been established.
Selected External Perspectives: Marine Corps Roles,
Missions, and Force Structure

While there has been a great deal of Marines Corps introspection as to future roles, missions, and
how the force should be structured, other institutions are also examining these very same
questions. Far from a purely academic exercise, this examination is bounded by the budgetary
constraints facing the Marine Corps and its sister services. A sample of some proposals that might
merit future discussion include:

34 Gina Harkins, “Expert: USMC Embassy Guard Boost Will be Tough,” Marine Corps Times, December 21, 2012.
35 Gina Harkins, “Marine Security Guards Stand Up New Posts in Africa,” Marine Corps Times, June 28, 2013.
36 Hope Hodge Seck, “MARSOC Battalions Get New Regional Assignments,” Marine Corps Times, September 30,
2013, and Dan Lamothe, “MARSOC Returns to Sea with the 11th MEU,” Marine Corps Times, June 9, 2013.
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The Marines and Special Operations Forces (SOF) Responsible for
Worldwide Ground Engagement37

This article in Joint Forces Quarterly, published by the National Defense University, proposes that
U.S. SOF and Marine MAGTFs should be the lead instruments for land engagement operations
with other countries. Engagement activities are viewed as both indirect and preventative in nature
and run the gamut from training other nation’s military forces, participating in military exercises,
and other activities which involve constructive interaction between U.S. and foreign military
personnel. In terms of land-oriented engagement operations, the U.S. Army is focusing a
significant level of effort in world-wide engagement activities - particularly aspiring to operations
in the Asia-Pacific region - in order to “prevent” future conflicts and, if unable to prevent a
conflict, at least “shape” its outcome.
The article’s authors argue that U.S. SOF and Marine MAGTFs should instead take the lead in
DOD engagement activities on land. They contend that SOF and the Marines “both possess
capabilities and cultures for early and successful initial ground engagement in the exceedingly
complex, unpredictable, and unstructured world that confronts the U.S. military.”38 They envision
the Marines and SOF undertaking such engagement activities designed to avoid larger and more
costly interventions. The Marines, they suggest, are optimally configured in their expeditionary
role to provide rapid response not just to engagement opportunities but to humanitarian crises,
traditional power projection operations, and forced entry operations if required.
Restructuring the Operational Force39
Distributed and Decentralized Forces
A study conducted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (2008) and an article
in the Naval War College Review (2012) propose the Marines improve their ability to operate
with smaller and more independent units in a highly distributed geographic manner. These small
teams would be designed to be highly mobile and capable of conducting low-signature
amphibious landings and could also designate targets for airstrikes as well as naval gunfire and
missile strikes. These smaller, distributed units could be ideal in dealing with pirates and small,
non-state terrorist organizations and would be well-suited for conducting raids and other short
duration operations. In a less lethal role, these units could also conduct train-and-advise
operations with friendly military forces operating in a remote field environment. These types of
units could also meet the U.S. strategic intent of conducting “light foot print” operations
whenever possible.

37 Information in this section is taken from Kevin D. Stringer and Katie M. Sizemore, “The Future of U.S. Landpower,
Special Operations Versatility, Marines Corps Utility,” Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ), Issue 69, 2nd Quarter 2013, pp.
84-90.
38 Ibid., p. 87.
39 Information in this section is taken from Robert P. Kozloski, “Marching Toward the Sweet Spot: Options for the U.S.
Marine Corps in a Time of Austerity,” Naval War College Review, 2012 and Dakota L. Wood, “The U.S. Marine
Corps: Fleet Marine Forces for the 21st Century,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington D.C.,
2008.
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Focus on Company and Battalion-Sized Forces40
Both the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments study and the Naval War College article
support and expand on the findings of the Marine’s 2010 Force Structure Review Group study41
which contends the Marines should occupy a “sweet spot” with respect to joint forces, lying
between an Army regiment [in actuality this would be an Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as
the Army does not typically organize for combat as a regiment] and a special operations team
(about a platoon-sized organization). This “sweet spot” is further defined as the company to
battalion level and the authors suggest the Marines should emphasize company and battalion level
operations and should focus their efforts and resources at this lower level of employment. This
lower level emphasis could not only address DOD’s “light foot print” aspiration but might also be
more cost efficient in an era of budgetary constraints. The recent creation of SPMAGTF-CRs
built around a reinforced Marine rifle company could prove to be a model for this lower level
focus. In terms of Marine forces afloat, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments42
suggests the creation of a littoral operations MAGTF consisting of a reinforced Marine rifle
company embarked on an LPD-1743 amphibious transport and two or three Littoral Combat Ships
(LCS).44 The author contends that this particular force mix would be well-suited for the types of
operational challenges likely to be faced by the Naval Services in the future.
Marine Aviation45
In “Marching Towards the Sweet Spot: Options for the U.S. Marine Corps in a Time of
Austerity,” the author acknowledges the contentious issue of Marine Aviation, noting that
questions as to the need for the Marines to have their own dedicated air arm have been in
existence since the post-World War II unification movement and continue to this day. The
Marines have argued the justification for having their own tactical air force is the “uniqueness” of
the Marine Corps combined arms team and if their air arm was reduced or eliminated, the other
services would have to fill the void.
Given DOD’s current and anticipated fiscal austerity, one suggestion would be to eliminate “high-
end” fixed wing aircraft such as the F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing variant of the
Lightning II multi-role fighter46 and instead rely on Navy aircraft for fixed-wing close air support.
Aside from fixed-wing air support, in keeping with the Marines’ focus on smaller infantry unit
operations, a more affordable mix of tactical air support might be adopted, using rotary-wing,
unmanned platforms, and modified cargo aircraft such as the KC-130J Harvest Hawk gunship

40 Ibid.
41 See “Reshaping America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness,” Report of the 2010 Marine Corps Force Structure
Review Group, March 14, 2011.
42 Dakota L. Wood, “The U.S. Marine Corps: Fleet Marine Forces for the 21st Century,” Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, Washington D.C., 2008, p. xv.
43 For additional information on the LPD-17 see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
44 For additional information on the LCS see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
45 Information in this section is taken from Robert P. Kozloski, “Marching Toward the Sweet Spot: Options for the U.S.
Marine Corps in a Time of Austerity,” Naval War College Review, 2012.
46 For additional information on the F-35 see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by
Jeremiah Gertler.
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variant or modified MV-22 Ospreys might be pursued. This new mix might be more in keeping
with the types contingency operations that the Marines are more likely to face in the future as
opposed to major theater wars which many experts feel are a much more remote possibility.
Move Selected Capabilities into the Reserves47
Some analysts believe the Marines are attempting to balance three identities: a forward-deployed
amphibious force; the small-wars force of choice; and a force that fights the nation’s major land
wars. Some believe that twelve years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the Marines were
tasked to function as a second land army, made the Marines “become too heavy, too removed
from their expeditionary, amphibious roots, and the unique skill sets those missions require.”48 If
the Marine Corps opts for a more expeditionary, crisis response type of force, many of the
capabilities needed for fighting a major land war could be shifted to the reserve component. The
Marine Corps Reserves have been touted as a success story during Operation Iraqi Freedom as
they did not require an extensive train up period to achieve an acceptable level of operational
effectiveness. Some of the major warfighting capabilities viewed as candidates for being moved
into the reserves include tank, artillery, and aviation command and control units that support
wing-level task forces.49In addition, fixed-wing Marine aviation units needed to support major
theater operations could also be moved to the Marine Corps Reserve as operations of this nature
have historically permitted time to buildup forces.50
Potential Issues for Congress
Marine Corps Roles and Missions
Historically, eras of declining or constrained defense budgets have served as “forcing functions”
ushering in changes in service’s roles and missions and force structure. Perhaps in the current era
of sequestration, redundancies between the Marines and the Army are an issue worth
examination.
Should the Marines be Given the Leading Role in the Pacific?
The Administration’s 2012 strategic shift to the Pacific region could present an opportunity to
both focus resources and eliminate redundancies. The U.S. Naval Institute notes:
Former Marine Corps deputy commandant for aviation Lt. Gen. George Trautman agreed
that the service will return to its traditional role in the vast stretches of the Pacific. “The
presence of strength breeds prosperity and peace,” he said.

47 Information in this section is taken from Robert P. Kozloski, “Marching Toward the Sweet Spot: Options for the U.S.
Marine Corps in a Time of Austerity,” Naval War College Review, 2012; Dakota L. Wood, “The U.S. Marine Corps:
Fleet Marine Forces for the 21st Century,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington D.C., 2008;
and Marc Gunzinger, “Shaping America’s Future Military, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
Washington D.C., 2013.
48 Gunzinger, p. 47 quoting a Secretary of Defense Robert Gates lecture.
49 Kozloski, p. 29.
50 Ibid., p. 31.
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The Marines have been in the Pacific theater continuously over the past 70 years to keep the
peace, he said, and that presence will continue to grow as the United States rebalances its
forces to the region. Anytime a crisis emerges, the Marines are usually the first to respond,
be it a humanitarian disaster or some kind of unanticipated military crisis.
The service plans to keep a force of Marines deployed to Darwin, Australia, as part of the
renewed interest the region, for example, Trautman says. Additionally, forces are being
redistributed from Okinawa, Japan, to both Guam and Hawaii. Meanwhile, the doors are
being reopened to training in Thailand and the Philippines, he added.
“Marines will be used all over the Pacific in small packets,” Work said. Those units will
respond to any number of different types of contingencies. Moreover, the Marine Corps has
strong ties with partners in the region. One example is the island nation of Singapore. “The
partnership between Marine Aviation and Singapore air force is as solid as can be,”
Trautman said. Meanwhile, the service also has historic ties with the South Korea’s Marine
Corps, which is closely modeled on its American counterpart.51
In a similar effort, the U.S. Army is seeking to assert itself in the region, with some analysts
suggesting that in a post Iraq and Afghanistan world - where few foresee the U.S. getting
involved costly, long term land operations - the Army is in search of a mission and has decided to
make engagement in the Asia-Pacific region a priority. Other than a significant presence in South
Korea, the Army does not have the history or presence that Marines enjoy in the Pacific.
One recent report suggests Army efforts to reassert itself in the Pacific are being undertaken to
develop a strategic narrative and an argument to prevent future Army personnel cuts.52 While
some have asserted the Army is trying to create a second Marine Corps in the Pacific and building
a force that the nation doesn’t need, the Army claims that it has a long, unbroken history in the
Pacific. This situation has evolved into what has been described as a “turf war” in the Pacific, a
not uncommon occurrence between the Army and Marines, particularly during post-war periods
when forces are reduced and defense budgets decline.
Perhaps, instead of competing for missions in the Pacific where the Marines are currently
established, the Marines could be allocated the lead role in the Pacific region and the Army could
be assigned the lead in another region better suited to the Army’s land-centric focus. Such an
allocation might help to avoid redundancy and associated costs and perhaps help the Army
reallocate resources that it would use to expand its Pacific presence to other areas such as training
and maintenance that are suffering due to decreased funding.
Should the Marines’ Focus be Primarily Crisis Response?
Assigning the leading role of crisis response to the Marines could help to decrease redundancy
and also achieve a level of cost savings for both the Army and Marine Corps. As previously
noted, in addition to MEUs stationed at sea around the world, the Marines have created a
SPMAGTF-CR for the USAFRICOM region and could possibly create additional units to support
other geographic combatant commanders. In a similar move, the Chief of Staff of the Army has
reportedly directed the creation of company-sized unit quick-response forces for each geographic

51 Dave Majumdar, “The Future of the Marines Corps, U.S. Naval Institute, June 14, 2013.
52 Information in this section is taken from Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Army’s Pacific Pathways’ Sets up Turf Battle with
the Marines,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2013.
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combatant commander to perform essentially the same tasks as the Marines SPMAGT-CRs.53
These Army units, formed around a conventional infantry company, would be required to respond
within 18 to 24 hours, but such a response could prove to be difficult as the vast majority of the
Active Army will be based in the continental United States after 2014. In contrast, in addition to
the MEUs afloat, the Marines envision stationing their crisis response units forward in theater
where they would likely have a better response time than Army units and would also have the
benefit of their own organic CV-22 and KC-130 aircraft to self-deploy their forces.
If the Marines are to focus primarily on crisis response, this could provide them with the
opportunity to perhaps “slim down” the force by focusing instead on what types of force structure
and equipment would be required for response to natural disasters, enhanced protection of U.S.
diplomatic facilities and personnel, and limited raid-like combat operations. A clear delineation of
who has the lead responsibility for crisis response might also permit the Army to eliminate some
of its crisis response force structure and instead focus its limited budget resources on post-crisis
follow-on operations and traditional land combat. For example, the Army reportedly has a
requirement for 49,000 paratroopers according to the 2012 Defense Planning Guidance, with one
entire division—the 82nd Airborne Division from Ft. Bragg, N.C.—devoted primarily to crisis
response.54 While a need for an Army airborne assault capability exists from a joint perspective,
perhaps a large scale, “ready to deploy at a moment’s notice” capability might no longer be
appropriate given anticipated future security challenges.55 If the Marines were designated the lead
service for crisis response, both services might be presented with an opportunity to better focus
their resources and training and thereby increase overall effectiveness. While some defense
officials might argue that the Marines and Army must have separate and distinct crisis response
capabilities and associated forces, an argument might be made that a degree of specialization
could actually be more effective and cost efficient over time.
How Much Amphibious Assault Capability Does the Marine Corps Need?
According to the 2010 report of the Marine Corps Force Structure Review Group, the Marines
require the forces, ships, and equipment to accommodate the assault echelons of two MEBs.56 In
April 2012, the Marine Corps published the results of an Amphibious Capabilities Working
Group study on naval amphibious capability. The study, Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st
Century: Strategic Opportunity and a Vision for Change
, states the United States is a maritime
nation with critical maritime interests, noting 90% of global commerce that travels by sea is most
vulnerable where sea meets land in the littorals.57 The study further finds “for a maritime nation
with global interests, a minimal two brigade amphibious force represents a sound investment in
ensuring access for the rest of the joint force.”58

53 Michelle Tan, “Army Quick-Response Forces Stood Up Around the World,” Army Times, November 11, 2013.
54 Brett Barrouquere, “Army Drops Number of Paratroops,” Army Times, November 30, 2013.
55 It should be noted that in terms of a short notice, world-wide airborne capability, the Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment
also has such a capability and, as a special operations force, is extensively trained to conduct a variety of operations in
demanding environments.
56 “Reshaping America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness,” Report of the 2010 Marine Corps Force Structure Review
Group, March 14, 2011, p. 2.
57 Information in this section was taken from “Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st Century: Strategic Opportunity
and a Vision for Change,” a report of the Amphibious Capabilities Working Group, April 27, 2012.
58 Ibid., p. 12.
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While U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 5063 sets out the requirements for the Marines and Navy to
maintain an amphibious assault capability, there is discretion as to “how much” of this capability
is required. If the Marines choose to focus on smaller, battalion and company-level operations
based on analysis of likely future threats, then there might be an opportunity to look at this
requirement for two MEB’s worth of capability which could have an impact on Marine Corps
force structure and equipment programs59 and Navy shipbuilding.
Marine Corps Force Structure
If the Marine Corps draws down to a 174,000 or lower active endstrength, there might be
opportunities to modify force structure to reflect both a smaller Marine Corps and the types of
future threats that it might face.
Marine Forces Afloat
As previously discussed, the Marines maintain two to three MEUs at sea to respond to crises as
well as other military operations as directed. As the Marine Corps adapts to accommodate a
smaller active force, a strategic shift to the Pacific, and an emerging security environment where
smaller, localized threats to U.S. security interests are more likely than major theater conflicts, a
reexamination of the traditional MEU might be in order. Marine leadership may have already
taken the first step by creating forward-deployed, land-based SPMAGTF-CRs. To provide a ship-
based complement, perhaps littoral operations MAGTF consisting of a reinforced Marine rifle
company embarked on a LPD-17 accompanied by a couple of LCSs as previously proposed might
be appropriate in some circumstances. While the littoral MAGTF might not be the Marines
chosen solution, a smaller MEU construct might permit the Marines and Navy to provide more
global coverage than the existing two to three embarked MEUs.
Emphasis on Battalion and Company-Sized Units
In order to fill the “sweet spot” between special forces and an Army BCT, the Marines might
choose to make company and battalion-sized units the focus of its force structure initiatives. This
force level could prove to be appropriate for the types of crisis response missions the Marines
could be asked to respond to as well as any engagement or security assistance operations they
might be asked to perform. A potential benefit of this focus could be the elimination or reduction
of higher echelon headquarters and support units (possibly regimental-level) which could also
greatly facilitate both decentralized and distributed operations. This emphasis also recognizes the
claim that military technological innovations over the past decade such as information
technology, unmanned systems, and precision weaponry have given smaller units of action
significantly more capability than their predecessors.

59 For information on Marine amphibious assault vehicles see CRS Report R42723, Marine Corps Amphibious Combat
Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for Congress
, by Andrew Feickert.
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Should More of the Marines’ Major Warfighting Capability be Placed in the
Reserves?

If the Marines are determined to return to their expeditionary roots and avoid becoming a de facto
“second land army” perhaps one course of action might be to place an increased portion of forces
and weapons systems that are more suited for major regional conflicts into the Marine Corps
Reserve. Such realignment could permit the Marines to pursue material solutions better suited for
crisis response operations. More expensive systems such as tanks, artillery, and high performance
aircraft - which would probably be of little use in embassy security or humanitarian support
missions - might prove to be better suited for placement in the Marine Corps Reserves. A number
of DOD and civilian studies suggest that reserve forces when not deployed are a more affordable
alternative than maintaining these forces on active duty, particularly those types of units that do
not have a great deal of utility except in certain scenarios, such as armor units. In this regard, such
a rebalancing of the Marine Corps active and reserve components might enable the Marine to
avoid additional cuts in infantry and aviation units if the decision is made to reduce the Marines
active endstrength below 174,000.


Author Contact Information
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673

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