Automatic Continuing Resolutions:
Background and Overview of Recent
Proposals

Jessica Tollestrup
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process
October 28, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41948
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress

Automatic Continuing Resolutions: Background and Overview of Recent Proposals

Summary
Currently, 12 regular appropriations acts fund the activities of most federal government agencies.
When these acts are not completed prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, Congress uses a
continuing appropriations act, also known as a “continuing resolution” (CR), to provide interim
funding until the annual appropriations process is complete.
Some Members of Congress have proposed legislation to establish an automatic continuing
resolution (ACR) mechanism that would ensure a source of funding for discretionary spending
activities at a specified level in the event that the timely enactment of appropriations was
disrupted. The funding would become available automatically at any point during the fiscal year
when a funding gap occurred without any further congressional action being needed, and it would
remain available for the duration that the ACR mechanism was in effect.
The framework employed by ACR proposals since the early 1980s has varied along four major
dimensions: whether or not the measure sunsets, the level of funding that would automatically be
provided, the activities for which the funding could be used, and the duration for which the
funding would be available.
Proponents of ACRs have argued that the mechanism is needed to prevent the possibility of
government shutdowns and their related effects, and to promote a more deliberative and less
time-pressured decision-making process. Further, proponents also have argued that adopting an
ACR mechanism would make CRs a less attractive vehicle for unrelated legislative measures. In
contrast, opponents of an ACR mechanism have posited that it would create an advantage for the
current level of federal spending relative to other proposed levels during subsequent budget
negotiations. Opponents have also claimed that the threat of a government shutdown causes
serious negotiations and compromise to occur and by lessening or eliminating this threat, the
enactment of regular appropriations would become more difficult. A further critique has been that
an ACR mechanism would create procedural challenges under the current budget process because
it would effectively establish a permanent appropriation for covered activities.
Congressional action on an ACR proposal first occurred in 1991, with hearings on H.R. 298, the
Budget Process Reform Act (102nd Congress). Action also occurred with respect to ACR
proposals during five subsequent Congresses, including floor votes in the House in the 105th and
106th Congresses, and floor votes in the Senate in the 110th and 113th Congresses. During the 112th
and 113th Congresses, a number of proposals have been introduced that would provide ACRs
under a variety of frameworks.
As of the date of this report, the only ACR mechanism to be enacted into law is the Pay our
Military Act (P.L. 113-39), which was signed by the President on September 30, 2013. P.L. 113-
39 provides an ACR mechanism to cover FY2014 pay and allowances for (1) certain members of
the Armed Forces, (2) certain Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, and (3) other
specified DOD and Department of Homeland Security contractors. The funding level is indefinite
(e.g., “such sums as are necessary”). There are currently unresolved questions, however, related
to the mechanism’s possible operation during FY2014 and the first quarter of FY2015—for
example, whether the automatic funding could be in effect for any funding gap that might occur
in FY2014, the maximum period of availability for those funds (assuming they were not
terminated through the enactment of regular or continuing appropriations), and the sunset date of
the mechanism. This report will be updated once these questions are resolved.
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Automatic Continuing Resolutions: Background and Overview of Recent Proposals

Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Funding Gaps and Shutdowns ......................................................................................................... 3
Features of Automatic Continuing Resolutions ............................................................................... 4
Arguments For and Against Automatic Continuing Resolutions ..................................................... 6
Congressional Action on Automatic Continuing Resolution Proposals......................................... 13
Recent Proposals: 112th and 113th Congresses ............................................................................... 16
P.L. 113-39 (113th Congress) .......................................................................................................... 17

Tables
Table 1. Committee Action on ACR Proposals: 102nd-113th Congresses ....................................... 14
Table 2. Floor Action on ACR Proposals: 102nd-113th Congresses ................................................ 15

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 18
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 18

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Automatic Continuing Resolutions: Background and Overview of Recent Proposals

Introduction
The activities of most federal government agencies are funded by discretionary spending, which
is provided annually in regular appropriations acts.1 When these acts are not completed by the
beginning of the fiscal year, Congress typically uses a continuing appropriations act, also known
as a “continuing resolution” or CR, to provide interim funding until the annual appropriations
process is complete.2
Continuing resolutions often provide funding for projects and activities initiated or conducted in
the previous fiscal year based on a rate for operations.3 Generally, CRs do not allow the initiation
of any new projects or activities, and existing conditions or limitations on spending remain in
place. CRs often include “anomalies,” however, that adjust the purposes for which funds are
provided, or the rate of funding up or down from the CR’s general rate, to account for changing
circumstances or special concerns, particularly when budget authority4 is provided for the
remainder of the fiscal year.5
Historically, the completion of the annual appropriations process often has been delayed beyond
the start of the fiscal year. Between FY1952 and FY1976, at least one CR was required in each
fiscal year to provide funding until full-year appropriations were enacted. In response to this
trend, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344; 2 U.S. C. 621) moved the beginning of
the federal government fiscal year from July 1 to October 1, to allow three additional months for
the annual appropriations process to be concluded during the calendar year. 6 Despite this change,
all of the regular appropriations bills were enacted on time in only FY1977, FY1989, FY1995,
and FY1997. In other years during this period, one or more CRs were necessary to provide
interim budget authority.7
The Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1341-1342, 1511-1519) generally bars the obligation or
expenditure of federal funds in the absence of appropriations.8 Exceptions are made under the act,

1 The congressional budget process distinguishes between direct (or mandatory) spending, which is controlled through
permanent law, and discretionary spending, which is controlled through appropriations acts. For general information on
the types of spending within the congressional budget process, see CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal
Budget Process
, coordinated by Bill Heniff Jr.
2 For general information on the annual appropriations process, CRS Report R42388, The Congressional
Appropriations Process: An Introduction
, by Jessica Tollestrup.
3 The “rate for operations” is the annualized level of budget authority for a project or activity divided by the number of
days in the previous or current fiscal year, depending on the how the formula for the rate is provided. For further
information, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices, by
Jessica Tollestrup, and CRS Report RL34700, Interim Continuing Resolutions (CRs): Potential Impacts on Agency
Operations
, by Clinton T. Brass.
4 “Budget authority” is “authority provided by federal law to enter into financial obligations that will result in
immediate or future outlays involving federal government funds.” U.S. Government Accountability Office, a Glossary
of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process
, GAO-05-734SP, September 2005, p. 20.
5 For further information on continuing resolutions, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of
Components and Recent Practices
, by Jessica Tollestrup.
6 This change was effective in FY1977.
7 For further information on the completion of annual appropriations acts and the use of continuing resolutions, see
Table 1 in CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices, by Jessica
Tollestrup.
8 The Antideficiency Act is discussed in CRS Report RL30795, General Management Laws: A Compendium, by
(continued...)
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including for activities involving “the safety of human life or the protection of property.”9 When
appropriations for a particular project or activity are not provided in laws, either in the form of
regular appropriations or a continuing resolution, a funding gap occurs.10 Since the issuance of
two Attorney General opinions in the early 1980s,11 in the event of a funding gap, agencies are
required to begin a shutdown of all activities not essential to the protection of property or the
safety of human life and furlough all non-excepted12 employees. Concern regarding the effects of
shutdowns on the federal government, the economy, as well as private individuals, has led some
to advocate for the enactment of an automatic continuing resolution (ACR). An ACR would
establish a mechanism to ensure a source of funding for discretionary spending activities, with
some limitations, in the event that timely enactment of appropriations does not occur. The funding
would become available automatically at any point during the fiscal year when a funding gap
occurred without any further congressional action being needed, and it would remain available for
the duration specified in the ACR. If an ACR mechanism were enacted, the possibility that the
government would need to shut down due to a funding gap might be lessened or eliminated. Such
an automatic funding mechanism could also have a significant effect on the dynamics of the
appropriations process by effectively removing October 1 as the deadline for annual action to be
completed. These, as well as other potential effects, are discussed below.
The one ACR approach to have been adopted, the Pay our Military Act (P.L. 113-39), was in the
context of the FY2014 appropriations process, when concern over an impending funding gap led
to the enactment of P.L. 113-39 on September 30, 2013. This ACR mechanism is applicable to
certain FY2014 project and activities in three different categories relating to the pay and
allowances for (1) members of the Armed Forces, (2) Department of Defense (DOD) civilian
personnel, and (3) other specified DOD and Department of Homeland Security contractors.
Although the automatic funding provided by this ACR took effect on October 1, 2013, due to the
absence of enacted regular or interim continuing appropriations, questions remain regarding
aspects of the mechanism’s potential future operation. This ACR is discussed in the report section
entitled, “P.L. 113-39 (113th Congress).”
This report begins by providing background on the historic frequency of federal funding gaps.
Next, four major features of ACR proposals since the 1980s—time frame, funding level,
activities, and duration—are explained. This is followed by a summary of the major arguments
for and against the enactment of an ACR. Finally, the last three sections of the report review
congressional action that has taken place on ACR proposals, describe ACR proposals that have
been introduced but not enacted during the 112th and 113th Congresses, and provide brief analysis
of P.L. 113-39.

(...continued)
Clinton T. Brass et al. In addition, the Government Accountability Office provides information about the act online at
http://www.gao.gov/ada/antideficiency.htm.
9 See 31 U.S.C. §1342.
10 For further information on the historic frequency of funding gaps, see CRS Report RS20348, Federal Funding Gaps:
A Brief Overview
, by Jessica Tollestrup. For further information on the effects of funding gaps, see CRS Report
RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass.
11 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 224 (April 25, 1980); 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 293 (January 16, 1981).
12 Non-excepted employees are those subject to furlough during a government shutdown. For further information, see
U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11: Preparation,
Submission, and Execution of the Budget
, July 2010, Section 124, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
circulars_a11_current_year_a11_toc, as cited in CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes,
Processes, and Effects
, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass.
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Funding Gaps and Shutdowns
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution prohibits the payment of money out of the Treasury that
has not been provided by law. The Antideficiency Act (31 U.S. C. 1341-1342, 1511-1519), which
was initially enacted in 1870,13 additionally forbids agencies from obligating or expending federal
funds in the absence (or in excess) of an appropriation, except as authorized by law or under
certain conditions. The absence of appropriations results in a funding gap.
Before the 1980s, federal agencies postponed nonessential obligations during a funding gap but
otherwise continued regular program operations until funding was restored.14 However, at the end
of 1980 and beginning of 1981, two opinions issued by Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti
(hereafter referred to as the “Civiletti opinions”) effectively restricted agencies’ actions under
such conditions by clarifying that in the event of a funding gap, executive branch agencies must
immediately begin to terminate regular activities.15 Under the opinions, obligations without
budget authority are only allowed in situations where there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the
protection of property or the safety of human life might be compromised without such spending.16
Under current practice, when a funding gap occurs, the federal government promptly furloughs
all non-excepted personnel and curtails many related agency activities until funding has been
restored.17
Between FY1977 and FY2013, a total of 17 funding gaps occurred. In three instances (FY1983,
FY1985, and FY1996), there were two funding gaps for one fiscal year, and in one instance
(FY1978), there were three funding gaps. These gaps ranged in duration from one to 21 days. Six
of the seven lengthiest gaps were before FY1981; generally, the duration and frequency of gaps
lessened considerably after 1981, perhaps, in part, due to the greater consequences of funding
gaps for agency operations that resulted from the Civiletti opinions. In six of the cases, the
funding gap was due to a failure to enact annual appropriations or a CR by the start of the fiscal
year. In the other 11 cases, the funding gaps occurred between CRs (as the fiscal year was already
underway). Nine of the funding gaps occurred at the start of the fiscal year or during October; the
other eight occurred in November or December.18
Most recently, a funding gap for FY2014 appropriations commenced on October 1, 2013.

13 For further information on the Antideficiency Act, see CRS Report RL30795, General Management Laws: A
Compendium
, by Clinton T. Brass et al.
14 U.S. General Accounting Office, Funding Gaps Jeopardize Federal Government Operations, PAD-81-31, March 3,
1981, p. 2.
15 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 224 (April 25, 1980); 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 293 (January 16, 1981). For additional information on the
Civiletti opinions, see CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects,
coordinated by Clinton T. Brass.
16 Attorney General opinions are binding on executive branch agencies for the Administration during which they are
issued. While the continued observance of the guidance provided by prior Attorney General opinions is at the discretion
of future administrations, the executive branch in the 30 years since the Civiletti opinions were issued has largely
continued to follow them.
17 CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects, coordinated by
Clinton T. Brass.
18 For further information on funding gaps and a legislative history of the two FY1996 shutdowns, see CRS Report
RS20348, Federal Funding Gaps: A Brief Overview, by Jessica Tollestrup.
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Features of Automatic Continuing Resolutions
Concern over the disruptive effects of shutdowns on the federal government, the economy, and
individuals has led some to advocate for the enactment of an ACR. The objective of such a budget
process change is to ensure that, in the event regular or continuing appropriations are not enacted,
a funding gap would not occur. An ACR would establish a source of funding for discretionary
spending activities at a specified level in the event that the timely enactment of appropriations is
disrupted. The funding would be automatically available upon the occurrence of a funding gap
and remain available for a specified duration, without the need for any further congressional
action.
In addition to preventing federal government shutdowns, ACR proponents aim to provide
additional time beyond the start of the fiscal year for appropriations decisions to be made. With
these objectives in mind, a variety of ACR frameworks have been proposed since the 1980s that
vary along four major dimensions: the extent to which the mechanism would sunset or be
indefinitely available, the level of funding that would automatically be provided, the activities for
which the funding could be used, and the duration for which the funding would be effective.
Sunset
An ACR mechanism can include a sunset provision or be applicable on a permanent basis. ACR
mechanisms containing a sunset provision are applicable during a specified fiscal year or range of
fiscal years, but expire thereafter.19 The alternative type of mechanism permanently establishes an
ACR that does not expire.20 These permanent ACR mechanisms are either effective indefinitely,
or (most commonly) only effective if certain conditions have been met. For example, an ACR
mechanism might only be effective for fiscal years in which there is a general election for federal
office and Congress has not completed annual appropriations or enacted a CR by the date that the
election occurs, thereby reducing the need for appropriations to be enacted during a lame duck
session.21 Alternatively, a permanent ACR mechanism might apply only if full-year
appropriations had been enacted the prior year, either through regular appropriations measures or
a CR.22 In this latter instance, the ACR could not be effective for more than two fiscal years in
succession.
Both ACR mechanisms that include sunset provisions and those that are effective only in
specified conditions have at least one significant implication—while it would successfully
provide interim funding under certain circumstances, it could not indefinitely assure that a
funding gap would not occur.

19 See, for example, S. 99 (106th Cong.), H.R. 142 (106th Cong.), H.R. 29 (107th Cong.).
20 See, for example, H.R. 298 (102nd Cong.).
21 See, for example, H.R. 5842 (111th Cong.). For further information on lame duck sessions and the enactment of
regular appropriations, see CRS Report RL34597, The Enactment of Appropriations Measures During Lame Duck
Sessions
, by Jessica Tollestrup.
22 See, for example, S. 3652 (111th Cong.) S. 2070 (110th Cong.), H.R. 3583 (110th Cong.).
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Funding Level
Although ACR proposals have differed widely in terms of the funding level they would provide,
most proposals have used a funding level that is the lower of multiple options. Such options have
included the level of funding for each project or activity (or a percentage of that funding23)
provided in (1) the relevant regular appropriations act for the previous fiscal year, (2) the most
recent CR for the current fiscal year,24 (3) the relevant House- or Senate-passed appropriations
bill for the current fiscal year,25 and (4) the budget submission of the President for the current
fiscal year.26 As an alternative, the ACR could instead provide funding at a specified rate for
projects and activities based on the current fiscal year or a prior fiscal year27, or at an indefinite
rate (e.g., “such sums as are necessary”).28
Activities Covered
Previous ACR proposals also vary as to the types of activities that would be covered by an
automatic source of continuous funding, although most would provide budget authority for all
activities
that received discretionary funding in the previous fiscal year.29 Some ACRs, however,
would limit funding to selected categories of discretionary budget authority, such as civilian pay
or government activities that, if not performed, would result in a loss of revenue.30
Duration
ACR proposals have differed as to how long they would provide funding in the absence of regular
appropriations acts or a CR, referred to in this report as the “duration” of an ACR. Under previous
proposals, the duration of an ACR mechanism would begin at the time that a funding gap
occurred due to the failure to enact full-year appropriations or to provide interim funding through
a CR. The funding that most ACR proposals provide would cease once full-year appropriations or
a “regular” CR for the current fiscal year were enacted, or once the end of the fiscal year was
reached.31 Some ACRs specify, however, that the automatic funds may continue to be provided
beyond the end of the fiscal year if regular or continuing appropriations for that fiscal year were

23 See, for example, H.R. 638 (105th Cong.), H.R. 3744 (107th).
24 See, for example, H.R. 298 (102nd Cong.).
25 See, for example, S. 228 (105th Cong.), H.R. 3744 (107th Cong.).
26 See, for example, H.R. 638 (105th Cong.).
27 This option can be conceived of as the annualized level of budget authority for a project or activity for the last day of
the previous fiscal year (see, for example, H.R. 5720, 96th Cong.), the average rate for operations for a project or
activity during the entire previous fiscal year (see, for example, H.R. 298, 102nd Cong.), the rate of operations (or an
overall percentage of this) contained in the relevant regular appropriations act or CR from the previous fiscal year (see,
for example, H.R. 4837, 105th Cong.), the rate of operations contained in the most recent CR for the current fiscal year
(see, for example, S. 558, 106th Cong.), or the rate of operations of a specific previous fiscal year (see, for example, S.
104, 106th Cong.).
28 See, for example, H.R. 3210 (113th Cong.).
29 See, for example, S. 2070 (110th Cong.), H.R. 3583 (110th Cong.). Some of these types of proposals specifically
exclude budget authority that was designated as emergency during the prior fiscal year (see, for example, S. 3779, 111th
Cong.).
30 See, for example, H.R. 2007 (104th Cong.).
31 See, for example, S. 3779 (111th Cong.), S. 2070 (110th Cong.), H.R. 3583 (110th Cong.).
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never enacted.32 Alternatively, an ACR’s funding could expire on a specified date or after a
specified number of days prior to the end of the fiscal year.33
Arguments For and Against Automatic Continuing
Resolutions

A number of arguments have been made for and against the enactment of an ACR mechanism,
some of which are discussed below. These arguments are primarily drawn from congressional
hearings and committee reports on ACR proposals made since the Civiletti opinions were issued
in the early 1980s. This discussion also draws from media reports of previous government
shutdowns, reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) cost estimates, and reports written by policy institutes analyzing various budget
process reform proposals. These arguments are not an exhaustive list of all reasons why ACR
proposals have been supported or opposed, and their applicability is heavily dependent upon the
type of ACR mechanism being considered. They are representative, however, of the debate that
has developed over the past 30 years.
Arguments For
Proponents of ACRs have argued that the mechanism is needed to prevent the possibility of
government shutdowns and their related effects, and to promote a context for funding decisions in
which time pressures are less intense, allowing for a more deliberative decision-making process.
Further, proponents also have argued that using an ACR mechanism would make CRs a less
attractive vehicle for unrelated legislative measures. These arguments are detailed below.
Disruption of Government Services
Some proponents of an ACR have argued that the disruption of government services during a
funding gap was never intended by the Antideficiency Act, and that a temporary CR is an
inadequate remedy.34 Federal government shutdowns result in disruptions in government services.
For example, during the FY1996 shutdown, the processing of benefit claims for many program
beneficiaries slowed or halted due to the furlough of non-excepted federal employees. Further,
tourist entry at public museums and parks was largely barred, which caused inconvenience to the
general public.35

32 See, for example, S. 768 (113th Cong.).
33 For a discussion of this option, see the testimony of Robert Greenstein, U.S. Congress, House Committee on the
Budget, H.R. 853, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999, 106th Cong. 1st sess., May 20, 1999
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1999).
34 U.S. General Accounting Office, Funding Gaps Jeopardize Federal Government Operations, PAD-81-31, March 3,
1981, pp. 3, 45. At that time, the GAO officially supported the enactment of an ACR.
35 For further information on the effects of the FY1996 shutdown, see CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal
Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects
, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass, Shutdown of the Federal Government:
Causes, Processes, and Effects, by Clinton T. Brass.
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The provision of interim funding through a CR can mitigate some disruptions to government
services, short-term CRs have also had negative effects on agencies. For instance, a 2009 GAO
report concluded that interim CRs can lead to inefficiencies due to hiring delays as agencies fail
to fill new or existing positions because of uncertainty over the ultimate funding level for the
fiscal year.36 Agencies have also engaged in repetitive work, such as entering into multiple
contracts with vendors or contract workers due to a lack of budget authority for the entire fiscal
year.37 These effects, some ACR proponents have argued, ultimately make it difficult for agencies
to fulfill their statutory duties and efficiently serve the public. An automatic funding mechanism
for discretionary spending, however, would lessen the issues caused by interim CRs by providing
agencies with a predictable source of funding until regular appropriations could be completed.
Cost of Shutdowns
Some proponents of an ACR mechanism have argued that the high costs of a shutdown for the
government and the private sector warrant the provision of an automatic interim funding process.
Within the federal government, a variety of program inefficiencies may arise from funding gaps.
Initially, government agencies expend work hours in preparation for the shutdown. Further,
during the shutdown, work and official travel is interrupted. Finally, once the shutdown is
concluded, additional work hours are needed to restart and complete government activities that
should have occurred during the shutdown.38
Funding gaps also may be costly for the private sector, particularly for businesses that are
dependent upon federal government activities. A 1999 Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs report noted, “Shutdowns…cause ripple effects in the economy. For instance, during a
shutdown not only are federal employees furloughed, but government contractors may be forced
to lay off their employees until funding is resumed.”39 These types of effects reportedly occurred
during the December 15, 1995, through January 6, 1996, federal government shutdown, when
more than 500,000 companies faced a delay in receiving government payments, and programs
operated by government contractors were at risk of layoffs.40 The Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs report concluded, “Clearly it is more desirable for the economy as a whole
for the operations of government to continue without interruption when action on appropriations
bills cannot be completed.”41

36 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Continuing Resolutions: Uncertainty Limited Management Options and
Increased Workload in Selected Agencies
, GAO-09-879, September 2009. See also CRS Report RL34700, Interim
Continuing Resolutions (CRs): Potential Impacts on Agency Operations
, by Clinton T. Brass.
37 Ibid.
38 For further information on the mechanics of federal government shutdowns, see CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of
the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects
, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass.
39 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Government Shutdown Prevention Act, report to
accompany S. 558, 106th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 106-15 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p. 3.
40 Dan Moran and Stephen Barr, “When Shutdown Hit Home Ports, GOP Cutters Trimmed Their Sails,” Washington
Post
, January 8, 1996.
41 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee Governmental Affairs, Government Shutdown Prevention Act, report to
accompany S. 558, 106th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 106-15 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p. 3.
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Public Perception of Congress
Some supporters of an ACR mechanism have argued that government shutdowns result in a
negative public perception of Congress’s ability to govern effectively. For example, while the
House Committee on Appropriations adversely reported42 the ACR proposal in H.R. 853 (106th
Congress), they stated in the accompanying written report, “As a political tool for leveraging an
issue with the President, the CR has been a dismal failure for the Congress. Aside from not
achieving the desired political results, Congress also has received criticism for allowing the
government to shut down, not the President.”43 By removing the possibility of a funding gap due
to the inability to enact annual or continuing appropriations, some ACR proponents have argued
that Congress will be able to avoid any public backlash that may occur when government shuts
down.44
Constructive Decision-Making Atmosphere
Some who have supported an ACR mechanism have perceived the tenor of the appropriations
process as being less than ideal for producing an agreement on spending priorities. For example,
the House Appropriations Committee report on H.R. 853 (106th Congress) noted,
Both Congress and the President have used the threat of a government shutdown to extort
concessions from the other side. During the 104th Congress, the Congress used the threat of a
shutdown to try to force the President to agree to tax cuts and significant reductions in
discretionary spending. Last year, the President used the threat of a shutdown to win higher
levels of discretionary spending—but not without the Congress wrangling large increases in
defense spending.45
The remedy for this, according to some previous proponents of an ACR mechanism, would be to
eliminate the threat of a government shutdown so that the tone of the negotiations would be less
combative. This, some have argued, would serve to “encourage more bipartisan discussions on
appropriations bills and discourage the past practices of holding appropriations bills hostage to
last-minute negotiations.”46

42 The provisions in H.R. 853 (106th Cong.) containing an ACR mechanism were jointly referred to the Committee on
Budget and the Committee on Appropriations on February 25, 1999. The Committee on Appropriations reported those
provisions adversely on June 24, 1999, and recommended that the ACR mechanism be stricken from H.R. 853 (see
H.Rept. 106-198, Part 1).
43 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999,
committee report to accompany H.R. 853, 106th Cong, 1st sess., H.Rept. 106-198, Part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999),
p. 3.
44 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental Affairs, To
Consider Budget Process Reform
, joint hearing, 106th Cong., 1st sess., S.Hrg. 106-24 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p.
30.
45 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999,
committee report to accompany (adversely reported) H.R. 853, 106th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 106-198, Part 1
(Washington, DC: GPO 1999), pp. 78-79.
46 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Government Shutdown Prevention Act, committee
report to accompany S. 558, 106th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 106-15 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p. 3.
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Avoiding Crisis Appropriations
Some have argued for the enactment of an ACR mechanism because it might reduce the need for
Members to make funding decisions in a rushed atmosphere in order to conclude the
appropriations process or avoid a government shutdown. For example, during a 1999 joint
hearing held by the Senate Committees on the Budget and Governmental Affairs to address
budget process reform, then-CBO Director Daniel L. Crippen stated, “Enacting automatic
continuing appropriations would end the crisis atmosphere that surrounds the appropriation
process at the end of each session.”47 Echoing this sentiment, Senator John McCain asserted that,
if an ACR mechanism were enacted, “Congress would be able to resist the pressure to throw
everything but the kitchen sink into a last-minute spending bill just to get a deal and prevent a
shutdown….”48 Ultimately, these individuals argued, by easing the time pressures on annual
spending negotiations and eliminating the possibility of a government shutdown, a more coherent
outcome could be achieved.49
Continuing Resolutions as Vehicles for Legislative Measures
Some proponents of an ACR mechanism also argue that the elimination of the need for CRs to
prevent a government shutdown would lessen their attractiveness as vehicles for legislative
provisions that are unrelated to federal government spending decisions (sometimes referred to as
“riders”). A 1981 GAO study concluded that appropriations riders were the predominant cause of
the delays in the annual appropriations process that resulted in funding gaps.50 In addition, in their
report on H.R. 853 (106th Congress), the House Committee on Appropriations identified the
inclusion of extraneous matter within CRs during the 1980s and 1990s as the primary reason for
their subsequent presidential veto.51 By mitigating the incentive to add policy issues to
government spending measures, these proponents have argued that an ACR mechanism would
further buttress the separation between money and policy decisions already encouraged by the
congressional budget process.52

47 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget, H.R. 853, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999,
hearing, 106th Cong., 1st sess., H.Hrg 106-4 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p. 69.
48 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental Affairs, To Consider Budget
Process Reform
, joint hearing, 106th Cong., 1st sess., S.Hrg. 106-24 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p. 14.
49 For more on this perspective, see the testimony of Martha Phillips, Concord Coalition, U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on the Budget and Committee on Governmental Affairs, To Consider Budget Process Reform, joint hearing,
106th Cong., 1st sess., S.Hrg. 106-24 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p. 63; Brian M. Riedl, “Backgrounder: 10
Elements of Comprehensive Budget Process Reform,” The Heritage Foundation, no. 1943, June 15, 2006, p. 7.
50 U.S. General Accounting Office, Funding Gaps Jeopardize Federal Government Operations, PAD-81-31, March 3,
1981.
51 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999,
adverse report to accompany H.R. 853, 106th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 106-198, Part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p.
2.
52 For more on this perspective, see the testimony of Daniel L. Crippen, Director, CBO, U.S. Congress, House
Committee on the Budget, H.R. 853, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999, hearing, 106th Cong., 1st
sess., H.Hrg 106-4 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p. 69.
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Arguments Against
Those who oppose an ACR mechanism have posited that its adoption would create an advantage
for the current level of federal spending relative to other proposed levels during subsequent
budget negotiations. Opponents have also claimed that the threat of a government shutdown
causes serious negotiations and compromise to occur, and by lessening or eliminating this threat,
the enactment of regular appropriations would be more difficult. A further criticism has been that
an ACR mechanism would create procedural issues under the current budget process with the
establishment of permanent appropriations and would fail to comprehensively solve the issue of
funding gaps. These arguments are detailed below.
Status Quo Bias
Some have argued against the enactment of an ACR mechanism because it might provide a built-
in advantage for some participants in spending negotiations. If a permanent ACR were to be
enacted, individuals who prefer the level of spending provided by the ACR to any new proposed
level might have an incentive to block such measures. For example, if an ACR mechanism
provided a level of spending that would freeze or reduce the previous fiscal year’s level, and a
congressional majority preferred that amount to a higher level being proposed by the President,
those Members would hold a negotiating advantage over the President because inaction would
cause the ACR to become effective. If the congressional majority, however, wanted to make even
greater spending cuts than what the ACR would provide, a President who was opposed to those
cuts would likewise hold a negotiating advantage.53
Those who have expressed concern that an ACR mechanism would create bias favoring the status
quo also argue that this could affect the budget process in Congress itself. For example, the House
Committee on Appropriations report on H.R. 853 (106th Congress) predicted that, under an ACR,
coalitions in Congress who want to prevent changes in spending would be able to do so without
forcing a government shutdown.
Inaction would favor the status quo. The option of doing nothing or stonewalling
appropriations bills would become a legitimate strategy. Those who would want to avoid a
funding cut or avoid a funding increase for a program or a bill would be strengthened by the
existence of an ACR. Their goals would not be accomplished through the legislative process,
as they should be, but through a strategy of placing the government on automatic pilot.54
This is particularly possible in the Senate, where a minority of Members may be able to
effectively freeze spending for certain programs by refusing to end debate on appropriations
measures.55

53 For a further explanation of this view, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Reform of
the Federal Budget Process: An Analysis of Major Proposals
, committee print, 100th Cong., 1st sess., H402-3
(Washington, DC: GPO 1987), p. 70 and Prepared Statement of Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and the
Budget. U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget, H.R. 853, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of
1999
, 106th Cong. 1st sess., May 20, 1999 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1999).
54 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999,
adverse report to accompany H.R. 853, 106th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 106-198, Part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p.
2.
55 Prepared statement of Jacob J. Lew, Director of OMB, U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget, H.R. 853,
The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999
, hearing, 106th Cong., 1st sess., H.Hrg 106-4 (Washington, DC:
(continued...)
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Delays in the Appropriations Process
Some who have opposed an ACR mechanism have argued that it might create a disincentive to
enact regular appropriations bills in a timely manner. For an ACR mechanism that was
permanent, the existence of automatic fall-back funding could cause the regular appropriations
process to slow, or not occur at all, because the completion of regular appropriations or the
provision of temporary funding would no longer be necessary to prevent a funding gap from
occurring.56 This is because, under an ACR, the cost of failing to come to an agreement would no
longer be a government shutdown; this situation might prompt participants in negotiations who
prefer the ACR-provided level to hold out for their preferences or simply not come to an
agreement. During the 1999 House Committee on the Budget hearing on H.R. 853 (106th
Congress), this concern was expressed by a number of individuals. For example, Robert
Greenstein, executive director of the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities stated that “…a 12-
month automatic, CR makes it too easy to have automatic CRs that maintain the status quo
supplant regular appropriations bills.”57 In a similar vein, Representative John Spratt posited that
“…it [an ACR] would take away some of the urgency and compulsion for us to make
compromises and get the work for the year done and put it behind us. Instead, we would always
have this to fall back upon.”58
Individual Funding Decisions
Some observers have opposed an ACR mechanism because it might make it more difficult for
Members to make funding decisions that reflect new priorities for individual budget accounts.
The enactment of annual appropriations legislation allows Members collectively to make
decisions that raise or lower the funding for each program individually. ACRs, however, typically
provide funding for all budget accounts at a level based on the same rate. If an ACR were used,
Members would only have the opportunity to influence the funding of individual programs if
additional legislation were passed. During the 106th Congress, testifying in opposition to an ACR
mechanism before the House Committee on the Budget, then-Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Jacob Lew stated that
An automatic CR is not a workable policy. It would effectively set the default position for
discretionary spending at a freeze level, resulting in: (1) the underfunding of programs which
require increases to cover growing costs and populations; and (2) the overfunding of projects
which are already near or at completion.59

(...continued)
GPO 1999), p. 41. See also U.S. Government Accountability Office, Continuing Resolutions and an Assessment of
Automatic Funding Approaches
, GAO/AFMD-86-16, January, 1986; Richard Kogan, “Proposal for Automatic
Continuing Resolutions Would Likely Make it Harder to Pass Regular Appropriations Bills,” Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, June 24, 2004.
56 Andrew J. Taylor, “The Congressional Budget Process in an Era of Surpluses,” PS: Political Science and Politics,
vol. 33, no. 3 (September, 2000), pp. 575-580.
57 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget, H.R. 853, The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999,
hearing, 106th Cong., 1st sess., H.Hrg 106-4 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p. 78.
58 Ibid, p.23. For a more expansive treatment of these concerns, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget,
Government Shutdown Prevention Act, report to accompany S. 558, 106th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 106-15 (Washington,
DC: GPO 1999), p. 13.
59 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget, Government Shutdown Prevention Act, report to accompany S. 558,
106th Cong., 1st sess., S.Rept. 106-15 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), pp. 14-15.
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Agency Oversight
Some have opposed an ACR mechanism out of concern that it might undermine agency
accountability to Congress. The appropriations process is a significant avenue for congressional
oversight and influence over executive agencies. For instance, appropriations accounts typically
specify the purposes for which the funds may be used, and often the purposes for which they
cannot be used. In addition, because the executive branch is dependent upon congressional action
to provide budget authority for each fiscal year, agencies have an incentive to regularly comply
with congressional directives.60 If agencies, however, are assured some level of funding in the
event of an impasse, without any requirement for congressional action, they may have less
incentive to cooperate with congressional wishes, at least in the short term.61
Procedural Issues
Some critics argue that an ACR is not feasible under current CBO scoring practices. When the
CBO analyzed the ACR proposals contained in S. 558 and H.R. 853 (106th Congress), it scored
the measures as an increase in direct spending.62 Under House and Senate rules, new direct
spending must be offset so that it does not increase the on-budget deficit over a six-fiscal-year
and an 11-fiscal-year period.63 In addition, under the statutory PAYGO (P.L. 111-139) budget
enforcement mechanism, at the end of a legislative session, any changes that cause a net increase
in direct spending over a 5-year and 10-year window that have not been offset trigger a
presidential sequester order that would implement, with some exceptions, across-the-board
spending cuts in non-exempt direct spending programs.64 It is unclear at this time how the OMB
would score an ACR structured like S. 558 or H.R. 853 if it were to be enacted. Under current
CBO scoring practices, however, the total amount of budget authority that was guaranteed by the
rate provided in such ACR proposals would need to be offset as new direct spending under House
and Senate rules.
Inadequate Funding
Some who have opposed an ACR mechanism believe it might inadequately provide for an
agency’s spending needs. Currently, CRs that provide initial funding for a fiscal year often

60 For more information on appropriations oversight, see CRS Report RL30240, Congressional Oversight Manual, by
Todd Garvey et al.
61 A similar argument is made in opposition to biennial budgeting. See, for example, Robert Greenstein and James
Horney, “Biennial Budgeting: Do the Drawbacks Outweigh the Advantages?,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
June 16, 2006.
62 CBO explained the rationale for its score of H.R. 853, thus, “By providing an automatic funding source for 2000 that
would take effect without further legislative action, H.R. 853 would provide direct spending authority, and pay-as-you-
go procedures would apply to the bill.” (Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, H.R. 853, Comprehensive Budget
Process Reform Act of 1999
, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Rules on June 23, 1999, available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/13xx/doc1378/hr853rls.pdf.) A similar rationale was provided
for its score of S. 558.
63 Section 201(a) of S.Con.Res. 21, 110th Congress and House Rule XXI, Clause 10. For further information on the
Senate PAYGO rule, see CRS Report RL31943, Budget Enforcement Procedures: Senate Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO)
Rule
, by Bill Heniff Jr. For further information on the House CUTGO rule, see CRS Report R41926, House Rules
Changes Affecting the Congressional Budget Process Made at the Beginning of the 112th Congress
, by Bill Heniff Jr.
64 For further information on statutory PAYGO, see CRS Report R41157, The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010:
Summary and Legislative History
, by Bill Heniff Jr.
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contain special provisions that adjust the rate up or down, or provide budget authority for some
new programs (sometimes referred to as “anomalies”).65 Congress often judges these anomalies to
be necessary because of new issues that arise from year to year that cannot be predicted, and CRs
do not otherwise provide funding for new activities or initiatives.66 ACR proposals, however,
typically do not contain anomalies and thus do not anticipate the year-to-year changes in agency
needs that often occur. Moreover, budget authority for entitlement programs that is provided
through the annual appropriations process, such as veterans compensation and pensions, and the
supplemental nutrition and assistance program, might also be inadequate if the funding provided
by the ACR formula were insufficient to meet the adjustment required in current law due to
factors such as inflation or population growth.67 Although an ACR might be able to keep
government running in the short term, opponents of an ACR argue that at least one long-term
regular or supplemental appropriations act would be necessary to make adjustments for new
programs and other funding changes. Enacting an additional appropriations measure could be as
contentious and as difficult as passing a CR in the first place, but without it, new programs could
not be initiated and agencies would be unable to adjust to the new circumstances occurring during
the current fiscal year.68
Congressional Action on Automatic Continuing
Resolution Proposals

After the release of the Civiletti opinions in 1980 and 1981, interest in providing an automatic
funding mechanism for discretionary spending gradually increased. In a 1981 report to Congress,
the Comptroller General suggested that an ACR mechanism be enacted to prevent the possibility
of future government shutdowns.69 During the 1980s, a number of proposals were introduced in
the House and Senate that would have provided some sort of automatic funding mechanism in the
event that action on appropriations was not completed at the start of the fiscal year.70 None of
these received any legislative action. In 1987, the House Committee on Government Operations
released a report on budget process reform that, in part, evaluated the potential advantages and
drawbacks of implementing an ACR.71 During subsequent hearings on H.R. 3929, the Budget

65 See, for example, H.R. 3081 (P.L. 111-242, 111th Cong.), which provided continuing appropriations from the
beginning of FY2011 through December 3, 2010.
66 For further information on anomalies, see CRS Report RL34700, Interim Continuing Resolutions (CRs): Potential
Impacts on Agency Operations
, by Clinton T. Brass.
67 Richard Kogan, “Proposal for Automatic Continuing Resolutions Would Likely Make it Harder to Pass Regular
Appropriations Bills,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, June 24, 2004. See also U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, Government Shutdown Prevention Act, report to accompany S. 558, 106th Cong.,
1st sess., S.Rept. 106-15 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p. 11.
68 For a full explanation of this argument, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, The Comprehensive
Budget Process Reform Act of 1999,
adverse report to accompany H.R. 853, 106th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 106-198,
Part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO 1999), p. 4.
69 Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, Funding Gaps Jeopardize Federal Government Operations,
PAD-81-31, March 3, 1981.
70 See, for example, H.R. 3847 and S. 823 (100th Cong.).
71 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Reform of the Federal Budget Process: An Analysis of
Major Proposals
, committee print, 100th Cong., 1st sess., H402-3 (Washington, DC: GPO 1987), pp. 4-7.
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Process Reform Act of 1990 (101st Congress), however, the possibility of an ACR was not
discussed.72
Congressional action on ACR proposals first occurred in 1991 with hearings on H.R. 298, the
Budget Process Reform Act (102nd Congress). Committee action also occurred with respect to
ACR proposals during the 104th, 105th, 106th, 108th, and 110th Congresses. None of these
proposals, however, were enacted.
Five pieces of legislation containing an ACR mechanism received committee action after referral
between the 102nd and 113th Congresses (see Table 1). Two of these bills (H.R. 298, 102nd
Congress; H.R. 853, 106th Congress) received action in at least one House committee, whereas
the three others (S. 672, 105th Congress; S. 93 and S. 558, 106th Congress) received action in at
least one Senate committee. A total of four days of hearings were held on such legislation during
this period. Legislation containing an ACR mechanism was reported by committee on three
different occasions, most recently in the 106th Congress.
Table 1. Committee Action on ACR Proposals: 102nd-113th Congresses
Committees
Congress Bill
no. Introduced (Subcommittees)
Hearings Reported
102nd
H.R. 298
01-03-1991
Rules
09-18-1991,
__
(Legislative Process)
09-25-1991
(Legislative
Process)
Appropriations __
__
Government Operations
__
__
105th S.
672a
04-30-1997
Appropriations
__
S.Rept. 105-16
106th
S. 93
01-19-1999
Budget
01-27-1999b
__

Governmental Affairs
01-27-1999b
__
S. 558
__
Governmental Affairs
__
S.Rept. 106-15
H.R. 853
02-25-1999
Appropriations
__
H.Rept. 106-98
(Part 1)
Budget
05-20-1999
H.R. 98 (Part 2)
Source: Compiled by CRS with data from the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress.
a. The companion bill to S. 672, H.R. 1469, did not contain an ACR provision when reported out of
committee.
b. Committees on Budget and Governmental Affairs joint hearing.
Although reported measures containing ACR mechanisms were not considered on the House or
Senate floor between the 102nd and 113th Congresses, action occurred on seven floor amendments
and one unreported measure (see Table 2). For four of these amendments (to H.R. 3756, 104th

72 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Subcommittee on the Legislative Process, The Budget Process Reform
Act of 1990
, hearing on H.R. 3929, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., H681-1, March 20, 21, April 19, May 9, 1990 (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1990).
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Congress; H.R. 853, 106th Congress; and H.R. 4663, 108th Congress), action occurred on the
House floor only; For two of these amendments (to S. 1, 110th Congress; H.R. 325, 113th
Congress), action occurred on the Senate floor only. In the case of H.R. 4663 (105th Congress),
the ACR mechanism was incorporated by adoption of a floor amendment in the House (H.Amdt.
99). The Senate substitute amendment for H.R. 4663 also contained provisions providing for an
ACR. After resolving differences, the conference report passed by the House and Senate still
included an ACR mechanism, but the bill was subsequently vetoed.
H.R. 3210, Making continuing appropriations for military pay in the event of a Government
shutdown, was introduced on September 28, 2013, and referred to the House Committee on
Appropriations. The same day that the bill was introduced, the House adopted a special rule that
allowed for its immediate consideration, H.Res. 366.73 Early the following morning, the House
passed H.R. 3210, by a vote of 423-0. On September 30, H.R. 3210 was considered in the Senate,
and passed by unanimous consent. The bill was signed into law by the President later that same
day (P.L. 113-39).
Table 2. Floor Action on ACR Proposals: 102nd-113th Congresses
House
Amdt.
Date First
Floor
Senate
Resolving
Presidential
Congress
no. Bill
no.
Considered
Action
Floor Action Differences
Action
104th H.Amdt. H.R. 3756 07-17-1996
Point of
__ __
__
1298
order
sustained
105th H.Amdt. H.R. 1469 05-15-1997
Passed,
Substituted
H.Rept. 105-
Vetoed
99
227-197
text of S. 672
119
by U.C.
106th H.Amdt. H.R. 853
05-16-2000
Failed,
__ __
__
709
173-236
108th H.Amdt. H.R. 4663 06-24-2004
Failed,
__ __
__
613
111-304
H.Amdt.
H.R. 4663 06-24-2004
Failed,
__ __
__
621
88-326
110th S.Amdt. S. 1
01-10-2007
__
Motion to
__ __
13
waive Budget
Act failed, 25-
72;
amendment
fell
113th
S.Amdt. 7
H.R. 325
01-31-2013
__
Tabled, 52-46
__
__

73 A “special rule” is a simple resolution reported by House Rules Committee that set the terms for considering a
measure. It is effective when adopted by a majority of the House. For further information on how special rules may
provide for consideration of a measure or matter, see CRS Report 98-354, How Special Rules Regulate Calling up
Measures for Consideration in the House
, by Richard S. Beth.
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House
Amdt.
Date First
Floor
Senate
Resolving
Presidential
Congress
no. Bill
no.
Considered
Action
Floor Action Differences
Action
__ H.R.
3210
09-28-2013
Passed,
Passed,
__
423-0
unanimous
Signed into
consent
law,
September
30, 2013 (P.L.
113-39)
Source: Compiled by CRS with data from the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress.
Recent Proposals: 112th and 113th Congresses
A number of ACR proposals have been introduced in the House and Senate during the 112th and
113th Congresses.
112th Congress
In the 112th Congress, the potential for funding gaps due to delays in the annual appropriations
process was of early congressional concern, as appropriations for FY2011 were not completed
until more than half-way through the fiscal year. During that time and throughout the rest of the
Congress, a number of pieces of legislation were introduced in the House and Senate to provide
ACR mechanisms. All but a few of these mechanisms would have been effective on a permanent
basis;74 the others would have been effective only for FY2011.75 About half of these bills would
have provided automatic funding for all projects and activities funded in the previous fiscal year’s
appropriations measures,76 whereas the other half would have provided funding for only specified
projects and activities,77 such as for “military pay and allowances,”78 or for “defense, veteran’s
affairs, and homeland security spending.”79 The funding level in these proposals varied
considerably. For some, the funding would have been at the previous year’s level or a percentage
of that level;80 for others, different levels of funding were applicable depending on the activity;81
for still others, the funding level for all covered projects and activities was indefinite (e.g., “such
sums as are necessary”).82 The duration of the ACR for most of these proposals would have begun
at the start of a funding gap and lasted until the applicable regular appropriations act for that
fiscal year became law, a CR providing funds for all or part of the fiscal year became law, or the
fiscal year ended.83 A few proposals, however, would have allowed the ACR mechanism to

74 See, for example, H.R. 1494, H.R. 2319, H.R. 3583, S. 439, S. 784, and S. 3434.
75 See, for example, H.R. 1442.
76 See, for example, H.R. 339 and H.R. 1471.
77 See, for example, S. 1679.
78 H.R. 1442.
79 S. 1679.
80 See, for example, H.R. 2319 and H.R. 1471.
81 See, for example, S. 768 and H.R. 339.
82 See, for example, H.R. 1494.
83 See, for example, H.R. 1471 and H.R. 339.
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continue providing funds into the next fiscal year if regular or continuing appropriations were not
enacted.84
113th Congress
In general, the ACR legislative proposals in the 113th Congress have had similar characteristics to
those in the 112th Congress discussed in the previous section.85 One of these received floor action
but was not enacted into law, S.Amdt. 7 to H.R. 325. The other was enacted into law, H.R. 3210,
and is discussed in the report section entitled, “P.L. 113-39 (113th Congress).”
S.Amdt. 7 to H.R. 32586 would have provided a permanent ACR mechanism to cover all projects
and activities funded in the previous fiscal year in the applicable regular appropriations bill or
full-year continuing resolution. The funding level was a rate for operations based on the lower of
the preceding fiscal year’s regular appropriations act or full-year CR, or the rate for operations in
the most recently enacted CR for the current fiscal year. After 120 days, and each 90-day period
thereafter, that rate for operations was to be reduced by 1%. The duration of the funds would have
begun at the start of a funding gap and lasted until the applicable regular appropriations act for
the current fiscal year, or a CR providing funds for all or part of the fiscal year, became law. The
amendment explicitly allowed the funds to continue to be provided by the ACR mechanism
during the following fiscal year, subject to additional 1% reductions every 90 days, if regular or
continuing appropriations had not yet been enacted.
P.L. 113-39 (113th Congress)
The one ACR approach to have been adopted, the Pay Our Military Act (P.L. 113-39), was in the
context of the FY2014 appropriations process. In the weeks before the beginning of the fiscal
year, no regular appropriations had been enacted into law, and many observers expressed concern
as to the possibility of a federal government shutdown if an agreement to provide interim
appropriations was not reached.87 In particular, some of these concerns related to the effect that a
funding gap would have on the military and certain associated civilian federal workers and
contractors.88 In response, the House and Senate passed H.R. 3210, and the bill was signed into
law by the President on September 30, 2013. The automatic funding provided by this mechanism
took effect on October 1, 2013, due to the absence of enacted regular or continuing
appropriations, and terminated on October 17, 2013, with the enactment of the Continuing
Appropriations Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-46).

84 See, for example, S. 768 and S. 3434.
85 These proposals include H.R. 1164, H.R. 3152, H.R. 3166, H.R. 3175, S. 29, S. 83, S. 171, and S. 280.
86 For the text of this amendment, see “Amendments Submitted and Proposed,” Senate, Congressional Record, daily
edition, vol. 159, part 14 (January 31, 2013), pp. S446-S447.
87 See, for example, Manu Raju and John Bresnahan, “Is a Grand Bargain Out of Reach,” Politico, July 29, 2013;
Annie Lowrey, “Budget Battles Keep Agencies Guessing,” New York Times, September 3, 2013; Daniel Newhauser
and Emily Ethridge, “Shutdown Showdown,” CQ Weekly, September 23, 2013.
88 See, for example, Niels Lesniewski, “Senators Float Proposal to Exempt Military from Shutdown,” CQ News,
September 24, 2013.
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This ACR provides a mechanism to cover FY2014 projects and activities in three different
categories:
(1) Pay and allowances to members of the Armed Forces (as defined in section 101(a)(4) of
title 10, United States Code), including reserve components thereof, who perform active
service during such period;
(2) Pay and allowances to the civilian personnel of the Department of Defense (and the
Department of Homeland Security in the case of the Coast Guard) whom the Secretary
concerned determines are providing support to members of the Armed Forces described in
paragraph (1); and
(3) Pay and allowances to contractors of the Department of Defense (and the Department of
Homeland Security in the case of the Coast Guard) whom the Secretary concerned
determines are providing support to members of the Armed Forces described in paragraph
(1).89
The funding level for all covered projects and activities is indefinite.
There are currently unresolved questions, however, related to the mechanism’s operation during
FY2014 and the first quarter of FY2015. First, the automatic funding might be limited to the
initial FY2014 funding gap, after which the mechanism would not be available. Alternatively, the
mechanism as enacted could be interpreted to apply to any funding gap that occurred during the
fiscal year. Second, while P.L. 113-39 would only provide new funds during FY2014, the
maximum period of availability for those funds (assuming they were not terminated through the
enactment of regular or continuing appropriations) could be the end of FY2014 under Section 2.
On the other hand, the mechanism could be interpreted to provide a period of availability for the
FY2014 funds of up to the date in Section 3 (January 1, 2015). In light of these questions the
sunset date of the mechanism could be the date in Section 3 (January 1, 2015), the end of FY2014
(October 1, 2014), or the end of the initial FY2014 funding gap (October 17 2013, P.L. 113-46).
These questions, as well as others not discussed in this paragraph, may need to be clarified in the
future.
Author Contact Information

Jessica Tollestrup

Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process
jtollestrup@crs.loc.gov, 7-0941

Acknowledgments
This report builds, in part, on the analysis contained in a previous report written by Robert Keith,
formerly of CRS.



89 Section 2(a) of P.L. 113-39. Section 2(b) provides that “Secretary concerned” is defined as, “(1) the Secretary of
Defense with respect to matters concerning the Department of Defense; and (2) the Secretary of Homeland Security
with respect to matters concerning the Coast Guard.”
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