International Crises and Disasters:
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Response
Mechanisms

Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
August 1, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33769
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International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Response Mechanisms

Summary
The majority of humanitarian emergencies worldwide stem from natural disasters or from
conflicts. Congress has consistently supported humanitarian efforts as a means of responding to
crises in the short term, taking the lead, and promoting a U.S. presence. Intervention results in
varying amounts of relief and recovery assistance and can have an important impact not only on
the relief operation itself but on broader foreign policy issues. In the 113th Congress, international
humanitarian and refugee assistance is expected to continue to have a strong measure of
bipartisan support, with key policy issues focused on budget priorities, levels and types of
funding, the sources of other support available worldwide, and the ways in which operational
assistance is delivered.
Factors that may impact decision-making include the type of humanitarian assistance required,
the impact of conflict and refugee flows on stability in the region in question, and the role of
neighboring countries in contributing to the relief effort. Examples of issues likely to remain of
congressional interest include competing aid and budget priorities, reimbursing U.S. government
agencies for their expenditures (to replenish the emergency accounts or other accounts that have
been used to provide assistance), and civilian and military coordination, including the evolving
role of the Department of Defense in humanitarian assistance. Other priorities may include an
examination of the disparity between numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees
worldwide and the available funding for these groups; physical protection of refugees and other
vulnerable populations in addition to the protection of human rights; programs to address gender
based violence; and the creation of durable solutions for displaced populations.
The President can provide emergency humanitarian assistance through several sources whose
funding is authorized and appropriated by Congress. These are funds currently appropriated to
U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA) through the International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDA) account; U.S.
Department of Agriculture food aid programs under Title II of the Food for Peace Act; the State
Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) through the Migration and
Refugee Assistance (MRA) and the U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund
(ERMA) accounts; and funds appropriated to the Department of Defense, Overseas Humanitarian
and Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account.
In addition, the President has the authority to draw down defense equipment and direct military
personnel to respond to disasters and provide space-available transportation on military aircraft
and ships to private donors who wish to transport humanitarian goods and equipment in response
to a disaster. Finally, the President can request other government agencies to assist within their
capabilities. The FY2014 Foreign Operations budget request for global humanitarian accounts,
which does not include OHDACA, totals $4.1 billion.
This report examines U.S. humanitarian assistance in international crises and disaster situations.
It considers the sources and types of U.S. government aid, the response mechanisms of key U.S.
agencies and departments, and possible issues for Congress—including competing aid and budget
priorities, burdensharing and donor-fatigue, the transparency and efficacy of U.S. humanitarian
assistance, consequences of such assistance, and potential links to broader U.S. foreign policy
goals.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Response Mechanisms

Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview of the U.S. Response ....................................................................................................... 2
Defining Humanitarian Assistance ............................................................................................ 2
Exemptions for Humanitarian Assistance .................................................................................. 3
Selected U.S. Activities and Coordination ....................................................................................... 3
United States Agency for International Development ............................................................... 3
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance ................................................................................. 3
Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480) ............................................................................................. 5
Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation ............................................................................. 6
Other Offices and Funds...................................................................................................... 6
Department of State ................................................................................................................... 6
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration .................................................................. 6
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund .......................................................... 7
Department of Defense .............................................................................................................. 7
Defense Security Cooperation Agency................................................................................ 7
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance ..................................................................................... 8
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance: Role of Congress and Current Funding Levels .............................. 9
Congressional Role .................................................................................................................... 9
Funding: FY2012 to FY2014 Request....................................................................................... 9
Other International Humanitarian Assistance Efforts .................................................................... 10
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 11
Competing Aid and Budget Priorities ...................................................................................... 11
Burdensharing and Donor Fatigue ........................................................................................... 12
Transparency and Efficacy ...................................................................................................... 12
Humanitarian Operations and Security Challenges ................................................................. 12
Branding ............................................................................................................................ 13
Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance ............................................................................. 14
Links to Broader Foreign Policy Goals ................................................................................... 14

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 15
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 15

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International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Response Mechanisms

Introduction
The complex humanitarian emergency has emerged as a category of crisis that can be defined in
different ways. For example, it can be viewed according to the situation on the ground—scale and
intensity of population dislocation, destruction of social networks/community and infrastructure,
insecurity of civilians and noncombatants, and human rights abuses; by the complexity of the
response needed to address these problems; or by the multi-causal factors that may have
contributed to the escalation of conflict in the first place. Beginning in the 1990s, crisis operations
increased in war-torn countries and regions throughout the world along with the numbers of those
providing relief, primarily humanitarian organizations and international actors. Multinational
military forces also served a greater peacekeeping role in these internal wars. The media added a
new measure of influence to the response to such crises in the form of greater access and live
reporting.
In crises resulting from conflict or natural disasters, population movements often occur within the
affected country or flow to countries in close proximity. In these situations the plight of the
refugee1 is one critical element of population movement; the internally displaced person (IDP) is
another.2 The displaced require particular protection, the basis of which may be found in
international humanitarian law, and sustained emergency assistance, which is usually provided by
U.N. system agencies, governments, international entities, international intergovernmental
organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In many protracted civil conflicts,
where groups within a country are fighting and in the absence of a political solution, the course
agreed on by the international community might be to provide humanitarian assistance to the
victims. This assistance may last for many years. Refugees may be stranded in camps for decades
or IDPs may be separated from their homes for long periods. Conducting a humanitarian
operation in an area of conflict often means that access to populations in need and the distribution
of emergency relief supplies is hampered by security concerns, not only for those needing
assistance but for humanitarian personnel as well. Thus, providing humanitarian and refugee
assistance has become increasingly complicated and expensive—sources of funding, civil-
military relations and operations, human rights concerns, aid worker security, protection, and
access are just some of the central issues facing the aid community. The ongoing conflict in and
around Syria demonstrates some of these challenges.
In addition, natural disasters affect millions of people each year who require prolonged and urgent
assistance. The event may be sudden (like the 2010 earthquake in Haiti) or protracted (like
drought conditions in the Horn of Africa and southern Africa and the possible long-term effects of
climate change). Responses to natural disasters are typically multilateral and less likely to be
hindered by the politics at hand, although the situation in Burma following the May 2008 cyclone
could argue the opposite.3

1 Defined broadly as those seeking asylum outside their country of citizenship with protection provided under
international law.
2 A direct result of internal wars, the internally displaced are also seeking asylum but within their state’s borders. IDPs
do not have the same protection as refugees under international law. The plight of this group has gained international
recognition as the estimated numbers of IDPs worldwide far exceed the numbers of refugees. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees has often been involved in providing assistance for IDPs.
3 For more information, see CRS Report RL34481, Cyclone Nargis and Burma’s Constitutional Referendum, by
Michael F. Martin and Rhoda Margesson.
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Overview of the U.S. Response
The United States is a major contributor to relief efforts in international crises and disaster
situations. Key relief-related policy issues likely to be of concern in the 113th Congress include
budget priorities, levels of funding, the sources of other support available worldwide, and the
ways in which operational assistance is delivered.4 In FY2012, the U.S. government contributed
more than $4 billion to disaster relief worldwide.5 Congress has consistently supported
humanitarian efforts as a means of responding to natural disasters (such as floods and
earthquakes) and man-made crises (such as war) in the short term, taking the lead and promoting
a U.S. presence.6
Humanitarian assistance generally receives strong bipartisan congressional support. Congress has
given the President broad authority in this area. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-
195), as amended, authorizes the United States to participate in disaster relief efforts and gives the
President great flexibility to respond to disasters with a wide range of government-funded
humanitarian assistance.7
In 1993, President Clinton designated for the first time the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) as the Special Coordinator for International Disaster
Assistance.8 In this capacity the Administrator coordinates the U.S. government’s response to
both natural and man-made disasters. The Administrator also calls upon federal agencies to
provide assistance; contracts with and funds private voluntary agencies to provide humanitarian
assistance; and coordinates the U.S. response with that of other countries.
Defining Humanitarian Assistance
The very nature of humanitarian emergencies—the need to respond quickly in order to save lives
and provide relief—has resulted in a broad definition of humanitarian assistance, on both a policy
and operational level. While humanitarian assistance is assumed to address urgent food, shelter,
and medical needs, the agencies within the U.S. government providing this support expand or
contract the definition in response to circumstances.
The legislation governing humanitarian or disaster assistance leaves the decision on the type of
assistance required to the President. U.S. humanitarian assistance in disasters and international
crises is broad and far-reaching; it covers many elements directly concerned with the provision of

4 These key policy issues may be applied in the global context, but also in the U.S. response to specific crises of
concern to Congress.
5 This figure represents total humanitarian assistance funding from the State Department and USAID. It does not
include funding from DOD. Due to the unanticipated nature of many disasters, humanitarian aid budget allocations
often increase throughout the year as demands arise. Countries that have experienced or are experiencing a crisis or
natural disaster receive U.S. aid through several key worldwide emergency humanitarian assistance, including accounts
for disaster (International Disaster and Famine Assistance or IDA); emergency food relief (P.L. 480 Title II); and
refugee programs (Migration and Refugee Assistance or MRA and Emergency Refugee Migration Assistance or
ERMA). Except in the case of MRA, these accounts are generally used to respond to emergency situations and are not
integrated into long-term development strategies.
6 U.S. private contributions and efforts are also part of the overall response but not addressed in this report.
7 §491-493 of P.L. 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
8 § 493 of P.L. 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
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relief and strategies for strengthening how people survive over time.9 Congress broadly defines
humanitarian activities in an effort to enable the U.S. response to be as flexible as possible to
adapt to humanitarian needs. Assistance can include the provision of basic needs, child survival
strategies, and assistance to refugees, but in practice the provision of humanitarian assistance is
typically case and time specific.10
Exemptions for Humanitarian Assistance
In general, humanitarian assistance is exempt from the regulations implementing various types of
foreign aid sanctions.11 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (P.L. 87-195), allows the
President to provide disaster assistance, “notwithstanding any other provision of this or any other
Act,” which would otherwise prohibit or restrict aid to selected countries, such as economic
sanctions.
Selected U.S. Activities and Coordination
Categories of humanitarian assistance can be broken down into several main elements including
relief and rehabilitation, food assistance, refugee programs, and logistical and operational
support. Three central parts of the U.S. government—USAID, the State Department, and the
Department of Defense—provide humanitarian assistance and cover a mix of these activities as
described below.12 USAID is the central U.S. agency charged with coordinating U.S. government
and private sector foreign assistance.
United States Agency for International Development
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), within USAID’s Bureau for Democracy,
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), provides non-food humanitarian assistance
during international crises and disasters and can respond immediately with relief materials and
personnel, many of whom are often already in the field. OFDA was established in 1964 to
coordinate what had previously been an ad hoc U.S. response to international disasters. It

9 A livelihood strategy considers the specific context and circumstances of the situation in designing effective programs
that work with local abilities to cope with emergencies.
10 What is less clear is when an activity might be considered humanitarian as differentiated from post-conflict transition
or reconstruction, and to what degree this distinction needs to remain flexible to adapt to changes in policy or
operations on the ground. In an operational sense, humanitarian and other assistance is often provided on parallel
tracks, and there is usually an overlap in activities in the transition from one phase to another.
11 The decision as to what is considered humanitarian versus non-humanitarian aid is often made on a case-by-case
basis. For example, in the India-Pakistan situation in 1998, sanctions were applied following India’s nuclear tests;
under the Pressler Amendment, all aid was cut off except for specific relief assistance programs.
12 In addition, although not the focus of this report, other parts of the U.S. government that support humanitarian
assistance include the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Forest Service, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),
the Department of Health and Human Services (HSS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which contribute
technical assistance to OFDA as needed in response to humanitarian emergencies.
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facilitates the U.S. government emergency assistance. OFDA provides some assistance through
its own personnel, but the bulk of its activities are carried out through grants to United Nations
(U.N.) agencies, other international organizations (IOs), international governmental and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and private or religious voluntary organizations (PVOs).
OFDA also coordinates with the U.S. embassy or USAID mission in the affected country, the
government of the country suffering the disaster, and other
governments. Funding for USAID/OFDA is authorized and
Role of the U.S. Government and
appropriated in annual Foreign Operations legislation.
Private Sector in Humanitarian Aid
Delivery
A response to a disaster generally begins with the U.S.
ambassador or chief of mission responding to a request
Most development and humanitarian assistance
activities are not directly implemented by U.S.
from the affected country’s government for assistance.
government personnel but by private sector entities,
OFDA has use of up to $50,000 (through Disaster
either non-profit or commercial. Generally speaking,
Assistance Authority) immediately available, which it
government foreign service and civil servants
releases to the USAID mission or U.S. embassy, generally
determine the direction and priorities of the aid
within 24 hours. This money is then provided to the local
program, allocate funds while keeping within
congressional requirements, ensure that appropriate
Red Cross/Red Crescent or a similar local disaster
projects are in place to meet aid objectives, select
response organization, or it may be used to buy relief
implementors, and monitor the implementation of
supplies or hire personnel locally. The United States also
those projects for effectiveness and financial
begins working with the affected government through the
accountability. At one time, USAID professionals
ambassador to determine what, if any, additional aid may
played a larger role in implementing aid programs,
but the effect of budget cuts on personnel and the
be needed.
emergence of private sector alternatives over the
past several decades have led to a shift in
USAID/OFDA can respond immediately with cash, relief
responsibilities. Private sector aid implementors,
materials, and personnel to any kind of disaster, whether
usual y employed as contractors or grantees, may be
man-made or natural. The President has the authority to set
individual “personal service contractors,” consulting
firms, non-profit NGOs, universities, or charitable
the terms and conditions of the aid provided. As a general
PVOs. These currently carry out the vast array of aid
rule, assistance provided by USAID/OFDA lasts about 90
projects in all sectors.13
days, although the agency may continue monitoring and
mitigation projects for a longer period. Some USAID/OFDA personnel are located in various
countries around the world and can move quickly to a disaster area. OFDA also has Disaster
Assistance Response Teams (DARTS), groups of experts that can be brought together quickly to
respond to different types of disasters. These groups may be sent to the area in anticipation of a
disaster, such as a tropical storm or flood that has been predicted by the weather service. Once a
DART is deployed, a Washington, DC-based Response Management Team (RMT) is also
activated.
Under the legislation governing disaster assistance, the President is authorized to borrow up to
$50 million in any fiscal year from any other section of the economic assistance part of the
foreign aid program if funding within the USAID/OFDA budget is inadequate. Generally, this
money is borrowed from programs already planned for countries within the region. These
borrowed funds may be repaid through passage by Congress of a supplemental appropriation.
USAID regional bureaus may also reprogram their projects within the disaster region in response
to local needs, or they may transfer funds to USAID/OFDA to carry out disaster related programs.

13 This text was drawn from CRS Report R40213, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, by Curt
Tarnoff and Marian L. Lawson.
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USAID/OFDA can also request the use of facilities, equipment, or personnel from other agencies
as needed. For example, U.S. weather prediction facilities and satellites may be used to track
storms, droughts, or floods. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention specialists are relied upon
for identifying and responding to outbreaks of disease.
Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480)14
The Food for Peace Act (FPA), historically referred to as P.L. 480, is the main legislative vehicle
that authorizes foreign food assistance.15 Funding for FPA programs is authorized in annual
Agriculture appropriations bills. One of the components of FPA is Title II, Emergency and Private
Assistance, which provides for the donation of U.S. agricultural commodities to meet emergency
and nonemergency food needs in foreign countries. Title II provides food as grant aid that does
not need to be repaid and is the primary disaster aid channel for U.S. food aid. Title II is
administered by USAID.
The legislation gives the USAID Administrator wide authority to provide food aid and contains a
“notwithstanding clause” that allows food aid to be provided despite prohibitions in other
legislation. Commodities may be made available for direct distribution to the needy, or for sale,
barter, or other disposition, according to the determination of the Administrator.
The United States is by far the largest international contributor of emergency food aid in disaster
situations. In recent years, most emergency food aid has been provided to victims of complex
humanitarian emergencies, helping people displaced by warfare and unable to grow or obtain
food in their traditional way. Crisis conditions often last many years. Food aid programs generally
target the most vulnerable populations, including children, pregnant and nursing mothers, the
elderly, sick and handicapped, and those identified as malnourished. Title II grant food aid is
mostly provided for humanitarian relief but may also be used for development-oriented purposes
through governments, intergovernmental entities, PVOs, and multilateral organizations, such as
the U.N. World Food Program (WFP).
As with other USAID/OFDA aid, food aid may be prepositioned in regions that are vulnerable to
disaster, or diverted from a less pressing food aid program in a nearby country that would be
replenished later. Food aid that is not prepositioned or diverted from nearby countries may take
several months to reach a disaster site. At least 75% of U.S. food aid tonnage must be shipped on
U.S. flagged vessels. Section 416 (b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 provides for the donation of
surplus U.S. agricultural commodities held by the Commodity Credit Corporation to needy
countries, including those suffering from disasters. This program is managed by the Department
of Agriculture.
Development professionals have long raised concerns about the efficiency and effectiveness of
U.S. food assistance. In the FY2014 budget, the Administration has proposed changes in U.S.

14 For more information about food aid, see CRS Report R41072, International Food Aid Programs: Background and
Issues
, by Charles E. Hanrahan.
15Authorized in §§201-207 of P.L. 83-480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as
amended. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy renamed it the “Food for Peace Act.” Congress officially changed the
name to Food for Peace Act in the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246). Additional information on Food for Peace Act (P.L.
480) food aid is available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/food-aid.asp.
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food aid programs that would substantially alter the way in which the United States provides food
security assistance.16
Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation
The Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC), which operates within USAID’s Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), was established in November 2011.
Previously named the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), CMC is an operational link established
to improve USAID’s coordination of humanitarian assistance with the U.S. military. It works to
align defense and development policies, plans, and programs to leverage the capabilities of each
agency to achieve better development outcomes. Senior USAID staff are assigned to the five
geographic Combatant Commands and help assess development needs. Joint exercises with the
military are ongoing training in preparation for future disasters. Training for both the military’s
civil affairs officers and USAID workers is also intended to increase knowledge and cooperation,
and capacity at the operational level. The OMA is also a contact point between NGOs and the
military, and allows each to benefit from the other’s operational experience while at the same
time contributing to the administration and delivery of humanitarian assistance.17
Other Offices and Funds
The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) provides post-disaster transition assistance, which
includes mainly short-term peace and democratization projects with some attention to
humanitarian elements (e.g., community projects such as housing, electricity, water) but not
emergency relief.18 OTI funding is often provided during the early recovery phase of a
humanitarian emergency or disaster. Additionally, the Office of Conflict Management and
Mitigation (CMM) provides transition assistance towards development through early intervention
in the causes and consequences of conflict.
There are three funds that can be used for disaster assistance and that are focused on specific
issues—Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF), the Leahy War Victims Fund (LWVF),
and the Victims of Torture Fund (VOT). They are coordinated by DCHA through funds reserved
by Congress each year.
Department of State
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) deals with problems of refugees
worldwide, conflict victims, and populations of concern to the U.N. High Commissioner for

16 For more information on proposed food aid reforms, see CRS Report R41072, International Food Aid Programs:
Background and Issues
, by Charles E. Hanrahan.
17 For more information on CMC, see http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-
conflict-and-humanitarian-assistance/office-4.
18 Other departments within USAID may provide some form of humanitarian assistance but it is unclear how much
because humanitarian activities may be a part but not the central focus of the program, such as women’s health, child
survival, trauma counseling and social welfare, and demining, activities that may be considered by some to be
humanitarian.
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Refugees (UNHCR), often including internally displaced persons (IDPs). Humanitarian
assistance includes a range of services from basic needs to community services to tolerance
building and dialogue initiatives. Key issues addressed by PRM include protection (refugees,
asylum issues, identification, returns, tracing activities) and quick impact, small community
projects.
Refugee funds are provided as cash grants to international governmental and NGO refugee
organizations. These include U.N. agencies such as UNHCR and the U.N. Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC).
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund
The Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA) is a contingency fund that
remains available until spent and is replenished as needed by Congress. P.L. 103-236 sets the
maximum amount of money that can be in this account at $100 million, although appropriations
have been made that exceed this amount. Established in 1962, ERMA gives the President wide
latitude in responding to refugee emergencies.19 Refugees are defined as those fleeing their
homeland due to persecution on account of their religion, race, political opinion, or social or
ethnic group. The law contains a “notwithstanding clause” that waives prohibitions against
providing aid contained in any other legislation. The legislation establishing ERMA places certain
requirements on the President. The President must publish a Presidential Determination in the
Federal Register and keep the appropriate congressional committees informed of drawdowns.
Refugee emergencies lasting more than a year are incorporated into the regular budget of the
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account through PRM. Both ERMA and MRA are
authorized in Department of State legislation and appropriated in Foreign Operations legislation.
Department of Defense
The Department of Defense (DOD) provides support to stabilize emergency situations, including
the transport and provision of food, shelter and supplies, logistical support, search and rescue,
medical evacuations, and refugee assistance.20 This includes the provision of 2,300 calorie low-
cost humanitarian daily rations to alleviate hunger after foreign disasters. The incremental costs
for all DOD humanitarian assistance for both natural and man-made disasters are funded through
the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Action (OHDACA) account in annual DOD
appropriations.
Defense Security Cooperation Agency
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is the central DOD agency that synchronizes
global security cooperation programs, funding, and efforts across the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, State Department, Combatant Commands, the services, and U.S.
civilian industry. Under DSCA oversight, the Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief

19 Authorized in §§2 and 3 of P.L. 87-510, the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962.
20 For more information on the evolution of DOD’s role in responding to humanitarian crises, see archived CRS Report
RL34639, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for
Congress
, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino.
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and Mine Action (HDM) manages DOD humanitarian assistance programs funded with
OHDACA appropriations in all Geographic Combatant Commands. This includes humanitarian
projects, transportation of DOD and privately donated humanitarian material, humanitarian mine
action programs, and foreign disaster relief.
DOD provides assistance in humanitarian emergencies under several provisions in law. The
primary authority21 is Title 10, Section 2561 (formerly Section 2551), which allows the use of
appropriated funds for humanitarian assistance “for the purpose of providing transportation of
humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide.”22 The Secretary of State
determines that this provision should be used and requests DOD to respond to a disaster with
specific assistance such as helicopter transport, provision of temporary water supplies, or road
and bridge repair. DOD response time depends upon what is being requested and how long it
takes to get personnel and equipment to the site of the emergency. If possible, military personnel
join USAID’s OFDA assessment team to help determine the type of aid that can be provided by
DOD. Under this provision, DOD generally limits its service activities to those that stabilize the
emergency situation, such as road or bridge repair, but generally does not undertake projects that
include rebuilding. The law requires an annual report to Congress on the use of funds.
Title 10 also contains a section that helps private voluntary agencies transport donated
humanitarian goods to disaster sites. Section 402, the Denton program, named after former
Member of Congress Jeremiah Denton, authorizes shipment of privately donated humanitarian
goods on U.S. military aircraft on a space-available basis. The donated goods must be certified as
appropriate for the disaster by USAID’s OFDA and can be bumped from the transport if other
U.S. government aid must be transported. Donated goods can also be shipped on commercial
vessels, using Section 2561 funds.
Section 506 (a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 allows the draw down of military
equipment to a limit of $100 million in any fiscal year if the President determines that an
unforeseen emergency exists that requires immediate military assistance and the requirement
cannot be met under any other provision. Before this provision can be used the President must
notify the Speaker of the House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in writing by
issuing a Presidential Directive explaining and justifying the need for the equipment being used.
This request is handled by the Department of State and the National Security Council.
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
Although its primary purpose is not focused on disaster and emergency response activities,
another subset of DOD Humanitarian Assistance, known as Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
(HCA) activities, is authorized under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 401. Under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary of Defense, humanitarian and civic assistance activities are authorized in
conjunction with authorized military operations of the Armed Forces in a country if it is
determined that the activities would (1) promote the security interests of both the United States

21 §404 of Title 10 also authorizes DOD to provide foreign disaster assistance. It is not generally used because it is
considered to be somewhat cumbersome and requires an expansive report to Congress.
22 §2561 is also used for more than disaster and emergency response activities.
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and the country in which the activities are to be carried out, and (2) promote the specific
operational readiness skills of the members of the Armed Forces who participate in the activity.23
HCA activities under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 401 authority are separate from HA programs
managed by DSCA and placed under direct oversight of Secretary of Defense.
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance: Role of Congress and
Current Funding Levels

Congressional Role
Congress plays a key role in funding U.S. humanitarian assistance. The global humanitarian
accounts (MRA, ERMA, IDA, and P.L. 480) have generally been approved by Congress at the
requested level. At times, however, the amount of disaster assistance provided during a fiscal year
exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress. Congress has provided the President with the
authority to borrow up to $50 million from economic assistance accounts in the foreign aid
program. In some cases, particularly when disasters occur during the appropriations process,
congressional amendments reimbursing a particular agency for a specific disaster may become
part of the next year’s appropriation for that agency.
Congress is also generally supportive of supplemental appropriations that reimburse agencies for
their expenditures, either to replenish the emergency accounts or other accounts that have been
used to provide assistance. When there is difficulty in passing supplemental legislation, the debate
is generally over non-disaster items, such as long-term reconstruction aid for the devastated area,
or non-germane amendments added to the legislation rather than opposition to disaster assistance
funding itself.
Funding: FY2012 to FY2014 Request24
Humanitarian assistance is intended to save lives and meet basic human needs in the wake of
natural disasters and conflicts. In FY2012, humanitarian assistance funding appropriated through
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs totaled $4.563 billion. The FY2013 full-year
continuing resolution increased funding over the FY2012 level for two key humanitarian
assistance accounts. IDA increased from $1.095 billion to an estimated $1.55 billion, with the
increased funds designated as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).25 The MRA account
increased from $1.975 billion to $2.740 billion, also with OCO funds. In addition, the

23 Title 10 U.S.C. §401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations.
24 Most funding for global humanitarian assistance accounts is administered through the State Department and USAID.
This section does not include funding appropriated through OHDACA or other DOD accounts. Some of the text of this
section appears in CRS Report R43043, The FY2014 State and Foreign Operations Budget Request, by Susan B.
Epstein, Marian L. Lawson, and Alex Tiersky.
25 Funding for OCO supports “extraordinary, but temporary, costs of the Department of State and USAID in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan.” See Executive Budget Summary, Function 150 and Other International Programs, Fiscal
Year 2014, p. 97.
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Administration transferred previously appropriated OCO funds for the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund to the MRA account to respond to the crisis in Syria.
The Obama Administration’s FY2014 budget request includes $4.131 billion for humanitarian
assistance accounts, including $1.761 billion for MRA, $2.045 billion for IDA, $0.25 billion for
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (of which $0.20 billion is specifically for Syria),
and $0.075 billion for a new Emergency Food Assistance Contingency Fund. Of the IDA funds,
$0.629 billion is allocated to OFDA to respond to natural disasters, civil strife, food security, and
displaced populations. The remaining $1.416 billion is designated for Food for Peace activities
currently funded through the Agriculture appropriation.26 In total, the humanitarian assistance
request for FY2014 is about 9% below the FY2012 enacted level.
Other International Humanitarian
Assistance Efforts

The United States responds with varying amounts of relief and recovery assistance, typically in
coordination with its international partners. The sheer number of players in the field, including a
range of actors and interests, creates a complicated coordination challenge and often contributes
to duplication of efforts or competition over the same sources of money and projects. Those
involved may include, for example, numerous U.N. agencies, other international organizations
(IOs), bilateral and multilateral donors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
International actors provide relief either through financial contributions to the government of the
affected country or aid organizations, or by directly providing in-kind support in the form of relief
supplies and emergency personnel. Local, regional, and national authorities may also have a role
in the provision of assistance, law enforcement, and access control. It is important to note that
local aid organizations may be critical because they often know the terrain, the available
resources, and the community, whereas the international community may bring to bear greater
resources and coordinating capacity.
While the relief operation itself is often daunting in terms of the demands of those in need—from
life saving action required to the provision of food and shelter under harsh physical conditions—
the response system has many moving parts. The United Nations works with a wide number and
variety of aid organizations and donors. Within the U.N. system, in addition to the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the World Food Program (WFP), the World
Health Organization (WHO), the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) all contribute to efforts to
respond to a crisis.27 OCHA also coordinates with IOs such as the International Committee of the

26 The Administration’s FY2014 budget for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) does not request funding for
Food for Peace Title II (emergency and nonemergency food assistance). Instead, the Administration proposes to shift
funding for international food aid to three other assistance accounts. Under the proposed food aid reform measures, the
Administration proposes to shift $1.1 billion of Food for Peace funds to the IDA account for emergency food response.
Together with $300 million of IDA funds for cash-based food security programs, total emergency food aid would be
$1.4 billion in FY2014. The Administration’s budget also proposes to shift $250 million to Development Assistance for
a Community Development Resilience Fund. In addition, the Administration’s budget proposes to create a new
Emergency Food Assistance Contingency Fund ($75 million) to provide emergency food assistance for unexpected and
urgent food needs. For more information about proposed food aid reforms, see CRS Report R41072, International
Food Aid Programs: Background and Issues
, by Charles E. Hanrahan.
27 As one of its functions, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) tracks worldwide
(continued...)
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Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and a wide range of
NGOs, many of which are implementing partners and provide much of the operational support on
the ground. In addition, other internationals—governments, militaries, intergovernmental entities
such as the European Union—are often part of the response network.
A key determinant in the response to humanitarian emergencies is, not surprisingly, level of prior
planning, including the identification of responders—local, national, or international—and their
level of preparedness. Furthermore, it is widely recognized that in many crises, it is the people
who are least able to help themselves—those who are poor and those who have few, if any,
options to live elsewhere—who are most affected.28 Experts continue to emphasize the
importance of drawing on lessons learned from responses to previous crises and disasters. Some
of the ongoing challenges include communication between the government, aid agencies, and the
public; coordination among emergency responders; civil-military cooperation and division of
duties; and the planning and logistics involved in providing aid to less accessible, often more
insecure, areas.
Issues for Congress
Members of the 113th Congress may wish to take the following issues into account when
considering U.S. humanitarian assistance activities worldwide.
Competing Aid and Budget Priorities
Finding the resources to sustain U.S. funding or pledges to humanitarian crises may be difficult in
light of domestic budget constraints. When disasters require immediate emergency relief, the
Administration may fund pledges by depleting most global humanitarian accounts. In order to
respond to future humanitarian crises, however, these resources would need to be replenished. If
not replenished, U.S. capacity to respond to other emergencies could be affected.
In recent years, the United States has moved away from annual supplemental funding to replenish
humanitarian or other accounts. Instead, it has increased levels of funding during the regular
appropriations process. Some experts have argued there are negative impacts to relying too
heavily on supplemental funding. The timing of the supplemental appropriations cycle, which is
mid-year or later, has consequences, particularly for the recipients of the humanitarian assistance.
For example, budget uncertainty may result in program cuts, delays in decision making, and
disruptions in service. Humanitarian programs may also have difficulty spending funding
received too late in the fiscal year through supplemental appropriations, or may incur greater
expense in restarting programs that had to be cut back due to insufficient funding earlier in the
year. This is turn may create questions about the credibility and reliability of the United States as
a partner in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

(...continued)
contributions to disasters. See http://www.reliefweb.int. Also, see http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/
humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/ for USAID’s OFDA webpage. Relief Web is a good source of
information, although the accuracy is not guaranteed. See http://www.reliefweb.int.
28 “What Can We Learn from Year of Disasters?” December 29, 2005, Reuters AlertNet, http://www.alertnet.org.
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Congress has an interest in the cost and effectiveness of foreign affairs activities that promote
U.S. interests overseas. Across-the-board reductions (sequestration) in most federal defense and
nondefense discretionary programs, projects, and activities, including those in foreign affairs,
went into effect on March 1, 2013. Of ongoing interest will be the impact of these cuts on
humanitarian assistance programs.
Burdensharing and Donor Fatigue
Both Congress and the Administration encourage other countries to provide disaster assistance
and to turn pledges into actual commitments.29 It is not always evident whether figures listing
donor amounts represent pledges of support or more specific obligations.30 Pledges made by
governments do not always result in actual contributions. It also cannot be assumed that the funds
committed to relief actually represent new contributions, since the money may previously have
been allocated elsewhere. Moreover, it is not readily apparent how the actual cost of the
humanitarian emergency might be shared among international donors. Comparing U.S. and
international aid is also difficult because of the often dramatically different forms the assistance
takes (relief items versus cash, for instance).
Finding a balance between burdensharing on the one hand and donor fatigue on the other can
negatively impact relief operations during emergencies when immediate funds are required for a
response and are not forthcoming. Some experts are concerned about funding priorities and the
ongoing need for resources for other disaster areas.
Transparency and Efficacy
Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about transparency of donor contributions,
allocation of monies, and monitoring of projects by the United Nations. The United Nations
continues to address its financial tracking and reporting system. In responding to international
disasters, many contributions are also made directly to IOs and NGOs, which could raise the
same questions about transparency requirements. Moreover, while earmarks and time limits may
ensure greater accountability, they can also add pressure for organizations to spend contributed
funds, sometimes leading to unnecessary spending, waste, and duplicated efforts. Many also
argue that restrictions on use of funds often do not allow flexibility to adapt projects to better
meet the changing needs on the ground.
Humanitarian Operations and Security Challenges
Since the 1990s, limitations on the operating environment of humanitarian agencies have been a
topic of intense debate and discussion. A number of recent reports highlight increased incidences

29 Although the United States is the world’s largest provider of overall foreign assistance (which includes humanitarian
assistance) in absolute terms, it is often one of the lowest contributors among developed countries when measured as a
percentage of its economic capacity.
30Obtaining an exact up-to-date record of all international contributions in response to an ongoing disaster is often not
possible—in part because some assistance is not reported to governments or coordinating agencies—and in part
because of the delay in their recording. ReliefWeb can be a useful source of information, although its accuracy is not
guaranteed for the aforementioned reasons. See http://www.reliefweb.int.
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of insecurity and attacks on humanitarian staff.31 While a more consistent and expanded response
by the international community to humanitarian crises over the past two decades has meant that a
greater number of aid workers are operating in crisis areas, most security incidences are
reportedly concentrated in a limited number of high-profile contexts, such as Afghanistan,
Somalia, and Sudan. At the same time, other reports indicate that the ability of aid workers to
access populations at risk has decreased over time. This could in part be due to operations taking
place in a greater number of conflict areas, but other factors may include the actions of multiple
non-state actors or the role of sovereign governments in denying access. Furthermore, some
experts stress that humanitarian agencies need to be able to operate independently of external
military and political agendas but may not be able to do so. For example, some contend that,
increasingly, the lines are blurred between humanitarian and other actors, such as the role of the
military in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the inclusion of humanitarian response in
counter-insurgency operations, and the incorporation of humanitarian action within integrated
U.N. missions.32 Adherence to international humanitarian law and the traditional humanitarian
principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence are often cited as the underpinnings of the
provision of humanitarian assistance, but their application may vary by organization mandate and
situation. The security of the environment in which humanitarian organizations are operating is
complicated not only by the specific crisis itself, but the ways in which humanitarian actors
define their roles and responsibilities. Security and access are serious concerns and remain key
priorities within the humanitarian community.
Branding
A related issue concerns an interest on the part of many Members of Congress in the labeling or
“branding” of U.S. humanitarian aid delivered to areas of conflict so that recipients are aware of
its American origins. The U.S. government tries to balance the desire to maintain visibility as a
contributor of humanitarian assistance with concerns for the security of aid recipients and
implementing partners who could become possible targets of attacks. Finding appropriate ways
for the United States to leverage its political objectives without politicizing humanitarian aid
remains a significant challenge. There has been some debate about whether the United States
receives adequate political benefit from its humanitarian assistance efforts and that those who
receive assistance remain unaware of its origins, or assume it is from a foreign government other
than the United States. Syria is a case in point where some Members of Congress and observers
have argued that the United States should begin to more aggressively brand U.S. aid to enhance
local perceptions that the people of the United States stand in solidarity with Syrians.
Humanitarian groups argue that strategic objectives such as winning hearts and minds potentially
compromise the neutrality of humanitarian assistance in general. Others contend that a targeted
attack on a U.S.-labeled humanitarian organization could jeopardize broader humanitarian efforts
and perhaps funding. It is often unclear whether raising awareness of U.S. humanitarian
assistance would do much to change local perceptions in conflict areas.

31 See, for example, Aid Worker Security Report 2012, “Host States and their Impact on Security for Humanitarian
Operations:” Insecurity Insight, Policy Brief, “Humanitarian Staff Security in Armed Conflict,” 2013; The Journal of
Humanitarian Assistance, “Shrinking Humanitarian Space? Trends and Prospects on Security and Access,” November
24, 2010; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy Development and Studies Branch, “To Stay and
Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments,” 2011; EUROPA Press Release,
“Security of Humanitarian Aid Workers: A Concern at the Heart of the EU’s Humanitarian Action,” August 19, 2010.
32 Humanitarian Policy Group and the Stimson Center, U.N. Integration and Humanitarian Space, December 15, 2011.
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Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance
The provision of humanitarian assistance raises the potential for unexpected consequences. First,
it is important to examine whether humanitarian assistance is going to those for whom it is
intended. Evaluating and tracking provision of supplies is difficult during a conflict and
impossible to completely control. Second, there is the role of the NGO, including its mission and
sources of funding, in what has become a major independent enterprise in conflict areas. There is
the potential for misuse, intended or unintended, which may require closer analysis of the
performance of providers. Third, the safety and protection of refugees, IDPs, and humanitarian
workers is another important issue. A growing number of humanitarian workers in various parts
of the world have been put at great risk or lost their lives in providing humanitarian assistance.
The degree to which a security force protects humanitarian relief workers and parties to the
conflict will have some bearing on who is in charge, the security measures taken and provided,
and the perception of whether the humanitarian community has taken sides in the conflict. Fourth,
there is the question raised by some experts as to whether the provision of humanitarian
assistance is helpful—particularly in cases where there is no consensus on how or when to
intervene but only on the need to demonstrate action. Some question whether humanitarian
assistance in some instances actually prolongs conflict.
Links to Broader Foreign Policy Goals
More broadly, political considerations play a role in the way assistance is given and to whom.
While the images of human suffering portrayed by the media only reinforce the need to do
something, humanitarian assistance carries some weight as an instrument of “neutral”
intervention in crises and is the most flexible policy tool that can be quickly brought to bear in a
crisis. It can buy time and keep options open, and it may be an avenue to achieve minimal
consensus. Sometimes the easiest policy route to promote and implement, humanitarian
assistance can also expand beyond its immediate function. It may provide the means to maintain
some form of contact with a country/region, or mitigate tensions over policy towards a region
within the U.S. government or with and among its allies. Sometimes humanitarian assistance is
expanded beyond its immediate function to avert a crisis, to provide support to allies, and to
maintain a presence in the region. How it is used and whether it becomes more of a strategic,
policy tool depends upon the situation, what other governments are doing, and the degree to
which the United States has further interest in the region.
Providing humanitarian assistance also raises questions about implications for future action. On
the one hand, if the United States decides to reduce its humanitarian support, would this diminish
U.S. standing among its allies or affect its interests in other ways? On the other hand, since the
President has a great deal of flexibility over U.S. involvement, once commitment to a
humanitarian effort is made, does this make the long-term U.S. participation in reconstruction and
political solutions more likely? Regardless, it is clear that as crises proliferate, the level and
sources of U.S. humanitarian assistance will inevitably have an important impact not only on the
relief operation itself, but on broader foreign policy goals.

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Author Contact Information

Rhoda Margesson

Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov, 7-0425


Acknowledgments
Parts of this report are drawn from a previous report on the same topic, now out of print, by Lois McHugh.


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