The Crisis in South Sudan
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
December 27, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43344
The Crisis in South Sudan
Contents
Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 1
What led to the recent outbreak of violence? ............................................................................ 3
Who are the parties to the conflict and what are their goals? .................................................... 5
Placing the Crisis in Context ................................................................................................... 10
Humanitarian Situation and Select Responses ............................................................................... 11
How does the fighting affect civilians and foreign nationals? ................................................. 11
How is the international community responding? ................................................................... 12
How has the United States responded to date? ........................................................................ 13
Conflict Resolution Efforts ............................................................................................... 13
U.S. Citizen and Embassy Protection Efforts .................................................................... 14
Select Issues for Congress ............................................................................................................. 14
U.S. Foreign Assistance .................................................................................................... 15
Mass Atrocity Prevention .................................................................................................. 18
Figures
Figure 1. South Sudan Crisis Map ................................................................................................... 3
Figure 2. Key Figures in the Crisis .................................................................................................. 8
Figure 3. Distribution of Major Ethnic Groups in Sudan and South Sudan .................................. 20
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Foreign Assistance .................................................................................... 17
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 20
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 21
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The Crisis in South Sudan
Overview
In December 2013, growing political tensions among key leaders in South Sudan erupted in
violence. While the political dispute that triggered this crisis was not clearly based on ethnic
identity, it overlapped with preexisting ethnic and political fault lines and sparked armed clashes
and targeted ethnic killings in the capital, Juba, and beyond. The fighting has caused a security
and humanitarian emergency that may draw the world’s newest country into civil war. In response
to the unfolding conflict, the international community is mobilizing diplomatic, humanitarian, and
peacekeeping resources to protect civilians and facilitate an end to the violence. At the same time,
many countries and aid agencies have evacuated their foreign nationals from South Sudan, and
security concerns currently constrain the humanitarian response. Four U.S. military personnel
were injured during an operation to evacuate U.S. citizens on December 21.
United Nations officials indicate that targeted attacks against civilians and U.N. personnel may
constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity.1 By U.N. estimates, thousands have been killed
and more than 120,000 displaced, including more than 63,000 people sheltering at U.N.
peacekeeping bases.2 On December 24, the U.N. Security Council unanimously authorized a
substantial increase in peacekeeping forces for the U.N. Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
(UNMISS) through Resolution 2132 (2013). In prior remarks, the U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations had stressed the urgency of the situation, noting the possibility of
“imminent confrontations at U.N. bases where civilians are gathered.â€3
The United States is the largest provider of bilateral foreign assistance to South Sudan and a
major financial contributor to international peacekeeping efforts there. The United States has
historically played a major role in supporting peace and stability for the country, which gained its
independence from Sudan in 2011 after a long civil war between the Sudanese government and
southern insurgents. Congress has been a key actor in setting U.S. policy toward both Sudans and
supporting South Sudanese independence. As such, the Obama Administration and Congress face
a series of complex questions as they seek to convince rival South Sudanese leaders to cease
hostilities, reengage in political dialogue, and prevent further humanitarian suffering. The future
of what successive U.S. Administrations have considered to be an important relationship with
South Sudanese leaders is also in question.
Members of Congress may choose to conduct additional oversight of U.S. efforts to secure U.S.
citizens, personnel, and property in South Sudan, as well as of U.S. assistance programs and U.S.
contributions to multiple U.N. peacekeeping missions in Sudan and South Sudan. U.S. support to
South Sudan’s security services may come under increased scrutiny given emerging splits within
the military and reports of serious human rights abuses by armed actors on all sides. President
Obama has stated that he may seek to withhold certain U.S. assistance in relation to the crisis if
South Sudanese leaders seek to take or hold power by force or intimidation. State Department
officials report that security assistance has halted and will not resume until security conditions
1 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Pillay Urges South Sudan Leadership to Curb
Alarming Violence Against Civilians,†December 24, 2013.
2 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “South Sudan Crisis: Situation Report as of 26
December 2013,†Report Number 4, December 26, 2013.
3U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Remarks by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, At the Security Council Stakeout, December 23, 2013.
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improve. The President informed Congress that he “may take further action to support the
security of U.S. citizens, personnel, and property, including our Embassy, in South Sudan.â€4 He
has deployed U.S. military personnel to South Sudan in support of this mission.
Congress may consider whether or how to respond, including in any continuing appropriations
legislation for FY2014 or in relation to FY2015 budget requests for the State Department and
foreign operations.
This report explores key questions related to the conflict below, summarizes the international
response to date, and outlines current U.S. policy and assistance. For additional background, see
CRS Report R42774, Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy, by
Lauren Ploch Blanchard.
4 Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, December 22, 2013.
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Figure 1. South Sudan Crisis Map
As of December 26, 2013
Source: Graphic created by CRS. Boundaries and cities generated by Hannah Fischer using data from
Department of State, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and Esri (all 2013), and the U.N. Development
Program (2012). Humanitarian data from the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA).
What led to the recent outbreak of violence?
The current crisis reflects underlying tensions and lingering mistrust among South Sudanese
leaders and ethnic groups that date back to Sudan’s civil war (1983-2005). While the war was
largely categorized as a north-south conflict, infighting among southern rebel commanders in the
1990s nearly derailed the southerners’ bid for independence, as leaders of the insurgency, the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/SPLA), competed for power and mobilized
supporters along ethnic lines, resulting in atrocities by all sides.5 The Sudan government in
Khartoum fueled splits in the SPLM during this period by financing and arming breakaway
5 The acronyms SPLM and SPLA refer to the political and armed wings of the former southern insurgency,
respectively. The SPLM is now South Sudan’s ruling party, and the SPLA refers to the country’s armed forces.
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factions. The major factions reconciled in the early 2000s, although several smaller southern
militias have continued to operate.
In 2005, the government in Khartoum and the SPLM signed a peace agreement to end what had
by then become Africa’s longest running civil war. That deal, known as the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA), paved the way for national elections and a southern referendum on
independence, after which South Sudan, led by the SPLM in Juba, seceded on July 9, 2011. The
relationship between the two countries remains tense, with parts of the peace agreement yet to be
fully implemented. Starting in January 2012, South Sudan’s government, angered by Khartoum’s
unilateral decisions regarding exports of South Sudanese oil, and by border security disputes,
suspended oil production for more than a year.6 This led to fiscal austerity measures and
economic shocks in both countries.7 Oil production restarted in April 2013 following diplomatic
negotiations, and exports resumed in June, but damage to the oil fields was expected to delay a
return to pre-shutdown production levels until at least mid-2014.8
Most SPLM leaders put aside their differences in the latter years of the independence struggle,
choosing to focus instead on presenting a unified front and, in some cases, positioning themselves
for political office in a new state. However, simmering ethnic tensions and bitter interpersonal
rivalries remained present, growing under the strains of establishing governing institutions and
assuming increased development responsibilities. Political maneuvering in advance of anticipated
2015 elections has added to these dynamics. Amid such pressures, an escalating political struggle
among senior members of the SPLM has unfolded, with leading figures trading accusations of
unilateral decision-making, corruption, and bad faith, and with key officials moving to isolate
potential rivals. President Salva Kiir’s announcement in July 2013 of a major cabinet reshuffle, in
which Vice President Riek Machar and several other senior officials were removed from office,
formalized a major fissure in the ruling party.
Planned meetings of the SPLM’s party leadership in December 2013 brought these tensions to the
fore as top figures held competing press conferences, publicly airing grievances against each
other. On the evening of December 15, 2013, following a leadership meeting, fighting reportedly
broke out among members of the presidential guard. While details of that initial conflict are
disputed, it appears to have occurred between members of the country’s two largest ethnic groups,
the Dinka and the Nuer (largest and second largest), who claimed loyalty to either Kiir or Machar,
respectively. The fighting subsequently spread to the military headquarters, and by December 16
gunfire was reported throughout Juba. Since then, the conflict has expanded to other parts of the
country, including the eastern state of Jonglei, where more than 100,000 people were already
displaced by ongoing inter-communal violence and instability.
In Juba, senior political and military figures have been arrested for what President Kiir describes
as a failed coup attempt led by Machar. The detained figures have denied the allegations; Machar
remains at large. While some observers question whether there was, in fact, such a plot, forces
6 Sudan lost most of its oil reserves, which are located in what is now South Sudanese territory, in the north-south split,
although that oil must still transit pipelines and facilities in Sudan to the Red Sea for export. While both sides had
agreed broadly that Sudan would benefit from some revenue sharing and compensation for lost revenues in the near-
term, several details of that deal remained unresolved after South Sudan gained independence.
7 Estimates on the cost of the 2012 oil shutdown vary, ranging from tens to hundreds of millions in U.S. dollars lost.
8 Damage to some of the fields was done during the shutdown process; additional damage reportedly occurred in some
fields during subsequent bombings. Experts have warned that if another shutdown occurs, and particularly if it lasts
more than six months, the damage could be irreversible.
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that now claim loyalty to Machar subsequently took control of the capitals of Jonglei and Unity
States, and on December 23 Machar claimed that he had taken control of the oil fields in Unity
and Upper Nile State.9 Control of Upper Nile remains in dispute, but the SPLA claims it retook
the Jonglei capital of Bor from pro-Machar forces on December 25. Most foreign aid staff and oil
workers in those states have been evacuated or have sought protection on U.N. compounds.
Who are the parties to the conflict and what are their goals?
In the 1990s, during Sudan’s north-south war, former Vice President Riek Machar was a senior
Nuer SPLA commander who, along with others, split from the SPLM/A, citing grievances with
the centralized leadership of the SPLM under John Garang, a Dinka, and disagreements on the
objectives of the insurgency against Khartoum.10 Machar and his allies, who were primarily
ethnically Nuer and Shilluk, later temporarily allied themselves with the government in Khartoum
and briefly held positions in the Sudanese government. Machar’s struggle against Garang’s forces
cost thousands of southern Sudanese lives—Amnesty International estimated that 2,000 civilians,
mostly Dinka, were killed in the so-called Bor Massacre by Nuer forces under Machar’s
command. Abuses against civilians by both sides fueled ethnic hatred and fighting, particularly in
the Greater Upper Nile area (northern Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states) throughout the
1990s. Machar reconciled with the SPLM in the early 2000s and assumed the third-highest post in
the leadership structure, after Garang and his deputy, Salva Kiir. After John Garang died in a
helicopter crash in 2005, shortly after the signing of the 2005 peace accord, Kiir then became
head of the SPLM, with Machar as his deputy.
Sudan held national elections in 2010, prior to the 2011 referendum on southern independence.
As part of the CPA deal, the SPLM had formed a temporary Government of National Unity with
Sudan’s ruling party. Salva Kiir, as Chairman of the SPLM, served as first vice president under
Sudanese President Omar al Bashir, and concurrently as president of a then-semi-autonomous
Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Rather than Kiir running against Bashir for the
Sudanese presidency in 2010, the SPLM decided to field a northern candidate, Yasir Arman, on
the national ticket. Kiir, who by many accounts viewed secession as imminent, instead ran to
retain the GoSS presidency, winning the position with almost 93% of the votes cast.11 As the
incumbent elected GoSS president, Kiir retained his position, now as president of the new
Republic of South Sudan, under a transitional constitution following the country’s independence,
with Machar remaining his vice president, for a four-year term beginning July 9, 2011.12
Efforts by senior South Sudanese leaders to seek reconciliation with and among various
communities and armed groups throughout the country have been ongoing for more than a
decade. As part of these efforts, and out of apparent concern for the country’s political stability,
President Kiir granted amnesty to several individuals who once led rebel militias against the
SPLM. In addition to Machar, many other senior faction leaders who returned to the party were
usually incorporated into either the government or the security forces; many brought their forces
9 Radio Tamazuj (Juba), “Salva Kiir: ‘We lost control over Unity State and Jonglei,’†December 23, 2013.
10 For additional information, see, e.g., Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 2003.
11 For more information on the 2010 elections, see. e.g., The Carter Center, Observing Sudan’s 2010 National
Elections, April 11-18, 2010: Final Report.
12 Under the transitional constitution, the vice president is appointed by the President and may be removed by him, or
by a two-thirds majority of the legislature on a vote of no confidence.
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with them, adding to government’s new challenge of reforming and “right-sizing†its increasingly
bloated security sector. Some faction leaders, including another Nuer commander who fought
against Garang during the civil war, Peter Gadet, received senior positions in the SPLA (which
now refers to South Sudan’s national armed forces).13
President Kiir has made several major changes to his government in 2013 in a stated effort to
downsize, but also, it appears, in response to perceived threats to his leadership and international
donor pressure to crack down on state corruption. In June 2013, he dismissed two senior cabinet
ministers over alleged corruption charges, and conducted a major cabinet reshuffle in July 2013,
removing Vice President Machar and his entire cabinet. Kiir also dismissed ruling party secretary-
general Pagan Amum, who had been publicly critical of the dismissals. The SPLM-dominated
parliament approved a new, leaner cabinet in August, after rejecting one of Kiir’s appointees.
Among his notable appointments was naming the powerful Dinka governor of the volatile Jonglei
state as defense minister; Kiir in turn appointed the previous defense minister, a Nuer, to assume
the Jonglei governorship. Jonglei, which is believed to have significant untapped oil reserves, has
been a historic flashpoint for inter-ethnic fighting, including, but not limited to clashes between
Dinka and Nuer. In recent years the state has seen considerable inter-communal fighting and
armed cattle-raiding.14 Given its mixed ethnic composition and existing tensions, the Jonglei
capital of Bor was among the first areas where fighting spread during the current crisis.
The political dispute that appears to have triggered this crisis was not based solely on ethnic
identities or communal disputes—the political leaders aligned with Machar in early December
2013 represented multiple ethnic groups, including senior Dinka figures. Likewise, several Nuer
leaders remain in top government positions, including the head of the military, Chief of Defense
James Hoth Mai.
While complex and politically driven, the sporadic fighting since mid-December 2013 in many
cases appears to have followed ethnic lines, with Dinka-on-Nuer violence reported in Juba, for
example, and Nuer-on-Dinka violence reported in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. In Juba,
many of the civilians seeking refuge with UNMISS are Nuer, according to U.N. officials, and
reports indicate that Nuer have been targeted by Dinka soldiers in Juba. The situation elsewhere
in the country is volatile, with clashes reported in at least half of the country’s ten states. The
involvement of armed civilians and militias complicate efforts to prevent the situation from
deteriorating further.
Several politicians associated with the “Riek camp†have been detained. Access to the detained
has been limited, although the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan was able to visit
them on December 24 and confirmed their wellbeing. Many analysts suggest that these figures
may be crucial to negotiations between the opposing factions. Machar has demanded their release
as a precondition for dialogue with Kiir, calling for one of the detained, Pagan Amum, to lead a
negotiating team for talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on his behalf. Kiir, in contrast, has called for
talks without preconditions. Regional mediators may seek to focus on Amum and the other
detained figures in attempts to facilitate dialogue.
13 For further information on other armed groups and realignments in South Sudan, see reports by the Small Arms
Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan, at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org.
14 Small Arms Survey, “My Neighbour, My Enemy: Inter-tribal Violence in Jonglei,†Sudan Issue Brief, Number 21,
October 2012.
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Whether the events triggering the current crisis in South Sudan were, in fact, part of a coup
attempt, the fracturing of the country’s leadership, the various factions’ resort to violence, and the
resurrection of dormant ethnic grievances may have negative long-term effects. International
leaders emphasize that the conflict is inherently political and requires a political solution.
Rebuilding trust among political leaders and between communities directly affected by ethnic
violence may prove difficult.
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Figure 2. Key Figures in the Crisis
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Figures Detained or Wanted by the Government of South Sudan
As of December 25, 2013
Several key figures from South Sudan’s independence movement and members of the SPLM’s Political Bureau (the
highest unit of the party) have been detained or are sought by forces aligned with President Ki r. Political Bureau
members include Pagan Amum, Riek Machar, Deng Alor, John Luk Jok, Kosti Manibe, and Taban Deng. The
government reports that it does not seek the arrest of another PB member, Rebecca Garang (see below), who has
been seen as politically aligned with Machar in 2013. There are members of several large ethnic groups represented
among the arrested, even as many civilians fleeing violence have done so along ethnic lines. The individuals listed
below include Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and Equatorian groups.
Riek Machar – Deputy Chairman of the SPLM and former Vice President of South Sudan. Wanted; at large.
Deng Alor Kuol – Former Minister of Cabinet Affairs (2011- July 2013), Interim Foreign Minister (2011), Government
of Sudan Foreign Minister (2007-2010), senior SPLM member of CPA negotiating team. Removed by Ki r on
corruption allegations. Detained.
Oyai Deng Ajak – Former Minister of National Security, Office of the President (2011-July 2013); SPLA Chief of Staff
(pre-CPA until 2009, when he was renamed GoSS Min of Regional Cooperation). Detained.
John Luk Jok – Former Minister of Justice (2011-July 2013). Detained.
Kosti Manibe – Former Minister of Finance (2011-July 2013); Removed by Ki r on corruption al egations. Detained.
Gier Chuang Aluong – Former Minister of Roads and Bridges (2011-July 2013), GoSS Minister of Internal Affairs,
SPLA ret. Major General. Detained.
Majak d’Agoot – Former Deputy Defense Minister (2011-July 2013). Detained.
Madut Bier – Former Minister for Telecomm & Postal Services (2011-July 2013). Detained.
Cirino Iteng/Hiteng – Former Minister of Culture, Youth & Sports (2011-July 2013), GoSS Deputy Minister for
Regional Cooperation, member of SPLM negotiating team during CPA talks. Detained.
Kuol Tong Mayay – Former Governor of Lakes State (elected 2010-July 2013) removed by Ki r in Jan 2013 and
replaced by military ‘caretaker’ governor. Detained.
Pagan Amum – Suspended SPLM Secretary General and lead SPLM negotiator in peace talks with Sudan. Detained.
Ezekial lol Gatkuoth – Former Head of Mission at the Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan to the United States
(2011-2012). Detained.
Peter Adwok Nyaba – Former Minister of Higher Education, Science & Technology (2011-2012). Wanted, some
reports suggest he was detained on December 25.
Taban Deng – Former Governor of Unity State, SPLA Lt. Gen, retired and removed by President Ki r in 2013,
Wanted; at large.
Alfed Ladu Gore – Former Minister of Environment. Wanted; at large.
Rebecca Nyandeng Garang – John Garang’s widow and former GoSS Minister of Roads and Transport. By some
accounts she was has been held on house arrest, although the government insists that no charges were filed against
her. On December 23, press reports indicate that she met with President Kiir.
As the fighting has spread beyond Juba to multiple state capitals and outlying areas, the potential
for other armed actors to contribute to the violence spiraling beyond the control of political and
military leaders is a serious concern. On December 21, civilians sheltering at an UNMISS
peacekeeping base in Akobo (in eastern Jonglei state, near the Ethiopian border), were attacked
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by a group of 2,000 armed Nuer youth, according to U.N. officials.15 More than 20 Dinka
civilians were reportedly killed, along with two Indian peacekeepers; another peacekeeper was
injured in the attack. It remains unclear what, if any, the relationship that group might have with
the forces that led the revolt in Bor in December 2013.
Placing the Crisis in Context
The potential for this crisis was not unforeseen—the violence was triggered by political disputes
among elites that had long been predicted by analysts, and reflects underlying ethnic tensions.16
Those tensions have waxed and waned among communities that have historically competed for
scarce water and grazing land, and that have remained armed in the aftermath of the Sudanese
civil war.17 As reports of new atrocities along ethnic lines emerge, the prospects for diffusing
these communal tensions appear poor. State Department travel advisories since independence
have warned of the potential for violence, not only between the security forces of Sudan and
South Sudan, but also between the armed forces and multiple rebel militias. The State Department
has repeatedly warned such internal clashes could “exacerbate ethnic tensions throughout the
country, leading to further violence.†These warnings have further cautioned U.S. citizens that
South Sudan’s government has “limited capacity to deter crime or provide security†and that
“security forces often operate outside civilian control and laws governing due process and
treatment of detainees are often ignored.â€
In its own “fragility assessment,†conducted in 2012 as part of the New Deal for International
Engagement in Fragile States, the South Sudan government stated that “large-scale internal
conflict†had “markedly decreased,†and said that “initiatives†had been “put in place to address
inter-tribal clashes recurring in some parts of the country.â€18 However, the assessment stated that
“sustainable implementation of internal peace initiatives, in particular for Jonglei state [had] not
yet been achieved,†and acknowledged challenges stemming from the “proliferation of small
arms.†The government further sought to “improve the behavior, effectiveness, and accountability
of a broad range of security actors,†some of whom now have been drawn into internal conflict.
Small arms proliferated during the civil war and efforts to disarm communities in its aftermath,
particularly efforts led by the SPLA, have been contentious and often accompanied by charges of
ethnic favoritism by commanders and abuses against rival communities. SPLA disarmament
campaigns in the Greater Upper Nile area have been particularly problematic in the context of
ongoing and emergent rebellions by various militia, most of which are organized along ethnic
lines that correspond to ethnic groups perceived to have fought as proxies of Khartoum against
the SPLM/A during the north-south war (e.g., the Nuer, Shilluk, and Murle).19 Many local
15 UNMISS Press Release, “UNMISS Issues Preliminary Account of Akobo Base Attack,†December 20, 2013.
16 See. e.g., Alex Vines, “Who Can Halt the Crisis in South Sudan?†The Guardian, December 26, 2013.
17 See, e.g., The International Crisis Group (ICG), South Sudan: Compounding Instability in Unity State, Africa Report
No. 179, October 17, 2011 and Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan, Africa Report No. 172, April 4, 2011.
18 The New Deal concept was created by the “G7+â€, a group of conflict-affected countries, as a new country-owned
and country-led mechanism for engagement with international partners, including donors, civil society groups, and
others working in fragile states. It was introduced at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in late 2011,
and has been endorsed by the United States. South Sudan is among its Pilot Countries. For more information, see
http://www.newdeal4peace.org and http://www.g7plus.org.
19 Small Arms Survey, “Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile,†Sudan Issue Brief, Number
18, November 2011.
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communities in this area have also sought to retain their weapons for self-defense, and armed
cattle raids have remained a recurrent source of violence there.
The South Sudan government’s incorporation of former militia fighters into its armed forces has
further contributed to an over-sized military with little or no professional training and loose
command and control20 The United States and other donors have invested considerable resources
in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs and security sector
transformation initiatives. However, challenges associated with making these reforms in the
context of inter-communal mistrust, massive underdevelopment, and few near-term prospects for
employment for ex-combatants are immense.
Humanitarian Situation and Select Responses
How does the fighting affect civilians and foreign nationals?
The current crisis worsens humanitarian conditions in a country facing acute needs.21 As of
December 25, the situation in South Sudan was fluid. Fighting and rising insecurity have
contributed to deteriorating conditions that are likely to be further negatively affected by the
evacuation of many international relief workers. The protection of civilians is currently the
primary humanitarian challenge in South Sudan, and reports indicate that the security forces are,
in several areas, divided and/or unable to provide security for either residents or foreigners. In
some areas, reports by human rights groups suggest that members of the security forces may have
committed serious abuses against civilians.22
U.N. peacekeeping mission personnel have limited capacity to protect civilians—under its
existing mandate, UNMISS is authorized by the U.N. Security Council to protect civilians under
imminent threat of physical violence “within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment.â€23
While the Security Council has authorized an increase in the force size of UNMISS, the mission’s
resources remain constrained given large-scale displacements in a country nearly the size of the
state of Texas, with extremely little infrastructure. The lack of paved roads significantly hinders
the mobility of both South Sudanese security forces and U.N. peacekeepers. The Security Council
has reiterated in previous resolutions that the government of South Sudan has the primary
responsibility for conflict prevention and civilian protection, with UNMISS playing a supporting
role.24 Amid reports of abuses by elements of the security forces, this dynamic may place U.N.
forces in an increasingly difficult position vis-Ã -vis the host government.
20 The size of South Sudan’s armed forces has been subject to debate, ranging between 150,000 to 200,000.For more
information on the security sector and related reform challenges, see John A. Snowden, Work in Progress: Security
Fore Development in South Sudan Through February 2012, Small Arms Survey, June 2012.
21 Prior to the outbreak of violence in December 2013, the United Nations estimated that one-third of the population
required assistance. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), South Sudan: Consolidated
Appeal 2014-2016, November 14, 2013.
22 See Human Rights Watch, “South Sudan: Soldiers Target Ethnic Group in Juba Fighting,†December 19, 2013.
23 UNMISS’s mandate was defined by the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 1996 (2011).
24 UNMISS’s civilian protection mandate, set out in Resolution 1996 (2011), includes taking the necessary actions to
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, irrespective of the source of that violence.
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More than 63,000 people have sought refuge at U.N. peacekeeping bases in the first two weeks of
the fighting. As of December 26, the United Nations conservatively estimates that more than
121,600 people had been displaced by the conflict, with the real figure “likely higher,†given
limited access to civilians outside population centers.25 Delivering assistance to those in need is a
top priority for relief agencies, where security allows. Hygiene and sanitation have emerged as
problems in areas where internally displaced persons are gathering, and U.N. officials indicate
that food, water, healthcare and shelter are urgently needed. The United Nations has issued an
emergency appeal for $166 million to address immediate needs, including those of Sudanese
refugees currently residing in camps in South Sudan.26 This funding represents the most urgently
required resources from an overall $1.1 billion 2014 aid appeal for enduring humanitarian needs
in South Sudan.
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay reported on December 24 that “mass
extrajudicial killings, the targeting of individuals on the basis of their ethnicity and arbitrary
detentions have been documented in recent days.†She further expressed concern about the safety
of detained individuals, including several hundred civilians who were reportedly arrested in Juba
and hundreds of police who were also reported arrested across the capital.27
Fighting in Unity and Upper Nile States threatens not only local residents but may also worsen
conditions for refugees who have fled the ongoing conflict in the neighboring Sudanese states of
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. Fighting between Sudanese forces and insurgents in those
states has led almost 200,000 refugees to seek shelter and assistance in camps in South Sudan
since 2011. Foreign aid workers were evacuated, for example, from Yida refugee camp, which
hosts more than 70,000 refugees from Southern Kordofan. Fighting has also been reported near
refugee camps in Upper Nile.
How is the international community responding?
Various world figures have joined local church and civil society leaders in calling for an
immediate end to the violence by all sides and a political resolution to the crisis. Many, including
President Obama, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and Pope Francis have cautioned South
Sudan’s leaders and participants in the conflict that their actions threaten gains made since
independence and the future of the country.28 The African Union (AU) expressed “deep dismay
and disappointment†at “the failure of political leaders in the country to live up to the hopes and
aspirations of their citizensâ€29 The AU has urged President Kiir to consider releasing the detainees
to facilitate a dialogue between the opposing sides.
25 Displaced figures from UNOCHA, “South Sudan Crisis: Situation Report as of December 26, 2013,†December 26,
2013. The death toll, which has not been verified, is an estimate given by U.N. Assistant Secretary-General and Deputy
Special Representative in South Sudan Toby Lanzer, as stated on Twitter and quoted in “UN to Send More Troops to
South Sudan†Al Jazeera, December 26, 2013.
26 UNOCHA, “Aid Agencies in South Sudan Need $166 Million Now to Save Lives of People Caught in Crisis,â€
December 25, 2013.
27 OHCHR, “Pillay Urges South Sudan Leadership to Curb Alarming Violence Against Civilians,†December 24, 2013.
28 See, e.g., The White House, Statement by the President on South Sudan, December 19, 2013; The Holy See, Urbi Et
Orbi Message of Pope Francis: Christmas 2013, December 25, 2013.
29 African Union, Press Statement of the 410th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the Situation in South
Sudan, December 24, 2013.
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The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the East Africa regional group that
led the peace negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan in the early 2000s, has sought to
mediate a dialogue between key leaders in the crisis with the support of the U.N. and the AU.
Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn traveled
to Juba on December 26 for discussions with South Sudan leaders; theirs was the highest level
international delegation to visit to date. Special envoys from the United States and the European
Union are also engaging key figures (see below). Concurrently, South Sudan’s influential church
leaders have also initiated reconciliation efforts.
The U.N. Secretary-General warned on December 24, “the world is watching all sides in South
Sudan,†announcing that the United Nations was bolstering efforts to investigate reports of human
rights violations and crimes against humanity and declaring that “those responsible at the senior
level will be held personally accountable and face the consequences—even if they claim they had
no knowledge of the attacks.â€30 He also stated, “Now is the time for South Sudan’s leaders to
show their people and the world that they are, above all, committed to preserving the unity of the
nation.†The U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2132 (2013) on December
24 in response to the crisis.31 Further deliberations are expected in January. The resolution, which
calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the opening of political dialogue, supports an
increase in the military component of UNMISS from an authorized 7,000 to 12,500 troops and in
the police component from 900 to 1,323 personnel. It additionally authorizes the Secretary-
General to facilitate inter-mission cooperation and, “if needed and subject to further Council
consideration,†complementary force and asset generation, including, through the possible
transfer of troops and force enablers from other U.N. missions.32 U.N. efforts to mobilize these
resources are underway, although it remains unclear how quickly new forces can be deployed,
and how any potential transfer from other missions might affect competing needs elsewhere on
the continent, including for the crisis currently underway in the Central African Republic.
How has the United States responded to date?
Conflict Resolution Efforts
Top U.S. officials have engaged both South Sudanese leaders and key figures in Africa and the
international community to seek a mediated solution to the current crisis. In addition to calls
made by Secretary of State John Kerry and National Security Advisor Susan Rice to President
Kiir and public comments made by President Obama, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South
Sudan Donald Booth has traveled to South Sudan to engage with the opposing sides. The envoy
has offered U.S. support to regional efforts to facilitate direct talks between Kiir and Machar. The
IGAD effort may be bolstered by the relationship between Booth, who previously served as U.S.
Ambassador to Ethiopia, and regional leaders. Booth appears to have been the first foreign
official to have secured approval from Kiir for a meeting with the detained political figures.
30 United Nations, Secretary-General’s Press Conference at U.N. Headquarters, New York, December 23, 2013.
31 Draft resolution S/2013/760 was co-sponsored by eight Council members: Australia, France, Luxembourg, the
Republic of Korea, Rwanda, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Togo. Its unanimous adoption responded to
the request of the U.N. Secretary-General on December 23.
32 U.N. Security Council, Resolution 2132 (2013), December 24, 2013.
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U.S. Citizen and Embassy Protection Efforts
The State Department issued a new travel warning as the crisis unfolded on December 17, urging
U.S. citizens in South Sudan to depart immediately.33 The U.S. Embassy in Juba suspended
normal operations and the Obama Administration ordered the departure of non-emergency U.S.
government personnel, and evacuation operations for U.S. citizens began on December 18. The
President further ordered 45 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel to Juba on December 18
“to protect U.S. citizens and property.â€34
On December 21, 2013, President Obama ordered “approximately 46 additional U.S. military
personnel deployed by military aircraft to the area of Bor, South Sudan, to conduct an operation
to evacuate U.S. citizens and personnel. After the aircraft came under fire as they approached Bor,
the operation was curtailed due to security considerations, and the aircraft and all military
personnel onboard departed South Sudan without completing the evacuation.â€35 Four U.S.
military personnel were injured in the attack and evacuated for medical treatment. The identity of
those responsible is unclear, although forces loyal to Machar claimed control of Bor at the time.
The following day, the United States, “in coordination with the United Nations and in
consultation with the South Sudanese government†evacuated U.S. citizens and others from Bor
on U.N. and U.S. civilian helicopters.36 The President has informed Congress in a message he
described as “consistent with the War Powers Resolution†that he “may take further action to
support the security of U.S. citizens, personnel, and property, including our Embassy, in South
Sudan.â€37 On December 23, U.S. Defense Department officials stated that forces were being
repositioned in the region to facilitate “maximum flexibility to respond to State Department
requests.â€38 Going forward, this crisis may test U.S. Africa Command’s new rapid response
capacity, which has drawn interest from Congress in the aftermath of the September 2012 attack
on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya.39
Select Issues for Congress
The United States, which is the single largest bilateral aid donor to South Sudan, has invested
significant resources in its development. Peace and stability among the Sudanese has long been a
key focus of U.S. foreign policymakers in Africa and a sustained issue of bipartisan congressional
attention.40 Congressional engagement in Sudan and South Sudan has historically been driven
33 Previous travel warnings had cited arbitrary arrests by security forces, along with limited health care, among ongoing
concerns. The December 17, 2013 warning cited a “lack of security and risk of remaining†in the country.
34 President Barack Obama, Report Consistent with War Powers Resolution, December 19, 2013.
35 Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, December 22, 2013.
36 State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki, “U.S. Citizen Evacuation in South Sudan,†December 22, 2013.
37 Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, December 22, 2013.
38 “U.S. Calls for Immediate Talks in South Sudan,†Armed Forces Press Service, December 25, 2013.
39 Deployed forces include those from the Djibouti-based Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa’s (CJTF-HOA)
East Africa Response Force and a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force based in Moron, Spain. See CJTF-
HOA Public Affairs, “Response Force Deploys for First Time,†December 26, 2013. See also, Richard Sisk, “South
Sudan Crisis Tests US Marine Response,†Military.com, December 26, 2013.
40 See CRS Report R42774, Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy, by Lauren Ploch
Blanchard.
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largely by human rights and humanitarian concerns. With South Sudan’s emergence as an
independent country, the focus has expanded beyond north-south dynamics to an increasing
examination of South Sudanese leaders’ records on these matters in the context of oversight of
expanded U.S. aid to the new country. Given evolving U.S. military deployments to the region in
response to the current crisis, some Members may further seek to engage the Obama
Administration on the role of those forces and the resources required to support them.
Members of Congress, including the Congressional Caucus on Sudan and South Sudan, have
frequently engaged South Sudanese leaders directly. The leadership of the Senate Foreign
Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees, for example, sent a letter to President Kiir in
August 2013 noting historic U.S. support for the people of South Sudan, but expressing
increasing concern about human rights conditions, particularly in Jonglei. In response, President
Kiir emphasized that improving security and preventing communal violence that might result in
human rights violations was a top priority for his government, and noted measures that his
government had taken in response to abuses in Jonglei. He made assurances that there would
“never be a government policy to cleanse any ethnic group†while he was president. He also
suggested that “without the sustained engagement of the United States Government and its
People,†the peace agreement that facilitated South Sudanese independence would not have been
signed or implemented.41 In light of the current crisis, the congressional committees and Caucus
leadership have publicly called for an end to the violence, improved humanitarian access, and
respect for human rights. In a new letter to President Kiir expressing deep concern and calling for
restraint to prevent the violence from escalating, they have emphasized the importance of
inclusive political dialogue. The letter cautions, “your actions over the course of the coming days
will be critical in influencing the path your country takes and how people remember your
leadership.â€42
U.S. Foreign Assistance
In recent years, U.S. foreign assistance to the people and government of South Sudan has been
among the largest spending priorities for the United States in Africa, with more than $410.6
million committed in FY2013 and more than $393 million in economic, health, and security
assistance requested for FY2014. In its FY2014 budget request, the Obama Administration stated
that South Sudan “still requires significant external support to provide basic services to citizens,
develop a broad-based, diverse economy, and establish basic standards for rule of law and good
governance.†The request also referred to “persistent ethnic conflictâ€; warned that South Sudan
was “trending toward authoritarianism,†although it argued that there was “still time to influence
this trend through strategic and targeted assistance that supports the government’s responsiveness
and citizen participation in determining a way forward.†The request further outlined U.S. plans
to fund new and ongoing conflict mitigation efforts aimed at improving internal stability.
The current crisis is creating new requirements for humanitarian aid for people displaced by the
recent fighting. In addition to the foreign aid figures cited above, the United States has provided
more than $268 million in humanitarian assistance in FY2013 and FY2014 to date, a figure that
includes emergency aid provided prior to the crisis and is likely to increase as the situation
41 Letter from President Salva Kiir, September 27, 2013.
42 The text of the December 24 congressional correspondence to President Kiir is at
http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov. See also Sudan and South Sudan Caucus Statement on Escalating Violence,
December 19, 2013.
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unfolds, drawing from funds previously appropriated by Congress.43 The USAID Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has activated a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)
and Response Management Team (RMT) to support U.S. government efforts to respond to the
humanitarian aspects of the crisis.
The crisis has implications for sizeable U.S. financial contributions to U.N. peacekeeping
missions in South Sudan, some of whose personnel have come under attack during recent fighting
and whose bases have been transformed into camps for those seeking safety. From FY2012-
FY2014, the Administration requested more than $850.6 million to support the U.N. Mission in
Southern Sudan (UNMISS) and more than $197.2 million to support the U.N. Interim Security
Force for Abyei (UNISFA).44 Given the pending expansion of UNMISS by an additional 5,000
troops, to be drawn from existing U.N. missions in Africa, State Department officials estimated
that the required U.S. annual contribution for UNMISS may increase by more than $50 million.
This may result in a request for increased peacekeeping contribution funds in FY2014 and/or
FY2015, or a reallocation from other U.S. commitments. Additional U.S. support to prepare
African peacekeepers to for UNMISS and UNISFA is provided through the State Department’s
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.
In the longer-term, the evolving conflict in South Sudan may call into question the future
direction of U.S. and international assistance to the South Sudan government. U.S. support to the
government and security forces was already subject to certain restrictions, some of which are
based on human rights and budget transparency concerns.45 South Sudan has nevertheless been
among the largest African recipients of State Department-funded security assistance in recent
years, as the United States has sought to support security sector reform there. This aid has
targeted both law enforcement and the military, seeking to help transform the SPLA from a rebel
force to a professional military capable of contributing to internal and regional peace and security
through training, advising, and non-lethal defense equipment. The SPLA has become increasingly
active in U.S.-supported regional efforts to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). 46
Underscoring the depth of U.S. concern about the recent crisis, U.S. National Security Adviser
Susan Rice said on December 20 that if “individuals or groups seek to take or hold power [in
South Sudan] through force, mass violence, or intimidation, the United States will have no choice
43 USAID, South Sudan—Crisis, Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year 2014, December 24, 2013. This document also includes
funding figures for South Sudan from other major international aid donors.
44 Part of UNISFA’s mandate is to support the monitoring and verification of a demilitarized zone and related security
arrangements along the yet-to-be-demarcated border between Sudan and South Sudan.
45 According to the State Department’s latest report on human rights conditions in the country, the three most serious
problems are “security force abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, intimidation, and other inhumane
treatment of civilians; lack of access to justice, including arbitrary arrest, prolonged pretrial detention, and corruption
within the justice sector; and conflict-related abuses, including continuing abuse and displacement of civilians as a
result of fighting between Sudanese and South Sudanese forces, RMGs opposing the government, and rival ethnic
communities.†State Department, 2012 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, April 19, 2013. The State
Department reports that the government has made progress in efforts to eliminate the use of child soldiers from the
SPLA. Information on restricted assistance is available to congressional offices upon request. South Sudan is one of ten
countries identified as subject to foreign aid restrictions based on the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA,
P.L. 110-457); President Obama waived the application of CSPA for South Sudan in September 2013, determining it in
the national interest to do so.
46 For more information on the LRA, a small, armed group in Central Africa, and efforts to counter it, see, e.g., Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, “Kony 2013: U.S. Quietly Intensifies Effort to Help African Troops Capture Infamous Warlord,†The
Washington Post, October 28, 2013 and CRS Report R42094, The Lord’s Resistance Army: The U.S. Response, by
Alexis Arieff and Lauren Ploch Blanchard.
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but to withdraw our traditional, robust support.â€47 State Department officials report that security
assistance has halted and will not resume until security conditions improve.48 Assistance to other
sectors is under review.
It remains to be seen how any withholding of U.S. development or security assistance might
affect the decision making of parties to the current conflict. One could argue that the withholding
of foreign aid might influence those leaders most concerned about the ability of the South
Sudanese government to meet the needs of citizens. A fiscal crunch induced by the dispute with
Sudan over oil exports had already undermined the solvency of the South Sudanese government
prior to the recent fighting. Given new threats to oil production in the context of the current crisis,
fiscal concerns may be a decisive issue for some. However, it is unclear whether the severity of
the crisis and the immediate threats key leaders may perceive to their security will make them
more or less susceptible to coercive pressure from international donors. It also is possible that the
continuation or the suspension of U.S. and international assistance could be perceived by
different parties to the conflict as unwelcome attempts to shape the outcome of internal South
Sudanese disputes.
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Foreign Assistance
Thousands of current U.S. dollars
FY2012 Actual
FY2013 Estimate
FY2014 Request
GHP-USAID
43,010 38,541 35,510
GHP-STATE
12,036 14,339 13,904
ESF
305,360 284,761 280,499
INCLE 32,000 28,882 22,000
NADR 2,135 3,000 2,135
IMET
858 759 800
FMF -- 190 200
PKO 48,000 19,200 38,000
FFP 175,513
21,000
N/A
TOTAL 619,577 410,672 393,048
Source: State Department FY2013 Post-Sequester 653(a) Initial Al ocations and FY2014 Congressional Budget
Justification documents.
Notes: FY2014 figures do not include emergency food aid provided under the USAID-administered Food for
Peace (FFP) program, which is determined during the year according to need. GHP = Global Health; DA =
Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE=International Narcotics Control & Law
Enforcement; PKO = Peacekeeping Operations; NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related
Programs; IMET = International Military Education & Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing.
47 The White House, “Urging Peace in South Sudan,†The White House Blog, December 20, 2013.
48 CRS communication with the State Department, December 24, 2013.
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Mass Atrocity Prevention
As Members of Congress weigh what role the role the United States might play going forward in
response to the South Sudan crisis, either directly or through support for international efforts,
reports of mass atrocities filed by the United Nations and others may become a focus of
congressional deliberations. In a number of recent crises with significant civilian casualties,
observers have examined the practical implications of the Obama Administration’s stated
commitment to the prevention of “mass atrocities.†The President, who was active in legislating
on the Darfur conflict during his Senate tenure, issued a presidential directive in 2011 classifying
the prevention of mass atrocities as “a core national security interest and a core moral
responsibility of the United States of America.†A major stated rationale of the President and the
leaders of various U.S. allies for military intervention in Libya in 2011 was the prospect that
forces loyal to Muammar Qadhafi might otherwise kill thousands of unarmed civilians. The
Administration released a strategy on mass atrocities prevention in 2012. As part of that strategy,
the Administration created the Atrocities Prevention Board and launched a new National
Intelligence Estimate on the risk of mass atrocities and genocide. In his public remarks on the
strategy release, President Obama referred to the Sudan/South Sudan peace process as one of
several examples of a diplomatic effort that had “saved countless lives,†noting that “when the
referendum in South Sudan was in doubt, it threatened to reignite a conflict that had killed
millions.â€49 The President’s comments suggested that, on a case-by-case basis, diplomacy was
one of several tools for atrocities prevention, with military intervention among other possible
options.
Human rights groups and others advocating U.S. intervention to protect civilians abroad are
divided on the legacy of the mass atrocities prevention initiative. In the Central African Republic,
for example, the Administration has credited the Atrocities Prevention Board with designing a
media messaging campaign on peace and reconciliation in response to a burgeoning conflict
along ethno-religious lines. Still, the exigencies of U.S. foreign policy and relative limits of U.S.
leverage have challenged both the President’s ability to give priority to prevention efforts and the
success of such efforts once implemented. This has been the case, for example, in Sudan—where
a bloody counterinsurgency campaign against rebel groups continues—and may be highlighted
anew if South Sudan’s internal conflict worsens or spreads.
In the near term, some in the advocacy community have sought to engage the U.S. government
and others in the international community on how best to prevent atrocities in South Sudan. Some
have outlined a range of proposals for increased U.N. action, including further examination and
potential modification of UNMISS’s mandate and a possible arms embargo on parties complicit
in atrocities.50 The U.N. Special Advisers to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide
and the Responsibility to Protect have expressed deep concern with targeted ethnic attacks that
they warn could constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity and have reiterated the
49 For more information on the Administration’s position on atrocities prevention, see, e.g., Remarks by the President at
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, April 23, 2012; The White House, Fact Sheet: The Obama
Administration’s Comprehensive Efforts to Prevent Mass Atrocities Over the Past Year, May 1, 2013.
50 See, e.g., George Clooney and John Prendergast, How to Stop an Inferno in South Sudan, The Daily Beast,
December 20, 2013 and Louise Arbour, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group, Open Letter to the U.N.
Secretary-General, December 24, 2013.
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Government of South Sudan’s responsibility to protect all populations, regardless of ethnicity or
political affiliation.51
President Kiir appears to have publicly acknowledged international concerns about the
government’s responsibility to protect its citizens, stating on December 24:
Anybody that goes to the residential areas to kill people or to loot the property of others and
hoping that he’s doing it to support me must know that that person is not supporting me.
Instead, you are destroying me. …Innocent people have been wantonly killed… There are
now people who are targeting others because of their tribal affiliation, by means of taking the
law into their own hands. …This general line of orientation is unacceptable. It will only lead
to one thing, and that is to turn this nation into chaos. All the unruly and undisciplined
soldiers, who are behind such terrible acts, and who are randomly bent to killing innocent
people are criminals and will not escape the long arm of justice, and will have to be
punished. …These atrocities recurring by now have to cease immediately.52
Developments to date suggest that such appeals may not have immediate effect outside the
capital, as disparate forces mobilize against perceived rivals. In the absence of a ceasefire,
ongoing military operations to secure or retake contested areas or rebel efforts to move against
government controlled areas may escalate violence by both state and non-state actors with
unpredictable results.
51 United Nations, Statement by Adama Dieng, U.N. Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, and Jennifer
Welsh, U.N. Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, on the Situation in South Sudan, December 24, 2013.
52 Nicholas Kulish, South Sudan’s President Condemns Ethnic Killings,†New York Times, December 25, 2013; and,
Radio Tamazuj (Juba), “Kiir calls on soldiers not to commit atrocities,†December 25, 2013.
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Figure 3. Distribution of Major Ethnic Groups in Sudan and South Sudan
Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
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Acknowledgments
Christopher M. Blanchard, Amber Hope Wilhelm, and Hannah Fischer contributed to this report.
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