U.S.-Kenya Relations: Current Political and
Security Issues
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
September 23, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42967
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S.-Kenya Relations: Current Political and Security Issues
Summary
The U.S. government views Kenya as a strategic partner and anchor state in East Africa, and as
critical to counterterrorism efforts in the region. Kenya has repeatedly been a target of terrorist
attacks, and, as the September 2013 attack on an upscale Nairobi shopping mall underscores,
terrorist threats against international and domestic targets in Kenya remain a serious concern.
Kenya’s military plays a key role in regional operations against Al Shabaab in Somalia. The Al
Qaeda-affiliated Somali insurgent group has claimed responsibility for the Westgate Mall attack
ostensibly in response to Kenya’s military offensive against the group across the Somali border.
The incident is the deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya since the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing and
the group’s first successful large-scale operation in the Kenyan capital.
Kenya ranks among the top U.S. foreign aid recipients in the world, receiving significant
development, humanitarian, and security assistance in recent years. The country, which is a top
recipient of police and military counterterrorism assistance on the continent, hosts the largest U.S.
diplomatic mission in Africa. Nairobi is home to one of four major United Nations offices
worldwide.
The election in March 2013 of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto
complicates the historically strong relationship between Kenya and the United States. Kenyatta,
whose victory against former Prime Minister Raila Odinga was deemed credible by most
observers, and Ruto face charges before the International Criminal Court (ICC) for their alleged
role in crimes against humanity during violence that followed Kenya’s last elections in December
2007.
Ruto’s ICC trial commenced in September 2013; Kenyatta’s begins in November. Their
supporters have portrayed the cases as part of an international conspiracy against Kenya, and as
emblematic of racial bias on the part of a court that has, to date, exclusively targeted Africans for
prosecution. This was a campaign message during the 2013 elections, in which voting largely
followed ethnic lines. The September vote by Kenya’s parliament to withdraw from the Rome
Statute of the ICC does not affect the current trials and is, for now, largely symbolic.
Kenya’s key aid donors and senior Obama Administration officials have been supportive of the
ICC process for the country, viewing impunity for state corruption and political violence as a
major challenge that continues to threaten Kenya’s long-term stability. Implications for U.S.
relations, assistance, and future cooperation remain unclear, given that the United States is not a
state party to the ICC. This may be a key issue for Congress in the coming months, as it weighs
various governance, human rights, and security priorities in the country.
The 2007-2008 post-election violence tarnished Kenya’s generally peaceful reputation and had a
significant impact on its economy, which is East Africa’s largest and most diverse. More recent
developments, including the September 2013 terrorist attack and a fire in August that did
extensive damage to Nairobi’s airport, the region’s busiest, may again slow economic growth.
The March elections were the first held under a new constitution, under which major political
reforms are proscribed. The Kenyatta government faces high expectations by the electorate to
improve the economy and deliver on pledged political and social reforms.
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U.S.-Kenya Relations: Current Political and Security Issues
Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Regional Security Dynamics ........................................................................................................... 3
Political Background ....................................................................................................................... 5
Justice and Reconciliation ......................................................................................................... 7
The New Constitution ................................................................................................................ 8
The 2013 Elections .................................................................................................................... 9
The Economy ................................................................................................................................. 10
Social and Humanitarian Issues ..................................................................................................... 11
Tensions on the Coast .............................................................................................................. 11
Food Insecurity in the Horn of Africa and Refugee Issues ...................................................... 11
U.S.-Kenya Relations .................................................................................................................... 13
U.S. Assistance ........................................................................................................................ 14
Development Assistance ................................................................................................... 16
Security Assistance ............................................................................................................ 16
Outlook .................................................................................................................................... 17
Figures
Figure 1. Kenya at a Glance............................................................................................................. 5
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Kenya, State Department and USAID ................... 15
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 18
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U.S.-Kenya Relations: Current Political and Security Issues
Introduction
The U.S. government has long viewed Kenya as a strategic partner and an anchor state in East
Africa. After Al Qaeda’s 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, this
partnership took on a new dimension as Kenya emerged on the frontline in the struggle against
international terrorism. Kenya expanded its efforts to counter violent extremism in the region in
late 2011, when it launched military operations in neighboring Somalia against a regional Al
Qaeda “affiliate,” Al Shabaab. The terrorist assault in September 2013 on a Nairobi shopping
mall popular with Americans and other expatriates, claimed by Al Shabaab, draws fresh attention
to the U.S. strategic relationship with Kenya and other security partners in the region.
With U.S. aid levels reaching almost $1 billion annually in some years, Kenya ranks among the
top recipients of U.S. foreign assistance globally. The United States has valued Kenya’s role as a
peacemaker among its neighbors and as a host to refugees from across the troubled region.
However, governance and human rights challenges periodically complicate Congress’s annual
deliberations on aid to Kenya and factor into its oversight of U.S. policy toward the country.
Corruption and abuses of power have fueled grievances among Kenya’s diverse population.
Periodic ethnic disputes—notably the widespread civil unrest that followed contested elections in
December 2007—have marred the country’s generally peaceful reputation. Impunity for state
corruption and political violence remains a major challenge that could threaten the country’s
long-term stability. Balancing these concerns against U.S. security priorities in the region may
pose challenges for congressional deliberations in the near term.
Kenya’s March 2013 elections were largely peaceful, despite fears of a repeat of the widespread
violence that followed Kenya’s last elections. As in past elections, however, voting largely
followed ethnic lines, and ethnic mobilization contributed to the victory of President Uhuru
Kenyatta and his running mate, William Ruto. The combination of Kenyatta and Ruto on the
presidential ticket is credited by many analysts with reducing the likelihood of violence during
the elections, given that they represent ethnic groups on opposing sides during the last election.
President Kenyatta’s election poses a challenge for many foreign governments, including the
United States, as they determine how to conduct diplomatic relations with a head of state who,
along with his vice president, is charged by the International Criminal Court for his alleged
involvement in crimes against humanity during the 2007-2008 post-election violence.
Kenya has a long history of politicized violence, and, for some Kenyans and foreign observers,
the ICC cases represent an important first step toward establishing accountability, and as a
deterrent to those who would foment ethnic animosities for political gain. The Kenyatta
Administration, which has committed to cooperating with the ICC, suggests however that the
prosecutions represent foreign interference in Kenya’s internal affairs and that the trials, as they
proceed, might incite further violence. The government also argues that the cases are a distraction
from critical challenges facing the government, including terrorist threats. In early September,
President Kenyatta warned that government cooperation with the court might be affected if he
and Vice President Ruto were required to appear at the Hague at the same time.1 President
Kenyatta declined to attend the September 2013 United Nations General Assembly meeting in
New York, reportedly the first time since independence that the Kenyan head of state has not been
1 James Macharia, “Kenyatta Urges ICC to Ensure Trials Do Not Damage Government,” Reuters, September 9, 2013.
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present, citing the need to remain in Kenya while his vice president, who was due to be present
before the ICC, was abroad. Ruto subsequently sought and obtained limited leave from the trial to
return to Kenya following the Westgate Mall incident.
Security threats facing Kenya, both domestic and foreign, impact the broader region. The country
is a top tourist destination in Africa, a regional hub for transportation and finance, and its
economy is among Africa’s largest. Terrorist threats, a high urban crime rate, and several high-
profile kidnappings have damaged the tourism industry and foreign investment, which took years
to recover from the 2007-2008 violence. Many international organizations base their continental
headquarters in Nairobi, which is home to one of four major United Nations offices worldwide
and serves as a base for regional humanitarian relief efforts. Kenya also hosts the largest U.S.
diplomatic mission in Africa, from which U.S. agencies manage both bilateral and regional
programs. The United States manages relations with the Somali government—formally
recognized by the United States in January for the first time in more than 20 years—from the
embassy in Nairobi, as the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu has been closed since 1991.
The September 2013 Siege of Nairobi’s Westgate Mall
On September 21, masked gunmen attacked an upscale shopping mall in Nairobi, taking hostages and killing more than
60 people. Several hundred people, including Americans, were wounded in the siege. The attack is the most deadly
terrorist incident in the country since the 1998 U.S. embassy bombing, and comes almost two years after the Kenyan
military launched a unilateral military offensive across its northeastern border with Somalia. Al Shabaab has claimed
responsibility for the attack through Twitter and press interviews, citing retaliation for Kenya’s ongoing military role
in Somalia and stating that the target was chosen because it is frequented by Western nationals and Kenyan elites.2
The Somali insurgent group, more formally known as Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin (“Mujahidin Youth Movement”)
has long been linked to Al Qaeda and was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)
in 2008. The group, which maintains ties with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), announced its formal
merger with Al Qaeda in February 2012, although the practical effects remain unclear. In July 2010, Al Shabaab
conducted its first major attack outside Somalia, killing 76 people, including one American, in near simultaneous
bombings in Kampala, the capital of Uganda. With that attack, Al Shabaab indicated its willingness, and capability, to
follow through on threats against countries contributing to AMISOM, the regional stabilization force in Somalia that
has been responsible for significant security gains against the Al Shabaab insurgency in recent years. While Al Shabaab
has lost territory against AMISOM advances in the past two years, it continues to conduct deadly asymmetrical
attacks against both Somali and foreign targets inside Somalia. Notable attacks against foreign targets in 2013 include
the June attack against the U.N. compound, in which 22 people were killed, and the July attack on the Turkish
diplomatic residence, both in Mogadishu.
Experts from the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia have closely reported on the rise of groups and
individuals supportive of Al Shabaab in Kenya, including a Kenyan group known as the Muslim Youth Center/Al Hijra.3
According to their July 2013 report, Al Hijra and its supporters “have suffered setbacks from disruptions of Al Hijra’s
operations by international and regional security services, as well as unexplained killings and disappearances of its
members.”4 The report warned that Al Hijra fighters returning from Somalia in the wake of Al Shabaab defeats and Al
Hijra members reeling from disruptive operations in Kenya “sought operational direction and guidance since the latter
part of 2012 from individuals with former ties to Al-Qaida in East Africa and self-styled Al-Qaida affiliates.”
A statement attributed to the group in late 2012 warned it would shift its focus to “jihad in the region of east Africa
with the obvious emphasis on Kenya” and said:
"Our focus on the region of east Africa should not be viewed as an admission of defeat in Somalia. ...[Muslim Youth
2 “Q&A: Al-Shabab Defends Nairobi Attack,” Al Jazeera, September 23, 2013.
3 The former Muslim Youth Center adopted the name Al Hijra (‘the emigration’), signaling its attempt to place itself in
the context of the original hijra of the Muslim prophet Mohammed and his closest supporters from Mecca to Medina.
4 U.N. Document S/2013/413, Somalia report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted in accordance
with resolution 2060 (2012), July 12, 2013.
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Center] MYC's decision to focus on Kenya and the wider east African region is but a mere continuation of the jihad
in Somalia and not defeat ... As our brothers Al Shabaab and our Kenyan mujahidin combat the kuffar [infidels] inside
Somalia, MYC and its lions will continue to spread the sword here in east Africa making Kenya an example for other
east African countries.”5
The July 2013 U.N. report identified a cleric named Abubakr Sharif Ahmed (aka “Makaburi”) as having “exerted a
growing influence over Al Hijra” and as being “determined to redirect the group’ s resources and manpower from
hitting ‘soft targets’ to conducting complex, large-scale attacks in Kenya on behalf and in support of Al-Shabaab.”
Ahmed has been the subject of Kenyan terrorism investigations for years and was accused of inciting violent riots and
attacks in the Kenyan coastal city of Mombasa after the public murder of his associate Aboud Rogo.6 In 2012, the
U.S. government designated Ahmed for sanctions for contributing to the conflict in Somalia, al eging that he “provides
material support to extremist groups in Kenya and elsewhere in East Africa” and “has preached at mosques in
Mombasa that young men should travel to Somalia, commit extremist acts, fight for al-Qa’ida, and kill U.S. citizens.” 7
He has pled not guilty to charges of incitement and denied involvement with terrorist activities.
While details of the Westgate attack remain unclear, Kenyan officials suggest that among the attackers may be not
only Somalis or other Africans, but also possibly British or American citizens. The Somali diaspora community in the
United States has drawn attention from law enforcement officials in recent years because of efforts by Al Shabaab to
recruit and raise funds abroad. Al Shabaab recruitment in the United States has been linked to concerns regarding
threats to the U.S. homeland and the involvement of U.S. citizens in terrorism activities overseas. The Federal Bureau
of Investigation and other entities within the Justice Department, and the Department of Homeland Security have
developed a range of outreach programs designed to counter radicalization and increase dialogue with Somali
communities in the United States. Several Somali-Americans have been prosecuted for terrorist financing, and several
American citizens (many, but not all, of Somali origin) have been indicted on suspicion of traveling to Somalia to train
and fight with Al Shabaab. At least two Somali-Americans have been implicated in suicide bombings in Somalia. Among
the most infamous of Al Shabaab’s foreign fighters was a Lebanese-American from Alabama, Omar Shafik Hammami,
also known as Abu Mansour al-Amriki, who appeared in propaganda videos and used Twitter and other Internet sites
for recruitment. Hammami, for whom the United States had issued a $5 million bounty, was killed in early September
2013, reportedly by former allies within Al Shabaab. Rumors of possible involvement by American foreign fighters in
the Westgate incident are, at the moment, unsubstantiated.
Regional Security Dynamics
Insecurity in neighboring countries, combined with concerns over terrorist movements across
Kenya’s porous border with Somalia and along its coastline, and piracy off the coast have led
Kenya to take an increasingly active role in regional security. Poaching, banditry, cattle rustling,
and high urban crime, as well as periodic outbreaks of communal violence, place competing
domestic demands on Kenya’s national security resources. Kenya has repeatedly been a target of
international terrorist attacks, and the concentration of potential international and domestic targets
in Nairobi remains a serious concern for Kenyan and Western security officials. The September
2013 siege of the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, a popular shopping destination for tourists,
expatriates, and the Kenyan elite, is the first successful high-profile terrorist attack in the country
since the Al Qaeda attacks in Mombasa in 2002. There have been numerous small-scale attacks
on civilian and state targets in recent years, though, many of which are attributed to Al Shabaab
5 U.S. Government Open Source Center Report AFP20121212950048, “Kenyan Islamist group threatens to launch
'jihad' in East Africa,” Twitter, December 11, 2012.
6 A 2012 U.N. Monitoring Group Report identified Rogo as “a known associate of members of Al-Qaida East Africa
and an advocate of the violent overthrow of the Government of Kenya.” In July 2012, Rogo was designated by the U.S.
government as contributing to the conflict in Somalia. He was shot in Mombasa on August 27, 2012.
7 Treasury Department, “Treasury Targets Regional Actors Fueling Violence and Instability in Somalia,” July 5, 2012.
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or its sympathizers. The frequency of these attacks, most of which occur near the Somali border,
has increased since Kenya commenced military operations in Somalia in 2011 (see below).
Kenya is home to over half a million Somali refugees, many of whom live in crowded Dadaab,
Africa’s largest refugee complex, near the Somali border. Other Somali migrants have
concentrated in the Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh. Kenya also has a significant population of ethnic
Somalis who were born in Kenya, some whose families have been in Kenya for generations. Al
Shabaab has drawn recruits from ethnic Somalis and other Muslim communities in Kenya. Many
Kenyan Muslims distrust the government and view its counterterrorism efforts as discriminatory.
The government faced opposition for years in its efforts to pass anti-terrorism legislation, due to
concerns over civil liberties; a law was finally passed in October 2012.8 The rendition to Uganda
by Kenyan security services of Kenyan citizens suspected in the Kampala bombings has been
challenged in the courts, as many were reportedly carried out without due process.
Rising insecurity near Dadaab, combined with a series of kidnappings along the Kenya-Somali
border, led in late 2011 to the suspension of all but emergency relief efforts at Dadaab. This
coincided with the Kenyan military incursion into Somalia. While an increased police presence
has since allowed some aid activities to resume, security threats, including improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), continue to hamper aid delivery. Some human rights groups allege that Kenyan
security forces have committed abuses against Somali Kenyans and refugees as part of
indiscriminate reprisals for suspected Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya.9 Reports suggest Somalis,
particularly in Eastleigh, are increasingly subject to police harassment. A Kenyan army unit is
under investigation for the shooting of civilians and for other abuses in the northeast town of
Garissa, home to many Somali Kenyans, during an incident in November 2012 that followed the
killing of three Kenyan soldiers by unknown assailants. Kenyan police, military, and civilians
have been increasingly targeted in multiple grenade and IED attacks since late 2011.
Kenya launched its military offensive into southern Somalia in October 2011, with the stated
intent of defending Kenya against terrorist threats and incursions by Al Shabaab. Governments in
the region, including that of Somalia, expressed support for Kenya’s actions. In February 2012,
the U.N. Security Council added its support, authorizing Kenya’s inclusion into the African Union
(AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), raising the mandated troop level of the force from 12,000
to 17,731, and expanding its mandate beyond Mogadishu.10 Kenya took the strategic port city of
Kismayo, which served as one of Al Shabaab’s key sources of revenue, in late 2012 on behalf of
AMISOM and the Somali government. The Kenyan forces are well-equipped by regional
standards, but have limited experience in deploying beyond their borders, except as peacekeepers.
As part of AMISOM, Kenyan forces will likely remain in Somalia for the foreseeable future.
Territorial gains by AMISOM, Ethiopian, and Somali forces have allowed the Somali government
to establish a presence in key strategic towns in southern and central Somalia and encouraged the
return of some international diplomatic representation to Mogadishu, although Al Shabaab
continues to conduct deadly attacks in the capital and elsewhere. Various criminal organizations,
8 “Kenyan Muslims Fear the Worst Over Proposals to Boost Police Powers, The Guardian (UK), September 27, 2012.
9 Human Rights Watch, Criminal Reprisals: Kenyan Police and Military Abuses against Ethnic Somalis, May 2012.
10 AMISOM was first authorized by the U.N. Security Council in 2007. It remains a regional, rather than U.N.,
stabilization mission, and is the first regional mission to receive a U.N. logistical support package. U.N. support is
augmented by other donor support, primarily from the EU, which pays troop stipends, and the United States, which
provides training and equipment. Kenya’s air and naval operations in Somalia remain outside AMISOM.
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including pirate networks, continue to operate on the Somali coast, posing an ongoing threat to
ship traffic in and out of Mombasa, despite a decline in successful attacks.11 The United States
and Kenya have an agreement to facilitate the transfer of suspected pirates captured by the U.S.
Navy off the Horn to Kenya for prosecution; the United Kingdom has a similar agreement.
Figure 1. Kenya at a Glance
Political Background
Kenya, a former British colony, was essentially a one-party state until 1991. The ruling party
during this period (the Kenya African National Union, KANU) subsequently retained its political
11 See CRS Report R40528, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, by Lauren Ploch Blanchard et al.
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dominance, in part through electoral manipulation and repression, until 2002, when long-serving
President Daniel arap Moi stepped aside at the end of his fifth term under donor and domestic
pressure. The elections that year were hailed at home and abroad as reflecting a fundamental shift
in Kenya’s democratic trajectory. For the first time, the fractious and primarily ethnically based
opposition parties came together, forming the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), to defeat
Moi’s chosen successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta. After the
election, though, NARC’s unified front slowly unraveled, revealing underlying ethnic grievances
and patronage politics that belied the optimism of the 2002 polls.
Ethnic Dynamics and Divisions
Kenya is home to more than 50 ethnic groups, and no one group constitutes a majority of the population. The
Kikuyu, comprising just over 20% of the population, are the largest group, and they have long been perceived by many
Kenyans to disproportionately dominate the country’s political class and the business community. Kikuyu led the Mau
Mau insurgency against the British prior to independence. Under Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, the
community was seen to benefit disproportionately from the al ocation of state resources, namely land, constituency
funds, government jobs, and procurement contracts. When Kenyatta’s vice president, Daniel arap Moi, assumed office
after Kenyatta’s death in 1978, many of these benefits shifted to his people, a smal er grouping of ethnicities
collectively referred to as the Kalenjin (estimated at 12% of the population).
In the first four decades after independence, the heartlands of these two communities—the central highlands around
Mt. Kenya for the Kikuyu and the central Rift Valley for the Kalenjin—saw the greatest state investment in schools,
roads, and health services. Other areas were marginalized and remain comparatively underdeveloped, such as the
predominately Muslim provinces of Coast and North Eastern, and the area of western Kenya near Lake Victoria that
many from the Luo ethnic group call home.12 Some Kenyans have referred to the dynamic of ethnic favoritism with
col oquial phrases such as “It’s our turn to eat.” Such favoritism and patronage politics also has reinforced a focus on
“tribe” among many Kenyans that has origins in the colonial period.13 Such perceptions underpinned the resentment
that fed hate speech and violence surrounding the 2007-2008 post-election crisis. Related state corruption and
nepotism has also undermined the country’s economic performance and development.
No single ethnic group constitutes a large enough voting block for its political leaders to obtain or maintain power
alone—Kenya’s electoral system requires them to form alliances with other groups. These alliances shift periodically;
many of today’s key political figures have moved in and out of government and the opposition since the Moi era.
One of the NARC factions, led by Raila Odinga, accused the new president, Mwai Kibaki, of
dishonoring a deal made prior to the elections, which would reportedly have created a power-
sharing arrangement with a prime ministerial post for Odinga. Instead, Odinga was appointed
minister of roads. A then-ongoing constitutional review process might have provided a vehicle for
the new prime minister post, Odinga’s team argued, as part of a widely popular push for more
checks and balances in the political system. The draft constitution proposed by the government in
2005, however, sought to maintain a strong presidency and create a ceremonial prime minister. It
was defeated in a public referendum after an intense campaign led by Odinga and his allies.
Odinga and another former NARC member, Kalonzo Musyoka, both challenged Kibaki for the
presidency in the December 2007 general elections. In the parliamentary polls, deemed largely
credible, parties opposed to Kibaki’s coalition made significant gains. Odinga’s party, the Orange
Democratic Movement (ODM), fell seven seats short of an absolute majority. The presidential
election, however, was seen by observers as deeply flawed, with evidence of rigging on both
sides. Despite significant irregularities in the vote tabulation process and indications that voter
12 See Commission on Revenue Allocation, Kenya: Country Fact Sheets, December 2011 at opendata.go.ke.
13 For further discussion, see, e.g., Michela Wrong, It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower (NY:
HarperCollins, 2009) and Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History Since Independence (NY: I.B. Tauris, 2011).
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turnout in some areas was over 100%, the electoral commission declared Kibaki the winner, and
he was quickly sworn in as president.
Riots in urban areas followed the announcement of the election results, and the outrage expressed
by Odinga supporters turned violent in many parts of Kenya, largely along ethnic lines.14 Some of
the violence was spontaneous, but investigations found that multiple attacks were planned, with
politicians on both sides implicated. In what became Kenya’s worst political crisis since
independence, as many as 1,300 people were killed and some 500,000 displaced during the
ensuing six weeks of violence, according to the State Department.15 Negotiations between the
parties under the auspices of former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and several African
former heads of state, combined with significant pressure from the United States and other aid
donors, led to a power-sharing agreement on February 28, 2008. A coalition government was
formed in April 2008, with Kibaki as president and Odinga in a new prime minister position. The
parties agreed to draft a new constitution, and to address sensitive land rights issues.
Justice and Reconciliation
After reaching the 2008 power-sharing agreement, the new government established a
Commission of Inquiry (often referred to as the Waki Commission for its chairman, Kenyan
Justice Philip Waki) with international representation to investigate abuses related to the post-
election violence. The commission provided its report to President Kibaki and Prime Minister
Odinga in October 2008. According to the Waki Commission report, Kenya’s “history of ethnic
violence has been papered over” and there had been “no serious effort by any government” to
punish the perpetrators or address the complaints of the victims. Further, the Commission stated
that “impunity has become the order of the day.” The commissioners identified several factors
contributing to the violence, namely:
the politicization and proliferation of violence, which in turn led to a culture of impunity;
the growing power and personalization of power around the Presidency;
the perception among certain ethnic groups of historical marginalization, which was tapped
by politicians to create an underlying climate of tension and hate; and
a growing population of poor, unemployed youth who join militias and gangs.16
Rather than publicly disclosing alleged perpetrators, the Waki Commission provided a list of
names to mediator Kofi Annan, who in turn submitted them to the ICC in July 2009.
In 2011, the ICC summoned five senior Kenyan government officials and one radio journalist to
respond to allegations of crimes against humanity committed during the post-election violence.
The suspects each denied the accusations against them. The Court confirmed charges against four
14 Inter-ethnic violence occurred between Luo (Odinga’s ethnic group) and Kikuyu (Kibaki’s ethnic group), primarily
in urban areas, and in the Rift Valley, where election unrest combined with historic land-focused grievances held by
Kalenjin ethnic groups, prompting attacks against Kikuyu communities. Many of the victims nationwide were Kikuyu,
but Kikuyu gangs also organized retaliatory attacks against non-Kikuyu.
15 State Department, “Kenya,” Background Notes, May 7, 2012.
16 Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), Final Report, October 2008.
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of the suspects—William Ruto, Uhuru Kenyatta, Joshua arap Sang, and Francis Mutharua—in
January 2012.17 The Kenyan government objected to these cases, despite being a state party to the
ICC.18 The ICC judges nevertheless proceeded, having found Kenyan efforts insufficient to
constitute a credible claim to prosecuting the suspects at home. Witness protection remains a
serious concern—in March, the ICC Prosecutor dropped the charges against Mutharua, claiming
that key witnesses in the case had either died, been bribed, or were too afraid to testify.19
The ICC Charges Against Kenyatta and Ruto
The ICC trial against Vice President William Ruto began in September 2013. He faces charges of murder, deportation
or forcible transfer, and persecution, in relation to attacks, primarily against Kikuyu, by members of his Kalenjin ethnic
group, in the Rift Valley. Kenyatta, whose trial is scheduled for November, faces similar charges, but his are tied to
revenge attacks by Kikuyu gangs against groups seen to support the ODM party, namely Luo and Kalenjin, in the 2007
elections. Both cases have been marked by a high number of witness defections, a possible sign of intimidation.
The New Constitution
Kenyan voters returned to the polls in August 2010 to vote on a new draft constitution, approving
it by roughly a two-thirds majority. The new constitution brings major changes to government—it
establishes new checks and balances and a more deliberate separation of powers; devolves
considerable powers to a new county level of government; and creates new bodies, including a
Supreme Court, an upper house (the Senate) in parliament, a new anti-corruption authority, and
an independent land commission. New public vetting and oversight mechanisms for key state
institutions have been introduced, and the 2010 constitution includes Kenya’s first bill of rights.
Initial reforms to the judicial sector under the new constitution have been received positively by
donors and Kenyans, and are seen as both increasing its independence and enhancing the integrity
of its judges. Several senior judges were found to be unfit for office—two were linked to long-
running, high-profile corruption cases—and were dismissed in 2012. The new chief justice of the
Supreme Court, former human rights activist Willy Mutunga, is viewed by many as a reformer.
Constitutionally required changes in some other sectors, including land and police reform, have
moved more slowly, and some remain outstanding. Concerns have been raised with the pace of
police reform.20 The Waki Commission found that the police response to the 2007-2008 violence
varied and was affected by ethnic divisions, and that some police participated, or were complicit,
in attacks against civilians. The Waki report states that at least 405 people were fatally shot by
police, many in the back, often in ODM strongholds, and with a high likelihood that many were
killed unlawfully. Human Rights Watch alleged that police were authorized to fire
17 The six original suspects were Ruto, former Minister of Education; Kenyatta, Deputy Prime Minister and former
Minister of Finance; Henry Kosgey, former Minister of Industrialization; Mutharua, former head of the civil service;
Mohammed Hussein Ali, former police commissioner; and Sang, a radio journalist.
18 The government first lobbied for the African Union to petition the U.N. Security Council for a deferral and more
recently applied to the East African Court of Justice for the transfer of the trials to the Tanzania-based court. Kenya’s
parliament passed legislation in 2010 unsuccessfully urging the government to withdraw as a state party to the ICC.
19 “Statement by the ICC Prosecutor on the Notice to Withdraw Charges Against Mr. Mutharua,” ICC Weekly Update
#163, March 12, 2013; “ICC’s Agony Over Key Kenyan Witnesses,” The Standard (Nairobi), August 16, 2012.
20 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Police Reform in Kenya: ‘A Drop in the Ocean,’ January 2013 and Human Rights
Watch (HRW), High Stakes: Political Violence and the 2013 Elections in Kenya, February 2013.
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indiscriminately on protestors.21 Amnesty International suggests that new policies on the use of
force have yet to be applied in practice.
The 2013 Elections
The March 2013 elections heralded several major changes in Kenyan political system. The new
constitution dissolved the power-sharing arrangement created after the 2007 elections, including
the position of prime minister, making the presidential race a winner-takes-all scenario for the
executive branch. With President Kibaki constitutionally ineligible to run for a third term, eight
presidential candidates vied for the post. Among them, the two primary candidates were then-
Prime Minister Raila Odinga and Kenyatta, who was then Deputy Prime Minister. The
proliferation of aspirants and opinion poll data led many observers to expect that neither of the
top candidates would achieve the required absolute majority in the March 4 polls, thereby forcing
a run-off.22 The close race increased fears that if the election results were contentious, they might
spark political violence, as happened in 2007.
The ICC cases became key among a range of issues covered in the presidential campaigns, as was
evident in Kenya’s first-ever presidential debate, which was widely televised and broadcast on
radio and Internet. Odinga questioned the practicality of having an ICC indictee as president,
while Kenyatta and Ruto, who ran under the banner of the new Jubilee coalition, focused on
rallying votes from their ethnic bases and, according to many analysts, ran a better-managed
campaign. 23 Legal challenges to Kenyatta and Ruto’s eligibility as candidates, based on integrity
and ethics requirements in the new constitution, failed to halt their bid for office.
Voter turnout in the March 4th elections was high, at 86%, and the complexity of the polls, during
which voters cast six different ballots for presidential, parliamentary, and county-level races,
combined with the failure of new electronic systems for transmitting and tallying results, delayed
the announcement of the election results until March 9th. Candidates from the Jubilee coalition
won the most seats in the National Assembly and the new Senate, but failed to secure an absolute
majority. Uhuru Kenyatta was declared the winner of the presidential race with 50.07% of all
votes cast, avoiding a runoff against Odinga, who earned 43.3% of the votes, by a slim margin of
8,419 votes. While the margin by which he won a first-round victory was narrow, his lead against
Odinga was not—Kenyatta beat Odinga by more than 800,000 votes. Kenya’s Supreme Court,
which heard several challenges to the results, including from Odinga, found on March 30th that
the elections had been held in a free, fair, and credible manner, and that Kenyatta and Ruto had
been validly elected. Many election observer groups concurred: while noting problems during the
party primaries, isolated violence in parts of the country on election day, technological failures,
and a lack of transparency during the tallying process, observers largely agreed that they had not
seen evidence to indicate that such irregularities undermined the declared result of the
21 HRW, Turning Pebbles: Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya, December 9, 2011.
22 The 2010 constitution requires a presidential candidate to win a majority of 50% of the votes plus one, and to secure
more than a quarter of votes in 24 of the country’s 47 new counties, to avoid a run-off.
23 A large number of new political parties were created in 2012. Many then formed coalitions with new names, adding
to the confusion. For example, Odinga (ODM) and Musyoka (Wiper Democratic Movement) united to form the
Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD). Kenyatta (TNA) and Ruto (United Republican Party) formed the
Jubilee Coalition with Deputy Prime Minister Musalia Mudavadi (United Democratic Forum), who served as Vice
President under Moi, Mudavadi left the coalition after the party nomination process in December. The presidential
ballots will include the name of the presidential candidate’s party rather than the name of their coalition.
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presidential election.24 While some analysts have questioned whether discrepancies in the tallying
of polling station results could indicate that Kenyatta might not have passed the first-round 50%
threshold, it appears unlikely that a full recount would have ultimately overturned his win.25
Odinga conceded defeat after the Supreme Court’s ruling, easing tensions and allowing the
Kenyatta Administration to commence its five-year term unchallenged. The peaceful resolution of
electoral disputes, including the opposition’s acceptance of the Supreme Court ruling, was hailed
by President Obama as a testament “to the progress Kenya has made in strengthening its
democratic institutions, and the desire of the Kenyan people to move their country forward.”26
Still, the devolution of power to local-level authorities, as called for in the new constitution,
continues to represent a potential flashpoint in local disputes over resources and power.
The Economy
Kenya’s economy is the largest and most diverse in East Africa, although it has faced increased
challenges in recent years. The economy was hit hard by the 2007-2008 post-election crisis, the
global economic downturn, and a 2011-2012 regional drought. The growth rate has risen in the
past two years, averaging 5%-6%, but not enough to address the country’s development needs.
The kidnapping of several foreigners by Somalia-based networks and the potential for terrorist
attacks such as the Westgate incident, combined with spillover effects from Europe’s financial
woes, have hurt Kenya’s tourism industry and its investment climate. A fire in August 2013 did
extensive damage to Kenya’s main international airport, in Nairobi, and its impact on exports and
tourism is expected to have a damaging effect. High fuel and electricity costs, inflation, poor
transportation infrastructure, and inadequate power supply continue to hamper multiple sectors.
Government efforts to pursue privatization, deregulation, and trade liberalization are ongoing, but
high tariff rates continue to hinder investment.27 Agricultural products dominate exports to
Europe, while manufactured goods, primarily apparel made from imported fabrics, dominate
exports to the United States. China is increasingly investing in the country. Despite challenges,
U.S. companies also appear to see potential in Kenya—more than 60 American companies,
including General Electric and IBM, have operations in the country and many of them are
expanding. Nascent oil exploration in northern Kenya also shows signs of promise. Kenyan firms
have led the way in developing mobile phone-based banking systems that have revolutionized
financial transactions for increasing numbers in the developing world. U.S. foreign direct
investment in Kenya has grown in recent years, and the U.S. government has proposed a new
trade and investment partnership with the East African Community (EAC), of which Kenya is a
member. The United States plans to engage with the EAC in a Commercial Dialogue, only one of
four such dialogues worldwide.
24 European Union Election Observation Mission to Kenya, Final Report, 2013.
25 See the September 3, 2013 Mars Group Kenya Audit Report at http://blog.marsgroupkenya.org.
26 The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Presidential Election in Kenya, March 30, 2013.
27 World Bank, Doing Business in the East African Community in 2012, April 11, 2012. Kenya’s ranking in the World
Bank’s Doing Business 2013 report fell four places to 121st out of 185 countries, placing it behind Uganda’s less
sophisticated economy and in 10th place among sub-Saharan African countries.
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Social and Humanitarian Issues
By regional standards, Kenya’s population is highly literate, and the number of Internet and
mobile phone users is rising dramatically. Kenya has a growing middle class, but more than half
the population lives on less than $1 per day. Unemployment is widespread, and a high population
growth rate has contributed to a young, increasingly urban, and potentially restive population.
Tensions on the Coast
On the predominately Muslim coast, a new political movement, the Mombasa Republican
Council (MRC), has given a new voice to long-standing grievances about the region’s perceived
marginalization and lack of state investment, and has called for secession. Kenya’s High Court
overturned a government ban on the MRC in July 2012, but the ban was later reinstated and
warrants issued for the arrest of MRC leaders. The group has to date maintained a public
commitment to non-violence. According to State Department officials, there was no evidence in
2012 to link the MRC to violent extremist elements on the coast. Increasing anti-government
sentiment among Muslim youths in the region is a cause for concern—in August 2012, Aboud
Rogo, a Kenyan cleric facing U.S. sanctions for contributing to the violence in Somalia (by
fundraising for Al Shabaab) was killed by gunmen in Mombasa. His death sparked several days
of violent protests, with demonstrators alleging that he had been the victim of an extrajudicial
killing, either by Kenyan security forces, or by the United States or Israel. Such allegations were
fueled in part by the extrajudicial rendition of Kenyan citizens to Uganda in 2010, after the Al
Shabaab bombings in Kampala. Human rights groups have reported on other alleged rendition
operations from Kenya to other Horn of Africa countries under the aegis of global
counterterrorism efforts.28
Food Insecurity in the Horn of Africa and Refugee Issues
In 2011, the Horn of Africa region suffered its worst drought in 60 years. Pastoral communities in
Kenya’s arid north faced conditions similar to those in Somalia, with extremely high rates of
malnutrition.29 Steep increases in staple food and fuel prices left many unable to meet basic
needs. At the height of the crisis, more than 4 million Kenyans required food aid. Food security
has since improved, but the situation is fragile in some areas. Insecurity and gaps in humanitarian
aid in south-central Somalia continue to deter the return of most Somali refugees, some of whom
fled during the 2011 crisis, and others who had left Somalia much earlier. Refugee flows from
Somalia and Sudan/South Sudan into northern Kenya have placed further strain on a host
population that also continues to face poor food security conditions.
While Kenya has long served as a haven for refugees from the region’s various conflicts and
natural disasters, the government’s tolerance for more than half a million Somali refugees appears
to be waning, in part based on an increase in attacks attributed to Al Shabaab and its sympathizers
28 See, e.g., Open Society Foundations, Counterterrorism and Human Rights Abuses in Kenya and Uganda, November
2012; HRW, Why Am I Still Here? The 2007 Horn of Africa Renditions, October 1, 2008.
29 See CRS Report R42046, Horn of Africa Region: The Humanitarian Crisis and International Response, coordinated
by Rhoda Margesson.
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in Kenya.30 In December 2012, the government directed that asylum seekers in Nairobi and other
urban areas no longer be received and registered, and that an estimated 100,000 urban refugees be
relocated to the overcrowded Dadaab refugee complex in northeastern Kenya and Kakuma camp
near the border with South Sudan. Dadaab is now Kenya’s fifth-largest population center, with
almost 500,000 inhabitants, and Kakuma is nearing its capacity. UNHCR and others have raised
serious concerns with this directive, in part because of the potential disruption in livelihoods for
many Somalis who have lived in Nairobi for years. Kenya’s High Court, in a July 2013 ruling,
upheld the asylum right of urban refugees, halting efforts to relocate them to the camps.
Kenya and the Illegal Ivory Trade
East Africa is widely recognized as one of the world’s most biologically diverse regions. Kenya, home to several
famous wildlife reserves, relies heavily on tourism for foreign exchange earnings and has played a lead role for over 30
years in efforts to stop the ivory trade. Game hunting, once a popular sport in Kenya, was increasingly restricted in
the 1970s in response to international media coverage of dramatically declining elephant and rhino populations and
sensational seizures of ivory exports to Asia. Kenya banned elephant hunting in 1973 and extended the sport hunting
ban to al animals, without a permit, in 1977. The government began to restrict ivory exports in 1974, although
exports continued and members of President Jomo Kenyatta’s own family were implicated in the trade.31
International pressure regarding increasingly endangered African elephant populations mounted in the 1980s.32 In
1989, as part of Kenya’s campaign to have the ivory trade banned worldwide, then-President Moi drew global media
attention by burning 12 tons of stockpiled tusks, worth an estimated $3 million and representing more than 2,000
elephants.33 Behind the effort was Dr. Richard Leakey, a conservationist whom Moi appointed to lead the
government’s wildlife department, which he transformed into the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS). Leakey mounted an
anti-poaching effort spearheaded by elite paramilitary KWS units that were authorized to kill increasingly well-armed
poachers. Under Leakey, who also sought to address corruption within the service, the KWS developed a reputation
as a disciplined and effective law enforcement agency that continues to draw significant donor funding.
Wildlife experts suggest that elephant poaching is again on the rise in East Africa. A recent study based in part on
NASA satellite imagery and KWS elephant mortality data found that poaching in southeast Kenya rose between 1999
and 2002, declined dramatically in 2003, and then sharply rose annually thereafter, with elephant kills in 2008 and
2009 at levels far higher than those documented in the 1990s.34 Poaching in parts of Kenya may now be at its highest
rate in 15 years—by government estimates, 350 elephants were kil ed in 2012 alone.35 Some observers estimate that
increased demand from Asia is driving the trade, but regional economic trends may also play a role on the supply-side
of poaching. Domestic budget constraints have reportedly limited Kenyan government support for KWS patrols and
outposts. The 2008-2009 global recession, coming after the 2007-2008 violence in Kenya, was particularly damaging
to East African economies—tourism fell, inflation rose, and security budgets and donor aid flows were reduced.
Reports suggest that Kenyan and Tanzanian ports and airports continue to serve as primary transit points for export
of ivory to Asia. In January 2013, Kenyan police seized two tons of ivory, worth over $1.5 million, which is cited as
the largest single seizure in Kenya’s history. Both Kenya and Tanzania hold sizeable stockpiles of ivory. Tanzania has
increasingly lobbied for authorization to sell some of its stocks, while Kenya has maintained its opposition to stockpile
sales, and in July 2011 publicly burned a reported $16 million in tusks (reports suggest that the tusks burned
30 Kenya has raised repeated concerns about the economic, security, and demographic implications of hosting large
numbers of Somali refugees and called for expanded aid delivery in Somalia to avoid a “pull” factor across the border.
31 International trade in ivory and other wildlife goods is regulated by the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which entered into force in 1975.
32 The African elephant population declined from 1.3 million to 600,000 between 1979 and 1987, and Kenya’s
population fell from 130,000 in 1973 to 16,000 in 1989, per Ian Douglas-Hamilton, “African Elephant Population
Study, Pachyderm, Vol. 8, 1987; and J.P. Cohn, “Elephants: Remarkable and Endangered,” Bioscience, Vol. 40, 1990.
33 Jane Perlez, “Kenya, In Gesture, Burns Ivory Tusks,” New York Times, July 19, 1989.
34 “Spatiotemporal Patterns of Elephant Poaching in South-Eastern Kenya,” Wildlife Research, April 12, 2012.
35 “Special Update: Elephant Poaching in Samburu,” National Geographic, June 2012.
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represent only a portion of Kenya’s existing stockpile). The Kenyan government continues to press regional
counterparts to strengthen law enforcement efforts to counter wildlife smuggling, and has extended training to the
nascent South Sudan Wildlife Forces. The KWS is additionally establishing a forensic and genetic laboratory that will,
among other aims, seek to serve as a regional referral center for the DNA sequencing of elephant remains, in an
effort to provide credible prosecutorial evidence for wildlife-related crimes.
U.S.-Kenya Relations
The United States and Kenya have maintained a close diplomatic relationship for decades. In the
late 1970s, for example, at the height of the Cold War, U.S. security cooperation with countries in
the Horn of Africa took on heightened strategic priority amid contingency planning for possible
U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf, and Kenya’s port in Mombasa was viewed as a
stable alternative to options in Somalia. A resulting base-access agreement accorded Kenya
substantial military aid, which continued under the Reagan Administration’s policy to “contain”
Soviet influence in the region. By the 1990s, with the Cold War over, the United States was
increasingly sensitive to political and human rights abuses by the Moi government, although
Kenya’s strategic location and comparative stability ensured that relations remained cordial, aided
by Kenya’s role as a hub for international humanitarian relief operations in Sudan and Somalia.
Ties improved as the two countries increased their cooperation on counterterrorism efforts. The
2002 elections and the subsequent political transition were a significant event in the warming
relationship, which current U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Robert Godec has described as a
friendship that is “broad and deep.”36
Kenya’s flawed 2007 elections and the violence that ensued were viewed with “great dismay and
disappointment” by U.S. officials such as former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Johnnie Carson, who had previously served as U.S. Ambassador to Kenya and who saw the
country’s democratic progress “seriously derailed and nearly destroyed” by the crisis.37 While
acknowledging the important security role Kenya plays, U.S. diplomats and some Members of
Congress have continued to raise concerns about state corruption and human rights abuses by
elements of the Kenyan security services. U.S. officials have also applauded progress, such as the
passage of the 2010 constitution.
The United States has stressed the need for accountability for the 2007-2008 unrest and long-
standing, unresolved corruption cases.38 The State Department has urged Kenyan cooperation
with the ICC, and President Obama has reiterated the importance of Kenya’s “commitment to
uphold its international obligations, including with respect to international justice.”39
36 Testimony of Robert F. Godec, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nomination Hearing, November 28, 2012.
37 Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, “Kenya and the U.S. – Meeting the Growing Challenge in East Africa,”
Remarks at the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC, July 22, 2009.
38 Parliament established a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) in 2009 to investigate and report on
gross human rights violations and historical injustices. The TJRC was not mandated with the authority to bring criminal
charges against alleged perpetrators of abuses. The TJRC held public hearings on an array of sensitive topics, and
issued its final report in May 2013, which is available at http://www.tjrckenya.org. Some allege that the final version of
the report was tampered with by President Kenyatta’s office. See Paul Seils, “Integrity of Kenya’s Truth Commission
Report Must Be Restored,” Al Jazeera, June 9, 2013.
39 The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Presidential Election in Kenya, March 30, 2013.
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Despite the potential diplomatic challenges posed by the ICC cases, the Obama Administration
has maintained its public commitment to the U.S.-Kenya relationship, during and in the aftermath
of the 2013 elections. A video message by President Obama to the Kenyan people prior to the
elections underscored his commitment to the partnership, according to the State Department, and
reflected “the important place that Kenya occupies in East Africa and beyond.”40 The message
that “the choice of who will lead Kenya is up to the Kenyan people” received mixed responses
from Kenyan politicians. Kenyatta and Ruto reportedly sought to portray the president’s
comments as endorsing their legitimacy as candidates, but a subsequent comment by Assistant
Secretary Carson that “choices have consequences” was interpreted by some as interference, i.e.,
an implicit message that the United States did not view ICC suspects as appropriate candidates.41
The Kibaki Administration was sensitive to comments by donor governments related to the ICC
issue, and in February the Foreign Ministry admonished European ambassadors for what it
viewed as interference in domestic issues and a perceived effort to influence the elections.42 That
sensitivity continues under the new government, which has looked to alternative allies, such as
China and Russia, for diplomatic and economic support in the early months of its tenure.
The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, and the Obama Administration
has not publicly stated its position on how U.S. relations with the Kenyatta Administration may
be affected by their ICC cases, other than to encourage continued cooperation with the Court.
Prior to the election, several European countries alluded to possible changes in diplomatic
relations based on EU policies requiring only “essential” contact with ICC defendants, although
the extent of those changes remains unclear.43 President Obama publicly congratulated President
Kenyatta on his election, and the United States and several European countries sent their
ambassadors to his inauguration. President Obama spoke directly with President Kenyatta by
phone during the September 2013 terrorist attack, expressing his condolences and offering U.S.
support for Kenyan efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice.44
U.S. Assistance
U.S. foreign assistance to Kenya has reached almost $1 billion annually in recent years, and the
country routinely ranks among the top ten U.S. aid recipients globally. U.S. assistance was
estimated at over $900 million in FY2011, including over $200 million in food and other
humanitarian aid.45 Kenya received more than $700 million in U.S. aid in FY2012—over $500
million in bilateral aid, including almost $8 million in Overseas Contingency Operations funds,
and roughly $200 million in humanitarian aid, in addition to U.S. support for AMISOM troop
40 The White House, “President Obama’s Message to the People of Kenya,” Video, February 5, 2013 and State
Department Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, Daily Press Briefing, February 5, 2013.
41 See, e.g., “US Official Says Kenya’s Elections Have Consequences,” VOA News, February 7, 2013, and “U.S.
Position Sends Mixed Signals in Jubilee Team,” The Standard (Nairobi), February 10, 2013.
42 “Kenya Rebukes U.S., EU Ambassadors Over Election Comments Seen as Discrediting Top Candidate,” Associated
Press, February 11, 2013.
43 The Cotonou Agreement governs trade and development cooperation between the European Union and developing
countries and legally requires compliance with the ICC. Kenya is a signatory. Sudan chose not to ratify the agreement
in 2009. This in turn limited European development assistance for the country. For more information, see the European
Council, The European Union and the International Criminal Court, May 2010.
44 The White House, Readout of the President’s Call with President Kenyatta of Kenya, September 22, 2013.
45 Assistance figures compiled by CRS based on annual State Department budget justifications, USAID emergency fact
sheets, and congressional notifications of both DOD and State Department security assistance.
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contributors. The State Department has requested $564 million in non-emergency aid for
FY2014; this figure does not include food aid or certain types of security assistance. Global
health programs regularly comprise 65%-75% of total non-emergency aid to Kenya, although
there has been a substantial reduction in HIV/AIDS-related funding in the past two years, based
on “efficiencies and country-specific factors.”46 The reduction in health funding, which began in
FY2012, accounts for comparatively smaller aid requests in FY2013 and FY2014. Bilateral aid
figures do not provide a full accounting of counterterrorism assistance, some of which draws
from regional State Department accounts or is provided by the Department of Defense (DOD).
Such assistance has increased significantly with Kenya’s incorporation into AMISOM, both
through assessed U.N. contributions and bilateral support to the country’s contributing forces.
Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Kenya, State Department and USAID
($ in millions)
Account, by Year
FY2011 Actual
FY2012 Actual
FY2013 Request
FY2014 Request
Development
75.8 92 92.9 89.8
Assistance (DA)
Economic Support
- 4.8 - -
Fund (ESF)
Food for Peace (FFP)
77.5
-
-
Global Health
Programs (GHP) –
498.8 241.5 277.4 382.1
State
Global Health
Programs (GHP) –
75.3 78.2 79.4 81.4
USAID
Foreign Military
Financing (FMF)
1 1.5 1.1 1.2
International Military
Education & Training
0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
(IMET)
International
Narcotics Control &
Law Enforcement
2 2 1.8 2
(INCLE)
Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism,
Demining & Related
8 1.2 6.2 6.5
Programs (NADR)
NADR – Overseas
Contingency
- 7.8 - -
Operations (OCO)
TOTAL
661.8 507.2 459.5 563.8
46 State Department, “Kenya,” FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations. Foreign aid for
FY2013 is currently funded under a continuing resolution, P.L. 112-175, under which accounts are funded at the same
level as in FY2012 plus 0.612%. Country allocations from those accounts are at the discretion of State and USAID.
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Source: State Department FY2013 and FY2014 Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations.
Totals do not include emergency humanitarian assistance, or certain types of security assistance provided
through regional programs, including for counterterrorism and peacekeeping purposes.
Development Assistance
U.S. development aid to Kenya focuses on health, education, economic growth, and advancing
key political reforms. Kenya receives U.S. support through the President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI); the Feed the Future (FtF)
initiative; and the Global Climate Change (GCC) initiative. Kenya has also been identified as one
of six initial partner countries in the Obama Administration’s Power Africa initiative. Other
development programs include investments in basic education and water and sanitation. Efforts to
support the implementation of the new constitution and enhance the country’s system of checks
and balances are cornerstones of U.S. governance programs. Technical assistance aims to build
government capacity at both the national and local level, and other U.S. aid programs aim to build
accountability, including through support for independent media and civil society. The judicial
sector is another target of U.S. aid. The United States has provided significant elections-related
assistance, totaling over $30 million since 2010 and including support for both domestic and
international monitors. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and the State Department’s
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) have provided conflict mitigation and
election-related support.
Security Assistance
Kenya is one of the largest recipients of U.S. security assistance in Africa. Aid in the past decade
has increasingly focused on improving Kenya’s capabilities to control its land and sea borders and
to counter terrorism. In addition to U.S. assistance, Kenyan purchases through the Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) program are sizable by regional standards, and have included fighter
aircraft, helicopters, and Air Force computer systems. The Kenyan Navy has received U.S.
assistance to enhance its ability to counter the piracy threat emanating from Somalia. Kenya
receives aid through a regional State Department program, the Partnership for Regional East
African Counterterrorism (PREACT), with related counterterrorism funding totaling over $10
million in FY2012. Kenya is a major African recipient of Department of Defense (DOD) “train
and equip” aid, totaling almost $80 million to date, as authorized under Section 1206 of the
FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as amended, and Section 1207(n) of the
FY2012 NDAA, as amended, the latter applying to its role in AMISOM. U.S. Africa Command’s
Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), based in Djibouti, maintains a small
contingent hosted at a Kenyan naval base that conducts civil affairs projects and other security
cooperation activities in Kenya.
The incorporation of over 4,000 Kenyan troops into AMISOM has budget implications for the
State Department, which has provided roughly $700 million in logistics support, equipment, and
training for AMISOM troop contributors since 2007. This aid has been provided through the
Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, and includes U.N. assessed contributions
to the U.N. logistics mission that supports AMISOM. DOD has provided more than $100 million
in funding for training and equipping AMISOM troop contributors since FY2011, some of which,
as noted, has been obligated for Kenya.47
47 DOD provided $140 million under Section 1206 to date, and almost $40 million under Section 1207(n) authority.
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Kenya is one of the top five global recipients of State Department Anti-Terrorism Assistance
(ATA) funding, which supports border and coastal security and law enforcement programs. ATA
funds support counterterrorism training for the Kenyan Police, and have averaged $8 million
annually in recent years. Congress has expressed concern with reports of abuses by Kenyan
security forces in recent appropriations legislation, and has stressed the need for strict vetting of
units receiving U.S. assistance. This concern is corroborated by State Department reports of
police corruption and impunity, and of serious abuses by multiple security agencies.48
Outlook
Kenya’s 2013 elections present donor governments, including that of the United States, with both
opportunities and challenges as they proceed in their relationship with the Kenyatta
Administration. The elections were relatively peaceful, and their outcome, including Kenyatta’s
victory, has been accepted by all parties, even though some still question whether Kenyatta’s first
round victory was legitimate. New-found public confidence in Kenya’s judiciary, which appears
to be a result of reforms made under the 2010 constitution, is partly credited with the peaceful
outcome of these elections. The ethnic tensions that preceded the polls, however, still exist, and
the Kenyatta Administration faces deep mistrust among some communities. Kenya’s major
political parties today appear to represent strategic alliances of ethnic communities rather than of
shared ideology, and their continued cohesion is far from assured. The Kenyatta Administration
represents a new generation of Kenyan leadership that has emphasized its commitment to pro-
market reforms and its intent to harness public-private partnerships to create jobs, expand access
to education, health care, and technology, and commence major infrastructure projects. While
many of these goals dovetail with U.S. foreign aid priorities, Kenya’s ability to fund them is
uncertain, and ongoing security risks facing the country may deter anticipated investments.
Another factor that may affect the views of Congress and other donor countries toward Kenya is
its continued compliance with the ICC, given recent moves by Kenya’s parliament and President
Kenyatta’s warnings about the challenges of governing the country while he and his Vice
President travel back and forth to the Hague for the trials.49 If Kenyatta or Ruto’s cooperation
with the Court were to change, foreign diplomatic interaction with Kenya’s top leadership might
be limited and their ability to travel abroad curtailed.50 Additional restrictions by ICC Member
States on trade and aid might also apply, which could place the United States, which is not
obligated by ICC policies, in an increasingly challenging position as a key donor to the country.51
Going forward, Congress may face difficult decisions in balancing U.S. human rights concerns
against other priorities in the U.S.-Kenya relationship. These include a shared desire to counter
terrorism, ongoing development and humanitarian priorities, and other foreign policy goals in the
region. The United States has made significant investments in Kenya and the size of the U.S.
government presence in the country underscores its importance for U.S. efforts in the region.
Kenya’s commitment and capacity to respond to transnational threats in ways that support U.S.
48 State Department, 2012 Country Reports on Human Rights, 2013.
49 “Analysis: Kenyatta’s Bid for Kenya Presidency a Diplomatic Headache,” Reuters, February 14, 2013.
50 See, e.g., Gabrielle Lynch, The ICC Intervention in Kenya, Chatham House, February 2013.
51 For possible implications for European development cooperation with a Kenyatta government, see, e.g., The
European Commission, “Non-Ratification of the Revised Cotonou Agreement by Sudan FAQ,” August 2009.
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U.S.-Kenya Relations: Current Political and Security Issues
interests, however, may be challenged by multiple domestic factors, from demographic pressures
to corruption and ethnic tensions, as well as by possible shifts in the diplomatic relationship.
Author Contact Information
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640
Congressional Research Service
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