Nuclear Energy Policy
Mark Holt
Specialist in Energy Policy
September 19, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33558
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Nuclear Energy Policy
Summary
Nuclear energy issues facing Congress include reactor safety and regulation, radioactive waste
management, research and development priorities, federal incentives for new commercial
reactors, nuclear weapons proliferation, and security against terrorist attacks.
The earthquake and resulting tsunami that severely damaged Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant on March 11, 2011 raised questions in Congress about the disaster’s possible
implications for nuclear safety regulation, U.S. nuclear energy expansion, and radioactive waste
policy. The tsunami knocked out electric power at the six-reactor plant, resulting in the
overheating of several reactor cores, loss of cooling in spent fuel storage pools, major hydrogen
explosions, and releases of radioactive material to the environment. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) issued orders to U.S. nuclear plants March 12, 2012, to begin implementing
safety improvements in response to Fukushima.
Significant incentives for new commercial reactors were included in the Energy Policy Act of
2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58), such as tax credits and loan guarantees. Together with volatile
fossil fuel prices and the possibility of greenhouse gas controls, the federal incentives for nuclear
power helped spur renewed interest by utilities and other potential reactor developers. License
applications for as many as 31 new reactors have been announced, and NRC issued licenses for
four reactors at two plant sites in early 2012. However, falling natural gas prices, safety concerns
raised by the Fukushima accident, and other changing circumstances have made it unlikely that
many more of the proposed nuclear projects will move toward construction in the near term.
Four U.S. reactors have been permanently closed in 2013, and another shutdown has been
announced for 2014. Three reactors were closed because of the need for major repairs, and the
other two because electricity prices fell below their generating costs. All five had substantial time
remaining in their NRC licenses, leading to speculation that further early shutdowns may occur.
DOE’s nuclear energy research and development program includes advanced reactors, fuel cycle
technology and facilities, and infrastructure support. The Obama Administration’s FY2014
funding request totals $735.5 million, $22.0 million (3%) below the comparable FY2013 funding
level (pre-sequestration). In the FY2014 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act
(H.R. 2609), the House voted for an increase of $14.9 million from the Administration request
and a decrease of $37 million in comparable funding from FY2013. The Senate Appropriations
Committee recommended the same total as the Administration request (S. 1245).
Disposal of highly radioactive waste has been one of the most controversial aspects of nuclear
power. The Obama Administration halted work on a long-planned waste repository at Yucca
Mountain, NV, and established the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC)
to recommend new approaches to the waste problem. The BRC issued its final report to the
Secretary of Energy on January 26, 2012. In response to the BRC report, and to provide an
outline for a new nuclear waste program, DOE issued a Strategy for the Management and
Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste in January 2013. The DOE strategy calls
for a new nuclear waste management entity to develop consent-based storage and disposal sites,
similar to recommendations by the BRC. No funding was provided in FY2012 and FY2013 or
requested for FY2014 to continue NRC licensing of the Yucca Mountain repository, although a
federal appeals court on August 13, 2013, ordered NRC to continue the licensing process with
previously appropriated funds.
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Contents
Most Recent Developments ............................................................................................................. 1
Nuclear Power Status and Outlook .................................................................................................. 3
Possible New Reactors .............................................................................................................. 5
Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation .................................................................................... 9
Safety ......................................................................................................................................... 9
Emergency Planning ......................................................................................................... 11
Domestic Reactor Safety Experience ................................................................................ 12
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc ......................................................................... 14
Licensing and Regulation ........................................................................................................ 14
Reactor Security ...................................................................................................................... 15
Decommissioning .................................................................................................................... 17
Nuclear Accident Liability....................................................................................................... 18
Federal Incentives for New Nuclear Plants ................................................................................... 20
Nuclear Production Tax Credit ................................................................................................ 20
Standby Support ...................................................................................................................... 21
Loan Guarantees ...................................................................................................................... 22
Subsidy Costs .................................................................................................................... 22
Congressionally Authorized Ceilings ................................................................................ 23
Nuclear Solicitations ......................................................................................................... 24
Global Climate Change ........................................................................................................... 25
Nuclear Power Research and Development ................................................................................... 26
Reactor Concepts ..................................................................................................................... 27
Small Modular Reactors .......................................................................................................... 28
Fuel Cycle Research and Development ................................................................................... 29
Nuclear Waste Management .......................................................................................................... 29
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation ...................................................................................................... 32
Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs ............................................................................. 33
Legislation in the 113th Congress ................................................................................................... 34
H.R. 259 (Pompeo)............................................................................................................ 34
H.R. 1700 (Engel) ............................................................................................................. 34
H.R. 1023 (Thornberry) .................................................................................................... 34
H.R. 2609 (Frelinghuysen)/S. 1245 (Feinstein) ................................................................ 35
H.R. 2712 (Lowey)............................................................................................................ 35
H.R. 2861 (Lowey)............................................................................................................ 35
S. 1240 (Wyden) ................................................................................................................ 35
S. 1519 (Vitter) .................................................................................................................. 35
Tables
Table 1. Announced Nuclear Plant License Applications ................................................................ 7
Table 2. Funding for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ........................................................... 33
Table 3. DOE Funding for Nuclear Activities (Selected Programs) .............................................. 34
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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 35
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Most Recent Developments
The first construction starts for new U.S. nuclear power reactors since the 1970s officially took
place in March 2013 in South Carolina and Georgia. Pouring of the first “safety related” concrete,
which marks the start of reactor construction, was completed on March 11, 2013, for V.C.
Summer Unit 2 in Cayce, SC, and three days later for Vogtle Unit 3 in Waynesboro, GA. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had issued combined construction permits and operating
licenses (COLs) for two new reactors at the Vogtle site on February 9, 2012, and for two identical
reactors at the Summer plant on March 30, 2012. Each of the new Westinghouse AP1000
reactors, scheduled for completion between 2016 and 2019, is expected to cost from $5 billion to
$7 billion.
Four U.S. reactors have been permanently closed during 2013, and the shutdown of a fifth unit
was announced for late 2014. Crystal River 3 in Florida was retired in February because of cracks
in its concrete containment structure. The single-unit Kewaunee plant in Wisconsin closed in May
because regional electricity prices had dropped below the reactor’s generating costs. San Onofre 2
and 3 in California closed in June because of faulty steam generators (unit 1 had been shut
previously). And the owner of the single-unit Vermont Yankee plant announced in August that the
reactor would permanently close in the fourth quarter of 2014 for economic reasons. All of those
units had substantial time remaining on their initial 40-year operating licenses or had received or
applied for 20-year license extensions from NRC. The shutdowns prompted widespread
discussion about the future of other aging U.S. reactors.
On March 12, 2012, NRC issued its first nuclear plant safety requirements based on lessons
learned from the March 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan. NRC ordered U.S. nuclear plant
operators to begin implementing safety enhancements related to power blackouts, reactor
containment venting, and monitoring the water levels of reactor spent fuel pools. The Fukushima
nuclear plant was hit by an earthquake and tsunami that knocked out all electric power at the six-
reactor plant, resulting in the overheating of the reactor cores in three of the units and a
heightened overheating risk at several spent fuel storage pools at the site. The overheating of the
reactor cores caused major hydrogen explosions and releases of radioactive material to the
environment. NRC’s response to the accident has been the subject of continuing congressional
oversight.
The Obama Administration requested $735.5 million for nuclear energy research and
development, including advanced reactors, fuel cycle technology and facilities, and infrastructure
support, in its FY2014 budget. Submitted to Congress on April 10, 2013, the nuclear energy
budget request is $22.0 million (3%) below the comparable FY2013 funding level.1 In the
FY2014 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act (H.R. 2609, H.Rept. 113-135), the
House voted July 10, 2013, for an increase of $14.9 million from the Administration request and a
decrease of $37 million in comparable funding from FY2013. The Senate Appropriations
Committee on June 27, 2013, recommended the same total as the Administration request (S.
1245, S.Rept. 113-47).
The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, established by the Obama
Administration to recommend a new strategy for nuclear waste management, issued its final
1 All FY2013 figures are pre-sequestration.
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report to the Secretary of Energy on January 26, 2012.2 President Obama has moved to terminate
previous plans to open a national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. In its final
report, the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended a “consent-based” approach to siting nuclear
waste facilities and that the roles of local, state, and tribal governments be negotiated for each
potential site. The development of consolidated waste storage and disposal facilities should begin
as soon as possible, the Commission urged. A new waste management organization should be
established to develop the repository, along with associated transportation and storage systems,
according to the Commission. The new organization should have “assured access” to the Nuclear
Waste Fund, which holds fees collected from nuclear power plant operators to pay for waste
disposal. Under existing law, the Nuclear Waste Fund cannot be drawn down without
congressional appropriations.
In response to the BRC report, and to provide an outline for a new nuclear waste program, DOE
issued a Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste
in January 2013. The DOE strategy calls for a new nuclear waste management entity to develop
consent-based storage and disposal sites, similar to the BRC recommendation. Under the DOE
strategy, a pilot interim spent fuel storage facility would be opened by 2021 and a larger-scale
storage facility, which could be an expansion of the pilot facility, by 2025. A geologic disposal
facility would open by 2048—fifty years after the initial planned opening date for the Yucca
Mountain repository.3 Legislation to redirect the nuclear waste program along the lines
recommended by the Blue Ribbon Commission was introduced by Senator Wyden on June 27,
2013 (S. 1240).
The House-passed Energy and Water bill would give DOE $25 million for the Yucca Mountain
project and direct NRC to use previously appropriated funds to continue the Yucca Mountain
licensing process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled on August
13, 2013, that NRC must continue work on the Yucca Mountain license application as long as
funding is available. The Court determined that NRC has at least $11.1 million in previously
appropriated funds for that purpose.4
NRC published a proposed rule September 13, 2013, on continued storage of spent nuclear fuel.5
The proposed rule responds to a federal circuit court ruling on June 8, 2012, that struck down
NRC’s Waste Confidence Decision, which contains the agency’s formal findings that waste
generated by nuclear power plants will be disposed of safely. The court ruled that the Waste
Confidence Decision required an environmental review under the National Environmental Policy
Act and that NRC needed to consider the possibility that a permanent waste repository would
never be built and examine potential problems with waste storage pools.
2 Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy, January 2012,
http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf.
3 DOE, Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste, January 2013,
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
Strategy%20for%20the%20Management%20and%20Disposal%20of%20Used%20Nuclear%20Fuel%20and%20High
%20Level%20Radioactive%20Waste.pdf.
4 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, In re: Aiken County et al., No. 11-1271, writ of
mandamus, August 13, 2013, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/
BAE0CF34F762EBD985257BC6004DEB18/$file/11-1271-1451347.pdf.
5 NRC, “Waste Confidence—Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel,” proposed rule, 78 Federal Register 56776,
September 13, 2013.
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Nuclear Power Status and Outlook
After nearly 30 years in which no new orders had been placed for nuclear power plants in the
United States, a series of license applications that began in 2007 prompted widespread
speculation about a U.S. “nuclear renaissance.” The renewed interest in nuclear power largely
resulted from the improved performance of existing reactors, federal incentives in the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), the possibility of carbon dioxide controls that could increase
costs at fossil fuel plants, and volatile prices for natural gas—the favored fuel for new power
plants for the past two decades.
Four of the proposed new U.S. reactors received licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) in early 2012. NRC approved combined construction permit and operating
licenses (COLs) for Southern Company to build and operate two new Westinghouse AP1000
reactors at the Vogtle nuclear power plant in Georgia on February 9, 2012. On March 30, 2012,
NRC approved COLs for two additional AP1000 reactors at the existing Summer nuclear plant in
South Carolina. Pouring of the first “safety related” concrete, which marks the start of reactor
construction, was completed on March 11, 2013, for V.C. Summer Unit 2 and three days later for
Vogtle Unit 3.
However, the future of all other proposed new U.S. reactors is uncertain. High construction cost
estimates—a major reason for earlier reactor cancellations—continue to undermine nuclear power
economics. A more recent obstacle to nuclear power growth has been the development of vast
reserves of domestic natural gas from previously uneconomic shale formations, which has held
gas prices low and reduced concern about future price spikes. Moreover, uncertainty over U.S.
controls on carbon emissions may be further increasing caution by utility companies about future
nuclear projects.
Four U.S. reactors have been permanently closed during 2013, and the shutdown of a fifth unit
was announced for late 2014. Crystal River 3 in Florida was retired in February because of cracks
in its concrete containment structure. The single-unit Kewaunee plant in Wisconsin closed in May
because regional electricity prices had dropped below the reactor’s generating costs. San Onofre 2
and 3 closed in June because of faulty steam generators (unit 1 had been shut previously). And the
owner of the single-unit Vermont Yankee plant announced in August that the reactor would
permanently close in the fourth quarter of 2014 for economic reasons. All of those units had
substantial time remaining on their initial 40-year operating licenses or had received or applied
for 20-year license extensions from NRC. The shutdowns prompted widespread discussion about
the future of other aging U.S. reactors.
The March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami that severely damaged Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant could also affect plans for new U.S. reactors, although U.S. nuclear power
growth was already expected to be modest in the near term. Following the Fukushima accident,
preconstruction work was suspended on two planned reactors at the South Texas Project. Tokyo
Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which owns the Fukushima plant, had planned to invest in
the South Texas Project expansion, but TEPCO’s financial condition plunged after the accident.
New U.S. safety requirements resulting from the Fukushima disaster could raise investor
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concerns about higher costs. On the other hand, after the accident the Obama Administration
reiterated its support for nuclear power expansion as part of its clean energy policy.6
The recent applications for new power reactors in the United States followed a long period of
declining nuclear generation growth rates. Until the COLs were issued for the Vogtle and Summer
projects, no nuclear power plants had been ordered in the United States since 1978, and more than
100 reactors had been canceled, including all ordered after 1973. The most recent U.S. nuclear
unit to be completed was the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA’s) Watts Bar 1 reactor, ordered in
1970 and licensed to operate in 1996. But largely because of better operation and capacity
expansion at existing reactors, annual U.S. nuclear generation has risen by about 20% since the
startup of Watts Bar 1.7
The U.S. nuclear power industry currently comprises 104 licensed reactors (including the four
permanently closed in 2013) at 65 plant sites in 31 states and generates about 19% of the nation’s
electricity.8 TVA’s board of directors voted August 1, 2007, to resume construction on Watts Bar
2, which had been suspended in 1985; the renewed construction project was to cost about $2.5
billion and be completed in 2013. However, TVA announced on April 5, 2012, that completing
Watts Bar 2 would cost up to $2 billion more than expected and take until 2015.9 At TVA’s
request, NRC in March 2009 reinstated the construction authorization for the two-unit Bellefonte
(AL) nuclear plant, which had been deferred in 1988 and canceled in 2006.10 The TVA board
voted on August 18, 2011, to complete construction of Bellefonte 1 after the Watts Bar 2 project
is finished. Completing Bellefonte 1 was projected at that time to cost $4.9 billion, with operation
to begin by 2020.11 Citing lower electricity sales, TVA on June 12, 2013, announced sharp
cutbacks at the Bellefonte site.12
Annual electricity production from U.S. nuclear power plants is much greater than that from oil
and hydropower and other renewable energy sources. Nuclear generation has been overtaken by
natural gas in recent years, and it remains well behind coal, which accounted for about 38% of
U.S. electricity generation in 2012.13 Nuclear plants generated more than half the electricity in
three states in 2012—New Jersey, South Carolina, and Vermont—and 12 states generated 25%-
50% of their electricity from nuclear power.14 The 769 billion net kilowatt-hours of nuclear
6 Oral Testimony of Energy Secretary Steven Chu at the House Energy and Commerce Committee – As Prepared for
Delivery, March 16, 2011, http://www.energy.gov/news/10178.htm.
7 Energy Information Administration, Electricity Data Browser, “Net Generation for All Sectors, Annual,” viewed
September 4, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser.
8 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Digest 2008-2009, NUREG-1350, Vol. 20, August 2008, p. 32,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/v20/sr1350v20.pdf.
9 Mary Powers, “Credit Agencies See Watts Bar-2 Cost Impact,” Nucleonics Week, April 12, 2012, p. 1.
10 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority (Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1
and 2),” 74 Federal Register 10969, March 13, 2009.
11 Tennessee Valley Authority, “TVA Board Implements Vision,” press release, August 18, 2011, http://www.tva.com/
news/releases/julsep11/board_meeting/index.htm.
12 Tennessee Valley Authority, “TVA Announces Budget Reduction for Bellefonte Plant,” press release, June 12, 2013,
http://www.tva.com/news/releases/aprjun13/bellefonte_budget.html.
13 Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly, Net Generation by Energy Source, February 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/epm_sum.html. Net generation excludes electricity used for power plant
operation.
14 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Information Digest, 2012–2013, NUREG-1350, Volume 24, http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/v24/sr1350v24.pdf.
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electricity generated in the United States during 201215 was about the same as the nation’s entire
electrical output in the early 1960s, when the oldest of today’s operating U.S. commercial
reactors were ordered.16
Reasons for the 30-year halt in U.S. nuclear plant orders included high capital costs, public
concern about nuclear safety and waste disposal, and regulatory compliance issues.
High construction costs may pose the most serious obstacle to nuclear power expansion.
Construction costs for reactors completed since the mid-1980s ranged from $2 to $6 billion,
averaging more than $3,900 per kilowatt of electric generating capacity (in 2011 dollars), far
higher than commercial fossil fuel technologies. The nuclear industry predicts that new plant
designs could be built for less than that if many identical plants were built in a series, but current
estimates for new reactors show little if any reduction in cost.17
In contrast, average U.S. nuclear plant operating costs per kilowatt-hour dropped substantially
since 1990, and expensive downtime has been steadily reduced. Licensed U.S. commercial
reactors generated electricity at an average of 87% of their total capacity in 2012, according to the
Energy Information Administration (EIA).18
Seventy-three commercial reactors have received 20-year license renewals from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), giving them up to a total of 60 years of operation. License
renewals for 12 additional reactors are currently under review, and more are anticipated,
according to NRC.19 However, as noted above, two reactors that have received license renewals,
Vermont Yankee and Kewaunee, are being permanently closed for economic reasons.
Possible New Reactors
Electric utilities and other firms have announced plans to apply for COLs for more than 30
reactors (see Table 1).20 (For a discussion of COLs, see the “Licensing and Regulation” section
below.)
As noted above, construction is currently underway on four of the proposed new reactors, at the
Vogtle and Summer sites. COLs are being actively pursued for 14 additional reactors (shown in
Table 1), whose owners have not committed to actual construction but are keeping the option
available if conditions are more favorable in the future. The experience of the first few reactors to
be constructed is likely to be crucial in determining whether a wave of subsequent units will
move forward as the nuclear industry envisions.
15 EIA, Electricity Data Browser, op. cit.
16 All of today’s 104 operating U.S. commercial reactors were ordered from 1963 through 1973; see “Historical Profile
of U.S. Nuclear Power Development,” U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, 1992.
17 For a comparison of generating costs, see CRS Report RL34746, Power Plants: Characteristics and Costs, by Stan
Mark Kaplan.
18 Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Nuclear Generation and Generating Capacity,” http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/
nuclear/page/nuc_generation/gensum.html.
19 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Fact Sheet on Reactor License Renewal, August 8, 2011, http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-reactor-license-renewal.html.
20 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, New Reactors, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors.html.
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The two new Vogtle reactors are scheduled to go on line in 2017 and 2018,21 the same years now
planned for startup of the new Summer units.22 EIA estimates that construction costs of new
nuclear power plants will average $5,335 per kilowatt of capacity, or about $6.1 billion for an
AP1000 unit, not including interest costs.23 The two Summer units are expected to cost about
$11.6 billion in 2012 dollars, according to regulatory filings,24 while the two Vogtle units are
projected by their primary owner to cost a total of $13.35 billion.25
Duke Energy’s Levy County project, with two AP1000 units, is scheduled by NRC to receive a
final decision on its COL in early 2014, although Duke has terminated its engineering,
procurement, and construction (EPC) contract for the project. Duke said it did not foresee a need
for the plant as soon as previously planned, but “continues to regard the Levy site as a viable
option for future nuclear generation.”26 COLs for five reactors at three other sites—Fermi (MI),
South Texas Project, and William States Lee (SC)—are scheduled to be issued in 2015.
As shown in Table 1, the remaining five projects that are actively seeking COLs, with a total of
seven proposed reactors, do not have firm licensing schedules from NRC. Several of those
projects would use designs that have not received NRC certifications. As a result, these reactors
appear unlikely to be completed before the early 2020s. This group includes the planned units 3
and 4 at the South Texas Project, where preconstruction work was suspended after the Fukushima
Daiichi accident, as noted above. The joint venture developing the new South Texas Plant
reactors, Nuclear Innovation North America (NINA), will focus solely on the COL and a DOE
loan guarantee.27 Several of these proposed nuclear projects may require additional partners in
order to proceed to construction, according to recent company announcements.28
Several other COL applications have been suspended, withdrawn, or shifted to early site permits
(ESPs) only. Entergy suspended further license review of its planned GE ESBWR reactors at
River Bend, LA, and Grand Gulf, MS, although it still has a previously issued ESP for Grand
Gulf. AmerenUE suspended review of a COL for its proposed new Callaway unit in Missouri, and
Exelon withdrew its COL application for a proposed two-unit plant in Victoria County, TX. Most
recently, Duke Energy suspended its application for two new AP1000s at its Shearon Harris plant.
21 Southern Company, “Smart Power,” http://www.southerncompany.com/smart_energy/smart_power_vogtle-
kemper.html.
22South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, “V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3, Quarterly Report to the
South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff,” June 30, 2013, http://www.scana.com/NR/rdonlyres/FD5FC097-3956-
48A6-9098-2C2D115C8512/0/NNDQuarterlyReport2013Q2FINAL81413PUBLIC.pdf.
23 Energy Information Administration, “Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Electricity Generation Plants,” November
2010, http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/beck_plantcosts/index.html.
24 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, “Petitions for Updates and Revisions to the Capital Cost Schedule and the
Construction Schedule,” before the Public Service Commission of South Carolina, February 29, 2012,
http://www.scana.com/NR/rdonlyres/35AAED95-5226-416A-8DC2-0743BC93B911/0/
2012PetitiontoUpdateCostSchedules.pdf. Total cost based on SCE&G ownership of 55%.
25 Southern Company, “Smart Power,” http://www.southerncompany.com/smart_energy/smart_power_vogtle-
kemper.html. Total cost based on Southern Company’s 45.7% ownership.
26 Duke Energy, “Duke Energy Reaches Revised Multi-year Settlement with Florida Consumer Advocates,” news
release, August 1, 2013, http://www.duke-energy.com/news/releases/2013080101.asp.
27 NRG Energy, “NRG Energy, Inc. Provides Greater Clarity on the South Texas Nuclear Development Project,” press
release, April 19, 2011, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=
UGFyZW50SUQ9OTAwMzB8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1.
28 Jeff Beattie, “Southeast Utilities Seek Partners to Hedge Nuclear Bets,” Energy Daily, October 5, 2010, p. 1.
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TVA decided to defer consideration of its COL application for two new Westinghouse AP1000
reactors at its Bellefonte plant in Alabama in favor of completing the first of two unfinished
Babcock & Wilcox reactors at the site. TVA had submitted a COL application for the Bellefonte
AP1000s in October 2007 as part of the NuStart consortium.29
Constellation Energy announced October 9, 2010, that it was abandoning negotiations with DOE
for a loan guarantee for the planned Calvert Cliffs 3 reactor, which Constellation had been
developing as part of its UniStar joint venture with the French national utility EDF.30
Constellation sold its share of UniStar to EDF so that EDF could seek another U.S. partner to
continue the Calvert Cliffs project.31 (For more discussion of Constellation’s decision, see the
“Loan Guarantees” section below.)
NRC anticipates that several more COL and other license applications will be submitted in the
next two years. This includes a TVA plan to submit construction permit applications for six small
modular reactors (SMRs) of about 160 megawatts each at its Clinch River, TN, site.
Table 1. Announced Nuclear Plant License Applications
Announced
Applicant
Site Reactor
Type
Units
Status
COL issued
Southern Vogtle
(GA)
Westinghouse
2
COL application submitted 3/13/08; engineering,
AP1000
procurement, and construction (EPC) contract signed
4/8/08; ESP and limited construction approved 8/26/09;
conditional DOE loan guarantee announced 2/16/10;
NRC hearing held 9/27-28/11; COL approved 2/9/12;
first “safety-related concrete” poured 3/14/13
SCE&G Summer
Westinghouse
2
COL submitted 3/31/08; EPC contract signed 5/27/08;
(SC)
AP1000
COL approved 3/30/12; first “safety-related concrete”
poured 3/11/13
COL scheduled for completion
Duke Energy
Levy
Westinghouse
2
COL submitted 7/30/08; application scheduled for
County (FL) AP1000
completion in 2014; termination of EPC contract
announced 8/1/13
DTE Energy
Fermi (MI)
GE ESBWR
1
COL submitted 9/18/08; application scheduled for
completion in 2015
Nuclear
South Texas Toshiba ABWR
2
COL submitted 9/20/07; EPC contract signed with
Innovation
Project
Toshiba 2/12/09; NRG Energy halted further
North America
investment 4/19/11; application scheduled for
29 Tennessee Valley Authority, “Single Nuclear Unit at the Bellefonte Plant Site,” fact sheet, http://www.tva.gov/
environment/reports/blnp/index.htm.
30 Constellation Energy, “Constellation Energy Releases Statement Regarding U.S. Department of Energy Loan
Guarantee,” press release, October 9, 2010, http://ir.constellation.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=516614.
31 Letter from Michael J. Wallace, Vice Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, Constellation Energy, to Thomas
Piquemal, Group Executive Vice President, Finance, EDF, October 15, 2010, http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/
CEG/1036755503x0x410084/e27369a0-ce85-432f-bfad-e17ddce4f8f2/101510_-_EDF_letter.pdf; Unistar, “EDF and
Constellation Energy Announce Comprehensive Agreement,” press release, October 27, 2010, http://press.edf.com/
press-releases/all-press-releases/2010/edf-and-constellation-energy-announce-comprehensive-agreement-82018.html&
return=42873.
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Announced
Applicant Site
Reactor
Type
Units
Status
completion in 2015
Duke Energy
Wil iam
Westinghouse
2
COL submitted 12/13/07; application scheduled for
States Lee
AP1000
completion in 2015
(SC)
COL schedule under revision
FPL Turkey
Westinghouse
2
COL submitted 6/30/09; preconstruction work being
Point (FL)
AP1000
conducted
Luminant
Comanche
Mitsubishi US-
2
COL submitted 9/19/08
Power
Peak (TX)
APWR
PPL Bell
Bend
Areva EPR
1
COL submitted 10/10/08
(PA)
UniStar Calvert
Areva EPR
1
COL submitted 7/13/07 (Part 1), 3/13/08 (Part 2);
Cliffs (MD)
Constel ation withdrew from project 10/8/10
Dominion
North Anna Mitsubishi US-
1
COL submitted 11/27/07; ESP approved 11/20/07;
APWR
reactor selection announced 5/7/10
Licensing suspended
Entergy Grand
Gulf
Not specified
1
COL submitted 2/27/08; licensing suspended 1/9/09;
(MS)
ESP approved 3/27/07
Exelon Victoria
Not specified
2
COL application withdrawn and ESP application
County
submitted 3/25/10; ESP application withdrawn 8/28/12
(TX)
AmerenUE Calloway
Areva EPR
1
COL submitted 7/24/08; license review suspended
(MO)
6/23/09
Entergy
River Bend
Not specified
1
COL submitted 9/25/08; licensing suspended 1/9/09
(LA)
TVA Bellefonte
Westinghouse
2
COL submitted 10/30/07; licensing deferred 9/29/10
AP1000
Unistar Nine
Mile
Areva EPR
1
COL submitted 9/30/08; licensing suspended 12/1/09
Point (NY)
Duke Energy
Harris (NC) Westinghouse
2
COL submitted 2/19/08; EPC contract signed 1/5/09;
AP1000
licensing suspended 5/2/13
Anticipated license applications
TVA Clinch
River
mPower small
6
Construction permit application expected in 2015
(TN)
modular reactor
AmerenUE
Missouri
Westing. SMR
1
COL application expected in 2015
Total units announced
38
Total currently active
18
COLs
Sources: NRC, Nucleonics Week, Nuclear News, Nuclear Energy Institute, company news releases.
Note: Applications are for COLs unless otherwise specified.
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Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation
Safety
Worldwide concern about nuclear power plant safety rose sharply after the Fukushima accident,
which is generally considered to be much worse than the March 1979 Three Mile Island accident
in Pennsylvania but not as severe as the April 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet
Union. Total radioactive releases from the Fukushima accident have been estimated at 25 million
curies,32 compared with 140 million curies from Chernobyl33 and 43,000 curies from Three Mile
Island.34
The Fukushima disaster resulted in similar levels of radioactive contamination per square meter
to that of Chernobyl, but the Fukushima contamination was much less widespread and affected a
smaller number of people.35 (For more background on the Fukushima accident, see CRS Report
R41694, Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, by Mark Holt, Richard J. Campbell, and Mary Beth D.
Nikitin.)36
The Fukushima accident has raised particular policy questions for the United States because,
unlike Chernobyl, the Fukushima reactors are similar to common U.S. designs. Although the
Fukushima accident resulted from a huge tsunami that incapacitated the power plant’s emergency
diesel generators, the accident dramatically illustrated the potential consequences of any natural
catastrophe or other situation that could cause an extended “station blackout” – the loss of
alternating current (AC) power. Safety issues related to station blackout include standards for
backup batteries, which had been required to provide power for 4-8 hours, and additional
measures that may be required to assure backup power.
Safety concerns at U.S. reactors were also raised by hydrogen explosions at three of the
Fukushima reactors—resulting from a high-temperature reaction between steam and nuclear fuel
cladding—and the loss of cooling at the Japanese plant’s spent fuel storage pools. Other safety
issues that have been raised in the wake of Fukushima include the vulnerability of U.S. nuclear
plants to earthquakes, floods, and other natural disasters, the availability of iodine pills to prevent
absorption of radioactive iodine released during nuclear accidents, and the adequacy of nuclear
accident emergency planning.
32 World Nuclear Association, “Fukushima Accident 2011,” September 9, 2013, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/
Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Fukushima-Accident-2011.
33 World Nuclear Association, “Chernobyl Accident 1986,” June 2013, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-
Security/Safety-of-Plants/Chernobyl-Accident.
34 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,” February 11, 2013,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html.
35 French Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (IRSN), Assessment on the 66th Day of Projected External
Doses for Populations Living in the North-West Fallout Zone of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Report DRPH/2011-
10, p. 27, http://www.irsn.fr/EN/news/Documents/IRSN-Fukushima-Report-DRPH-23052011.pdf.
36 See also Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station, INPO 11-005, November 2011, available from the Nuclear Energy Institute at
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/reports/special-report-on-the-nuclear-
accident-at-the-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-station.
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In response to such concerns, NRC on March 23, 2011, established a task force “made up of
current senior managers and former NRC experts” to “conduct both short- and long-term analysis
of the lessons that can be learned from the situation in Japan.”37 The Near-Term Task Force issued
its report July 12, 2011, making recommendations ranging from specific safety improvements to
broad changes in NRC’s overall regulatory approach.38 NRC staff subsequently identified several
of those actions that “can and should be initiated without delay.”39 The NRC Commissioners
largely agreed with the recommendations on October 18, 2011, and instructed the agency’s staff
to “strive to complete and implement the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident within five
years—by 2016.”40 Tier 1 regulatory actions, which are now being implemented, include41
• Seismic and flood hazard reevaluations and walkdowns. Nuclear plant operators
must evaluate the implications of updated seismic and flooding models, including
all potential flooding sources. Plant operators must identify and verify the
adequacy of flood and seismic protection features at their sites.
• Station blackout regulatory actions. NRC issued an order on March 12, 2012,
that required U.S. reactors to implement mitigation strategies “that will allow
them to cope without their permanent electrical power sources for an indefinite
amount of time.” Under the order, installed equipment at each plant must be
sufficient to maintain or restore cooling until portable on-site equipment and
supplies could take over. The portable on-site equipment would have to provide
sufficient cooling until “sufficient offsite resources” could be brought in to
maintain cooling indefinitely. Enough equipment and personnel would be
required to protect all affected reactors at a multi-unit plant. NRC is currently
preparing permanent regulations based on the mitigation strategies order.
• Reliable hardened vents for Mark I containments. NRC on March 12, 2012,
ordered nuclear plants to install “reliable, hardened” vents for the containments
in Mark I reactors (the type at Fukushima). The vents would be designed to
reduce containment pressure before damage occurs to the reactor core. NRC
modified the order in June 2013 to require that the vents continue to function
after core damage occurs, which could prevent hydrogen generated by
overheated fuel cladding from leaking into the reactor building, as occurred at
Fukushima. Because venting after core damage has occurred could release
radioactive core material into the environment, NRC is also considering a
requirement that vents include filters or that other strategies be implemented to
reduce such emissions.
37 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Nuclear Regulatory Commission Directs Staff on Continuing Agency Response to
Japan Events; Adjust Commission Schedule,” press release, March 23, 2011, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1108/
ML110821123.pdf.
38 Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, Recommendations for Enhancing
Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, July 12, 2011,
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf.
39 NRC, “Recommended Actions to Be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report,” SECY-11-
0124, September 9, 2011.
40 NRC, “Staff Requirements – SECY-11-0124 – Recommended Actions to Be Taken Without Delay from the Near-
Term Task Force Report,” October 18, 2011, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1126/ML11269A204.pdf.
41 NRC, “What Are the Lessons Learned from Fukushima?,” June 26, 2013, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-
experience/japan-dashboard/priorities.html.
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• Spent fuel pool instrumentation. NRC ordered nuclear plants on March 12, 2012,
to install safety instrumentation to monitor spent fuel pool conditions, such as
water level, temperature, and radiation levels, from the plant control room.
• Strengthening and integrating accident procedures and guidelines. NRC issued
an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on April 18, 2012, to require
integrated emergency procedures, including clear command-and-control
strategies and training qualifications for emergency decisionmakers.
• Emergency preparedness regulatory actions. NRC has asked nuclear plants how
many workers would be needed to respond to large accidents affecting multiple
reactors at the same site. In addition, plants were asked to assess and ensure the
operability of emergency communications systems during such accidents.
The NRC staff slightly modified its proposals for top priority actions and divided the remaining
Task Force proposals into two lower tiers, which were determined to require further assessment
and potentially long-term study. Included in the lower-tier actions were requirements for
emergency water supply systems for spent fuel pools, secure power for emergency
communications and data systems, confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards, and
modifications to NRC’s regulatory process.42
Emergency Planning
Following the Three Mile Island accident, which revealed severe weaknesses in preparations for
nuclear plant emergencies, Congress mandated that emergency plans be prepared for all licensed
power reactors (P.L. 96-295, Sec. 109). NRC was required to develop standards for emergency
plans and review the adequacy of each plant-specific plan in consultation with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
NRC’s emergency planning requirements focus on a “plume exposure pathway emergency
planning zone (EPZ),” encompassing an area within about 10 miles of each nuclear plant. Within
the 10-mile EPZ, a range of responses must be developed to protect the public from radioactive
releases, including evacuation, sheltering, and the distribution of non-radioactive iodine (as
discussed above). The regulations also require a 50-mile “ingestion pathway EPZ,” in which
actions are developed to protect food supplies.43 Nuclear plants are required to conduct
emergency preparedness exercises every two years. The exercises, which are evaluated by FEMA
and NRC, may include local, state, and federal responders and may involve both the plume and
ingestion EPZs.44
The size of the plume exposure EPZ has long been a subject of controversy, particularly after the
9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, in which nuclear plants were believed to have been a
potential target. Attention to the issue was renewed by the Fukushima accident, in which some of
the highest radiation dose rates have been measured beyond 10 miles from the plant.45
42 R.W. Borchardt, NRC Executive Director for Operations, “Prioritization of Recommended Actions to Be Taken in
Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,” SECY-11-0137, October 3, 2011.
43 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans.
44 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Emergency Preparedness & Response,” website, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/
emerg-preparedness.html.
45 Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT), “Readings of Integrated Dose at
(continued...)
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Controversy over the issue intensified after NRC recommended on March 16, 2011, the
evacuation of U.S. citizens within 50 miles of the Fukushima plant. The NRC recommendation
was based on computer models that, using meteorological data and estimates of plant conditions,
found that potential radiation doses 50 miles from the plant could exceed U.S. protective action
guidelines.46
In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NRC modified its nuclear plant emergency planning
requirements and began a comprehensive review of emergency planning regulations and
guidance. The NRC staff sent a proposed final rule based on that review to the NRC
Commissioners for approval on April 8, 2011, and the rule took effect December 23, 2011.47
Among the changes included in the rule are new requirements for periodic updates of EPZ
evacuation time estimates, mandatory backups for public alert systems, and protection of
emergency responders during terrorist attacks. The new emergency planning regulations were
prepared before the Fukushima accident, but the NRC staff recommended approval of the
changes without waiting for further changes that might result from the lessons of the Japanese
accident. Emergency planning changes resulting from Fukushima should be implemented later,
the staff recommended.48
Domestic Reactor Safety Experience
Nuclear power safety has been a longstanding issue in the United States. Safety-related
shortcomings have been identified in the construction quality of some plants, plant operation and
maintenance, equipment reliability, emergency planning, and other areas. In one serious case, it
was discovered in March 2002 that leaking boric acid had eaten a large cavity in the top of the
reactor vessel in Ohio’s Davis-Besse nuclear plant. The corrosion left only the vessel’s quarter-
inch-thick stainless steel inner liner to prevent a potentially catastrophic loss of reactor cooling
water. Davis-Besse remained closed for repairs and other safety improvements until NRC allowed
the reactor to restart in March 2004.
NRC’s oversight of the nuclear industry is a subject of contention as well; nuclear utilities often
complain that they are subject to overly rigorous and inflexible regulation, but nuclear critics
charge that NRC frequently relaxes safety standards when compliance may prove difficult or
costly to the industry.
In terms of public health consequences, the safety record of the U.S. nuclear power industry in
comparison with other major commercial energy technologies has been excellent. During more
than 3,500 reactor-years of operation in the United States,49 the only incident at a commercial
(...continued)
Monitoring Post out of 20 Km Zone of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP,” data series, http://www.mext.go.jp/english/incident/
1304275.htm.
46 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Provides Protective Action Recommendations Based on U.S. Guidelines,”
press release, March 16, 2011, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1108/ML110800133.pdf.
47 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Enhancements to Emergency Planning Regulations,” Final rule, Federal Register,
November 23, 2011, p. 72560.
48 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Final Rule: Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations,” SECY-11-
0053, April 8, 2011, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2011/2011-0053scy.pdf.
49 Nuclear Energy Institute, “Myths and Facts About Nuclear Energy,” January 2012, p. 12, .http://www.nei.org/
resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/reliableandaffordableenergy/factsheet/myths—facts-about-nuclear-energy-january-
2012.
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nuclear power plant that might lead to any deaths or injuries to the public has been the Three Mile
Island accident, in which more than half the reactor core melted.50 A study of 32,000 people living
within five miles of the reactor when the accident occurred found no significant increase in
cancer rates through 1998, although the authors noted that some potential health effects “cannot
be definitively excluded.”51
The relatively small amounts of radioactivity released by nuclear plants during normal operation
are not generally believed to pose significant hazards, although some groups contend that routine
emissions are unacceptably risky. There is substantial scientific uncertainty about the level of risk
posed by low levels of radiation exposure; as with many carcinogens and other hazardous
substances, health effects can be clearly measured only at relatively high exposure levels. In the
case of radiation, the assumed risk of low-level exposure has been extrapolated mostly from
health effects documented among persons exposed to high levels of radiation, particularly
Japanese survivors of nuclear bombing in World War II, medical patients, and nuclear industry
workers.52
NRC announced April 7, 2010, that it had asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to
“perform a state-of-the-art study on cancer risk for populations surrounding nuclear power
facilities.” Unlike in previous studies, NAS is to examine cancer diagnosis rates, rather than
cancer deaths, potentially increasing the amount of data. The new study would also use
geographic units smaller than counties to determine how far members of the study group are
located from reactors, to more clearly determine whether there is a correlation between cancer
cases and distance from reactors.53
NRC’s 1986 Safety Goal Policy Statement declared that nuclear power plants should not increase
the risk of accidental or cancer deaths among the nearby population by more than 0.1%.54 Later
NRC guidance established a “subsidiary benchmark” for the probability of accidental core
damage (fuel melting): Core damage frequency should average no more than one in 10,000 per
reactor per year.55 In addition, NRC set a benchmark that reactor containments should be
successful at least 90% of the time in preventing major radioactive releases during a core-damage
accident. Therefore, the benchmark probability of a major release from containment failure
during a core melt accident would average less than one in 100,000 per reactor per year.56 (For the
50 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,” March 15, 2011,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html.
51 Evelyn O. Talbott et al., “Long Term Follow-Up of the Residents of the Three Mile Island Accident Area: 1979-
1998,” Environmental Health Perspectives, published online October 30, 2002, at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/docs/2003/
5662/abstract.html.
52 National Research Council, Committee to Assess the Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation, Beir VII: Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, Report in Brief, http://dels-
old.nas.edu/dels/rpt_briefs/beir_vii_final.pdf.
53 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Asks National Academy of Sciences to Study Cancer Risk in Populations
Living Near Nuclear Power Facilities,” press release, April 7, 2010, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/
news/2010/10-060.html.
54 NRC, “Safety Goals for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants,” policy statement, Federal Register, August 21,
1986, p. 30028, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/policy/51fr30028.pdf.
55 NRC Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-89-102, “Implementation of the Safety Goals,” Memorandum to
James M. Taylor from Samuel J. Chilk, June 15, 1990, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0037/ML003707881.pdf.
56 U.S. NRC, Regulatory Guide 1.174, “An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed
Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,” Revision 1, November 2002, http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/reg-guides/power-reactors/rg/01-174.
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current U.S. fleet of about 100 reactors, that rate would yield an average of one core-damage
accident every 100 years and a major release every 1,000 years.) On the other hand, some groups
challenge the complex calculations that go into predicting such accident frequencies, contending
that accidents with serious public health consequences may be more frequent.57
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc
The Chernobyl accident was by far the worst nuclear power plant accident to have occurred
anywhere in the world. At least 31 persons died quickly from acute radiation exposure or other
injuries, and thousands of additional cancer deaths among the tens of millions of people exposed
to radiation from the accident may occur during the next several decades.
According to a 2006 report by the Chernobyl Forum organized by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the primary observable health consequence of the accident was a dramatic
increase in childhood thyroid cancer. The Chernobyl Forum estimated that about 4,000 cases of
thyroid cancer have occurred in children who after the accident drank milk contaminated with
high levels of radioactive iodine, which concentrates in the thyroid. Although the Chernobyl
Forum found only 15 deaths from those thyroid cancers, it estimated that about 4,000 other
cancer deaths may have occurred among the 600,000 people with the highest radiation exposures,
plus an estimated 1% increase in cancer deaths among persons with less exposure. The report
estimated that about 77,000 square miles were significantly contaminated by radioactive
cesium.58 Greenpeace issued a report in 2006 estimating that 200,000 deaths in Belarus, Russia,
and Ukraine resulted from the Chernobyl accident between 1990 and 2004.59
Licensing and Regulation
For many years, a top priority of the U.S. nuclear industry was to modify the process for licensing
new nuclear plants. No electric utility would consider ordering a nuclear power plant, according
to the industry, unless licensing became quicker and more predictable, and designs were less
subject to mid-construction safety-related changes required by NRC. The Energy Policy Act of
1992 (P.L. 102-486) largely implemented the industry’s licensing goals.
Nuclear plant licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703; U.S.C. 2011-2282)
had historically been a two-stage process. NRC first issued a construction permit to build a plant
and then, after construction was finished, an operating license to run it. Each stage of the
licensing process involved adjudicatory proceedings. Environmental impact statements also are
required under the National Environmental Policy Act.
Over the vehement objections of nuclear opponents, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 provided a
clear statutory basis for one-step nuclear licenses. Under the new process, NRC can issue
combined construction permits and operating licenses (COLs) and allow completed plants to
operate without delay if they meet all construction requirements—called “inspections, tests,
57 Public Citizen Energy Program, “The Myth of Nuclear Safety,” http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy_enviro_nuclear/
nuclear_power_plants/reactor_safety/articles.cfm?ID=4454.
58 The Chernobyl Forum: 2003-2005, Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts,
International Atomic Energy Agency, April 2006.
59 Greenpeace. The Chernobyl Catastrophe: Consequences on Human Health, April 2006, p. 10.
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analyses, and acceptance criteria,” or ITAAC. NRC would hold preoperational hearings on the
adequacy of plant construction only in specified circumstances.
DOE’s Nuclear Power 2010 program had paid up to half the cost of several COLs and early site
permits to test the revised licensing procedures. However, the COL process cannot be fully tested
until construction of new reactors is completed. At that point, it could be seen whether completed
plants will be able to operate without delays or whether adjudicable disputes over construction
adequacy may arise. Section 638 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58)
authorizes federal payments to the owner of a completed reactor whose operation is held up by
regulatory delays. The nuclear industry is asking Congress to require NRC to use informal
procedures in determining whether ITAAC have been met, eliminate mandatory hearings on
uncontested issues before granting a COL, and make other changes in the licensing process.60
A fundamental concern in the nuclear regulatory debate is the performance of NRC in issuing and
enforcing nuclear safety regulations. The nuclear industry and its supporters have regularly
complained that unnecessarily stringent and inflexibly enforced nuclear safety regulations have
burdened nuclear utilities and their customers with excessive costs. But many environmentalists,
nuclear opponents, and other groups charge NRC with being too close to the nuclear industry, a
situation that they say has resulted in lax oversight of nuclear power plants and routine
exemptions from safety requirements.
Primary responsibility for nuclear safety compliance lies with nuclear plant owners, who are
required to find any problems with their plants and report them to NRC. Compliance is also
monitored directly by NRC, which maintains at least two resident inspectors at each nuclear
power plant. The resident inspectors routinely examine plant systems, observe the performance of
reactor personnel, and prepare regular inspection reports. For serious safety violations, NRC often
dispatches special inspection teams to plant sites.
NRC’s reactor safety program is based on “risk-informed regulation,” in which safety
enforcement is guided by the relative risks identified by detailed individual plant studies. NRC’s
risk-informed reactor oversight system, inaugurated April 2, 2000, relies on a series of
performance indicators to determine the level of scrutiny that each reactor should receive.61
Reactor Security
Nuclear power plants have long been recognized as potential targets of terrorist attacks, and
critics have long questioned the adequacy of requirements for nuclear plant operators to defend
against such attacks. All commercial nuclear power plants licensed by NRC have a series of
physical barriers against access to vital reactor areas and are required to maintain a trained
security force to protect them.
A key element in protecting nuclear plants is the requirement that simulated terrorist attacks,
monitored by NRC, be carried out to test the ability of the plant operator to defend against them.
60 Nuclear Energy Institute, Legislative Proposal to Help Meet Climate Change Goals by Expanding U.S. Nuclear
Energy Production, Washington, DC, October 28, 2009, p. 5, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/
newplants/policybrief/2009-nuclear-policy-initiative.
61 For more information about the NRC reactor oversight process, see http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/
ASSESS/index.html.
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The severity of attacks that plant security must prepare for is specified in the “design basis threat”
(DBT).
EPACT05 required NRC to revise the DBT based on an assessment of terrorist threats, the
potential for multiple coordinated attacks, possible suicide attacks, and other criteria. NRC
approved the DBT revision based on those requirements on January 29, 2007. The revised DBT
does not require nuclear power plants to defend against deliberate aircraft attacks. NRC
contended that nuclear facilities were already required to mitigate the effects of large fires and
explosions, no matter what the cause, and that active protection against airborne threats was being
addressed by U.S. military and other agencies.62 After much consideration, NRC voted February
17, 2009, to require all new nuclear power plants to incorporate design features that would ensure
that, in the event of a crash by a large commercial aircraft, the reactor core would remain cooled
or the reactor containment would remain intact, and radioactive releases would not occur from
spent fuel storage pools.63 The rule change was published in the Federal Register June 12, 2009.64
NRC rejected proposals that existing reactors also be required to protect against aircraft crashes,
such as by adding large external steel barriers. However, NRC did impose some additional
requirements related to aircraft crashes on all reactors, both new and existing, after the 9/11
terrorist attacks of 2001. In 2002, as noted above, NRC ordered all nuclear power plants to
develop strategies to mitigate the effects of large fires and explosions that could result from
aircraft crashes or other causes. An NRC regulation on fire mitigation strategies, along with
requirements that reactors establish procedures for responding to specific aircraft threats, was
approved December 17, 2008.65 The fire mitigation rules were published in the Federal Register
March 27, 2009.66
Other ongoing nuclear plant security issues include the vulnerability of spent fuel pools, which
hold highly radioactive nuclear fuel after its removal from the reactor, standards for nuclear plant
security personnel, and nuclear plant emergency planning. NRC’s March 2009 security
regulations addressed some of those concerns and included a number of other security
enhancements.
EPACT05 required NRC to conduct force-on-force security exercises at nuclear power plants
every three years (which was NRC’s previous policy), authorized firearms use by nuclear security
personnel (preempting some state restrictions), established federal security coordinators, and
required fingerprinting of nuclear facility workers.
(For background on security issues, see CRS Report RL34331, Nuclear Power Plant Security and
Vulnerabilities, by Mark Holt and Anthony Andrews.)
62 NRC Office of Public Affairs, NRC Approves Final Rule Amending Security Requirements, News Release No. 07-
012, January 29, 2007.
63 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Rule—Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors,
Commission Voting Record, SECY-08-0152, February 17, 2009.
64 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors,” Final Rule,
74 Federal Register 28111, June 12, 2009. This provision is codified at 10 CFR 50.150.
65 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Approves Final Rule Expanding Security Requirements for Nuclear Power
Plants,” press release, December 17, 2008, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2008/08-227.html.
66 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Power Reactor Security Requirements,” Final Rule, 74 Federal Register 13925,
March 27, 2009.
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Decommissioning
When nuclear power plants reach the end of their useful lives, they must be safely removed from
service, a process called decommissioning. NRC requires nuclear utilities to make regular
contributions to dedicated funds to ensure that money is available to remove radioactive material
and contamination from reactor sites after they are closed.
The first full-sized U.S. commercial reactors to be decommissioned were the Trojan plant in
Oregon, whose decommissioning completion received NRC approval on May 23, 2005, and the
Maine Yankee plant, for which NRC approved most of the site cleanup on October 3, 2005. The
Trojan decommissioning cost $429 million, according to reactor owner Portland General Electric,
and the Maine Yankee decommissioning cost about $500 million.67 Decommissioning of the
Connecticut Yankee plant cost $790 million and was approved by NRC on November 26, 2007.68
NRC approved the cleanup of the decommissioned Rancho Seco reactor site in California on
October 7, 2009.69 The decommissioning of Rancho Seco was estimated to cost $500 million,
excluding future demolition of the cooling towers and other remaining plant structures.70
When a reactor is permanently shut down, the owner (licensee) has 30 days to notify NRC. The
licensee then certifies with NRC when spent fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor
vessel. By two years after shutdown, the licensee must submit a Post Shutdown
Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR). The PSDAR specifies which of the two primary
decommissioning options will be pursued:
• DECON: Plant and equipment are dismantled and removed, or decontaminated to
the level required for release from NRC licensing.
• SAFSTOR: The plant is placed in a safe, stable condition for future
dismantlement and decontamination.
According to NRC, nine reactors are currently in SAFSTOR: Dresden 1 (IL), Indian Point 1
(NY), La Crosse (WI), Millstone 1 (CT), Peach Bottom 1 (PA), San Onofre 1 (CA), GE
Vallecitios (CA), NS Savannah (MD), and Three Mile Island 2 (PA). Four units are in DECON:
Fermi 1 (MI), Humboldt Bay (CA), and Zion 1 and 2 (IL).71
After nuclear reactors are decommissioned, the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) accumulated during their
operating lives remains stored in pools or dry casks at the plant sites. About 2,800 metric tons of
spent fuel is currently stored at nine closed nuclear power plants. Another 3,100 metric tons is
stored at the four plants announced for closure in 2013.72 “Until this SNF is removed from these
nine sites, the sites cannot be fully decommissioned and made available for other purposes,” DOE
67 Sharp, David, “NRC Signs Off on Maine Yankee’s Decommissioning,” Associated Press, October 3, 2005.
68 E-mail communication from Bob Capstick, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, August 28, 2008.
69 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Releases Rancho Seco Nuclear Plant for Unconditional Use,” press release,
October 7, 2009, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2009/09-165.html.
70 “20 Years Later, Rancho Seco Ready for Final Shutdown,” Sacramento County Herald, June 9, 2009,
http://m.news10.net/news.jsp?key=190656.
71 NRC, Information Digest, 2013-2014, NUREG-1350, Volume 25, Appendix C, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350.
72 Gutherman Technical Service, “2011 Used Fuel Data,” January 14, 2012.
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noted in a 2008 report.73 President Obama’s decision to terminate development of an underground
spent fuel repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, has increased concerns about the ultimate
disposition of spent fuel at decommissioned sites. (For more information, see CRS Report
R42513, U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, by James D. Werner.)
Nuclear Accident Liability
Liability for damages to the general public from nuclear incidents is addressed by the Price-
Anderson Act (primarily Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2210).
EPACT05 extended the availability of Price-Anderson coverage for new reactors and new DOE
nuclear contracts through the end of 2025. (Existing reactors and contracts were already covered.)
Under Price-Anderson, the owners of commercial reactors must assume all liability for nuclear
damages awarded to the public by the court system, and they must waive most of their legal
defenses following a severe radioactive release (“extraordinary nuclear occurrence”). To pay any
such damages, each licensed reactor with at least 100 megawatts of electric generating capacity
must carry the maximum liability insurance reasonably available, which was raised from $300
million to $375 million on January 1, 2010.74 Any damages exceeding $375 million are to be
assessed equally against all 100-megawatt-and-above power reactors, up to $121.3 million per
reactor (increased for inflation from $111.9 million on September 10, 2013).75 Those
assessments—called “retrospective premiums”—would be paid at an annual rate of no more than
$19.0 million per reactor (up from $17.5 million), to limit the potential financial burden on
reactor owners following a major accident. According to NRC, 104 commercial reactors,
including the four closed in 2013, are currently covered by the Price-Anderson retrospective
premium requirement.76
For each nuclear incident, the Price-Anderson liability system currently would provide up to $13
billion in public compensation. That total includes $121.3 million in retrospective premiums from
each of the 104 currently covered reactors, totaling $12.6 billion, plus the $375 million in
insurance coverage carried by the reactor that suffered the incident. On top of those payments, a
5% surcharge may also be imposed, raising the total per-reactor retrospective premium to $127.4
million and the total available compensation to about $13.6 billion. Under Price-Anderson, the
nuclear industry’s liability for an incident is capped at that amount, which varies over time
depending on the number of covered reactors, the amount of available insurance, and the inflation
adjustment. Payment of any damages above that liability limit would require congressional
approval under special procedures in the act.
73 DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Report to Congress on the Demonstration of the Interim
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel from Decommissioned Nuclear Power Reactor Sites, DOE/RW-0596, Washington, DC,
December 2008, p. 1, http://www.energy.gov/media/ES_Interim_Storage_Report_120108.pdf.
74 American Nuclear Insurers, “Need for Nuclear Liability Insurance,” January 2010,
http://www.nuclearinsurance.com/library/Nuclear%20Liability%20in%20the%20US.pdf.
75 NRC, “Inflation Adjustments to the Price-Anderson Financial Protection Regulations,” 79 Federal Register 41835,
July 12, 2013.
76 Reactors smaller than 100 megawatts must purchase an amount of liability coverage determined by NRC but are not
subject to retrospective premiums. Total liability for those reactors is limited to $560 million, with the federal
government indemnifying reactor operators for the difference between that amount and their liability coverage (Atomic
Energy Act Sec. 170 b. and c.).
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EPACT05 increased the limit on per-reactor annual payments to $15 million from the previous
$10 million, and required the annual limit to be adjusted for inflation every five years. As under
previous law, the total retrospective premium limit is adjusted every five years as well. For the
purposes of those payment limits, a nuclear plant consisting of multiple small reactors (100-300
megawatts, up to a total of 1,300 megawatts) would be considered a single reactor. Therefore, in
the event of a severe release a power plant with six 120-megawatt small modular reactors would
be liable for retrospective premiums of up to $121.3 million, rather than $727.8 million
(excluding the 5% surcharge).
The Price-Anderson Act also covers contractors who operate DOE nuclear facilities. EPACT05
set the liability limit on DOE contractors at $10 billion per accident, to be adjusted for inflation
every five years. The first adjustment under EPACT, raising the liability limit to $11.961 billion,
took effect October 14, 2009.77 The liability limit for DOE contractors previously had been the
same as for commercial reactors, excluding the 5% surcharge, except when the limit for
commercial reactors dropped because of a decline in the number of covered reactors. Price-
Anderson authorizes DOE to indemnify its contractors for the entire amount of their liability, so
that damage payments for nuclear incidents at DOE facilities would ultimately come from the
Treasury. However, the law also allows DOE to fine its contractors for safety violations, and
contractor employees and directors can face criminal penalties for “knowingly and willfully”
violating nuclear safety rules. EPACT05 limited the civil penalties against a nonprofit contractor
to the amount of management fees paid under that contract.
The Price-Anderson Act’s limits on liability were crucial in establishing the commercial nuclear
power industry in the 1950s. Supporters of the Price-Anderson system contend that it has worked
well since that time in ensuring that nuclear accident victims would have a secure source of
compensation, at little cost to the taxpayer. Extension of the act was widely considered a
prerequisite for new nuclear reactor construction in the United States. Opponents contend that
Price-Anderson inappropriately subsidizes the nuclear power industry by reducing its insurance
costs and protecting it from some of the financial consequences of the most severe conceivable
accidents. Projections that damages to the public from the Fukushima accident will greatly exceed
the Price-Anderson liability limits have prompted new calls for reexamination of the law.78
The U.S. government is supporting the establishment of an international liability system that,
among other purposes, would cover U.S. nuclear equipment suppliers conducting foreign
business. The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) will not
enter into force until at least five countries with a specified level of installed nuclear capacity
have enacted implementing legislation. Such implementing language was included in the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140, section 934), signed by President Bush
December 19, 2007. Supporters of the Convention hope that more countries will join now that the
United States has acted. Aside from the United States, three countries have submitted the
necessary instruments of ratification, but the remaining nine countries that so far have signed the
convention do not have the required nuclear capacity for it to take effect. Ratification by a large
nuclear energy producer such as Japan would allow the treaty to take effect, as would ratification
by two significant but smaller producers such as South Korea, Canada, Russia, or Ukraine.
77 Department of Energy, “Adjusted Indemnification Amount,” 74 Federal Register 52793, October 14, 2009.
78 Ellen Vancko, Union of Concerned Scientists, “The Impact of Fukushima on the US Nuclear Power Industry,”
presentation to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference on Nuclear Safety and Fukushima, April
7, 2011, https://csis.org/files/attachments/110407_vancko_nuclear_safety_0.pdf.
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Under the U.S. implementing legislation, the CSC would not change the liability and payment
levels already established by the Price-Anderson Act. Each party to the convention would be
required to establish a nuclear damage compensation system within its borders analogous to
Price-Anderson. For any damages not covered by those national compensation systems, the
convention would establish a supplemental tier of damage compensation to be paid by all parties.
P.L. 110-140 requires the U.S. contribution to the supplemental tier to be paid by suppliers of
nuclear equipment and services, under a formula to be developed by DOE. Supporters of the
convention contend that it will help U.S. exporters of nuclear technology by establishing a
predictable international liability system. For example, U.S. nuclear equipment sales to the
growing economies of China and India would be facilitated by those countries’ participation in
the CSC liability regime.
Federal Incentives for New Nuclear Plants
The nuclear power industry contends that support from the federal government would be needed
for “a major expansion of nuclear energy generation.”79 Significant incentives for building new
nuclear power plants were included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58),
signed by President Bush on August 8, 2005. These include production tax credits, loan
guarantees, insurance against regulatory delays, and extension of the Price-Anderson Act nuclear
liability system (discussed in the previous section on “Nuclear Accident Liability”). Relatively
low prices for natural gas—nuclear power’s chief competitor—and rising estimated nuclear plant
construction costs have decreased the likelihood that new reactors would be built without federal
support. Any regulatory delays and increased safety requirements resulting from the Fukushima
accident could also pose an obstacle to nuclear construction plans.
As a result, numerous bills have been introduced in recent years to strengthen or add to the
EPACT05 incentives (see “Legislation in the 113th Congress” at the end of this report). Nuclear
power critics have denounced the federal support programs and proposals as a “bailout” of the
nuclear industry, contending that federal efforts should focus instead on renewable energy and
energy efficiency.80
Nuclear Production Tax Credit
EPACT05 provides a 1.8-cents/kilowatt-hour tax credit for up to 6,000 megawatts of new nuclear
capacity for the first eight years of operation, up to $125 million annually per 1,000 megawatts.
The credit is not adjusted for inflation.
The Treasury Department published interim guidance for the nuclear production tax credit on
May 1, 2006.81 Under the guidance, the 6,000 megawatts of eligible capacity (enough for about
four or five reactors) are to be allocated among reactors that filed license applications by the end
79 Nuclear Energy Institute, “NEI Unveils Package of Policy Initiatives Needed to Achieve Climate Change Goals,”
press release, October 26, 2009, http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/newsreleases/nei-unveils-package-of-policy-
initiatives-needed-to-achieve-climate-change-goals/.
80 Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Senate Appropriators Lard President Obama’s Stimulus Package with
up to $50 Billion in Nuclear Reactor Pork,” press release, January 30, 2009, http://www.nirs.org/press/01-30-2009/1.
81 Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Bulletin, No. 2006-18, “Credit for
Production From Advanced Nuclear Facilities,” Notice 2006-40, May 1, 2006, p. 855.
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of 2008. If more than 6,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity ultimately qualify for the production
tax credit, then the credit is to be allocated proportionally among any of the qualifying reactors
that begin operating before 2021.
By the end of 2008, license applications had been submitted to NRC for more than 34,000
megawatts of nuclear generating capacity,82 so if all those reactors were built before 2021 they
would receive less than 20% of the maximum tax credit. However, the reactor licensing status
shown in Table 1 indicates that only four new units, totaling about 4,600 megawatts of capacity,
are currently licensed for construction and likely to be completed before 2021. Seven other units,
totaling about 9,000 megawatts, are scheduled to receive their licenses by 2015 and could
possibly go into service by 2021.
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has urged Congress to remove the 6,000 megawatt capacity
limit for the production tax credit, index it for inflation, and extend the deadline for plants to
begin operation to the start of 2025. NEI is also proposing that a 30% investment tax credit be
available for new nuclear construction as an alternative to the production credit.83
Standby Support
Because the nuclear industry has often blamed licensing delays for past nuclear reactor
construction cost overruns, EPACT05 authorizes the Secretary of Energy to provide “standby
support,” or regulatory risk insurance, to help pay the cost of regulatory delays at up to six new
commercial nuclear reactors. For the first two reactors that begin construction, the DOE payments
could cover all the eligible delay-related costs, such as additional interest, up to $500 million
each. For the next four reactors, half of the eligible costs could be paid by DOE, with a payment
cap of $250 million per reactor. Delays caused by the failure of a reactor owner to comply with
laws or regulations would not be covered. Project sponsors will be required to pay the “subsidy
cost” of the program, consisting of the estimated present value of likely future government
payments. DOE published a final rule for the “standby support” program August 11, 2006.84
Under the program’s regulations, a project sponsor may enter into a conditional agreement for
standby support before NRC issues a combined operating license. The first six conditional
agreements to meet all the program requirements, including the issuance of a COL and payment
of the estimated subsidy costs, can be converted to standby support contracts. However, no
applicant has pursued the incentive.85
82 Energy Information Administration, Status of Potential New Commercial Nuclear Reactors in the United States,
February 19, 2009.
83 Nuclear Energy Institute, Legislative Proposal to Help Meet Climate Change Goals by Expanding U.S. Nuclear
Energy Production, Washington, DC, October 28, 2009, p. 4, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/
newplants/policybrief/2009-nuclear-policy-initiative.
84 Department of Energy, “Standby Support for Certain Nuclear Plant Delays,” Federal Register, August 11, 2006,
p. 46306.
85 Freebairn, William, “Nuclear Tax Credits, Previously Low-Profile, Might Draw Scrutiny: Lobbysists,” Nucleonics
Week, May 17, 2012.
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Loan Guarantees
Title XVII of EPACT05 authorizes federal loan guarantees for up to 80% of construction costs for
advanced energy projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including new nuclear power
plants. Under such loan guarantee agreements, the federal government would repay all covered
loans if the borrower defaulted. This would reduce the risk to lenders and allow them to provide
financing at low interest rates. The Title XVII loan guarantees are widely considered crucial by
the nuclear industry to obtain financing for new reactors. However, opponents contend that
nuclear loan guarantees would provide an unjustifiable subsidy to a mature industry and shift
investment away from environmentally preferable energy technologies.86 The authorized ceiling
on nuclear power plant loan guarantees is currently $18.5 billion.
The Administration announced the first conditional nuclear power plant loan guarantee on
February 16, 2010, totaling $8.33 billion for two proposed new reactors at Georgia’s Vogtle
nuclear plant site. Owners of the Vogtle project have reportedly estimated that the loan guarantee
could reduce their financing costs by as much as $2 billion.87 Although DOE has made
conditional agreements, these loan agreements had not been finalized as of September 2013.
Subsidy Costs
Title XVII requires the estimated future government costs resulting from defaults on guaranteed
loans to be covered up-front by appropriations or by payments from project sponsors, such as the
utility planning to build a plant. These “subsidy costs” are calculated as the present value of the
average possible future net costs to the government for each loan guarantee. If those calculations
are accurate, the subsidy cost payments for all the guaranteed projects together should cover the
future costs of the program, including default-related losses. However, the Congressional Budget
Office has predicted that the up-front subsidy cost payments will prove too low by at least 1%
and is scoring bills accordingly.88 For example, appropriations bills that provide loan guarantee
authorizations include an adjustment equal to 1% of the loan guarantee ceiling. (For more
information on loan guarantee subsidy costs, see CRS Report R42152, Loan Guarantees for
Clean Energy Technologies: Goals, Concerns, and Policy Options, by Phillip Brown.)
DOE loan guarantees for renewable energy and electricity transmission projects under EPACT05
section 1705, added by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), do
not require subsidy cost payments by project sponsors, because potential losses are covered by
advance appropriations in the act. No such appropriations are currently available for nuclear
power projects, so it is anticipated that nuclear loan guarantee subsidy costs would be paid by the
project sponsors. As a result, the level of the subsidy costs could have a powerful effect on the
viability of nuclear power projects, which are currently expected to cost between $5 billion and
$10 billion per reactor. For example, a 10% subsidy cost for a $7 billion loan guarantee would
require an up-front payment of $700 million.
86 Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, Statement on Nuclear Developments Before the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Natural Resources Defense Council, March 18, 2009,
http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=f25ddd10-c1f5-9e2e-528e-
c4321cca4c1b&Witness_ID=9f14a78d-58d0-43fb-bf5b-21426d1d888e.
87 K. Steiner-Dicks, “Weekly Intelligence Brief 7-13 June 2012,” Nuclear Energy Insider, June 13, 2012.
88 Congressional Budget Office, S. 1321, Energy Savings Act of 2007, CBO Cost Estimate, Washington, DC, June 11,
2007, pp. 7-9, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8206/s1321.pdf.
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No subsidy cost amount has yet been established for any nuclear loan guarantee, including the
lead Vogtle project in Georgia. The Administration’s continuing internal deliberations over that
question may reflect its importance and the amount of controversy being generated. Internal DOE
documents released May 23, 2012, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act show that
Southern Company, the lead partner in the Vogtle project, has been offered a subsidy cost of
0.5%-1.5%, subject to other conditions that are still under negotiation. Higher subsidy costs are
being offered to two other partners in the project.89
The nuclear industry contends that historical experience indicates defaults are likely to be
minimal and that nuclear plant subsidy costs should therefore be low.90 However, nuclear power
critics contend that nuclear power plants are likely to experience delays and cost overruns that
could lead to much larger losses under the loan guarantee program. The Center for American
Progress concluded that nuclear subsidy costs “should be at least 10 percent and possibly much
more.”91
Constellation Energy informed DOE on October 8, 2010, that it was withdrawing from loan
guarantee negotiations on Calvert Cliffs 3, blaming “the Office of Management and Budget’s
inability to address significant problems with its methodology for determining the project’s credit
subsidy cost.” Constellation’s letter to DOE said OMB’s “shockingly high” estimate of the
subsidy cost for Calvert Cliffs 3 was 11.6%, or about $880 million. “Such a sum would clearly
destroy the project’s economics (or the economics of any nuclear project for that matter), and was
dramatically out of line with both our own and independent assessments of what the figure should
reasonably be,” the letter stated.92 Although OMB has not released its subsidy cost methodology,
it may consider the default risk for a “merchant plant” such as Calvert Cliffs to be significantly
higher than that of a rate-regulated plant such as Vogtle. A plant under traditional rate regulation
is allowed to pass all prudently incurred costs through to utility ratepayers, while a merchant plant
charges market rates for its power. A merchant plant, therefore, could potentially earn higher
profits than a rate-regulated plant, but it also runs the risk of being unable to cover its debt
payments if market rates for wholesale electric power drop too low or if its costs are higher than
anticipated.
Congressionally Authorized Ceilings
Under the Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA), federal loan guarantees cannot be provided
without an authorized level in an appropriations act. The Senate-passed version of omnibus
energy legislation in the 110th Congress (H.R. 6) would have explicitly eliminated FCRA’s
applicability to DOE’s planned loan guarantees under EPACT05 (Section 124(b)). That provision
would have given DOE essentially unlimited loan guarantee authority for guarantees whose
89 Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, “Secret Documents Highlight Nuclear’s Risk,” press release, May 23, 2012,
http://www.cleanenergy.org/index.php?/Press-Update.html?form_id=8&item_id=299.
90 Statement of Leslie C. Kass, Nuclear Energy Institute, to the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, April 20, 2010, http://www.nei.org/newsandevents/speechesandtestimony/april-
20-2010-kass. DOE is treating final subsidy cost determinations as proprietary, prompting some groups to call for the
amounts to be made public.
91 Richard Caperton, Protecting Taxpayers from a Financial Meltdown, Center for American Progress, Washington,
DC, March 8, 2010, p. 2, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/nuclear_financing.html.
92 Letter from Michael J. Wallace, Vice Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, Constellation Energy, to Dan Poneman,
Deputy Secretary of Energy, October 8, 2010, http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/hp/ssi/wpc/
constellationenergy.PDF?sid=ST2010100900005.
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subsidy costs were paid by project sponsors, but it was dropped from the final legislation (P.L.
110-140). Pursuant to FCRA, the FY2007 continuing resolution (P.L. 110-5) established an initial
cap of $4 billion on loan guarantees under the program, without allocating that amount among the
various eligible technologies. The explanatory statement for the FY2008 omnibus funding act
(P.L. 110-161) increased the loan guarantee ceiling to $38.5 billion through FY2009, including
$18.5 billion specifically for nuclear power plants and $2 billion for uranium enrichment plants.93
The FY2009 omnibus funding act increased DOE’s total loan guarantee authority for specified
technology categories to $47 billion, in addition to the $4 billion in general authority provided in
FY2007. Of the $47 billion, $18.5 billion continued to be reserved for nuclear power, $18.5
billion was for energy efficiency and renewables, $6 billion was for coal, $2 billion was for
carbon capture and sequestration, and $2 billion was for uranium enrichment. The time limits on
the loan guarantee authority were eliminated.
Nuclear Solicitations
DOE issued a solicitation for up to $20.5 billion in nuclear power and uranium enrichment plant
loan guarantees on June 30, 2008.94 According to the nuclear industry, 10 nuclear power projects
applied for $93.2 billion in loan guarantees, and two uranium enrichment projects asked for $4.8
billion in guarantees, several times the amount available.95 Under the program’s regulations, a
conditional loan guarantee commitment cannot become a binding loan guarantee agreement until
the project receives a COL and all other regulatory requirements are met, as noted above; and the
first COLs were issued in early 2012.
In the uranium enrichment solicitation, DOE in July 2009 informed USEC Inc., which plans to
build a new plant in Ohio, that its technology needed further testing before a loan guarantee could
be issued.96 DOE notified Congress in March 2010 that it would reprogram $2 billion of its
unused FY2007 loan guarantee authority toward uranium enrichment, increasing the uranium
enrichment total to $4 billion. The move would potentially allow guarantees to be provided to
both USEC and the other applicant in the uranium enrichment solicitation, the French firm Areva,
which is planning a plant in Idaho.97 DOE offered a $2 billion conditional loan guarantee to Areva
on May 20, 2010.98
DOE informed USEC in October 2011 that the centrifuge technology for its proposed new
enrichment plant still needed further testing and offered to provide up to $300 million to help
build a demonstration “train” of 720 centrifuges.99 The FY2013 Continuing Appropriations
93 Congressional Record, December 17, 2007, p. H15585.
94 http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/keydocs.html.
95 Marvin S. Fertel, Statement for the Record to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Nuclear
Energy Institute, March 18, 2009, p. 9, http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&
Hearing_ID=f25ddd10-c1f5-9e2e-528e-c4321cca4c1b&Witness_ID=4de5e2df-53fe-49ba-906e-9b69d3674e41.
96 Department of Energy, “800 to 1000 New Jobs Coming to Piketon,” press release, July 28, 2009,
http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/press/072809.pdf.
97 Maureen Conley, “DOE Finds $2 Billion More for SWU Plant Loan Guarantees,” NuclearFuel, April 5, 2010, p. 3.
98 Department of Energy, “DOE Offers Conditional Loan Guarantee for Front End Nuclear Facility in Idaho,” press
release, May 20, 2010, http://www.energy.gov/news/8996.htm.
99 Maureen Conley, “Congress ‘Frustrated’ by Inaction on USEC Loan Guarantee,” NuclearFuel, October 31, 2011,
p. 8.
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Resolution (P.L. 112-175) included $100 million for the USEC demonstration program.100 For
FY2014, the House provided $48 million for the program through special reprogramming
authority (H.Rept. 113-135).
DOE has recently provided other assistance to USEC. DOE agreed on May 15, 2012, to provide
depleted uranium stockpiles (material left over from the enrichment process) to Energy Northwest
for reenrichment at USEC’s plant in Paducah, KY, for use as reactor fuel.101 DOE agreed on
March 13, 2012, to acquire low-enriched uranium from USEC in exchange for taking
responsibility for low-value depleted uranium tails that USEC would otherwise have to dispose
of, freeing $44 million of USEC’s funds for the centrifuge project.102 DOE announced June 13,
2012, that it would provide $88 million for the centrifuge demonstration program by taking over
responsibility for disposal of additional depleted uranium from USEC. In return, DOE will take
ownership of the equipment and technology used in the demonstration and lease it to USEC.103
Global Climate Change
Global climate change that may be caused by carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions
is cited by nuclear power supporters as an important reason to develop a new generation of
reactors. Nuclear power plants emit relatively little carbon dioxide, mostly from nuclear fuel
production and auxiliary plant equipment. This “green” nuclear power argument has received
growing attention in think tanks and academia. As stated by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in its major study The Future of Nuclear Power: “Our position is that the prospect of
global climate change from greenhouse gas emissions and the adverse consequences that flow
from these emissions is the principal justification for government support of the nuclear energy
option.”104 The Obama Administration is including nuclear power as part of its clean energy
strategy.
However, some environmental groups have contended that nuclear power’s potential greenhouse
gas benefits are modest and must be weighed against the technology’s safety risks, its potential
for nuclear weapons proliferation, and the hazards of radioactive waste.105 They also contend that
energy efficiency and renewable energy would be far more productive investments for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.106
100 All FY3013 figures are pre-sequester.
101 USEC Inc., “Five-Party Arrangement Extends Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Enrichment Operations,” press
release, May 15, 2012, http://www.usec.com/news/five-party-arrangement-extends-paducah-gaseous-diffusion-plant-
enrichment-operations. The depleted uranium consists of “high assay” tails, which have relatively high levels of fissile
U-235.
102 USEC Inc., “Funding,” web page, http://www.usec.com/american-centrifuge/what-american-centrifuge/plant/
funding.
103 Department of Energy, “Obama Administration Announces Major Step Forward for the American Centrifuge
Plant,” press release, June 13, 2012, http://energy.gov/articles/obama-administration-announces-major-step-forward-
american-centrifuge-plant.
104 Interdisciplinary MIT Study, The Future of Nuclear Power, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003, p. 79.
105 Gronlund, Lisbeth, David Lochbaum, and Edwin Lyman, Nuclear Power in a Warming World, Union of Concerned
Scientists, December 2007.
106 Travis Madsen, Tony Dutzik, and Bernadette Del Chiaro, et al., Generating Failure: How Building Nuclear Power
Plants Would Set America Back in the Race Against Global Warming, Environment America Research and Policy
Center, November 2009, http://www.environmentamerica.org/uploads/39/62/3962c378b66c4552624d09cbd8ebba02/
Generating-Failure—Environment-America—Web.pdf.
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Proposals to reduce carbon dioxide emissions – through taxation, a cap-and-trade system, or other
regulatory controls – could significantly increase the cost of generating electricity with fossil
fuels and improve the competitive position of nuclear power. A federal Clean Energy Standard
that includes nuclear power, as proposed in President Obama’s January 2011 State of the Union
Address, could provide a similar boost to nuclear energy expansion. Utilities that have applied for
nuclear power plant licenses have often cited the possibility of federal greenhouse gas controls or
other mandates as one of the reasons for pursuing new reactors.
Nuclear Power Research and Development
The Obama Administration’s FY2014 funding request for nuclear energy research and
development totals $735.5 million. Including advanced reactors, fuel cycle technology,
infrastructure support, and safeguards and security, the total nuclear energy request is $22.0
million (3%) below the FY2013 funding level. Funding for safeguards and security at DOE’s
Idaho facilities in FY2013 was provided under a separate appropriations account, Other Defense
Activities, but it is included under the Nuclear Energy account in the FY2014 request. In contrast,
funding for space and defense infrastructure, totaling $64.1 million in the FY2013 nuclear energy
appropriation, would be shifted to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) by
the Administration’s request.
The House-passed Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill for FY2014 (H.R. 2609)
would provide $656.4 million for nuclear energy. That total excludes the Administration’s
proposed shift of $94.0 million for Idaho safeguards and security from Other Defense Activities
and includes the space and defense funding transfer to NASA. For the programs that would
remain in nuclear energy, therefore, the House bill would provide an increase of $14.9 million
from the Administration request and a decrease of $37 million from FY2013. The Senate
Appropriations Committee (S. 1245) recommended the same total as the Administration request,
including the proposed funding transfers.
The Administration’s FY2014 nuclear R&D budget request is consistent with DOE’s Nuclear
Energy Research and Development Roadmap issued in April 2010. The Roadmap lays out the
following four main goals for the program:
• Develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain
the safety, and extend the life of current reactors;
• Develop improvements in the affordability of new reactors to enable nuclear
energy to help meet the Administration’s energy security and climate change
goals;
• Develop sustainable nuclear fuel cycles; and
• Understand and minimize the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.
The Senate Appropriations Committee directed DOE to update the Roadmap within 180 days
after enactment of the FY2014 energy and water bill to reflect lessons learned from the
Fukushima nuclear accident, advances in small modular reactors, and the Administration’s new
nuclear waste strategy.
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Reactor Concepts
The Reactor Concepts program area includes the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)
demonstration project and research on other advanced reactors (often referred to as Generation IV
reactors). This area also includes funding for developing advanced small modular reactors
(discussed in the next section) and to enhance the “sustainability” of existing commercial light
water reactors. The total FY2014 funding request for this program is $72.5 million, a reduction of
$41.6 million from FY2013. The House voted to provide $86.5 million, while the Senate
Appropriations Committee approved the Administration’s funding level.
Most of the Administration’s proposed reduction in Reactor Concepts would be for NGNP, a
high-temperature gas-cooled reactor demonstration project authorized by the Energy Policy Act
of 2005. The reactor is intended to produce high-temperature heat that could be used to generate
electricity, help separate hydrogen from water, or be used in other industrial processes. DOE is
not requesting any funding specifically for the NGNP project in FY2014. Under EPACT05, the
Secretary of Energy was to decide by the end of FY2011 whether to proceed toward construction
of a demonstration plant. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu informed Congress on October 17,
2011, that DOE would not proceed with a demonstration plant design “at this time” but would
continue research on the technology. Potential obstacles facing NGNP include low prices for
natural gas, the major competing fuel, and private-sector unwillingness to share the project’s costs
as required by EPACT05. According to the DOE budget justification, some research activities
now conducted under the NGNP program will be shifted to the Advanced Reactor Concepts
subprogram in FY2014.
Funding for the Advanced Reactor Concepts subprogram would be increased by the
Administration request to $31.0 million in FY2014, up from $21.7 million in FY2012. The
increase would cover research on high-temperature gas reactors previously conducted under the
NGNP Program. Reactor concepts being developed by the Advanced Reactor Concepts
subprogram are generally classified as “Generation IV” reactors, as opposed to the existing fleet
of commercial light water reactors, which are generally classified as generations II and III. Such
advanced reactors “could dramatically improve nuclear power performance including
sustainability, economics, and safety and proliferation resistance,” according to the FY2014
justification. Nuclear technology development under this program includes “fast reactors,” using
high-energy neutrons, and reactors that would use a variety of heat-transfer fluids, such as liquid
sodium and supercritical carbon dioxide. International research collaboration in this area would
continue under the Generation IV International Forum (GIF). The House bill would boost
Advanced Reactor Concepts funding to $45 million, with the increase focused on high-
temperature gas reactor fuel development formerly conducted under the NGNP program.
DOE’s FY2014 request for the Light Water Reactor Sustainability subprogram is $21.5 million,
$3.3 million below the FY2012 appropriation. The program conducts research on extending the
life of existing commercial light water reactors beyond 60 years, the maximum operating period
currently licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The program, which is to be cost-
shared with the nuclear industry, is to study the aging of reactor materials and analyze safety
margins of aging plants. Other research under this program is to focus on improving the
efficiency of existing plants, through such measures as increasing plant capacity and upgrading
instrumentation and control systems. Research on longer-life LWR fuel is aimed at eliminating
radioactive leakage from nuclear fuel and increasing its accident tolerance, along with other
“post-Fukushima lessons learned,” according to the budget justification. The House approved the
Administration funding level, as did the Senate committee.
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Small Modular Reactors
Rising cost estimates for large conventional nuclear reactors—widely projected to be $6 billion or
more—have contributed to growing interest in proposals for small modular reactors (SMRs).
Ranging from about 40 to 300 megawatts of electrical capacity, such reactors would be only a
fraction of the size of current commercial reactors. Several modular reactors would be installed
together to make up a power block with a single control room, under most concepts. Current
SMR proposals would use a variety of technologies, including the high-temperature gas
technology described above and the light water (LWR) technology used by today’s commercial
reactors.
DOE requested $70.0 million for FY2014 to provide technical support for licensing small
modular reactors, about $3 million above the FY2013 funding level. This program has focused on
LWR designs because they are believed most likely to be deployed in the near term, according to
DOE. The FY2014 budget justification states that the SMR licensing and technical support
program will last six years and cost DOE a total of $452 million. The program is similar to
DOE’s support for larger commercial reactor designs under the Nuclear Power 2010 Program,
which ended in FY2010. DOE will provide support for design certification, standards, and
licensing. As with the Nuclear Power 2010 Program, at least half the costs of the SMR design and
licensing program are to be covered by industry partners, according to DOE.
A consortium led by Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) was announced by DOE in November 2012 as
the first award recipient under the program. DOE and the B&W consortium signed a cooperative
agreement in April 2013 to implement the award, allowing for federal payments of around $226
million over five years to design and license a commercial demonstration plant that could open by
2022. DOE announced a second award solicitation in March 2013 for innovative SMR designs
that could begin commercial operation around 2025.
The House bill would increase funding for SMR design and licensing support to $110.0 million,
while the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended the Administration level.
An additional $20.0 million for FY2014 was requested by DOE under the Reactor Concepts
program (described in the section above) for SMR advanced concepts R&D—$4.5 million below
the FY2012 funding level. Unlike the SMR licensing support program, which focuses on near-
term technology, the SMR advanced concepts program would conduct research on technologies
that might be deployed in the longer term, according to the budget justification. The House
approved the Administration funding level, as did the Senate panel.
Small modular reactors would go against the overall trend in nuclear power technology toward
ever-larger reactors intended to spread construction costs over a greater output of electricity.
Proponents of small reactors contend that they would be economically viable despite their far
lower electrical output because modules could be assembled in factories and shipped to plant
sites, with minimal on-site fabrication, and because their smaller size would allow for simpler
safety systems. In addition, although modular plants might have similar or higher costs per
kilowatt-hour than conventional large reactors, their ability to be constructed in smaller
increments could reduce electric utilities’ financial commitment and risk.
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Fuel Cycle Research and Development
The Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program conducts “long-term, science-based”
research on a wide variety of technologies for improving the management of spent nuclear fuel,
according to the DOE budget justification. The total FY2014 funding request for this program is
$165.1 million, $10.1 million below the FY2013 appropriation. The House bill would provide
$91.1 million, while the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $175.1 million.
The range of fuel cycle technologies being studied by the program includes direct disposal of
spent fuel (the “once through” cycle) and partial and full recycling, according to the FY2014
budget justification. The Fuel Cycle R&D Program “will research and develop a suite of
technology options that will enable future decision-makers to make informed decisions about how
best to manage nuclear waste and used fuel from reactors,” the budget justification says.
Much of the Administration’s planned research on spent fuel management options would address
the near-term recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future,
which issued its final report on January 26, 2012. The commission was chartered to develop
alternatives to the planned Yucca Mountain, NV, spent fuel repository, which President Obama
wants to terminate. DOE released its Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear
Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in January 2013 in response to the Blue Ribbon
Commission report. Funding to begin implementing the strategy is included in the Used Nuclear
Fuel Disposition subprogram, with a request of $60.0 million, $2.1 million above the FY2012
funding level. Activities in that area include developing plans for a “consent-based siting process”
for nuclear storage and disposal facilities, waste transportation analyses, and research on potential
waste repositories, including salt caverns and deep boreholes. (See the “Nuclear Waste
Management” section, below, for more details.)
Other major research areas in the Fuel Cycle R&D Program include the development of accident-
tolerant fuels for existing commercial reactors, evaluation of fuel cycle options, development of
improved technologies to prevent diversion of nuclear materials for weapons, and technology to
increase nuclear fuel resources, such as uranium extraction from seawater. The Senate
Appropriations Committee increased the Administration’s request for the Advanced Fuels
subprogram by $20 million, to $57.1 million, with an emphasis on developing “meltdown-
resistant nuclear fuels” that could be tested and made available within 10 years.
Nuclear Waste Management
One of the most controversial aspects of nuclear power is the disposal of radioactive waste, which
can remain hazardous for thousands of years. Each nuclear reactor produces an annual average of
about 20 metric tons of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel, for a nationwide total of about 2,000
metric tons per year. U.S. reactors also generate about 27,000 cubic meters of low-level
radioactive waste per year, including contaminated components and materials resulting from
reactor decommissioning.
The federal government is responsible for permanent disposal of commercial spent fuel (paid for
with a fee on nuclear power production) and federally generated radioactive waste, while states
have the authority to develop disposal facilities for most commercial low-level waste. Under the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA, 42 U.S.C. 10101, et seq.), spent fuel and other highly
radioactive waste is to be isolated in a deep underground repository, consisting of a large network
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of tunnels carved from a geologic formation that has remained stable for hundreds of thousands
of years. As amended in 1987, NWPA designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the only
candidate site for the national repository. The act required DOE to begin taking waste from
nuclear plant sites by 1998—a deadline that even under the most optimistic scenarios will be
missed by more than 20 years. DOE filed a license application with NRC for the proposed Yucca
Mountain repository in June 2008.
The Obama Administration “has determined that developing the Yucca Mountain repository is not
a workable option and the Nation needs a different solution for nuclear waste disposal,”
according to the DOE FY2011 budget justification. To develop alternative waste management
strategies, the Administration established the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear
Future, which issued its final report to the Secretary of Energy on January 26, 2012.107 The Blue
Ribbon Commission recommended that future efforts to develop nuclear waste facilities follow a
“consent based” approach and be carried out by a new organization, rather than DOE. The
Commission said the new nuclear waste entity should have “assured access” to the Nuclear Waste
Fund, which holds fees collected from nuclear power plant operators to pay for waste disposal.
Under NWPA, those funds cannot be spent without congressional appropriations.
DOE released its Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-
Level Radioactive Waste in January 2013 in response to the Blue Ribbon Commission report. The
strategy calls for a pilot interim storage facility for spent fuel from closed nuclear reactors to open
by 2021 and a larger storage facility, possibly at the same site, to open by 2025. A site for a
permanent underground waste repository would be selected by 2026, and the repository would
open by 2048. Storage and disposal sites would be selected by a new waste management
organization through a consent-based process, as recommended by the Blue Ribbon
Commission.108
DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) currently is responsible for civilian waste management
activities. NE’s Fuel Cycle R&D Program (discussed in the “Nuclear Power Research and
Development” section above) includes funding under the Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition
subprogram to begin implementing the DOE waste management strategy. DOE is seeking $60.0
million for the Used Fuel subprogram in FY2014, $2.1 million above the FY2012 funding level,
and no funding for Yucca Mountain.
In approving the Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill for FY2014 (H.R. 2609), the
House Appropriations Committee excoriated the Obama Administration’s termination of the
Yucca Mountain project as “blatant political maneuverings.” The House-passed bill would
eliminate DOE’s $60 million request to implement its new nuclear waste policy and add $25
million for Yucca Mountain. It would also direct the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to use
prior-year funds to continue the Yucca Mountain licensing process.
The Senate Appropriations Committee approved the Administration’s proposed funding level for
Used Fuel and did not mention Yucca Mountain. The Committee-passed bill includes a provision
107 Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy, January 2012,
http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf.
108 DOE, Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, January
2013, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
Strategy%20for%20the%20Management%20and%20Disposal%20of%20Used%20Nuclear%20Fuel%20and%20High
%20Level%20Radioactive%20Waste.pdf.
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from the previous year that would authorize DOE to conduct a pilot program to develop one or
more high level radioactive waste storage facilities, with the consent of state, local, and tribal
governments.
Senator Wyden, along with Senators Murkowski, Feinstein, and Alexander, introduced legislation
June 27, 2013, to redirect the nuclear waste program (S. 1240) along the lines recommended by
the Blue Ribbon Commission. The bill would establish an independent Nuclear Waste
Administration to develop nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities. Siting of such facilities
would require the consent of the affected state, local, and tribal governments. The Nuclear Waste
Administration could spend nuclear waste fees collected after the bill’s enactment without the
need for further appropriation. Fee collection would halt after 2025 if a waste facility had not
been opened. The Energy and Natural Resources Committee held a hearing on the bill July 30,
2013.
DOE had filed a license application with NRC for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository in
June 2008 but filed a motion to withdraw the application on March 3, 2010. An NRC licensing
panel rejected DOE’s withdrawal motion June 29, 2010, on the grounds that NWPA requires full
consideration of the license application by NRC. The full NRC Commission deadlocked on the
issue September 9, 2011, leaving the licensing panel’s decision in place and prohibiting DOE
from withdrawing the Yucca Mountain application. However, the commission ordered at the same
time that the licensing process be suspended because of “budgetary limitations.”109 No funding
was provided in FY2012 or FY2013 or requested for FY2014 to continue Yucca Mountain
licensing activities. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled
on August 13, 2013, that NRC must continue work on the Yucca Mountain license application as
long as funding is available. The Court determined that NRC has at least $11.1 million in
previously appropriated funds for that purpose.110
NWPA required DOE to begin taking waste from nuclear plant sites by January 31, 1998. Nuclear
utilities, upset over DOE’s failure to meet that deadline, have won two federal court decisions
upholding the department’s obligation to meet the deadline and to compensate utilities for any
resulting damages. Utilities have also won several cases in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
DOE estimates that liability payments would eventually exceed $20 billion if DOE were to begin
removing waste from reactor sites by 2020, the previous target for opening Yucca Mountain.111
(For more information, see CRS Report R42513, U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, by James D.
Werner; CRS Report RL33461, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal, by Mark Holt; and CRS Report
R40996, Contract Liability Arising from the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982, by Todd
Garvey.)
NRC published a proposed rule September 13, 2013, on continued storage of spent nuclear
fuel.112 The proposed rule responds to a federal circuit court ruling on June 8, 2012, that struck
109 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “In the Matter of U.S. Department of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository),”
CLI-11-07, September 9, 2011, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/orders/2011/2011-
07cli.pdf.
110 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, In re: Aiken County et al., No. 11-1271, writ of
mandamus, August 13, 2013, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/
BAE0CF34F762EBD985257BC6004DEB18/$file/11-1271-1451347.pdf.
111 Ibid., p. 80.
112 NRC, “Waste Confidence—Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel,” proposed rule, 78 Federal Register 56776,
September 13, 2013.
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down NRC’s Waste Confidence Decision, which contains the agency’s formal findings that waste
generated by nuclear power plants will be disposed of safely. The court ruled that the Waste
Confidence Decision required an environmental review under the National Environmental Policy
Act and that NRC needed to consider the possibility that a permanent waste repository would
never be built and to examine potential problems with waste storage pools.
The Waste Confidence Decision, first issued in 1984 and since updated twice, resulted from a
1979 federal circuit court ruling that required NRC to determine whether waste from nuclear
facilities would be safely managed after their licenses expired. After the court vacated the Waste
Confidence Decision in 2012, NRC stated that it would not issue final licenses for new reactors
and waste facilities until a new Waste Confidence Decision was completed.113
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Renewed interest in nuclear power throughout the world has led to increased concern about
nuclear weapons proliferation, because technology for making nuclear fuel can also be used to
produce nuclear weapons material. Of particular concern are uranium enrichment, a process to
separate and concentrate the fissile isotope uranium-235, and nuclear spent fuel reprocessing,
which can produce weapons-useable plutonium.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts a safeguards program that is intended
to prevent civilian nuclear fuel facilities from being used for weapons purposes, but not all
potential weapons proliferators belong to the system, and there are ongoing questions about its
effectiveness. Several proposals have been developed to guarantee nations without fuel cycle
facilities a supply of nuclear fuel in exchange for commitments to forgo enrichment and
reprocessing, which was one of the original goals of the Bush Administration’s Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership, now called the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation.114
Several situations have arisen throughout the world in which ostensibly commercial uranium
enrichment and reprocessing technologies have been subverted for military purposes. In 2003 and
2004, it became evident that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan had sold sensitive technology
and equipment related to uranium enrichment to states such as Libya, Iran, and North Korea.
Although Pakistan’s leaders maintain they did not acquiesce in or abet Khan’s activities, Pakistan
remains outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG). Iran has been a direct recipient of Pakistani enrichment technology.
IAEA’s Board of Governors found in 2005 that Iran’s breach of its safeguards obligations
constituted noncompliance with its safeguards agreement, and referred the case to the U.N.
Security Council in February 2006. Despite repeated calls by the U.N. Security Council for Iran
to halt enrichment and reprocessing-related activities, and imposition of sanctions, Iran continues
to develop enrichment capability at Natanz and at a site near Qom disclosed in September 2009.
Iran insists on its inalienable right to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, pursuant to
Article IV of the NPT. Interpretations of this right have varied over time. Former IAEA Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei did not dispute this inalienable right and, by and large, neither have
113 Ibid.
114 The organization approved a new mission statement with the name change at its June 2010 meeting in Ghana. See
http://www.gneppartnership.org.
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U.S. government officials. However, the case of Iran raises perhaps the most critical question in
this decade for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime: How can access to sensitive
fuel cycle activities (which could be used to produce fissile material for weapons) be
circumscribed without further alienating non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT?
Leaders of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime have suggested ways of reining in
the diffusion of such inherently dual-use technology, primarily through the creation of incentives
not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel. The international community is in the process of
evaluating those proposals and may decide upon a mix of approaches. At the same time, there is
debate on how to improve the IAEA safeguards system and its means of detecting diversion of
nuclear material to a weapons program in the face of expanded nuclear power facilities
worldwide.
(For more information, see CRS Report RL34234, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy
Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power, coordinated by Mary Beth D.
Nikitin; and CRS Report R41216, 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference: Key
Issues and Implications, coordinated by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.)
Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs
The following tables summarize current funding for DOE nuclear energy programs and NRC.
The sources for the funding figures are Administration budget requests and committee reports on
the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts, which fund DOE and NRC. The House
passed its version of the FY2014 Energy and Water bill on July 10, 2013 (H.R. 2609, H.Rept.
113-135). The Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version on June 27, 2013 (S. 1245,
S.Rept. 113-47).
Table 2. Funding for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(budget authority in millions of current dollars)
FY2013
FY2014
FY2014
FY2011
FY2012
Request FY2014 Sen.
Approp.
Approp.
Approp.a
House
Comm.
Reactor Safety
804.1a 800.1a
—c 812.4 812.4 —c
Nuclear Materials and
— 231.5 231.5 —
Waste
229.4 227.1
Yucca Mountain Licensing
10.0
0
0
0
0
0
Inspector
General 10.1 10.9
10.9
11.1
11.1
11.1
Total NRC budget
1,036.0 1,055.0
1,055.0 1,055.0
authority
1,052.3 1,038.1
—Offsetting fees
-914.2
-909.5
-909.5
930.7
-930.7
-930.7
Net
appropriation
138.1
128.6 126.6 124.3
124.3 124.3
a. FY2013 figures do not reflect March 1, 2013, sequester under P.L. 112-25.
b. Subcategories from NRC budget request.
c. Subcategories not specified.
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Table 3. DOE Funding for Nuclear Activities (Selected Programs)
(budget authority in millions of current dollars)
FY2013
FY2014
FY2014
FY2011
FY2012
Request FY2014 Senate
Approp.
Approp.
Approp.
House
Comm.
Reactor
Concepts 168.5
115.5
114.1
72.5 86.5 62.5
Small Modular Reactor
Licensing
— 67.0
66,2
70.0 85.0 70.0
Fuel Cycle R&D
187.6
187.4
185.0
165.1
91.1
175.1
Nuclear Energy Enabling
73.9
62.3 66.7 62.3
Technologies
51.4 74.9
International Nuclear
3.0 2.5 2.5 2.5
Energy Cooperation
3.0 3.0
Radiological Facilities
68.0 5.0 5.0 20.0
Management
51.7 69.9
Idaho Facilities
153.1
181.6 181.6 166.6
Management
183.6 155.0
Program
Direction
86.3 91.0
89.9
87.5 87.5 87.5
Yucca Mountain
0 0 25.0 0
repositoryb
0 0
Total, Nuclear Energya 732.1 765.4
757.5
735.5 656.4 735.5
a. Excludes funding provided under other accounts.
b. Funded by a 1-mill-per-kilowatt-hour fee on nuclear power.
Legislation in the 113th Congress
H.R. 259 (Pompeo)
Energy Freedom and Economic Prosperity Act. Terminates nuclear energy production tax credit,
among other provisions. Introduced January 15, 2013; referred to Committee on Ways and
Means.
H.R. 1700 (Engel)
Nuclear Disaster Preparedness Act. Requires the President to issue guidance for federal response
to nuclear disasters, covering specific topics listed in the bill. Introduced April 24, 2013; referred
to Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
H.R. 1023 (Thornberry)
No More Excuses Energy Act of 2013. Includes provisions to prohibit NRC from considering
nuclear waste storage when licensing new nuclear facilities, and to establish a tax credit for
obtaining nuclear component manufacturing certification. Introduced May 21, 2013; referred to
multiple committees.
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H.R. 2609 (Frelinghuysen)/S. 1245 (Feinstein)
Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2014. Provides
funding for DOE nuclear programs and NRC. House bill introduced July 2, 2013; reported as
original measure by Committee on Appropriations July 2, 2013 (H.Rept. 113-135); passed House
July 10, 2013, by vote of 227-198. Senate bill introduced June 27, 2013; reported as original
measure by Committee on Appropriations June 27, 2013 (S.Rept. 113-47).
H.R. 2712 (Lowey)
Nuclear Power Licensing Reform Act of 2013. Requires evacuation planning within 50 miles of
U.S. nuclear power plants and that reactor license renewals be subject to the same standards that
would apply to new reactors. Introduced July 17, 2013; referred the Committee on Energy and
Commerce.
H.R. 2861 (Lowey)
Requires NRC to distribute safety-related fines collected from nuclear facilities to the counties in
which the facilities are located to maintain radiological emergency preparedness plans.
Introduced July 30, 2013; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
S. 1240 (Wyden)
Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2013. Establishes an independent Nuclear Waste
Administration to develop nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities. Siting of such facilities
would require the consent of the affected state, local, and tribal governments. The Nuclear Waste
Administration could spend nuclear waste fees collected after the bill’s enactment without the
need for further appropriation. Fee collection would halt after 2025 if a waste facility had not
been opened. Introduced June 27, 2013; referred to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
Full committee hearing held July 30, 2013.
S. 1519 (Vitter)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Reorganization Plan Codification and Complements Act.
Specifies functions and authorities of the Chairman and Commissioners of NRC. Specifies that
any commissioner may request a vote on whether a particular issue should be reserved for the
Chairman or handled by the full Commission. Introduced September 18, 2013; referred to
Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Author Contact Information
Mark Holt
Specialist in Energy Policy
mholt@crs.loc.gov, 7-1704
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