In Brief: The September 2013 Terrorist Attack
in Kenya
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
September 27, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43245
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
In Brief: The September 2013 Terrorist Attack in Kenya
Contents
Overview ................................................................................................................................... 1
Who is Al Shabaab? ............................................................................................................ 2
Who were the attackers? Were Americans involved? .......................................................... 4
Why attack Kenya? .............................................................................................................. 6
Why now? ............................................................................................................................ 7
What is the United States doing to counter the Al Shabaab threat? .................................... 7
What are key issues for Congress to consider? ................................................................... 9
Figures
Figure 1. Al Shabaab in East Africa ............................................................................................... 11
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 11
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In Brief: The September 2013 Terrorist Attack in Kenya
Overview
On September 21, 2013, masked gunmen attacked the upscale Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi,
Kenya, taking hostages and killing more than 60 people.1 Almost 200 people, including at least 5
U.S. citizens, were wounded in the siege, which lasted four days. The attack is the most deadly
terrorist incident in Kenya since the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi.2 A
Somali Islamist insurgent group, Al Shabaab, which has ties to Al Qaeda, has claimed
responsibility for the Westgate attack.
Al Qaeda and affiliated groups like Al Shabaab have had a presence in East Africa for almost 20
years, although the extent of their operations there has varied over time. The region’s porous
borders, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and judicial institutions, and
pervasive corruption, combined with almost 20 years of state collapse in neighboring Somalia,
have provided an enabling environment for violent extremist groups.
The Westgate mall attack comes almost two years after Kenya launched a military offensive
across its northeastern border with Somalia, with the stated aim of defending itself against
terrorist threats and incursions by Al Shabaab. Kenya subsequently joined the U.N.-mandated
African Union stabilization mission, AMISOM, which is tasked with countering the threat posed
by Al Shabaab in Somalia. Al Shabaab’s attack on the mall comes three years after an Al Shabaab
cell conducted the group’s first successful attack outside Somalia with deadly bombings in
Kampala, Uganda, in retaliation for Uganda’s role as a leading AMISOM troop contributor.3 Al
Shabaab has repeatedly threatened countries contributing to the regional operation, and
spokesmen for the group have cited Kenya’s ongoing military role in Somalia as justification for
the Westgate attack.4 While Kenyan officials thus far have maintained commitment to AMISOM
in the siege’s aftermath, the attack may deter other countries from contributing troops in response
to a call from the U.N. envoy for Somalia for more military support to counter Al Shabaab.
In the 15 years since the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, Congress has appropriated
increasing counterterrorism funding for Africa, and has focused hearings and investigations on
reported support provided by U.S. citizens to Al Shabaab. The United States is a major
contributor of financial and in-kind support to AMISOM, and has provided its troop contributors
and other countries in the region with substantial support to counter terrorist threats. “We are in
this fight together,” the U.S. ambassador to Kenya commented as Federal Bureau of Investigation
forensic teams deployed after the Westgate attack. President Obama has pledged U.S. support to
bring those responsible for the attack to justice.5 Political instability and terrorist activities in and
emanating from Somalia are subject to ongoing interest by policymakers, who remain concerned
about Al Shabaab’s ties to Al Qaeda and affiliated groups and its use of Somalia as a staging
ground for attacks in the region and a training ground for foreign fighters. The following sections
address possible questions about the attack and related issues for Congress.
1 There are conflicting reports about the number killed in the attack, since part of the mall collapsed due to a fire that
started during the siege. A final casualty count is unavailable pending recovery operations and forensic investigations.
2 More than 4,000 people were injured and 218 killed, including 12 Americans, in the 1998 embassy bombing.
3 The bombings at a restaurant and rugby club in Kampala killed 76 people, including one American.
4 Hamza Mohamed, “Q&A: Al-Shabab Defends Nairobi Attack,” Al Jazeera, September 23, 2013.
5 The White House, Statement by NSC Spokesperson Caitlin Hayden on the Attack in Nairobi, September 21, 2013,
and “U.S. Sees Direct Threat in Attack at Kenya Mall,” New York Times, September 25, 2013.
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Who is Al Shabaab?
Al Shabaab, more formally known as Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin (“Mujahidin Youth
Movement”), emerged about a decade ago in Somalia amid a proliferation of Islamist and clan-
based militias. It has been linked to Al Qaeda for years and was designated by the United States
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2008. The group, which also maintains ties with Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), announced its formal merger with Al Qaeda in February
2012. Al Shabaab, as it exists today, appears to be a hybrid—it is both a locally focused Islamist
insurgent group and a transnational terrorist affiliate of Al Qaeda.6 Like several other “AQ
affiliates,” the group appears to operate largely independently from core Al Qaeda.
Al Shabaab was formed as a militia loosely affiliated with a network of local Islamic courts that
emerged in the 1990s in the absence of central authority in Somalia. The courts’ leaders varied in
their ideological approaches, which reflected diverse views on political Islam, clan identity, and
Somali nationalism. Unlike the courts and their individual militias, which were largely clan-based
and nationalist in agenda, Al Shabaab’s leadership drew members from across clans, ascribing to
a broader irredentist and religiously driven vision of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited areas of East
Africa under an Islamist caliphate. Some of its leaders reportedly trained in Afghanistan.
Al Shabaab’s vision for Somalia runs counter to long-running international efforts to create a
stable, inclusive Somali government (see text box). Somali authorities, unable to secure territory
on their own, have relied on AMISOM forces to retake and secure the capital, Mogadishu, from
Al Shabaab, which has controlled much of southern and central Somalia since 2006. Since
February 2011, military offensives by AMISOM, allied regional forces from Ethiopia and Kenya,
Somali government troops, and allied militia have pushed Al Shabaab out of the major cities and
ports, but it continues to enjoy some freedom of movement and to control territory in rural areas.7
These setbacks have deprived Al Shabaab of major sources of revenue and have resulted in a shift
in its operations. Since what it termed a “strategic withdrawal” from Mogadishu in August 2011,
the group has conducted almost-daily guerilla-style attacks on government, civilian, AMISOM,
and other foreign targets, in both urban and rural areas.8 Notable attacks against foreign targets in
2013 include a June attack against the U.N. compound in Mogadishu, in which 22 people were
killed, and a July attack on the Turkish diplomatic residence there. Al Shabaab conducts
assassinations and attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of various types, mortars,
grenades, and automatic weapons, causing hundreds of civilian casualties.9 Some observers argue
that Al Shabaab has been greatly weakened by AMISOM gains. However, U.N. experts suggest
that avoiding direct military confrontation has allowed Al Shabaab to “preserve the core of its
6 The term “Islamist” here refers to those who advance a formal political role for Islam, through the implementation of
Islamic law, political mobilization through a religious party, or the creation of a religious system of governance.
7 According to the U.N. Monitoring Group, tasked by the Security Council to report on violations of international
sanctions and security threats in Somalia, Al Shabaab remains in control of Middle Juba, most of Hiran, Bay and Bakol
regions, and parts of Galgudud, and Lower Shabelle regions. U.N. Security Council, Somalia report of the Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted in accordance with resolution 2060 (2012), S/2013/413, July 12, 2013.
8 See Christopher Anzalone, “Al-Shabab’s Tactical and Media Strategies in the Wake of its Battlefield Setbacks,” CTC
Sentinel, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, March 27, 2013.
9 For an overview of Al Shabaab attacks in Somalia in 2012-2013, see Navanti Group, “Somalia’s Al-Shabaab: Down
But Not Out,” Homeland Security Policy Institute Issue Brief 22, August 27, 2013.
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In Brief: The September 2013 Terrorist Attack in Kenya
fighting force and resources,” with some 5,000 fighters who remain “arguably intact in terms of
operational readiness, chain of command, discipline and communication capabilities.10
Recent Political Developments in Somalia
Terrorism, maritime piracy, illicit trafficking, and mass refugee flows in the Horn of Africa region are, in part,
symptoms of the wider instability that has plagued Somalia since the collapse of the authoritarian Siad Barre regime in
1991. There have been numerous outside attempts to reunite Somalia’s regions, clans, and sub-clans within a credible
Somali central government. The election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in September 2012 fol owed the
establishment of a new federal parliament and its approval of a provisional constitution, in accordance with an
internationally facilitated political process inside Somalia. That process has been viewed by U.S. and U.N. officials as
the most credible, inclusive, and representative process to date to reestablish central governance in war-torn Somalia.
The new Somali Federal Government replaced a Transitional Federal Government (TFG), established in 2004 as a
result of a regional peace process. The TFG was unable to establish a presence in Mogadishu until 2007, after an
Ethiopian military operation ousted the Union of Islamic Courts. It subsequently struggled to reconstitute national
security and law enforcement entities and to expand its authority outside the capital. The TFG, which relied on
AMISOM for security, was unable to provide basic social services or security to the population. This inability, along
with corruption allegations, undermined the TFG’s perceived legitimacy among Somalis. During this period, violence
and recurrent drought drove more than one quarter of Somalia’s estimated population of 7.5 million from their
homes—as either refugees or internally displaced persons.
In January 2013, the United States officially recognized the Somali government for the first time in more than 20
years. U.S. diplomatic recognition reflected significant security advances against Al Shabaab and political developments
in Mogadishu. Others, including the United Kingdom and other European countries, along with the U.N. and the AU,
have also recognized the government. Given ongoing security concerns, however, the State Department has yet to
reestablish an embassy in Somalia, and President Obama has not yet appointed an ambassador to the country. The
U.S. government continues to maintain its diplomatic dialogue with Somali authorities through the U.S. embassy in
neighboring Kenya, where a U.S. Special Representative to Somalia is based. While travel within Somalia is still limited,
U.S. officials are traveling with increasing frequency to Mogadishu.
To many in Somalia and the international community, the country appears to be at an inflection point, after years of
state collapse. Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in remarks following U.S. recognition of the new government,
noted that the move reflected a “sense of optimism and opportunity” in Somalia, and expressed the desire for that
sentiment to “translate into lasting progress.”11 Part of that optimism stems from the security gains made by
AMISOM, in concert with Somali and Ethiopian forces. Political progress made to date has been bolstered by robust
engagement from East African leaders.
Now one year old, Somalia’s new federal government still faces significant hurdles in extending its own authority
beyond Mogadishu, and in overcoming contentious clan dynamics and “the political economy of state col apse.”12
While the concept of federalism is enshrined in the provisional constitution, the document is vague on how it will
work in practice. After more than 20 years without central authority, the sharing of power, responsibility, revenue,
and resources in Somalia remains subject to considerable debate.13 The process of state building is further
complicated by reportedly rampant corruption, ongoing security threats, and domestic spoiler networks described by
the U.N. Monitoring Group that are working against the consolidation of state authority.14 In a September 2013
statement to the U.N. Security Council, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia Nicholas Kay
suggested that Somalia has the “foundations for progress,” but stressed the fragility of the political and security gains
that had been made and the need for greater international engagement and support.
10 U.N. Security Council, S/2013/413, op. cit.
11 State Department, Remarks by Secretary Clinton with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, January 17, 2013.
12 For a critical analysis of the government, see, e.g., Matt Bryden, Somalia Redux? Assessing the New Somali Federal
Government, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2013.
13 The government still seeks to define its relationship with semi-autonomous Puntland and Somaliland. Regional
mediation, led by Ethiopia, has eased tensions with authorities of the self-declared Jubaland state in southern Somalia.
14 See, e.g., U.N. Security Council, S/2013/413, op. cit.
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While many of its Somali foot soldiers may have joined for economic reasons, or to defend clan
interests, rather than based on extremist beliefs,15 Al Shabaab also continues to draw support
from roughly 300 foreign fighters, according to U.N. reporting. These fighters are reportedly
predominantly from Kenya, Sudan, and Yemen, but also from Bangladesh, Chechnya, and
Pakistan, as well as from Europe, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Two Sudanese
involved in the January 2008 murder of a U.S. diplomat in Khartoum are believed to be among
the group’s ranks.16 U.S. Africa Command officials suggest that these foreign fighters “remain the
greatest threat to Western interests regionally and internationally.”17 Some have reportedly
deserted Al Shabaab in recent years, either because of disillusion with its military losses or
because of internal dissent in the group (see below).
The practical effect of Al Shabaab’s 2012 merger with Al Qaeda is unclear—some experts argue
that it is largely symbolic, given that the group appears to remain self-sufficient and continues to
follow a largely Somalia-focused agenda. They see the attack in Kenya as part of that effort.18
Others argue that the Westgate attack bears the hallmarks of new guidelines reportedly released
by Al Qaeda leadership, instructing affiliated groups to use hostages to attract maximum
publicity, and may signal a more global focus by Al Shabaab leadership.19
Who were the attackers? Were Americans involved?
Many details of the Westgate attack remain unclear, and investigations are ongoing regarding the
identity of those who planned and led the attack. Eyewitness accounts reported by the press and
remarks by Kenyan officials suggest that British and/or U.S. citizens may have participated in the
attack alongside Somalis and, possibly, other Africans.20
The Somali diaspora community in the United States has drawn considerable attention from U.S.
law enforcement officials in recent years because of efforts by Al Shabaab to recruit and raise
funds abroad. Al Shabaab recruitment in the United States has raised concerns regarding not only
the involvement of U.S. citizens in terrorism activities overseas, but also possible threats to the
United States from those carrying U.S., Canadian, and European passports. Several Somali
Americans have been prosecuted for terrorist financing, and U.S. citizens (many, but not all, of
Somali origin) have been indicted on suspicion of traveling to train and fight with Al Shabaab.
Estimates vary on the number of U.S. citizens who may have joined Al Shabaab in Somalia, but
more than 20 young men from Minnesota, which hosts the largest concentration of Somali
Americans, are believed to have gone to fight in Somalia, and at least two Somali Americans
15 U.N. Information Service, Press Briefing by Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia Nicholas
Kay in Geneva, September 24, 2013.
16 The two individuals, who were convicted of the crime in 2009 and subsequently escaped a Sudanese prison, have
been listed by the United States as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).
17 General David M. Rodriguez, Written Responses to Advance Policy Questions for the Nominee for Commander,
U.S. Africa Command, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 13, 2013.
18 Nicholas Kulish, Mark Mazzetti, and Eric Schmitt, “Kenya Mall Carnage Shows Shabaab Resilience,” New York
Times, September 22, 2012.
19 Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “Al Shabaab Breaks New Ground with Complex Nairobi Attack,” CNN,
September 23, 2013. See also Ayman al Zawahiri, General Guidelines for Jihad, As-Sahab Media, September 2013.
20 Address by Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, September 24, 2013, available at http://www.stategousekenya.go.ke.
See also CRS Report R41416, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, by Jerome P. Bjelopera.
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were implicated in suicide bombings there.21 Among the most infamous of Al Shabaab’s foreign
fighters was a Syrian American from Alabama, Omar Hammami, also known as Abu Mansour al-
Amriki, who appeared in propaganda videos and used social media for recruitment. Hammami,
for whom the United States had issued a $5 million bounty, was killed in early September 2013,
reportedly by former allies within Al Shabaab.22
The possible role of Kenyan citizens in the attack is also subject to speculation. One of the suicide
bombers in the 2010 Kampala bombings is believed to have been Kenyan, and Kenyan and other
East African nationalities were arrested in connection with those attacks. East African Muslims
have been increasingly exposed to extremist religious ideologies, and the concept that Islam is
under attack by the West has become a prominent factor in radicalization.23 Experts from the U.N.
Monitoring Group on Somalia have closely reported on the rise of groups and individuals
supportive of Al Shabaab in Kenya, including a Kenyan group known as the Muslim Youth
Center/Al Hijra.24 According to the Monitoring Group’s July 2013 report, Al Hijra and its
supporters “have suffered setbacks from disruptions of Al Hijra’s operations by international and
regional security services, as well as unexplained killings and disappearances of its members.”25
The report warned that Al Hijra fighters returning from Somalia in the wake of Al Shabaab
defeats and reeling from disruptive operations in Kenya “sought operational direction and
guidance since the latter part of 2012 from individuals with former ties to Al-Qaida in East Africa
and self-styled Al-Qaida affiliates.” A statement attributed to Al Hijra in late 2012 warned it
would shift its focus to “jihad in the region of East Africa with the obvious emphasis on
Kenya.”26
The U.N. report identified a cleric named Abubakr Sharif Ahmed (aka “Makaburi”) as having
“exerted a growing influence over Al Hijra” and as being “determined to redirect the group’s
resources and manpower from hitting ‘soft targets’ to conducting complex, large-scale attacks in
Kenya on behalf and in support of Al-Shabaab.” Ahmed has been the subject of Kenyan terrorism
investigations for years and was accused of inciting violent riots and attacks in the Kenyan
coastal city of Mombasa after the public murder of his associate Aboud Rogo, formerly identified
by U.N. experts as the group’s ideological leader.27 In 2012, the U.S. government designated
Ahmed for sanctions, alleging that he “provides material support to extremist groups in Kenya
and elsewhere in East Africa” and “has preached at mosques in Mombasa that young men should
travel to Somalia, commit extremist acts, fight for al-Qa’ida, and kill U.S. citizens.”28 After being
arrested in Kenya, he pleaded not guilty to charges of incitement and denied involvement with
21 “Somalis Still Leaving U.S. to Join Terror Group,” Military Times, September 26, 2013, and Jamie Dettmer, “Al-
Shabab’s Jihadi Recruitment Drive in Minnesota,” The Daily Beast, September 24, 2013.
22 For more on Hammami see e.g., USA v. Omar Hammami; Andrea Elliott, “The Jihadist Next Door,” New York
Times, January 31, 2010, and articles by J.M. Berger in Foreign Policy.
23 CRS Report R41473, Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response, by Lauren Ploch Blanchard. See also
International Crisis Group, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization, Africa Briefing No. 85, January 25, 2012.
24 Adoption of the name Al Hijra (“the emigration”) appears to signal its attempt to place itself in the context of the
original hijra of the Muslim prophet Mohammed and his closest supporters from Mecca to Medina.
25 U.N. Security Council, S/2013/413, op. cit.
26 U.S. Government Open Source Center (OSC) Report AFP20121212950048, “Kenyan Islamist group threatens to
launch 'jihad' in East Africa,” Twitter, December 11, 2012.
27 A 2012 U.N. Monitoring Group report (S/2012/544) identified Rogo as “a known associate of members of Al-Qaida
East Africa and an advocate of the violent overthrow of the Government of Kenya.” The United States designated Rogo
as a contributor to the Somali conflict in July 2012. He was shot by unidentified assailants on August 27, 2012.
28 Treasury Department, “Treasury Targets Regional Actors Fueling Violence and Instability in Somalia,” July 5, 2012.
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terrorist activities; he was released on bail in September 2012. Reports have linked a British
woman, Samantha Lewthwaite, who has reportedly been living in East Africa, to Rogo, Ahmed,
and Al Hijra. Lewthwaite is the widow of one of the suicide bombers in Al Qaeda’s July 7, 2005,
London attacks. Some speculate that she may have been involved in the Westgate attack.29
Why attack Kenya?
Al Shabaab charges that the Kenyan military has “massacred” innocent civilians in southern
Somalia during its operations, and it threatened to increase attacks if Kenya does not withdraw its
troops.30 Kenya’s military plays a key role in the regional operations against Al Shabaab in
Somalia, and the United States views Kenya as critical to counterterrorism efforts in the region.31
As noted above, Kenyan and other AMISOM forces have made significant advances against Al
Shabaab in the past two years. Kenya’s operations, launched in October 2011, resulted in Al
Shabaab’s loss of the strategic seaport of Kismayo, from which it previously derived substantial
revenues through the international charcoal trade.32
The border that Kenya shares with Somalia is long, porous, and vulnerable to terrorist movement,
among other illicit activity. According to the State Department, Kenya has successfully disrupted
several large-scale terrorist threats, but more than three dozen small-scale terrorist incidents were
reported in Kenya in 2012.33 Most were grenade attacks, generally attributed by the Kenyan
government to Al Shabaab or its supporters, although the group reportedly claimed few of them
and specifically denied several. The attacks were directed at both government and civilian targets,
including bars, restaurants, a bus station, a mosque, and several churches.34
The Westgate mall incident is the group’s first successful large-scale operation in the Kenyan
capital, which hosts the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in Africa. Kenya is a top tourist
destination on the continent and a regional hub for trade, transportation, and finance. As a result,
many international organizations base their continental headquarters in Nairobi, which is home to
one of four major U.N. offices worldwide and serves as a base for regional humanitarian relief
efforts, including in Somalia. U.S. diplomats have been previously targeted by extremists in the
region, and Al Shabaab has made repeated threats against U.S. and Western targets.35 In an
interview with Al Jazeera, an Al Shabaab spokesman stated that the mall was chosen as the target
29 David Clark Scott, “Samantha Lewthwaite: Is ‘White Widow’ Behind Kenya Mall Attack?” Christian Science
Monitor, September 23, 2013.
30 OSC Report AFL2013092380722161, “Somalia, Kenya—Al Shabaab Vocal in Claiming Responsibility for Nairobi
Attack,” September 23, 2013
31 For further information see CRS Report R42967, U.S.-Kenya Relations: Current Political and Security Issues, by
Lauren Ploch Blanchard.
32 In response to Al Shabaab’s efforts to profit from the trade, the U.N. Security Council prohibited the export and
import of charcoal from Somalia in Resolution 2035 (2012).
33 State Department, “Kenya,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, May 30, 2013.
34 Among the deadliest attacks in 2012 were a minibus explosion in Eastleigh that killed 10 and injured 34, and an
attack on a church in the northeast city of Garissa with grenades and guns that killed 17 and injured 40.
35 See, e.g., OSC Report GMP20080527873001, “Somalia’s Mujahidin Youth Movement Spokesman Discusses
Progress of Jihad,” May 8, 2008; and OSC Report AFP20080603410001, “Somalia: MYM Commander Shaykh Al-
Zubayr Sends Message to Global Jihad Leaders,” June 1, 2008.
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because it is frequented by Kenyan elites, diplomats, and tourists, specifically Americans and
Israelis (Westgate mall is Israeli-owned).36
Why now?
Like other details of the attack, the timing of the Westgate incident is subject to conjecture. Many
regional analysts suggest that Al Shabaab has suffered from internal tensions between those loyal
to its leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane (aka Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed or “Abu Zubeyr”), and other
Al Shabaab commanders. Some suggest that the timing of the Westgate attack may be an
expression of Godane’s recent consolidation of power.37 Godane, 36, who has reportedly long
sought to centralize control, is credited with the recent deaths of several high-profile figures,
including senior Al Shabaab commanders Ibrahim al Afghani and Maalim Burhan in June and
American jihadist Omar Hammami and a British foreign fighter in September. His efforts may
have driven Islamic Courts’ leader Hassan Dahir Aweys, designated as a terrorist by the United
States since 2001, to turn himself in to Somali authorities. The whereabouts of another key Al
Shabaab leader, Mukhtar Robow, are unknown; by some accounts he has gone into hiding. The
tensions within the Al Shabaab leadership appear to center on disputes over strategy, tactics, and
objectives, and over power-sharing and resources. Some, like Hammami, publicly criticized
Godane for corruption and mistreatment of foreign fighters, while others criticized the group’s
indiscriminant killing of Somali (Muslim) civilians.38
Godane publicly pledged Al Shabaab’s fealty to Osama bin Laden in 2009. He was reportedly
dismissed by bin Laden as a possible leader of Al Qaeda in East Africa, however, in favor of an
Al Qaeda operative from the Comoros, Harun Fazul, who was suspected of leading the 1998 U.S.
embassy bombings. Fazul was killed in June 2011 at a Somali government checkpoint under
questionable circumstances; many believe this was arranged by Godane. Having neutralized his
rivals, some of whom had rejected his move in 2012 to merge with Al Qaeda,39 Godane may,
some speculate, have sought to demonstrate Al Shabaab’s credentials as a global threat, proving
its bona fides to Al Qaeda, and thus attract more recruits and financing from abroad.40
What is the United States doing to counter the Al Shabaab threat?
The Obama Administration and others have viewed the threat posed by Al Qaeda “affiliates” to
be of increasing concern in recent years. Despite estimates that Al Shabaab may have been
weakened by its military setbacks, the group is still seen as the primary terrorist threat to U.S.
interests in the region.41 In its 2011 National Counterterrorism Strategy, the Administration
warned, “influenced by its Al Qaeda elements, Al Shabaab ... could—motivated to advance its
36 Hamza Mohamed, “Q&A,” op. cit.
37 See, e.g., Simon Tisdall, “Kenya Attack is Product of Brutal Power Struggle Within Al-Shabaab,” The Guardian,
September 22, 2013 and “Kenya’s Westgate Atrocity is Al-Shabaab’s Way of Escalating Somali Conflict,” The
Guardian, September 23, 2013, and Rafaello Pantucci, “Bilal al-Berjawi and the Shifting Fortunes of Foreign Fighters
in Somalia,” CTC Sentinel, September 24, 2013.
38 J.M. Berger, “Omar and Me,” Foreign Policy, September 16, 2013; “The Letters: How Al-Qaeda Failed in Mali and
Somalia,” Wardheernews.com, April 18, 2013; and Muhyadin Ahmed Roble, “Al-Shabaab Split Threatens to Open
New Conflict Between Somalia’s Islamists,” Terrorism Monitor Volume 10 Issue 9, May 4, 2012.
39 See Aweys comments in “Residents Fear Clashes as Somali Rebel Row Worsens,” Reuters, April 1, 2012.
40 Robin Simcox, “Al Shabaab’s Global Menace,” The Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2013.
41 State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, May 30, 2013.
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insurgency or to further its al Qaeda agenda or both—strike outside Somalia in East Africa, as it
did in Uganda, as well as outside the region.”
In addition to being designated as an FTO, several Al Shabaab leaders are subject to U.S.
counterterrorism sanctions under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 (2001) and others are subject to
E.O. 13534 (2010) sanctions for contributing to the Somali conflict, including acts that threaten
AMISOM or the Somali government. The Justice Department has prosecuted American citizens
for violations of these sanctions, and the Treasury Department continues to work with foreign
counterparts to track the flow of funds to Al Shabaab and to freeze terrorist-related assets.42
Among recent U.S. prosecutions was the February 2013 conviction of four Somali immigrants on
terrorist financing charges based on intercepted phone conversations with a former Al Shabaab
leader who was subsequently killed in a U.S. strike.43 Through its Rewards for Justice program
(established under P.L. 98-533 of 1984), the State Department has offered a $7 million reward for
information leading to the capture of Godane, and lesser rewards for other Al Shabaab leaders.
The Justice Department and the Department of Homeland Security have developed a range of
outreach programs designed to counter radicalization and increase dialogue with Somali
communities in the United States.
The United States has implemented a variety of foreign assistance and security cooperation
programs to counter violent extremist threats in East Africa. These programs seek to build partner
countries’ intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen aviation,
port, and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter recruitment. Until
2007, much of this effort was focused on helping Somalia’s neighbors, most notably Kenya, to
contain threats emanating from Somalia and to address homegrown or regional terrorist threats. In
recent years, the State Department and the Department of Defense (DOD) have placed substantial
priority on building the capacity of regional forces contributing to AMISOM operations inside
Somalia, and the United States has begun to provide cautious support to elements of the nascent
Somali security services, although their capacity to absorb assistance is limited. Congress has
provided new authorities to the DOD to support partner capacity-building for counterterrorism
purposes, including the “global train-and-equip” or “Section 1206” authority (provided in the
FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 109-163, as amended) and an
additional train-and-equip authority known as Section 1207(n), specifically for East African and
Yemeni forces, provided in the FY2012 NDAA, P.L. 112-81, as amended. Other U.S. efforts to
stabilize Somalia are ongoing and may further diminish Al Shabaab’s ability to attract recruits.
Recent U.S. security assistance provided to East African partner nations includes:
• more than $700 million in State Department-funded logistics support, equipment,
and training for AMISOM troops since 2007, of which more than $325 million
has been provided through assessed U.N. contributions, and more than $100
million in DOD “train-and-equip” Section 1206 and 1207(n) support to
AMISOM troop contributors since FY2011;
• almost $70 million in DOD Section 1206 support specifically to Kenya and
almost $8 million in Section 1207(n) support;
42 For more information on Al Shabaab financing, see, e.g., reports of the U.N. Monitoring Group and William
Maclean, “Shabaab Finances Face Squeeze after Kenya attack,” Reuters, September 26, 2013.
43 USA v. Basaaly Saeed Moalin, et al. See http://www.theinvestigativeproject.org for other Al Shabaab-related cases.
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• more than $10 million in FY2012 for Kenya under the State Department’s
Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT) and related
counterterrorism funding, and $9 million in FY2012 in Anti-Terrorism Assistance
(ATA) to Kenya; and
• more than $140 million to provide basic capacity building and pay salaries for
vetted units of the Somali National Security Forces.
AMISOM’s force size is currently estimated at roughly 17,700, near its U.N.-authorized troop
ceiling, and it is composed of troops from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone.
The mission has been constrained by a lack of mobility and force protection assets, and it appears
unlikely to extend the territory it holds until these constraints are addressed. AMISOM units in
parts of the country continue to rely on support from Ethiopian forces that have deployed with the
permission of Somali authorities. A recent modification to the U.N. arms embargo for Somalia
(U.N. Security Council Resolution 2093 [2013]) relaxes restrictions on the Somali government’s
ability to acquire weapons and training, and also permits support for AMISOM’s “strategic
partners,” namely Ethiopian forces and Kenyan air and naval assets not included in AMISOM.
Those deployments had previously been a technical violation of the arms embargo.
In addition to support for AMISOM efforts against Al Shabaab, the U.S. military has, “in a
limited number of cases,” taken direct action in Somalia against members of Al Qaeda, including
those members of Al Shabaab “who are engaged in efforts to carry out terrorist attacks against the
United States and our interests,” as described in White House reports to Congress.44 These strikes
have been responsible for the deaths of several senior operatives with reported Al Qaeda links.
Additional air strikes against Al Shabaab targets have been conducted by other foreign militaries,
including the Kenyan Air Force. The U.S. military regularly conducts aerial surveillance of
Somalia from multiple locations in the region as part of a “broad, sustained and integrated
campaign to counter terrorism.”45
What are key issues for Congress to consider?
As Congress continues to weigh the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other violent extremist
groups in Africa, it may be confronted with the question of how the United States can most
effectively balance persistent concerns about security with ongoing concerns about governance
and human rights in the region. Human rights advocates have repeatedly raised concerns with
abuses conducted by regional security forces that they suggest have been condoned by their
governments under the guise of countering terrorism.46 Regional analysts warn that such abuses
have the potential to further fuel radicalization, and that Al Shabaab may have intended with the
44 See Correspondence from the President to Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution. According to news
reports, U.S. strikes against terrorist targets in Somalia include, among others, a May 2008 cruise missile attack against
Al Shabaab’s then-top military commander Aden Hashi Ayro; a 2009 commando raid by helicopter in which suspected
AQ operative Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan was killed; a June 2011 air strike against a target near Kismayo; and a January
2012 strike in which a British-Lebanese fighter was killed. Open source speculation on lethal strikes from U.S.
unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) is explored at http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com.
45 The White House, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, October 28, 2011.
46 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “You Are All Terrorists”: Kenyan Police Abuse of Refugees in Nairobi, May 29,
2013 and Criminal Reprisals: Kenyan Police and Military Abuses Against Ethnic Somalis, May 4, 2012, and Open
Society Justice Initiative, Counterterrorism and Human Rights Abuses in Kenya and Uganda: The World Cup Bombing
and Beyond, November 2012.
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Westgate attack to provoke a violent response from Kenya against ethnic Somalis and other
Kenyan Muslims. One Somalia expert argues that the attack was “a desparate, high-risk gamble
by Shabaab to reverse its prospects,” and has urged Kenya to respond “with restraint and due
process and the rule of law.”47 The application of anti-terrorism laws in East Africa has often been
controversial—in some countries such laws have reportedly been used to silence critics, and, in
others, weak laws have hindered the ability of law enforcement to detain and effectively
prosecute terrorist suspects, leading security services to extra-legal actions. Other questions
Congress may consider include:
• What is the extent of support from U.S. citizens to Al Shabaab? How many
Americans have joined the group in Somalia? What is the intelligence
community doing to ascertain the relationship between U.S. citizens fighting
overseas for Al Shabaab and family or acquaintances in the United States?
• What are the main sources of revenue for Al Shabaab and affiliated groups in the
region? To what extent is Al Shabaab able to profit from the financial remittances
to Somalia? Are international regulations governing Somali money transfer
services sufficient? How might the threatened closure by international banks of
these services’ accounts affect Somalia? How might it affect the ability to track
both licit and illicit financial flows to the country?
• What are the factors driving recruitment by Al Shabaab and affiliated groups in
East African countries like Kenya? How do Kenyan Muslims view the country’s
operations in Somalia? To what extent, if at all, do reported abuses by security
forces affect cooperation by Muslim communities with counterterrorism efforts?
How can the United States and its allies counter the extremist narrative that Islam
is under attack by the West and its “proxies”?
• To what extent are U.S. diplomatic and military facilities in East Africa
vulnerable to attack by extremists? How do U.S. diplomats in the region balance
concerns for their security against the outreach required of their mission?
• What has been the legal justification for U.S. strikes in Somalia? What role
should Congress play in determining the scope and duration of future U.S.
targeted strikes against terrorist actors in East Africa?
• How are limited tactical strikes against terrorist targets in Somalia tied to broader
efforts to promote regional stability? What is the relationship between U.S.
strikes and U.S. support for regional military operations in Somalia? What are the
constraints on U.S. intelligence sharing with regional partners such as Kenya and
the other AMISOM troop contributors? How long will a foreign military
presence in Somalia be required?
• Does Al Shabaab pose a direct threat to the United States? What steps have been
taken at the federal or other levels of government to deter, prevent, and/or
respond to a scenario involving this style of coordinated attack, conducted by a
trained terrorist team against a soft target such as a mall, if it were to be
attempted in the United States?
47 Ken Menkhaus, “What the Deadly Attack on a Kenya Mall Was Really About,” ThinkProgress, September 22, 2013.
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Figure 1. Al Shabaab in East Africa
Areas of Al Shabaab control and influence and major terrorist incidents in 2012-2013
Source: CRS map produced by Hannah Fischer and Jamie Hutcheson, September 25th, 2013. Border data from
the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Geographer, 2012 and Esri, 2012.
Notes: The borders of the shaded areas are approximate and do not imply official endorsement or acceptance
by CRS or the U.S. government. The graphic is not intended to represent all Al Shabaab attacks in the region.
Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
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