Interim Agreement on Iran’s Nuclear Program
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Paul K. Kerr
Analyst in Nonproliferation
December 11, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43333
Interim Agreement on Iran’s Nuclear Program
Summary
In the early hours of November 24, 2013, in Geneva, Switzerland, Iran and the six powers that
have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, Britain,
France, Russia, China, and Germany—collectively known as the “P5+1”) finalized an interim
agreement requiring Iran to freeze many aspects of its nuclear program in exchange for what the
Obama Administration calls “limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible” relief from
international sanctions. The period of the interim deal is to be six months, during which time Iran
and the P5+1 will attempt to reach a comprehensive deal on the long-term status of Iran’s nuclear
program.
Iran has agreed to
• freeze, in effect, its production of enriched uranium containing up to 5%
uranium-235 during this period by converting the material to a uranium
compound unsuitable for further enrichment;
• refrain from producing enriched uranium hexafluoride containing 20% uranium-
235—the form of enriched uranium in Iran’s stockpile that has caused the most
concern. Iran has also agreed to dilute this stockpile to low enriched uranium
hexafluoride containing no more than 5% uranium-235 or convert it to a uranium
compound unsuitable for further enrichment;
• halt key elements of its heavy-water reactor and uranium enrichment facilities;
and
• provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with additional
information about its nuclear program, as well as access to some nuclear-related
facilities which are not covered by Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement.
In exchange, the P5+1 countries agree to refrain from imposing new sanctions and permit Iran to
• repatriate to Iran about $4.2 billion in oil sales proceeds that are locked up in
foreign accounts. Iran’s oil exports are to remain at their current level of about 1
million barrels per day—a 60% drop from 2011 levels of about 2.5 million
barrels per day;
• resume sales of petrochemicals and trading in gold and other precious metals,
and to resume transactions with foreign firms involved in Iran’s auto sector. The
estimated value of the revenue that will accrue to Iran from these sources during
the six months of the interim arrangement is $1.5 billion; and
• access about $400 million of its hard currency for tuition for Iranian students to
be paid directly to third country institutions, to buy spare parts for U.S.-made
civilian aircraft, and to facilitate humanitarian purchases of food and medicine.
Many analysts see the agreement as a necessary first step that, if fully implemented, would delay
Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon, improve the international community’s ability to
identify Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and begin to reintegrate Iran into the
international community. Some governments and experts criticized the agreement as failing to
adequately roll back Iran’s current nuclear program and as setting off a process by which foreign
countries and firms might begin to ignore international sanctions and seek new business in Iran.
Some countries also assert that the deal reflects a U.S.-Iran rapprochement that will cause the
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United States to further retreat from the Middle East and give Iran a free hand to support its proxy
movements throughout the region. The Administration, and some allied governments, assert that
the P5+1 must adhere to its pledge to refrain from imposing new sanctions or risk many
governments and firms reducing their cooperation with the sanctions regime on Iran. U.S.
officials have said that sanctions can be re-imposed if Iran fails to comply with the interim
agreement.
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Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background on Nuclear Program .................................................................................................... 2
Iranian Nuclear Facilities .......................................................................................................... 3
Enrichment Facilities........................................................................................................... 3
Arak Reactor ....................................................................................................................... 4
November 24 Joint Plan of Action Elements ................................................................................... 5
Nuclear Program Provisions ...................................................................................................... 6
Initial Steps .......................................................................................................................... 6
U.S. Sanctions Easing .............................................................................................................. 10
Analysis of Sanctions Relief ............................................................................................. 11
Implications and Reactions in the Middle East ....................................................................... 13
Israel .................................................................................................................................. 14
Saudi Arabia ...................................................................................................................... 16
Implications for U.S.-Iran Relations ........................................................................................ 16
Appendixes
Appendix. Nuclear Weapons Development ................................................................................... 19
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 20
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Interim Agreement on Iran’s Nuclear Program
Introduction
On November 24, 2013, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and European Union High
Representative Catherine Ashton announced in Geneva that Iran had reached agreement with
China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, collectively known
as the “P5+1,” on a “joint plan of action which sets out an approach towards reaching a long-term
comprehensive solution” to international concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The
announcement followed several days of meetings which began on November 20 and, in addition
to Ashton and Zarif, included the Foreign Ministers and Political Directors of the P5+1.
Recent multilateral negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear program date back to 2003. In October
of that year, Iran concluded an agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that
contained provisions designed to alleviate international concerns regarding Iran’s uranium
enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. In June 2006, the P5+1 presented a proposal to
Tehran that offered a variety of incentives in return for several Iranian confidence-building steps
concerning those programs. Since then, the two sides have held multiple rounds of talks—some
as recently as spring of 2013—without reaching agreement. Following the June 2013 election of
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, many observers expressed optimism that these negotiations
would produce an agreement. After Rouhani took office in August, Iran and the P5+1 met twice
(once in October and once in November) prior to the talks that began on November 20.
As part of the diplomatic efforts cited above, the U.N. Security Council adopted several
resolutions, the most recent of which (Resolution 1929) was adopted in June 2010. These
resolutions require Iran to cooperate fully with an ongoing International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend
its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to
its IAEA safeguards agreement. Resolution 1929 also requires Tehran to refrain from “any
activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and to comply with a
modified provision (called code 3.1) of Iran’s subsidiary arrangement to its IAEA safeguards
agreement. Several of these resolutions imposed economic and other sanctions on Iran.
Iran is a party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and has concluded a comprehensive
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Such agreements are designed to enable the IAEA to detect
the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses, as well as to
detect undeclared nuclear activities and material.1 As a practical matter, the IAEA’s ability to
inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as well as to obtain information, in a particular country
pursuant to that government’s comprehensive safeguards agreement is limited to facilities and
activities that have been declared by the government. Additional Protocols to IAEA
comprehensive safeguards agreements increase the agency’s ability to investigate undeclared
nuclear facilities and activities by increasing the IAEA’s authority to inspect certain nuclear-
related facilities and demand information from member states. Iran signed such a protocol in
December 2003 and agreed to implement the agreement pending ratification. Tehran stopped
adhering to its Additional Protocol in 2006.2 Subsidiary arrangements to IAEA safeguards
1 For more information, see CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International
Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr.
2 Iran announced that it would stop implementing the protocol two days after the IAEA Board of governors adopted a
resolution in February 2006 which referred Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement to the U.N.
(continued...)
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agreements describe the “technical and administrative procedures for specifying how the
provisions laid down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied.”3 Code 3.1 of Iran’s subsidiary
arrangement to its IAEA safeguards agreement requires Tehran to provide design information for
new nuclear facilities “as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a
facility has been taken, whichever is earlier.”
In addition to concluding the November 24 joint plan of action mentioned above, Iran signed a
joint statement with the IAEA on November 11, 2013, describing a “Framework for
Cooperation.”4 According to the statement, Iran and the IAEA agreed to “strengthen their
cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by
the IAEA.” The agency has long sought to resolve some outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s
nuclear program, some of which concern possible Iranian research on nuclear weapons
development.
Background on Nuclear Program5
Iran has nuclear programs that could provide Tehran with the capability to produce both weapons-
grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium—the two types of fissile material used in
nuclear weapons. Statements from the U.S. intelligence community indicate that Iran has the
technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons at some point, but the U.S.
government assesses that Tehran has not mastered all of the necessary technologies for building a
nuclear weapon.
A November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iran “halted its nuclear weapons
program” in 2003.6 The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is “keeping open the option
to develop nuclear weapons.” The intelligence community has reaffirmed this conclusion on
several occasions.7 However, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper reiterated during an
April 18, 2013, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that Iran has apparently not decided to
produce nuclear weapons.8 Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman
articulated the same assessment during an October 3, 2013, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing.9
(...continued)
Security Council.
3 2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/6570/IAEA-Safeguards-
Glossary-2001-Edition.
4 Available at http://www.iaea.org/press/?p=4018.
5 For more information, see CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr.
6 The estimate defined “nuclear weapons program” as “nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert
uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment related work.”
7 For example, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated during a January 31, 2012, Senate Select
Intelligence Committee hearing that Iran has “is keeping open the option to develop” nuclear weapons.
8 “Hearing on Current and Future Worldwide Threats,” Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 18, 2013. Clapper
explained that such a decision “would be made singly” by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i.
9 “Reversing Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 3, 2013.
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U.S. officials argue that the IAEA would likely detect an Iranian attempt to use its safeguarded
facilities for producing weapons-grade HEU. According to Clapper’s testimony before a March
12, 2013, hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the United States assesses that
“Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce” enough weapons-grade HEU for a
nuclear weapon before this activity would be discovered.10 Tehran is considerably more likely to
use covert facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon, partly because the IAEA would
likely detect an Iranian attempt to use its safeguarded facilities for this purpose; Clapper stated in
his April 18 testimony that Iranian use of declared nuclear facilities to produce weapons-grade
HEU is the “least likely scenario” for such an Iranian action. U.S. officials have argued that Iran
does not have covert enrichment facilities and have also expressed confidence in the United
States’ ability to detect such facilities.11
Regarding the amount of time that it would take Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, Sherman
stated during the October 3, 2013, hearing that “from the time” that Iran’s Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i “decides that he truly wants to go for a nuclear weapon ... it could take
as much as a year before he got there.” Clapper testified April 18 that Iran would probably need
“a period of months, not years” to develop a nuclear weapon using its declared enrichment
facilities. Using covert facilities for this purpose would “lengthen the time” required for Iran to
develop a nuclear weapon, he explained. (See the Appendix for more information.)
Iranian Nuclear Facilities12
This section contains a brief description of the Iranian nuclear facilities most relevant to the
November 24, 2013, joint plan of action. It is worth noting that, according to a November 14,
2013, report from IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano, Iran had generally stopped expanding
its enrichment and heavy water reactor programs.13
Enrichment Facilities
Iran has three gas centrifuge enrichment facilities. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning
uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope.
Such centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear
power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). LEU used in nuclear
reactors typically contains less than 5% uranium-235; HEU used in nuclear weapons typically
contains about 90% uranium-235. Tehran argues that it is enriching uranium for use as fuel in
nuclear power reactors and nuclear research reactors.
10 “Hearing on Security Threats to the United States,” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 12, 2013. Then-
IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Herman Nackaerts stated in July 2013 that the IAEA “would know
within a week,” if Iran were to use its safeguarded facilities to produce weapons-grade HEU. (Barbara Slavin, “Tight
IAEA Inspection Regime Hampers Iran’s Nuclear Breakout,” Al-Monitor, July 22, 2013).
11 “Senior Administration Official Holds A Background Briefing Previewing Iran P5+1 Talks,” November 6, 2013;
Colin H. Kahl, “Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort,” Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2012.
12 Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, and the
three most recent reports from IAEA Director-General Amano to the IAEA Board of Governors: GOV/2013/27 (May
2013), GOV/2013/40 (August 2013), and GOV/2013/56 (November 2013).
13 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2013/56, November 14, 2013.
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Natanz Commercial-Scale Enrichment Plant
In this facility, Iran is using first-generation centrifuges, called IR-1 centrifuges, to produce LEU
containing up to 5% uranium-235. Iran has installed about 15,400 of these centrifuges,
approximately 8,800 of which are enriching uranium. Iran has also installed about 1,000
centrifuges with a greater enrichment capacity, called IR-2m centrifuges, in the facility. Those
centrifuges are not enriching uranium.
Natanz Pilot Enrichment Plant
Iran is using IR-1 centrifuges in this facility to produce LEU containing approximately 20%
uranium-235. Iran is also testing several types of centrifuges in the facility. Iran’s production of
LEU enriched to this level has caused concern because such production requires approximately
90% of the effort necessary to produce weapons-grade HEU, which, as noted, contains
approximately 90% uranium-235.14
Fordow Enrichment Plant
Iran is using IR-1 centrifuges in this facility to produce LEU containing approximately 20%
uranium-235. Iran has installed about 2,700 first-generation centrifuges, approximately 700 of
which are enriching uranium.
Enriched Uranium Inventory
Iran has enough uranium hexafluoride containing up to 5% uranium-235, which, if further
enriched, would yield enough weapons-grade HEU for several nuclear weapons. The total amount
of Iranian LEU containing 20% uranium-235 would, if it were in the form of uranium
hexafluoride and further enriched, be sufficient for a nuclear weapon. However, Iran has either
converted much of that material for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran (called the
Tehran Research Reactor), or is preparing it for that purpose. The remaining stockpile of uranium
hexafluoride containing 20% uranium-235 would not be sufficient for a nuclear weapon, even if
Iran were to enrich it further. Tehran’s uranium conversion facility is not set up to reconvert the
reactor fuel to uranium hexafluoride.15
Arak Reactor
Iran is constructing a heavy water-moderated reactor at Arak, which, according to Tehran, is
intended to produce radioisotopes for medical use. Iran has said that the reactor is to substitute for
the Tehran Research Reactor. Although Iran has since decided to refuel the Tehran reactor, it has
also continued to construct the Arak reactor and has begun to produce fuel for it. Iran told the
IAEA in May 2013 that the reactor, which is under IAEA safeguards, was “expected to become
14 Former IAEA Deputy Director General Olli Heinonen, “Dealing with a Nuclear Iran: Redlines and Deadlines,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 6, 2013.
15 Nuclear Industry in Iran: An Overview on Iran’s Activities and Achievements in Nuclear Technology, Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, 2012, p.13. This absence can also be inferred from IAEA reports and the November 24 interim
agreement text.
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operational during the third quarter of 2014.” However, Iran has told the IAEA that this date will
likely slip.16
Iran has a plant to produce heavy water for the reactor. An August 2013 report from IAEA
Director-General Amano states that the plant appeared to be in operation, but his November 2013
report does not repeat this assessment. Tehran has notified the IAEA that it has produced enough
heavy water to commission the reactor.
The Arak reactor is a proliferation concern because heavy water reactors produce plutonium
better suited for nuclear weapons than plutonium produced by light water-moderated reactors.17
However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel—a procedure called “reprocessing.” Iran
has said that it will not engage in reprocessing. A November 2011 report from Amano described
an “absence of any indicators that Iran is currently considering reprocessing irradiated nuclear
fuel to extract plutonium.”18
November 24 Joint Plan of Action Elements
The November 24 joint plan of action text describes a two-step process for Iran and the P5+1 to
“reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear
programme will be exclusively peaceful.” This solution “would build on these initial measures
and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon.” It would also “produce the
comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national
sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme.” Reiterating previous Iranian statements, the
agreement also states that “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or
develop any nuclear weapons.”
The first step described in the joint plan of action is to last for six months and be “renewable by
mutual consent.” The agreement does not include a start date for this six-month period.
“Implementation will begin following technical discussions with Iran and the IAEA, and
[European Union] preparations to suspend the relevant sanctions, which we hope will all be
concluded by the end of January,” according to November 25, 2013, parliamentary testimony
from British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs William Hague.19
Beginning on December 9, technical experts from Iran and the P5+1 met to discuss implementing
the interim agreement.
The P5+1 and Iran are to establish a “Joint Commission” to “monitor the implementation of the
near-term measures and address issues that may arise.” The exact composition of this commission
had not been determined at the time the agreement was concluded on November 24. The IAEA
will be “responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures,” but the commission will work
16 Deputy National Security Adviser Tony Blinken indicated during a November 25, 2013, television interview that
Iran could have completed the reactor earlier (“‘Fox and Friends’ Interview with Deputy National Security Adviser
Tony Blinken,” Fox News Channel, November 25, 2013).
17 Both the Tehran Research Reactor and an Iranian nuclear power reactor near Bushehr are light-water reactors.
18 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011.
19 The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs William Hague, Today’s House of Commons
Debates, November 25, 2013.
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with the agency “to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern,” the agreement
says. As noted, the IAEA has long sought to resolve some outstanding questions regarding
Tehran’s nuclear program. The commission will also monitor the implementation of the
agreement’s sanctions provisions.
Nuclear Program Provisions
Iran and the P5+1 “aim to conclude negotiating and commence implementing” the second step of
the comprehensive solution “no more than one year after the adoption of this document,” the
agreement says. The comprehensive solution described in the joint plan of action would include a
“mutually defined [Iranian] enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency
measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme.” Specifically, the two sides are to reach
agreement on the “scope and level” of Iran’s enrichment activities, the capacity and location of
Iranian enrichment facilities, and the size and composition of Tehran’s enriched uranium stocks.
These limits would continue “for a period to be agreed upon.”
Tehran would be obligated to “resolve concerns related to” the Arak reactor, refrain from
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel or constructing a facility “capable of reprocessing,” implement
“agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring,” and ratify and implement its
Additional Protocol. The agreement also states that “international civil nuclear cooperation”
would be part of a comprehensive solution.20
According to the joint plan of action, “[f]ollowing successful implementation of the final step of
the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in
the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.”
Initial Steps21
Iran has agreed to refrain from “any further advances of its activities” at the Natanz commercial-
scale facility, Fordow facility, and Arak reactor. Tehran is also to provide the IAEA with
additional information about its nuclear program, as well as access to some nuclear-related
facilities to which Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement does not require access. These latter steps
are designed to ensure Iran’s compliance with the Iran-P5+1 agreement, as well as improve the
IAEA’s ability to detect Iranian efforts to produce weapons-grade HEU using its declared nuclear
facilities, or to use or develop covert facilities for that purpose.
Government officials, such as British Foreign Secretary Hague and U.S. Deputy National
Security Adviser Tony Blinken, have expressed confidence that the IAEA will be able to detect
any Iranian noncompliance with the joint plan of action.22 In addition, Herman Nackaerts, who
until recently was IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards, echoed this confidence in an
interview with Reuters.23 Moreover, the interim agreement’s nuclear provisions will add
20 Such cooperation would include “modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, and the
supply of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed” research and development (R&D) practices.
21 Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on the agreement text (available at http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/
docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf), “Background Briefing By Senior Administration Officials On First Step Agreement On
Iran’s Nuclear Program,” November 24, 2013, and GOV/2013/56.
22 CNN, November 25, 2013.
23 Fredrik Dahl, “Analysis: Reversible Iran Deal Puts More Pressure on Final Talks,” Reuters, November 27, 2013.
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“probably several months” to the time needed for Iran to produce a nuclear weapon, Blinken
stated November 25.24
Enrichment Program
Centrifuge Limits
Iran is to refrain from feeding uranium hexafluoride into its installed centrifuges that are not
enriching uranium. Tehran is also to replace existing centrifuges only with “centrifuges of the
same type” and produce centrifuges for the sole purpose of replacing damaged centrifuges.
Tehran is to refrain from installing additional centrifuges at the Natanz facility and constructing
additional enrichment facilities.
Level of Enrichment Limits
Iran is to refrain from producing enriched uranium hexafluoride containing 20% uranium-235.
Tehran is also to dilute half of this stockpile to uranium hexafluoride containing no more than 5%
uranium-235 and convert the rest to the same form of uranium oxide that is being used as fuel for
the Tehran Research Reactor.25 Iran is also to refrain from building a line in its uranium
conversion facility for reconverting the uranium oxide to uranium hexafluoride.
LEU Stockpile Limits
Iran is also to, in effect, freeze its production of enriched uranium hexafluoride containing up to
5% uranium-235 by converting the material to uranium dioxide. Tehran would take this step when
it has completed the necessary facility, which is currently under construction. The uranium
dioxide is to be set aside for R&D on fuel for Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power reactor.
According to the joint plan of action, Iran will continue its “current enrichment R&D Practices”
under IAEA safeguards, “which are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.” This
provision prohibits Tehran from producing enriched uranium hexafluoride containing more than
5% uranium-235 as part of an R&D program.
Additional Monitoring
The agreement also provides for additional IAEA monitoring of the enrichment facilities.
Specifically, it allows IAEA inspectors to access video records from those facilities on a daily
basis. Currently, inspectors reportedly access such records (the video is not streamed in real time
to the agency), but not on a daily basis. Deputy National Security Adviser Blinken stated in a
November 25, 2013, television interview that such access would enable IAEA inspectors to detect
Iranian efforts to produce weapons-grade HEU at its declared enrichment facilities “almost
instantaneously.”26 However, as noted, U.S. officials have previously expressed confidence in the
IAEA’s ability to detect such Iranian efforts; the extent to which the November 24 agreement
improves this ability is unclear.
24 “Deal Leaves Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Intact,” National Public Radio, November 25, 2013.
25 As noted, this material is unsuitable for further enrichment. Uranium hexafluoride is the form of uranium used as
feedstock for centrifuge enrichment.
26 CNN, November 25, 2013.
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Arak Reactor
Iran is to refrain from commissioning the reactor, transferring fuel or heavy water to the reactor
site, testing and producing additional reactor fuel, and installing remaining reactor components.
The agreement allows Tehran to continue some construction at the reactor site and also produce
reactor components off-site that are not covered by the agreement. Iran has also agreed to refrain
from reprocessing spent nuclear material and building a reprocessing facility.27
Iran has agreed to submit updated design information about the reactor and take “[s]teps to agree
with the IAEA on conclusion of” a suitable safeguards approach for the reactor. IAEA Director-
General Amano’s November 2013 report states that the IAEA needs this updated design
information “as early as possible in order ... to ensure that all possible diversion paths are
identified, and appropriate safeguards measures and customized safeguards equipment are put in
place.”
Additional Information
According to the joint plan of action, Iran is to provide the IAEA with other information about
Tehran’s nuclear programs—a provision which appears to reiterate Iran’s commitments pursuant
to its November 11, 2013, agreement with the IAEA described above. Provision of this
information is required by the additional protocol and code 3.1 of Iran’s subsidiary arrangement
to its IAEA safeguards agreement.
Iran is also to provide IAEA inspectors with “managed access” to its centrifuge assembly
workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops, centrifuge storage facilities, and uranium
mines and mills.28 Access to these facilities, which the IAEA has lacked for some time, will help
the IAEA to enhance its understanding of the enrichment program’s scope and thereby improve
the agency’s ability to detect an undeclared Iranian enrichment program.
U.N. Security Council Resolutions
The first steps of the joint plan of action do not fulfill Iran’s obligations imposed by the U.N.
Security Council. However, the agreement states that its parties are to take “additional steps in
between the initial measures and the final step, including ... addressing the UN Security Council
resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Council’s
consideration of this matter.” As part of this process, the Council could adopt a new resolution
altering the resolutions’ current requirements.
27 There is no public official evidence that Iran has such a facility.
28 According to the IAEA, “managed access” to nuclear-related facilities is “arranged in such a way as ‘to prevent the
dissemination of proliferation sensitive information, to meet safety or physical protection requirements, or to protect
proprietary or commercially sensitive information.’ Such arrangements shall not preclude the Agency from conducting
activities necessary to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at the
location in question.” (2001 IAEA Safeguards Glossary. Available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/
6570/IAEA-Safeguards-Glossary-2001-Edition.)
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Right to Enrichment
The joint plan of action also addresses the issue of Iran’s right to enrich uranium. Tehran has long
argued that it has the right to enrich uranium pursuant to the NPT, Article IV of which states, in
part, that nothing in the treaty “shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination and in conformity” with the non-proliferation provisions of the
treaty. For example, Iran demanded in a 2012 proposal to the P5+1 that those countries recognize
and announce “Iran’s nuclear rights, particularly its enrichment activities, based on NPT Article
IV.”29
According to the agreement, the “comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its
right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity
with its obligations therein.” This solution “would involve a mutually defined enrichment
programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the
programme.” The solution would also “[r]eflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT
and IAEA Safeguards Agreements.”
The Obama Administration has not acknowledged that Iran or any other country has the right to
enrich uranium because the United States does not believe that the NPT contains an explicit right
to enrichment. A senior Administration official explained on November 24, 2013, that, although
the comprehensive solution does envision a possible Iranian enrichment program, “the United
States has not recognized a right to enrich for the Iranian government, nor do we intend to. The
document does not say anything about recognizing a right to enrich uranium.”30
The United States has also been concerned that acknowledging such a right for Iran could weaken
the P5+1’s ability to persuade Tehran to accept limits on its enrichment program because Iranian
negotiators could claim that an “acknowledged inalienable right cannot be abridged.”31 U.S.
officials have also wanted to avoid acknowledging such a right because the acknowledgement
could set a precedent that could compromise other U.S. efforts to limit the number of enrichment
facilities in the world.32 Echoing the U.S. argument, British Foreign Secretary Hague testified on
November 25 that the joint plan of action does not contain “a recognition of the right to enrich,
which we do not believe exists under the non-proliferation treaty.” French Minister of Foreign
Affairs Laurent Fabius made a similar claim in a radio interview the same day.33
Other governments, including Germany and Japan, argue that the NPT includes a right to
enrichment, Under Secretary Sherman acknowledged during the October 3, 2013, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing. Indeed, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov
indicated in a November 26, 2013, statement that the agreement acknowledges “the right of Iran”
to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.34
29 Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals.
30 “Background Briefing By Senior Administration Officials On First Step Agreement On Iran’s Nuclear Program,”
November 24, 2013.
31 Interview with former Administration official, December 4, 2013.
32 Interviews with two former Administration officials, December 4, 2013, and December 5, 2013.
33 Interview given by M. Laurent Fabius to Europe 1, November 25, 2013.
34 Comment from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 26, 2013.
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U.S. Sanctions Easing
The joint plan of action provides for what the Administration terms “limited, temporary, targeted,
and reversible” sanctions relief for Iran.35 Almost all U.S. sanctions provisions provide the
President with waiver authority. Other countries that commit to easing sanctions are expected to
do so to the extent permitted by their political systems. Those sanctions that have been imposed
by executive order could be eased by a superseding order. Moreover, most sanctions laws give the
Administration flexibility to determine sanctions violations. These issues are discussed further in
CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by
Dianne E. Rennack and CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
The agreement provides for the following:
• Iran will be able to repatriate about $4.2 billion in oil sales proceeds that is
locked up in foreign accounts, and to access an additional $400 million of its
hard currency for tuition for Iranian students abroad. Iran is estimated to have the
vast majority (80%) of its $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings
inaccessible,36 in part because of a provision (Section 504) of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-158) that requires Iran
to be paid for oil sales in accounts located in the countries that buy the Iranian
oil. Enabling Iran to access these assets appears to require use of the waiver
provisions of Section 1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 112-81) or Section 104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act (P.L. 111-195). Those laws sanction foreign
banks that deal with Iranian commercial banks and Iran’s Central Bank. Such
waivers could potentially be applied to specific foreign banks that hold specific
targeted amounts of Iranian hard currency, or with respect to all banks in a
specified country or countries.
• During the interim agreement period, Iran’s oil exports are to remain at their
current level of about 1 million barrels per day—a 60% drop from 2011 levels of
about 2.5 million barrels per day. This implies that Iran’s current oil customers
will not reduce their oil purchases from Iran “significantly” during the interim
period—such reduction is a requirement to avoid sanctions on the banks of those
countries under Section 1245 of P.L. 112-81. To avoid penalizing these oil
buyers, the Administration would appear to need to exercise the waiver
provisions of Section 1245. The European Union countries have committed to
easing sanctions against shipping insurance that have deterred some Iranian oil
purchases.37
• Iran will be permitted to resume sales of petrochemicals and trading in gold and
other precious metals, and to resume transactions with foreign firms involved in
Iran’s auto sector. The Administration estimates the value of the revenue Iran will
accrue from these changes during the six months of the interim arrangement is
$1.5 billion. Enabling Iran to sell petrochemicals appears to require the
35 White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of
Iran’s Nuclear Program.” November 23, 2013.
36 Author conversations with congressional staff and experts on Iran, September – November 2013.
37 Daniel Fineren. “Iran Nuclear Deal Shipping Insurance Element May Help Oil Sales.” Reuters, November 24, 2013.
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Administration to suspend applicable provisions of Executive Order 13622 (July
30, 2012) sanctioning foreign firms that buy Iranian petrochemicals. It is not
clear whether there will also be a requirement to suspend provisions of Executive
Order 13590 sanctioning sales of equipment that Iran can use to expand
petrochemical production. Permitting Iran to deal in precious metals appears to
require a waiver of Section 1245 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation
Act of 2012 (Title XII, subtitle D, of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization
Act, P.L. 112-239), which sanctions entities that supply precious metals (gold and
others) to Iran. Easing sanctions on foreign participation in Iran’s automotive
sector appears to require an Administration modification of Executive Order
13645 of June 3, 2013, that imposes sanctions required by the Iran Sanctions Act
(P.L. 104-172) on firms that supply goods or services to Iran’s automotive sector.
• The United States will facilitate humanitarian transactions that are already
allowed by U.S. law, such as sales of medicine to Iran, but which many banks
refuse to finance. The United States also commits to license safety-related repairs
and inspections inside Iran for certain Iranian airlines. Such licensing is
specifically permitted under U.S. trade regulations written pursuant to Executive
Order 12959 (May 6, 1995) and Executive Order 13059 (August 19, 1997) that
impose a ban on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran. However, several Iranian
airlines, including Iran Air, have been designated for sanctions under Executive
Order 13382 or 13224, and it is possible that these designations might need to be
rescinded in order to approve repairs to planes operated by sanctioned airlines.
• The P5+1 and Iran agreed to set up a Joint Commission whose tasks will include
evaluating P5+1 compliance with its commitments for sanctions relief. The
commission apparently will be empowered to consider Iranian complaints about
foreign firms that Tehran believes have been sanctioned inappropriately for its
commercial interactions with Iran.
Analysis of Sanctions Relief
According to the Administration, the sanctions relief offered maintains “the vast bulk of the
sanctions, including the oil, finance, and banking sanctions architecture.” According to the
Administration, “If Iran fails to meet its commitments, [the United States and its partners] will
revoke the relief.”38 Administration officials note that sanctions relief during the six-month period
amounts to between $6 billion and $7 billion. During that same six months, the oil sanctions that
remain in place (Section 1245 of P.L. 112-81) will reduce Iran’s oil export earnings by about $30
billion.39 According to the Administration argument, the hard currency balances in Iran’s accounts
abroad will actually increase during the six-month period, even though $4.7 billion will be
allowed to be drawn down.
The interim agreement does not require an easing of any U.S. sanctions that were imposed in the
1980s and 1990s based on Iran’s support for acts of international terrorism. The sanctions relief
does not, for example, permit foreign firms to resume investment in Iran’s energy sector. Iran’s
38 White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic
of Iran’s Nuclear Program.” November 23, 2013.
39 Ibid.
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gross domestic product (GDP) shrank about 5% in 2013 due largely to sanctions, and Treasury
Department officials say the interim deal will have a small positive impact on Iran’s economy.40
Critics of the interim deal assert that although the formal sanctions relief might appear modest,
the act of easing sanctions even slightly may ignite a process of sanctions unraveling. According
to this view, foreign firms anticipate that Iran will be welcomed back into the international
community, and that penalties for doing business in Iran will either end or not be strictly
enforced.41 Others argue that the sanctions relief offered is already having a psychological effect
on Iran’s economy. Crowds welcomed the negotiating team upon their return from the Geneva
meetings, apparently hopeful that the sanctions relief offered will improve the economy. The
unofficial exchange rate of Iran’s currency, the rial, immediately began to appreciate after the
deal was announced and has continued to rise since, according to various press reports.
Pledge of “No New Nuclear Sanctions”
The interim agreement contains a P5+1 commitment to “[n]ot impose new nuclear-related
sanctions for six months, if Iran abides by its commitments under this deal, to the extent
permissible within their political systems.”42 This pledge has direct implications for congressional
reaction to the interim agreement. Some Members have cited an overall mistrust of Iranian
intentions, perhaps partly based on past examples of Iranian behavior regarding the nuclear issue,
as reasons to question whether Iran will fully implement the deal. Some Members say they doubt
that the negotiating process will produce a result that ensures that Iran’s nuclear program can only
be used for peaceful purposes. Some Members reportedly plan to introduce new legislation that
would strengthen sanctions (on Iran’s economy, but clearly related to Iran’s nuclear program) if
the President does not certify to Congress that Iran is fully implementing the agreement and has
not been involved in any anti-U.S. terrorism.43 The sanctions that may be imposed, if that
certification is not issued, apparently are similar to those proposed in H.R. 850, a House bill that
was passed 400-20 in July 2013. Before the interim deal was reached, Senate action was
reportedly imminent on a version of that bill. It is not known if any of the other P5+1 countries
had been considering increasing their sanctions on Iran, but the other countries that forged the
agreement are required to refrain from doing so as well.
After the interim deal was reached, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said in an
interview that any U.S. imposition of new sanctions during the interim period would void the
deal.44 It is not clear that the reported legislation, if enacted, would represent imposition of new
sanctions that would cause Iran to refuse to implement its commitments. Still, the Administration
argues that the consideration or enactment of any new sanctions legislation by Congress could
complicate the ongoing negotiating process and potentially split the international coalition that
successfully negotiated the joint plan of action. The Administration argues that some countries
could end their cooperation with international sanctions if they perceive that the United States is
40 Elad Benari. “Zarif: We Only Spoke with the U.S. About the Nuclear Program.” Arutz Sheva, November 27, 2013.
41 David Sanger and Jod Rudoren. “A Gamble in Iran Talks: Easing of the Sanctions.” New York Times, November 23,
2013.
42 White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of
Iran’s Nuclear Program.” November 23, 2013.
43 Bradley Klapper. “Obama, Senate Spar Over New Iran Sanctions Threats.” Associated Press, November 27, 2013.
44 Robin Wright. “Exclusive: Iran’s Foreign Minister Says Sanctions Would Kill Nuclear Deal” Time, December 9,
2013.
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not upholding its end of the agreement, including the pledge not to increase sanctions.45
Proponents of additional sanctions might counter that such legislation might be useful in the next
round of negotiations by reinforcing to Iran that it would face consequences for failing to comply
with the interim agreement or to accept a comprehensive agreement within the next six months.
Implications and Reactions in the Middle East
The interim agreement and potential comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran has profound
implications for the Middle East, particularly in the potential to lower regional tensions that have,
at times, threatened to boil over into military conflict. Governments generally friendly to Tehran,
such as Iraq and Syria, reacted positively; Iraq’s Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki hailed it as a
“major step for the region’s security and stability.” Syria’s leadership, perhaps indirectly hinting
at potential approaches for resolving its own internal conflict, said the deal proved the importance
of diplomacy to resolve regional disputes.46
The interim agreement has significant potential implications for the Persian Gulf states, which
have generally been aligned with the United States to contain Tehran’s influence. Some of the
Gulf countries were more positive than many experts expected about the interim deal. Bahrain, a
member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and close ally of GCC de facto leader Saudi
Arabia, has accused Tehran of supporting hardline Shiite factions in the unrest that has rocked
Bahrain since early 2011. Yet, Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa stated that the
interim agreement “removes fears from us, whether from Iran or any other state.”47 The United
Arab Emirates (UAE), which like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia has consistently identified Tehran as
a major regional adversary, expressed “hope that this would represent a step towards a permanent
agreement that preserves the stability of the region and shield it from tension and the danger of
nuclear proliferation.” Although not reflected in their public statements, as an Iran-P5+1 deal took
shape, some Gulf officials expressed concerns about a “double standard” in which Iran would be
allowed to continue enriching uranium, whereas the United States insists that civilian nuclear
programs in the Gulf, such as that in UAE, not include indigenous production of nuclear fuel.48
The interim deal lowered regional tensions to the point where Foreign Minister Zarif and his
aides visited several of the GCC states after the deal was reached—Qatar, Oman, UAE, and
Kuwait. The Iranian diplomats appealed for cooperation in curbing sectarian tensions that have
been stoked by Iran and the GCC’s support for opposing sides in Syria’s civil war.49
Still, it is likely that few, if any, regional states will immediately shift their defense and foreign
policy postures in response to the interim deal alone. The GCC states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, and Oman) are closely aligned on security issues with the United States and
host significant numbers of U.S. troops and amounts of U.S. prepositioned military equipment—
in large part due to contingency plans regarding a potential crisis with Tehran. These states have
been at odds with the Islamic Republic since its 1979 Islamic revolution—and especially during
the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war in which Iran attacked international shipping and some Gulf port
facilities of Kuwait. Pro-Iranian Shia movements reportedly were responsible for acts of
45 Ibid.
46 “Iran’s Arab Neighbors Keep Reservations Quiet Over Nuclear Deal.” Reuters, November 24, 2013.
47 Ibid.
48 Author conversations with Gulf diplomats. 2011-2013.
49 Liz Sly. “After Iran Deal, Uptick in Diplomacy, Violence.” Washington Post, December 4, 2013.
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intimidation and terrorism in several of the GCC states during the 1980s and 1990s—an era that
long predated international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.
Despite public reactions to the interim nuclear deal, many experts assert that the Gulf states—and
other states that cooperate closely with the United States on security matters, such as Israel and
Jordan—privately might question whether the nuclear negotiations with Iran represent a more
fundamental U.S. shift away from the region. In citing evidence for a possible U.S. shift, leaders
of some of these states conflate the deal with Iran with U.S. reticence to act in the internal conflict
in Syria and with the U.S. pullout of all troops from Iraq. Some Middle Eastern diplomats also
express concern that the United States wants ultimately to rebuild the strategic alliance between
the United States and Iran that existed for most of the rule of the ousted Shah of Iran.50
Israel and Saudi Arabia are two close U.S. allies in the region that appear to have particularly
acute concerns about the longer-term implications of the U.S. decision to accept an interim deal
with Iran. Their reactions are examined in greater detail below.
Israel51
Israel’s leaders routinely assert that their country is uniquely threatened by the possibility that
Iran might obtain nuclear weapons—despite Iran’s insistence that its nuclear program is solely for
peaceful purposes. Consequently, Israel has assertively participated in the public debate that has
accompanied both the diplomacy leading to the November 24, 2013, interim agreement on Iran’s
nuclear program and its aftermath. Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has vociferously
warned of the alleged perils of a deal that would in any way ease the international sanctions
regime against Iran and would accept Iran’s retention of enriched uranium or of infrastructure
potentially usable for the generation of fissile material. He labeled the interim agreement an
“historic mistake,” and had similarly inveighed against the contours of the agreement that was
nearly reached earlier in November as the “deal of the century for Iran.” President Obama
reportedly spoke by phone with Netanyahu hours after the interim deal was signed, though
Obama’s attempts to reassure Netanyahu of a continued U.S. commitment to preventing Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons did not appear to affect Netanyahu’s opposition to the deal.52
Other Israeli leaders express a range of views. A number of cabinet ministers and leading
politicians from Netanyahu’s coalition government have joined in criticizing the agreement.
However, Israeli President Shimon Peres and several prominent former military and intelligence
officials have welcomed the initial step that the agreement might represent. Retired Major
General Amos Yadlin, a former military intelligence chief, was quoted as saying:
This agreement is something I can live with—for the next six months. For the first time since
2003, the Iranian nuclear program is halted, even slightly rolled back. [If this were the final
agreement,] it would really be a bad agreement, but that’s not the situation.53
50 Author conversations with Persian Gulf diplomats, 2013.
51 This section was prepared by Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. For additional background on Israel’s
perspective on and approach to the Iranian nuclear issue, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
52 Matthew Lee et al., “Obama Advised Netanyahu of Iran Talks in Early September,” Associated Press, November 25,
2013.
53 “Unlike Netanyahu, retired generals go along with Iran deal,” UPI, November 26, 2013.
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Some Israeli officials and lawmakers have questioned the wisdom of Netanyahu’s assertively
critical stance toward U.S.-led negotiations. Isaac Herzog, leader of the Labor Party and the
Knesset opposition, has argued that Netanyahu’s approach has been too focused on outright
rejection of compromise. Herzog has called for Netanyahu instead to focus on accepting the
reality of the current diplomatic track and on working with President Obama behind closed doors
to help shape an “effective permanent Iran deal.”54 Media reports indicate that high-level U.S.-
Israeli consultations on the issue are imminent.
However, it is unclear whether Netanyahu will significantly change his tactics, visibility, or tone
on the subject, as he may see his efforts as instrumental in giving Israel a voice in a negotiating
process in which it does not directly participate. It is possible, though not certain, that
Netanyahu’s outspoken criticism of the early November “near-deal”—along with French
objections—contributed to a toughening of the ultimate interim agreement with regard to freezing
activities connected with Iran’s heavy water reactor at Arak. Also, Netanyahu may view
outspokenness as essential both in holding Iran accountable to its part of the deal, and in
cultivating support from key audiences such as Congress and broader U.S. public opinion—
particularly in connection with potential legislative initiatives relating to the imposition and/or
lifting of sanctions. However, as for a potential Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities,
many—if not most—observers deem it unlikely while international hopes remain for a diplomatic
solution.55
In addition to the question of how effective diplomacy can be in compelling Iran to surrender any
capacity it might have or otherwise develop to build nuclear weapons, Israeli concerns regarding
the next six months appear to center on preventing the erosion of the sanctions that remain—
particularly on Iranian oil exports. According to a prominent Israeli journalist, “officials in
Jerusalem are worried that the front has begun to collapse; enforcing the sanctions took a lot of
work, and the moment they are relaxed, it will be hard to stop China, or European businesspeople
who spot economic opportunities, from relaxing them more.”56 Many analysts anticipate that
Israel will press the Obama Administration to emphasize to other countries the importance of
observing and enforcing compliance with the sanctions, and to vigorously discourage or deter
potential “workarounds.”57
More broadly, U.S. pursuit of diplomacy with Iran appears to exacerbate Israel’s anxiety over the
extent to which it can rely on its geographically distant superpower ally to actively thwart
potential threats Israel faces in the manner its government prefers, especially at a time when it
may perceive that the U.S. profile in the Middle East may be waning due to a number of political
and economic factors. It remains to be seen whether this presages fundamental change in the
U.S.-Israel relationship, including possible effects on Israel’s capacity and resolve to defend its
population and borders, deter its potential adversaries, and settle its disputes with the Palestinians
and neighboring states.
54 Haviv Gur Rettig, “Herzog: Netanyahu sowing ‘unnecessary panic’ on Iran,” Times of Israel, November 25, 2013.
55 See, e.g., Amos Harel, “With Iran deal sealed, don’t expect Israel to send out the air force,” Ha’aretz, November 25,
2013.
56 Harel, op. cit.
57 See, e.g., Dennis Ross, “How to Think About Obama’s Deal with Iran,” Politico, November 25, 2013.
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Saudi Arabia58
Saudi leaders see the government of Iran as an existential threat and view Iran’s nuclear program
as inherently threatening, in spite of Iranian assurances of its peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the
Saudi cabinet responded to the recently concluded agreement with the following statement:
The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has viewed carefully the Geneva
Agreement of the P5+1 Group and Iran around the Iranian nuclear program on 21 Muharram
1435, November 24 2013. The Kingdom views the agreement as a primary step towards a
comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear program, as long as good intentions are
provided and as long as it concludes in a Middle East and Gulf region free of all weapons of
mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. The Kingdom hopes that such a step will be
followed by more important steps leading to a guarantee of the right for all countries in the
region to peacefully use nuclear energy.
Although the public Saudi reaction was more positive than many experts expected, it remains to
be seen how Saudi Arabian leaders will respond to any further U.S. negotiations with Iran or any
perceived failings by Iran or the United States to live up to their commitments as outlined in the
agreement. Saudi Arabia has close defense and security ties with the United States anchored by
long-standing military training programs and supplemented by ongoing high-value weapons sales
and new critical infrastructure security cooperation initiatives. These bonds would be difficult to
break or replace rapidly, although outstanding Saudi and U.S. decisions regarding implementation
of cooperative agreements could provide opportunities for both sides to reconsider or send
messages about ties in the event of serious disagreements. Saudi officials have long feared that
closer U.S.-Iranian relations could undermine the basis for close Saudi-U.S. relations and
empower Iran to be more assertive in the Gulf region and broader Middle East. These fears are
amplified at the moment by Saudi perceptions of what they see as an expansionist, sectarian
Iranian agenda aimed at empowering Shia Muslims in the region at the expense of Sunnis. Iranian
leaders attribute similarly sectarian motives to their Saudi counterparts. Analysts continue to
debate whether the Kingdom would seek to acquire its own nuclear weapons capability if Iran did
so.
Implications for U.S.-Iran Relations59
Many of the reported regional concerns about the interim deal assume that the agreement
increases the potential for a breakthrough in U.S.-Iran relations. That perception has been fed by
the fact that Secretary of State John Kerry has had substantial interaction with Iranian Foreign
Minister Zarif over the past several months; the Iran-P5+1 talks in 2013 have consistently
included extensive bilateral meetings between the two chief diplomats.
The two countries have been mostly at odds since the February 1979 Islamic revolution, and
came into limited naval conflict during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. In 1984, the United States
placed Iran on its list of “state sponsors of terrorism” and has accused Iran of numerous acts of
terrorism against the United States and its interests. The most recent such accusation came in
October 2011 when the Justice Department accused Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods
58 This section was prepared by Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
59 For detail on U.S.-Iran relations, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth
Katzman.
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Force (IRGC-QF) of involvement in a suspected plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to
the United States at a restaurant in Washington, DC.
At other times prior to the interim deal, the United States and Tehran have cooperated when doing
so has suited their mutual interests. U.S. diplomats negotiated with Iranian officials to form the
post-Taliban government in Afghanistan in late 2001, and in connection with the formation of
post-Saddam governments and various security-related issues in Iraq during the 2003-2011 U.S.
military presence there. Iranian leaders sent a proposal to the George W. Bush Administration in
2003 offering to negotiate all outstanding issues between the two countries; the Administration
did not respond to the offer reportedly out of concern that it lacked the imprimatur of Iran’s
Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i. The interim deal reportedly was, in part, a
product of quiet U.S.-Iran negotiations since 2011, but which accelerated after the June 2013
election of President Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani unexpectedly won election on a platform of
ending Iran’s international isolation and obtaining relief from international sanctions. The talks
between Iranian officials and U.S. officials reportedly were brokered by and occurred in the
Sultanate of Oman, a GCC state that has consistently maintained excellent relations with Iran.60
The potential for rapprochement seemed to improve as the U.N. General Assembly meetings in
New York approached. President Obama, in his September 24, 2013, speech, confirmed that he
had exchanged letters with Rouhani stating the U.S. willingness to resolve the nuclear issue
peacefully.61 President Obama’s speech also appeared intended to assuage long-standing Iranian
fears, reportedly particularly strongly held by the Supreme Leader, by stating, “We are not
seeking regime change.” The Administration signaled that the President would be open to
meeting Rouhani on September 24, 2013, during time between their respective speeches to the
General Assembly. That meeting did not occur, but a September 27, 2013, phone call President
Obama placed to Rouhani represented the first direct contact between presidents of the two
countries since the Islamic revolution of 1979. The two presidents reportedly agreed to direct
their teams to focus on a nuclear solution, which Rouhani said could be achievable within six
months.
Officials of both countries have sought to downplay prospects that the interim nuclear deal will
produce a dramatic breakthrough in relations. U.S. and Iranian officials have denied that the
Geneva bilateral talks discussed broader issues beyond the nuclear issue.62 U.S. officials also
have stressed that no sanctions that address long-standing U.S. concerns about Iran’s use of
terrorism or its human rights abuses have been lifted. Iranian officials appear to be reticent to
discuss broader rapprochement out of concerns about hardline Iranian factions that see the United
States as an implacable adversary. These factions, supported by frequent comments by Iran’s
Supreme Leader to that effect, maintain that the United States is committed to overturning Iran’s
regime and limiting the influence of pro-Iranian movements and governments in the region. The
nuclear deal also has caused some unrest among Iranian dissidents as well as families of three
American nationals confirmed or believed held by Iran. Some of these groups had wanted the
United States to seek Iranian concessions on human rights issues as part of any nuclear deal.
60 http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/26/
who_is_the_shadowy_sultan_that_shepherded_the_nuclear_deal_with_iran.
61 Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 2013.
62 Elad Benari. op.cit.
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Yet, some see the agreement as a significant step toward U.S.-Iran rapprochement. In his remarks
after the deal was announced, President Obama said that “we can begin to chip away at the
mistrust between our two nations.”63 Some experts suggest that the interim agreement could cause
the United States to look for ways to cooperate with Iran on regional issues, such as Syria, where
the two countries are supporting opposite sides in the civil war. The two countries also appear to
share an interest in reducing sectarian tensions in Iraq that are affecting the stability of the Shiite-
led government of Prime Minister Maliki, who has sought to balance relations with both Iran and
the United States.
63 Statement by the President on the First Step Agreement on Iran’s Nuclear Program. November 23, 2013.
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Appendix. Nuclear Weapons Development64
An effective nuclear weapons capability has three major elements: producing fissile material in
sufficient quantity and quality for a nuclear explosive device; designing and weaponizing a
survivable nuclear warhead; and producing an effective means for delivering the weapon, such as
a ballistic missile.65 The U.S. government assesses that, although Iran could eventually produce
nuclear weapons, it has not yet decided to do so and has not mastered all of the necessary
technologies for building a nuclear weapon. Tehran had a nuclear weapons program but halted it
in 2003, according to U.S. government estimates.66
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 3,
2013, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that Iran would need as much as one year to
produce a nuclear weapon if the government made the decision to do so.67 This estimate takes
into account the amount of time that Iran would need to produce a sufficient amount of weapons-
grade highly-enriched uranium (HEU), which is widely regarded as the most difficult task in
building nuclear weapons, as well as to develop the other components necessary for a nuclear
weapon. This estimate does not include the time that Iran would need to be able to render a
nuclear weapon deliverable by a ballistic missile. Then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated
in January 2012 that Iran would need “possibly ... one to two years in order to put [a nuclear
weapon] on a deliverable vehicle of some sort.”68
A senior intelligence official explained during a December 2007 press briefing that the
“acquisition of fissile material” was the “governing element in any timelines” regarding Iran’s
production of a “nuclear device.”69 However, the estimate articulated by Sherman assumes that
Iran would need less time to produce the necessary weapons-grade HEU than it would to
complete the relevant nuclear weapons design and weaponization tasks.70 This estimate also
apparently assumes that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material
for a weapon.71 The other assumptions behind the estimate are not clear.72
64 For more information about Iran’s ballistic missile program, see CRS Report R42849, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and
Space Launch Programs, by Steven A. Hildreth.
65 For a more detailed discussion, see Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass
Destruction (OTA-BP-ISC-115), December 1993.
66 A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate defined “nuclear weapons program” as “nuclear weapon design and
weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment related work.”
67 “Reversing Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 3, 2013.
68 Transcript of remarks by Secretary Panetta from CBS’s 60 Minutes interview, January 29, 2012.
69 “Unclassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,”
Background Briefing with Senior Intelligence Officials, December 3, 2007.
70 Iran has expanded its fissile material production capability after halting the other aspects of its weapons development
program in 2003.
71 It is worth noting that no country has ever used a centrifuge facility designed and built for low-enriched uranium
production to produce weapons-grade HEU. Therefore, Iran may need a trial-and-error period to determine the proper
modifications for its own centrifuge facilities, were Tehran to adapt them for such a purpose.
72 For a detailed discussion of the variables such estimates must take into account, see Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011, pp.69-70 and William C.
Witt, Christina Walrond, David Albright, and Houston Wood, Iran’s Evolving Breakout Potential, Institute for Science
and international Security, October 8, 2012.
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Tehran would probably use covert enrichment facilities to produce fissile material for nuclear
weapons—a tactic that would require a longer period of time, according to testimony from
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper during an April 18, 2013, Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing. As noted in the body of this report, U.S. officials have argued that the
International Atomic Energy Agency would likely detect an Iranian attempt to use its safeguarded
facilities to produce weapons-grade HEU. They have also expressed confidence in the United
States’ ability to detect covert Iranian enrichment plants.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Paul K. Kerr
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Analyst in Nonproliferation
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
pkerr@crs.loc.gov, 7-8693
Congressional Research Service
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