U.S.-Taiwan Relationship:
Overview of Policy Issues
Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
Wayne M. Morrison
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
July 23, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41952
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues
Summary
The purpose and scope of this CRS report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the
major issues in the U.S. policy on Taiwan. This report will be updated as warranted. Taiwan
formally calls itself the sovereign Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the
ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in
1949. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a non-
diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in
Beijing in 1979. The State Department claims an “unofficial” U.S. relationship with Taiwan,
despite official contacts that include arms sales. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L.
96-8, has governed policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other
key statements that guide policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and
1982; as well as the “Six Assurances” of 1982. (See also CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan:
Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.)
For decades, Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the
United States. In 2012, Taiwan was the 11th-largest U.S. trading partner. Taiwan is a major
innovator and producer of information technology (IT) products, many of which are assembled in
the PRC by Taiwan-invested firms there. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect
international security (with potential U.S. intervention), the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.-
PRC cooperation. While the United States does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, it is in
reality an important autonomous actor. Today, 23 countries (including the Vatican) have
diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the ROC. Taiwan’s 23 million people enjoy self-governance
with democratic elections. After Taiwan’s presidential election in 2008, the United States
congratulated Taiwan as a “beacon of democracy.” Democracy has offered Taiwan’s people a
greater say in their status, given competing politics about Taiwan’s national identity and priorities.
Taiwan held presidential and legislative elections in January 2012. Kuomintang (KMT) President
Ma Ying-jeou won re-election against the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) candidate.
Since Taiwan and the PRC resumed their quasi-official dialogue in 2008 under President Ma and
cross-strait tension decreased, some have stressed the need to take steps by the United States and
by Taiwan to strengthen their relationship to advance U.S. interests. Another approach has viewed
closer cross-strait engagement as allowing U.S. attention to shift to expand cooperation with a
rising China, which opposes U.S. arms sales and other dealings with Taiwan. In any case,
Washington and Taipei have put more efforts into their respective relations with Beijing, while
contending that they have pursued a positive, parallel U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou has sought U.S. support for his policies, including Taiwan’s
inclusion in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) (in 2012), the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), and talks on maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.
Taiwan and the Philippines are concluding parallel investigations into the incident on May 9,
when the Coast Guard of the Philippines (a U.S. treaty ally) shot at a Taiwan fishing boat,
resulting in the death of a Taiwan fisherman, Taiwan’s sanctions, and bilateral tension. Other
policy issues include whether to approve arms sales, restart Cabinet-level visits, and continue
trade talks under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), or TIFA talks
(resumed in March 2013). The United States has concerns about Taiwan’s restrictions on U.S.
beef and pork, even as Taiwan has claimed attention to international organizations and standards.
Legislation in the 113th Congress includes H.R. 419, H.R. 772, H.R. 1151, H.R. 1960, H.Con.Res.
29, H.Res. 185, S. 12, S. 579, S. 1197, and S.Res. 167. Other congressional actions have focused
on arms sales. (See CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.)
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U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues
Contents
Overview: Policy Interests and Issues ............................................................................................. 1
Historical Background ............................................................................................................... 3
Bipartisan “One China” Policy .................................................................................................. 4
Democratic Politics ................................................................................................................... 5
Major Developments in Cross-Strait Engagement........................................................................... 6
Resumed Dialogue and Reduced Tension ................................................................................. 6
Cross-Strait Agreements ............................................................................................................ 7
Continuing Challenges .............................................................................................................. 8
Issues in U.S. Policy on Taiwan ..................................................................................................... 13
Overview ................................................................................................................................. 13
International Security .............................................................................................................. 14
International Organizations ..................................................................................................... 20
Arms Sales to Taiwan .............................................................................................................. 22
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) .................................................................................................. 23
Extradition Treaty .................................................................................................................... 24
Human Rights and Rule of Law .............................................................................................. 24
Democratic Elections (KMT and DPP) ................................................................................... 27
Restoring Trust and Resolving Disputes (Beef and Pork) ....................................................... 29
Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 31
Taiwan’s Global Trade ............................................................................................................. 32
Cross-Strait Economic Ties ..................................................................................................... 34
U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Investment Flows ............................................................................... 36
Legislation in the 113th Congress ................................................................................................... 41
Figures
Figure 1. Taiwan’s Trade with China as a Percent of its Total Trade: 2000 and 2012 ................... 35
Figure 2. Taiwan’s Annual Approved Outbound Investment to China: 1991-2012 ....................... 36
Figure 3. U.S.-Taiwan Merchandise Trade: 2000-2012 ................................................................. 37
Figure 4. Comparison of Taiwan Export Orders From the United States with U.S. Imports
from Taiwan: 2000-2012 ............................................................................................................ 39
Tables
Table 1. Taiwan’s Top Five Trading Partners: 2012....................................................................... 32
Table 2. Top Five U.S. Trade Commodities with Taiwan: 2012 .................................................... 37
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 42
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U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues
Overview: Policy Interests and Issues
The purpose and scope of this CRS report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the
major issues in the U.S. policy on Taiwan. Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and
political interest to the United States. While the United States does not diplomatically recognize
Taiwan, it is in reality an important autonomous actor in the world. Today, 23 countries including
the Vatican have diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the Republic of China (ROC).1 In what
many consider to be a model democracy, Taiwan’s 23 million people enjoy self-governance with
democratic elections. In 2012, Taiwan was the 11th-largest U.S. trading partner. It is the 7th-largest
market for U.S. agricultural products. Taiwan also is a major recipient of U.S. arms sales.
With active congressional involvement, the United States has played critical roles in Taiwan’s
economic development, political liberalization from an authoritarian dictatorship to a dynamic
democracy, self-defense against the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) military threats, and
preservation of international space. Overall, U.S. policy seeks to support security, political, and
economic interests that involve peace and stability, the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan’s
efforts to maintain international space, democracy and human rights in Taiwan, and U.S.
businesses in Taiwan. As a critical concern, the United States has interests in the ties or tension
across the Taiwan Strait, which affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention), the
U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.-PRC cooperation. The cross-strait relationship has grown
closer since the 1980s. When James Lilley arrived as the U.S. representative in Taipei in 1982, he
was one of the first officials to encourage cross-strait economic ties as the driver in a trend toward
greater peace and security.2 Indeed, closer economic engagement gradually has increased regular
contacts and reduced tension across the Taiwan Strait.
U.S. support for Taiwan has posed challenges to U.S. engagement with the PRC, though
Washington and Beijing have advanced an overall cooperative relationship since the 1970s. As
Washington has engaged with both Taipei and Beijing, long-standing issues for policy have
included how to balance U.S. relations with Taiwan and with the PRC, and also how to balance
maintaining the relationship with Taipei in its own right as opposed to approaching Taiwan as part
of Washington’s relationship with Beijing. For decades, Taipei has harbored fears about whether
Beijing’s cooperation with Washington has occurred at the expense of Taiwan’s interests. U.S.
policy seeks a cooperative relationship with a rising PRC, which opposes U.S. arms sales and
other official dealings with Taiwan as interference in its internal affairs in unifying with Taiwan
as a part of China. In an apparent contradiction, Beijing also seeks its preferred U.S. policies to
influence Taiwan. However, Taiwan considers itself a sovereign country. As Taiwan shifted from
an authoritarian political system, U.S. policy has been mindful of respecting its democracy.
After the Kuomintang (KMT) Party’s Ma Ying-jeou became president in Taiwan in May 2008, he
promptly resumed the dialogue across the Taiwan Strait after its suspension for a decade. The
PRC had accused his predecessor, the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP’s) Chen Shui-bian, of
pushing for de jure independence of Taiwan. The resumption of the cross-strait dialogue resulted
in even closer economic engagement between Taiwan and the PRC as well as a reduction of
1 Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Belize, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
Grenadines, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland, and Vatican.
2 James Lilley with Jeffrey Lilley, China Hands (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
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tension, which was welcomed by the United States. This situation afforded U.S. policy
opportunities to strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship and/or shift attention to seek greater
cooperation from Beijing. President Ma Ying-jeou has sought U.S. support, including arms sales,
for Taiwan’s stronger position to sustain cross-strait talks. One view has stressed that the United
States and Taiwan needed to strengthen their relationship to pursue U.S. interests. Another
approach has stressed that the new era of cross-strait engagement allowed for improved U.S. ties
with a rising China and that Taiwan has pursued its own interests in engaging with the PRC. In
any case, Washington and Taipei have put more efforts into their respective relations with Beijing,
while contending that they have pursued a parallel, positive U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
On October 4, 2011, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on “Why Taiwan
Matters.” Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell testified that the United States sought a
strategic “rebalancing” (or “pivot”) of comprehensive priorities to focus more on the Asia-Pacific
region. He stated that “a critical part of that overarching strategy is building a comprehensive,
durable, and unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan.” Campbell stressed
that “the bedrock of that relationship is our security relationship.” He called the Taiwan Relations
Act (TRA) one of the most important acts of “legislative leadership” and foreign policy in U.S.
history. He recognized that the TRA stipulates that the United States must maintain the capacity
to resist coercion, maintain peace and stability, and provide necessary defense articles to Taiwan.
He acknowledged that the Administration must “consult actively on Capitol Hill.” Campbell also
reaffirmed that the Six Assurances as well as the TRA and three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques
form the foundation of U.S. policy on Taiwan.
Overall, some salient issues for policy include the following:
• How effectively is the Administration encouraging Taiwan to support U.S.
interests in peace and prosperity, including in U.S. alliances and the cross-strait
relationship? Is the Administration effectively influencing Taiwan to play a
helpful, stabilizing role in maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas?
• How might Congress exercise its roles in U.S. policy or engage with Taiwan?
How might Congress ensure momentum in strengthening U.S.-Taiwan ties?
• Should the United States sell more weapons and which ones, as requested by
Taiwan for its self-defense? How effectively is the Administration encouraging
Taiwan to strengthen its self-defense, including by increasing the defense budget?
• Should the United States resume visits by Cabinet-level officials to Taiwan?
• Should the United States also favor Taiwan’s observership (if not membership) in
supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, such as the
World Health Organization (WHO), International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), and U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)?
• Should U.S. policy allow or encourage more senior officials from Taiwan to visit
and encourage expanded communication with Taiwan’s president?
• Should policy allow U.S. flag and general military officers to visit Taiwan?
• How should the United States support transparent, fair, and impartial rule of law,
elections, and freedoms in Taiwan, while respecting Taiwan’s democracy?
• How should policy press Taiwan to contribute more in weapons nonproliferation,
counter-piracy, foreign aid, and other areas of international security?
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• What is Taiwan’s role in the U.S. comprehensive strategy for rebalancing
priorities toward the Asian-Pacific region (so-called “pivot” to the Pacific)?
• Should decision-makers review policy on Taiwan, with the last review in 1994?
• Should the United States press Taiwan to notify the cross-strait Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) of 2010 to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and pay more attention to benefits for U.S. companies?
• How should U.S. policy encourage Taiwan to remove trade barriers to U.S. goods
and services?
• With resumption of talks under the 1994 Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) after they were in limbo for years due largely to Taiwan’s beef
restrictions, what should be U.S. priorities to deepen bilateral economic ties?
• Should the United States seek to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with
Taiwan, and/or encourage Taiwan’s efforts to join multilateral trade negotiations,
such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?
• Should Taiwan’s growing economic dependence on the PRC be of concern to the
United States?
Historical Background
Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC
set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC does not recognize the PRC founded in
Beijing by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949. The PRC claims that the ROC ceased to
exist in 1949 and that Taiwan is a province of “one China.” (The Qing Empire had incorporated
Taiwan as a full province in 1885-1895, when more settlers moved from China to the island.) The
PRC and ROC do not recognize each other or two Chinas. The ROC refers to the other side of the
strait as the “mainland.” The PRC opposes recognition of the ROC and seeks unification of
Taiwan with the mainland as a part of “one China,” without renouncing the use of force. Taiwan
has stated an intention to set aside the dispute over sovereignty. In any case, since 1949, the ROC
has governed only on Taiwan, and the PRC based in Beijing has ruled mainland China.
Previously called Formosa, Taiwan never has been ruled by the CPC or as a part of the PRC, and
until 1945, had never been ruled by the ROC. In Taiwan after World War II, October 25, 1945, or
“Retrocession Day,” marked the ROC’s claim of “recovering” Formosa from Japan. However,
upon Japan’s surrender, that was the first time that the ROC’s military forces had occupied the
island of Formosa. When the Qing Empire ceded in perpetuity Formosa to Japan under the Treaty
of Shimonoseki of 1895, the ROC was not yet in existence. Moreover, the colony’s people did not
have a say in self-determination of their status or identity. The Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist
Party of China, has contended that the ROC claimed Formosa at Japan’s surrender in August
1945, with no country challenging the island’s status. The ROC under KMT forces led by Chiang
Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan in 1949, when the Communist forces led by Mao Zedong took over
mainland China. Taiwan’s people have faced a social, ethnic, linguistic, and political issue of
whether to identify with Taiwan or China, with two major groups of local “Taiwanese” and
“mainlanders” (folks who retreated to Taiwan with the KMT forces and their descendants). The
KMT’s imposed authoritarian rule and martial law on Taiwan, including a massacre called the
“228 Incident” of February 28, 1947, exacerbated difficulties between the groups. In July 2013,
President Ma said that over 29,700 victims of the “White Terror” period got compensation.
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Bipartisan “One China” Policy
One of the first powers to support reforms and the new republic of progressive leaders in early
20th century China, the United States recognized the ROC government from 1913 until the end of
1978.3 By the early 1970s, the United States looked to switch the diplomatic recognition to the
PRC in Beijing while figuring out a framework to maintain the relationship with Taiwan. As a
scholar on China and member of the National Security Council staff in 1977-1980 wrote,4
Many factors produced the change in U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan in the 1970s,
some tactical, some strategic. The timing of the initial step was unquestionably related to
the Vietnam War and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The second and third steps were facilitated
by and partly a response to the Soviet expansion. But these were transitory
considerations. From a longer-term perspective, America’s China policy of the 1950s and
1960s could not be sustained. It was based on American acknowledgment of an absurd
claim. Taiwan was not, as it asserted, the government of mainland China. At the same
time, China’s position was unrealistic. The People’s Republic was not the government of
Taiwan. In fact, the two governments ruled different parts of Chinese territory, each
asserting that it was the rightful authority for all of China, each denying the legitimacy of
the other.
The United States has its own “one China” policy (vs. the PRC’s “one China” principle) and
position on Taiwan’s status. Not recognizing the PRC’s claim over Taiwan nor Taiwan as a
sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan’s status as unsettled. Since a declaration by
President Truman on June 27, 1950, during the Korean War, the United States has supported a
future determination of the island’s status in a peaceful manner. The United States did not state a
stance on the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972,
1979, and 1982. The United States simply “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides
of the Taiwan Strait. Washington has not promised to end arms sales to Taiwan for its self-
defense, although the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 terminated on December 31, 1979. U.S.
policy does not support or oppose Taiwan’s independence; U.S. policy takes a neutral position of
“non-support” for Taiwan’s independence. U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved
by the people on both sides of the strait: a “peaceful resolution,” with the assent of Taiwan’s
people in a democratic manner, and without unilateral changes. In short, U.S. policy focuses on
the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome.
The United States has maintained a non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of
the PRC in Beijing in 1979. The State Department claims an “unofficial” U.S. relationship with
Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales. Congress passed a law that did not
describe the relationship as official or unofficial. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L.
96-8, has governed policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. The
TRA stipulates the expectation that the future of Taiwan “will be determined” by peaceful means.
The TRA specifies that it is policy, inter alia, to consider any non-peaceful means to determine
Taiwan’s future “a threat” to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of “grave concern”
to the United States; “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character”; and “to maintain the
capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing
the security, or social or economic system of Taiwan’s people. The TRA provides a congressional
3 Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990).
4 Michel Oksenberg, “Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong in Sino-American Relations,” in Living with China, edited by
Ezra Vogel (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997).
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role in determining security assistance “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability.” The TRA set up the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) to carry out the day-
to-day matters of the relationship to sustain U.S. interests after the de-recognition of the ROC.
Since 1979, the TRA has had bipartisan support in guiding policy with a firm foundation and
flexible framework for the maintenance of the relationship with Taiwan.
In addition to the three Joint communiqués and the TRA, there is a fifth key statement that guides
U.S. policy on Taiwan. President Reagan offered “Six Assurances” to Taipei on July 14, 1982,
that in negotiating the third Joint Communiqué with the PRC, the United States: (1) has not
agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; (2) has not agreed to hold prior consultations
with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan; (3) will not play any mediation role between Taipei and
Beijing; (4) has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; (5) has not altered its position
regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and (6) will not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with
the PRC. (Also see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—
Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by Shirley A. Kan.)
Democratic Politics
Since those years when the United States dealt with the KMT authoritarian government in Taipei,
the relationship has grown both more robust and more complex with Taiwan’s democratization
and shared values about freedom. The United States supported Taiwan’s political liberalization
from an authoritarian dictatorship to a dynamic democracy. Democratization and electoral politics
have allowed the people a greater say in Taiwan’s identity (as part of China or a separate entity).
In 1986, the KMT did not crack down against the formation of Taiwan’s second major party, the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has leaned toward Taiwan’s independence. The KMT
then lifted Martial Law in 1987. In 1999, the DPP passed a Resolution on Taiwan’s Future. It
declared, inter alia, that after the elections for the national legislature in 1992, direct presidential
election in 1996, and constitutional reform to abolish the provincial government, Taiwan became
a democratic and independent country. The Resolution stated that Taiwan is not a part of the PRC
and that Taiwan and China should hold talks for understanding, economic cooperation, and peace.
At times, the PRC has reacted unfavorably to Taiwan’s democratic politics and implications for
sovereignty, particularly since its first democratic, direct presidential election in March 1996. The
PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “test-fired” missiles into sea areas close to Taiwan, which
provoked the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996. President Clinton deployed two aircraft carrier
battle groups near Taiwan in March 1996. The PRC threatened Taiwan after President Lee Teng-
hui characterized the cross-strait relationship as “special state-to-state ties” on July 9, 1999. On
March 18, 2000, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP won the presidential election. Chen’s DPP
administration brought Taiwan’s first democratic transfer of power from one party to another,
after 55 years of KMT rule. In recognition of Taiwan’s democracy, President Clinton declared in
2000 another condition that the resolution of the Taiwan question must be peaceful as well as
with the “assent” of Taiwan’s people. In 2003, President Bush expressed “opposition” to any
unilateral decision to change the “status quo.” On the TRA’s 25th anniversary, Representative
James Leach said at a hearing of the House International Relations Committee on April 21, 2004,
that Taiwan has the unique situation in which it can have de facto self-determination only if it
does not attempt to be recognized with de jure sovereignty. He urged Taiwan’s people to
recognize that they have greater security in “political ambiguity.”
Cross-strait tension rose again when the PRC accused President Chen (2000-2008) of promoting
Taiwan’s de jure independence (e.g., with a referendum on Taiwan’s membership in the U.N.
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during the presidential election on March 22, 2008). While opposing such referendums, President
Bush positioned two aircraft carriers near Taiwan, as the largely symbolic referendums were still
targets of the PRC’s belligerent condemnation. The referendums failed to be valid. The victory of
the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou ushered in Taiwan’s second democratic transfer of power from one
party to another. Bush congratulated Taiwan as a “beacon of democracy.” Some have stressed
Taiwan as a model democracy in a Chinese cultural context. (Also see CRS Report RL34441,
Security Implications of Taiwan’s Presidential Election of March 2008, by Shirley Kan.)
The KMT’s March 2008 presidential victory was preceded on January 12, 2008, by a sweeping
victory in which it swamped the DPP in elections for the Legislative Yuan (LY). Having won the
presidency as well in March, the KMT assumed solid control of the government in May 2008.
The 2008 legislative elections were the first held under new electoral rules adopted in 2005 under
an amendment to Taiwan’s constitution. The rules cut in half the size of the LY to 113 members
from its former size of 225 and increased the term of office from three years to four years. The
rules also instituted a new single-member district system employing two ballots for voters, similar
to systems used in Germany and Japan: one to be cast for a candidate and one to be cast for a
political party. As demonstrated by the electoral results, the new system favored larger, well-
organized parties and put smaller parties at a disadvantage. Two smaller opposition parties have
been the People’s First Party (PFP), initially allied with the KMT as “Blue” parties, and the
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), siding with the DPP as “Green” parties. Compared to the KMT,
the DPP and TSU have been more Taiwan-centric in their perspectives and wary of the PRC.
Major Developments in Cross-Strait Engagement
Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S.
intervention), the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.-PRC cooperation. Congressional oversight
has been concerned with support for U.S. interests, particularly respect for Taiwan’s democracy.
Since their first direct talks in 1992, Taiwan and the PRC have negotiated through quasi-official
organizations: the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) in Taipei and the Association for
Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) in Beijing. In discussing practical issues in initial
contact, the two sides agreed to disagree on the meaning of “one China” with the verbal formula
of “One China, Different Interpretations.” To Taipei, “China” is the ROC. To Beijing, “China” is
the PRC. However, years later, the CPC in Beijing and KMT in Taipei shifted to contend that they
reached a “1992 Consensus.” The DPP has disputed that there was a “consensus” and has argued
that any understanding was reached between two political parties without a democratic mandate.
Resumed Dialogue and Reduced Tension
In the two months between his election and his inauguration on May 20, 2008, President Ma
spoke of his intentions to begin normalizing cross-strait ties in a “cross-strait common market,” to
establish direct air links with the PRC, and to ease other restrictions on cross-strait contacts. In his
inaugural address, President Ma announced his “Three Noes”: “no unification, no independence,
and no use of force” to maintain the “status quo” and set aside the sovereignty dispute. He called
for a “diplomatic truce” with the PRC and pledged to stop using “dollar diplomacy” in a zero-sum
game to win or preserve diplomatic recognition around the world.5 After his inauguration,
5 “Dollar diplomacy” (or “checkbook diplomacy”) refers to both Taiwan and the PRC competing for diplomatic
(continued...)
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President Ma moved to improve cross-strait engagement, building on foundations laid by the
previous President Chen.6 KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung met with CPC General Secretary Hu
Jintao on May 28, 2008, the highest-level encounter between the two governments after 1949.7
Along with Washington’s actions to maintain the relationship with Taipei, it has pursued closer
engagement and reduced tension across the Taiwan Strait. Although the PRC objects to U.S.
security assistance to Taiwan as harming cross-strait “peaceful development,” economic
integration and other engagement between Taiwan and the mainland have intensified. Taipei
contends that U.S. support provides it with confidence and strength to engage with Beijing.
Cross-Strait Agreements
In June 2008, KMT President Ma Ying-jeou and the PRC leadership resumed the cross-strait
dialogue (after a decade) and pursued closer engagement, beyond seeking détente. President Ma
announced a priority of economic talks over political negotiations with Beijing. Taiwan’s reality
involved the PRC as Taiwan’s largest trading partner by 2003 and as many as 2 million of its
citizens already working and living on the mainland by 2008. By the end of 2009, Taiwan’s
companies had invested about $150 billion in over 77,000 projects in the past 20 years there.8
Since 2008, Taiwan has announced 9 rounds of SEF-ARATS talks along with the conclusion of
19 cross-strait primarily economic agreements. Those agreements included the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) to lower tariffs or relax access for 539 products
and services from Taiwan. Though politically controversial, President Ma promoted the ECFA
amid the opposition DPP’s protests and negotiated it within months, from January 2010 until it
was signed in June 2010. A range of government officials and their counterparts developed
routine contacts across the strait, including through phone calls. In May 2010, the two sides
opened the first quasi-official agencies (as tourism offices) in Beijing and Taipei. Two dramatic
changes cited by Taiwan’s people and foreign businesspeople have been direct flights across the
strait and an increase in tourists from the mainland. From mid-2008, when Taiwan allowed PRC
tour groups, until the end of 2011, 3 million PRC tourists visited Taiwan.9 In June 2011, Taiwan
announced deals that allowed individual mainland tourists and increased direct flights from 370
to 560 a week. In 2013, weekly passenger flights totaled 616 and cargo flights totaled 56. Visits
by PRC travelers (including those from Hong Kong and Macau) totaled 3.6 million in 2012,
accounting for about half of all visits. Taiwan’s dependence on PRC travelers increased.
Starting in 2009, Taiwan looked to conclude an agreement on investment protection for Taiwan’s
business people, but negotiations were difficult over issues that involved dispute resolution
(whether to have an international mechanism). After postponing an investment protection
agreement expected in June 2012, the two sides announced in August two agreements on
(...continued)
relations by promising to and investing huge sums in countries that may be wavering in their diplomatic allegiances.
6 Among other initiatives during the Chen Administration, in January 2005, Taiwan and the PRC launched the first
non-stop holiday direct charter flights flown in 55 years across the strait. These were expanded in 2006 with an
agreement to allow up to 168 direct annual round-trip charter passenger flights between the PRC and Taiwan.
7 On April 29, 2005, when the KMT was out of power, KMT Chairman Lien Chan met with CPC General Secretary Hu
Jintao, the first time the leaders of the KMT and CPC had met since World War II.
8 Kathrin Hille, “Straitened Times,” Financial Times, March 26, 2008; CNA, Taipei, December 23, 2009.
9 Central News Agency, Taipei, January 4, 2012.
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investment protection (including some allowance for arbitration) and customs cooperation. At the
9th round of talks on June 21, 2013, the two sides signed the 19th agreement (on trade in services).
Continuing Challenges
Despite the announcements of those agreements, the two sides did not sign an expected
agreement on taxation in 2009, in a dispute over the PRC’s proposal to tax income from stock
trading. At the 7th round in October 2011, the two sides also announced a “consensus” (not
agreement) on industrial cooperation. After failing to reach an agreement between banking
regulators in April 2011, the two sides announced a “consensus” in November. Still, the Taiwan
side believed it pragmatically negotiated benefits for its banks.
Taiwan continues to face challenges in protecting its citizens from detentions in the PRC
(including secret detentions in PRC “black jails”). From June 18, 2012, just before the investment
protection agreement was expected, until August 11, the PRC’s Ministry of State Security (MSS)
detained Chung Ting-pang (Bruce Chung), a visitor from Taiwan, for allegedly sabotaging
national and public security in activities associated with Falun Gong (a banned group in the
PRC). Representative Dana Rohrabacher wrote a letter on July 10 to urge President Ma to speak
out strongly against Chung’s detention. (Later, on December 18, Chung testified at a hearing
chaired by Representative Christopher Smith and Senator Sherrod Brown of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China (CECC). Chung discussed interrogations about his activities and
about other Falun Gong practitioners in Taiwan. He also commented that the Ma Administration
was relatively passive in securing his release.) Taiwan said it got a separate “consensus” in
August on protecting the safety of Taiwan’s business people. However, questions remained about
protections for visitors not doing business, not detained by the police but the MSS, held in
security-related cases, detained in secret, and denied prompt, private, and repeated visits by
relatives, officials, and lawyers (not just notifications of detentions to relatives). Other questions
concerned Taiwan’s enforcement of PRC promises and securing the release of other detained
citizens. New York University (NYU)’s legal scholar, Jerome Cohen, offered a critique.10
Also, at the end of August 2012, Taiwan and the PRC signed a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) on an agreement for currency clearing.
The pace has slowed in signing cross-strait agreements since 2008. The initial pace of signing
multiple agreements a year was not sustained. While there were two rounds of talks in each year
of 2008, 2009, and 2010, the 7th round took place in 2011, the 8th in 2012, and the 9th in 2013.
Though the agreement to expand trade in services was expected to be signed at the 9th round of
talks in June 2013, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) did not brief the LY until the first
briefing on April 25, and it lacked details. Many in Taiwan raised concerns that the talks lacked
transparency and that the MAC did not consult with Taiwan’s many affected industries, did not
brief the public until May 27, did not allow time for debate, and did not present an assessment of
positive and negative impacts or national security implications. Both KMT and DPP legislators
called for the LY’s detailed review of the agreement (not just its report to the LY). After the
10 Jerome Cohen and Yu-Jie Chen, “For Taiwanese, the Mainland Remains a Dangerous Place,” South China Morning
Post, Hong Kong, September 5, 2012; Author’s interview with Bruce Chung, December 2012.
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agreement was signed, President Ma argued on June 28 that it would help in Taiwan’s economic
liberalization, involve Taiwan in regional trade talks, and advance cross-strait ties.11
The United States has welcomed the reduction in tension brought by economic and people-to-
people engagement across the Taiwan Strait. Aside from increased stability and direct flights,
however, it has been less clear how the agreements, especially ECFA, have benefitted U.S. and
other foreign firms. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Shear said in July 2010 that “if
ECFA is to be a truly successful arrangement, firms from the United States and other countries
must also be able to benefit.” Taiwan announced that ECFA entered into force on September 12,
2010. However, some have concerns that Taiwan has not notified ECFA to the WTO, as required
of its members. Taiwan’s officials have claimed that there was a notification, but Taiwan made
only an early announcement. Moreover, even as Taipei quickly negotiated ECFA with Beijing
from January to June 2010, Taipei did not devote a similar level of attention to resolving the
dispute with Washington over beef (see discussion below). Further, in mid-2011, the American
Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Taipei noted that 41.7% of Taiwan’s exports went to the
PRC (including Hong Kong) and warned Taiwan against the risks of over-reliance on one market.
AmCham urged Taiwan to pursue balanced relationships that include stronger ties with other
countries, particularly the United States as part of a national security agenda. When asked in 2013
about the effect of ECFA on their business, 37% of AmCham’s members in Taiwan which
answered its survey said that the effect was neutral, 44% saw some positive effect, 5% saw very
positive effect, 10% did not know, and the remaining 4% reported some or very negative effect.12
In addition, some observers pointed out that Taiwan could increase substantive visits to the
United States by its Minister of Economic Affairs. Cross-strait flights raised an issue of whether
they have benefitted or harmed U.S. and other foreign airlines, aside from Taiwan and PRC
airlines. In September 2012, AmCham published an article, lamenting that the shipping links set
up across the strait in 2008 have done little to help Taiwan realize its aspiration of becoming a
shipping hub, since the arrangement excluded foreign carriers from cross-strait shipping.
Questions also have arisen about Taiwan’s reviews of technology transfers to the PRC and any
national security implications of increasing PRC investments in Taiwan, including how Taiwan’s
review of PRC investments compare with the U.S. security review by the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Taiwan has tried to use ECFA as a springboard to sign
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries. Taiwan started to explore FTAs,
including with Singapore in August 2010, with India in March 2011, and with New Zealand in
October 2011. Taiwan also has continued to face challenges in joining multilateral trade talks
(like the TPP), although it has the option of unilateral liberalization of trade and investment rules.
On July 10, 2013, Taiwan and New Zealand signed a FTA. Taiwan touted the importance of the
agreement, because New Zealand is one of the countries in the TPP.13
Further, despite the cross-strait warming trend, concerns remain about the PLA’s challenges to
Taiwan. At a hearing on Taiwan held by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 4,
2011, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Lavoy expressed the U.S. concern that a
11 Central News Agency, May 27, June 14, June 19, June 25, June 28; Taipei Times, May 28, June 22, June 26, 2013.
12 AmCham Taipei, “Business Climate Survey,” Taiwan Business Topics, February 2013.
13 New Zealand signed the agreement with Taiwan as the “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen,
and Matsu.” Later in July 2013, Japan joined the TPP talks as the 12th member, along with Australia, Brunei, Canada,
Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam.
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Taiwan that is vulnerable, isolated, and under threat would not be in a position to discuss its
future with the mainland and might invite the very aggression U.S. policy seeks to deter. He
warned that if the PLA were to attack, it would be able to rapidly degrade Taiwan’s ability to
resist. Lavoy testified that the Defense Department’s report to Congress on Taiwan’s air power
concluded that Taiwan’s defense cannot match the PLA one-for-one. He reiterated the Pentagon’s
view that Taiwan needs innovative and asymmetric approaches, not simply limited numbers of
advanced weapons systems.
On March 5, 2013, the Commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral Samuel
Locklear, testified to the House Armed Services Committee that the cross-strait relationship is
stable and tensions are at historic lows due to economic integration and people-to-people contact.
However, he warned that the PLA continues to maintain a robust military buildup against Taiwan
that contradicts the PRC’s stated “peaceful development” of ties with Taiwan. He reported that
many of the PLA’s developments appeared to be intended for use in a possible conflict with
Taiwan (including ballistic and cruise missiles, patrol boats, mines, electronic warfare, and cyber
threats). Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper testified to the Senate Intelligence
Committee on March 12 that the cross-strait relationship remained calm but the military and
economic balance will keep shifting in China’s favor.
In May 2013, the Defense Secretary reported to Congress that China has continued its military
modernization with potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait (with possible U.S. intervention) as the
principal focus and primary driver. Despite the reduction of cross-strait tension since 2008, the
PLA’s disposition opposite Taiwan has not changed significantly, and the PLA could attempt to
coerce or invade Taiwan. The worrisome trend in the Taiwan Strait has seen the PLA’s more
sophisticated capabilities improving against Taiwan’s eroding defensive advantages, even while
Taiwan’s military spending has dropped to about 2% of GDP (below President Ma’s promise of
3% of GDP). The PLA’s increasingly advanced capabilities include over 1,100 short-range
ballistic missiles, attack submarines and ships, fighters, and long-range surface-to-air missiles.14
Observers might watch to see whether President Ma ensures greater transparency about cross-
strait negotiations and agreements for Taiwan domestically, the United States and other countries,
and international groups. Since 2005, the CPC and KMT have proposed a “peace agreement” and
military confidence building measures (CBMs). In campaigning for re-election in October 2011,
Ma raised the controversial idea of a cross-strait peace accord. Beijing took the results of
Taiwan’s elections in January 2012 as validation of the “peaceful development” approach. On that
basis, Beijing could continue patient engagement focused first on economics and refrain from
pressuring Ma, given cross-party criticism of his leadership and his low approval ratings.
Further into Ma’s second term, however, Beijing could increase pressure on Taiwan, in preparing
for if not pressing for political and military negotiations. In March 2012, two months before Ma’s
second inaugural address, the CPC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) in Beijing called for a new phase
of consolidating political mutual trust, negotiating economic benefits for both sides (not just for
Taiwan), and shaping Taiwan’s cultural understanding of the “national identity” of “one China”
(including “cleaning up” harmful thoughts about “Taiwan independence”). Moreover, KMT
Honorary Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung met in Beijing with CPC General-Secretary Hu Jintao, who
called for actions to build “political trust” with the insistence that “the mainland and Taiwan
14 Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China, 2013,” May 6, 2013.
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belong to one China.” On his part, the KMT’s Wu stressed the concept of “one country, two
areas.” The opposition DPP criticized the “one country, two areas” formula, stressing that Taiwan
is a sovereign country and does not belong to the PRC. A month before Ma’s inaugural address,
TAO Director Wang Yi visited Washington in April, where he met with Deputy Secretary of State
William Burns. Wang indicated Beijing’s expectation of future political talks with Taipei.15
In his second inaugural address on May 20, 2012, President Ma did not repeat either of those
phrases. Ma apparently assured Beijing about his cross-strait policy but asserted limits in
accommodating on sovereignty. While Ma upheld the “1992 Consensus” (explicitly defined as
“One China, Different Interpretations”), he more explicitly and formally added that “one ROC,
two areas” defines the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Ma asserted that the two sides practice
“mutual non-recognition of sovereignty and mutual non-denial of governing authority,” because
the ROC’s sovereignty covers Taiwan and the mainland, but the ROC governs only the islands of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. However, Ma reiterated the principle in the first inaugural
address of maintaining the “status quo” of what he called “no unification, no independence, and
no use of force.” Further, Ma seemed to agree with Beijing on cultural cooperation, saying that
civic groups could expand exchanges across the strait based on what he called common Chinese
ethnicity, ancestry, bloodline, history, culture, and founding father (Sun Yat-sen). Still, he also
stressed democracy, human rights, rule of law, and civil society. While Ma noted that national
security is the key to the ROC’s “survival,” he articulated an approach that relied on cross-strait
engagement, diplomacy for international space, and defense. On his defense policy, Ma did not
explicitly cite the PLA as the threat but called for continued U.S. arms sales in order to sustain the
cross-strait engagement. While the English version of his speech called for a “strong national
defense” to deter external threats, the original text in Chinese referred to the “national defense
forces.” At a conference four days later, President Ma invoked the model of West Germany and
East Germany on a distinction between sovereignty and governing authority.
It was unclear if Ma’s message was coordinated as part of parallel statements that involved
control of Wu’s meeting with Hu, a counter to Hu’s position, or a compromise. On May 30, when
asked about Ma’s “One ROC, Two Areas” formulation, the CPC TAO responded that it was not
surprising and was consistent with the view that both sides of the strait belong to one China
(rather than a “state-to-state relationship”) and beneficial to the peaceful development of the
cross-strait ties. However, the TAO rejected use of the model of the two Germanys.
Beijing’s patience could be tested further by the sustained separate identity in Taiwan. Despite the
pronouncements of a “one China” by leaders in Taipei and Beijing and closer cross-strait ties,
Taiwan’s people retain a strong Taiwan-centric identity after over a century of mostly separation
from mainland China. Still, Taiwan’s people pragmatically have pursued prosperity, security, and
their democratic way of life and self-governance. Moderate voters generally have supported
economic ties to the PRC amid political separation. In August 2012, only 0.9% of those surveyed
in Taiwan wished for cross-strait unification as soon as possible, while 84% desired the status quo
(at least indefinitely or with a later decision on unification or independence), 7% called for
independence as soon as possible, and the remaining 8% voiced no opinion. The results showed
even weaker support for urgent unification, compared with results back in August 2008 (shortly
after Ma became president), when 1.5% desired unification as soon as possible, 83% opted for the
status quo, 9% called for independence as soon as possible, and 7% voiced no opinion.16
15 TAO, Beijing, March 15; Xinhua, Beijing, and CNA, Taipei, March 22; Taipei Times, April 14, 2012.
16 Surveys conducted by the Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan.
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At the 18th National Congress of the CPC in Beijing in November 2012, outgoing CPC General
Secretary Hu Jintao delivered a report that was drafted by a group led by incoming CPC General
Secretary Xi Jinping. The report called for strengthening political, economic, cultural, and social
cross-strait ties to achieve eventual “peaceful reunification.” While stressing political ties first
and without new initiatives, the report indicated that top-level authoritative policy would continue
to call for the “1992 Consensus,” military CBMs, and a peace agreement.
On his part, Taiwan President Ma said in his New Year day address for 2013 that he will
cooperate with Xi Jinping on the basis of the “1992 Consensus,” but Ma clarified that each side of
the strait retains its own interpretation of what “one China” means. Ma said that his policy would
seek to expand all aspects of cross-strait ties while stressing economic and people-to-people ties.
Ma said that Taiwan will seek to loosen further the restrictions on investments, students, and
individual travelers from the mainland, including through amendment of the “Act Governing
Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.” Moving on to a
political matter, Ma said that the two sides would establish reciprocal, representative offices.
In addition, President Ma has to deal with a political propensity in his own party to move even
closer to the PRC. In February 2013, KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan met in Beijing with Xi
Jinping. Furthermore, Lien visited the Beijing Aerospace Control Center, though the PLA controls
the PRC’s space program. Ma’s office stated that he did not give Lien any message to convey.
Starting in April 2013, negotiations for setting up the representative offices reportedly raised
issues (in the KMT and opposition parties) about sovereignty and national flags, legal immunity
and inviolability, equal and reciprocal rights, official visits to (not just notifications of) detained
citizens (including Taiwan’s intelligence agents in China), issuance of travel permits (visas), non-
interference in Taiwan’s elections, security, and political talks. Before Taiwan completed
negotiations over the representative offices, the Ma Administration asked the LY to pass the legal
authority in June, but KMT, DPP, PFP, and TSU lawmakers balked at granting a “blank check.”
In June, President and KMT Chairman Ma again sent KMT Honorary Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung
to Beijing to meet with CPC General-Secretary Xi Jinping and maintain momentum in cross-strait
engagement. After adding the phrase of “one country, two areas” the previous year, Wu added this
time that the ties are under the “one China framework,” another phrase different from the vague
“1992 Consensus.” Wu conveyed Ma’s message that representative offices would not be
diplomatic offices since cross-strait ties are not “state-to-state” under the ROC’s constitution. Wu
also sought support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and economic talks.
The DPP criticized the KMT’s use of “one China framework” as harming Taiwan’s sovereignty.
The PRC has continued to block Taiwan’s participation at international meetings or organizations.
In March 2013, Indonesia reportedly withdrew the invitation for Taiwan’s delegation to the third
Jakarta International Defense Dialogue (JIDD). Two professors from Taiwan’s Tamkang
University and National Defense University were forced to cancel their trip at the last minute.
(See also the section below on International Organizations.)
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Issues in U.S. Policy on Taiwan
Overview
The Obama Administration and Congress have considered various options to strengthen the
relationship with Taiwan. One issue has been whether to resume Cabinet-level visits, perhaps by
the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Agriculture, Veteran Affairs, Commerce, or Energy, or the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Cabinet-level officials visited Taiwan in 1992, 1994, 1996,
1998, and 2000. The United States and Taiwan sought to resume trade talks under the Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), or TIFA talks. However, Taiwan’s restrictions on U.S.
beef raised concerns. TIFA talks resumed in March 2013 for the first time since July 2007.
In 2011, Taiwan’s political campaigning constrained U.S. influence on some policy priorities,
particularly opening Taiwan’s market to U.S. beef. There was some expectation that after the
elections in January 2012, Taiwan would pay greater attention to the relationship with the United
States. Both Washington and Taipei describe the relationship as generally a positive one of an
economic and security partnership based on shared values. On the U.S. side, the Legislative and
Executive Branches took actions to strengthen the relationship. On September 14, 2011,
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced
the Taiwan Policy Act (H.R. 2918) to enhance ties with Taiwan. The House Foreign Affairs
Committee held hearings on “Why Taiwan Matters” on June 16 and October 4, 2011.
In September 2011, the Obama Administration met with visiting delegations from Taiwan’s
presidential candidates, led by DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen and a key advisor in KMT President
Ma’s campaign (King Pu-tsung). There was a congressional reception for Tsai. However, the
Administration promptly gave negative remarks to the Financial Times, saying that Tsai raised
doubts about continuing cross-strait “stability,” despite professing U.S. neutrality in Taiwan’s
democratic elections. The Administration then notified Congress on September 21 of three major
arms sales programs with a total value of $5.9 billion, including upgrades for Taiwan’s existing F-
16A/B fighters. The Administration also increased senior visits to Taiwan, sending Assistant
Secretary of Commerce Suresh Kumar in September and then U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) Administrator Rajiv Shah and Deputy Secretary of Energy Dan Poneman
in December 2011. After not mentioning Taiwan in an article in Foreign Policy on “America’s
Pacific Century” in October 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a speech on the same
subject the next month and added that the United States has a strong relationship with Taiwan as
an “important security and economic partner.” On December 22, the State Department nominated
Taiwan as a candidate for the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), and Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry touted
the long-awaited announcement as a “Christmas gift” in appreciation to the Ma Administration.
The Obama Administration has argued that its efforts to intensify and expand cooperative
engagement with the PRC in Beijing have not been at the expense of a stronger relationship with
Taiwan. Washington officials contend that they have pursued parallel relationships with Beijing
and Taipei. Nonetheless, policy issues have included whether the Administration actually has
ambitious objectives to achieve in the relationship with Taipei, has timed arms sales and certain
other actions out of concern about the relationship with Beijing, strengthened ties with Taiwan in
the months before the elections in January 2012 to favor President Ma, should resume U.S.
Cabinet-level visits, has been effective in encouraging Taiwan to raise the priority of defense, or
has included Taiwan in the strategy to “rebalance” more weight in U.S. priorities to the Asia-
Pacific (what some called a “pivot” to the Pacific).
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On Taiwan’s side, President Ma “transited” in the United States, where he sometimes joined
public activities: in Los Angeles, Austin, and San Francisco on his way to and from Paraguay and
the Dominican Republic in 2008; in San Francisco and Honolulu on his way to and from Panama
and Nicaragua in 2009; and in San Francisco and Los Angeles on his way to and from Honduras
and the Dominican Republic in 2010. President Ma asserted that he rebuilt U.S.-Taiwan trust by
not raising cross-strait tension. Particularly with the sensitive political season over in January
2012, President Ma said he placed priority on the relationship with the United States. However,
some observers stressed that Taiwan needed to restore some trust lost in the relationship and
reciprocate U.S. efforts to strengthen it. Although President Ma has served also as the Chairman
of the ruling KMT, he faced a challenge (some called a “crisis”) for years to lead his
administration and party to resolve the dispute over U.S. products (particularly beef and pork).
On the occasion of President Ma’s second inauguration on May 20, 2012, Representative Ros-
Lehtinen led a congressional delegation to visit Taiwan. In meetings with the Codel and the
delegation led by former White House chief of staff William Daley that represented the Obama
Administration, President Ma said that Taiwan seeks to join the TPP, though in eight years.
On the strategic rebalancing toward the Pacific region, issues have concerned whether U.S.
strategy considers Taiwan’s security role narrowly in the Taiwan Strait or more broadly in the
Pacific, and what Taiwan has contributed. After not mentioning Taiwan in an article on a U.S.
“pivot” to the Pacific in Foreign Policy on “America’s Pacific Century” in October 2011,
Secretary of State Clinton gave a speech on the same subject the next month in Honolulu and
added that the United States has a strong relationship with Taiwan as an “important security and
economic partner.” At the start of 2012, President Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
issued new Defense Strategic Guidance on how to maintain U.S. military superiority in the face
of budget cuts and to “rebalance” priorities, posture, and presence to stress more attention to Asia
as well as the Middle East. An issue arose about Taiwan’s role in the U.S. comprehensive strategy
of rebalancing more diplomatic, defense, and economic attention to Asia. At a conference of
defense ministers in Singapore in June 2012, Defense Secretary Panetta discussed the strategic
refocus to Asia and mentioned Taiwan by saying that the United States strongly supports the
efforts of both the PRC and Taiwan to improve the cross-strait relationship. He added that “we
have an enduring interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” Taiwan’s Deputy
Defense Minister Andrew Yang said he discussed Taiwan’s role in the rebalancing strategy with
U.S. officials in August and with Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter on October 2,
2012.17 Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Jose
Fernandez visited Taipei in August 2012. He delivered a speech that discussed economic
exchanges with Taiwan in the context of the strategic rebalancing toward Asia.
International Security
The United States has watched Taiwan’s contribution to international development and security.
In response to Haiti’s devastating earthquake in January 2010, Taiwan’s air force delivered relief
supplies on a C-130 transport plane, which received approval for refueling and repair at U.S.
bases. However, there has been a question of whether Taiwan followed up with sustained major
missions in Haiti (with which Taiwan, as the ROC, has a diplomatic relationship).
17 Defense Department, Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, June 2, 2012; Author’s
consultation, August 2012; Yang’s interview with Defense News, published on November 12, 2012.
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After Japan’s catastrophic earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster in March 2011, President Ma
led Taiwan to be the largest donor of official and private aid, including $3.5 million from the
government, though Taiwan did not offer military and coast guard assistance to Japan. Although
the USAID Administrator’s visit in 2011 highlighted Taiwan’s role as an aid donor, Taiwan’s
foreign assistance amounted to US$380 million in 2010 and in 2011, accounting for 0.1% of
gross national income (compared to the international average of 0.5%). Taiwan could increase
military and civilian participation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR)
missions, particularly in Pacific island nations. On September 25, 2012, in Taipei, President Ma
spoke at a conference on international aid, touting Taiwan’s development aid but promising to
maintain the aid budget (not a rise). However, Taiwan’s 2013 foreign aid budget reportedly
dropped by almost 20% (to about US$366 million).
The United States could work with Taiwan to increase cooperation in international security.
Taiwan could boost its defense and foreign aid spending, contribute more to security, fight cyber
threats, and improve counter-espionage amid cases in Taiwan of alleged spying for Beijing. The
United States has obtained counterterrorism cooperation at ports through Taiwan’s agreements in
2005 and 2006 to participate in the Container Security Initiative (CSI) (to screen and inspect
cargo before shipping to U.S. ports) and the Megaports Initiative (to detect and interdict nuclear
and other radioactive materials in cargo). The U.S. Department of Energy and Taiwan’s Ministry
of Finance and Directorate of Customs completed the installation of radiation detection
equipment at the southern port of Kaohsiung in February 2011. Visiting Taipei in December 2011,
Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman personally applauded the milestone reached after five years
of effort. He remarked that Taiwan has worked with the U.S. National Nuclear Security
Administration to strengthen nuclear security at ports to detect nuclear smuggling.
The United States also has sought Taiwan’s cooperation in nuclear and missile nonproliferation
efforts especially concerning Iran and North Korea, reportedly involving Taiwan’s companies.
For example, in March 2009, the Shanghai-based Roc-Master Manufacture and Supply Company
reportedly ordered 108 pressure gauges that could be used in centrifuges to enrich uranium for
transfer to Iran from an agent in Taiwan (Heli-Ocean Technology Company) for Inficon Holding,
the manufacturer in Switzerland. In July 2010, Taiwan reportedly raided Ho Li Enterprises which
received orders since March 2007 from Dandong Fang Lian Trading Company in Dandong, PRC,
which was allegedly associated with North Korea’s military, for two dual-use, high-technology
machine tools that ended up in North Korea earlier in 2010. In August 2012, the United States
reportedly asked a Taiwan shipping company not to allow its ship to transfer suspected weapons-
related cargo in Malaysia that North Korea shipped via China bound for Burma (Myanmar).
Japan then seized the cargo. In October 2012, a U.S. court sentenced a Taiwan woman to two
years in prison for using her companies in Taiwan to procure embargoed technology for Iran.18 In
May 2013, an U.S. Attorney’s Office in Illinois announced the arrests in Estonia and the United
States of two citizens of Taiwan, Alex Tsai and his son, Gary Tsai, for using their Taiwan-based
companies to export U.S.-origin goods and machinery that could be used by North Korea to
produce weapons of mass destruction. Documents reported that in June 2008, Alex Tsai had been
indicted in Taiwan for illegally forging invoices and shipping restricted materials to North Korea,
and he was convicted later that year. Still, he could travel internationally. In January 2009, the
Department of the Treasury designated Alex Tsai and his two companies for supporting a North
Korean company involved in weapons proliferation. The Treasury Department urged all
governments to cut off this channel for North Korean procurement. The Department of the
18 Taipei Times, October 26, 2012; Asahi, Tokyo, November 24, 2012; Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2012.
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Treasury then imposed sanctions against Taiwan’s Trans Multi Mechanics Company and its
general manager, Chang Wen-Fu, for procurement of dual-use machinery for North Korea and
links to Alex Tsai. The sanctions were effective on May 10 pursuant to Executive Order 13382,
“Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters.”19
The United States enacted the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
(CISADA) of 2010 (P.L. 111-195) on July 1, 2010, which followed the U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1929 of June against Iran’s nuclear program. Like others, Taiwan also is expected to
comply with U.S. sanctions on Iran for nuclear proliferation in Section 1245 of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2012 (P.L. 112-81). Taiwan has not announced its own
sanctions against dealings with Iran’s oil and gas industry, though petroleum refiner CPC
Corporation Taiwan is a state-owned enterprise. In any case, Taiwan cut the volume of imports of
oil from Iran by 49% from 2010 to 2011. In 2012, Taiwan further cut the volume by 39%,
importing $805 million worth of oil from Iran, the eighth-largest source of Taiwan’s oil imports.
On June 11, 2012, Secretary of State Clinton announced that Taiwan and six other countries
significantly reduced oil purchases from Iran and would not be subject to the NDAA’s sanctions
for a renewable period of 180 days. On December 7, 2012, the Secretary of State again decided to
exempt financial institutions in Taiwan (and other countries) from the NDAA’s sanctions for 180
days, based on further reductions in oil imports from Iran. American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)
Deputy Director Brent Christensen said in December that U.S. exemptions showed Taiwan’s
commitment to global security, while U.S. policy encourages Taiwan (like other partners) to
continue reducing economic ties to Iran. Meanwhile, in November 2012, Taiwan’s Dragon
Aromatics petrochemical company (operating in the PRC) bought its first cargo of Iranian
condensate (natural gas in liquid form) from the PRC’s Zhuhai Zhenrong oil company (under
U.S. sanctions for transfers of gasoline to Iran).20 On June 5, 2013, the Secretary of State again
exempted Taiwan (and other countries) from sanctions under the NDAA for FY2012. Major
Taiwan shipping companies, Evergreen and Yang Ming, reportedly stopped dealing with Iran.21
Taiwan could increase counter-piracy security for and/or restrict its ships to reduce the burden on
international anti-piracy naval operations in the Gulf of Aden. A bilateral matter involved a U.S.
Navy ship and the death of the captain (Wu Lai-yu) of one of Taiwan’s fishing boats in a NATO
anti-piracy operation off Somalia on May 10, 2011. On July 23, the U.S. government provided a
report from the U.S. Fifth Fleet of the Naval Forces Central Command based in Bahrain on the
frigate USS Stephen W. Groves’ (SWG) interdiction of the Taiwan-flagged fishing boat that had
been hijacked in March 2010 and then used as a pirate mother-ship along with pirate skiffs to
attack other ships for more than a year off the Horn of Africa. The U.S. Navy operated under the
NATO-led Combined Task Force 508 to conduct an operation on May 10 against the mother-ship
to disrupt further attacks. After compelling the pirates to surrender and boarding the ship, the
Navy’s crew found Wu deceased in his cabin. An investigation found that ammunition fired from
the U.S. naval ship during the operation “inadvertently” killed him and three pirates. The naval
crew then buried the captain at sea, laid to rest in his ship, which was sunk to prevent it from
19 Treasury Department, “Treasury Targets Taiwanese Proliferators,” January 16, 2009; U.S. District Court, Northern
Illinois, Criminal Complaints for Alex Tsai, October 23, 2012, and Gary Tsai, April 19, 2013; U.S. Attorney’s Office,
Northern District of Illinois, “Taiwanese Father and Son Arrested for Allegedly Violating U.S. Laws to Prevent
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” May 6, 2013; Treasury Department, “Treasury Sanctions Taiwan
Proliferators Linked to North Korea,” May 10, 2013; Federal Register, May 29, 2013.
20 Reuters, November 13, 2012; Taipei Times, December 6, 2012.
21 Reuters, July 1, 2013.
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becoming a hazard to other ships. The United States expressed “regret” that the ship and its
captain were lost in the protection of shipping against piracy and sent condolences to Wu’s
family. The U.S. Navy maintained that it conducted the counter-piracy operation “in accordance
with existing rules of engagement and in compliance with international law.” However, Taiwan
persisted in protests, including a call from the Foreign Minister for U.S. compensation to Wu’s
family, which demanded $3 million. Taiwan’s government could have been trying to deflect
political criticism and demands for compensation from Wu’s family, since the government,
including the navy, apparently took few if any steps to rescue the boat’s captives while they were
held for over a year. Somali pirates captured another fishing ship from Taiwan in December 2010.
A PLA Navy frigate sailing off Somalia took credit for the release of the ship’s crew in July 2012,
though Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry attributed their release to a ransom and international assistance.
In March 2013, the LY considered a bill to allow private armed guards on Taiwan’s ships.
Concerning maritime territorial disputes in East Asia, there is an issue of whether Taiwan role
serves as a helpful, stabilizing U.S. security partner. Taiwan has asserted itself as the ROC with
sovereign claims and has sought international attention and inclusion in bilateral or multilateral
discussions. The disputes in the South China Sea involve overlapping claims by Brunei,
Malaysia, PRC, Philippines (a U.S. ally), Taiwan, and Vietnam. In the East China Sea, PRC and
Taiwan claims conflict with those of Japan (another U.S. ally). U.S. concerns involve possible
conflict between the PRC and Japan over their competing claims to the Senkaku Islands (called
Diaoyu Islands by the PRC), which could bring U.S. involvement under the U.S.-Japan defense
treaty. Taiwan, asserting itself as the ROC, also claims the islands as Diaoyutai. On June 27,
2012, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell confirmed at a public forum that the State
Department has discussed with Taiwan U.S. concerns about whether it would work with the PRC
in the South China Sea and that Taiwan assured that it would be careful. Another issue concerns
any cross-strait coordination also in the East China Sea. Taipei’s officials have insisted on a
position of no cooperation with the PRC. Nevertheless, even if not with explicit coordination, the
parallel actions of Taiwan have added pressure against Japan, a U.S. ally. Moreover, there are
concerns that the PRC and Taiwan have taken actions that militarized or escalated tensions. At
another event on December 4, Campbell said U.S. officials underscored the expectation that
Taiwan not take steps to provoke misunderstandings or tensions over the Senkaku Islands.
President Ma has sought support for his “East China Sea Peace Initiative,” announced on August
5, 2012, that reiterated the ROC’s claim over the islands as the Diaoyutai Islands and called for
joint development of resources and a code of conduct to address tension peacefully. The next
month, President Ma called for parallel bilateral talks (Taipei-Tokyo, Taipei-Beijing, and Beijing-
Tokyo) that might advance to trilateral talks. In his National Day address on October 10, Ma said
that his proposed principles also would apply in the South China Sea. There, Taiwan claims the
Pratas Islands, Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Spratly Islands, occupying since 1956 the
largest one of the Spratly Islands (Taiping Island, or Itu Aba), near the Philippines. Since 2000,
Taiwan has stationed coast guard instead of military personnel on Taiping Island, though the
military has supplied weapons to and trained the coast guard. In April 2013, Taiwan held a live-
fire drill with some mortars and grenade launchers on the island. The PRC’s nine-dash line in its
South China Sea maps is a legacy of the ROC’s maps from the 1940s. One question is whether
Taipei would clarify the meaning of the controversial line consistent with international law.
Taiwan gave mixed messages. On September 25, the very day that the PRC and Japan held
diplomatic exchanges to try to cool tensions as the United States urged, Taiwan deployed 12
Coast Guard ships to escort about 60 fishing boats into the Senkaku Islands’ territorial waters.
Reportedly, Japan’s Coast Guard ships fired water cannons at Taiwan’s fishing boats in the
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territorial waters, but Taiwan’s Coast Guard ships fired water cannons toward Japan’s official
ships. The ships maneuvered in proximity, raising the risk of accidental collisions or
endangerment of lives and property. However, while the media focused on the coast guard,
Taiwan also deployed military assets. According to Taiwan’s military news media, the military
deployed two Knox-class frigates, one Perry-class frigate, F-16 fighters, Mirage fighters, E2-K
Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, and S-70C ship-borne helicopters (a civilian version of
the UH-60 Black Hawk). The United States sold to Taiwan such weapon systems (except for the
Mirage fighters sold by France) for Taiwan’s self-defense against the PRC. The next day,
President Ma visited military units and praised the actions of the boats sailing close to the islands.
Ma said that Japan “misappropriated” the islands for 117 years and never returned them.
Congress passed the FY2013 NDAA (enacted on January 2, 2013, as P.L. 112-239) with Section
1286 (based on an amendment by Senator Jim Webb) to express the sense of the Congress
concerning the Senkaku Islands. Congress declared that the peaceful settlement of disputes in the
East China Sea requires the exercise of self-restraint by all parties in activities that would
complicate or escalate disputes and destabilize the region. The language, inter alia, stressed that
while the United States takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, the
United States acknowledges the administration of Japan over the islands. Further, the legislation
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Japan under Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security that addressed an armed attack in the territories under Japan’s administration. On
January 18, Secretary of State Clinton added the U.S. opposition to any unilateral actions that
would seek to undermine Japan’s administration and urged all parties to prevent incidents.
On January 24, 2013, Taiwan sent four Coast Guard ships to “escort” a boat close to the Senkaku
Islands, though it sailed with protestors and a TV reporter (not fishermen). Japan’s Coast Guard
responded. Taiwan’s military said that it strengthened air and naval patrols in the area. Taiwan’s
Coast Guard also warned the PRC’s maritime surveillance ships to leave the area, likely
concerned about political embarrassment if the PRC claimed to “protect” Taiwan’s ships. Still,
Taiwan already has faced the PRC’s claim of “protecting” Taiwan’s ships in the Gulf of Aden.
Nonetheless, Taiwan and Japan placed priority on concluding a long-awaited agreement over
fishing rights near the Senkaku Islands. Negotiations started in 1996. Taiwan and Japan held their
16th round of talks in February 2009. On April 10, 2013, they held their 17th round of formal talks
and signed a bilateral agreement that defined an expanded area for joint fishing rights. The
agreement did not address the islands’ 12-nm territorial sea and set up a commission to
institutionalize discussions over disputes. The agreement was not unique but seemed to be a
model of tension-reduction. President Ma credited his “East China Sea Peace Initiative” for the
agreement and said that it did not prejudice either side’s claims to sovereignty over the islands.
The opposition DPP Chairman Su Tseng-Chang called the agreement an accomplishment. Japan
reportedly was concerned about facing Taiwan-PRC unity amid heightened tensions. On April 23,
AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt positively said that the agreement was handled well by both
Taiwan and Japan. In several occasions starting on May 14, Japan’s Coast Guard reportedly
detained Taiwan’s fishing boats for operating outside the agreed area, while Taipei’s officials
calmly urged fishermen to comply with the agreement rather than raising tension with Tokyo.
Aside from Japan, Taiwan faced increased tension with another democratic neighbor. On May 9,
2013, the Coast Guard of the Philippines (another U.S. treaty ally) shot at a Taiwan fishing boat
(Guang Da Xing 28), resulting in the death of a Taiwan fisherman (Hong Shi-cheng), in the
Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippines. Taiwan’s initial diplomatic reaction called for
an investigation and arrests, and expressed grave concerns. However, the PRC quickly and
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harshly “condemned” the “barbaric act.” This intervention likely placed pressure on Taiwan’s
leaders, who are said to fear political embarrassment if the PRC send ships to “protect” Taiwan’s
citizens or demand direct interactions with Manila under a “one China” policy. President Ma also
faced stubbornly low approval ratings and a bid for re-election as the KMT Chairman on July 20.
The State Department reacted calmly the next day by welcoming the Philippines’ pledge to hold a
full and transparent investigation along with Taiwan and by urging all sides to ensure maritime
safety and refrain from actions that could escalate tensions and undermine a diplomatic or
peaceful resolution. (Similarly, in May 2010, Taiwan had urged restraint by both South Korea and
North Korea in not escalating tension, when South Korea issued findings that its naval ship
(Cheonan) was sunk and 46 sailors were killed by North Korea two months earlier.) President Ma
initially said that Taiwan’s Coast Guard (rather than the Navy) covered the interests of fishermen.
Then on May 11, President Ma held a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) and issued
four demands of Manila: an official apology, compensation for losses, investigation and
punishment, and negotiations over an agreement on fishing rights. Ma also issued an ultimatum
that if the Philippines failed to meet the demands in 72 hours, by midnight on May 15, Taiwan
would impose three sanctions: freezing the processing of applications of Filipino workers,
recalling Taiwan’s envoy, and requesting that Manila’s envoy return to help resolve the dispute.
On May 12 in Manila, Deputy Presidential Spokesperson, Abigail Valte, said that the Philippines’
representative in Taipei, Antonio Basilio, visited the victim’s family and “offered his apologies on
behalf of the Philippine government.” She also said that “as the Philippine Coast Guard has
stated, we express our heartfelt sorrow on the unfortunate situation that occurred during one of
the anti-illegal fishing patrols conducted by a Philippine fishery law enforcement vessel (MCS
3001) within the maritime jurisdiction (waters off the Batanes group of islands) of the Philippines
on the morning of May 9, which tragically resulted in the death of a fisherman from one of the
fishing vessels reportedly poaching in the area.” However, Taiwan protested that Valte’s statement
did not contain a formal, government-to-government apology.
Meanwhile, by May 12, Taiwan increased Coast Guard patrols and sent the Navy’s Lafayette-
class and Knox-class frigates to “protect fishermen” between the island and the Philippines. The
next day, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that it will send a Kidd-class
destroyer and Perry-class frigate to join the Coast Guard in drills south of Taiwan on May 16. The
Navy also said it would extend its patrol area by about 100 miles southward to the waters near the
Batanes islands of the Philippines. The State Department, on May 13, expressed regret for the
“tragic death” of the Taiwan fisherman and urged all parties to refrain from provocative actions.
Reflecting the public’s indignant nationalistic anger in the LY, Taiwan legislators across party
lines supported Ma’s demands. There was concern about violent targeting of Filipinos in Taiwan.
On May 15, President Ma held another NSC meeting, said that the Philippines failed to meet his
demands by the deadline, and ordered the implementation of the three sanctions. Later that day,
Philippines President Benigno Aquino sent a “personal representative,” Amadeo Perez, to Taiwan
to apologize to the fisherman’s family and Taiwan’s people. On the night of May 15, Taiwan
announced eight more sanctions (for a total of 11 measures): suspensions of normal travel (with
an alert), senior-level exchanges, economic exchanges, agricultural or fisheries cooperation,
technical cooperation, talks on aviation, and visa-free treatment; and a military-coast guard drill.
The State Department expressed concern about the increase in tensions between two neighboring
democracies and U.S. partners. Taiwan rejected the Philippines’ apology as “nongovernmental,”
not formal, and insincere. On May 16, Taiwan proceeded with the Navy and Air Force exercise,
dispatching a Kidd-class destroyer, a Lafayette-class frigate (with S-70C helicopters), two Mirage
2000 fighters, Indigenous Defense Fighters, and E-2K early warning aircraft. The Navy ships
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sailed south of 20 degrees north latitude, the traditional line of patrol by the Coast Guard, and
entered waters around the Batanes Islands. Taiwan’s military said it did not use live ammunition.
Even as the investigations were ongoing, President Ma declared on May 17 that the shooting was
“cold-blooded murder.” PRC media, including CCTV programs, used the tension and Ma’s
rhetoric to condemn the Philippines and called for cross-strait actions in support of Taiwan’s
sanctions. Hackers from Taiwan and the Philippines reportedly exchanged cyber disruptions of
government websites. Taiwan’s officials called for calm treatment of Filipinos in Taiwan, while
Taiwan’s sanctions targeted Filipino workers and officials discouraged private, people-to-people
ties, including volunteers going to help in the Philippines.
On May 19, Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice reported that the fishing boat had 45 bullet holes. Based
on their Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Taiwan and the Philippines
agreed to conduct “parallel investigations,” after the Philippines rejected a “joint investigation” as
violating its sovereignty. Respective investigators were in Taipei and Manila on May 27-31.
Taiwan’s investigators returned to Manila for talks on June 6-7. Reportedly, issues included the
precise location and jurisdiction of the incident (reportedly about 40 miles east of the Philippines’
northern Balintang Island), and specific charges against the Coast Guard officers.
On May 28, President Ma participated in an annual computerized military war game that focused
on crisis-management in scenarios in the East and South China Seas (not the Taiwan Strait). Ma
also announced on June 11 that the Navy and the Coast Guard will increase patrols in the South
China Sea and that “protecting fishermen” will be another major mission of Taiwan’s military.
Concerning talks on a fisheries agreement, Taiwan and the Philippines held their first preparatory
meeting in Manila on June 14, and both sides agreed to avoid the use of force in patrols. In
addition to their agreement on mutual legal assistance, there is another precedent for a bilateral
agreement. In September 2005, the Minister and Secretary of Agriculture of Taiwan and the
Philippines, through representatives, signed a Memorandum of Understanding to promote
scientific, technical, and economic cooperation in agriculture and fisheries, including helping to
prevent poaching on the waters of both sides.22
International Organizations
Taipei is a full member in some international organizations to which the PRC also belongs, such
as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the WTO. Still, Taiwan has sought international
space amid continued constraints from the PRC. Taiwan has been a full member of the Asian-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. For the second time since initiating APEC
22 Author’s observations, and numerous official and news reports including: Taipei Economic and Cultural Office
(TECO) and the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECA), Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural and
Fishery Cooperation, September 30, 2005; Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), May 9; Xinhua, May 9; PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 10; CNA, May 10; South China Morning Post, May 11; President Ma’s office, May
11; Taiwan MOFA, May 11; GMA News, May 12; Taiwan MOFA, May 12; CNA, May 12; CNA, May 13; Taipei
Times, May 14; Taipei Times, May 15; President Ma’s office, May 15; CNA, May 15; GMA News, May 15; CNA, May
15; CNA, May 16; Taiwan, “Non-Paper,” May 16; Taiwan’s MAC, May 16; China Post, May 17; CNA, May 17;
Philstar, May 18; Global Times, article and editorial, May 18-19; CNA, May 19; Philstar, May 20; Bloomberg, May
21; Taiwan MOFA, May 22; Philstar, May 27; CNA, May 27; CNA, May 28; Taipei Times, May 29; Taiwan News,
May 31; Inquirer, May 31; CNA, June 6; GMA News, June 6; Taipei Times, June 12; CNA, June 15, 2013.
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summits in Seattle in 1993, the United States hosted an APEC summit in 2011 in Honolulu.
However, Taiwan’s president has not been able to attend any of the APEC summits.
The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Taiwan Policy Review promised to support Taiwan’s
membership in organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite and to support opportunities
for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in organizations where its membership is not possible. The focus
of congressional action for many years was on Taiwan’s international participation at the World
Health Organization (WHO) and the annual meetings in Geneva of its governing body, the World
Health Assembly (WHA). On April 21 and May 6, 2004, the House and Senate passed H.R. 4019
and S. 2092 in support of Taiwan’s efforts to gain observer status in the WHO and to make it an
annual requirement to have an unclassified report from the Secretary of State on the U.S. plan to
help obtain that status for Taiwan. One implication of this legislative change was the end of
annual congressional statements and votes on this issue. In signing S. 2092 into law (P.L. 108-
235) on June 14, 2004, President Bush stated that the United States fully supported the
participation of Taiwan in the work of the WHO, including observer status.
President Ma decided to be more flexible than his DPP predecessor in pressing Taiwan’s bid to
rejoin the United Nations (U.N.), which it left in 1971 (as the ROC). On August 14, 2008, Taiwan
submitted instead a letter (via some countries with which Taiwan has diplomatic relations) to
allow Taiwan to “participate meaningfully” in U.N. specialized agencies.23
Only after Ma Ying-jeou was inaugurated as President in May 2008 did the WHO in January
2009 include Taiwan in the International Health Regulations (IHR). At the WHA in May 2009,
Taiwan’s Minister of Health participated, as an observer, for the first time since the ROC lost
membership in the U.N. However, there have been concerns that the invitation had required the
PRC’s approval, came through a WHO-PRC memorandum of understanding (MOU), and was ad
hoc (not routine for every year or only for a KMT President). Indeed, in its required report
submitted to Congress in April 2010, the State Department reported that the WHO invited Taiwan
to attend the 2009 WHA after the PRC “agreed to Taiwan’s participation.” Moreover, in May
2011, a secret WHO Memorandum (dated September 14, 2010) came to light in Taiwan, showing
that the WHO had an “arrangement with China” to implement the IHR for the “Taiwan Province
of China” (instead of “Chinese Taipei”). At the WHA on May 17, 2011, Secretary of Health and
Human Services Kathleen Sebelius protested to the WHO, saying that no organization of the U.N.
has a right to unilaterally determine the position of Taiwan.24
In its April 2013 report to Congress, the State Department stressed that the unresolved issue of
nomenclature continued to hamper Taiwan’s effective implementation of the IHR and that the
WHO’s communication with Taiwan was delayed by routing through PRC authorities in Beijing
or Geneva. Taiwan must communicate with the WHO in an inconvenient and limiting way only
through the WHO Legal Counsel. While Taiwan’s experts were harassed or banned in accessing
the WHA in 2011, U.S. diplomacy helped to prevent such incidents in 2012. Still, limits on
Taiwan’s participation in technical meetings remained unsatisfactory. The State Department stated
a concern that Taiwan’s sporadic and intermittent participation in the WHO limits Taiwan’s ability
23 United Nations General Assembly, A/63/194, “Need to Examine the Fundamental Rights of the 23 Million People of
the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Participate Meaningfully in the Activities of the United Nations Specialized
Agencies,” dated August 22, 2008.
24 The interpretation of Taiwan as a “province of China” is contrary to the U.N.’s own General Assembly Resolution
2758 of 1971, which “restored” the legal rights of the PRC in the U.N. and expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-
shek” but did not mention Taiwan.
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to deal with health emergencies. In the same month, after Taiwan reported its first case of human
infection of the PRC-origin H7N9 “bird flu,” Taiwan protested to the WHO for incorrectly
naming Taiwan as “Taiwan, China” on the WHO’s reports on the H7N9 outbreak.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Shear stated in March 2010 that “the United States is a
strong, consistent supporter of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations.”
He also stated that “Taiwan should be able to participate in organizations where it cannot be a
member, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization,
and other important international bodies whose activities have a direct impact on the people of
Taiwan.” Taiwan has sought status as an observer in the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Taiwan’s airlines
(China Airlines, Eva Air, and TransAsia Airways) are members of the International Air Transport
Association (IATA). Taiwan’s Flight Safety Foundation provides indirect communication between
domestic aviation authorities and airlines and the ICAO based in Montreal. In 2011, Taiwan
joined the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO), which is an observer in ICAO.
Many believe that Taiwan’s direct communication with ICAO would enhance aviation security
and safety. In July 2013, President Ma said that over 1.3 million flights pass through Taiwan’s
controlled airspace each year. Taiwan’s challenges include justifying the practical gains and
gaining PRC support. While the State Department stopped short of publicly supporting Taiwan’s
“observership” in ICAO, Congress has supported this stance in passing legislation since 2010. On
June 18 and 19, 2013, the House and Senate, respectively, passed H.R. 1151 (Royce) and S. 579
(Menendez), to direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for
Taiwan at ICAO. The House passed H.R. 1151 (by 424-0), after Representatives Royce,
Faleomavaega, Ros-Lehtinen, and Green spoke in favor. The Senate also passed H.R. 1151 on
June 27. President Obama signed the bill into law (P.L. 113-17) on July 12. He stated that
Administration supports Taiwan’s participation at ICAO, while he construed the act to be
consistent with the “one China” policy. Taiwan seeks to participate in the ICAO assembly (held
once in three years) from September 24-October 4 in Montreal, Canada.
Arms Sales to Taiwan
The Defense Department has reported to Congress in annual reports on the PLA that the balance
of forces across the Taiwan Strait has continued to shift to the PRC’s favor. Moreover, the
Secretary’s report of March 2009 told Congress that it was no longer the case that Taiwan’s Air
Force enjoyed dominance of the airspace over the strait. Since 2001, Taiwan has discussed the
acquisition of diesel-electric submarines. Since 2006, Taiwan has been unsuccessful in trying to
submit a formal request to procure new F-16C/D fighters. One policy issue concerns whether
President Obama denied or delayed arms sales out of concern about military exchanges and other
aspects of the overall relationship with the PRC. The Administration maintains that it adheres to
the TRA. While the PRC has not warned Taiwan of consequences in continuing to seek U.S.
weapons, the PRC has claimed to “suspend” many military meetings with the United States.
President Obama notified Congress on January 29, 2010, of major arms sales to Taiwan: five
programs with a total value of $6.4 billion. Again submitting notifications on one day, President
Obama proposed on September 21, 2011, three major arms sales programs with a total value of
$5.9 billion, including upgrades for Taiwan’s existing F-16A/B fighters. Like Bush, President
Obama has not notified Congress of the submarine design program (the only one pending from
decisions in 2001) and has not accepted Taiwan’s formal request for new F-16C/D fighters.
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The United States has concerns that Taiwan under President Ma has not given sufficient priority
to defense and cut the defense budget in 2009, 2010, and 2011 until an increase in 2012. The
2013 budget ($10.5 billion) is a small drop from that in 2012. President Ma has failed to reach the
promised defense spending at 3% of GDP, even as Taiwan’s military shifts from conscripts to
volunteer personnel. There are increasing concerns about whether Taiwan’s military is hollowing
out with problems in recruitment and retention in trying to set up a volunteer force by 2015
without sufficient resources and commitment by the leadership. On July 20, 2013, an estimated
30,000 demonstrators protested at the MND, after the death of a corporal on July 3 reportedly
from heatstroke while in detention. Even before the incident that could harm recruitment and
retention, MND reached only 10.6% of its goal for the year, signing 1,847 out of 17,447
recruits.25
In the 113th Congress, on January 25, 2013, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.R.
419, the Taiwan Policy Act of 2013. The bill, inter alia, would seek to strengthen Taiwan’s
defense by authorizing a number of arms sales, acceptance of Taiwan’s letter of request for F-
16C/D fighters, and a sale of excess U.S. Navy Perry-class frigates as Excess Defense Articles
(EDA). The bill also would require the Departments of Defense and State to brief and report to
Congress on arms sales and the implementation of the TRA. On February 26, Senator Daniel
Coats introduced S. 12, the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013, to authorize the sale of excess
Perry-class frigates to Taiwan. Representative Robert Andrews wrote a letter, dated June 4, to
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, asking about possible U.S. support for Taiwan’s indigenous
submarine program. The Defense Department’s response acknowledged that the United States has
reviewed since 2008 Taiwan’s request for a submarine design and noted that Taiwan has not
requested technical assistance for a submarine program. The House, on June 14, passed H.R.
1960 (McKeon), NDAA for FY2014, with Section 1265 to direct the President to sell 66 F-16C/D
fighters (approved as language offered by Representative Connolly for amendments en bloc). The
Senate’s report (S.Rept. 113-44) for the NDAA, S. 1197, extended the deadline to July 15, 2013,
for the Defense Department to brief on Taiwan’s air power (as required by April 15 in the
conference report for the NDAA for FY2013) and directed the department to submit a classified
report on Taiwan’s air force by December 1. The briefing took place on July 17. (Also see CRS
Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley A. Kan.)
Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
As one of its top priorities, Taiwan sought inclusion in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP),
which eliminates some visa requirements for qualified countries, allowing their citizens to make
temporary U.S. visits without first obtaining a valid visa. VWP countries must meet certain
criteria, such as offering reciprocal privileges to U.S. citizens, having machine-readable
passports, and having a low non-immigrant refusal rate.
The Ma Administration has stressed visa waiver status as a benefit for Taiwan’s travelers, a
symbol of support for his policies, and a step to support Taiwan’s international stature. Mariko
Silver, Acting Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for International Policy, visited Taiwan
in April 2010 and welcomed Taiwan’s adoption of e-passports and looked to Taiwan’s resolution
of technical security and a new requirement for in-person applications for passports to prevent
25 Taiwan News, July 20; CNA, July 21, 2013. A ruling KMT legislator, Ma Wen-chun, warned that the military could
“collapse” if there are no recruits (quoted in Want China Times, Taipei, July 23, 2013).
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fraud. The refusal rate for Taiwan’s applicants of U.S. non-immigrant visas was at 2.2% in 2010,
better than the 3% standard for the VWP. In late 2010, Taiwan announced that it would sign three
relevant agreements with the United States to exchange information on stolen or counterfeit
passports, on terrorists, and on combating crime. Even without U.S. leadership in waiving visas
for Taiwan’s travelers, President Ma announced in June 2011 that Taiwan had secured offers from
116 countries and territories to grant its citizens visa-free or landing visa travel privileges. To
prevent fraud, Taiwan started on July 1, 2011, a new system to require first-time applicants for
passports to apply in person. One implication of Taiwan’s gaining visa waiver status was that
approximately $15 million would be needed to offset visa processing fees lost per year to the
State Department (starting in FY2013). With broader implications for more visitors, Assistant
Secretary of Commerce Kumar said in Taiwan in September 2011 that almost 300,000 visitors
from Taiwan contributed over $1 billion to the U.S. economy in 2010. On December 22, 2011,
the State Department announced the nomination of Taiwan as a candidate for the VWP. The
Department of Homeland Security then reviewed Taiwan’s candidacy, including through a visit to
Taiwan in March 2012 (vs. the higher-profile announcement of candidacy). Once Taiwan was
included in the VWP, only Taiwan’s e-passports would be eligible. Another issue for resolution
concerned Taiwan’s category of passports issued to “compatriots” whom Taiwan has not accepted
for repatriation or given the right of residency (with questions about their true citizenship). On
October 2, 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security designated Taiwan in the VWP, effective on
November 1. Taiwan’s citizens may travel to the United States for business or tourism for up to
90 days without a visa. Taiwan became the 37th country to join the VWP.
Other options could include Taiwan’s inclusion in the Department of Homeland Security’s
Trusted Traveler and Trusted Trader programs. The Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary
Mark Koumans visited Taipei in December 2012. In his speech on supply chain security,
Koumans said that increased security can help facilitate (rather than impede) travel and trade.
Extradition Treaty
Taiwan has asked for an extradition treaty, and negotiations started in 2010, involving the
Departments of Justice and State. Taiwan has sought about 70 fugitives suspected of being in the
United States. Taiwan had proposed an extradition treaty with the United States as early as 1979.
In December 1992, the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations
recommended negotiation of an extradition agreement with Taiwan as soon as possible. A
precedent for congressional consideration could be the U.S.-Hong Kong extradition agreement.26
Aside from an extradition treaty or agreement, another option could be authorizing statute passed
by Congress. (Also see CRS Report 98-958, Extradition To and From the United States:
Overview of the Law and Recent Treaties, by Michael John Garcia and Charles Doyle.)
Human Rights and Rule of Law
The TRA reaffirmed that the preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all of Taiwan’s
people are U.S. objectives. President Ma has contended that he has valued democracy, freedom,
26 Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations, a report on “The New International Criminal and
Asian Organized Crime,” S. Prt. 102-129, December 1992; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, report on the “U.S.-
Hong Kong Extradition Treaty,” Exec. Rept. 105-2, August 19, 1997; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, report on
the “Agreement with Hong Kong on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons,” Exec. Rept. 105-24, October 14, 1998.
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and human rights. However, in early November 2008, Taiwan’s police allegedly used heavy-
handed measures against protestors in providing security for an official from Beijing, ARATS
Chairman Chen Yunlin. Freedom House called for an independent investigation. Taiwan sent
officials to Washington to defend the police, acknowledging a U.S. role. Concerned observers say
that Taiwan under the KMT has not done enough to promote those values in the PRC or judicial
reforms in Taiwan. Some have questioned whether the Ma Administration has downplayed
democracy promotion by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD) and has been less
welcoming to those attacked by Beijing, such as political dissidents, Tibetan leader Dalai Lama,
Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer, and Falun Gong practitioners.
Trials of former president Chen Shui-bian (who has been sentenced to prison for 20 years in
ongoing cases for corruption but also found not guilty of other charges) heightened scrutiny of
pre-indictment and pre-trial detentions, prosecutorial leaks, other misconduct, transparency of
judicial procedures, and prisoners’ freedom of speech. On November 12, 2008, which happened
to be the day that ex-president Chen was first detained on charges of corruption, AIT Director
Stephen Young expressed the U.S. expectation that Taiwan’s judicial process be “transparent, fair,
and impartial.” Jerome Cohen, a legal scholar at NYU’s School of Law who was Ma’s professor
at Harvard, has written critiques of Taiwan’s judicial system as well as commended Ma’s signing
of the instruments of ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. He wrote that the prosecution
of former president Chen was not a political vendetta by the KMT but showed that no one is
above the law in Taiwan. Still, Cohen criticized judicial officials for a skit on “Law Day” in 2009
that mocked the detained Chen and restraints on Chen’s ability to defend himself. In a meeting
with Professor Cohen in May 2010, President Ma said that judicial officials took actions to reduce
human rights concerns about Taiwan’s detention system.27 In his second inaugural address in May
2012, Ma acknowledged the continued need for judicial reform.
A number of U.S. and foreign former officials, activists, and academics have written several open
letters to President Ma to express concerns that Taiwan’s judiciary lacked political independence
or objectivity. A letter of April 11, 2011, in the Taipei Times asked whether legal charges against
17 former DPP officials of the Chen Administration for allegedly failing to return about 36,000
documents were “politically motivated” in coming out three years after the transition in 2008 and
during electoral campaigns. On June 30, 2011, prosecutors indicted Lee Teng-hui, who was
president from 1988 to 2000, for allegedly diverting $7.8 million in diplomatic funds for the
establishment of the Taiwan Research Institute in the 1990s. Some foreign observers questioned
whether the legal action was timed to affect Lee’s support for the DPP in the elections in January
2012 and noted the lack of prompt follow-up.28 The first hearing on Lee’s case was on June 22,
2012, but he could not attend until another hearing on August 10. In contrast, a high-profile case
against a ruling KMT politician, Lin Yi-shih, raised controversy, when the Taipei District Court,
on April 30, 2013, found him not guilty of corruption and sentenced him to seven years in prison.
Lin was charged with using his positions as a legislator and then Secretary-General of the
Executive Yuan (Cabinet) to demand payments for contracts with a state-owned corporation. The
Control Yuan (the government branch responsible for accountability) impeached Lin in June.29
27 Jerome Cohen’s articles published in South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, May 28, 2009, June 11, 2009,
September 17, 2009, October 15, 2009, January 20, 2010; and Apple Daily, October 9, 2009.
28 For example, see another open letter to President Ma Ying-jeou in the Taipei Times on August 2, 2011.
29 Taiwan News, May 1, 2013; Taipei Times, May 1, 2013; Central News Agency, June 11, 2013.
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In March-April 2012, some Members in Congress (including Representatives Steve Chabot, Dan
Lungren, and Ed Royce) raised concerns about Chen’s prison conditions and health. In July,
Representatives Robert Andrews and Lungren submitted a report by medical professors at the
University of California at Davis to the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, raising
questions about the conditions of ex-President Chen in prison (confined in a small cell) and
calling for his medical parole.30 Chen’s conditions in prison reportedly improved in June.
However, starting in September 2012, Chen’s medical condition deteriorated, requiring extended
guarded stays in hospitals. Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice denied that political bias influenced
Chen’s medical care. In October, Representative Howard Berman wrote to President Ma, calling
for Chen’s release from prison on humanitarian grounds. Also, Senator Sherrod Brown wrote to
the AIT Director in Taipei, asking him to visit Chen. Jerome Cohen met with Chen at a hospital in
Taipei in December, showing concern about this medical treatment while declining to call for
Chen’s medical parole. In January 2013, Representative Steve Chabot added his support for
Chen’s medical parole. Representative Andrews wrote a letter on March 1 to Secretary of State
John Kerry, strongly urging his department to take a stance on the treatment of Chen. Two weeks
later, the State Department responded that AIT has raised concerns about Chen’s health with
Taiwan’s officials. On April 19, the Justice Ministry suddenly moved Chen from the Veterans
General Hospital in Taipei to Taichung Prison’s Pei-Te Hospital (in the central city of Taichung),
with a special area for Chen with a garden. The Justice Ministry argued that it has treated Chen
legally and appropriately as a prisoner, medical patient, and former head of state. Some doctors,
relatives, DPP politicians, and activists protested. The DPP called for Chen’s medical parole. On
May 2 in Taiwan, accompanied by AIT officials, Representatives Chabot and Eni Faleomavaega
(of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific) visited Chen at Taichung
Prison’s hospital. Mr. Chabot said he offered his personal view about Chen’s human rights.31
In April 2013, the State Department issued its worldwide human rights reports for 2012, noting
that Taiwan’s principal human rights problems concerned corruption and violence against women
and children. The State Department also reported that the right to strike was highly regulated, and
that there was evidence of forced labor and violations of maximum working hours.
Concerning human rights in China, in mid-November 2012, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry denied a
visa to the Tibetan Dalai Lama to attend a conference in Taipei. Opposition DPP lawmakers
criticized the decision that simply cited bad timing. Taiwan did not issue a policy statement. In
contrast, the State Department confirmed on November 30 that Assistant Secretary for Human
Rights Affairs Michael Posner met with relatives of Tibetans who self-immolated in the Tibetan
area. The department then issued a statement on December 5 by Maria Otero, the U.S. Special
Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. The United States expressed concern about violence and
increasing self-immolations in the Tibetan areas, called on the PRC government to address
policies, including use of force, that exacerbated the tensions, expressed hope that the self-
immolations will end, urged the PRC to allow reporters, diplomats, and other observers to the
Tibetan areas, and called on the PRC to talk with the Dalai Lama without preconditions. Taiwan
last allowed the Tibetan leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner to visit in 2009, in the wake of a
major typhoon. Congress and President Bush had awarded in the U.S. Capitol the Congressional
Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama in October 2007.
30 U.S. Citizen Medical Team (Joseph Lin, Ken Yoneda, and Charles Whitcomb), “The Effects of Incarceration on the
Mental and Physical Health of Former President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan,” July 12, 2012.
31 “U.S. Politicians Concerned About A-Bian,” Taipei Times, May 4, 2013.
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Taiwan allowed a visit by PRC activist Chen Guangcheng, who arrived in Taipei on June 24,
2013. The well-known blind human rights activist fled detention in China to the American
Embassy, which negotiated his release in May 2012 for a one-year fellowship at NYU. Chen said
that Taiwan presented a model in fighting for democracy. However, President Ma declined to
meet with Chen, though Jerome Cohen accompanied him and his visit was for 18 days.
Democratic Elections (KMT and DPP)
The United States has closely watched Taiwan’s elections, because of the critical implications for
U.S. interests in democracy and security. Taiwan held elections on January 14, 2012, with the first
combined presidential and legislative elections on one day. Beijing seemed to favor incumbent
President Ma Ying-jeou. The CPC and KMT oppose Taiwan’s independence and agree on what
they call now the “1992 Consensus.” KMT President Ma won re-election with 51.6% of the
votes, a victory of 6 percentage points over DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen, who won 45.6% of
the votes. Voter turnout was lower than in previous elections but still considered high (74% out of
18 million eligible voters). Out of 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan (LY), the KMT won the
majority with 64 (down from 72 seats), and the DPP won 40 seats (up from 32). Minor parties
and an independent won the remaining 9 LY seats. The State Department congratulated Taiwan
for another free and fair election. On August 2, 2012, Senator Lisa Murkowski introduced S.Res.
542 to express the sense of the Senate that the United States should continue to support
democracy and human rights in Taiwan after the elections. The bill noted a report by a group of
international observers that found the elections were “mostly free but only partly fair.”32
Observers attributed DPP Chairwoman Tsai’s loss to lack of clarity and certainty about how she
would sustain the status quo and a stable cross-strait relationship. She tried to balance appeals to
the pro-independence base and to moderate voters who support continued cross-strait economic
engagement. While Tsai proposed a “Taiwan Consensus,” the KMT touted “peaceful
development” under the KMT-CPC’s “1992 Consensus.” Instead of a clearer stance on the ECFA
signed in June 2010 amid a dwindling number of DPP-led protestors, Tsai said vaguely that she
would use “democratic procedures” to continue the policy.33 In October 2011, Tsai said “Taiwan
is the ROC, the ROC is Taiwan.” Tsai focused on income inequality, but Taiwan’s economic
conditions have been tied to the PRC’s economy. Rather than keeping distance from Taiwan’s
electoral politics, in August 2011, Beijing opposed the DPP’s policy guidelines as “unacceptable.”
On December 16, 2011, CPC Politburo Standing Committee Member Jia Qinglin warned that
cross-strait talks would not continue without accepting the “1992 Consensus.” Taiwan’s major
businesses with interests in mainland China echoed support for the “1992 Consensus.” The DPP
also attributed its loss to the Obama Administration’s actions seen as favoring Ma. As a close U.S.
observer told the Washington Post after the election, “the administration liked the fact that
tensions had been reduced across the Taiwan Strait … and rewarded Ma.”34 While it was difficult
to determine the impact of various factors, a poll taken after the elections indicated that the most
cited concerns of voters were the economy, income gap, cross-strait ties, and social welfare.35
32 On September 19, 2012, Senator Murkowski submitted to the Congressional Record the summary of the report of the
International Election Observers Mission, written by Woodrow Clark and Frank Murkowski.
33 Tsai Ing-wen’s interview with Apple Daily, Taipei, September 20, 2010.
34 Andrew Higgins, “Taiwan’s Pro-China Chief Reelected,” Washington Post, January 15, 2012, quoting Douglas Paal.
35 Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), Taipei, January 16, 2012.
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The DPP continues as a viable party in Taiwan’s electoral politics, with observers watching for
potential party unity and rejuvenation in leadership. After Chen Shui-bian’s eight years in office,
the DPP had suffered a significant loss in the presidential election in 2008. Nonetheless, the DPP
under Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen rebuilt its strength and won a number of local and legislative
elections in 2009-2011. The DPP then lost to the KMT in the presidential election in 2012 but
with a smaller margin than that in 2008, and the DPP gained seats in the LY. Tsai stepped down as
the chair. Some observers have concerns about the DPP in future elections and any reversal of the
warming trend in cross-strait ties. Others have confidence about the DPP’s evolution as a party
that provides democratic checks and balance and about the voters’ choices on their status. While
the KMT stresses the ROC’s legacy that includes “one China,” the DPP pursues Taiwan-centric
policies based on a legacy of fighting for freedoms and a stated priority of ties to democratic
countries like the United States and Japan. In contrast to the KMT’s touting of the “1992
Consensus,” the DPP says that cross-strait talks cannot be simply KMT-CPC negotiations.
Nonetheless, both the KMT and DPP could continue to use political ambiguity, including the
KMT’s use of “1992 Consensus.” The KMT and DPP could find areas of common ground
concerning the ROC’s name and constitution, forging a domestic consensus about Taiwan’s
relationships with the United States, Japan, and the PRC, and protecting the way of life in the
democratic, security, and economic interests of Taiwan’s people. No matter which party rules,
Taiwan faces challenges from the PRC within the context of economic integration. The DPP
could clarify or review its approach toward the United States and toward the PRC.
After winning the election to be the DPP’s chairman on May 27, 2012, former premier Su Tseng-
chang (at age 64) announced restoration of the DPP’s Department of “China Affairs,” among
various departments. While such a move took cross-strait policy out of “international” policy, the
approach differed from the KMT and CPC’s use of “mainland China.” Not until later (in August)
did Su set up a Department on Defense Policy. On October 4-8, former premier Frank Hsieh
became the most senior member of the DPP to visit the PRC, though on a private visit. He met
with senior PRC officials (State Councilor Dai Bingguo, ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin, and
TAO Director Wang Yi). Hsieh proposed a “constitutional consensus” (“two constitutions with
different interpretations”) for the “status quo,” instead of talking about the “1992 Consensus”
(“one China with different interpretations”). Hsieh’s idea did not represent the DPP’s proposal but
represented an effort to review the party’s policy on China. Hsieh urged the DPP to accept the
ROC constitution. In November, DPP Chairman Su named himself as the convener of the higher-
level Committee on China Affairs (later set up in May 2013 with members that include Hsieh).
The DPP has reached out to the United States, Japan, Singapore, the PRC, Canada, and other
countries. At a cross-strait conference in Taipei in December 2012, a DPP official, Joseph Wu,
met with TAO Deputy Director Sun Yafu, who reportedly said that talks should continue without
preconditions. Chairman Su visited Japan in January 2013, stressing that Taiwan should not
provoke tensions over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) islands. On the eve of his visit to the United
States in June, Chairman Su issued a DPP paper on defense policy. It stressed strengthening
defense against the PRC, raising the defense budget to 3% of GDP, and cooperating with all
democracies, but it expressed a consensus with the KMT on a “military presence” in the dispute
with the Philippines over the shooting of a Taiwan fisherman in May. During his visit, Su met
with Members of Congress, Administration officials, and others. Su’s message was that Taiwan is
a sovereign country that does not belong to the PRC, but he also said that seeking independence
was unnecessary and that the country’s name under the constitution is “Republic of China.” He
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said that this is Taiwan’s “status quo” and what he called the “Taiwan Consensus.” Su said that
Taiwan’s relationship with the United States is the most important and needs to be strengthened.36
Restoring Trust and Resolving Disputes (Beef and Pork)
Taiwan has a window for greater attention to governance, before the local elections in 2014 and
presidential election in 2016. Taiwan’s political seasons have constrained U.S. influence on some
priorities, particularly to relax Taiwan’s restrictions on U.S. beef. Taiwan banned U.S. beef in
2003 and 2005 out of concern about bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or mad cow
disease. In 2006, Taiwan lifted the ban but imposed restrictions on U.S. beef. U.S. concerns
include whether Taiwan abides by rules of the WTO and World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE), of which Taiwan is a member, even as Taiwan seeks U.S. support for its participation in
international organizations. Taiwan has been a key market for U.S. beef exports, with values that
increased from $42 million in 2005 to $215 million in 2010. The value dropped to $199 million in
2011 and dropped further to $128 million in 2012, according to the U.S. Meat Export Federation.
In April 2009, President Ma gave a speech directed at the Obama Administration, including a
promise to open Taiwan’s market to U.S. agricultural exports, alluding to the U.S. request
conveyed to him since his inauguration day in May 2008 that Taiwan lift restrictions on U.S. beef.
In October 2009, President Ma agreed to conclude two years of negotiations on an agreement to
relax Taiwan’s restrictions on imports of U.S. beef over Taiwan’s concern about mad cow disease.
The United States maintains that U.S. beef is safe. Under the U.S.-Taiwan agreement signed on
October 22, 2009, Taiwan would allow bone-in beef, ground beef, and cow parts under 30 months
of age without specified risk materials (skulls, spines, brains, etc.). However, both the ruling
KMT and opposition DPP complained. In what the Ma Administration admitted as a “crisis,”
Taiwan raised tension with the Obama Administration and Congress over beef. Taiwan’s
Legislative Yuan passed in January 2010 a bill to ban ground beef, parts, and risky materials from
areas with mad cow disease in the past 10 years. The USTR and Members of Congress expressed
concerns about Taiwan’s political, unscientific restrictions and questions of safety concerning
U.S. beef, unilateral abrogation of an agreement, and violations of key principles in international
trade that harmed U.S. agricultural exports. However, the broader U.S. business community
questioned the freezing of TIFA talks due to one category of exports, and some observers pointed
out that the United States has continued trade talks with the PRC in spite of many disputes.
Taiwan then raised another dispute over beef, right before an attempted resumption of TIFA talks
expected in late January 2011. On January 15, Taiwan ordered the removal from sale of U.S. beef
with a drug to promote leanness called ractopamine, although the United States maintains that the
additive is safe. On February 17, the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Finance
Committee and House Ways and Means Committee (Senators Max Baucus and Orrin Hatch, and
Representatives Dave Camp and Sander Levin) wrote a letter to President Ma to express concern
that U.S. beef exports to Taiwan stopped effectively, to urge a correction, and to seek confidence
to resume the TIFA talks. On July 13, 2011, AIT expressed disappointment in Taiwan’s apparently
“political” decision to keep the ban by citing the lack of agreement at an international
commission on acceptable, maximum residue levels (MRLs) for ractopamine. Representative
Royce delivered a speech on November 12, in which he lamented that only with Taiwan (not
36 DPP, press release on Su’s remarks in New York, June 10; Su’s speech at Brookings Institution, June 13, 2013.
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South Korea and Japan) has the Administration suspended overall economic talks over the
“narrow, politically-charged” dispute about beef.
With expectation that Ma would resolve the dispute after the January 2012 elections, AmCham in
Taipei urged Ma in February to put an end to the dispute before it “further damages” the
relationship with the United States. In February and March, AIT issued Fact Sheets about the
safety of U.S. beef and ractopamine, which also pointed out that Taiwan itself has established
MRLs for over 100 veterinary compounds. The Department of Commerce postponed the visit of
Under Secretary Francisco Sanchez scheduled for March 4-6, amid protests, recalls of U.S. beef,
and DPP and KMT proposals in the LY to stipulate zero-tolerance for ractopamine. President Ma
held “national security” meetings over this “crisis.” The Ma Administration then issued four
conditions for beef: safe levels of ractopamine, separate allowances for beef and pork (amid
objections from hog farmers), labeling of meats, and no imports of organs. To counter the
domestic political pressure, Ma argued that a resolution was needed for U.S.-Taiwan ties and
Taiwan’s international integration to avoid marginalization.
On March 6, 2012, Senator Chuck Grassley issued a press release stating that he was encouraged
by Taiwan’s announcement that it would allow some beef imports containing ractopamine. But he
added that there was no scientific reason for Taiwan to set residual levels of a certain additive for
beef but not pork.37 On March 15, 68 Members of Congress led by Representatives Denny
Rehberg and Ron Kind sent a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and the USTR, objecting to
Taiwan’s protectionist trade restrictions on U.S. pork and beef. They wrote that “further toleration
of Taiwan’s unnecessary restrictions sets a dangerous precedent for the mistreatment of U.S.
products and undermines our efforts to establish objective, internationally-recognized science-
based standards for U.S. exports.”38 Then, on April 24, the Department of Agriculture found a
cow with mad cow disease, stating that it posed no risk. In the LY, some lawmakers of the ruling
KMT voted down attempts by lawmakers of opposition parties led by the DPP to ban U.S. beef
(including on April 27 and May 4, 11, and 18). A committee in the LY defeated on May 7 the
Cabinet’s proposal to allow beef with safe levels of ractopamine, leaving a potential vote in the
full LY. Meanwhile, Taiwan sent agricultural officials who arrived on May 6 in Washington and
then set up meetings with U.S. officials, associations, and beef processing sites. The officials
visited several states over 23 days and found U.S. beef to be safe.
AmCham in Taipei lamented that the dispute over beef became “heavily politicized” but
commended President Ma for doing the right thing in working on a resolution. Although the
Speaker of the LY, Wang Jin-pyng of the KMT, negotiated an agreement between the KMT and
DPP to extend the LY’s session for two weeks until June 15, 2012, in part to vote on the
Cabinet’s, or Executive Yuan’s (EY’s), amendment to the Act Governing Food Safety, the LY did
not vote by then. As KMT Chairman, Ma met with the LY’s KMT Caucus on June 7 to forge
party unity behind his proposal. Starting on June 11, DPP, TSU, and PFP opposition lawmakers
occupied the Speaker’s podium in the LY’s chamber to prevent a vote all week, targeting what
some called the “U.S. beef bill” as detrimental to food safety. The DPP’s new chairman, Su
Tseng-chang, visited the DPP legislators and supported their stance. Some DPP politicians
claimed that they were not opposing U.S. beef yet denounced “toxic” or “poisonous” beef.
37 Senator Chuck Grassley, “Taiwan Decision on U.S. Beef Imports Should Apply to Pork,” March 6, 2012.
38 Representative Denny Rehberg, “Rehberg Leads Ongoing Fight Against Unfair Trade Restrictions by Taiwan on
U.S. Pork and Beef,” March 15, 2012.
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On July 5, Representatives Edward Royce and Gerald Connolly led 10 Members of Congress to
write to President Obama to urge a resumption of the TIFA talks, while “Taiwan must take steps
to open its market to U.S. agriculture exports.”39 On the same day, the international Codex
Alimentarius Commission voted in Rome to adopt MRLs for ractopamine in beef and pork. The
DPP cited that development to announce support for international standards and sought to rebuild
trust with the United States. However, at a special session of the LY on July 25, all legislators in
the DPP Caucus voted against the bill to end the ban on ractopamine in beef. In passing the KMT-
supported bill (63-46), 40 DPP, 3 PFP, and 3 TSU legislators voted against it. While the DPP
stopped obstructing the legislative process, its vote continued to raise questions about its political
leadership and principles (professed to be in concert with Washington), when the elections were
over in January and Taiwan’s people commonly expressed satisfaction with U.S. products. The
DPP defended its stance as part of supporting its own version of the legislation, which included
language on differentiating between treatment of beef and pork, while resolving the dispute.
After the postponement of his visit in March, Under Secretary of Commerce Sanchez visited
Taipei in late October 2012. He highlighted the start on November 1 of the VWP for Taiwan’s
travelers to facilitate their visits to the United States for tourism and business. Sanchez welcomed
the news that U.S. beef was again available, a step to strengthen confidence in Taiwan as a
responsible trading partner. However, Taiwan has maintained a ban on ractopamine for pork. At a
hearing of the Senate Finance Committee on March 19, 2013, Senator Grassley expressed
concern that Taiwan has continued to “discriminate against pork” with an “unjustifiable barrier”
despite an expectation of a resolution after Taiwan’s political elections (in January 2012).
Taiwan has acknowledged its own food safety problems, including a scandal reported on May 14,
2013, that some of Taiwan’s companies added maleic acid to starch in some products (such as
noodles, meatballs, and tapioca balls in bubble tea). Taiwan launched an international campaign
to reassure foreign markets.40 The Congress has not targeted Taiwan for food safety problems.
Economic Issues41
Taiwan is a major innovator and producer of information technology (IT), broadly defined as
computer hardware and software; telecommunications; and other knowledge-based industries.
According to the Taiwan government, Taiwan is the world’s second-largest producer of ICT
goods, although 83.3% of Taiwan ICT products are produced outside Taiwan—mainly China. In
2010, Taiwan’s ICT industry generated $424.6 billion in revenues.42 Numerous surveys have
identified Taiwan as a major leader in global technology. For example:
• A BusinessWeek survey of the 100 best performing global IT companies in 2009
listed 10 Taiwanese firms, 4 of which were among the world’s top 10 IT firms.43
39 Letter to Barack Obama from Representatives Edward Royce, Gerald Connolly, Donald Manzullo, Howard Berman,
Gary Ackerman, Steve Chabot, Walter Jones, James Moran, Renee Ellmers, and Mike Kelly, July 5, 2012.
40 Meg Chang, “ROC Cabinet Unveils Food Starch Response,” Taiwan Today, May 30, 2013.
41 Written by Wayne Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance.
42 Taiwan Ministry of Economics and Digitimes, Taiwan’s ICT Industry Development and Outlook, June 2011.
43 Bloomberg Businessweek, the InfoTech 100, 2009, available at http://www.businessweek.com/interactive_reports/
it100_2009.html.
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• According to the World Bank’s Knowledge Economy Index (KEI), which
attempts to measure and rank a country’s ability to generate, adopt, and diffuse
knowledge, Taiwan ranked 13th out of 145 economies in 2012.44
• The World Economic Forum’s Global Information Technology Report for 2012
ranked Taiwan 11th out of 142 economies in terms of preparedness to leverage
ICT advances for increased competitiveness and development.45
Taiwan’s Global Trade
Taiwan’s economy is highly dependent on trade. In 2012, Taiwan’s exports of goods and services
were equal to 74% of gross domestic product (GDP). From 2005 to 2012, net exports (exports
minus imports) were the largest contributor to Taiwan’s annual GDP growth.46 Taiwan’s 2012
merchandise exports and imports were $284 billion and $271 billion, respectively, making it the
world’s 17th-largest exporter and 18th-largest importer. Continued weakness in the global
economy has significantly impacted Taiwan’s economy. Taiwan’s real GDP grew 10.8% in 2010
over the previous year (while real exports of goods and services were up 25.6%). In 2011, real
GDP slowed to 4.1% (real exports of goods and services grew by 4.4%), and in 2012, real GDP
increased by only 1.2% (real exports of goods and services experienced zero growth). Taiwan’s
nominal GDP in 2012 was $475 billion.47 Taiwan’s top trading partners in 2012 were China,
Japan, the United States, Singapore, and South Korea (see Table 1).
Table 1. Taiwan’s Top Five Trading Partners: 2012
($ billions)
Total
Exports
Imports
Trade Balance
World
555.1 284.3 270.8 240.8
China
121.6 80.7 40.9 39.8
Japan
64.7 17.1 47.7 -6.5
United
States
55.4 31.8 23.5 23.7
Singapore 27.2
19.0
8.1
4.01
South
Korea
26.6 11.5 15.1 11.5
Source: Data for China are from Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council. All other data are from the Global Trade
Atlas.
Notes: Data on China are direct trade as well as estimated indirect trade through Hong Kong.
Taiwan has tried to expand trade, amid concerns about the proliferation of regional and bilateral
FTAs that exclude Taiwan, especially among Taiwan’s major trading partners and competitors.
Taiwan’s officials have warned that the exclusion of Taiwan from such FTAs could weaken the
44 The World Bank, the Knowledge Economy Index, 2012, at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp.
45 See http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-information-technology-report-2012.
46 For example, in 2011, Taiwan’s real GDP grew by 4.0% over the previous year. The components of that growth were
net exports (at 3.7 percentage points), private consumption (1.6%), and government consumption (0.2%), while
stockbuilding and gross fixed investment declined by 0.8% and 0.7%, respectively.
47 IHS Global Insight, Country & Industry Forecasting, Taiwan, March 1, 2013.
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competitiveness of Taiwanese firms, diminishing trade and economic growth.48 Currently, Taiwan
has FTAs with only Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which, together
account for only a minor share of Taiwan’s total trade. In contrast, South Korea, a major
competitor for many Taiwanese exporters, has FTAs in effect with the United States, the
European Union, the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Peru,
India, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Singapore, and Chile. South Korea has
concluded FTAs with Turkey and Columbia and is negotiating with 11 other countries and
regions.49 Until recently, Taiwan’s efforts to enter into negotiations for an FTA with its major
trading partners have proven unsuccessful, partly because of opposition by China.50
In an effort to boost economic ties with China in order to take advantage of its rapidly growing
economy, and to improve the chances of Taiwan entering into FTAs with other countries,51 the Ma
administration, after coming into office in 2008, sought to liberalize cross-strait trade and
investment barriers. This included the lifting of restrictions on direct trade, transportation, and
postal links.52 In 2010, the two sides negotiated the Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement (ECFA), an FTA that seeks to significantly liberalize trade and investment barriers
over time. The agreement is expected to hasten the pace of cross-strait economic integration and
boost economic growth on both sides.53
Press reports indicate that, since the signing of the ECFA, China has backed away somewhat from
its opposition to Taiwan seeking trade agreements with other countries. Taiwan is reportedly close
to completing negotiations for FTAs, which it calls “economic cooperation agreements” (ECAs)
with Singapore and with New Zealand.54 Taiwan also has pursued exploratory talks with the
European Union, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, and Israel about the possibility of an ECA.55
Taiwan has expressed interest in a FTA/ECA with the United States for the past several years.
Some analysts have urged Taiwan to pursue other agreements with the United States, such as a
48 For example, countries with FTAs often reduce most or all of their tariff levels to zero. Since Taiwan is not partner to
of the FTA its products will be assessed the non-FTA tariffs, which could put them at a competitive disadvantage.
49 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, FTA Status of ROK, at http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/
policy/fta/status/overview/index.jsp?menu=m_20_80_10.
50 In the past, PRC officials have argued that only “sovereign nations” can enter into FTAs, which, they claim, Taiwan
is not because it is “part of China.” However, WTO rules allow its members to negotiate FTAs. Taiwan is a member of
the WTO under the title: “the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu (Chinese Taipei).”
51 Another concern to Taiwan policymakers was China’s FTA agreements with ASEAN, which is considered the
world’s largest FTA in terms of population, and third largest in terms of trade flows and GDP. The China-ASEAN Free
Trade Area went into effect on January 1, 2010. Taiwan officials sought an ECFA with China to ensure that Taiwan’s
exports to China remained competitive vis-a-vis ASEAN exports to China.
52 Until recently, most trade, transportation, and postal links with China occurred indirectly, mainly via Hong Kong.
These constituted significant added time and money costs to cross-strait economic ties.
53 During the debate over the ECFA, the Taiwan government argued that the agreement would greatly benefit Taiwan’s
economy, estimating that it would boost GDP by 1.7% and exports by 5.0%, and expand employment by 263,000.
Taiwan opponents of the EFCA contended that the agreement would lead to further hollowing out of Taiwan’s
manufacturing industries, while other warned the agreement would make Taiwan overly-dependent on China’s
economy, which would give China leverage over Taiwan.
54 Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs defines an ECA as “an agreement signed by two or more economies for
promotion of trade activities and economic integration with each other by reducing tariffs and fees, as well as by
eliminating other trade barriers for goods and services.”
55 Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, Overview of Taiwan’s Progress on FTA/ECA, October 24, 2012, at
http://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/otn_e/content/SubMenu.aspx?menu_id=6199.
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bilateral investment agreement, which could boost both trade and investment.56 In addition,
Taiwan is seeking to join various proposed regional FTAs, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) that would include the United States; and the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) that would include 16 Asia-Pacific countries.57
Cross-Strait Economic Ties
The importance of the PRC as a trading partner for Taiwan is significant and has been growing
rapidly (see Figure 1).58 Taiwan’s total trade with China grew from $31.3 billion in 2000 to
$121.6 billion in 2012 (a 288.5% increase).59 The PRC is Taiwan’s largest trading partner
(followed by Japan and the United States),60 its largest export market, and its second-largest
source of imports (after Japan).61 According to Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), the
share of Taiwan’s exports to China rose from 3.2% in 1985 to 28.4% in 2012, while the share of
its imports from China rose from 0.6% to 15.1%.62 Taiwan has enjoyed large annual trade
surpluses with the mainland over the past several years, which totaled $39.8 billion in 2012.63
56 Taiwan signed an investment agreement with Japan in 2011.
57 The RCEP would include the ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand.
58 In 2001, Taiwan decided to relax restrictions on Taiwan’s investments in the PRC and to sharply reduce the number
of PRC products subject to import bans in order to boost Taiwan’s economy (which was in recession), as well as to take
advantage of new economic opportunities that were expected to occur following the PRC’s accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. Taiwan joined the WTO in January 2002.
59 Taiwan’s trade with China peaked at $134.7 billion in 2011.
60 In 2012, the United States was Taiwan’s second largest export market and third largest source of imports.
61 China replaced the United States as Taiwan’s largest export market in 2002 and has remained so through 2012.
62 Taiwan’s exports to, and imports from, China in 2012 were $80.7 billion and $40.9 billion, respectively.
63 PRC data indicate that its trade deficit with Taiwan in 2012 was the largest incurred with any of its trading partners.
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Figure 1. Taiwan’s Trade with China as a Percent of its Total Trade: 2000 and 2012
(percent)
28.4
30
25
21.9
20
16.9
15.1
15
10.9
10
4.4
5
0
Total Trade
Exports
Imports
2000
2012
Source: Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council.
Notes: Data include direct trade as well as estimated indirect trade through Hong Kong.
Taiwan is a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the PRC. According to the
MAC, Taiwan’s approved FDI flows to China totaled $10.9 billion in 2012 (see Figure 2), which
was down by 11% over the previous year, and its cumulative approved FDI in China from 1991 to
2012 was $124.5 billion, 81% of which is in manufacturing. These top five sectors of Taiwan’s
cumulative FDI in China include electronic parts and components manufacturing ($24.5 billion);
computers, electronic, and optical products manufacturing ($17.2 billion); electrical equipment
manufacturing ($9.3 billion); wholesale and retail trade $7.0 billion); and fabricated metal
products manufacturing ($5.9 billion). Many analysts argue that a large level of Taiwan’s
investment in China is not reported to the government. For example, many Taiwan investors are
believed to invest in China through a Hong Kong entity in order to avoid scrutiny by Taiwan’s
government. Some analysts estimate the total level of Taiwan FDI in China could be as high as
$300 billion.64 More than 1 million Taiwan people are estimated to be residing in China, and more
than 70,000 Taiwan companies have operations there.65
64 U.S. Department of State, 2013 Investment Climate Statement-Taiwan, February 2013, at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/
rls/othr/ics/2013/204742.htm.
65 American Institute in Taiwan, Taiwan Economic and Political Background Note, February 8, 2012.
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Figure 2. Taiwan’s Annual Approved Outbound Investment to China: 1991-2012
($ billions)
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Source: Taiwan Investment Commission.
Notes: Taiwan’s data reflect only FDI to China that was approved by the government. It likely does not include
FDI in China by Taiwan investors that did not seek or obtain government approval.
U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Investment Flows
U.S. trade data appear to indicate that the relative importance of Taiwan as a U.S. trading partner
has declined over the past 20 or so years, especially when compared with U.S. trade with China.
For example:
• Total U.S. trade with Taiwan in 2012 was $63.2 billion, making Taiwan the 11th
largest U.S. trading partner—down from 6th in 1989.
• U.S imports from Taiwan were $38.9 billion, making Taiwan the 11th-largest
source of U.S. imports—down from 5th in 1989.
• U.S. exports to Taiwan were $24.7 billion, making Taiwan the 16th-largest U.S.
export market—down from 9th in 1989. Taiwan was the 7th-largest export market
for U.S. agricultural products in 2012.66
• Major U.S. imports from Taiwan in 2012 included semiconductors and other
electronic components; communications equipment; computer equipment, and
motor vehicle parts. Major U.S. exports to Taiwan included semiconductors and
66 Conversely, the importance of China as a U.S. trading partner has risen significantly between 1989 and 2012: from
10th to 2nd for total trade, from 15th to 3rd for exports, and from 9th to 1st for imports.
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other electronic components; industrial machinery; basic chemicals; waste and
scrap; and oilseeds and grains (Table 2).
• At the end of 2012, Taiwan was the sixth-largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury
securities at $199 billion.
Table 2. Top Five U.S. Trade Commodities with Taiwan: 2012
($ millions)
Major U.S. Import Commodities from Taiwan
Semiconductors and other electronic components
6,078
Communications equipment
4,637
Computer equipment
2,236
Motor vehicle parts
2,095
Navigational, measuring, electro-medical, and control instruments
1,901
Major U.S. Export Commodities to Taiwan
Semiconductors and other electronic components
3,202
Industrial machinery
2,558
Basic chemicals
2,053
Waste & scrap
1,720
Oilseeds and grains
1,460
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb.
As indicated in Figure 3, U.S. trade with Taiwan has been relatively stagnant over the past 10
years. From 2003-2012, U.S. exports to, and imports from, Taiwan grew by 41.1% and 22.1%,
respectively, compared to the growth of total U.S. exports and imports during this period of
113.7% and 80.7%, respectively.
Figure 3. U.S.-Taiwan Merchandise Trade: 2000-2012
($ billions)
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Trade Balance
Exports
Imports
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) Dataweb.
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However, the trade data may not explain the whole picture. Taiwan’s manufacturers and traders
report data on the amount of export orders they receive from various countries. These data
indicate that annual orders for products from U.S. buyers are much larger than the reported level
of annual U.S. imports from Taiwan. For example, U.S. imports from Taiwan in 2012 were $38.9
billion. However, U.S. export orders placed with Taiwanese firms in that year were $107.2
billion. As can be seen in Figure 4, the gap between U.S. imports from Taiwan and U.S. export
orders to Taiwanese firms has widened considerably over the past 10 years.
The disparity between the data on Taiwan’s export orders and U.S. import data largely is
explained by the fact that a significant level of products designed and sold by Taiwan’s firms are
actually built elsewhere, especially in mainland China, and then shipped globally, including to the
United States. For example, from 2001 to 2008, the value of Taiwan’s IT hardware (such as
computers) production increased from $42.8 billion to $100.0 billion. However, the share of that
production in Taiwan during this time declined from 47.1% to 1.3%, while the share in China
increased from 36.9% to 90.6%. A significant amount of Taiwan’s IT hardware products that are
assembled in China are exported. U.S. trade data indicate that computer products and parts are the
single largest category of U.S. imports from China. Thus, it is likely that a large share of U.S.
imports of computers and computer parts from China originate from Taiwan-invested firms in
China. In many cases, U.S. IT firms place orders for products with Taiwan’s firms, which
manufacture the products in China, then ship them to the United States, where U.S. firms sell the
products under their own brand name. According to MOEA, U.S. firms, such as Apple, Inc., Dell,
Verizon, and HP are among the major global purchasers of ICT products made by Taiwanese
firms. For example, many of Apple Inc.’s products (such as iPads, iPhones, and iPods), which
were developed and engineered in the United States, are assembled by Taiwan’s firms in China
(using imported parts), many of which are shipped to the United States and sold by Apple.67
According to the State Department, Taiwan factories in China produced slightly more than 50%
of export orders received by Taiwan companies’ headquarters by late 2010, up from 11.5% in
early 2000, and for Taiwan IT firms, this ratio is around 85%.68
67 Taiwan’s Foxconn Technology Group is Apple’s major supplier.
68 U.S. Department of State, 2013 Investment Climate Statement-Taiwan, February 2013, at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/
rls/othr/ics/2013/204742.htm.
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Figure 4. Comparison of Taiwan Export Orders From the United States with U.S.
Imports from Taiwan: 2000-2012
($ billions)
120.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Taiwan Export Orders
U.S. Imports
Source: Taiwan export order data are from the Taiwan Ministry of Economics. Data on U.S. imports are from
the USITC DataWeb.
Notes: Export for a given year reflect orders received by Taiwanese firms throughout the year. The year a
product was ordered and the year the product arrived in the country where the order originated may differ.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Affairs (BEA), Taiwan’s cumulative FDI in the
United States through 2011 was $5.2 billion (compared to China’s FDI in the United States at
$3.8 billion). The BEA estimates U.S. FDI in Taiwan through 2011 at $15.8 billion. According to
MOFA, the United States is both Taiwan’s largest destination of its outflows and the largest
source of FDI inflows into Taiwan; it estimates cumulative U.S. FDI in Taiwan through 2011 was
$21.5 billion (19.2% of total FDI inflows) and Taiwan’s cumulative outflows to the United States
were reported at $13.0 billion (18.8% of Taiwan’s total FDI outflows).69
U.S.-Taiwan Commercial Issues. The economic relationship between the United States and
Taiwan has been generally positive, although there are a few issues that have proved contentious.
• Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) Issues. These have ranked among the most
contentious issues in the relationship. As noted earlier, Taiwan’s restrictions on
certain imported U.S. beef products led the United States to suspend the bilateral
TIFA talks for several years. Although Taiwan changed its regulations regarding
ractopamine in beef, it has not done so for pork. In addition, Taiwan has rejected
agricultural shipments of U.S. cherries, apples, wheat, barley, strawberries, and
corn over SPS issues, which, the United States contends, are not justified.70
69 Taiwan’s cumulative FDI flows to the United States, and cumulative U.S. FDI flows to Taiwan were $13.1 billion
and $21.9 billion, respectively. Note U.S. data on bilateral FDI often differ from those of its investment partners.
70 USTR, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Report), 2012, p.78.
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• Intellectual property rights (IPR). In recent years, Taiwan has strived to
improve its protection and enforcement of IPR. Such improvements led the
USTR in January 2009 to remove Taiwan from its annual “Special 301” list of
countries whose IPR policies were of the greatest concern to the United States.71
In 2012, the USTR stated that Taiwan generally provides effective IPR protection
and enforcement, although it noted that a number of problems remain, such as
infringement of copyrighted material on the Internet and widespread commercial
photocopying of university textbooks.72 However, in February 2013, the
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a private sector coalition
representing U.S. copyright-based industries, stated that Taiwan had “allowed
copyright piracy, particularly in the online environment, to spiral out of control.”
It added that “the enforcement situation in Taiwan has deteriorated in the past
several years to the point that, without some signs of positive change, IIPA
members will consider recommending that Taiwan again be placed back on the
Special 301 Watch List.”73
• Government Procurement. In July 2009, Taiwan joined the WTO’s
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), which gives U.S. firms (and other
members of the GPA) access to an annual procurement market estimated at $6
billion.74 According to the USTR’s office, while Taiwan has made several
reforms to open up its government procurement market, U.S. firms have
encountered a number of problems, including issues relating to transparency,
contract terms and conditions, and licensing and liabilities.75
• Investment Restrictions. Taiwan bans or limits foreign investment in various
sectors, including agricultural production, chemical manufacturing, bus
transportation, and public utilities. Restrictions exist on FDI in a number of
industries, including telecommunications, cable television broadcast services,
high-speed rail, and piped natural gas.76
March 2013 TIFA Talks. The United States and Taiwan resumed the TIFA talks in Taipei on
March 10, 2013, after a hiatus of nearly six years (previous talks were held in July 2007). The
two sides released joint statements on investment principles and ICT services. They also
announced the launch of new TIFA working groups on investment and technical barriers to trade.
Deputy USTR Demetrios Marantis stated:
71 Taiwan was designated a Special 301 “watch list” country, an indicator that particular problems existed in that
country with respect to IPR protection, enforcement, or market access. When Taiwan was removed from the Special
301 list, the USTR’s Office stated: Taiwan has come a long way on this issue over the last eight years. In 2001, USTR
called Taiwan a haven for pirates. Today, Taiwan has strengthened its enforcement, strengthened its laws, and
demonstrated a commitment to becoming a haven for innovation and creativity. This is a credit to the hard work done
by Taiwan as well as to our close bilateral cooperation. We hope that this progress can continue and be duplicated in
other areas of our trade relationship.” (source: USTR, Press Release, January 2009)
72 USTR, the 2012 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE), March 2012, p. 361.
73 IIPA, Taiwan, 2013 Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection and Enforcement, 2013, at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/
2013/2013SPEC301TAIWAN.PDF.
74 The GPA is plurilateral agreement within the WTO. Its currently has 15 members, including the United States, the
European Union, Canada, and Japan.
75 USTR, 2013 Trade Policy Agenda and 2012 Annual Report, March 1, 2013, p. 151.
76 U.S. Department of State, 2013 Investment Climate Statement—Taiwan, February 2013, at http://www.state.gov/e/
eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204742.htm.
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The resumption of TIFA talks between Taiwan and the United States represents a new
stage in our economic relationship that will more fully open the lines of communication
on trade and investment. The dedication of our partners from Taiwan to achieving
positive outcomes in investment, information and communication technology services,
and other areas is a testament to President Ma’s vision for Taiwan’s economic opening
and deepening ties with regional and global partners.77
Legislation in the 113th Congress
H.R. 419 (Ros-Lehtinen), Taiwan Policy Act of 2013, to strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
H.R. 772 (Faleomavaega), to promote peaceful and collaborative resolution of the South China
Sea dispute.
H.R. 1151 (Royce)/P.L. 113-17, to direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain
observer status for Taiwan at the triennial International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly.
H.R. 1960 (McKeon), National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014.
H.Con.Res. 29 (McCaul), to express the sense of Congress that the United States should resume
normal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
H.Res. 185 (Bentivolio), Taiwan Travel Act, to declare that it should be U.S. policy to encourage
visits between the United States and Taiwan at all levels.
S. 12 (Coats), Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013, inter alia, to authorize the transfer by sale of
four excess Perry-class frigates to Taiwan.
S. 579 (Menendez), to direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status
for Taiwan at the triennial International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly.
S. 1197 (Levin), National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014.
S.Res. 167 (Menendez), to reaffirm the strong U.S. support for the peaceful resolution of
territorial, sovereignty, and jurisdictional disputes in the Asia-Pacific maritime domains.
77 USTR, Press Release, March 10, 2013, at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/march/amb-
marantis-Taiwan-TIFA. According to the USTR, TIFA agreements “serve as a forum for the United States and other
governments to meet and discuss issues of mutual interest with the objective of improving cooperation and enhancing
opportunities for trade and investment.” Resolution of trade and investment barriers within the TIFA framework can
often serve as a path to an eventual FTA with the United States. (Source: USTR, Trade & Investment Framework
Agreements, at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements).
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Author Contact Information
Shirley A. Kan
Wayne M. Morrison
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
skan@crs.loc.gov, 7-7606
wmorrison@crs.loc.gov, 7-7767
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