European Union Enlargement: A Status
Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations
Vincent L. Morelli
Section Research Manager
August 5, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RS22517
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations
Summary
October 2013 will mark the eighth anniversary of the European Union’s decision to launch formal
negotiations with Turkey toward full membership in the Union. Beginning in 2012 and
continuing through most of 2013, formal accession talks between Turkey and the EU had reached
a political and technical stalemate. It appears that little or no progress was made on any open
chapters of the EU’s rules and regulations known as the acquis communautaire, and no additional
chapters were opened.
In May 2012, noting the accession stalemate, the EU Commission launched what was termed the
“positive agenda” with Turkey and described as intended to bring fresh dynamics into EU-Turkey
relations. Others referred to it as an “institutional trick” intended to circumvent Ankara’s refusal
to deal with certain aspects of the EU involving the Cypriot presidency which was set to begin on
July 1, 2012. It is unclear what the “positive agenda” accomplished or what its current status is.
In October 2012, the European Commission issued its annual assessment of the progress of the
candidate countries, including Turkey. This was followed in December 2012 by the European
Council’s “conclusions” on enlargement, and in April 2013 with the European Parliament’s
Progress Report on Turkey. All three reports, while restating Turkey’s importance to the EU and
offering a few positive conclusions, expressed overall disappointment with Turkey’s progress on
a number of issues including judicial reform, media freedom, freedom of expression, Turkey’s
continued refusal to extend diplomatic recognition to EU member Cyprus, and Turkey’s position
on the Cyprus EU presidency. All three institutions urged Turkey to achieve more reforms.
In February 2013, France signaled that it was prepared to support opening at least one new
chapter of the acquis (Chapter 22, Regional Policy) as a way to rejuvenate the accession talks.
This step was supported by many EU member states, although some retained their doubts.
Eventually, agreement was reached to open the new chapter and negotiations were set to begin in
June. In early June public protests in Turkey over the future of a park and the government’s tough
reaction precipitated a harsh response from Brussels and a resolution from the European
Parliament expressing its “deep concern at the disproportionate and excessive use of force by the
Turkish police.” Turkish officials responded with tough rhetoric toward the EU. After two weeks
of rather nasty verbal sparring, and Ankara’s continued crackdown on the protestors, several EU
member states threatened to press for the postponement of the upcoming accession talks. Since
neither side really wanted to end the accession process despite mutual ill-feelings, the EU agreed
to open the new chapter but to postpone the resumption of the accession negotiations until
October 2013.
For many Turks, EU membership seems to have lost its appeal as Turkey’s economy continues to
thrive and as Ankara continues to try to reposition and strengthen itself in its own neighborhood
between secular Europe and the Islamist emergence in the Middle East. Many Turks seem to feel
“being European” or gaining membership in the Union is no longer needed in order to secure
Turkey’s status or to have an otherwise normal partnership with Europe. European support for
Turkey, never really that strong among the average citizenry, now seems even more ambivalent.
This report provides a brief overview of the EU’s accession process and Turkey’s path to EU
membership. The U.S. Congress has had a long-standing interest in Turkey as a NATO ally and
partner in regional foreign policy and energy security issues. Although some Members of
Congress have expressed continued support for Turkey’s membership in the EU, congressional
interest and enthusiasm seems to have diminished recently.
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European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations
Contents
The EU Accession Process .............................................................................................................. 1
Turkey’s Path to European Union Accession ................................................................................... 2
Current Status of Turkey’s Accession ............................................................................................ 10
New Agenda—Relabeled Approach ........................................................................................ 10
Assessment .................................................................................................................................... 13
U.S. Perspective ............................................................................................................................. 16
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 18
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European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations
The EU Accession Process1
The European Union (EU) views enlargement as an historic opportunity to promote stability and
prosperity throughout Europe. The criteria for EU membership require candidates to adopt
political values and norms shared by the Union by achieving “stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities; a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive
pressure and market forces within the Union.”2
Under Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union, any European country may apply for
membership if it meets a set of criteria established by the Treaty. In addition, the EU must be able
to absorb new members, so the EU can decide when it is ready to accept a new member.
Applying for EU membership is the start of a long and rigorous process. The EU operates
comprehensive approval procedures that ensure new members are admitted only when they have
met all requirements, and only with the active consent of the EU institutions and the governments
of the EU member states and of the applicant country. Basically, a country that wishes to join the
EU submits an application for membership to the European Council, which then asks the EU
Commission to assess the applicant’s ability to meet the conditions of membership.
Accession talks begin with a screening process to determine to what extent an applicant meets the
EU’s approximately 80,000 pages of rules and regulations known as the acquis communautaire.
The acquis is divided into 35 chapters that range from free movement of goods to agriculture to
competition. Detailed negotiations at the ministerial level take place to establish the terms under
which applicants will meet and implement the rules in each chapter. The European Commission
proposes common negotiating positions for the EU on each chapter, which must be approved
unanimously by the Council of Ministers. In all areas of the acquis, the candidate country must
bring its institutions, management capacity, and administrative and judicial systems up to EU
standards, both at national and regional levels. During negotiations, applicants may request
transition periods for complying with certain EU rules. All candidates receive financial assistance
from the EU, mainly to aid in the accession process. Chapters of the acquis can only be opened
and closed with the approval of all member states, and chapters provisionally closed may be
reopened. Periodically, the Commission issues “progress” reports to the Council (usually in
October or November of each year) as well as to the European Parliament assessing the progress
achieved by a candidate country. Once the Commission concludes negotiations on all 35 chapters
with an applicant, a procedure that can take years, the agreements reached are incorporated into a
draft accession treaty, which is submitted to the Council for approval and to the European
Parliament for assent. After approval by the Council and Parliament, the accession treaty must be
ratified by each EU member state and the candidate country. This process of ratification of the
final accession treaty can take up to two years or longer.3
The largest expansion of the EU was accomplished in 2004 when the EU accepted 10 new
member states. In January 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined, bringing the Union to its current
1 For more detailed information on EU accession see, “The Process of Joining the EU” on the European Commission’s
website at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement.
2 Conclusions of the European Council, Copenhagen, Denmark, June 1993.
3 CRS Report RS21344, European Union Enlargement, by Kristin Archick.
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European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations
27 member states. Since then, the EU has continued supporting the enlargement process.
Currently, there are five candidate countries (Croatia, which after eight years of negotiation,
joined the EU on July 1, 2013); Montenegro, which was given candidate status in December 2010
and formally opened accession negotiations with the EU on June 19, 2012; Serbia which was
granted candidate status in March 2012 and could begin actual negotiations by January 2014;
Macedonia, which has a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, but whose
negotiations have been blocked by Greece and Bulgaria, and Turkey. Iceland, which began the
accession process in July 2010 and opened and closed several chapters of the acquis has come
under a new government which has reportedly told the EU Commission that it was no longer
interested in pursuing membership in the Union.
Prior to October 2009, in order for enlargement to continue, two barriers that existed had to be
overcome. First, and although not explicitly stated, certain conditions established by the 2000
Treaty of Nice seemed to limit the EU to 27 members. In order for any other new country to be
admitted to the Union, the Nice Treaty had to be amended or a new treaty ratified to allow further
expansion of the Union. The Lisbon Treaty4, which was agreed to in 2007 and took effect on
December 1, 2009, permitted, among other things, future enlargement of the Union to continue. A
second barrier to the current accession structure involves any candidate country whose accession
could have substantial financial consequences on the Union as a whole. Under this provision,
admission of such a candidate could only be concluded after 2014, the scheduled date for the
beginning of the EU’s next budget framework.5 Currently, only Turkey’s candidacy would fall
under this restriction. It is unclear what the EU’s next budget will provide by way of addressing
the possibility of Turkey’s admission to the EU.
Turkey’s Path to European Union Accession
Turkey and the European Commission first concluded an Association Agreement (Ankara
Agreement) aimed at developing closer economic ties in 1963. A key provision of that agreement
was the commitment by Turkey to establish a customs union that would be applied to each EU
member state. In 1987, Turkey’s first application for full EU membership was deferred until 1993
on the grounds that the European Commission was not considering new members at the time.
Although not technically a rejection of Turkey, the decision did add Turkey to a list, along with
the United Kingdom, of nations to have been initially turned down for membership in the Union.
In 1995, a Customs Union agreement between the EU and Turkey entered into force, setting a
path for deeper integration of Turkey’s economy with that of Europe’s. In 1997, the Luxembourg
EU summit confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the EU but failed to put Turkey on a
clear track to membership. The EU recognized Turkey formally as a candidate at the 1999
Helsinki Council summit but asserted that Turkey still needed to comply sufficiently with the
EU’s political and economic criteria before accession talks could begin.6
In February 2001, the EU formally adopted an “Accession Partnership” with Turkey, which set
out the priorities Turkey needed to address in order to adopt and implement EU standards and
legislation. Although Ankara had hoped the EU would set a firm date for initiating negotiations at
4 For additional information on the Lisbon Treaty and EU reform see, CRS Report RS21618, The European Union’s
Reform Process: The Lisbon Treaty, by Kristin Archick and Derek E. Mix.
5 “The Process of Joining the EU,” op. cit.
6 CRS Report RS21344, European Union Enlargement, op. cit.
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the December 2002 EU Copenhagen Summit, no agreement was reached. Two years later, 10 new
member states, including a divided Cyprus, were admitted into the Union. In December 2004, and
despite the fact that Turkey had still not met its obligations regarding the application of its
customs union to the EU member states, the European Council stated unanimously that Turkey
had made enough progress in legislative process, economic stability, and judicial reform to
proceed with accession talks within a year. In the aftermath of the Council’s decision, the
European Parliament voted overwhelmingly to support the Council’s decision to move forward
with Turkey.
Although projected by many to require at least 10 or more years to complete the accession, the
question of Turkey’s membership in the Union became a debating point during consideration of
the Treaty for a European Constitution in the spring of 2005. Many observers suggested that one
of the factors contributing to the defeat of the Treaty in France and the Netherlands was voter
concern over continued EU enlargement and specifically over the potential admission of Turkey,
which was considered by many as too large and too culturally different to be admitted into the
Union.
Under a compromise formula agreed to by the Council, Turkey, before October 2005, would have
to sign a protocol that would adapt the 1963 Ankara Agreement, including the customs union, to
the 10 new member states of the Union, including the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey signed the
Protocol in July 2005 but made the point that, by signing the Protocol, it was not granting
diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey insisted that recognition would only
come when both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island were reunited. Ankara
further stated that Turkey would not open its seaports or airspace to Greek Cypriot vessels until
the EU ended the “isolation” of the Turkish Cypriots by providing promised financial aid that at
the time was being blocked by Cyprus and opened direct trade between the EU and the north. The
decision by Turkey to make such a declaration regarding Cyprus immediately served to sour
attitudes of many within the EU. In September 2005, the EU Council issued a rebuttal reminding
Turkey that Cyprus was a full member of the EU, that recognition of all member states was a
necessary component of the accession process, and that the EU and its member states “expect
full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to all EU member states ...
and that failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the
negotiations.”7
The controversy over Turkey’s accession continued until October 3, 2005, when, after a
prolonged debate over the status of Cyprus and expressions of concern by some European
member states over admitting Turkey at all, the EU Council agreed to a “Negotiating
Framework,” and opened formal accession talks with Turkey. However, the language of the
Framework included an understanding that the negotiations would be open-ended, meaning an
outcome (eventual full membership) could not be guaranteed. This language was to become a
significant rallying point for some European governments such as Germany, France, and Austria,
which proposed that Turkey be given a “privileged partnership” or some type of closer
relationship with Turkey but one which fell short of full membership in the Union.
For Turkey, 2006 became a difficult year in its relations with the EU even as formal negotiations
between Brussels and Ankara began. The membership of Cyprus in the Union, despite the Greek
7 Enlargement: Turkey, Declaration by the European Community and Its Member States, Council of the European
Union, September 21, 2005.
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European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations
Cypriot rejection of a U.N.-sponsored unification plan, and Turkey’s public stance not to deal
with the Greek Cypriot government, served to aggravate relations further and, in the opinion of
some observers, may have contributed to the beginning of a change in attitude within Turkey and
the EU toward each other. At the outset, Cyprus expressed its opposition to formally opening and
closing the first of 35 negotiation chapters unless Ankara met its obligations to recognize all 10
new EU member states, including Cyprus. On June 16, 2006, the EU Presidency issued a
statement that referred implicitly to Turkey’s continued refusal to open its ports to Greek Cyprus
as required by Turkey’s customs union with the EU. The EU again asserted that Turkey’s failure
to “implement its obligations fully will have an impact on the negotiating process.”8
The then-EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn warned Ankara that the resolution of the
Cyprus issue was a central stumbling block in the accession talks and that a “train crash” was
coming later in the year if Turkey did not resume implementing reforms and honoring its
commitments in the Accession Agreement and the additional Protocol.9
In Ankara, advocates for closer relations with the EU began to believe that European interest in
Turkey was changing and that what should have been EU incentives to promote and encourage
necessary reforms in Turkey had become conditions that many Turks felt were designed to
discourage Turkey. As a consequence, many observers believe that the reform process in Turkey
began to slow as a reassessment of the relationship with the EU began to take hold.10
In September 2006, the European Parliament joined in the criticism of Turkey when the
Committee on Foreign Affairs issued a progress report on Turkey’s accession. The Parliament’s
findings suggested that reforms in Turkey had slowed, especially in the implementation of
freedom of expression, protection of religious and minority rights, reform in law enforcement,
and support for the independence of the judiciary, and urged Turkey to move forward. The
Parliament also stated that “recognition of all member states, including Cyprus, is a necessary
component of the accession process and urged Turkey to fulfill the provisions of the Association
Agreement and Additional Protocol.”11 On September 14, 2006, then-Cyprus Foreign Minister
George Lillikas suggested that without Turkey’s compliance with its obligations, Cyprus would
likely object to opening any further chapters of the acquis.12
On November 29, 2006, the EU Commission issued its assessment of Turkey’s accession
negotiations. Although acknowledging that negotiations should move forward, the Commission
noted that Turkey had not met its obligations toward Cyprus and recommended that the Council
not take actions regarding the opening of any new chapters in the acquis. At the EU Summit in
December 2006, a compromise was reached that averted the worst possible outcome but clearly
enunciated a strong opinion against Turkey. Based on the recommendations of the EU
Commission,13 the Council noted that Turkey had not fully implemented the additional Protocol
8 See Council of the European Union - 15/16 June (2006), Presidency Conclusions, at http://www.consilium.europa.eu.
9 Interview with Olli Rehn on EU Enlargement, Reuters, March 28, 2006.
10 A public opinion poll conducted by the German Marshall Fund in 2004 indicated that 75% of those Turks
interviewed responded that being in the EU would be a good thing for Turkey. A similar poll in 2006 indicated that that
number had declined to 54%. See Transatlantic Trends, German Marshall Fund, 2006.
11 See “Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession,” Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament, September 2006
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu.
12 See “Cyprus FM: No More EU Chapters for Turkey Before Progress Report,” Cyprus Embassy, September 2006.
13 See “Commission presents its recommendations on the continuation of Turkey’s accession negotiations,” European
Commission, November 29, 2006.
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European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations
to the Ankara Agreement and, more importantly, decided not to open negotiations on eight
chapters of the acquis, or to provisionally close any chapters until the Commission had confirmed
that Turkey had fully implemented its commitments under the Additional Protocol.14 The Council
further required the Commission to report on Turkey’s progress “in its forthcoming annual
reports, in particular 2007, 2008, and 2009.”15 While the compromise decision prevented any
dramatic action against Turkey, it did portend a slowing of the accession negotiations and, in the
eyes of some Turkey skeptics, presented a deadline of sorts for Turkey to implement the
Additional Protocol by December 2009, the final year of the Barosso Commission’s term.
Between 2007 and 2011, the accession process muddled along with a mixed sense of direction
and very little accomplishment. Turkey felt its EU aspirations had been dealt a serious blow with
the EU decision to withhold negotiations on certain key chapters of the acquis until the Cyprus
issue was resolved. In addition, the issue of Turkey’s membership entered France’s 2007
presidential election campaign, during which conservative candidate and then-Interior Minister
Nicholas Sarkozy, in a campaign speech, stated that he felt Turkey should never become a
member of the Union.16
During 2007, the EU agreed to open three additional chapters of the acquis and identify the
benchmarks necessary to open 14 additional chapters should Turkey meet the requirements for
doing so. By the end of the year, the EU Commission and Council in their annual accession
progress reports noted some progress in the political reform process had been made but also
pointed out areas where additional progress was needed. These areas included freedom of
expression, the fight against corruption, cultural rights, and civilian oversight of the security
forces. Both institutions also expressed regret that overall political reform had achieved limited
progress and once again warned Turkey that it had not made any acceptable progress in
establishing relations with Cyprus.17
Progress throughout 2008 continued to be negligible. However, despite ongoing internal political
issues which polarized the political atmosphere in Turkey and the global economic crisis which
began to consume the government’s attention, six additional chapters of the acquis were formally
opened by the EU. However, key chapters relating to energy, external relations, and security and
defense matters had been held up by several EU member states, including France, although in the
case of energy, France did propose to open this chapter during its 2008 Presidency of the EU
Council.
In early 2009, Turkey in a sign of a renewed commitment to the accession process, announced the
appointment of its first full-time EU accession negotiator, State Minister Egemen Bağış, a
decision noted as a positive step by the EU Council. However, in March 2009 Turkey’s accession
process hit a political bump in the European Parliament. In a resolution on Turkey adopted by the
Parliament, the members of Parliament noted with concern the “continuous slowdown of the
reform process” and called on Turkey “to prove its political will to continue the reform process.”
The resolution also stressed the need to reach a solution to the Cyprus question and called for
14 This freeze on negotiations included chapters on the free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom to
provide services, financial services, agriculture and rural development, transport policy, and external relations, among
others.
15 Conclusions of the European Council, December 11, 2006.
16 “News Analysis: Sarkozy May Cause Global Ripple,” International Herald Tribune, September 11, 2006.
17 Conclusions of the European Council, December 11, 2007.
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European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations
Turkey to remove its military forces from the island. Despite the concerns expressed by the
Parliament, in June 2009 the 11th chapter of the acquis was opened, suggesting that Turkey was
making some progress meeting the reform criteria.
As in all of their previous reports on the accession progress, the Commission, Council, and
Parliament found positive issues that they could point to and noted in one year or another that
they welcomed Turkey’s continued commitment to the negotiation process, as well as
advancements Turkey had made in judicial reform, civil-military relations, and cultural rights,
relations with both the Kurds and Armenia, and its positive role in the Nabucco pipeline that the
EU has sought to provide an alternative source for delivering natural gas to Europe.
Nevertheless, each assessment noted Turkey’s shortcomings in the areas of freedom of expression
and freedom of the press, respect for property rights, and in other areas. All three institutions
continued to “note with deep regret that Turkey, despite repeated calls, continues refusing to
fulfill its obligations regarding the Additional Protocol and normalization of its relations with the
Republic of Cyprus.”18 The reports also noted that while Turkey has expressed public support for
negotiations regarding a Cyprus solution, the EU expected Turkey to actively support the ongoing
negotiations and was not satisfied that Turkey was fully engaged.
With little progress to point to, many Turkey skeptics in Europe had begun to suggest that the
accession process for Turkey may have to be significantly altered. For instance, in an interview
with Spanish news media in 2009, then-French Secretary of State for European Matters Pierre
Lellouche reiterated his government’s position that if Turkey failed to satisfy the requirements for
membership or if the European Union’s capacity for absorption did not permit it, alternatives
should be considered. Although not specifically stating that the EU needed to prepare such
alternatives by the end of 2009, Lellouche did state that “we wonder whether it is not the time to
begin reflecting on alternative paths [for Turkey] without interrupting the negotiations.”19 This
statement reflected France’s (and perhaps others’) continued opposition to full membership in the
Union for Turkey and support for a then-to-be defined “special relationship” or “privileged
partnership,” which Turkey stated it would reject. Similarly, on September 11, 2009, Cypriot
Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou stated that while Cyprus was “a genuine supporter of
Turkey’s EU course,” Cyprus was “one of the strictest supporters who are not prepared to
compromise the principles and values that the EU is founded upon just for the sake of a speedier
accession of our neighbor.”20
In May 2010, the EU-Turkey Association Council, led by EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan
Füle and Turkey’s chief negotiator for EU Affairs, Egemen Bağış met to discuss EU-Turkey
relations. The EU welcomed the effort underway at the time to amend Turkey’s constitution to
strengthen democracy and rule of law but noted that more reform was needed in areas such as the
fight against corruption, freedom of expression and of religion, and continued judicial reform.
On October 26, 2010, EU Commissioner Füle told an EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee
meeting in Brussels that the outcome of Turkey’s September constitutional reform referendum
was a step towards EU accession.21 Füle said the EU’s 2010 progress report on Turkey would
18 Ibid. EU Council, December 8, 2009.
19 “France Seeks alternative to Turkey’s EU membership,” TurkishNY.com, September 3, 2009.
20 “Cyprus, one of a few genuine supporters of Turkey’s EU Course,” Cyprus News Agency, September 11, 2009.
21 Press Release, “EU Enlargement: Turkey must do more to protect basic freedoms,” European Parliament, October
(continued...)
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mention positive steps taken by Turkey such as lifting restrictions on broadcasting in languages
other than Turkish, furthering judicial reform, and improving fundamental rights, but it would
also voice concern about Turkey’s difficulties in guaranteeing freedom of expression, press, and
religion.
The 2010 progress reports issued by the European Commission and Council once again provided
less-than-ringing endorsements of Turkey’s progress reading much like previous assessments.
Nevertheless, Egeman Bağış, Turkey’s chief EU negotiator called the reports the “most positive
and encouraging” Turkey had ever received.22
This attitude changed when the European Parliament adopted a resolution assessing Turkey’s
accession progress for 2010. The Parliament sharply criticized the government of Turkey for a
lack of dialogue among the various political parties and noted the continued failure to implement
the Additional Protocols. When the Parliament reserved its strongest criticism for the lack of
press freedom in Turkey, a representative of the main Turkish opposition CHP party declared that
“the latest report is the toughest-worded document drafted since ... formal negotiations began in
2005.”23 The tone of the resolution and debate in Parliament also provoked the anger of Turkish
Prime Minister Erdogan, who stated that “there was no balance in this report” and suggested that
the resolution was written by people who did not know Turkey.24
The two rather bland assessments of Turkey’s accession progress by the Commission and Council
and the tough assessment made by the Parliament led some to conclude that “Turkey’s accession
talks with the EU were heading for stalemate”25 and that “EU leaders have undermined support
for accession in Turkey”26
Some observers believed that the various Commission and Council assessments between 2006
and 2010 could have been the subject of very difficult internal debate due to a lack of consensus
among the member states on how to respond to Turkey’s shortcomings in the reform process and
its continued failure to meet its customs union obligations toward Cyprus.27 However, in most
instances while the debates have highlighted disappointment and frustration on the part of the EU,
it does not appear that the debates in either institution had been difficult after all, and both the
Commission and Council, perhaps for the sake of the ongoing negotiations on Cyprus, have been
able to issue what they believed to be balanced reports giving credit to the Turks for some
positive developments and offering criticisms where there were noted shortcomings.
Throughout 2011 the accession negotiations with Turkey continued at a snail’s pace, with talks
for all practical purposes reaching a virtual political and technical stalemate. No new chapters of
the acquis were opened in 2011 and very little progress had been achieved within the chapters
already under negotiation. This lack of progress led Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu to state
(...continued)
27, 2010.
22 “EU Scolds Turkey on Border Issues,” Wall Street Journal, November 10, 2010.
23 Statement of Kader Sevinc to the Hurriyet Dailey News, March 9, 2011.
24 “PM slams European Parliament report as ‘unbalanced’”. Hurriyet Daily News, March 11, 2011.
25 Katinka Barysch, “Turkey and the EU: Can Stalemate be avoided?,” Centre for European Reform, December 2010.
26 Sinan Ulgen, “Turkish politics and the fading magic of EU enlargement,” Centre for European Reform, December
2010.
27 Observations made by the author during discussions with EU and other officials.
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that the talks were at a bottleneck due to “political blockages”28 and Prime Minister Erdogan in
May to complain that France and Germany [among others] “are determined to have Turkey give
up its interest in joining the EU.”29
Turkey, for its part, was distracted in part due to a national election that was held in June 2011,
with a deterioration in its relations with Israel and Syria, and with the on-going dilemma of
Cyprus. In the elections, the AK Party of President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan again
emerged victorious solidifying the party’s acceptance by the people and reaffirming support for
the direction they were taking the country. The elections also gave Erdogan another five-year
mandate to continue implementing the reform programs he had championed. Although the AKP
had not won the super majority it had hoped for in the Parliament in order to guarantee the
adoption of a new constitution, the AKP victory was thought to have paved the way for a new
constitution and reform agenda by the end of 2012, goals not yet achieved.
During the election campaign, as in the previous fall’s referendum on constitutional reform, the
EU and the accession process appeared to have been of little consequence, leading to further
speculation that the Turkish leadership and general population were growing more ambivalent
toward the EU as the catalyst for further domestic political reform and that membership in the
Union may no longer be a necessary goal.
Despite this growing view, in June, Prime Minister Erdogan announced the establishment of the
European Union Ministry to take over coordination of Turkey’s EU accession process. Egeman
Bagis, Turkey’s chief EU accession negotiator, was named the head the new ministry, signaling to
the EU that Ankara still had an interest in EU membership even if it appeared that national
enthusiasm was on the wane.
During the summer of 2011, the Cyprus issue emerged again as a significant stumbling block for
progress on Turkey’s accession process. Greek Cypriots have long claimed that Turkey’s
influence over exactly what the Turkish Cypriots will accept as part of any final solution to the
Cyprus problem has been the principal reason for the lack of any agreement. In July, fresh from
receiving his new five-year mandate as a result of the June national elections in Turkey, Prime
Minister Erdogan visited northern Cyprus on the occasion of the anniversary of Turkey’s
intervention in Cyprus in 1974. In a speech to Turkish Cypriots, Ergodan seemed to have
hardened his views on a Cyprus settlement when he suggested that a negotiated solution had to be
achieved by the end of 2011 or the island would remain split.30 In his speeches in the north,
Erdogan also suggested that security and territorial concessions demanded of the Turkish Cypriots
were not acceptable and that if, in his words, “southern Cyprus” were to assume the presidency of
the EU Council on July 1, 2012, then Ankara would freeze its relations with the EU because it
could not work with a presidency that it does not recognize.31 Erdogan’s statements drew harsh
criticism from all sectors of the Greek Cypriot political community. Reaction from some quarters
of the EU was equally strong with European Parliament member and member of the Parliament’s
EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee Andrew Duff suggesting that Erdogan’s comments
were an appalling twist to Turkey’s policy toward Cyprus.32
28 “Turkey’s EU membership talks deadlocked, FM Davutoglu says,” Hurriyet Daily News, April 20, 2011.
29 “France and Germany accused of ‘Black campaign’ against Turkey’s EU bid,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 12, 2011.
30 “PM draws the line for Cyprus: Unity or split,” Hurriyet Dailey News, July 20, 2011.
31 “Erdogan: Cyprus at EU helm unacceptable,” Cyprus-Mail, July 20, 2011.
32 “Erdogan comments irk EU officials,” Cyprus Mail, July 22, 2011.
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An additional issue regarding Turkey and Cyprus arose in August when the Republic of Cyprus
announced that in September it would begin drilling for natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean
in an area off the coast of southern Cyprus. Ankara blasted the decision as illegal, indicated that
such a move could negatively affect the Cyprus negotiations,33 and suggested that it would
increase its naval presence in the region. This again raised concerns within the EU, which called
into question the implementation of Turkey’s foreign policy initiative of “no problems with its
neighbors.”
Near the end of 2011, the European Commission and Council issued their annual assessment of
Turkey’s accession progress.34 Both stated that “with its dynamic economy, important regional
role and its contributions to EU’s foreign policy and energy security, Turkey is a key country for
the security and prosperity of the European Union ... that was already well integrated into the EU
in terms of trade and foreign investment through the Customs Union.”35 Continuing on a positive
note, both acknowledged that the changes proposed in the constitutional referendum and the
conduct of the June elections were positive signs and that Turkey had made progress on a number
of fronts including civilian control of the military, financial services, competition policy, religious
property and cultural rights, and in the judiciary. They also noted that the creation of the Ministry
for EU Affairs was an “encouraging signal.” On the other hand, both reports repeated concerns
over a number of issues where both felt not enough progress had been made including in the areas
of freedom of expression, freedom of the media, women’s rights, and freedom of religion. Both
the Commission and Council expressed regret at statements by Prime Minister Erdogan that
Turkey would freeze relations with the EU Presidency during the second half of 2012 when
Cyprus would assume the Presidency. The Council also expressed its concerns over Turkey’s
threats directed at what the Council called Cyprus’ right to explore and exploit their own natural
resources, a reference to Cyprus’ discovery of natural gas in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic
Zone.
Not surprisingly, the reaction from Ankara was swift and negative. Prime Minister Erdogan
blasted the EU for “slinging mud” and claimed that “the progress reports had once again shown
the serious eclipse of reason at the EU.”36 Perhaps showing both his frustration and contempt for
the EU, Erdogan was reported to have suggested the EU itself was “crumbling.” Turkish Minister
for EU Affairs Egemen Bağış claimed that the Commission’s report zoomed in on the problem
areas but ignored the real progress Turkey has made and that linking Turkey’s membership to the
Cyprus issue was a mistake.37 On the other side, Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP,
reportedly praised the Commission’s report and stated that the “report shows democracy is not
moving forward as the government claims.”38
Earlier in November 2011, EU Minister Bağış had suggested that Turkey would not lose anything
if no additional chapters of the acquis were to be opened during the Cypriot Presidency. It was
reported that certain Turkish officials had indicated that due to the uncertainty of Turkey’s EU
33 “Don’t sacrifice talks in Cyprus for natural gas,” Hurriyet Daily News, August 14, 2011.
34 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Enlargement Strategy and main
Challenges 2011-2012, Brussels, October 12, 2011.
35 Ibid.
36 “Prime Minister Erdogan lashes out at EU over the latest progress report, Cyprus,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 16,
2011.
37 “Turkish Minister chides EU for Greek Cyprus conditions,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 12, 2011.
38 “Turkey’s main opposition says gov’t needs EU report’s advices,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 14, 2011.
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membership, the government was reluctant to move forward with meeting required benchmarks
in order to open the three remaining chapters of the accession acquis involving competition,
social policy, and procurement.39 As a result, none were opened.
Despite the less than positive assessments, one interesting issue arose when the Commission, in
its assessment report, proposed to initiate a new relationship, or “positive agenda” with Turkey
outside of the accession negotiations if Turkey followed through on its threats to avoid the
Cypriot presidency of the EU beginning in July 2012.
The final piece of business regarding the 2011 assessment of Turkey’s accession progress rested
with the European Parliament. The Parliament’s assessment reflected the earlier views of the
Commission and Council. However, having in early 2011 considered an amendment calling on
EU institutions to study the possibility of establishing a ‘privileged partnership’ with Turkey as an
alternative to full EU membership, the Parliament expressed its support for the Commission’s
intension to develop a fresh agenda for EU-Turkey relations, stating that a positive agenda would
build on the solid fundamentals of EU and Turkey relations and move the reform process forward.
The resolution adopted by the Parliament noted, however, any new initiative should not replace
the accession negotiations, but complement them in order to support reforms. 40
Current Status of Turkey’s Accession
New Agenda—Relabeled Approach
As 2012 began, Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU had basically reached a political and
technical stalemate with little anticipation of any additional chapters of the EU’s rules and
regulations known as the acquis communautaire being opened in the near term. In March 2012,
Egemen Bağış, at the London School of Economics once again stated that Turkey would ignore
the Republic of Cyprus’ EU Presidency and apparently stated that “Turkey has 52 years of
relationship with the EU, thus, six months is not a long time for Turkey”41, referring to the length
of the rotating presidency. These statements were not taken lightly both in the EU and in the
Republic of Cyprus which would be entering its own presidential election period in 2013
immediately following the Cyprus EU presidency meaning little, if any, progress was likely in
Turkey’s accession negotiations until possibly after a new government in the Republic was in
place.
The EU Commission realized that the accession process itself would achieve little in 2012,
especially if Ankara did carry out its threat to ignore at least the rotating EU presidency once
Cyprus assumed that role on July 1. Not wanting to place relations with Turkey in a deep freeze
until after the national elections in the Republic in early 2013, the Commission began to put into
place the new initiative with Turkey that the Commission had proposed in its 2011 accession
progress report.
39 Ankara unenthusiastic on new EU chapters, Hurriyet Daily News, November 21, 2011.
40 For more detailed information see “Motion for a Resolution—on the 2011 Progress Report on Turkey,
B7-0000/2011, Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament, March 8, 2012.
41 “Turkey will Ignore Cyprus as EU president,” Famagusta Gazette On-Line, March 2, 2012.
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On May 17, 2012, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Štefan
Füle and Turkish Minister for European Affairs Egemen Bağış announced the launch of the EU’s
new “positive agenda” with Turkey. Both stated that the “positive agenda” was intended to bring
fresh dynamics into EU-Turkey relations. Commissioner Füle indicated that areas covered by the
“positive agenda” would include legislative alignment, enhanced energy cooperation, visas,
mobility and migration, Customs Union, foreign policy, political reforms, the fight against
terrorism and increased participation in people-to-people programs, all issues included in the
frozen chapters of the acquis. In launching the “positive agenda” both Commissioner Füle and
Minister Bağış had gone to great lengths to insist that the new initiative was not intended to
replace, but complement, the formal accession negotiations and to strengthen the reform process
in Turkey.
On the other hand, to some the concept was described as essentially an “institutional trick
intended to circumvent the Cyprus EU Presidency,”42 and that the technical discussions
surrounding the “agenda” looked very much like an informal accession negotiation on issues
included in those chapters of the acquis not yet opened. Still others saw the comprehensive nature
of the “agenda” as perhaps a repackaging of the old ‘privileged partnership’ concept suggested by
the French and others as early as 2009. The new “agenda” for some could eventually allow the
EU and Turkey to achieve as close a relationship as desirable, for some a “virtual membership,”43
while potentially allowing them to walk away from the ultimate goal of Union membership
having developed stronger political, economic, and social relations with Turkey in the meantime.
To become an actual EU member, Turkey would still have to comply with the much more detailed
acquis no matter how extensive or successful the new “agenda” were to become. However, by
changing its name, but not necessarily its goal, Turkey, which had previously rejected the
“privileged partnership” idea seemed to have embraced the new “agenda” with the EU. On July 1,
2012, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, over the objections of EU officials, made good on his
threat to freeze certain relations with the EU, including formal accession negotiations, which are
normally overseen by the presidency, when Cyprus assumed the 6-month rotating presidency of
the Council of the European Union. Erdogan’s decision to actually ignore the EU presidency
appeared to have been made with the understanding that since the “positive agenda” had been
launched despite his threat, he had nothing to lose by suspending the accession talks for at least
the next six months.
One consequence of the launch of the “positive agenda,” however, was its impact on the Cyprus
settlement negotiations. It could be suggested that the Turkish Cypriots concluded that since the
EU’s action appeared to signal that Turkey’s long-term relations with the EU may no longer be
dependent on Turkey’s contribution to any measurable progress on the Cyprus issue, despite what
the annual EU Commission and Council progress reports say about the need for Turkey to play a
constructive role in Cyprus, there was little incentive to continue the negotiations thus fulfilling
Ankara’s and the Turkish Cypriot’s warning that July 1, 2012, was indeed the deadline to
conclude an agreement over Cyprus or the talks could end. With no agreement in the works by
July 1, Turkish Cypriot leader Eroglu could hardly object when the United Nation’s Good Offices
in Cyprus essentially declared their role in promoting the talks suspended.
42 Dimitar Bechev, “EU-Turkey Relations: A Glimmer of Hope,” European Council on Foreign Relations, July 27,
2012.
43 Sinan Ulgen, “Avoiding a Divorce: A Virtual EU Membership for Turkey,” Carnegie Endowment, December 2012.
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The Cyprus presidency was launched on July 1, 2012 and formal accession negotiations between
the EU and Turkey came to a halt. However, working groups established under the “positive
agenda” began a series of informal negotiations which could not be affected by the Turkish
refusal to deal with the Republic of Cyprus. Engagement between the EU and Turkey did
continue throughout the last six months of 2012 especially with respect to visa liberalization
where Turkey is the only EU candidate country which does not have a visa agreement with the
EU. Both sides have stressed the importance of facilitating access to the European Union to
Turkish business people, academics, students and representatives of civil society and both sides
made the goal to harmonize and simplify visa requirements a priority.
Beyond visa liberalization, it is unclear exactly what progress had been achieved under the
“positive agenda” or how whatever advancements were made could be incorporated into the
formal accession process in the future, whenever new chapters of the acquis are opened. It was
also unclear at the time whether the “positive agenda” would end once the Cypriot EU presidency
ended, and whether the formal accession negotiations would resume again in 2013 under the Irish
presidency of the EU Council. It appears now that the EU and Turkey may resume the formal
accession negotiations, including the opening of one new Chapter of the acquis in October 2013.
In the meantime it appears unclear whether the “positive agenda” framework will continue for
those issues that fall under the chapters that will remain blocked by the Republic of Cyprus,
France, and others. 44
As 2012 ended and with little movement on the accession front, the EU Commission in October
issued its annual progress report on Turkey. In its report, the Commission, while offering a few
positive conclusions, expressed its overall disappointment with Turkey’s progress on a number of
issues leading Ankara to express its disappointment with the “biased” and “unbalanced” Report.
Turkey’s continued refusal to extend diplomatic recognition to EU member Cyprus, or to open
Turkey’s sea and air ports to Cypriot shipping and commerce until a political settlement has been
achieved on Cyprus as well as Turkey’s position on the Cyprus EU presidency were again cited as
problematic. On December 11, 2012, the European Council released its conclusions on
enlargement. While the Council struck a more positive note regarding Turkey’s importance to the
EU, noted the implementation of the “positive agenda,” and listed several issues where the
Council felt Turkey had made progress, it nevertheless repeated the shortfalls outlined in the
Commission’s earlier assessment, including what the Council felt was insufficient progress on
freedom of the media, expression, and assembly and an overall lack of judicial reform.
Interestingly, it was reported that the Turkish Foreign Ministry frustrated by what EU Minister
Bağış has described as the “skewed mentality in Europe,” published its own first-ever progress
report. The report was described as refuting many of the criticisms of Turkey’s reform process
found in the EU Commission’s October progress report.
In early February 2013, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius announced that the new
government in Paris was favorably disposed to resuming the accession talks with Turkey and was
prepared to lift its hold on opening at least one new chapter of the acquis—Chapter 22, Regional
Policy. Even Germany and Cyprus seemed to have softened their views on resuming the
negotiations although Cyprus felt Turkey needed to display a new attitude toward making
significant contributions to the Cyprus unification talks once they resumed.
44 Based on a discussion with an official at the EU Commission.
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Technical discussions subsequently opened on Chapter 22 and it was agreed among the EU
leadership that a new round of accession negotiations would begin in mid-June 2013.
The European Parliament, in a resolution adopted on April 18, 201345, issued its annual progress
report on Turkey which mirrored the views of both the Council and Commission on issues such
as judicial reform, freedom of expression, the media, and assembly. The Parliament also reminded
Turkey that ignoring the Republic of Cyprus’ EU presidency and its attitude regarding Cyprus’
exploration of its own natural resources was not consistent with the EU’s demand that Turkey
pursue “good neighborly” relations within its region.
Like the Council and Commission, however, the Parliament seemed to send mixed messages
regarding the Commission’s “positive agenda” initiative. In Article 48 of its adopted resolution,
the Parliament stated that “the EU is based on the principles of sincere cooperation and mutual
solidarity amongst all its members and has respect for the institutional framework ... ” [of the
presidency of the Union]. At the same time, in Article 1of the resolution the EP commended the
Commission and Turkey for implementing the “positive agenda” apparently forgetting the need
for solidarity amongst member states (especially toward Cyprus) and respect for the institutional
framework.
In early June 2013, as the resumption of the accession negotiations with Turkey approached,
domestic turmoil rocked Turkey. Public protests over the future of a park and the government’s
reaction precipitated a harsh response from Brussels over the use of force and the freedom of
assembly and speech. A resolution was adopted on June 13 by the European Parliament
expressing its “deep concern at the disproportionate and excessive use of force by the Turkish
police.”46 Turkish officials responded with tough rhetoric toward the EU, including from Prime
Minister Erdogan who said he “did not recognize decisions made by the European Parliament.” 47
After two weeks of rather nasty verbal sparring, and Ankara’s continued crackdown on the
protestors, several EU member states threatened to press for the postponement of the upcoming
accession talks, again provoking an angry response from Ankara, including comments by
Turkey’s EU Minister Bağış that some European countries should “get lost”48 if they decided not
to open Chapter 22 or delay the start of the accession negotiations. Since neither side really
wanted to end the accession process or freeze the relationship despite mutual ill-feelings, the EU,
in a face-saving decision for both sides, agreed to officially declare Chapter 22 open but to
postpone the resumption of the accession negotiations until October 2013.
Assessment
Relations between Turkey and the European Union have vacillated between support for and doubt
over future membership on both sides, but not over the need for close relations. There is little
doubt among most observers that over its first eight years, the EU accession process has been a
major motivation behind Turkey’s internal march toward reform and democratization. It has also
been a factor in helping transform Turkey’s economy and its political and military institutions,
45 European Parliament resolution of 18 April 2013 on the 2012 Progress Report on Turkey (2012/2870)
46 European Parliament resolution on the situation in Turkey, June 13, 2013, in Strasbourg.
47 “I don’t recognize European Parliament decision, Turkish PM Erdogan says,” Huriyet Daily News, June 14, 2013.
48 “Minister Bagis: If necessary, Turkey will tell EU to get lost,” Today’s Zaman, June 19, 2013.
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leadership, and political culture, both at the national and, in some respects, the local government
level. And, it has helped forge a closer relationship between Europe and Turkey.
Economic ties between the EU and Turkey, despite the current problems within the Eurozone,
have expanded over the past several years with nearly half of Turkey’s exports flowing to Europe.
Turkey’s strong and growing economy offers a large and important market for European goods
and services and will continue to do so for a long time. Turkish businesses are flourishing in parts
of Europe and Turkey has become a magnate for foreign direct investment with much of that
flowing from Europe. Turkey’s role as an important energy hub and transit region for European
energy supply diversification continues to grow as was recently seen with the decision to
construct the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) which will bring natural gas from Azerbaijan across
Turkey, via the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), into Italy and parts of Europe.
Continuing instability in Europe’s southern neighborhood of North Africa and the Middle East
suggest closer EU-Turkey relations. The emerging activism in Turkey’s foreign policy, begun in
2010 by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu with the intent of establishing Turkey as a more
independent regional influence has led EU Enlargement Commissioner Füle and others to suggest
that a “strategic dialogue” with Turkey on foreign policy should become a regular feature of the
relationship. These examples reinforce the belief among many that both the EU and Turkey do
need each other for a multitude of reasons.
The need for good neighborly relations, the current economic and financial crisis within the
Eurozone and a continued healthy level of public skepticism or ambivalence toward EU
enlargement to Turkey on the part of many Europeans, fueled by cultural and religious
differences, however, continues to cloud European attitudes about Turkey, not as an important
neighbor to Europe, economic partner, or regional foreign policy influence, but simply as a full-
scale member of the Union. This attitude was highlighted in June when it was reported that
German Chancellor Merkel’s coalition partners, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the
Christian Social Union (CSU) included in their election manifesto that Turkey should not become
a member of the European Union. In addition, it appears that a growing number of Europeans
have expressed concerns regarding what seems to some as a change in Turkey’s political,
economic, social, and religious orientation. In a recent article, Diba Nigar Goksel suggested that
Europeans believe that “Turkish public opinion polls reflect deepening cynicism about the EU
and that the popularity of a [Turkish] leadership more keen on flaunting its affinity, solidarity, and
close links to Muslim brothers than European friends exacerbates concerns that Turkey has an
inherently non-European disposition.49
Despite these problems, a few EU member states, and in particular the EU Commission, still
continue to publically express a desire to see Turkey’s accession move forward.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that Europe’s disinterest, skepticism or in the case of a
few, outright opposition to Turkey’s membership, along with the perceived EU foot-dragging in
the accession negotiations have reinforced a growing ambivalence in Turkey about its future in
the EU. Many observers have suggested that the AK Party’s early embrace of the reforms
required under the EU accession process was an attempt to help transform and legitimize the AK
as a post-Islamist party. Many feel Turkey’s leadership’s goals were more about solidifying their
own power and acceptance by the Turkish people than the long-term “Europeanization” of
49 Diba Nigar Goksel, “Turkey and the EU: What Next,” German Marshall Fund “On Turkey” Series, December 2012.
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Turkey.50 Others point to the September 2010 constitutional referendum and the June 2011
national elections as cases in point. Despite statements by Prime Minister Erdogan and others that
the proposed constitutional reforms would help bring Turkey into line with European norms,
some observers believe that Turkey’s EU aspirations were not central to any of the Turkish
political parties’ messages during the referendum campaign51 or the national elections and are not
necessarily considerations in the writing of the new constitution.
Still others have suggested that after eight years of accession negotiations and various iterations
of reform, Turkey’s citizenry have accepted an unprecedented amount of change. But some now
believe that the reform process has slowed as EU membership may no longer be the desired end
point for Turkey’s leadership.52 For instance, writing in the Hurriyet Daily News, Semih Idiz
commented that the EU Commission’s 2011 progress report on accession, while performing as a
mirror for Turkey, was more of a concern for Turkish bureaucrats and Eurocrats and that “the EU
is not something the majority of Turks look to with confidence or enthusiasm anymore.”53
Further, he wrote that what drives Turkey’s reform process today “is its own pressing needs.”
Continuing on this theme, Idiz reported the 2012 Commission assessment was “a report with no
effect” that has “hardly created a stir among Turks.”54 Reflecting a similar view, columnist
Mehmet Ali Birand wrote that “Europe is not on Turkey’s agenda,” that “for the first time in 47
years the influence of the EU over Turkish politics has reached almost zero,” and that “ today,
Ankara does not pay attention to either the Council of Europe or the European Parliament.”55 Idiz,
in another article, also pointed out that during Prime Minister Erdogan’s 2012 three hour speech
to the AKP party congress, “Turkey’s EU perspective was not once mentioned.”56
Despite what some have categorized as dynamic changes that have taken place in Turkey, driven
in part by its EU aspirations, the EU accession process continues at a relatively slow pace (a pace
some have called comatose). Supporters of Turkey’s EU membership understand that actions
taken, or not taken, by Turkey have made achieving that goal more difficult. Turkey’s long-
standing refusal to recognize EU member state, Cyprus, and its continued refusal to open its air
and sea ports to Cypriot commercial operations as required under the Additional Protocol will
remain major stumbling blocks to any forward progress, even as the accession negotiations restart
in October 2013. Turkey’s decision to ignore the Cypriot rotating presidency of the EU Council
further exacerbated the problem as has Turkey’s tough rhetoric and occasional naval presence in
the Eastern Mediterranean as part of Ankara’s response to the decision by the Republic of Cyprus
to begin exploring for energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. The handling of the Gezi
park protests in June also served to further alienate those in Europe who remain skeptical of
Turkey’s ability and willingness to meet the requirements established in all the chapters of the
acquis.
With many in Ankara now believing it may no longer be necessary for Turkey to become a
member of the EU in order to define Turkey or its place in the international community and with
what appears to be a great deal of rhetoric but little real enthusiasm in Europe (except from the
50 Alessandri, op. cit.
51 Ibid.
52 “Getting to Zero: Turkey, Its Neighbors and the West,” Transatlantic Academy, 2010.
53 Semih Idiz, “EU report important despite skepticism,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 13, 2011.
54 “A Report with No Effect,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 12, 2012.
55 Mehmet Ali Birand, “Progress report an overstatement but not a lie,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 13, 2011.
56 “EU on the backburner for the AKP,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 2012.
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EU Commission) for Turkey as a full voting member of the club, observers have begun to
question why both the EU and Turkey continue with the accession process at all.
Turkey and its supporters have continued to argue that at least an enhanced dialogue with the EU
should continue. Clearly, the EU can benefit from Turkey’s position as an economic partner and
as a key regional actor with respect to the greater Middle East, and that Turkey will continue to
play a growing energy role for Europe as a gateway to the Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas
supply system. Many Europeans share that view and point out that Turkey already plays an
important role in defense and foreign policy matters with Europe, including through its
membership in NATO although some seem concerned that foreign policy developments in Turkey
have become, and could continue to be, increasingly detached from the EU.57 However, many
European believe that while energy security and foreign policy are important elements for the
EU, those issues comprise only two or three of the 35 chapters in the acquis, and Turkey must
come into compliance with the requirements of the entire acquis. Turkey, for its part must rely on
the European market for its goods and services and Europe’s political good will and engagement
for the longer term.
Nevertheless, and despite the doubts, Turkish leaders seem to have decided that at least for now
they need to continue the accession process. This appeared to be the case when in a 2013 New
Year’s message Turkish President Gul stated that EU membership was still a priority and as the
Turkish leadership pursued the resumption of negotiations and the opening of new chapters of the
acquis before June 2013. Some believe this approach is being used possibly as a hedge in the
event Ankara’s goal of becoming a regional leader and influence fails to take hold or that the
Turkish people become concerned that the internal reform process, called into question by the
Gezi park demonstrations and government reaction, will come to an end, which could impact
Prime Minister Erdogan’s future political plans.
Neither Turkey nor the EU appear to be prepared to actually end the accession process, although
it has been reported that Prime Minister Erdogan may have suggested that “if they [EU] do not
want Turkey in, they should say so ... and we will mind our own business and will not bother
them.”58 If, when the negotiations resume later in 2013, both the EU and Turkey feel formal
membership in the Union is no longer an EU obsession or in Turkey’s best interest, both could
seek a way to mutually agree to end the formal accession process. This would not end necessarily
end talks between the EU and Turkey as the “positive agenda” could be revitalized and used to
draw Turkey and the EU closer to each other as “privileged partners,” or for Turkey, a “virtual EU
member.”
U.S. Perspective
Although the United States does not have a direct role in the EU accession process, successive
U.S. Administrations and many in Congress have continued to support EU enlargement, believing
that it serves U.S. interests by spreading stability and economic opportunities throughout Europe.
During the George W. Bush Administration, the United States had been a strong and vocal
proponent of Turkish membership in the European Union. Early on, the Obama Administration
continued the support of Turkey’s EU membership aspirations. President Obama’s statements in
57 Tocci, op. cit.
58 European Parliament report strains already fragile Turkey-EU ties, Hurriyet Daily News, March 10, 2011.
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support of Turkey during his April 2009 visit to Ankara, restated more recently, and his assertion
that Turkey’s accession would send an important signal to the Muslim world reaffirmed the U.S.
position.
Vocal U.S. support for Turkey’s EU membership had caused some displeasure among some EU
member states who felt that the United States did not fully understand the long and detailed
process involved in accession negotiations, did not appreciate the debate within Europe over the
long-term impact the admission of Turkey could have on Europe, and defined the importance of
Turkey in too narrow a set of terms, generally related to geopolitical and security issues of the
region. This latter view seems to be one held by countries such as France, Germany, Austria and
others. Some Europeans also feel that putting Turkey’s accession in terms related to the Muslim
world suggests that anything short of full EU membership for Turkey would represent a rejection
of Turkey by the West, and by association, a rejection of the Muslim world.
Now, however, many in Europe have been somewhat relieved that the United States has scaled
back its rhetoric and hope the United States will use its relationship with Turkey in more
constructive ways for the EU. For instance, some Europeans feel that the United States should be
more helpful in encouraging Turkey to move more rapidly on reforms and to comply with the
Additional Protocol regarding Turkey’s relations with Cyprus. When asked in an interview in
June 2009 whether the United States could be more helpful on this point, former Assistant
Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia Philip Gordon demurred, saying that “ultimately, this is
an EU issue; we’re not directly involved in it.... This is between the EU and Turkey.”59 The
United States believes that Turkey’s membership in NATO has demonstrated that Turkey can
interact constructively with an organization dominated by most of the same European countries
that belong to the EU and play a positive role in foreign policy matters that impact Europe,
whether it is the Europe of the EU or the Europe of NATO. However, the United States has been
disappointed that it has not been able to use its influence to help shape a more constructive EU-
Turkey relationship in an attempt to promote closer NATO-EU relations.
Although some Members of Congress continue to support Turkey’s EU accession, attitudes
toward Turkey have changed somewhat and the vocal enthusiasm for Turkey’s EU membership
seems to have waned. While some Members of Congress have applauded Turkey for its stance on
Iran’s nuclear weapons program and its position on Syria, there have been expressions of concern
in some congressional quarters over other Turkish foreign policy initiatives, particularly at one
point towards Israel and continually toward Cyprus. However, these concerns do not appear likely
to alter the views of those who support Turkey or for new EU approaches to relations with Turkey
during the 113th Congress.
59 See Assistant Secretary Gordon’s interview with Tom Ellis of Kathimerini, June 27, 2009, Corfu, Greece.
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Author Contact Information
Vincent L. Morelli
Section Research Manager
vmorelli@crs.loc.gov, 7-8051
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