Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
July 16, 2013
Congressional Research Service
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www.crs.gov
95-1013
CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
The uprising against Bahrain’s Al Khalifa royal family that began in Bahrain on February 14,
2011, amidst other regional uprisings, has not come close to changing Bahrain’s regime.
However, the mostly Shiite opposition shows no signs of ending its campaign to achieve its stated
goal of establishing a constitutional monarchy or, at the very least, winning greatly increased
political influence and rights. The crisis has demonstrated that the grievances of the Shiite
majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by the
modest reform efforts instituted during 1999-2010.
The government has held dialogue with the opposition to try to address its grievances. A “national
dialogue” held in July 2011 reached consensus on a few modest political reforms. Hopes for
resolution were elevated further by a pivotal report by a government-appointed “Independent
Commission of Inquiry” (BICI), released November 23, 2011, which was critical of the
government’s actions against the unrest. The government asserts it implemented most of the 26
BICI recommendations, but outside human rights groups assessed that overall implementation has
been modest. After more than one year of impasse, both sides resumed a dialogue in February
2013, but it has made little concrete progress, by all accounts.
The Obama Administration has not called for an end to the Al Khalifa regime, but it has criticized
its human rights abuses and urged it to undertake more substantial political reform. The U.S.
criticism has angered some Al Khalifa officials but it has also dissatisfied human rights activists
who assert that the United States is downplaying regime abuses because of U.S. dependence on
the security relationship with Bahrain. Bahrain has provided key support for U.S. interests—
particularly the containment of Iran—by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60
years. The United States signed a formal defense pact with Bahrain in 1991 and has designated
Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally,” that entitled it to sales of sophisticated U.S. weapons systems.
Partly to address criticism from human rights advocates and some Members of Congress, in 2011
the Administration put on hold a proposed sale of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. Since
2012, the State Department has held up some sales of small arms and light weapons that could
poentially be used against protesters. In mid-May 2012 the Administration announced that it
would proceed with the sale of other arms sales to Bahrain that it can only use for external
defense.
Consumed by its own crisis, Bahrain has joined with but deferred to other GCC powers to resolve
political crises in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Bahrain has strongly criticized the entry of the Iran-
backed Shiite group Lebanese Hezbollah into the Syria conflict on the side of President Bashar Al
Assad.
Fueling Shiite unrest is the fact that Bahrain is poorer than most of the other Persian Gulf
monarchies and therefore lacks ample resources to significantly improve Shiite standards of
living. In 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation
implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169). The unrest has further strained,
although not crippled, Bahrain’s economy.


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Contents
The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights ....................................................................... 1
The Ruling Family and Its Dynamics ........................................................................................ 1
Executive and Legislative Powers ............................................................................................. 2
Political Groups and Elections .................................................................................................. 3
2002 Elections ..................................................................................................................... 4
2006 Elections: Allegations of Gerrymandering and “Importing Sunnis” .......................... 5
The 2010 Elections: Prelude to the Uprising....................................................................... 5
2011 Uprising: Origin, Developments, and Prognosis .............................................................. 6
Crown Prince Salman’s “Seven Principles” Reform Plan ................................................... 7
The Saudi-led Intervention .................................................................................................. 7
First “National Dialogue” Held ........................................................................................... 8
Dialogue Recommendations Implemented By Constitutional Amendment ........................ 9
Opposition Counter-Proposal: Manama Document .......................................................... 10
September 24-October 1 Special Election ......................................................................... 10
BICI Report on Handling of the Unrest: Reaction and Implementation ........................... 11
Post-BICI Report: Continued Unrest And Deadlock ........................................................ 13
Dialogue Resumes in February 2013 ................................................................................ 14
Concerns About Possible Insurgency ................................................................................ 15
U.S. Posture on the Uprising ............................................................................................. 16
Other Human Rights Issues ..................................................................................................... 19
U.N. Scrutiny .................................................................................................................... 19
Women’s Rights ................................................................................................................ 20
Religious Freedom ............................................................................................................ 20
Media Freedoms ................................................................................................................ 20
Labor Rights ...................................................................................................................... 21
Human Trafficking ............................................................................................................ 21
Executions and Torture ...................................................................................................... 21
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations ..................................................................... 22
U.S. Naval Headquarters in Bahrain ....................................................................................... 22
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) ................................................................................. 24
Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan ................................................... 24
U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid ..................................................................................... 25
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) .................................................................................... 26
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) ........................................................................................ 26
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET) .......................................... 26
Major Foreign Military Sales (FMS) From Bahrain National Funds ................................ 27
September 2011 Humvee and TOW Sale .......................................................................... 27
Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran .......................................................................... 29
Bahrain-Iran Economic Ties and Bahraini Enforcement of Iran Sanctions ...................... 30
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation .................................................................................................... 31
Other Foreign Policy Issues ..................................................................................................... 32
Extensive Ties to Saudi Arabia .......................................................................................... 32
Other GCC ........................................................................................................................ 32
Syria Issue ......................................................................................................................... 33
Iraq .................................................................................................................................... 33
Qatar Territorial Disputes .................................................................................................. 33
Arab-Israeli Issues ............................................................................................................. 34
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Economic Issues ............................................................................................................................ 34

Figures
Figure 1. Bahrain ........................................................................................................................... 37

Tables
Table 1. Comparative Composition of National Assembly.............................................................. 6
Table 2.Status of Prominent Dissidents/Other Metrics of the Uprising ......................................... 16
Table 3. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain ..................................................................................... 35
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain ............................................................................................... 36

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 37

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The Political Structure, Reform, and Human Rights1
The site of the ancient Bronze Age civilization of Dilmun, Bahrain was a trade hub linking
Mesopotamia and the Indus value until a drop in trade from India caused the Dilmun civilization
to decline around 2,000 B.C. The inhabitants of Bahrain converted to Islam in the 7th century.
Bahrain subsequently fell under the control of Islamic caliphates based in Damascus, then
Baghdad, and later Persian. Omani, and Portuguese forces.
The Al Khalifa family, which is Sunni Muslim and generally not as religiously conservative as the
leaders of neighboring Saudi Arabia, has ruled Bahrain since 1783. That year, the family, a branch
of the Bani Utbah tribe, arrived from the Saudi peninsula and succeeded in capturing a Persian
garrison controlling the island. In 1830, the ruling family signed a treaty establishing Bahrain as a
protectorate of Britain, which was the dominant power in the Persian Gulf until the early 1970s.
As Britain began reducing its responsibilities in the Gulf in 1968, Bahrain and other Persian Gulf
emirates (principalities) began deciding on their permanent status. A 1970 U.N. survey (some
refer to it as a “referendum”) determined that Bahrain’s inhabitants preferred independence to
Iranian control. Despite that domestic sentiment, in 1971, Bahrain negotiated with other Persian
Gulf emirates that ultimately (end of 1971) formed the United Arab Emirates. Difficulties
throughout 1971 in reaching agreement on a broad federation caused Bahrain to decide to declare
itself independent on August 15, 1971. A U.S. Embassy in Manama, Bahrain’s capital, opened in
September 1971 in conjunction with Bahrain’s independence.
The Ruling Family and Its Dynamics
Bahrain is led by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (about 61 years old), who succeeded his father,
Shaykh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, upon his death in March 1999. Educated at Sandhurst Military
Academy in Britain, King Hamad was previously commander of the Bahraini Defense Forces
(BDF). The king is considered to be a reformer, but some observers consider him a relatively
weak leader unwilling to override hardline, anti-reform Khalifa family members.
The Kings’s son, Shaykh Salman bin Hamad, about 43 years old, is Crown Prince. On March 11,
2013, he was appointed first deputy Prime Minister concurrently. Shaykh Salman is U.S.- and
U.K.-educated and has long been considered a proponent of accommodation with Bahrain’s Shiite
majority—about 60% of the approximately 1.25 million person citizenry.2 Bahrain’s Shiite
Muslims have long perceived themselves as “second class citizens” who are deprived of a
proportionate share of political power and the nation’s economic wealth. There are, additionally,
an estimated 235,000 expatriates in Bahrain. About 25% of the population is age 14 or younger.
The King’s uncle (the brother of the late Amir Isa), Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al
Khalifa, has been in position since Bahrain’s independence in 1971. He is about 80 years old but

1 Much of the information in this section is from State Department reports: 2011 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices (May 24, 2012). CRS has no means to independently investigate the human rights situation in Bahrain or
confirm allegations of specific human rights abuses there.
2 Government officials dispute that the Shiite community is as large a majority as the 70% figure used in most
factbooks and academic work on Bahrain. The Shiite community in Bahrain consists of the more numerous “Baharna,”
who are of Arab ethnicity and descended from Arab tribes who inhabited the area from pre-Islamic times. Shiites of
Persian ethnicity, referred to as Ajam, arrived in Bahrain over the past 400 years and are less numerous than the
Baharna. The Ajam speak Persian and generally do not integrate with the Baharna or with Sunni Arabs.
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believed to be in stable health. He is considered aligned with—although somewhat more
politically flexible than—a group of family hard-liners that include Minister of the Royal Court
Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa3 and his brother the Commander of the BDF Khalifa bin Ahmad Al
Khalifa. The two brothers are known as “khawalids”—they hail from a branch of the Al Khalifa
family that is traced to an ancestor Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa—and are considered implacably
opposed to compromise with the Shiites.4 The khawalids reportedly have allies throughout the
security and intelligence services and the judiciary. The Royal Court Minister’s protégé,
Ateyatallah Al Khalifa, a non-royal, is an influential hardliner as well. Collectively, the harder
liners within and outside the family assert that concessions made to the Shiite majority since 1999
caused the Shiites to increase their political demands rather than satisfied them.
The allies of the Crown Prince within the ruling family—which include a deputy Prime Minister,
Muhammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa (possible successor to the current prime minister)—assert
that the level of unrest reached in 2011 would have occurred long ago had the king’s reforms not
been enacted. The reformists within the family were strengthened by the March 2013
appointment of Crown Prince Salman as first deputy Prime Minister, a new position.
The reforms instituted by King Hamad before the unrest began, although well short of the hopes
and expectations the Shiite majority had when he took office, were more extensive than those
made by his father, Amir Isa. In December 1992, Amir Isa established a 30-member appointed
Consultative Council to comment on proposed laws. In June 1996, he expanded it to 40 members.
These reforms did not come close to quieting the demands of either Shiites or Sunnis for the
restoration of an elected national assembly, even though Bahrain’s Sunnis are considered less
hungry for “democracy” than are the Shiites. An elected assembly was provided for under the
1973 constitution but abolished in August 1975 because of fear of sectarian competition and
tensions over control of the body. In the years just prior to Shaykh Hamad’s accession to rule,
there was daily anti-government violence during 1994-1998, mostly by Shiites.
Executive and Legislative Powers
The King, working through the Prime Minister and the cabinet, has broad powers. The King,
through the Prime Minister, makes all cabinet appointments. Al Khalifa family members have
consistently held about half of all ministerial slots, including all defense, internal security, and
foreign policy positions. Before the 2011 unrest, there were only 4 Shiite ministers out of 23
cabinet positions (plus one out of the four deputy prime ministers), and those ministries run by
Shiites have been considered less critical. The number of Shiite ministers was increased to six in
2012, in part as a gesture to the opposition. Shiites have also been highly underrepresented in the
security forces, serving mainly in administrative tasks. The King appoints all judges by royal
decree and he has the authority to amend the constitution.
As Hamad’s first reform steps upon taking office, he assumed the title of King, dropping the more
traditional rulership title “Amir,” to imply more accountability to the population. He held a
referendum on February 14, 2002 that adopted a “National Action Charter,” including the text of
a constitution. However, many Shiites criticized the constitution because it established that the

3 The name of this official is similar to that of the Foreign Minister, Khalid bin Ahmad bin Mohammad Al Khalifa.
4 Differences between the khawalids and others in the family are discussed in, Charles Levinson. “A Palace Rift in
Persian Gulf Bedevils Key U.S. Navy Base.” Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2013.
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elected Council of Representatives (COR)5 and the all-appointed Shura (Consultative) Council
were of equal size (40 seats each). Together, they constitute a National Assembly (parliament).
The government has tended to appoint generally more educated and pro-Western members to the
Shura Council, and it is generally more supportive of the government than is the COR, which
explains why the opposition seeks maximum authority for the COR. There is no “quota” for
females in the National Assembly.
• The Assembly serves as only a partial check on government power, despite
constitutional amendments adopted in May 2012 that gave the Assembly greater
authority. The amendments declared the elected COR as the presiding chamber of
the Assembly, thereby giving it the lead when the two chambers disagree.
• The National Assembly have the power to confirm individual cabinet
appointments. However, as a consequence of the May 2012 amendments, it does
have the power to reject the government’s four-year work plan—and therefore
the whole cabinet. The COR has always had the power to remove sitting
ministers through a vote of no-confidence (requiring a two-thirds majority). The
COR can also, by a similar super-majority, declare that it cannot “cooperate”
with the Prime Minister, but the King then rules on whether to dismiss the Prime
Minister or disband the COR. None of these actions has ever occurred in
Bahrain.
• Either chamber of the National Assembly can originate legislation but enactment
into law requires concurrence by the King.6 Prior to the May 2012 amendments,
only the COR could originate legislation. A royal “veto” can be overridden by a
two-thirds majority vote of both chambers. A decree issued by the king on August
23, 2012, gives the National Assembly the ability to recommend constitutional
amendments, which are then vetted by a “Legislation and Legal Opinion
Commission” before consideration by the king.
Political Groups and Elections
Government-opposition disputes over organizing the COR elections predate the 2011 uprising.
The Shiite opposition has sought to establish electoral processes that would allow Shiites to
translate their numbers into political strength. Elections have been held every four years since
2002, each time marked by substantial tension over perceived government efforts to prevent
election of a Shiite majority in the COR. In the COR elections, if no candidate in a contested
district wins more than 50% in the first round, a runoff is held one week later.
Formal political parties are banned, but factions organize, for the elections and other political
activity, as “political societies”—the functional equivalent of parties:
• Wifaq (formally, the Al Wifaq National Islamic Society, also known as the Islamic
National Accord Association) is the largest and most prominent Shiite political
society. It is led by Shaykh Ali al-Salman, who is about 42 years old; because he
is a cleric, Shaykh Salman has not run in any parliamentary elections. He was
slightly injured by security forces during a protest in June 2012. Wifaq is

5 This body is also referred to as the Council of Deputies (Majles al-Nawwab).
6 Before the May 2012 constitutional amendments, only the COR could draft legislation.
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considered open to a compromise and has participated in national dialogue with
the government and royal family. However, Wifaq is divided, and another of its
top leaders, the 75-year-old fiery Shiite cleric Isa Qasim, has resisted many
proposals to settle the crisis. A number of Shiite factions are allied with Wifaq,
including the National Democratic Action Society, the National Democratic
Assembly, the Democratic Progressive Tribune, and Al Ekhaa.
• Al Haq (Movement of Freedom and Democracy), another Shiite faction, is
outlawed because of its calls for outright change of regime and has boycotted all
the COR elections. However, it is smaller in membership than Wifaq. Its key
leaders are Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace, who is wheelchair-bound, and Mr. Hassan
Mushaima, both of whom are alleged by the government to have ties to Iran and
to Islamist movements in the Middle East. Both have been imprisoned since the
February 2011 uprising. Prior to the uprising, Alsingace has visited the United
States several times to discuss the human rights situation in Bahrain.
• Like Al Haq, the Bahrain Islamic Action Society, a small Shiite faction, is
outlawed. It is a successor to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
(IFLB), a party purportedly linked Iran-backed extremist actions in Bahrain the
1980s and 1990s. Another Shiite group, Amal, is known as the “Shirazi faction”
for its ties to radical Shiite clerics in Iran linked to Ayatollah Shirazi. Amal’s
leader, Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Mafoodh, has been in prison since 2011 and
Amal was outlawed in 2012.
• Waad (“promise”) is a left-leaning secular political society whose members are
both Sunni and Shiite and is generally aligned with Wifaq as an opposition party.
Waad’s leader, Ibrahim Sharif, has been in prison since 2011.
• Sunni opinion is generally represented by the government. There are some Sunni
political societies that support it, but in some cases criticize the government for
concessions to the Shiite majority. Two Sunni societies are considered Islamist:
Minbar (Arabic for “platform”), which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood,
and Al Asala, which is a harder-line “Salafist” political society. As noted below,
in the 2006-2010 parliament, Asala and Minbar members held a combined 15
seats. In June 2011, another Sunni grouping formed as a response to the Shiite-
led 2011 uprising, organized as a pro-government political society called the
National Unity Gathering/National Unity Association. Other Sunni factions that
support these groups include Al Saff, the Islamic Shura Society, and the Al Wasat
Al Arabi Islamic Society.
2002 Elections
The first elections under the Charter were held in October 2002. In the 2002 election, many Shiite
opposition political societies, including Wifaq, boycotted the elections on the grounds that setting
the COR and the Shura Council at the same size dilutes popular will. The 2002 boycott lowered
turnout (about 52%) and helped Sunnis win two-thirds of the 40 COR seats. Of the 170 total
candidates, 8 were women, but none of the women was elected.
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2006 Elections: Allegations of Gerrymandering and “Importing Sunnis”
Sunni-Shiite tensions escalated again in the run-up to the November 25, 2006, parliamentary and
municipal elections. The tension was aggravated by the Shiite perception that a once-repressed
Shiite majority came to power in Iraq through U.S.-backed elections. The election was clouded
by allegations, publicly corroborated by a government adviser (Salah al-Bandar) in August 2006,
that the government was adjusting election districts to favor Sunni candidates. It was also alleged
the government had issued passports to Sunnis in an attempt to shift the demographic balance to
the Sunnis’ advantage. Wifaq and a few other Shiite societies participated, producing a 72%
turnout. The Shiite opposition won 17 seats, virtually all those it contested, and became the
largest single bloc in the COR, although still short of a majority.
The government was heartened that Sunni Muslims won 23 total seats. Of those, eight were won
by secular Sunnis and fifteen by Islamist Sunnis. One woman, who was unopposed in her district,
was elected out of 18 female candidates. Wifaq boycotted the speakership contest, and incumbent
COR Speaker Khalifa al-Dhahrani was reelected speaker. The King subsequently named a new
Shura Council with 20 Shiites, 19 Sunnis, and 1 Christian (a female). Ten women were appointed.
In a nod to the increased Shiite strength as a result of the elections, the government appointed a
Shiite as one of the four deputy prime ministers and another, a Wifaq supporter, as a minister of
state for foreign affairs.
The 2010 Elections: Prelude to the Uprising
Heightened political tensions continued in between national elections. In December 2008, the
government made numerous arrests of Shiite demonstrators and, on January 26, 2009, the
government arrested Al Haq leaders Alsingace and Mushaima. The two-round COR vote was held
on October 23 and October 30, 2010. Two Bahraini human rights watchdog groups, the Bahrain
Human Rights Society and the Bahrain Transparency Society, jointly monitored the elections, and
there were a limited number of international observers. Municipal elections were held
concurrently.
The electorate was about 300,000 persons, voting in 40 districts spread throughout 5
governorates. Shiite oppositionists again accused the government of drawing boundaries so as to
prevent the election of a Shiite majority. About 200 candidates registered, of whom six were
women. Of the six, only Munira Fakhro, a Shiite who was exiled prior to the accession of King
Hamad, was endorsed by a political society (Waad).
Wifaq participated despite the arrests, one month prior to the election, of 23 Shiite leaders charged
with attempting to overthrow of the government. They were among about 160 Shiites arrested in
August and September 2010 under a 2006 anti-terrorism law that gives the government broad
arrest and prosecution powers. The tensions over the 2010 election almost certainly contributed to
the major unrest that began in February 2011.
2010 Election Results
Despite the pre-election tensions, the election was held without major reports of violence.
Turnout was about 67% between the two rounds. The results, some unexpected, included
• The increase of Wifaq’s representation to 18 seats, although still not a majority.
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• Unexpected losses by Sunni Islamist factions, reducing their total to 5 seats from
15. Most of the seats were picked up by Sunni independents, who won 17 seats,
up from 9 in the 2006-2010 parliament.
• The same one woman won who had won in 2006.
• In the municipal elections conducted concurrently, one woman was elected in the
second round—the first woman to be elected to a municipal council.
In advance of the December 14, 2010, start of the parliamentary term, the King reappointed 30 of
the 40 serving Shura Council members and ten new members. Of its membership, 19 were
Shiites, including the speaker, Ali bin Salih al-Salih. The Council has four women, substantially
fewer than the 2006-2010 Council that had nine. Among the four, one is Jewish (Nancy
Khadouri), out of a Jewish population in Bahrain of about 40 persons, and one is Christian (Hala
Qarrisah). Bahrain has an estimated 1,000 Christians.
Table 1. Comparative Composition of National Assembly
Post-By-Election

2006
2010
(October 2011)
Council of Representatives (COR)
Wifaq (Shiite Islamist)
17
18
0
Shi te
Independent
0 0 8
Sunni Independent (mostly
secular) in COR
8
17
27
Moderate Sunni Islamist
(Minbar, Muslim
Brotherhood) 7 2 2
Conservative Sunni
Islamist (Asala, Salafi)
8
3
3
COR Sect Composition
23 Sunni, 17 Shiite
22 Sunni, 18 Shiite
32 Sunni, 8 Shiite
Women in COR
1
1
4
Shura Council (Upper House, appointed)
Sectarian, Religious
Composition Upper
20 Shi te, 19 Sunni, 1
19 Shi te, 19 Sunni, 1
House (Shura Council)
Christian
Christian, 1 Jew
Same as before
Number of Women
9
4
same

2011 Uprising: Origin, Developments, and Prognosis
King Hamad’s efforts to satisfy Shiite aspirations was demonstrated to have failed when a major
uprising began on February 14, 2011, in the wake of the success of the uprising against Egypt’s
President Hosni Mubarak.7 After a few days of protests and relatively minor confrontations with

7 The events of the uprising, and the government’s political and security reaction, are examined in substantial detail in
(continued...)
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security forces, the mostly Shiite demonstrators converged on the interior of a major traffic circle,
“Pearl Roundabout,” named after a statue that depicted Bahrain’s pearl-diving past. The protesters
demanded altering the constitution to expand the powers of the COR; ending gerrymandering that
prevents Shiites from winning a majority in the COR; providing more jobs and economic
opportunities; and, for some protesters, replacing hard-line Prime Minister Khalifa. On February
15, 2011, King Hamad announced the formation of a committee to investigate the use of force
against protestors, which had killed two until that time.
The unrest took on new dimensions in the early morning of February 17, 2011, when security
forces surrounded the thousands of demonstrators in Pearl Roundabout and used rubber bullets
and tear gas to remove them from the location. At least four demonstrators were killed. Additional
protests took place on February 18, 2011, and security forces shot several demonstrators. Wifaq
pulled all 18 of its deputies out of the COR immediately thereafter. Britain closed its embassy and
banned arms exports to Bahrain.
In part at the reported urging of the United States, on February 19, 2011, the government pulled
security forces back, but demonstrators reentered the Roundabout. A February 22, 2011,
demonstration was said to be perhaps the largest in Bahrain’s history, although some accounts say
that a demonstration three days later, which spanned miles of downtown roads, was larger. The
demonstration came one day after a large demonstration by government supporters.
The government, with Crown Prince Salman leading the effort, invited the representatives of the
protesters to begin a formal dialogue. That effort was supported by a gesture by King Hamad on
February 22, 2011, to release or pardon 308 Bahrainis, including Al Haq leader Hassan
Mushaima, paving the way for him to return from exile. On February 26, 2011, the King dropped
two Al Khalifa family members from cabinet posts as a gesture to the opposition.
Crown Prince Salman’s “Seven Principles” Reform Plan
On March 13, 2011, Crown Prince Salman articulated “seven principles” that would guide a
national dialogue, including a “parliament with full authority”; a “government that meets the will
of the people”; fair voting districts; and several other measures.8 The articulation of the seven
principles gave Wifaq and other moderate oppositionists hope that many of their demands could
be met through dialogue. However, anger at the government’s use of force appeared to shift many
demonstrators closer to hardline groups such as Al Haq that demanded an end to the monarchy.9
The Saudi-led Intervention
With Shiite groups refusing to accept the offer of dialogue, protests escalated and began to spark
broader Sunni-Shiite clashes. On March 13, 2011, despite the crown prince’s articulation of his
“seven points,” protesters blockaded the financial district of the capital, Manama, prompting
governmental fears that the unrest could choke this major economic sector and overwhelm the

(...continued)
the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report released November 23, 2011. Text of the report is at
http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf
8 BICI report, op. cit., p. 165.
9 “Bahrain Hard-Liners Call for Royal Family to Go.” Cable News Network website, March 9, 2011.
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security forces. Bahrain requested that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which it is a
member, send security forces to protect key sites and, on March 14, 2011, a GCC force (from the
GCC joint Peninsula Shield unit) spearheaded by a reported 1,200 Saudi armored forces and 600
UAE police crossed into Bahrain and took up positions at key locations. Kuwait sent naval forces
to help Bahrain secure its maritime borders. On March 15, 2011, King Hamad declared (Royal
Decree Number 18) a three-month state of emergency. Bahrain’s security forces, freed up by the
GCC deployment, cleared demonstrators from Pearl Roundabout and demolished the Pearl
Monument on March 18, 2011.10 In conjunction, seven hardline Shiite leaders were rearrested,
including Al Haq’s Mushaima. The remaining Shiite ministers in the cabinet, many of the Shiites
in the Shura Council, and many Shiites in other senior posts suspended their work or resigned.
Well before intervening in Bahrain, the GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, had begun to fear
that the Bahrain unrest could spread to other GCC states. It was also feared that Iran might be
able to exploit the situation. None of the other GCC states has a Shiite majority (like Bahrain),
but most of them, including Saudi Arabia, have substantial Shiite minorities. The Saudi position
has been not to permit a Shiite takeover in Bahrain, and the Saudi government is seen as backing
hardline, anti-compromise officials in the Bahrain ruling family. Perhaps to reinforce this
position, on May 14, 2012, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain announced they supported a plan to form a
close political and military union among the GCC states—a signal to Bahrain’s Shiite opposition
that the Bahrain government has unconditional Saudi backing. At a GCC leadership meeting in
Riyadh that day, the other four GCC states opposed such a union and the GCC as a whole
formally deferred a decision on the Saudi-Bahraini plan.
Most public protests in downtown Manama ceased subsequent to the GCC intervention.
Perceiving the regime had gained the upper hand, the King announced in May 2011 that the state
of emergency would end on June 1, 2011, two weeks earlier than scheduled. The government held
to that schedule; the GCC forces that deployed to Bahrain, including the Kuwaiti naval force,
reportedly began to depart in late June 2011. The departures were reportedly completed, although
some reports suggest some elements of the force might remain. King Hamad spoke to the
population on May 31, 2011, to mark the end of the emergency, offering unconditional dialogue
with the opposition beginning July 1, 2011.
The GCC armed intervention represented an escalation from earlier steps to help the beleaguered
Bahraini government. Shortly after the uprising in Bahrain began, the GCC states pledged aid
(some reports mention $20 billion) to help Bahrain (and Oman, which also faced unrest) try to
defuse unrest through job creation. In April 2013, Kuwait continued the effort by pledging an
additional $1.3 billion for development projects in Bahrain.
First “National Dialogue” Held
On June 29, 2011, as a further gesture toward the opposition, the king named a five-person
“Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry,” (BICI) headed by highly regarded international
legal expert Dr. Cherif Bassiouni, to investigate the government’s response to the unrest that
began in February. It held a public forum on July 24, 2011, but came under criticism from Shiite
opposition figures who interpreted certain Bassiouni statements as exonerating top officials.

10 Some accounts differ on the involvement of the Peninsula Shield force, with some observers arguing that members of
the force participated directly in suppressing protests, and others accepting the Bahrain/GCC view that the GCC force
guarded key locations and infrastructure.
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Still, the naming of the BICI set the stage for the “National Dialogue” on political and economic
reform to begin on July 2, 2011, under the chairmanship of speaker of the COR Dhahrani. About
300 delegates participated, of which the Shiite opposition broadly comprised 40-50 delegates, of
which 5 belonged to Wifaq.11 Over several weeks, the dialogue addressed political, economic,
social, and human rights issues; each had 15 sub-themes and each sub-theme had 90 topics.
Senior Bahraini officials said the intent of the dialogue was to outline a vision of Bahrain rather
than necessarily reach agreement on specific steps. Still, the continuing detention of many
oppositionists hung over the meetings, and Wifaq exited the talks on July 18, 2011. Others noted
that the Crown Prince, the principal champion of dialogue within the senior leadership, did not
chair the meetings, suggesting he was eclipsed by hard line figures within the royal family.
The dialogue concluded in late July 2011 after reaching consensus on the following
recommendations, which were endorsed by the government on July 29, 2011.
• an elected parliament (lower house) with expanded powers, including the power
to confirm or reject a nominated cabinet; the power to confirm or veto the
government’s four-year work plan; the right to discuss any agenda item; and the
power for the full COR to question ministers on their performance or plans. In
addition, the overall chairmanship of the National Assembly should be exercised
by the elected COR, not the Shura Council.
• a government “reflecting the will of the people.”
• “fairly” demarcated electoral boundaries.
• reworking of laws on naturalization and citizenship.
• combating financial and administrative corruption.
• efforts to reduce sectarian divisions.
• There were reportedly 82 economic recommendations, including new
mechanisms to provide food subsidies to only the most needy citizens.
As a gesture of reconciliation after the dialogue concluded, in a speech on August 28, 2011, near
the conclusion of the holy month of Ramadan, King Hamad announced the pardoning of some
protesters and the reinstatement of some of the approximately 2,700 of those who had been fired
for alleged participation in unrest. On August 8, 2011, the government released the two jailed
Wifaq COR deputies, Matar and Fairuz, along with several other jailed activists.
Dialogue Recommendations Implemented By Constitutional Amendment
The government subsequently appointed a committee, headed by deputy Prime Minister
Muhammad Mubarak Al Khalifa, to implement the national dialogue consensus
recommendations. After rounds of meetings between both houses of the National Assembly and
various ministries, the government drafted amendments to the Bahraini constitution. They were
announced by the king on January 16, 2012, and adopted by the National Assembly and ratified
by the king on May 3, 2012. The amendments:

11 Mohamed Hasni. “Bahrain Opens Dialogue Buoyed by Shiite Attendance.” Agence France Presse, July 2, 2011.
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• Imposed limitations on the power of the king to appoint the members of the
Shura Council, and a requirement that he consult the heads of the two chambers
of the National Assembly before dissolving the COR.
• Gave either chamber of the National Assembly the ability to draft legislation or
constitutional amendments.
• Decided that the overall chair of the National Assembly will be the speaker of the
COR, not the chairman of the appointed Shura Council.
• Gave the COR the ability to veto the government’s four-year work plan—
essentially an ability to veto the nomination of the entire cabinet—without the
concurrence of the Shura Council. This was an expansion of previous powers to
vote no confidence against individual ministers.
Opposition Counter-Proposal: Manama Document
The opposition immediately rejected the constitutional amendments as insufficient, because they
did not fulfill the core of the Crown Prince’s principles of a parliament with “full authority.” Nor
did the amendments meet the demands contained in the “Manama Document,” adopted on
October 12, 2011, by several opposition parties, led by Wifaq and Waad. The Document called for
a fully elected one-chamber parliament with legislative powers, the direct selection of the prime
minister by the largest coalition in the elected legislature, and the running of elections by an
independent election commission. The opposition also viewed the government’s pledge of “fairly
demarcated” election boundaries as vague, and likely to enable the government to continue to
gerrymander districts to ensure a Sunni majority in the lower house.
September 24-October 1 Special Election
Following the conclusion of the National Dialogue, there was a special election to fill the seats
vacated by the 18 Wifaq COR deputies that had resigned at the outset of the unrest. The elections
were scheduled for September 24, 2011, with a second round to be held on October 1, if needed.
However, the legitimacy of the special elections was clouded by the announcement by Wifaq on
August 14, 2011, that it would boycott the elections.
In advance of the elections, four winners were declared (including one woman) because they
were running unopposed. In both rounds of voting, turnout was assessed as very low, at about
20%, although the government put out official turnout figures of close to 50%. After the first
round on September 24, five additional seats were decided. The October 1 runoff decided the
remaining nine seats. As shown in Table 1, the elections produced a COR overwhelmingly
dominated by Sunnis, with 32 seats to only 8 Shiite seats. It resulted in the addition of three
women COR deputies.
The special election did not revive the basic legislative work of the Assembly, which largely
stalled after the uprising began. Prior to the uprising, the Assembly tended to address primarily
economic and social issues, but not national security issues. In May 2010, it voted to ban sale of
alcohol to Muslims, although subject to implementing regulations made by the king. Other
legislation considered prior to the uprising included bills to combat cybercrime, regulate the
pharmaceutical sector, regulate the press, create an anti-corruption body, and establish a higher
council on social security.
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BICI Report on Handling of the Unrest: Reaction and Implementation
The next major benchmark in the crisis was the release of the BICI report. It was initially due by
October 30, 2011 but, because of the large number of interviews conducted, was delayed until
November 23, 2011. Although the focus of the BICI mission was the handling of the unrest—and
not on competing ideas for political reform—the release was viewed by both the government and
the opposition as pivotal. The 500+ page report provided some support for the narratives of both
sides in the crisis, and recommendations, including 12
• There was “systematic” and “deliberate” use of excessive force, including torture
and forced confessions, against protesters.
• The opposition articulated additional demands as the uprising progressed.
• The government did not provide evidence to establish a link between the unrest
in Bahrain and the government of Iran. (p. 378)
• There was no evidence of human rights abuses committed by the GCC forces that
intervened at the request of the Bahraini government. (p. 378)
Implementation Oversight by a National Commission and “Follow-Up Unit”
The BICI made 26 recommendations (pp. 411-415) to try to prevent future violence against
peaceful protesters and to hold accountable those responsible for abuses against protesters. In
keeping with the BICI’s mandate, the recommendations did not address the political structure of
Bahrain. Apparently recognizing that it would be judged by the international community on its
response to the report, King Hamad issued a statement accepting the criticism and promising full
implementation of the BICI recommendations. Wifaq supported the parts of the report that
support its accounts but criticized it as failing to state that abuse of protesters were deliberate
government policy. The bulk of the opposition, including Wifaq, expressed skepticism that the
recommendations would be fully implemented, and Wifaq refused to participate in cooperation
with the government on specific implementation steps.
On November 26, 2011, King Hamad issued a royal order to establish a 19-member National
Commission to oversee implementation of the BICI recommendations, chaired by Shura Council
chairman Ali al-Salih (a Shiite). The King also announced that the “National Human Rights
Institution,” established in 2010, would be fully independent of the government.
On March 20, 2012, the National Commission issued its final report, generally supporting the
government’s assertions of its implementation steps to that date.13 In the cover letter to its report,
the National Commission stated that “the reader will see that in less than 100 days this
Commission has worked hard with the Government to reform the justice, human rights, policing,
security services and media sectors in a way that accords with best international practice.”
Subsequently, a “Follow-Up Unit,” headed by Ms. Dana Al Zayani, was established by the
Ministry of Justice.14 According to the government, the National Commission, and the Follow Up

12 http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf.
13 The full text of the National Commission’s March 20, 2012, report is at http://www.biciactions.bh/wps/portal/BICI/.
14 The Follow-Up Unit’s June report can be found at http://www.iaa.bh/downloads/bici_followup_report_en.pdf
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Unit, the government implemented the vast majority of the 26 BICI recommendations. However,
a study by the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), issued on the one-year anniversary
of the BICI recommendations, found that the government had fully implemented only three of the
recommendations, partially implemented fifteen of them, not implemented six of them at all, and
two others had “unclear” implementation.15 This more critical assessment was supported by BICI
chair Bassiouni in public comments marking the one-year anniversary of the BICI report. The
conference report on the FY2013 defense authorization act, H.R. 4310 (P.L. 112-239) directed the
Secretary of State to report to Congress within 180 days of enactment on Bahrain’s
implementation of the BICI recommendations. (A formal provision of the law to this effect was
taken out in conference and substituted with conference report language to the same effect.)
The recommendations that human rights groups and other observers agree have been fully
implemented include:
• Stripping the National Security Agency of law enforcement powers and limiting
it to purely intelligence gathering. That occurred with the issuing of an
amendment to the 2002 decree establishing that agency. The then-head of the
organization, Shaykh Khalifa bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, was removed and made an
advisor to the king; he was replaced by Adel bin Khalifa Al Fadhil, a non-royal.
• Drafting and providing training on a code of conduct for the police, based on
international best practices. The government hired former Miami police chief
John Timoney and former British police chief John Yates to teach Bahraini police
tactics and techniques that conform to international standards of human rights
practices. However, the State Department’s human rights report for 2012, issued
on April 19, 2013, says that the Ministry of Interior’s enforcement of the code of
conduct is unclear.16
• Training judiciary employees and prosecutors on preventing and eradicating
torture and ill-treatment.
There appears to be broad agreement among observers, including the State Department, human
rights groups, Bassiouni, and others, that the government has not implemented several
recommendations (5, 8, 10, 14, 22, and 24) that address investigation and prevention of torture,
detention without prompt access to legal counsel, dropping charges on those who protested but
did not use violence, and allowing the opposition free expression and access to media.
Most of the recommendations fall into an intermediate category in which implementation has
been partial and incomplete:
• Two recommendations (No.2 and 7) concern holding security officials
accountable for abuses. There appears to be agreement that the government has
shielded high-ranking officials from prosecution, while allowing prosecution of
lower-ranking officers. In September 2012, seven police lieutenants were referred
to criminal courts for alleged mistreatment and torture allegations against
medical staff detained during the unrest.

15 POMED. “One Year Later: Assessing Bahrain’s Implementation of the BICI Report.” November 2012.
16 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper. p.11.
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• Referral of all cases of security personnel who committed major abuses to the
Public Prosecutor, for subsequent prosecution. In early July 2013, the
government appointed Nawaf al-Maawdah as the police ombudsman, in line with
the BICI recommendations, to examine cases filed against security personnel for
causing death or physical harm.
• Abolition of the military court system and transfer of all cases to ordinary courts.
• Establishment of new procedures to record interrogations of detainees (no. 13).
• Reinstatement of fired workers, public sector employees, and students (No. 18,
19, and 20). Almost all of the over 2,500 dismissed workers have been reinstated.
• Establishment of a compensation fund for the victims of torture and families of
deceased victims (No.16 and 17). In August 2011, the King announced the “Civil
Settlement Initiative” fund setting aside over $25 million to compensate these
victims.
• The rebuilding of destroyed religious sites (No. 21). At least five of the more than
53 Shiite religious sites demolished by the regime during the course of the
uprising have been mostly rebuilt. Rebuilding of another 17 sites is in various
stages of planning or construction.
• Integrate Shiites into the security services (No. 11). On September 17, 2012, the
government announced hiring of 500 police cadets “representing all communities
in Bahrain”—an effort to address this recommendation.
Post-BICI Report: Continued Unrest And Deadlock
The implementation of at least some of the BICI recommendations did not end the crisis. And,
continued abuses by Bahraini security forces—including use of tear gas against demonstrators
and raids on homes of suspected dissidents and protesters—suggest that the main goal of the BICI
process was not accomplished. The State Department human rights report for 2012 stated that the
government raided over 800 homes in 2012 to try to ferret out dissidents. The continued abuses
have caused some experts to say that implementation of the BICI recommendations should not
constitute the main criteria by which to evaluate Bahrain’s responsiveness to its critics.
Security forces confronted protesters who tried to march to Pearl Roundabout to mark the
February 14, 2012, first anniversary of the uprising. One of the largest demonstrations to date was
held on March 9, 2012, marking the anniversary of the GCC intervention and intended to derail
the holding of the Formula One auto race in Bahrain on April 22, 2012. The government
advertised the race as a hallmark of “normalization” of the situation in Bahrain. Demonstrations
took place in the days leading up to and including the race, but the event was held, although
spectator turnout was low. (Protesters repeated the process in 2013, but a large demonstration on
April 19, 2013 failed to disrupt the 2013 Formula One race in Bahrain, which was held on April
21, 2013.) In June 2012 the government ceased issuing permits for demonstrations in downtown
Manama. After two teenagers and a police officer were killed during protests in September and
October 2012, on October 30, 2012, the government imposed a ban on all public rallies and
demonstrations. On November 7, 2012, the government revoked the citizenship of 31 dissidents
on November 7, 2012, on the grounds that they had done “damage to state security.” In July 2013,
oppositionists warned of a government crackdown against demonstrations planned for August
2014 to mark the toppling by the Egyptian military of elected President Mohammad Morsi.
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Dialogue Resumes in February 2013
By mid-late 2012, continued demonstrations and use of force against them, as well as increasing
incidents of anti-government violence, caused the government and the opposition to search for
ways to resume dialogue. Moderates on both sides stressed that the Crown Prince’s “Seven
Principles,” the 2011 national dialogue recommendations and constitutional amendments, and the
Manama Document all had many points in common. Deputy Prime Minister Mohammad
Mubarak Al Khalifa held a meeting with Wifaq representatives on August 30, 2012. The U.S.
State Department sought to foster momentum for resumed dialogue by promoting “Track 2”
meetings that might float ideas for a compromise. A British national, Jonathan Powell, formerly
chief of staff to then-Prime Minister Tony Blair, reportedly provided Wifaq activists with
reconciliation training. However, the Bahraini government rejected a U.S. idea to tap name a
high-level international mediator to narrow the differences between the parties.
Signs of potential compromise multiplied in late 2012. The State Department praised the Crown
Prince’s speech at the December 7-8, 2012, Manama Dialogue (international security conference
sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies) calling for a resumption of
government-opposition dialogue. On January 22, 2013, the King formally reiterated his earlier
calls for a restart of the national dialogue and, the same day, Wifaq and five allied parties (Waad,
the National Democratic Gathering Society, the Unitary National Democratic Assemblage, the
Democratic Progressive Tribune, and the Ekhaa National Society) accepted the invitation.
A new dialogue process began on February 10, 2013. Present in the meetings, which take place
twice per week, are the Minister of Justice (an Al Khalifa family member) and two other
ministers, eight opposition representatives, eight representatives of pro-government
organizations, and five members of the National Assembly (both the upper and lower house).
After the start of the dialogue, the Al Khalifa family made several gestures intended to signal
willingness to compromise. As noted, the Crown Prince was appointed first deputy Prime
Minister on March 11,2013. On March 13, 2013, two police officers were sentenced to 10 years
in prison for fatally beating protesters in 2011. On March 28, 2013, the convictions of 21 medical
personnel arrested in April 2011 were overturned. On the other hand, in early March 2013 the
Ministry of Education fired Jalila al-Salman, a Shiite and vice president of the Bahrain Teachers’
Association, from her teaching job for organizing teacher strikes in October 2012.
Despite setbacks and some additional protester deaths, Wifaq and other oppositionists have
mostly remained in the dialogue. Wifaq suspended participation for two weeks in late May and
early June 2013 because of lack of progress and to protest a police raid on the house of Isa Qasim
(see above), but Wifaq has been participating continuously since June 5, 2013. Still, observers
note that the dialogue has not produced concrete results, to date, or agreed to opposition proposals
about how to enact into law any consensus agreements that might be reached. The opposition
insists such proposals be put to a popular referendum, while the government and its allies insist
that agreements follow established procedures, including enactment by the National Assembly. In
addition, the opposition continues to demand that the dialogue include authoritative decision
makers and representatives of the King—higher-level figures than the ministers that are
participating currently. On the other hand, those who believe the dialogue is having positive
results note that some senior Saudi officials have been meeting with Bahraini opposition
figures—a sign of possible softening of the Saudi position that has been against any Bahraini
government compromise with the Shiite opposition.
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Mainstream Opposition Moderating Its Demands?
Some experts express optimism for the ongoing dialogue on the grounds that the opposition may
be displaying increasing pragmatism. Some evidence for that moderation came in late January
2013, before the dialogue began, in which Wifaq leader Shaykh Ali Salman offered an interim
compromise short of the longstanding demands for the government to be selected by an all-
elected parliament. In a January 19, 2013, statement, Salman indicated that one way to resolve the
national crisis could be the formation of a “national unity government” in which the opposition
gains half the seats in a new cabinet. Since the dialogue began, observers of Bahrain’s politics
have noted that the statements of both the government and the opposition have discussed
negotiations on “power sharing,” suggesting the government might be open to bringing the
opposition into the cabinet.
Earlier, a widely discussed interim compromise was the replacement of Prime Minister Khalifa,
who is widely despised by the opposition, with a moderate opposition figure. Some oppositionists
have said they would even accept a Sunni, but not a member of the royal family, as a replacement
for the current prime minister. The government did not agree to this step even though, throughout
the crisis, some Bahrain government supporters have said that the dismissal of Prime Minister
Khalifa was likely.17
Concerns About Possible Insurgency
At the same time, the dialogue has not caused harder line opposition elements from undertaking
violence that the government asserts is part of a nascent insurgency. Opponents of the government
argue that it is the government’s failure to accept opposition proposals and its continued use of
repressive tactics that is causing some oppositionists to use violence. On April 9, 2012, an
improvised explosive device killed seven police. The next day, Sunni citizens ransacked a
supermarket owned by a Shiite business group (Jawad Group). On June 14, 2012, the government
discovered bomb-making materials in several locations. On November 5, 2012, two non-
Bahrainis were killed in five explosions from homemade bombs. Several police officers were
wounded by a roadside bomb on January 31, 2013. On April 14, 2013, an explosion occurred in
the Financial Harbour district; a group calling itself the “February 14” movement claimed
responsibility, suggesting that violent elements may be increasingly organized. On April 29, 2013,
the government claimed to have uncovered an arms warehouse used by oppositionists. On May
30, 2013 and July 14, 2013, home-made bombs wounded a total of eleven police officers.
Wifaq and other mainstream opposition groups have denounced any use of violence, while at the
same time accusing the government of exaggerating the incidents discussed above. Pro-
government Bahrainis say that the increasing instances of violence and bombings shows intent of
the opposition to overthrow the regime by any means necessary. Should the uprising evolve into a
violent uprising, the ascension of a Shiite-led regime is possible, although the GCC determination
to prevent this makes this outcome unlikely.


17 Author conversations with representatives of and observers close to the regime. April 2011.
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Table 2.Status of Prominent Dissidents/Other Metrics of the Uprising
Abdul Hadi al-
Arrested April 9, 2011, was one of 13 prominent dissidents tried by state security court
Khawaja, founder
May 8, 2011, and sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to overthrow the government
of Bahrain Center
and for espionage on June 22, 2011. He conducted a hunger strike in prison in early 2012
for Human Rights
but was force fed by Bahraini officials and remains alive. Daughters Zainab and Maryam
have been repeatedly arrested for opposition activities, and have campaigned abroad for
their father’s release and for the Shiite opposition generally. His brother, Salah Abdullah
al-Khawaja, was sentenced that day to five years in prison. Both sentences upheld
September 4, 2012.
Hassan Mushaima and
Two of the 13 prominent dissidents tried by state security court May 8, 2011, sentenced
Dr. Abduljalil Alsingace,
to life in prison on June 22 2011. Sentence upheld September 4, 2012. Mushaima’s son
Al Haq leaders
was one of the 31 whose citizenship was revoked in November 2012.
Remainder of the 13
Along with the Khawaja brothers, Mushaima, and Alsingace, the June 22, 2011, sentences
prominent
of nine other prominent dissidents were upheld on September 4, 2012 and reaffirmed by
oppositionists sentenced the Court of Cassation on January 8, 2013. Of the nine, four are sentenced to life in
on June 22, 2011
prison—Abdulwahab Ahmed; Mohammad al-Saffaf; Abduljalil Mansour; and Said Mirza
Ahmad. State Department said on September 4, 2012, it was “deeply troubled” by the
upholding of the sentences.
Nabeel Rajab
Successor to al-Khawaja as head of BCHR. Arrested February 15, 2012, for inciting illegal
assembly and organizing unlicensed demonstrations, released, and rearrested on April 1,
2012. Sentenced on August 16, 2012, to three years in jail but, on December 11, 2012,
sentence was reduced to two years on appeal.
Mohammad al Maskati
President of the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights, arrested October 16, 2012, for
taking part in illegal gatherings. Released the following day.
Sayed Yousif al-
Member of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, has catalogued and reported on
Muhafdha
protests over social media. Arrested December 17, 2012, and detained for two weeks in
November 2012.
21 medical personnel
Twenty-one medical personnel were arrested in April 2011 and subsequently tried for
from Salmaniya Medical
inciting sectarian hatred, possession of illegal weapons, and forcibly occupying a public
Complex
building. The personnel argued that they were helping wounded protesters. They were
tried in a military court before the government announced their retrial in a civilian court.
All were eventually acquitted, most recently in late March 2013 by an appeals court.
However, they have not been able to regain their jobs at the medical center.
Matar Matar and Jawad
Arrested May 2, 2011, and released August 8, 2011. Matar formal y acquitted on February
Fairuz, members of the
19, 2012. Fairuz was one of the 31 whose citizenship was revoked in Nov. 2012. His
COR
brother, Jalal Fairuz, was another stripped of citizenship.
Number killed in the
80+
uprising to date
Sources: Various press and interest group reports.
U.S. Posture on the Uprising
The Administration has not called for the Al Khalifa to step down, asserting that Bahrain’s use of
force against demonstrators has been dramatically less severe than that used by Muammar
Qadhafi in Libya or Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and that the Bahrain government has undertaken
reform and addressed other demands of the opposition. The Administration asserts that it has
directly and repeatedly warned its Bahraini counterparts against using force against the protesters,
that it opposed the GCC intervention, and that it called on all parties to engage in sustained
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political dialogue on reforms.18 After the GCC intervention, on March 19, 2011, then Secretary
Clinton said:
Bahrain obviously has the sovereign right to invited GCC forces into its territory under its
defense and security agreements…. [The United States has] made clear that security alone
cannot resolve the challenges facing Bahrain. As I said earlier this week, violence is not and
cannot be the answer. A political process is. We have raised our concerns about the current
measures directly with Bahraini officials and will continue to do so.
The Administration notes that the State Department’s then-Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Michael Posner made six visits to Bahrain between early
2011 and early 2013 to prod the government on reform and broker a political settlement.
On April 30, 2011, according to the White House, President Obama spoke by phone to King
Hamad and reportedly stated that Bahrain’s stability depends on respect for the universal rights of
the people of Bahrain, and a process of meaningful reform. President Obama’s May 19, 2011,
speech on the uprisings in the Middle East said the prospects for success of a Bahrain government
dialogue with the opposition were compromised by the jailing of opposition figures. This U.S.
position was restated in separate June 7, 2011, meetings between the Crown Prince and Secretary
Clinton and President Obama. In his September 21, 2011, speech to the U.N. General Assembly,
President Obama said:
In Bahrain, steps have been taken toward reform and accountability. We’re pleased with that,
but more is required. America is a close friend of Bahrain, and we will continue to call on the
government and the main opposition bloc—the Wifaq—to pursue a meaningful dialogue that
brings peaceful change that is responsive to the people. We believe the patriotism that binds
Bahrainis together must be more powerful than the sectarian forces that would tear them
apart. It will be hard, but it is possible.
The same day, Ambassador-nominee to Bahrain Thomas Krajeski testified in confirmation
hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, saying the government “overreacted” to
the unrest. He also praised the government’s long record of reform and accommodation of some
Shiite demands. (He was confirmed as Ambassador to Bahrain.)
After the release of the BICI report,then Secretary of State Clinton said that the United States is
deeply concerned about the abuses identified in the report … and believe[s] that the BICI
report offers a historic opportunity for all Bahrainis to participate in a healing process that
will address long-standing grievances and move the nation onto a path of genuine, sustained,
reform.
During May 2012, Crown Prince Salman visited Washington, DC, and met with Secretary of
State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Panetta, and Vice President Biden. As discussed further
below, a resumption of some U.S. arms sales to Bahrain was announced on May 11, 2012, which
represented an Administration effort to strengthen the reformist crown prince politically.
During their visit to Bahrain to attend the Manama Dialogue conference in December 2012, both
Deputy Secretary of State Burns and then Assistant Secretary Posner welcomed the Crown

18 Secretary of State Clinton Comments on the Situation in the Middle East. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
GbucMZUg3Gc.
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Prince’s call to restart the national dialogue. However, suggesting some Bahrain government
upset over U.S. criticism, the Crown Prince’s speech omitted the United States from a list of
countries that he said had supported Bahrain during its time of difficulty. On June 6, 2013,
Secretary of State John Kerry met in Washington D.C. with the Crown Prince, and a State
Department statement said the two “…agreed that all sides should contribute constructively to
reconciliation, meaningful dialogue, and reform that meets the aspirations of all Bahrainis.
Secretary Kerry reiterated [the U.S.] belief that all sides must reject violence and pursue actions
that will contribute to Bahrain’s future growth and prosperity.”
Although the Obama Administration has continued military and anti-terrorism assistance and
some arms sales to Bahrain, some U.S. aid and sales are on hold or are at reduced levels from
what was expected before the unrest began. For example, $25 million in military aid (Foreign
Military Financing, FMF) was requested for Bahrain for FY2012 (figures determined just before
the uprising began), but only $10 million was provided, and the same $10 million is being
provided or requested for each of FY2013 and FY2014. The Administration has not imposed any
sanctions on Bahrain or on Bahraini officials for human rights abuses.
Critics of the Administration—primarily human rights-oriented groups such as Human Rights
Watch and the Project on Middle East Democracy19—say the U.S. response has been colored by
the vital U.S. security interests in Bahrain rather than a commitment to promoting human rights.
Critics add that the Administration is concerned, excessively so in the view of these critics, that a
fall of the Al Khalifa regime and ascension of a Shiite-led government could increase Iran’s
influence and lead to an unwanted loss of the U.S. use of Bahrain’s military facilities. Still,
Administration critics have said that continued military sales and aid to the government
represents a tacit endorsement of the government’s stance on the unrest.
Some human rights-related groups have suggested that the United States should ban travel to the
United States or freeze any U.S.-based assets of Bahraini officials determined by the
Administration to have committed or authorized human rights abuses against peaceful protesters.
Such sanctions have been imposed on members of adversary governments such as Syria and Iran,
for example in the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2012
(P.L. 111-195).
Pre-2011 U.S. Posture on Bahraini Democracy and Human Rights
Well before the 2011 unrest began, human rights groups and Bahraini Shiite oppositionists had
accused successive U.S. Administrations of downplaying government abuses. Critics point to
Secretary of State Clinton’s comments in Bahrain on December 3, 2010, referring to the October
2010 elections, saying: “I am impressed by the commitment that the government has to the
democratic path that Bahrain is walking on. It takes time; we know that from our own
experience.”20
The Administration counters the criticism with assertions that, for many years prior to the 2011
unrest, the United States sought to accelerate political reform in Bahrain and to empower its
political societies through several programs. The primary vehicle has been the “Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI),” which began funding programs in Bahrain in 2003. MEPI funds

19 Stephen McInerny. “Silence on Bahrain.” Washington Post op-ed. November 5, 2012.
20 Department of State. “Remarks With Foreign Minister Al Khalifa After Their Meeting.” December 3, 2010.
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have been used to help Bahrain build an independent judiciary, to strengthen the COR, to
empower women, to conduct media training, and to promote legal reform. MEPI funds have also
been used to fund AFL-CIO projects with Bahraini labor organizations, and to help Bahrain
implement the U.S.-Bahrain FTA. In May 2006 Bahrain revoked the visa for the resident program
director of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and did not allow the office to reopen. NDI
was conducting programs to enhance parliamentary capabilities through a local NGO. In
February 2010, the MEPI office of State Department signed a memorandum of understanding
with Bahrain to promote entrepreneurship there and promote opportunities for trade with U.S.
small businesses. According to the State Department’s International Religious Freedom report for
July-December 2010 (September 13, 2011), “the U.S. government discusses religious freedom
with the [Bahraini] government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights.”
Other Human Rights Issues21
Many of the human rights issues in Bahrain are directly tied to the schism between the Sunni-led
regime and the Shiite majority, as noted in the State Department reports on human rights and
religious freedom in Bahrain. The State Department reports also note problems for non-Muslims
and for non-Shiite opponents of the government, as well as limitations in the rights of laborers
and labor unions.
There are several Bahraini human rights groups, mainly advocates for Shiite rights and causes.
The most prominent are the Bahrain Human Rights Society (the primary licensed human rights
organization), the Bahrain Transparency Society, and the Bahrain Center for Human Rights
(BCHR) and its offshoot, the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights (BYSHR). The latter wo
organization were officially dissolved but remain active informally. As noted above, the
government has arrested several leaders of these organizations.
U.N. Scrutiny
As the uprising has unfolded, Bahrain has drawn increasing attention from U.N. human rights
bodies and other governments. On June 28, 2012, 28 countries issued a joint declaration, during
U.N. Human Rights Council debate, condemning human rights abuses by the Bahrain
government. The United States, Britain, and eight other EU countries did not support the
initiative. Human rights groups criticized the Administration for refusing to block the September
28, 2012, vote in the U.N. Human Rights Council to fill one of its advisory committee vacancies
with a Bahraini representative, Saeed Mohammad al-Faihani. That vote came nine days after the
Human Rights Council accepted a Universal Periodic Review of Bahrain’s human rights record,
in which the government agreed to fully accept 140 out of 176 recommendations of the review. In
early December 2012, a team from the United Nations Human Rights Council visited Bahrain to
assess the human rights situation; it met with the government as well as the opposition.
Opposition activists reportedly requested that the U.N. team recommended the appointment of a
Special Rapporteur on human rights in Bahrain, and the establishment of a formal U.N. office in
Bahrain that would monitor human rights practices there.

21 Much of this section is from the State Department’s country report on human rights practices for 2012 (released
April 19, 2013), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204370#wrapper;
the International Religious Freedom Report for 2012 (May 20, 2013),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=208398#wrapper; and the Trafficking in
Persons Report for 2013 (June 19, 2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210740.pdf
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Women’s Rights
Bahrain has tended to be relatively progressive as far as law and regulations. However, as is the
case with its neighbors, Bahrain’s practices and customs tend to limit women’s rights. Women can
drive, own and inherit property, and initiate divorce cases, although religious courts may refuse a
woman’s divorce request. Some prominent women are campaigning for a codified family law that
would enhance and secure women’s rights, running into opposition from Bahraini clerics who are
against granting more rights for women. The campaign for the law is backed by King Hamad’s
wife, Shaykha Sabeeka, and the Supreme Council for Women, which is one association that
promotes women’s rights in Bahrain. Others include the Bahrain Women’s Union, the Bahrain
Women’s Association, and the Young Ladies Association.
To try to showcase its progressiveness, the government has promoted several women to high
positions. The number of women in both chambers of the National Assembly is provided in Table
1, above. Since 2005, there have been at least two female ministers—Minister of Human Rights
and Social Development Fatima bint Ahmad al-Balushi and Minister of Information and Culture
Mai bint Muhammad Al Khalifa. A third female, Samira Rajab, was added to the cabinet in 2012
as minister of state for media affairs. Ms. Huda Azar Nunu, an attorney and formerly the only Jew
in the Shura Council, is ambassador to the United States. As noted above, a female—Dana
Zayani—heads the “Follow Up Unit” that is continuing to oversee implementation of the BICI
recommendations.
Religious Freedom
The State Department report on international religious freedom for 2012 (released May 20, 2013)
says that the “trend in the government’s respect for religious freedom did not change significantly
during the year.” As in past State Department religious freedom reports on Bahrain, the report for
2012 focuses extensively on Sunni-Shiite differences and the unrest. According to past State
Department reports on religious freedom in Bahrain, the government allows freedom of worship
for Christians, Jews, and Hindus although the constitution declares Islam the official religion.
Non-Muslim groups must register with the Ministry of Social Development to operate and 19
non-Muslim religious groups are registered as of the end of 2012, including Christian churches
and a Hindu temple. During 2012, the government donated land for the Roman Catholic Vicariate
of Northern Arabia to relocate from Kuwait to Bahrain.
The Baha’i faith, declared blasphemous in Iran and Afghanistan, has been discriminated against
in Bahrain, although recent State Department human rights reports say that the Baha’i community
can gather and operates openly. According to the State Department human rights report for 2011,
there are about 40 Jews in Bahrain, and no recent reports of anti-Semitic acts.
Aside from sectarian differences, religious conservatives, both Sunni and Shiite, are active in
Bahrain. On September 14, 2012, about 2,000 Bahrainis demonstrated in the mostly Shiite district
of Diraz against the U.S.-produced video “The Innocence of Muslims.” Similar demonstrations
took place throughout the Middle East and South Asia.
Media Freedoms
Media freedoms have been curbed since the uprising began. The State Department human rights
report for 2012 states that, during 2012, the government suppressed critical speech. In April 2013,
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the government increased the recommended jail sentence for “insulting the King” to five years,
from two years.
Labor Rights
On labor issues, Bahrain has been credited with significant labor reforms, including a 2002 law
granting workers, including noncitizens, the right to form and join unions. The law holds that the
right to strike is a legitimate means for workers to defend their rights and interests, but their right
is restricted in practice, including a prohibition on strikes in the oil and gas, education, and health
sectors. There are about 50 trade unions in Bahrain, but all unions must join the General
Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU). As a sign of the degree to which the GFBTU is
dominated by oppositionists, during the height of unrest in 2011, the GFBTU called at least two
general strikes to protest excessive force by security forces. In apparent retaliation by the
government and employers, during March-May 2011, employers dismissed almost 2,500 workers
from the private sector, and almost 2,000 from the public sector, including 25% of the country’s
union leadership.
Human Trafficking
On human trafficking, the State Department “Trafficking in Persons Report” for 2013, released
June 19, 2013, again places Bahrain in “Tier 2: Watch List.” This is the second year in a row that
Bahrain is rated at that level—a downgrade from the Tier 2 placement of the 2011 report. The
Tier 2 Watch List ranking is based on the government’s failure to demonstrate increasing effort to
address the human trafficking issue. The report for 2013 asserts that Bahrain is a destination
country for migrant workers from India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Thailand, the Phillipines, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Eritrea to be subjected to forced labor and sex
trafficking.
Executions and Torture
Another issue that has been widely discussed in the context of the uprising, but which predated it,
is that of executions and torture. Human Rights Watch and other groups long asserted that
Bahrain had been going against the international trend of ending executions. In November 2009,
Bahrain’s Court of Cassation upheld the sentencing to death by firing squad of a citizen of
Bangladesh. That sentenced was imposed for a 2005 murder. From 1977 until 2006, there were no
executions in Bahrain.
Allegations of torture against Shiite opposition figures have been widespread. In February 2010,
more than one year before the uprising began, Human Rights Watch issued a study alleging
systematic use by Bahraini security forces of torture.22 Witnesses at the May 13, 2011, hearing of
the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission asserted that torture was being used regularly on
those (mostly Shiites) arrested in the unrest. The State Department human rights report for 2011
said there were numerous reports of torture and other cruel punishments during the state of
emergency (March—June 2011). The government cancelled the planned late May 2013 visit of
the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Juan Mendez—the second cancellation of his visit since the unrest began. Mendez

22 Human Rights Watch. “Bahrain: Torture Redux.” February 2010.
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said he was “deeply disappointed” in the postponement. On June 7, 2013, twenty Senators and
House Members signed a letter to the King urging him to allow a visit by Mendez in order to
demonstrate Bahrain’s “commitment to help put an end to such abuses.”23
U.S.-Bahrain Security and Foreign Policy Relations24
The U.S.-Bahrain security relationship dates back to just after the end of World War II. Since the
late 1970s, defense issues have been central to U.S.-Bahrain relations. In large part to keep
powerful neighbors in check, Bahrain has linked its security to the United States, and has placed
its facilities at U.S. disposal to address threats from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, international
terrorism, and piracy in the Gulf and Arabia Sea. Bahrain, perhaps even more so than the other
GCC states, considers Iran’s nuclear program a major potential threat. Since the U.S.-led ousting
of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the perceived threat from Iraq has receded because Iraq’s military is
far smaller and less well-armed than it was during the rule of Saddam Hussein.
In addition to the longstanding U.S. naval headquarters presence in Bahrain, the two countries
signed a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in 1991. In March 2002, President Bush
(Presidential Determination 2002-10) designated Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally (MNNA),” a
designation that qualifies Bahrain to purchase the same U.S. arms that NATO allies can purchase.
However, since the Bahrain uprising began in 2011, Bahrain-U.S. political relations have been
somewhat strained. U.S. officials say that U.S.- Bahrain defense cooperation has not suffered
significantly, although the Bahrain government has become slightly less forthcoming with in-kind
port to the U.S. military presence in Bahrain than it was before the unrest began. U.S. officials
add that there are few, if any, security cooperation initiatives that the United States can use as
leverage to obtain Bahrain government flexibility on the unrest issue.
The opposition says that U.S.-Bahrain defense relations are not at risk should the Shiite
opposition achieve greater influence in Bahrain; Wifaq leader Salman has said in interviews that
he supports continuing the security relationship with the United States. Some observers assert that
the opposition sees the continued U.S. presence in Bahrain as leverage the United States can use
to persuade the Bahraini government to offer concessions to the opposition.
U.S. Naval Headquarters in Bahrain
The cornerstone of U.S.-Bahrain defense relations is U.S. access to Bahrain’s naval facilities.
February 2008 marked the 60th anniversary of a U.S. naval command presence in Bahrain;
MIDEASTFOR (U.S. Middle East Force), its successor, NAVCENT (naval component of U.S.
Central Command), as well as the Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in June 1995) are headquartered
there, at a sprawling facility called “Naval Support Activity-Bahrain.” The facility now covers
60-100 acres, and about 5,000 U.S. personnel, mostly Navy, are deployed in Bahrain.25 It is also

23 http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/HRF-King-Al-Khalifa-Letter.pdf
24 Information in this section obtained from a variety of press reports, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA).
25 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/after-iraq-pullout-us-serves-a-reminder-to-iran/
2011/10/24/gIQAU7dGCM_blog.html.
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home to U.S. Marine Forces Central Command, Destroyer Squadron Fifty, and three Combined
Maritime Forces.26 The “on-shore” U.S. command presence in Bahrain was established after the
1991 Gulf war against Iraq; prior to that, the U.S. naval headquarters in Bahrain was on a
command ship mostly docked in Bahrain and technically “off shore.”
Some smaller U.S. ships (e.g., minesweepers) are homeported there, but the Fifth Fleet consists
mostly of U.S.-homeported ships that are sent to the region on six- to seven-month deployments.
Ships operating in the Fifth Fleet at any given time typically include a carrier strike group, an
amphibious ready group, and some additional surface combatants, and operate in both the Persian
Gulf and Indian Ocean/Northern Arabian Sea. In mid-March 2012, the U.S. Navy announced it
was doubling its minesweepers in the Gulf to eight, and sending additional mine-hunting
helicopters, as tensions escalated over Iran’s nuclear program and its threatened reaction to new
sanctions. In May 2013, the U.S. Navy announced it is moving an additional five coastal patrol
ships to Bahrain, to join five already there. The naval headquarters serves as the command
headquarters for periodic exercises intended to signal resolve to Iran; a mine-sweeping exercise
involving 41 countries was held in the Gulf during May 5-30, 2013.
The naval headquarters also coordinates the operations of over 20 U.S. and allied warships in
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 and 152 that seek to interdict the movement of terrorists,
pirates, arms, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related technology and narcotics across the
Arabian Sea. In March 2008, Bahrain took a turn in a rotation to command CTF-152, and it
commanded again in December 2010. Bahrain commanded an anti-piracy task force in
Gulf/Arabian Sea waters in October 2010. These operations are offshoots of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, which ousted the Taliban after the September 11 attacks.
To further develop the naval facility (sometimes referred to as “Bahrain Island”), and other
military facilities, the U.S. military is implementing a planned $580 million military construction
program in Bahrain. Construction began in May 2010 to allow larger ships to dock at the naval
facility; the project is expected to be completed, in several phases, by 2015. A January 2008 lease
agreement between the United States and Bahrain allowed for the expansion by making available
the decommissioned Mina (port) Al Salman Pier. U.S. officials say they continue to request
further expansions of the facility. Another deep water port in Bahrain, Khalifa bin Salman, is one
of the few facilities in the Gulf that can accommodate U.S. aircraft carriers and amphibious
ships.27
The bulk of the ongoing military construction program has been to expand the naval facility, but
$45 million of the funds is to be used to expand an apron at Shaykh Isa Air Base, where a variety
of U.S. aircraft are stationed, including F-16s, F-18s, and P-3 surveillance aircraft. About $19
million is to be used for a Special Operations Forces facility. Recent appropriations and requests
to fund the construction include $54 million for FY2008 (Division 1 of P.L. 110-161); no funds
for FY2009; $41.5 million for FY2010 (P.L. 111-117); $258 million for FY2011 (P.L. 112-10).
$100 million was requested for FY2012 for two projects of nearly equal size, but was not funded
(accepting a Senate provision of H.R. 2055) in the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 112-
74).

26 For an extended discussion of the U.S. military presence in Bahrain, see Brookings Institution, Center for 21st
Century Security and Intelligence, Policy Paper “No ‘Plan B’: U.S. Strategic Access in the Middle East and the
Question of Bahrain. June 2013, by Commander Richard McDaniel, U.S.N.
27 Ibid.
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Some say that the United States should begin examining alternate facilities in the Gulf region in
the expectation that continued Bahraini hosting of the U.S. naval headquarters has become
unstable. On July 22, 2011, the U.S. Navy in Bahrain issued a statement refuting a British press
report that the Navy is planning to relocate the facility. Should there be a decision to take that
step, likely alternatives in the Gulf would include Qatar’s New Doha Port (to open in 2016),
Kuwait’s Shuaiba port, and the UAE’s Jebel Ali.28 None of teither has publicly expressed a
position on whether it would be willing to host such an expanded facility, but both countries have
been highly cooperative with U.S. defense efforts in the Gulf and presumably would be willing to
host the naval headquarters. U.S. officials say other Gulf state facilities, such as Jebel Ali in UAE,
do not currently provide large U.S. ships with the ease of docking access that Bahrain does, and
that many of the alternative possibilities inconveniently share docking and other facilities with
large commercial operations. Still, such facilities could be improved, if necessary, by further
construction.
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
Bahrain was part of the U.S.-led allied coalition that ousted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, hosting
17,500 troops and 250 combat aircraft at Shaykh Isa Air Base (mentioned above). Expanding on
the agreement under which Bahrain hosted U.S. naval headquarters, Bahrain and the United
States signed a 10-year defense pact on October 28, 1991, seven months after the ousting of Iraqi
troops from Kuwait. The pact was renewed in October 2001, and was presumably to be up for
renewal in October 2011. However, press and expert accounts in August 2011 indicated that, a
few months after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, the Bush Administration
may have extended the pact a further five years, to 2016. The U.S. Defense Department has not
publicly confirmed these stories, although one U.S. official, on background, said the pact was
previously extended beyond October 2011.29 The pact not only provides the United States access
to Bahrain’s air bases and to pre-position strategic materiel (mostly U.S. Air Force munitions),
but also requires consultations with Bahrain if its security is threatened, and it expanded exercises
and U.S. training of Bahraini forces.30 The pact provides a backdrop for a “Status of Forces
Agreement” (SOFA) with Bahrain under which U.S. military personnel serving in Bahrain
operate under U.S., and not Bahraini, law.
Cooperation With U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
Following the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991, there were about 1,300 U.S. military
personnel in Bahrain during the 1990s to contain Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and Bahraini pilots flew
strikes over Iraq during the war; Iraq fired nine Scud missiles at Bahrain during the war, of which
three hit facilities there. Bahrain hosted the regional headquarters for U.N. weapons inspections in
Iraq during 1991-1998, and the U.S.-led Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that enforced a

28 Ibid.
29 “U.S.-Bahrain Defense Pact Renewed.” Agence France Presse, August 5, 2011.
30 Details of the U.S.-Bahrain defense agreement are classified. Some provisions are discussed in Sami Hajjar, U.S.
Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute), March
2002, p. 27. The State and Defense Departments have not provided CRS with requested information on the duration of
the pact, or whether its terms had been modified in recent years.
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U.N. embargo on Iraq during 1991-2003. Since the early 1990s, the United States has reportedly
stationed two Patriot anti-missile batteries there.31
Bahrain allowed the United States to fly combat missions from its bases (Shaykh Isa Air Base) in
both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and the war to oust Saddam Hussein in
March-April 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF). During both OEF and OIF, Bahrain publicly
deployed its U.S.-supplied frigate warship (the Subha) to help protect U.S. ships, and it sent
ground and air assets to Kuwait in support of OIF. Bahrain hosted about 4,000 U.S. military
personnel during major combat of OEF (October 2001-May 2003).
Bahrain and UAE have been the only Gulf states to deploy their own forces to provide aid to
Afghanistan. In January 2009, Bahrain sent 100 police officers to Afghanistan on a two-year tour
to help U.S./NATO-led stabilization operations there. Their tour was extended until the end of the
NATO mission at the end of 2014.
U.S. Arms Transfers and Military Aid
To assist Bahrain’s ability to cooperate with the United States on regional security issues,
Congress and successive Administrations, citing Bahrain’s financial resources, have supported
military assistance to Bahrain’s small force. According to the State Department, the United States
has sold $1.4 billion worth of weaponry to Bahrain since 2000;32 based on the small amounts of
U.S. military aid provided to Bahrain, the overwhelming majority of the arms were purchased
with Bahrain’s national funds. The unrest has caused the Administration to put on hold sales to
Bahrain equipment that could easily be used against protesters, while continuing to provide
equipment that is suited to Bahrain’s external defense capabilities and its support for U.S.
operations in the region. Sales of small arms are generally commercial sales, licensed by State
Department with Defense Department concurrence. On September 10, 2011, the State Department
licensed a sale of 250 pistols to the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) and other firearms for the
protection of a high ranking Bahraini official. Since 2012, the Department has put “on hold”
license requests for sales to Bahrain of small arms, light weapons, and ammunition.33
The main recipient of U.S. military assistance has been the relatively small BDF—Bahrain’s
military force—which has less than 10,000 active duty personnel, including 1,200 National
Guard. The BDF, as well as Bahrain’s police forces, are run by Sunni Bahrainis, but supplement
their ranks with unknown percentages of paid recruits from Sunni Muslim neighboring countries,
including Pakistan, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Some human rights groups say that BDF
equipment, such as Cobra helicopters, have been used against protesters and that the United
States cannot be sure that sales to and training of the BDF is not being used to crush unrest.

31 Walter Pincus. “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Washington Post, February 22,
2011.
32 Justin Elliott. “Revealed: America’s Arms Sales to Bahrain Amid Bloody Crackdown.” Propublica, January 15,
2013.
33 Email from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, May 20, 2013.
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Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was suspended for Bahrain in FY1994 but restarted in
appreciation of Bahrain’s support in OEF and OIF. According to the Administration, FMF (and
funds provided under “Section 1206” of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, P.L.
109-163) is provided to Bahrain to help it maintain U.S.-origin weapons, to enhance inter-
operability with U.S. forces, to augment Bahrain’s air defenses, to support and upgrade the
avionics of its F-16 combat aircraft (see below), and to improve counter-terrorism capabilities. As
an example, the United States has supplied Bahrain with a coastal radar system that reportedly
provides Bahrain and the U.S. Navy a 360-degree field of vision around Bahrain.34 Some FMF
funds have been used to build up Bahrain’s Special Operations forces and, in April 2012, U.S.
military teams reportedly provided additional training to the BDF on the use of its Blackhawk
helicopters.35 The Defense Department estimates that, in part due to U.S. assistance, about 50% of
Bahrain’s forces are fully capable of integrating into a U.S.-led coalition.
The Administration’s FY2012 aid request, made at the start of the unrest, asked for $25 million in
FMF for Bahrain. As shown in Table 4 below, only $10 million was provided for FY2012, due in
large part to the Administration’s intent to retain leverage against Bahrain to compel it to make
reforms. The same lower amount, $10 million, was requested for FY2013 and for FY2014.
Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
Bahrain is eligible to receive grant “excess defense articles” (EDA), and it has received over $400
million worth of EDA since the program began for Bahrain in 1993. In June 1995, the United
States provided 50 M-60A3 tanks to Bahrain as a “no cost” five-year lease. Bahrain later received
title to the equipment. In July 1997, the United States transferred the FFG-7 “Perry class” frigate
Subha (see above) as EDA. In the State Department’s FY2012 budget request, the Administration
supported providing another frigate (an “extended deck frigate”) to Bahrain as EDA because the
Subha is approaching the end of its service life. The Administration said on May 11, 2012, that it
continued to support that transfer, which is planned for 2014, subject to passage of authorizing
legislation.36 However, the FY2014 foreign aid budget justification says that the BDF has put
acquisition of a new frigate on hold, and would put U.S. military aid toward maintaining the
Subha instead.
International Military Education and Training Funds (IMET)
As noted in Table 4, small amounts of International Military Education and Training funds
(IMET) are provided to Bahrain to inculcate principles of civilian control of the military,
democracy, and interoperability with U.S. forces. Approximately 250 Bahraini military students
attend U.S. military schools each year, either through the IMET program (57% of them), or using
FMF funds, in connection with the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program.

34 “Bahrain Government’s Ties With the United States Run Deep.” Op. cit.
35 “Revealed: America’s Arms Sales to Bahrain Amid Bloody Crackdown,” op.cit.
36 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/189810.htm
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Major Foreign Military Sales (FMS) From Bahrain National Funds
Bahrain’s total government budget is about $6 billion per year, allowing modest amounts of
national funds to be used for purchases of major combat systems. In 1998, Bahrain purchased 10
U.S.-made F-16Cs from new production, worth about $390 million. It later purchased 12 more of
the system, bringing its F-16 fleet to 22. In 1999, the United States sold Bahrain 26 Advanced
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) to arm the F-16s.
An August 2000 sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs, a system of short-range
ballistic missiles fired from a multiple rocket launcher), valued at about $70 million, included an
agreement for joint U.S.-Bahraini control of the weapon. That arrangement was reached in part to
allay U.S. congressional concerns about possible U.S. promotion of missile proliferation in the
region. Sales of up to 180 “Javelin” anti-armor missiles and 60 launch units, worth up to $42
million; 9 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters worth up to $252 million; and 6 Bell search and
recovery helicopters, valued at about $160 million, were notified August 3, 2007. An additional
25 AMRAAMs (Raytheon Missile Systems Corp.) and associated equipment, valued at about $74
million, was notified for sale to Bahrain on July 28, 2009. Section 581 of the FY1990 foreign
operations appropriation act (P.L. 101-167) made Bahrain the only Gulf state eligible to receive
the Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, and the United States has sold Bahrain about 70
Stingers since 1990. (This authorization has been repeated in subsequent legislation.)
Some of the recent sales to Bahrain are in accordance with the State Department’s “Gulf Security
Dialogue,” begun in 2006 to counter Iran. Much of the initiative involves missile defense
integration, and it is primarily Bahrain’s wealthier neighbors, such as UAE, that are buying
advanced U.S. missile defense equipment. That prevents Bahrain from becoming a major factor
in the U.S. effort to assemble a Gulf-wide, integrated missile defense network. That effort has
been discussed extensively with the Gulf states; on March 31, 2012, then Secretary of State
Clinton attended the first ministerial meeting of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which focused on the integrated Gulf missile defense plan. Subsequently,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose spoke in Abu Dhabi on April 12, 2012,37 on that
issue. The concept was also discussed between the United States and the GCC countries at a
meeting on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly meetings in September 2012.
September 2011 Humvee and TOW Sale
One sale, notified on September 14, 2011, was announced seven months after the unrest began,
and has been agreed to despite U.S. criticism of Bahrain’s crackdown. It is for a proposed sale of
44 “Humvee” (M115A1B2) armored vehicles and several hundred TOW missiles of various
models, of which 50 are to be “bunker busters.” Along with associated equipment and support,
the proposed sale is worth an estimated $53 million. Although not considered large in dollar
terms, or of particularly sophisticated equipment, the sale incurred opposition from several human
rights groups and from the Bahraini opposition who assert that the sale represents U.S.
downplaying of the abuses committed by the Bahraini government in the course of the unrest.
Human rights groups and Bahraini opposition figures say the regime could use the Humvees, in
particular, in their efforts to crack down on protests. When the sale was announced, State
Department officials said the sale would not violate the intent of the “Leahy amendment”—a

37 U.S. Department of State Daily Digest Bulletin, April 12, 2012.
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provision of foreign aid and defense appropriations laws that forbids U.S. sales of equipment to
security units that have committed human rights abuses.38
Two joint resolutions were introduced in the 112th Congress to block the sale: S.J.Res. 28,
introduced by Senator Ron Wyden, and H.J.Res. 80, introduced by Representative James
McGovern. Both joint resolutions would have prohibited the sale unless the Administration
certifies that Bahrain is rectifying the alleged abuses connected to its suppression of the uprising
in 2011. To block a proposed arms sale would require passage of a joint resolution to do so, and
with a veto-proof majority, because President Obama could veto a joint resolution of disapproval
in order to complete the sale. The House bill attracted 14 co-sponsors, the Senate bill two co-
sponsors. On October 19, 2011, even though the sale had passed the period of congressional
review, and apparently addressing the criticism and legislative initiatives, the Administration told
Congress it would delay the sale until it could review the BICI report that was released November
23, 2011. Still, the State Department spokesperson stated on January 27, 2012, that “we are
maintaining a pause on most security assistance to Bahrain pending further progress on reform.”
At the same briefing, the department said it was releasing to Bahrain previously notified and
cleared spare parts and maintenance—worth a reported $1 million—needed for Bahrain’s external
defense and support of Fifth Fleet operations. None of the items can be used against protesters,
according to the State Department statement.39
May 11, 2012, Announcement of Possible Future Sales40
As discussed above, on May 11, 2012, in conjunction with a visit to Washington, DC, by
Bahrain’s Crown Prince Salman, the Administration announced that, despite continuing concerns
about Bahrain’s handling of the unrest, it would open up Bahrain to the purchase of additional
U.S. arms for the BDF, Bahrain’s Coast Guard, and Bahrain’s National Guard. The
Administration stated that weaponry that could be sold is not typically used in crowd control or
riot control, and that the TOW and Humvee sale discussed, as well as any sales of equipment that
could be used against protesters (tear gas and rifles, for example), would remain on hold. The
Administration did not release a complete list of weapons categories that might be sold, but it
gave a few examples as follows:
• The Perry-class frigate, as EDA, discussed above; but later mooted;
• Harbor security boats for the Bahrain Coast Guard, as EDA;
• An upgrade to the engines on Bahrain’s U.S.-made F-16s; and
• Additional AMRAAMs (see above), according to press reports quoting U.S.
officials knowledgeable about the decision.41
Some Members of Congress publicly criticized the May 11, 2012, decision as yielding U.S.
leverage on the government to enact more substantial reforms. Some said they might seek
legislation to block the proposed sales.42

38 James Lobe. “Bahrain: U.S. Congress Urged to Reject Arms Sales.” IPS News Service, September 29, 2011.
39 Department of State. Taken Question: Bahrain’s Security Assistance. January 27, 2012.
40 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/189810.htm.
41 Nicole Gaouette. “U.S. Resumes Bahrain Arms Sales Citing Security Interests.” Bloomberg News, May 11, 2012.
42 Sara Sorcher. “Arms Sales to Bahrain Anger Senators.” National Journal Daily, May 14, 2012.
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Relations with and Cooperation Against Iran
Bahrain focuses its foreign policy intently on Iran, which the government believes is supporting
Shiite groups against Bahrain’s Sunni-dominated government. The issue of alleged Iranian
involvement in the unrest has been part of the debate in Bahrain and the United States about the
Bahrain situation. Ambassador Krajeski testified on September 21, 2011, that the United States
“saw no evidence of Iranian instigation” of the unrest, but that the United States is concerned
“about Iranian exploitation” of it. U.S. officials reportedly believe that Iran has urged hardline
Bahraini Shiite factions not to compromise.43 On April 14, 2011, U.S. officials, speaking on
background, told journalists that there was some information to indicate that Iran might have
transferred small amounts of weapons to Bahraini oppositionists.44
Bahraini leaders assert that Iran has been actively stoking the Bahrain unrest. On March 21, 2011,
King Hamad indirectly accused Iran of involvement in the unrest by saying a “foreign plot” had
been foiled by the GCC intervention, and on April 17, 2011, the Bahraini government sent a letter
to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon formally alleging that the pro-Iranian Shiite faction
Hezbollah is seeking to destabilize Bahrain with “logistical help” from unnamed countries (but
clearly referring to Iran). Iran and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors in mid-March 2011, but
returned them in August 2012. The Bahrain government assertions were undercut by the BICI
report, which largely absolved Iran of direct involvement in the unrest, although the report
blamed Iran’s media for incitement of the situation in Bahrain. On February 21, 2013, the
government said that Iran’s Revolutionary guard had helped form a Bahraini cell—part of a group
called the “Imam Army”—to recruit other agents and store weapons in Bahrain for possible
attacks on officials and key locations.45 In May 2013, the government declared Lebanese
Hezbollah a terrorist organization, accusing that organization of helping orchestrate a Shiite-led
insurgency in Bahrain.46
Well before the 2011 unrest, Bahrain’s fears about Iran had been infused by lingering suspicions,
sometimes fed by Iranian actions, that Iran never accepted the results of the 1970 U.N. survey
giving Bahrain independence rather than integration with Iran. Those findings were endorsed by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 278, which was ratified by Iran’s parliament. After these
official determinations, Bahrain had considered the issue closed, after over a century of Persian
contestation of Bahraini sovereignty. Those contests included an effort by Reza Shah Pahlavi of
Iran in the 1930s to deny Bahrain the right to grant oil concessions to the United States and
Britain. In December 1981, and then again in June 1996—a time when Iran was actively seeking
to export its Islamic revolution—Bahrain publicly accused Iran of trying to organize a coup by
pro-Iranian Bahraini Shiites (the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, IFLB). The group’s
successor is the Bahrain Islamic Action Society, which is outlawed.
In recent years, Bahrain’s leadership—and other countries in the region—have reacted strongly
against statements by Iranian editorialists and advisers to Iranian leaders appearing to reassert
Iran’s claim. One such example was a July 2007 Iranian newspaper article reasserting the Iranian

43 http://www.stripes.com/gates-protracted-bahrain-negotiations-allowing-greater-iran-influence-1.137532.
44 Adam Entous and Matthew Rosenberg. “U.S. Says Iran Helps Crackdown in Syria.” Wall Street Journal, April 14,
2011.
45 “Iran’s Revolutionary guard Behind Terror Cell, Says Bahrain.” Saudi Gazette, February 22, 2013.
46 The United States designated Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, FTO, in 1997 when that list was
established by the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. 1189.
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claim to Bahrain. However, that article, along with the Bahraini crown prince’s November 3,
2007, comment that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon (Iran claims it is developing only
civilian nuclear power), did not mar the visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad on November 17,
2007. In March 2009, Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, again referred
to Bahrain as Iran’s 14th province. Iran’s Foreign Ministry immediately tried to limit any
diplomatic damage by asserting respect for Bahrain’s sovereignty and independence, but some
Arab governments sharply criticized the comments; Morocco broke relations with Iran.
In connection with its own concerns about Iran, Bahrain has supported the U.S. position that Iran
is not fully cooperating with U.N. Security Council requirements to suspend enrichment of
uranium. In the joint news conference with Secretary Clinton on December 3, 2010, referenced
earlier, the foreign minister restated Bahrain’s support for Iran’s right to nuclear power for
peaceful uses, but that “when it comes to taking that [nuclear] power, to developing it into a cycle
for weapon grade, that is something that we can never accept, and we can never live with in this
region.”47
At the same time, so as not to provide Iran a pretext to pressure Bahrain, Bahrain’s leaders have
sometimes tried to silence voices in Bahrain that publicly attack Iran. An example is the one-day
suspension in 2009 of the newspaper Akhbar al Khaleej (Gulf News) for running an editorial by a
Bahrain Shura Council member who criticized Iranian leaders. Prior to the uprising, Bahrain
regularly supported the invitation of high-ranking Iranian officials to the annual “Manama
Dialogue” strategy conference, discussed above. At times, there have been expectations that U.S.
officials might meet with Iranian officials at the margins of the conference, although such
meetings have not taken place in practice.
Bahrain-Iran Economic Ties and Bahraini Enforcement of Iran Sanctions
Despite its political difficulties with Iran, Bahrain maintains normal trade with Iran, probably to
avoid antagonizing Iran into undertaking more assertive action on behalf of Bahrain’s opposition.
There are no indications that Iran-Bahrain general commerce has been affected by the unrest in
Bahrain. On the other hand, in mid-September 2012, Bahrain confiscated carbon fiber bound for
Iran, an item that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear program.
Energy market observers say that some Bahrain energy firms may still be supplying gasoline to
Iran. No U.N. Security Council Resolution bars such sales, but a U.S. law signed on July 1,
2010—the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(CISADA, P.L. 111-195)—provides for sanctions against foreign firms that sell more than $1
million worth of gasoline to Iran.48 No Bahraini gasoline traders have been sanctioned.
Foreign banks that deal with sanctioned Iranian banks or Iran’s Central Bank are subject to U.S.
sanctions under several U.S. laws (see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth
Katzman). In March 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice sanctioned Future Bank, headquartered
in Bahrain, because it is controlled and partially owned by Iran’s Bank Melli. The sanctions,
under Executive Order 13382 (anti-proliferation), prevent U.S. citizens from participating in

47 Department of State. Transcript of Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Al Khalifa. December 3,
2010.
48 For a list of possible sanctions that could be imposed, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth
Katzman.
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transactions with Future Bank and require the freezing of any U.S.-based bank assets. The bank
remains in operation.
And, the unrest has clouded the prospects for further energy cooperation between the two
countries. A 2007 Ahmadinejad visit to Bahrain resulted in a preliminary agreement for Bahrain
to buy 1.2 billion cubic feet per day (for 25 years) of Iranian gas via an undersea pipeline to be
built. The deal would have involved a $4 billion investment by Bahrain to develop Phases 15 and
16 of Iran’s South Pars gas field, which presumably would be the source of the gas that Bahrain
would import. The March 2009 comments of Nateq Nuri, discussed above, led to the suspension
of this deal, and there has been no movement on the arrangement since.
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation
Mostly prior to the 2011 uprising, the United States provided some assistance to Ministry of
Interior-supervised internal security forces to facilitate their cooperation with regional U.S.
counter-terrorism operations. Since the uprising began, U.S. aid to the Interior Ministry-
controlled forces has become controversial because of the role of these forces in suppressing the
unrest. Until 1998, Bahrain’s internal security services were run by a former British colonial
police officer, Ian Henderson, who had a reputation among Shiites for using repressive measures.
And, the current director of the internal security service is Shaykh Khalifa bin Abdullah Al
Khalifa, considered a hardliner in the royal family.
According to the FY2012 budget justification, the Administration was “reviewing” the use of
NADR-ATA support to Bahrain to ensure that none was used “against protestors” in the 2011
unrest. The FY2013 budget justification said that NADR-ATA support would continue to go to
the Ministry of Interior “on a limited basis,” and in part to prod the ministry on security sector
reform and implementation of the BICI recommendations. The State Department, as noted above,
has placed on hold license requests for small arms and related equipment to the Bahraini
government in general. However, the FY2014 budget justification appears to stress that NADR-
ATA will focus on helping security forces counter the explosive devices used by extremist
elements within the opposition—suggesting that the Administration shares the Bahrain
government’s view that the opposition is increasingly developing a violent component. As noted
by the State Department, some of the NADR-ATA funds have previously been used to provide
training to its counterterrorism institutions, to augment the ability of Bahraini forces to protect
U.S. diplomatic and military facilities in Bahrain, and to help train Bahrain’s police contingent in
Afghanistan guard Camp Leatherneck in Helmand Province.
The State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2011 (released July 31, 2012) noted
some of the government responses to the BICI report, particularly ending the National Security
Agency’s arrest and detention authorities. The State Department report on terrorism for 2012
(released May 30, 2013), said the agency had transferred those authorities to the Ministry of
Interior in 2012.49
Regarding regional anti-terrorism cooperation, the State Department terrorism report for 2012
continues to credit Bahrain with strongly cooperating with U.S. and international counter-
terrorism efforts. Bahrain has hosted the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task

49 http:r//www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209982.htm
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Force (MENA/FATF) secretariat, and its Central Bank, Financial Information Unit (within the
Central Bank), and local banks have cooperated with U.S. efforts against terrorism financing and
money laundering.
Other Foreign Policy Issues
Bahrain has close relations with the other GCC states, in particular Saudi Arabia, as evidenced by
its turn to Saudi Arabia to help it deal with the 2011 unrest. Virtually all the GCC states have
political structures similar to that of Bahrain, and several have substantial Shiite minorities,
although none of the others has a Shiite majority.
Extensive Ties to Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia’s Shiites (about 10% of the population) are located mostly in the eastern provinces,
across a causeway constructed in 1986 that connects it to Bahrain. This linkage partly explains
Saudi concerns about the unrest shaking the royal family in Bahrain as well as the Saudi push, at
a May 14, 2012, GCC leadership meeting, to turn the GCC into a political union (“Riyadh
Declaration”). Doing so would further commit all the GCC states to ensuring that Shiites do not
come to power in Bahrain. The Saudi and Bahraini leaderships went into the May 14, 2012,
meeting proposing a Bahrain-Saudi union that would be expanded to all six GCC states.
However, opposition from several of the other GCC states caused the shelving of the concept of
any union, even between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Still, the GCC states agreed in December
2012 to a collective security agreement that combats crime and terrorism through information
exchanges. Bahrain’s cabinet endorsed the agreement on December 30, 2012. Among all the other
linkages, King Hamad’s fifth son, Khalid bin Hamad, married a daughter of Saudi King Abdullah
in 2011. Since the beginning of the Bahrain unrest, Saudi Arabia reportedly has donated at least
$500 million to help Bahrain’s economy.
Other GCC
Because of historic ties between their two royal families, Kuwait has sometimes been touted as a
potential mediator in the Bahraini political crisis. Both royal families hail from the Anizah tribe
that settled in Bahrain and some of whom went on to what is now Kuwait. Kuwaiti Shiites in
Kuwait’s parliament have argued against Kuwait’s siding firmly with the Al Khalifa regime.
However, the Kuwaiti government did, as noted with its naval deployments, join the GCC
position on the side of the government and it is giving financial aid to Bahrain.
On other regional issues, unlike Qatar and UAE, Bahrain did not play a significant role in
assisting the Libyan opposition to the rule of Muammar Al Qadhafi. Had Bahrain intervened in
Libya, doing so could have been viewed as a contradiction—supporting a revolutionary
movement in another Arab state while arguing that its domestic opposition’s grievances lacked
legitimacy. As part of the GCC, Bahrain also joined the GCC efforts, which yielded success in
November 2011, to persuade Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh to cede power to a transition
process. He left Yemen in January 2012.
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Syria Issue
As to Syria, the GCC sees Syria as Iran’s main Middle Eastern ally and seeks the ouster of
President Bashar Al Assad. In August 2011, Bahrain joined the other GCC countries in
withdrawing their ambassadors to Syria. In November 2011, the GCC voted with other Arab
League states to suspend Syria’s membership in the body. In April 2012, the GCC states also
proposed giving the Syrian opposition $100 million in funding that it can use to buy weaponry,
although most of that funding reportedly is being provided by the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi
Arabia. Some of the GCC states, but not Bahrain, are said to be providing weapons as well. Since
June 2013, Bahrain has joined its GCC partners in expelling sympathizers of Lebanese Hezbollah
following its announced entry into the Syria civil conflict on the side of Assad.
Iraq
Bahrain’s participation in OIF, discussed above, came despite domestic opposition in Bahrain to
that war. Because of its limited income, Bahrain did not contribute funds to Iraq reconstruction,
but it attended the “Expanded Neighbors of Iraq” regional conference process which last met in
Kuwait on April 22, 2008. That process wound down in late 2008 as Iraq stabilized. On October
16, 2008, Bahrain’s first post-Saddam ambassador to Iraq (Saleh Ali al-Maliki) presented his
credentials in Baghdad, in line with King Hamad’s pledge to President Bush in March 2008 to
appoint an ambassador to Iraq. However, Bahrain-Iraq relations have become tense to the extent
that Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government and population is perceived as sympathetic to Bahrain’s
opposition. On March 9, 2012, Iraqi Shiites rallied in support of Bahrain’s Shiites on the same
day as Bahrain’s opposition mounted a major demonstration. King Hamad did not attend the
March 27-29 Arab League summit in Baghdad, and Bahrain sent a relatively low-level
delegation, as did the other GCC states with the exception of Kuwait.
Qatar Territorial Disputes50
The United States cooperates closely with both Qatar and Bahrain, which is why the Bahrain-
Qatar territorial dispute was closely watched by U.S. policymakers. The resolution of the dispute
has partly removed these tensions as an issue for U.S. Gulf policy. Qatar, like Bahrain, is a GCC
monarchy; however, their relations have been sometimes acrimonious because of territorial
disputes with roots in the 18th century, when the ruling families of both countries controlled parts
of the Arabian peninsula. Qatar-Bahrain relations have improved since an International Court of
Justice ruled on March 16, 2001, on the disputes. The ICJ ruled in favor of Qatar on some of the
issues, and in favor of Bahrain on others, but the central dispute—over the Hawar Islands—was
decided in favor of Bahrain. Qatar expressed disappointment over the ruling but said it accepted it
as binding, and the two have since muted mutual criticism and cooperated on major regional
issues. The territorial disputes were referred to the ICJ by Qatar in 1991 after clashes in 1986 in
which Qatar landed military personnel on a man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal) that was in dispute,
and took some Bahrainis prisoner. Saudi mediation in the 1986-1991 period proved fruitless. That
reef was awarded to Qatar in the ICJ ruling. However, the ICJ ruled against Bahrain’s claim to the
town of Zubara on the Qatari mainland, where some members of the Al Khalifa family were long

50 See The Estimate. Dossier: The Bahrain-Qatar Border Dispute: The World Court Decision, Part 1 and Part 2. March
23, 2001, and April 6, 2001.
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buried. Two smaller islands, Janan and Hadd Janan, were ruled not part of the Hawar Islands
group and were awarded to Qatar.
Arab-Israeli Issues
On the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has not been as significant a mediator or broker as have its
larger neighbors in the Gulf or broader Middle East. However, Bahrain has at times advanced
ideas to move the Arab-Israeli peace process forward. In July 2009, Crown Prince Salman
authored an op-ed calling on the Arab states to do more to communicate directly with the Israeli
people on their ideas for peaceful resolution of the dispute.51 In October 2009, Bahrain’s foreign
minister called for direct talks with Israel. Like most Arab states, Bahrain is supporting the efforts
of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to obtain U.N. recognition for a State of
Palestine, despite U.S. opposition to doing so prior to a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement.
Earlier, Bahrain participated in the 1990-1996 multilateral Arab-Israeli talks, and it hosted a
session on the environment (October 1994). Bahrain did not follow Oman and Qatar in
exchanging trade offices with Israel. In September 1994, all GCC states ceased enforcing
secondary and tertiary boycotts of Israel while retaining the ban on direct trade (primary boycott).
In conjunction with the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Bahrain dropped the primary boycott and closed
boycott-related offices in Bahrain.
Still, the Arab-Israeli dispute always has the potential to become a political issue within Bahrain.
In October 2009, the elected COR passed a bill making it a crime (punishable by up to five years
in jail) for Bahrainis to travel to Israel or hold talks with Israelis. The bill, which did not become
law, apparently was a reaction to a visit by Bahraini officials to Israel in July 2009. The visit was
to obtain the release of five Bahrainis taken prisoner by Israel when it seized a ship bound with
goods for Gaza, which is controlled by Hamas. In June 2010, Sunni and Shiite Islamists in
Bahrain held a demonstration to denounce the Israeli seizure of a ship in a flotilla intended to run
the Israeli blockade of the Hamas-run Gaza Strip.
Economic Issues
Like the other Gulf states, Bahrain was affected by the international financial crisis of 2008-2009,
but perhaps to a lesser extent than the wealthier states of Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
Bahrain did not experience the construction and real estate “bubble” to the degree that this
occurred in, for example, UAE. It is also apparently being affected by the 2011 unrest; in May
2011 Moody’s, a bond rating agency, downgraded the quality of Bahrain’s bonds, thereby costing
the government more to borrow funds.
Bahrain has little cushion to deal with economic downturns. It has the lowest oil and gas reserves
of the Gulf monarchy states, estimated respectively at 210 million barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion
cubic feet of gas. Some economic statistics are presented in Table 3. Without the ample oil or gas
resources of its neighbors, Bahrain has diversified its economy by emphasizing banking and
financial services (about 25.5% of GDP). At current rates of production (35,000 barrels per day of
crude oil), Bahrain’s onshore oil reserves will be exhausted in 15 years, but Saudi Arabia shares

51 “Arabs Need to Talk to the Israelis.” The Washington Post. July 16, 2009.
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equally with Bahrain the 300,000 barrels per day produced from the offshore Abu Safa field. The
United States buys virtually no oil from Bahrain; the major U.S. import from it is aluminum.
Aluminum and other manufacturing sectors in Bahrain account for the existence in Bahrain of a
vibrant middle and working class among its citizens. However, these classes are largely
composed of Shiites, and this has made many Shiites envious of the “ownership class” of Sunni
Muslims. On the other hand, many Shiites own businesses and have done well economically.
To encourage reform and signal U.S. appreciation, the United States and Bahrain signed an FTA
on September 14, 2004. Implementing legislation was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169).
However, in light of the unrest, the AFL-CIO has urged the United States to void the FTA on the
grounds that Bahrain is preventing free association of workers and abridging their rights.
In 2012, the United States exported $1.21 billion worth of goods to Bahrain, about the same
amount as in 2011. The United States imported $700 million in goods from that country,
substantially more than the $520 million worth of imports in 2011 and than the $420 million
worth of imports in 2010. In 2005, total bilateral trade was about $780 million, suggesting that
trade has more than doubled since the U.S.-Bahrain FTA.
Table 3. Some Basic Facts About Bahrain
Population
About 1.25 million, of which about 1 million are citizens
Religions
81% Muslim, 9% Christian, 10% other
GDP (purchasing power parity)
$33.6 billion (2012)
Budget
$8.4 billion revenues, $8.7 billion expenditures (2012)
Inflation Rate
0.3% (2011)
Unemployment Rate
15%
GDP Real Growth Rate
3.9% in 2012
Size of Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF)
About 13,000, plus about 1,200 National Guard. Some personnel
are expatriates, including other Arab and Pakistani.
Source: CIA, The World Factbook.




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Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain
($ in millions)
FY13 FY14

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 (req)
FMF
90.0 24.6 18.9 15.6 15 3.968 8.0 19.0 15.46 10 10 10
IMET
0.448 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.616 0.622 .661 .670 .435 .554 .725 .725
NADR


1.49 2.76 .776 0.744 .500 1.10 1.5 .50 .45 .45
“Section



1206”
5.3
24.54
4.3
16.2
Notes: IMET = International Military Education and Training Funds, used mainly to enhance BDF military
professionalism and promote U.S. values. NADR = Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related
Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists. Section 1206 are DOD
funds used to train and equip Bahrain’s special forces, its coastal surveillance and patrol capabilities, and to
develop its counter terrorism assessment capabilities. (Named for a section of the FY2006 Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 109-163.) FY2008 funds derived from FY2008 supplemental (P.L. 110-252), and the
Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 110-329). FY2009 funds included funding from FY2008 supplemental (P.L. 110-
252) as wel as regular appropriation (P.L. 111-8). FY2010 funds are from Consolidated Appropriation (P.L. 111-
117). FY2011 funds are appropriated by P.L. 112-10, Continuing Appropriations for FY2011.
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Figure 1. Bahrain

Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

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