Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and
Personnel Abroad: Legislative and Executive
Branch Initiatives
Alex Tiersky
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
September 12, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43195
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad
Summary
The September 11, 2012, attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, prompted sustained
congressional attention on the specific circumstances of the events in question, as well as broader
questions regarding how U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad are secured. Ensuring
that the Department of State is better prepared for the possibility of similar attacks in the future
has been a central congressional concern.
The Department of State undertook a number of measures in response to the attack, including
immediate steps to bolster security at posts around the world; an investigation of the incident
through an Accountability Review Board; and longer-term measures implementing the board’s
recommendations, including requests for significantly greater funding than in recent years.
Congress has conducted oversight through investigations by a number of committees and through
a number of hearings. Members have also put forward legislative proposals on issues ranging
from the composition of Accountability Review Boards to procedures for awarding local security
guard force contracts.
In the 113th Congress, two wide-ranging bills incorporating many of these areas have been
considered and approved by committees: H.R. 2848, the Department of State Operations and
Embassy Security Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2014, and S. 1386, the Chris Stevens, Sean
Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty Embassy Security, Threat Mitigation, and Personnel
Protection Act of 2013.
This report briefly summarizes and tracks congressional and State Department actions in response
to the attack, and will be updated as necessary to reflect further developments and actions on
ongoing policy proposals. Readers seeking background information on recent embassy attacks,
State Department policies and procedures relevant to embassy security, or information on recent
year embassy security funding trends should consult CRS Report R42834, Securing U.S.
Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues.
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Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Department of State Actions in Response to the Benghazi Attack .................................................. 2
The Benghazi Accountability Review Board ............................................................................ 2
State Department Implementation of ARB Recommendations ................................................. 3
Funding Requests ...................................................................................................................... 4
Legislative Response to the Benghazi Attack .................................................................................. 6
Legislative Investigations and Oversight .................................................................................. 6
Diplomatic Security Legislation in the 113th Congress ............................................................. 7
Funding ............................................................................................................................... 8
Accountability Review Board Process ................................................................................ 8
Personnel Accountability ..................................................................................................... 9
Contracting .......................................................................................................................... 9
High Threat Posts: Assessment and Reporting .................................................................. 10
Security Training ............................................................................................................... 10
Marine Security Guard Program ....................................................................................... 10
Additional Measures ......................................................................................................... 11
Figures
Figure 1. Capital Security Cost Sharing Program Funding, FY2010-FY2014 ................................ 5
Tables
Table 1. H.R. 2848 and S. 1386 Legislative Status (as of August 2013) ......................................... 7
Appendixes
Appendix A. DOS Fact Sheet on Benghazi ARB Implementation ................................................ 12
Appendix B. Selected Congressional Hearings on Benghazi Attack ............................................. 17
Appendix C. Selected Diplomatic Security-Related Legislation, 112th and 113th
Congresses (in Chronological Order) ......................................................................................... 18
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 20
Key Policy Staff ............................................................................................................................. 20
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Introduction
While attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel abroad are not infrequent,1 the severity
of the September 11, 2012, attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, has caused a
reexamination of measures in place to protect U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad.
Ambassador Christopher Stevens was the first sitting U.S. ambassador to have been killed since
1979. Moreover, a concern exists that the attack may reflect a growing danger to U.S. diplomatic
facilities—the result of an increasingly diffuse threat from extremists across the Middle East and
of Arab revolutions that have decreased the capacity, and perhaps the will, of local governments
to protect U.S. interests. Congressional and State Department actions will be critical to
responding to this evolving threat and to preventing similar tragedies in the future.
Congress has legislated extensive changes to the U.S. approach to securing facilities and
personnel in at least two previous instances of attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad. The
1983-1984 bombings of U.S. facilities in Beirut, Lebanon, led to the adoption of the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986,2 which, among other measures, established
the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Similarly, the 1998 bombings of U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania led to, among other measures, a significant construction
funding program under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999
(SECCA).3
After the Benghazi attack, Congress initiated oversight through investigations by several
committees and through a number of hearings featuring testimony from officials ranging from the
working level to the Secretary of State. Members have also put forward a number of legislative
proposals on issues ranging from the composition of Accountability Review Boards to procedures
for awarding contracts for local security guards. Two of these measures have been considered and
approved by committees.
The Department of State undertook several measures in response to the attack, including
immediate steps to bolster security at posts around the world; an investigation of the incident
through an Accountability Review Board; and longer-term measures implementing the board’s
recommendations, including requests for significantly greater funding than in recent years.
The following summarizes and tracks congressional and State Department efforts to make U.S.
embassies and personnel around the world more secure. It will be updated as necessary to reflect
further developments and actions on ongoing policy proposals.4
1 There were 521 attacks on U.S. diplomatic embassies, consulates, or personnel in 92 countries between 1970 and
2012, according to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The
incidents led to nearly 500 deaths. See Erin Miller, August 2013 Security Threat to Americans Abroad, The National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Background Report, August 2013, p. 3,
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/br/STARTBackgroundReport_Aug2013SecurityThreats.pdf.
2 22 U.S.C. §4801 et seq., P.L. 99-399.
3 H.R. 3427, which was enacted as Title VI of Appendix G of P.L. 106-113.
4 The responses of U.S. government agencies other than the Department of State to the Benghazi attack are not covered
in this report, unless noted.
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Department of State Actions in Response to the
Benghazi Attack
The protection of U.S. government employees and facilities under chief of mission authority
overseas from terrorist, criminal, or technical attack is the responsibility of the Secretary of State.5
The Benghazi attack prompted the Department to take several actions. In the immediate
aftermath, the Department ordered all posts to review their security posture and to take all
necessary steps to enhance it if necessary.6 Shortly thereafter, five Interagency Security
Assessment Teams (ISATs) were deployed to 19 posts in 13 countries to undertake urgent reviews
of high-threat posts.7
In order to ensure consistent focus on the most endangered locations, State also reorganized its
Diplomatic Security Bureau by establishing a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat
Posts to oversee security arrangements for a number of so-designated countries. While press
reports initially suggested the Department had designated 17 High Threat Posts, State officials
have suggested that this number is not static and that it would be reconsidered annually, at a
minimum. As of mid-July 2013, the number of High Threat Posts stood at 28.8
The Benghazi Accountability Review Board
In addition to the above steps, in the first week of October 2012, then-Secretary of State Clinton
convened an accountability review board (ARB) to investigate the Benghazi attack.9 The board
was chaired by former Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering and included five members,
four of whom were designated by the Secretary of State and one by the intelligence community.10
On December 18, the Benghazi Accountability Review Board published its findings in an
unclassified version of its report.11 The board concluded that, while responsibility for the attack
rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated it, systemic failures in Washington
led to key decisions that left the Special Mission in Benghazi with significant security shortfalls.
Key leadership failures in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) as well as in the Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) led to confusion over decision-making in relation to security and
5 22 U.S.C. §4802, P.L. 99-399.
6 Transcript, State Department Briefing to Update on Recent Events in Libya, September 12, 2012.
7 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Benghazi Attack, Part II: The Report of the Accountability
Review Board, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., December 20, 2012; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Benghazi: The Attack and the Lessons Learned, 112th Cong., December 20, 2012.
8 See Bill Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for High Threat Posts, Testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, July 16, 2013.
9 As required by Title III of the Omnibus Diplomatic and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §4831 et seq.
10 The other members of the board were: Admiral Michael Mullen (Ret), a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; Richard Shinnick, a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer who served as interim Director for the Department of
State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations in 2008; Catherine Bertini, a Professor of Public Administration and
International Affairs at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and former Executive Director of the
United Nations World Food Program; and Hugh Turner, a former deputy director of the CIA’s Directorate of
Operations.
11 Department of State, Accountability Review Board for Benghazi Attack of September 2012, December 19, 2012,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf.
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policy in Benghazi; these were likely factors in the insufficient priority given to the Benghazi
mission’s security-related requests, according to the board. Still, these leadership failures did not
amount to a clear breach of duty by any single U.S. government employee, the board found.
The board also determined that decisions by the Department’s senior leadership regarding the
nature and extension of Special Mission Benghazi’s unclear status left it outside normal
procedures for funding and executing security measures, including office facility standards and
accountability measures under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of
199912 and the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB).13
State Department Implementation of ARB Recommendations
On the release of the ARB’s report, the Department of State accepted the panel’s
recommendations and pledged to implement them fully. The Department formed a task force to
implement the board’s 29 recommendations, as they were translated into 64 specific action items
assigned to bureaus for implementation.
In reviewing failures of leadership and management, the Department removed four of its
employees from the positions they held at the time of the attack. The officials removed from their
positions include three officials from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and one from the Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs. The four State Department employees, who had been on administrative
leave, were returned to duty on August 20 and reassigned to other positions within the
Department.14 Prior to the officials’ reinstatement, a number of Members of Congress had sought
clarification on their administrative status, in order to assess whether the Department had held the
appropriate officials to account in a full and fair manner.15 In addition, while the ARB fixed
responsibility for these failures at the level of Assistant Secretary and below, some congressional
observers have suggested that more senior Department officials should have been held more fully
to account.
By January 2013, then-Secretary Clinton reported to Congress that, of the ARB’s
recommendations, “more than 80 percent are on track to be completed by the end of March, with
a number completed already.”16 Later, Secretary of State Kerry also stated that as Secretary, he is
“committed to implementing every single one of the recommendations in the report of the
Accountability Review Board and doing more.”17
The Department described its progress in implementing the ARB’s recommendations in a May
20, 2013 fact sheet, the text of which is included as Appendix A. The document stated that the
12 H.R. 3427, which was enacted as Title VI of Appendix G of P.L. 106-113.
13 More information on the board’s extensive findings and recommendations is available in CRS Report R42834,
Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues.
14 Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, August 20, 2013.
15 See Letter from Edward R. Royce, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and 14 other Members of the
Committee to The Honorable John F. Kerry, Secretary of State, May 29, 2013.
16 Department of State, Report to the Congress on Actions Taken by the Department of State In Response to the
Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Board on the Death of Four Official Americans in Benghazi,
Libya September 11, 2012, January 2013.
17 Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks to the Foreign Service Institute Overseas Security Seminar, Department of
State, May 20, 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/05/209671.htm.
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Department had addressed or was addressing all 24 unclassified recommendations. It also
indicated that 113 new diplomatic security personnel were expected to be hired by the
Department of State by the end of September. The Department reportedly also expected 90
additional Marine guards to deploy to high-risk embassies by the end of 2013.18
In accordance with the Benghazi ARB’s recommendations, the Department convened a panel of
external security experts in April 2013 to identify best practices from other agencies and
countries. The so-called Best Practices Panel, chaired by former Director of U.S. Secret Service
Mark Sullivan, reportedly provided its report to the Department in late August 2013. The panel
observed that many security-related decisions were in the hands of the Department of State’s
Under Secretary for Management, a position overseeing what it viewed as a too-large number of
support functions, creating what it deemed a “span of control” problem. Accordingly, the panel’s
chief recommendation was the elevation of the diplomatic security function through the creation
of an Under Secretary for Diplomatic Security, which would focus all security issues through a
single focal point at the senior executive level, according to press reports.19
Funding Requests
In response to the ARB report as well as its own internal post-Benghazi assessments, the
Department of State requested additional funding from Congress to improve its security measures
for both FY2013 and FY2014. As part of what it termed an Increased Security Proposal (ISP),
State in December 2012 submitted a revised FY2013 budget request to Congress outlining
resource shifts totaling approximately $1.419 billion, primarily a reallocation of unobligated
funds originally intended for programs in Iraq. The request sought $553 million for 35 new
detachments of Marine Security Guards (roughly 225 Marines) to medium- and high-threat posts
to serve as visible deterrents to hostile acts; $130 million to increase the size of the Diplomatic
Security workforce by 155 DS personnel, mostly focused on medium- and high-threat posts; and
$736 million to fund facility security upgrades and construction of new embassy compounds.20
The Administration’s FY2014 budget request seeks to sustain the initiatives launched under the
FY2013 Increased Security Proposal, including expansion of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
and further growth in the number of Marine Security Guard detachments deployed to diplomatic
facilities. The request seeks $2.2 billion for construction of new secure diplomatic facilities, a
combination of enduring funding, Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, and other
agency contributions. The request for Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance of $2.65
billion (including $250 million in OCO) represents a 60% increase from the FY2012 actual level.
Within this account, Worldwide Security Upgrades funding (for bricks and mortar security needs,
including construction of secure new embassy compounds) would grow by 108% to $1.61 billion,
while Ongoing Operations would increase by 18%. Worldwide Security Protection funds (for
security programs including a worldwide guard force), under Diplomatic and Consular Programs,
18 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Takes Steps to Add Security at Embassies,” The New York Times, May 20, 2013.
19 Department of State, Report of the Independent Panel on Best Practices, as released by Al Jazeera America,
September 4, 2013, p. 13, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/3/exclusive-
benghazireportdetailssecurityflawsatusdiplomaticposts.html. See also Eric Schmitt, “Diplomatic Security Must Be
Priority at State Dept., Panel Says,” The New York Times, September 4, 2013.
20 Congress provided the Department of State with the authority to transfer more than $1 billion from Iraq Operations
OCO funds to accounts addressing global security needs within the context of the FY2013 Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6, Sec. 1708).
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would rise by 37%, to $2.18 billion. President Obama issued a statement on May 16, 2013,
calling on Congress to “fully fund Embassy security” and support implementation of the ARB
recommendations.21
Among its funding-related prescriptions, the ARB recommended that “the State Department must
work with Congress to restore the Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) Program at its full
capacity, adjusted for inflation to approximately $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2015, including an up
to ten-year program addressing that need, prioritized for construction of new facilities in high
risk, high threat areas.”22 The Capital Security Cost Sharing Program requires all U.S. agencies
with presence at diplomatic facilities abroad (including the State Department) to pay a share
toward the cost of those facilities. The size of each agency’s required contribution is directly
linked with the number of positions it authorizes overseas.23 In its FY2014 budget request, the
Department accordingly seeks $1.4 billion for the restoration of the CSCS. Figure 1 depicts this
request in the context of recent year funding levels. Additional information about recent year
funding requests and levels is available in CRS Report R42834, Securing U.S. Diplomatic
Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues.
Figure 1. Capital Security Cost Sharing Program Funding, FY2010-FY2014
($ in current millions; Department of State contributions only)
Source: Department of State Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2012-FY2014.
21 The White House, “President Obama Calls on Congress to Fully Fund Embassy Security,” press release, May 16,
2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/16/president-obama-calls-congress-fully-fund-embassy-
security.
22 Department of State, Report of the Accountability Review Board on the Benghazi Attack, December 19, 2012, p. 9.
23 The Capital Security Cost Sharing program was authorized by the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA), H.R. 3427, enacted as Title VI of Appendix G of P.L. 106-113, and amended
by Sec. 629 of P.L. 108-447.
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Legislative Response to the Benghazi Attack
Congressional activity in the 112th and 113th Congresses on the issue of the protection of U.S.
personnel and facilities abroad has included a number of legislative actions and proposals, as well
as a variety of hearings and investigations into the Benghazi attack by a number of different
committees.
Legislative Investigations and Oversight
Congress has produced two publicly released reports pertaining to the Benghazi attack. The first
was presented in the 112th Congress by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs’ Chairman Joseph Lieberman and Ranking Member Susan Collins on
December 30, 2012.24 Their report found that the Department of State did not take sufficiently
into account clear evidence of a worsening security situation in Benghazi and requests for
additional support from US personnel posted there. This situation was compounded by the
evident inability of the Libyan government to perform its duty to protect U.S. diplomatic facilities
and personnel. In this context, the Department should have increased protective measures or
withdrawn the US presence there, even without specific intelligence about an imminent attack,
the report concludes. The Senate report’s recommendations included additional interagency joint
assessments of the security requirements of high-risk U.S. diplomatic facilities; a funding process
delivering sufficient, steady, and timely funding to secure diplomatic facilities and personnel
worldwide; additional Department of Defense (DOD) assets and personnel devoted to the African
continent; and clear and consistent communication by administration officials about terrorist
attacks.
A second report was put forward on April 23, 2013, when the chairmen of five House committees
active in the 113th Congress in oversight of the Benghazi attack presented to the House
Republican Conference an “Interim Progress Report” on their inquiries.25 Among the report’s
preliminary findings were that the senior leadership of the Department of State approved security
reductions at the Benghazi diplomatic facilities prior to the 9/11/12 attack, and that the public
presentation of the attack by the Administration was deliberately inaccurate in order to protect
State Department interests. The report relates the chairmen’s view that continued examination and
oversight by their respective committees of the Benghazi attack, and the Administration’s
response to it, remain necessary.
A number of different committees have held hearings relating to the Benghazi attack; a list of
selected hearings focused on the Benghazi attack is available in Appendix B. However, some
Members have suggested that effective oversight would require the creation of a select committee
to investigate and report on the Benghazi attack. H.Res. 36, introduced by Representative Frank
24 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Flashing Red: A Special Report
on the Terrorist Attacks at Benghazi, By Joseph I. Lieberman, chairman, and Susan M. Collins, ranking Member, 112th
Cong., 2nd sess., December 30, 2012.
25 The report, by Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, Committee on Armed Services; Chairman Ed Royce,
Committee on Foreign Affairs; Chairman Bob Goodlatte, Committee on the Judiciary; Chairman Darrell Issa,
Committee on Oversight & Government Reform; Chairman Mike Rogers, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, is available on-line at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Libya-Progress-Report-
Final-1.pdf.
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Wolf on January 18, 2013, would establish such a committee and set out its purpose, composition,
and procedures. The proposal has drawn some support from House and Senate Members.26 Those
who support the proposal tout the additional, across-government subpoena powers afforded the
chairman of a select committee, and suggest that the current approach suffers from being
fractured across committee jurisdictions.27 The House Speaker has publicly opposed the
measure.28
Diplomatic Security Legislation in the 113th Congress
In the 113th Congress to date, two bills relating directly to embassy security matters have been
considered and approved by committees in the House and Senate (in addition to bills to
appropriate FY2014 funds for the Department of State, including diplomatic security accounts,
that have also received House and Senate committee action):
1. H.R. 2848, the Department of State Operations and Embassy Security
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2014, introduced by House Foreign Affairs
Committee Chairman Royce on July 30, 2013, considered and approved by voice
vote by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 1.29
2. S. 1386, the Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty
Embassy Security, Threat Mitigation, and Personnel Protection Act of 2013,
introduced by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Menendez on July
30, 2013; adopted by voice vote and ordered reported favorably to the full Senate
on August 1.
Prior to the committees’ consideration of these measures, a number of other legislative proposals
related to the Benghazi attack and its implications for the protection of U.S. personnel and
facilities abroad had been introduced and are listed in Appendix C. The two bills that have been
considered by committees, H.R. 2848 and S. 1386, both would impact related policy matters.
However, their provisions differ significantly, and the following sections compare their main
elements.
Table 1. H.R. 2848 and S. 1386 Legislative Status (as of August 2013)
Full Committee
Conference Report
Markup
H.R.
Approval
H.R.
2848
House
S. 1386
Senate
Conf.
Public
2848
S. 1386
Report
Passage
Report
Passage
Report
House
Senate
Law
08/01/2013 08/01/2013
Source: CRS.
26 For example, see “Senators Renew Call For Joint Select Committee To Investigate Benghazi,” which names Senators
Graham, McCain, and Ayotte as supporters of the creation of a joint select committee, press release, April 30, 2013.
27 Guy Taylor, “Republicans weigh risks, benefits of select committee on Benghazi,” The Washington Times, May 19,
2013.
28 When asked about the possibility of a special committee on Benghazi, House Speaker Boehner told Fox News on
May 22, 2013 that “I don't think at this point in time that it’s necessary. Now, we may get to a point where it is. But at
this point, I think our committees are doing a very good job, and I'm going to be supportive of them.”
29 H.R. 2848 also includes a number of foreign affairs authorization measures not relating directly to embassy security
issues; those measures are not covered in this report.
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Funding
H.R. 2848 authorizes $2.65 billion for FY2014 for the Department of State’s Embassy Security,
Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account, and $2.18 billion for Worldwide Security
Protection. It also permits the transfer of additional funds to the ESCM account after consultation
with appropriate committees.
S. 1386 authorizes for FY2014:
• $1.383 billion for the Capital Security Cost Sharing Program, of which $300
million would go to immediate threat mitigation at high-threat, high-risk posts;
• $5 million for language training for diplomatic security personnel at high-threat,
high-risk posts;
• $100 million for improved training facilities for high-threat, high-risk post
personnel, as well as $350 million for the acquisition, construction, and operation
of a new Foreign Affairs Security Training Center, and $54.54 million of
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) funds also to be
applied to improved training facilities.
Accountability Review Board Process
While the administration has asserted that the Benghazi Accountability Review Board was
independent and thorough, some congressional observers have suggested that the ARB process is
fundamentally flawed. Some observers have questioned whether an investigative body made up
principally of current and former officials of the institution under investigation can truly be
independent. Others argue that oversight of the ARB process is made more difficult by the
absence of a requirement that ARB reports be provided directly to Congress. Finally, public
scrutiny of the process is made more difficult by the classification of nearly all previous ARB
reports, some suggest.
A number of measures have been introduced in the House seeking to reform the process by which
accountability review boards are conducted. H.R. 1768, the Accountability Review Board Reform
Act of 2013, would amend the 1986 Diplomatic Security Act to increase the independence of
ARBs from the State Department through, among other measures, changing the composition of
the membership of ARBs (under current statute, four members named by the Secretary of State
and one named by the Director of National Intelligence) to have fewer State-appointed members,
and specifying conflict of interest guidelines. Although H.R. 2848 does not include these
measures, Chairman Royce has reportedly stated his intent to take up more comprehensive review
of the ARB process in the fall of 2013.30
S. 1386 describes the current ARB mechanism as an effective tool. Still, it proposes reforms to
the membership of ARB panels, requiring that the Department of State’s Inspector General serve
as one of State’s four appointees to ARBs. It would also require that the staff supporting any
given ARB should not be drawn from bureaus or units impacted by the incident under review.
Finally, it calls for ARB reports to be provided directly to Congress, not later than 2 days after it
30 Carolyn Phenicie, “Embassy Security Provisions Advance With Panel’s State Department Bill,” Congressional
Quarterly Roll Call, August 1, 2013.
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is provided to the Secretary of State (under current statute, the report itself is not required to be
shared with Congress).
Personnel Accountability
The Benghazi Accountability Review Board found that significant leadership failures contributed
to the gravity of the event; however, the board assessed that such failures did not amount to a
clear breach of duty by any single U.S. government employee. It therefore did not recommend
disciplinary action against any individual. The Benghazi ARB recommended clarifying the
authority of future boards to empower them to recommend disciplinary action in cases of
unsatisfactory leadership by senior officials.
Both H.R. 2848 and S. 1386 take up this recommendation to broaden the standard by which
future boards can recommend discipline. H.R. 2848 takes up a measure originally introduced as
H.R. 925, the Securing Accountability in Foreign Embassies (SAFE Embassies) Act, which
would require an ARB to recommend investigatory or disciplinary action if it found that an
individual’s misconduct or unsatisfactory performance of duty significantly contributed to serious
injury, loss of life, significant property destruction, or serious security breach at or related to a
U.S. government mission abroad.
The related measure in S. 1386, originally proposed as Section 203 of S. 980, appears somewhat
narrower in scope than the House measure. It would allow ARBs to recommend disciplinary
action on the basis of unsatisfactory leadership by a senior official with respect to a security
incident involving loss of life, serious injury, or significant destruction of property at or related to
a U.S. government mission abroad.
Contracting
The Department of State has requested authority to allow it to use best-value contracting for local
guard contracts, rather than “lowest price technically acceptable” criteria.31 Current statute
requires the Department to award contracts using a lowest price technically acceptable selection
process, with exceptions for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.32 A “best value” approach would
allow other factors, such as prior performance, to be included in the review of a bid.
Legislative measures have been introduced in both the House and Senate on this subject. H.R.
2848 took up a measure outlined in H.R. 731, the Protecting Americans Abroad Act, which would
authorize the State Department to use a best value contracting award method for local guard
forces when deemed necessary in high-risk areas. S. 1386 took up a similar provision (from S.
980) which would allow the Secretary of State to award contracts on the basis of best value;
however, it would not be geographically limited. Both bills would also require the Department to
report each instance of “best value” contracting to relevant committees.
31 For background on how best value and best price approaches to local security guard contracts impact the Department
of State, see United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General,
Review of Best-Value Contracting for the Department of State Local Guard Program and the Utility of Expanding the
Policy Beyond High-Threat Posts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, AUD/CG-12-27, February 29, 2012,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/185288.pdf.
32 22 U.S.C. §4864.
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High Threat Posts: Assessment and Reporting
H.R. 2848 would require the Secretary of State to submit a list of high-risk, high-threat posts
within 30 days of the enactment of this section, in classified form. It also would require the
Secretary to regularly review existing and potential posts to determine whether they should be
included in this category. Under the measure, when opening or reopening such a post, the
Secretary must convene a working group that would evaluate the rationale for the post; ensure
proper funding, physical security measures, and personnel are provided to the post; and establish
‘tripwires’ that might trigger a change to the post’s status (such as an evacuation of non-essential
personnel, or a closure). The Secretary would also be required to notify Congress not less than 30
days before opening or reopening such a post.
S. 1386, on the other hand, would require the Secretary to submit a report within 90 days
evaluating high-threat, high-risk facilities, including detailed information on the threats to and
staffing at the post, as well as host nation capabilities and willingness to defend it. It also requires
a summary of all security requests regarding each high threat, high risk post during the previous
calendar year. The State Department Inspector General’s Office would also be charged with
reviewing the designation of such posts, as well as contingency planning, risk mitigation and
early warning systems pertaining to such posts, and reporting its assessments to Congress.
Security Training
H.R. 2848 requires personnel assigned to high-risk, high-threat posts to receive security training
to help them cope with potential attacks. In addition, it requires senior officials who might be in a
management role at high-risk, high-threat posts to receive training on threat evaluation and the
effective identification and application of resources to address those threats. Finally, it calls for
diplomatic security personnel assigned to high risk, high threat posts to receive adequate language
training to allow them to better manage discussions with locals regarding security matters.
S. 1386 addresses similar ground regarding Department of State personnel training; however, it
does so by authorizing $100 million for improved training facilities for high-risk, high-threat post
personnel, as well as $350 million for the acquisition, construction, and operation of a Foreign
Affairs Security Training Center. $54.54 million of American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of
2009 (P.L. 111-5) funds are also to be applied to improved training facilities. The measure would
also authorize $5 million for language training for diplomatic security personnel at high-risk,
high-threat posts.
Marine Security Guard Program
The Marine Security Guard Program is a collaborative effort between the Departments of Defense
and State. In the wake of the Benghazi attack, the Secretary of Defense was directed to grow the
Marine Security Guard program in order to increase the number of detachments at United States
embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic facilities by up to 1,000 Marines during Fiscal Years
2014 through 2017, and reassess the program’s focus on the protection of classified information.33
33 H.R. 4310 (P.L. 112-239), “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013,” Title IV, Subtitle A, Section
404, “Additional Marine Corps Personnel for the Marine Corps Security Guard Program.”
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The President must also separate the program’s budget request from that of the Marine Corps as a
whole; and it requires reexamination of the Marine units’ rules of engagement.
The Department of State also intends to expand its participation in the Marine Security Guard
program. Accordingly, S. 1386 requires the Secretary of State (in consultation with the Secretary
of Defense) to elaborate and implement a plan to incorporate the additional Marine Security
Guard teams required by the FY2013 NDAA. Under the measure, the Secretary would also bear
responsibility (in consultation with the Secretary of Defense) for an annual review of the
program’s size and composition, as well as an assessment of the adequacy of the distribution of
marine teams to posts, and an evaluation of the objectives of the program and its rules of
engagement. H.R. 2848 calls for a similar annual review of the program.
Additional Measures
The House and Senate measures each have additional provisions. H.R. 2848 requires the
Departments of State and Defense to jointly develop contingency plans for attacks at high-risk,
high-threat posts; requires the Secretary of State to conduct a Strategic Review of the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security; authorizes the Secretary to make physical security enhancements at schools
where children of government-employed U.S. citizens attend; and directs the Secretary to station
key personnel at high-risk, high-threat posts for sustained periods of time.
S. 1386 would also specify a number of qualifications for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for High Threat, High Risk Posts; require regular briefings on State’s Security Environment
Threat List; require reporting on risks at posts in high counterintelligence threat nations; and
require a report by the Comptroller General on the progress made by the Department of State in
implementing the Benghazi ARB’s recommendations.
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Appendix A. DOS Fact Sheet on Benghazi
ARB Implementation
Title: Fact Sheet: Benghazi Accountability Review Board Implementation
Source: U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesperson, May 20, 2013
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209672.htm
______________________________________________________________________________
Following the September 11, 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi, Libya, the
independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) issued 29 recommendations (24 of
which were unclassified) to the Department of State. The Department accepted each of the ARB’s
recommendations and is committed to implementing them. This will require fundamentally
reforming the organization in critical ways. While risk can never be completely eliminated from
our diplomatic duties, we must always work to minimize it. A brief summary of the Department’s
actions on the 24 unclassified recommendations is as follows:
Unclassified Recommendations of the ARB (Text abridged) and Department Actions
OVERARCHING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
1. The Department must strengthen security for personnel and platforms beyond traditional
reliance on host government security support in high risk, high threat posts.
The Department established a High Threat Board to review our presence at High Threat,
High Risk posts; the Board will review these posts every 6 months.
We created a Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat Posts in the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security (DS), who is responsible for ensuring that such posts receive the focused attention
they need.
2. The Board recommends that the Department re-examine DS organization and management,
with a particular emphasis on span of control for security policy planning for all overseas U.S.
diplomatic facilities.
The Department established a six-person panel to thoroughly review DS’s organization and
management structure; the panel has developed draft findings.
3. Regional bureaus should have augmented support within the bureau on security matters, to
include a senior DS officer to report to the regional Assistant Secretary.
DS staff attend regular Regional Bureau meetings, and Regional Bureau staff attend DS daily
briefings to better communicate on security issues.
The Department has adjusted the work requirements (position descriptions) for senior level
staff (Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries) to reflect everyone’s
responsibility for overseas security.
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4. The Department should establish a panel of outside independent experts (military, security,
humanitarian) with experience in high risk, high threat areas to identify best practices (from other
agencies and other countries), and evaluate U.S. security platforms in high risk, high threat posts.
The Department established a six-person panel to identify best practices used by other
agencies and countries; this panel’s work is expected to be complete by late summer.
5. The Department should develop minimum security standards for occupancy of temporary
facilities in high risk, high threat environments, and seek greater flexibility to make funds rapidly
available for security upgrades at such facilities.
The Department has re-affirmed that Overseas Security Policy Board Standards apply to
temporary facilities.
We identified flexible funding authorities to make improvements to our overseas facilities.
6. Before opening or re-opening critical threat or high risk, high threat posts, the Department
should establish a multi-bureau support cell, residing in the regional bureau.
The Department developed standard operating procedures for “Support Cells” for
opened/reopened posts. The process is being incorporated into the Foreign Affairs Handbook.
7. All State Department and other government agencies’ facilities should be collocated when they
are in the same metropolitan area, unless a waiver has been approved.
We verified all data on our overseas facilities; we are exploring which non-collocated
facilities can be eliminated and their personnel relocated.
8. The Secretary should require an action plan from DS, OBO, and other relevant offices on the
use of fire as a weapon against diplomatic facilities, including immediate steps to deal with urgent
issues.
The Department issued guidance to all posts on “weapons of opportunity.”
Fire testing is ongoing at U.S. military facilities.
9. The Department should revise its guidance to posts and require key offices to perform in-depth
status checks of post tripwires.
The Department reviewed and revised requirements for posts on how to respond to changing
security benchmarks (i.e., “tripwires”).
The Department established a Washington-based “Tripwires Committee” to review tripwires
upon breach, to help ensure that posts and regional bureaus in Washington respond more
quickly should security deteriorate at post.
10. The State Department must work with Congress to restore the Capital Security Cost Sharing
Program [for embassy construction] at its full capacity, adjusted for inflation to approximately
$2.2 billion in fiscal year 2015.
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The FY14 President’s Budget included a request for $2.2 billion in the Embassy Security,
Construction, and Maintenance account.
11. The Board supports the State Department’s initiative to request additional Marines and expand
the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program – as well as corresponding requirements for staffing
and funding.
Along with the Congress and Department of Defense, we are working to increase the number
of Marine Security Guards at U.S. diplomatic facilities, and have requested (and received)
more resources to build facilities at additional posts to host Marine Security Guards in the
future.
STAFFING HIGH RISK, HIGH THREAT POSTS
12. The Board strongly endorses the Department’s request for increased DS personnel for high-
and critical-threat posts and for additional Mobile Security Deployment teams, as well as an
increase in DS domestic staffing in support of such action.
With Congressional support, the Department is creating 151 new Diplomatic Security
positions—113 are expected to be hired this fiscal year. The remainder will be hired in FY14.
13. The Department should assign key policy, program, and security personnel at high risk, high
threat posts for a minimum of one year. For less critical personnel, the temporary duty length
(TDY) length should be no less than 120 days.
All high threat posts now have a minimum of a one-year tour of duty. We are planning to
ensure overlap between incumbent and incoming positions to facilitate continuity of
operations at high threat posts.
Temporary duty assignments are set at a minimum of 120 days.
14. The Department needs to review the staffing footprints at high risk, high threat posts, with
particular attention to ensuring adequate Locally Employed Staff (LES) and management support.
High risk, high threat posts must be funded and the human resources process prioritized to hire
LES interpreters and translators.
The Department surveyed every post to review the numbers of interpreters and translators on
staff, and found that there was adequate staffing.
15. With increased and more complex diplomatic activities in the Middle East, the Department
should enhance its ongoing efforts to significantly upgrade its language capacity, especially
Arabic, among American employees, including DS, and receive greater resources to do so.
The Department is ramping up the language capacity of its American employees, including
Diplomatic Security agents, especially in Arabic. Increasing language capacity takes time –
certain languages take up to 2 years to learn. In the short term, the Department is committed
to better equipping the growing cadre of security experts to engage local populations and
cooperate with host nation security forces.
TRAINING AND AWARENESS
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16. A panel of Senior Special Agents and Supervisory Special Agents should revisit DS high-
threat training with respect to active internal defense and fire survival as well as Chief of Mission
protective detail training.
The Department established a panel of Supervisory Special Agents to participate in a
Program Review of the High Threat Tactical Course; as a result, DS revised high-threat
training and COM protective detail training and raised standards for passing the High Threat
Tactical Course. DS and the Foreign Service Institute are currently revising the curriculum.
DS is pursuing a high-threat training strategy that will incorporate elements of this training
across the full spectrum of courses required for DS special agents throughout their careers.
17. The Diplomatic Security Training Center and Foreign Service Institute should collaborate in
designing joint courses that integrate high threat training and risk management decision processes
for senior and mid-level DS agents and Foreign Service Officers and better prepare them for
leadership positions in high risk, high threat posts.
The Department has enhanced security training efforts, including by requiring personnel
headed to high threat posts to receive additional, specialized security training.
SECURITY AND FIRE SAFETY EQUIPMENT
18. The Department should ensure provision of adequate fire safety and security equipment for
safe havens and safe areas in non-Inman/SECCA facilities, as well as high threat Inman facilities.
The Department has surveyed fire and life safety equipment requirements abroad and is now
upgrading this equipment, to include enhanced fire safety equipment and personal protective
equipment, at all high-threat, high-risk U.S. diplomatic posts abroad.
19. There have been technological advancements in non-lethal deterrents, and the State
Department should ensure it rapidly and routinely identifies and procures additional options for
non-lethal deterrents in high risk, high threat posts and trains personnel on their use.
The Department has addressed this recommendation.
20. DS should upgrade surveillance cameras at high risk, high threat posts for greater resolution,
nighttime visibility, and monitoring capability beyond post.
Over the next year the Department will have upgraded high-threat, high-risk facilities with
more modern surveillance cameras that feature greater resolution and monitoring capability
at all times of day.
INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS
21. Careful attention should be given to factors showing a deteriorating threat situation in general
as a basis for improving security posture. Key trends must be quickly identified and used to
sharpen risk calculations.
The Department has addressed this recommendation.
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22. The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis should report directly to the DS Assistant
Secretary and directly supply threat analysis to all DS components, regional Assistant Secretaries,
and Chiefs of Mission in order to get key security-related threat information into the right hands
more rapidly.
The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, now reports directly to the Assistant
Secretary for Diplomatic Security for threat reporting and supplies threat analysis to regional
Assistant Secretaries and Chiefs of Mission.
PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY
23. The Board is of the view that findings of unsatisfactory leadership performance by senior
officials in relation to the security incident under review should be a potential basis for discipline
recommendations by future ARBs, and would recommend a revision of Department regulations
or amendment to the relevant statute to this end.
The Department is working with Congress to increase accountability. In January, the
Department proposed legislation to grant future ARBs the authority to recommend
disciplinary action on the basis of unsatisfactory leadership, and thus increase accountability
for security incidents.
24. The Board was humbled by the courage and integrity shown by those on the ground in
Benghazi and Tripoli, in particular the DS agents and Annex team who defended their
colleagues… We trust that the Department and relevant agencies will take the opportunity to
recognize their exceptional valor and performance, which epitomized the highest ideals of
government service.
The President and the Secretary of State have publicly mentioned the bravery and heroic
efforts of our personnel on numerous occasions.
The Department bestowed the Holbrooke award on Ambassador Chris Stevens; the Thomas
Jefferson award to the personnel who gave their lives in September; the Secretary’s award to
one officer who was seriously injured; and the Secretary’s Heroism Award to 12 personnel
who defended the Benghazi facilities.
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Appendix B. Selected Congressional Hearings on
Benghazi Attack
Hearing Title
Committee
Date
Benghazi: Progress on State
House Foreign Affairs Committee
July 18, 2013 (postponed)
Department Accountability?
S. 980, “Chris Stevens, Sean Smith,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
July 16, 2013
Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty
Embassy Security and Personnel
Protection Act of 2013” (Hearing and
markup)
Benghazi: Exposing Failure and
House Oversight and Government
May 8, 2013
Recognizing Courage
Reform Committee
Attack on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi,
Senate Armed Services Committee
February 7, 2013
Libya
Terrorist Attack in Benghazi: The
House Foreign Affairs Committee
January 23, 2013
Secretary of State’s View
Benghazi: The Attacks and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
January 23, 2013
Lessons Learned
Benghazi and Beyond: What Went
House Foreign Affairs Committee
December 20, 2012
Wrong on September 11, 2012 and
How to Prevent it from Happening
at other Frontline Posts (Part II)
Benghazi: The Attack and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
December 20, 2012
Lessons Learned
Closed hearing on the
Senate Select Intelligence Committee November 16, 2012
circumstances, including the
intelligence and security situation,
surrounding the recent terrorist
attack in Benghazi, Libya
Benghazi and Beyond: What Went
House Foreign Affairs Committee
November 15, 2012
Wrong on September 11, 2012 and
How to Prevent it from Happening
at other Frontline Posts (Part I)
Closed oversight hearing on the
Senate Select Intelligence Committee November 15, 2012
circumstances, including the
intelligence and security situation,
surrounding the recent terrorist
attack in Benghazi, Libya, and the
intelligence and security situation in
other Arab Spring countries
The Security Failures of Benghazi
House Oversight and Government
October 10, 2012
Reform Committee
Source: CRS. See respective committee websites for witness lists and testimony.
Note: Includes only hearings in which the Benghazi attack was the main subject.
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Appendix C. Selected Diplomatic Security-Related
Legislation, 112th and 113th Congresses (in
Chronological Order)
Measure (and date introduced)
Title
Summary
H.Res. 36
Establishing a select committee to
Establishes a select committee to
investigate and report on the attack
investigate and report on the attack
(introduced 1/18/2013)
on the United States consulate in
on the United States consulate in
Benghazi, Libya
Benghazi, Libya
S. 227
Embassy Security Funds Transfer Act Authorizes funds appropriated under
of 2013
the Department of State, Foreign
(introduced 2/4/2013)
Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 2012 under
the headings “Diplomatic and
Consular Programs" and "Embassy
Security, Construction, and
Maintenance" to be transferred
between such headings
H.R. 731
Protecting Americans Abroad Act
Authorizes the State Department to
use to the “Best-Value Contracting”
(introduced 2/14/2013)
award method for local guard forces
in high-risk areas when deemed
necessary
H.R. 925
Securing Accountability in Foreign
Amends the Diplomatic Security Act
Embassies (SAFE Embassies) Act
to require a determination by the
(introduced 2/28/2013)
Accountability Review Board that an
individual’s misconduct or
unsatisfactory performance of duty
significantly contributed to serious
injury, loss of life, significant property
destruction, or serious security
breach in order for the Board to
recommend that an investigatory or
disciplinary action be initiated by the
appropriate federal agency or
instrumentality
P.L. 113-6, Sec. 1708
FY2013 Consolidated and Further
Congress provided the Department
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 of State with the authority to
(introduced 3/4/2013)
transfer more than $1 billion from
Iraq Operations OCO funds to
accounts addressing global security
needs, as requested in State’s
Increased Security Proposal.
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Measure (and date introduced)
Title
Summary
H.R. 1186
To posthumously award the
Directs the Speaker of the House of
Congressional Gold Medal to each of Representatives and the President
(introduced 3/14/2013)
Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods in
pro tempore of the Senate to
recognition of their contributions to
arrange for the posthumous award,
the Nation.
on behalf of Congress, of a gold
medal in commemoration of the
contributions of Glen Doherty and
Tyrone Woods, two former Navy
SEAL members who sacrificed their
lives on September 11, 2012, while
serving as part of a U.S. diplomatic
security detachment in Libya
H.R. 1768
Accountability Review Board Reform Amends the Diplomatic Security Act
Act of 2013
to improve the effectiveness of ARBs
(introduced 4/26/2013)
by increasing their independence
from the State Department through,
among other measures, changing the
composition of the membership of
ARBs to have fewer State-appointed
members, and specifying conflict of
interest guidelines
H.R. 1781
Mustafa Akarsu Local Guard Force
Seeks to assist the family members
Support Act
of Foreign Service Nationals (FSN)
(introduced 4/26/2013)
killed in the line of duty by making
them eligible to obtain special visas
to immigrate to the United States
H.R. 2723
Embassy Security and Enhancement
Enhances security for facilities and
Act of 2013
personnel at United States
(introduced 7/18/2013)
diplomatic and consular posts abroad
through improved training,
procedures, and resources
S. 1372 (see also S.Rept. 113-81)
Department of State, Foreign
Recommends appropriation levels
Operations, and Related Programs
for diplomatic security-related
(introduced 7/25/2013)
Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2014
spending
H.R. 2855 (see also H.Rept. 113-185) Making appropriations for the
Recommends appropriation levels
Department of State, foreign
for diplomatic security-related
(introduced 7/30/2013)
operations, and related programs for spending
the fiscal year ending September 30,
2014, and for other purposes
Source: CRS.
Notes: Does not include legislative proposals pertaining to other agencies, such as the FY2014 National Defense
Authorization Act and its provisions relating to the Marine Security Guard program.
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Author Contact Information
Alex Tiersky
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
atiersky@crs.loc.gov, 7-7367
Key Policy Staff
Area of Expertise
Name
Phone
E-mail
Diplomatic Security Funding
Susan Epstein
7-7367
sepstein@crs.loc.gov
Libya Christopher
Blanchard
7-0428
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov
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