The Evolution of Cooperative Threat
Reduction: Issues for Congress
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
July 8, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43143
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress
Summary
The United States uses a number of policy tools to address the threat of attack using chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. These include a set of financial and
technical programs known, variously, as cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs,
nonproliferation assistance, or, global security engagement. Congress has supported these
programs over the years, but has raised a number of questions about their implementation and
their future direction.
Over the years, the CTR effort shifted from an emergency response to impending chaos in the
Soviet Union to a broader program seeking to keep CBRN weapons away from rogue nations or
terrorist groups. It has also grown from a DOD-centered effort to include projects funded by the
Department of Defense (DOD), the State Department, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Together, these agencies are seeking nearly $1.65
billion for these programs in FY2014.
Although initially focused on the former Soviet Union, these programs now seek to engage
partners around the world. The United States has used funding and expertise from these programs
to help secure dangerous weapons and materials in nations that experience civil strife or regime
collapse, such as in Libya, and to prevent their spread outside a conflict’s borders, such as with
Syria’s neighboring countries. U.S. cooperation with Russia is narrowing, as the Memorandum of
Understanding that governed the Defense Department’s CTR activities in Russia expired in mid-
June 2013 and was replaced with a bilateral protocol under the Multilateral Nuclear
Environmental Program in the Russian Federation Agreement (MNEPR). Many of the CTR
projects in Russia will wind down, although the two countries will continue to cooperate on some
areas of nuclear security.
In its oversight of these programs, Congress has addressed questions about the coordination of
and priority given to these programs, about partner nations’ willingness to provide the United
States with access to their weapons facilities, and about the metrics used to measure progress.
Congress has also reviewed efforts to engage nations around the world in cooperative threat
reduction and security engagement activities. Some Members have actively encouraged the
Obama Administration to expand these programs to the Middle East and North Africa. This goal
is evident in the Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2013 (S. 1021) and the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Modernization Act (H.R. 2314). Similar provisions are part of both
the House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2014 (H.R. 1960,
§1304; S. 1197, §1326).
This report summarizes cooperative activities conducted during the full 20 years of U.S. threat
reduction and nonproliferation assistance. Many older programs have concluded their work, while
more recent programs continue to expand their scope and their geographic reach.
Several DOD and DOE programs have helped Russia and the other former Soviet states eliminate
nuclear weapons delivery systems and secure nuclear warheads in storage. DOE has also helped
Russia strengthen security and materials accounting at facilities that store nuclear materials.
These agencies are seeking to expand this effort to other nations by sharing “best practices” with
partner countries through Centers of Excellence. DOE is also working, through the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative (GTRI), to secure, protect, and in some cases, remove vulnerable nuclear and
radiological materials at civilian facilities worldwide.
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DOD has also helped Russia secure and eliminate chemical weapons by supporting the design
and construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. DOD and the State
Department also provide assistance to address concerns about the proliferation of pathogens that
might be used in biological weapons. DOD’s biological threat reduction program now accounts
for nearly 60% in the FY2014 budget request. It also has grown from a program focused on
dismantling the vast biological weapons complex in Russia into a tool used to promote “best
practices” at biological laboratories with dangerous pathogens and to develop disease surveillance
systems on several continents, particularly Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
The United States also supports global programs that are designed to prevent the smuggling or
illegal export of CBRN materials and technology. The State Department and DOE have also
developed programs that are designed to reduce the risk that the weapons scientists would sell
their knowledge to nations seeking their own CBRN weapons. These programs seek to prevent
terrorists from exploiting scientists, other personnel, or materials to develop these weapons. The
programs also train not only scientists, but other lab personnel about international security
standards and improve personnel reliability programs to address the “insider threat.”
This report will be updated as needed.
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Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 2
The Nunn-Lugar Amendment .................................................................................................... 2
An Evolving Program ................................................................................................................ 3
Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation .............................................................................. 3
Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism ............................................................................... 3
Global Security Engagement ............................................................................................... 4
The Future of Cooperation with Russia .............................................................................. 6
Threat Reduction After Regime Collapse ........................................................................... 7
Agency Participation ................................................................................................................. 9
Department of Defense (DOD) ........................................................................................... 9
Department of Energy (DOE) ........................................................................................... 10
The State Department ........................................................................................................ 10
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ........................................................................ 11
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 11
Coordination Across Government Agencies ............................................................................ 11
Priority Within the Executive Branch ...................................................................................... 13
Measuring Success and Metrics .............................................................................................. 14
Access and Transparency ........................................................................................................ 16
International Cooperation—The G-8 Global Partnership ........................................................ 17
The Programs ................................................................................................................................. 18
Securing and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons ........................................................................... 18
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination ............................................................................... 18
Global Nuclear Security .................................................................................................... 20
Warhead Security and the Department of Energy ............................................................. 23
Securing and Eliminating Nuclear Materials ........................................................................... 25
CTR Fissile Materials Storage .......................................................................................... 25
DOE Nuclear Materials Security Programs ...................................................................... 25
Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence ............................................................................ 27
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) ....................................................................... 28
Securing Borders and Improving Export Controls .................................................................. 30
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance ................................................... 30
Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) ................................................................ 31
Proliferation Prevention .................................................................................................... 31
Second Line of Defense .................................................................................................... 32
Container Security Initiative and Secure Freight Initiative ............................................... 33
Chemical Weapons Destruction ............................................................................................... 33
Cooperative Biological Engagement ....................................................................................... 35
Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) in Russia .................................................................. 36
Central Asia and the Caucuses .......................................................................................... 37
Global Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE).......................................................... 37
Funding ............................................................................................................................. 38
Securing Knowledge and Expertise ......................................................................................... 39
The Science Centers .......................................................................................................... 40
Iraq and Libya Scientist Engagement Programs ............................................................... 40
Department of Energy Programs ....................................................................................... 41
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Tables
Table 1. CTR Funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) ................................... 20
Table 2. CTR Funding for Transportation Security ....................................................................... 21
Table 3. DOD and DOE Authorizations for Warhead Storage Security Programs ........................ 24
Table 4. CTR Authorizations for Fissile Materials Storage ........................................................... 25
Table 5. DOE Authorizations for Nuclear Materials Security Programs ....................................... 27
Table 6. DOE Authorizations for Global Threat Reduction Initiative ........................................... 29
Table 7. DOE Funding for Second Line of Defense and Megaports ............................................. 33
Table 8. CTR Funding for Chemical Weapons Destruction........................................................... 35
Table 9. CTR Funding for Cooperative Biological Engagement ................................................... 38
Table A-1. Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program ................................ 44
Table A-2. Department of State Programs ..................................................................................... 44
Table A-3. Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs .......................... 45
Table A-4. Department of Homeland Security Programs .............................................................. 45
Table B-1. Title XIII, National Defense Authorization Acts FY2001-FY2013 ............................. 46
Appendixes
Appendix A. Funding Requests, by Agency .................................................................................. 44
Appendix B. Major Provisions in Cooperative Threat Reduction Legislation .............................. 46
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 48
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Introduction
Many experts have postulated that the threat of attack with chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear (CBRN) weapons represents one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security. There is
widespread agreement—within the U.S. government, among national security policy analysts,
and across the political spectrum—that the United States faces a growing threat from the potential
use of these weapons by hostile nations and terrorist groups. Many in Congress have also
expressed concerns about the potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons and have supported U.S.
efforts to address and mitigate this threat.
President George W. Bush highlighted this threat in his 2002 National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction. This report opened with the observation that “weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the possession of hostile states and
terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. We must
pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions.”1 President Obama
offered a similar warning in his 2010 National Security Strategy, when he noted that “there is no
greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger
posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional
states.”2
The United States uses a range of policy tools to address the threats posed by the potential spread
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to hostile nations or non-state actors. These range
from diplomatic engagement and economic sanctions to the threat of military intervention. One
key set of tools is a set of financial and technical programs known, variously, as cooperative
threat reduction programs, nonproliferation assistance, or, global security engagement. Through
these programs, the United States seeks to work with other nations to help them secure and
eliminate their CBRN weapons and material, to stem the flow of weapons and related knowledge
and materials to hostile nations or non-state actors who might seek to develop their own weapons,
and to develop training programs and share “best practices” to ensure that other nations can
protect the materials and knowledge that remain in their countries.
Many of the programs that are funded through these efforts evolved out of an initiative that
Congress created in late 1991. After an August 1991 coup in Moscow led to concerns about the
potential loss of control over Soviet nuclear weapons, Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar
amendment and authorized the use of up to $400 million in funds in the Department of Defense
(DOD) budget to help safely secure, transport, and eliminate Soviet nuclear weapons. This
initiative grew over the years, such that the United States now spends around $1.65 billion per
year on programs that have sought to secure and eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons and materials in the former Soviet states; enhance border security and export controls to
deter and detect efforts to transport these materials across state lines; secure and eliminate
nuclear, chemical, or biological materials in nations outside the former Soviet Union; and redirect
weapons scientists in many nations around the world so that they will pursue programs with
1 The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington, D.C., December 2002, p.
1, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-wmd.pdf.
2 The White House, National Security Strategy, Washington, D.C., May, 2010, p. 4, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
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peaceful purposes. In addition, these programs are now funded and administered by DOD, the
Department of Energy (DOE), the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and several other U.S. agencies.
Over the years, Congress has offered significant support to these efforts. It has not only
authorized and appropriated increasing sums for these programs, it has generally agreed with the
executive branch on the priorities and goals for them. Nevertheless, over the years, some
Members have questioned the value of specific goals and the effectiveness of some projects.
Congress has adjusted the profile of these programs over the years, sometimes reducing funds,
sometimes increasing funds, and sometimes initiating new programs and project areas. The 113th
Congress is likely to continue to review the funding for these programs, consider the goals, and
assess their effectiveness. Moreover, Congress may continue to raise questions about the future
intent of these programs, the success of government-wide coordination in implementing them,
and the extent of international cooperation in addressing these threats. These questions may be
amplified in the coming year, as the United States and Russia wrap up their cooperation on a
number of threat reduction and nonproliferation projects after the expiration of the umbrella
agreement governing many of these programs.3
This report provides information on the wide range of programs that the United States is pursuing
to secure and eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials and to prevent
hostile nations and terrorist organizations from gaining access to these weapons or the knowledge
and materials needed to manufacture and use them. It begins with a brief review of the evolution
of these programs, demonstrating how the goals and objectives have changed over the years. It
then provides information on individual programs that are designed to secure and eliminate
nuclear weapons, secure and eliminate nuclear materials, secure borders and improve export
controls, eliminate chemical weapons, secure biological pathogens, and redirect scientists with
knowledge of CBRN weapons. The report then reviews some of the issues that Congress may
confront as it seeks to provide oversight of these programs and reviews budget requests for them.
Background
The Nunn-Lugar Amendment
Congress initiated U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the Soviet Union in
November 1991. A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of
the Soviet Union had raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons.
Consequently, Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar proposed an amendment to the
implementing legislation for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (P.L. 102-
228). This amendment, titled the “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,” authorized the
use of $400 million in FY1992 Defense Department (DOD) funds to assist the Soviet Union, and
its “successor entities” with efforts to “1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and other
weapons, 2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction,
3 The current agreement expired on June 16, 2013. A new agreement covers a more narrow set of programs, and is
likely to exclude most projects funded by DOD. See Jordana Mishory, “Creedon: New Agreement with Russia Needed
to Preserve CTR Programs,” Inside the Pentagon, May 22, 2013, pp. http://insidedefense.com/Inside-the-Pentagon/
Inside-the-Pentagon-05/23/2013/creedon-new-agreement-with-russia-needed-to-preserve-ctr-programs/menu-id-
80.html.
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and 3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”4 This effort
became known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.
An Evolving Program
Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation
Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance under the CTR program as an emergency
response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union. Senators arguing in support of the program,
including Senators Nunn and Lugar, noted that the disintegration of the Soviet Union created “the
danger that the ultimate disposition of nuclear weapons in the new political system will not be
conducive to their safety or international stability.” They warned of “a danger of seizure, theft,
sale or use of nuclear weapons or components” and argued that “any weakening of control over
weapons and components could spill outside the territory of the former Soviet Union, fueling
nuclear proliferation worldwide.”5 Senator Nunn further warned that “we are on the verge of
either having the greatest destruction of nuclear weapons in the history of the world or the
greatest proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and scientific know-how on how to
make these weapons, as well as chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, even biological weapons the
world has ever seen.”6
Even after the sense of immediate crisis passed in 1992 and 1993, many analysts and Members of
Congress remained concerned about the potential for diversion or a loss of control of Russia’s
nuclear and other weapons. Russia’s economy was extremely weak and press accounts reported
that nuclear materials from Russia were appearing on the black market in Western Europe.
Consequently, many began to view CTR as a part of a long-term threat reduction and
nonproliferation effort. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry referred to CTR as “defense
by other means,”7 as the program helped eliminate Soviet weapons that had threatened the United
States and contain weapons and materials that could pose new threats in the hands of other
nations.
Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism
By the mid-1990s, many observers also began to view U.S. assistance to the former Soviet states
as a part of the effort to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. In 1996, experts
testified to Congress that Russian nuclear and chemical facilities, with their crumbling security
and lack of accounting procedures, could provide a source for terrorists seeking nuclear or
chemical materials. In response, Congress expanded the programs that provided security at
facilities with nuclear materials and suggested that more attention be paid to security at facilities
with materials that could be used in chemical or biological weapons.8
4 For more information on this legislation, see CRS Report 94-985, The Nunn-Lugar Program for Soviet Weapons
Dismantlement: Background and Implementation, by Theodor Galdi. (Available from Amy F. Woolf, on request.)
5 See the comments of Senator Richard Lugar in the Congressional Record, November 25, 1991. p. S18005.
6 Ibid., p. S18004.
7 See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, DC, p. 1.
8 The March 1995 nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinryo cult raised the profile of this
type of threat.
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In January 2001, a task force sponsored by the Department of Energy stated that “the most urgent
unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass
destruction or weapons-usable materials in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile
nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.”9 Since September 11,
2001, virtually all analysts who follow U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance have
argued that, by helping Russia protect its weapons, related materials, and knowledge, the United
States could make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire CBRN weapons.10
The George W. Bush Administration also considered U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs in the former Soviet states to be a part of U.S. efforts to keep weapons of mass
destruction away from terrorists, explaining, in early 2003, that it had “expanded the strategic
focus of the CTR program” to support the war on terrorism.11 In its budgets presented in the years
after FY2004, the Administration increased funding for several export and border control
programs, for programs designed to stem the leakage of knowledge out of the former Soviet
Union, and for an effort to find and recover “radiological sources”—a type of device that could
provide terrorists with nuclear materials for use in a “dirty bomb.”12
All of these initiatives focused more on stemming proliferation than on eliminating nuclear
weapons in the former Soviet states. But they did not completely lose the initial focus. During a
February 2005 summit in Bratislava, Presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin agreed to accelerate
some of the efforts to secure Soviet-era nuclear weapons. This agreement shifted additional
funding into some of the DOD CTR projects and hastened the completion of some warhead
storage and security efforts. As a result, in recent years, U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs in Russia have completed much of the work focused on eliminating retired Soviet-era
nuclear weapons delivery systems, transporting and securing nuclear warheads, and paving the
way for the destruction of Soviet-era chemical weapons.
Global Security Engagement
Over the past decade, U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have expanded beyond
the borders of the former Soviet Union, as the United States has sought to secure and eliminate
nuclear, chemical, and biological materials around the world by working with a diverse set of
countries to build capacity on nuclear security, biological pathogen security, and border security.
This is done through a combination of training programs and equipment, the majority of which is
provided to non-nuclear-weapon states.
9 The report went on to state that “unless protected from theft of diversion, the former Soviet arsenal of weapons of
mass destruction threatens to become a goldmine for would-be proliferators the world over.” Baker, Howard and Lloyd
Cutler, Co-Chairs, Russia Task Force. A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with
Russia. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, United States Department of Energy. January 10, 2001. p. 1.
10 Senator Sam Nunn has stated that “Preventing the spread and use of nuclear biological, and chemical weapons and
materials should be the central organizing principle on security for the 21st century.” Remarks by Former U.S. Senator
Sam Nunn, Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. International
Nonproliferation Conference. November 14 , 2002.
11 U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union Threat
Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 1.
12 Many analysts believe that this type of weapon, which could disperse radioactive materials across a wide area, might
be particularly attractive to terrorists. For details see CRS Report R41891, ”Dirty Bombs”: Background in Brief, by
Jonathan E. Medalia.
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The Obama Administration endorsed the expansion of these programs, noting that they could help
contain proliferation and reduce the threat from terrorists who might seek CBRN weapons.
According to Administration officials, these programs are designed to keep these weapons “out of
the hands of terrorists and states of concern, [to lock down] dangerous nuclear and biological
materials, [to eliminate] chemical weapons, [to destroy] legacy weapons, and [to build]
capabilities and conduct operations to prevent acquisition, contain and roll back threats, and
respond to [CBRN] crises.”13 President Obama has specifically placed a priority on securing
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide, and has both engaged international partners through the
Nuclear Security summit process and accelerated funding for the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI) with this goal in mind.
Funding requests have demonstrated the new priorities, with support for programs that move
beyond the program’s historical base in the former Soviet Union. Nations in Africa, the Middle
East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia can now participate in cooperative programs supported by
this funding. According to the Obama Administration, in 2013, DOD is “now funding roughly as
much work outside of the former Soviet Union as we are inside the former Soviet Union.” Its goal
is to increase “the flexibility of the program to be successful as a global effort.”14
While many in Congress now support this expansion of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs, Congress took several years to approve this new authority. For example, during the
debate over the FY2003 Defense Authorization Bill, the Senate approved an amendment,
proposed by Senator Richard Lugar, that would allow DOD to use up to $50 million in FY2003
CTR funds “outside the states of the former Soviet Union” to resolve “critical emerging
proliferation threats and to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing United States
nonproliferation goals.”15 The Bush Administration supported Senator Lugar’s proposal but the
House objected and the language was removed in conference. The Bush Administration requested
the same authority the following year and the Senate again offered its unqualified support, but
many in the House again objected. The conference committee included the authority to spend $50
million in CTR funds outside the former Soviet Union in the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 108-136), but, indicated that this funding could be used only for short-term projects. The
Bush Administration exercised this authority for the first time in mid-2004, when it provided
assistance to Albania for the elimination of chemical weapons.16
Congressional support for the expansion of these programs had grown more wide-spread by the
end of the Bush Administration. For example, in the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
110-181, §1306), Congress indicated that CTR should be “strengthened and expanded, in part by
developing new CTR initiatives.” It suggested that these new initiatives could include “programs
and projects in Asia and the Middle East; and activities relating to the denuclearization of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Congress added $10 million to the CTR authorization
to fund these programs, streamlined the process of identifying and approving projects, and
eliminated the requirement that limited the program to short-term projects that addressed sudden,
emergency proliferation concerns. Congress also mandated that the National Academy of
13 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services, Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Proliferation Prevention Programs,
Hearing, 113th Cong., 1st sess., April 23, 2013. Testimony of Madelyn R. Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Global Strategic Affairs.
14 Ibid.
15 S. 2026, H.R. 4546, §1203.
16 Warrick, Joby. Albania’s Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others. Washington Post. January 10, 2005. p. A1.
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Sciences conduct a study “to analyze options for strengthening and expanding the CTR Program.”
When it released the required report in 2009, the National Academy recommended that the United
States use a new, broader CTR program to engage nations around the world in a global effort to
secure dangerous weapons and materials.17 It also suggested that Congress authorize DOD to
accept funds from other nations for use in CTR efforts. The FY2010 Defense Authorization Bill
included this provision. The Obama Administration supported these efforts and its budget request
for FY2011 included funds for this purpose in several program areas.
Some Members of Congress have actively encouraged the Obama Administration to expand
cooperative threat reduction efforts in the Middle East and North Africa. Senator Jeanne Shaheen
introduced the “Next Generation Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 2013” (S. 1021) and
Representative Jeff Fortenberry introduced the Cooperative Threat Reduction Modernization Act
(H.R. 2314). Both of these bills direct the Administration to provide a strategy for the expansion
of CTR programs in the Middle East and North Africa. Similar provisions are part of both House
and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2014 (H.R. 1960, §1304; S.
1197, §1326).
The Future of Cooperation with Russia
While the United States has broadened and deepened its nonproliferation and security
engagement with nations outside the former Soviet Union, it has begun to scale back, and, in
some cases, conclude programs of cooperation with Russia. Some of these changes have occurred
because ongoing projects are nearing completion or because Russia now has the resources to
manage the programs on its own. However, more significant changes to the future of U.S.-
Russian nonproliferation cooperation derive from the June 17, 2013, expiration of the long-
standing Memorandum of Understanding, known as the “umbrella agreement,” that has governed
these programs since 1992. This agreement provided the legal framework that allowed for
program implementation.
Reports indicate that the United States presented Russia with a draft extension of the umbrella
agreement in mid-2012. This draft contained most of the same provisions as the original
agreement, which was signed at a time when Russia lacked the financial resources and political
will to secure its nuclear weapons and materials on its own. Russia is not only able to finance
many of these programs itself now, but according to some observers, is more than willing to do
so.18 Moreover, Russian officials may no longer be willing to allow U.S. contractors access to
sensitive Russian military facilities, even if that means Russia will no longer have access to U.S.
financial resources. As a result, in early October 2012, Russian officials indicated that they were
prepared to allow the agreement to lapse and to conclude the programs. In a report for Congress
prepared in March 2013, the Pentagon indicated that, without adequate legal protections in a new
agreement, the United States would have to begin to shut down some of the ongoing projects.19
17 National Academy of Sciences, Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction,
Washington, DC, April 2009.
18 Douglas Birch, “Letting Go of “Loose Nukes,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2012.
19 Jordana Mishory, “Creedon: New Agreement with Russia Needed to Preserve CTR Programs,” Inside the Pentagon,
May 22, 2013, pp. http://insidedefense.com/Inside-the-Pentagon/Inside-the-Pentagon-05/23/2013/creedon-new-
agreement-with-russia-needed-to-preserve-ctr-programs/menu-id-80.html.
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After the United States and Russia failed to reach an agreement on the extension of the original
umbrella agreement, they agreed to continue cooperation under a bilateral protocol to the
Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) Agreement.
The MNEPR was negotiated to allow European partners to give funds to nonproliferation and
radiological clean-up projects in Russia under the G-8 Global Partnership. The United States
signed the MNEPR agreement in 2003, but did not sign the associated Protocol on Claims, Legal
Proceedings and Indemnification, since the preexisting CTR umbrella agreement covered those
issues already. Nine countries as well as several European institutions20 have used this protocol
for liability protection and tax exemption for threat reduction assistance in Russia for the past
decade. These protections will apply to the United States now, since it signed such a MNEPR
protocol with Russia on June 14, 2013.
In a fact sheet released on June 19, 2013, the State Department noted that the United States and
Russia will continue to cooperate “in a broad array of nuclear security and nonproliferation
areas.” These will include, but are not limited to
• improving security of nuclear and radiological material;
• customs control of nuclear and radioactive material;
• recovery and securing of radioactive sources;
• consolidation of nuclear material and conversion of excess highly enriched
uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU);
• conversion of HEU research reactors to operate with LEU; and
• nuclear submarine dismantlement.21
Reports indicate that Russia’s Ministry of Defense will not participate in projects under this
agreement, and, as a result, the United States and Russia will no longer cooperate on projects that
eliminate strategic offensive arms or transport and secure nuclear warheads. According to the
State Department fact sheet, “Russia will now take full responsibility over this mission.” Projects
in both areas were already winding down this year after many years of successful cooperation. At
the same time, the United States will continue to monitor Russia’s deployed strategic offensive
forces under the 2010 New START Treaty. The United States and Russia also will not continue
ongoing projects designed to eliminate chemical weapons, although the State Department
indicated that the United States and Russia “continue to discuss potential technical cooperation on
chemical weapons destruction outside the new framework.”22
Threat Reduction After Regime Collapse
The United States government has grown increasingly concerned about its ability to address the
security of stocks of weapons of mass destruction and the facilities that produce them in the event
of a regime collapse in countries where such capabilities exist. This scenario presented itself
20 MNEPR instruments of ratifications are managed by the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency. http://www.oecd-nea.org/
law/mnepr-ratification.html
21 U.S. Department of State, A New Legal Framework for U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Nuclear Nonproliferation
Security, Fact Sheet, Washington, D.C., June 19, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/210913.htm.
22 The largest of these projects, the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye is described
on page 26, below.
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during regime transitions in Libya and Iraq, and is now evident in debates over chemical weapons
in Syria. North Korea has also been discussed as a possible future scenario should its regime
collapse, or should the current government agree to disarmament measures. The concern over loss
of control of WMD during conflict or regime change is the same concern that motivated the
original CTR programs in the former Soviet Union. Providing assistance in these cases can be
difficult, primarily because CTR and related nonproliferation programs are not designed work in
a non-cooperative environment; they require the agreement of the host country.
The United States is considering a number of policy options for Syria. These focus on how to
prevent the use or loss of control of the chemical weapons there, with the ultimate goal being the
destruction of these weapons.23 While the estimated scope of the chemical (and likely biological)
weapons stocks and facilities in Syria is far greater than those in Libya or Iraq, those cases give
some precedent. In Libya, the dismantlement process after Libya became a party to the
Conventional Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2004 was initially cooperative with the agreement
of the regime. In 2011, after the fall of the Qaddafi regime, the chemical stocks were first secured
by forces aligned with the United States. Later, the new government in Libya agreed to work with
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),24 to complete the destruction
of CW stocks. In Iraq, much of the dismantlement work had been accomplished by the United
Nations inspectors prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, and stockpiles and capacity turned
out to have been overestimated. As described above, a major focus of CTR and nonproliferation
programs in both Iraq and Libya has been engaging former WMD weapons scientists in civilian
projects to prevent the proliferation of their expertise.
The Syrian case may be the first time the international community faces the possibility of a
protracted civil war in a state with a known stockpile of chemical weapons. Due to the urgency of
preventing access to these weapons by unauthorized groups including terrorists, the United States
government has been preparing for scenarios to secure the weapons in the event of the loss of
control by the Assad regime. However, this will present unique challenges. In testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 7, 2012, Secretary of Defense Panetta said, “It’s
100 times worse than what we dealt in with in Libya. And for that reason, that’s why it’s raised
even greater concerns about our ability to address how we can secure those sites.”
International partners under the G-8 Global Partnership (described below) have experience
cooperating in dismantling former Soviet chemical weapons stockpiles, and could work together
to have a role in future CW destruction in Syria. The OPCW could also play a role, based on an
agreement with the United Nations, even though Syria is not a party to the CWC. If the stocks
remain secure after a transition to a new government in Syria, or if the present government agrees
to rid itself of these weapons as part of a negotiated agreement, then cooperative threat reduction
programs could have a prominent role to play. In other scenarios, it may take a combination of
military and intelligence operations followed by more traditional NDF or cooperative threat
reduction activities with the agreement of a new government.
23 CRS Report R42848, Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
24 The OPCW was established by the Chemical Weapons Convention, and is tasked with assisting countries with the
elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical weapons production facilities subject to the verification
measures provided for in the Convention.
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Agency Participation
When Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar Amendment in 1991, it authorized the use of $400
million from the Defense Department budget to fund U.S. threat reduction assistance to the
former Soviet states. Experts from other agencies, such as the State Department and Department
of Energy, participated in the projects when their expertise was required. In FY1997, as the
programs expanded and funding increased, these agencies each took budgetary and management
responsibility for the projects that relied on their expertise. The overwhelming majority of the
funding for U.S. threat reduction, nonproliferation, and cooperative engagement programs now
resides in the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), and Department of
State. The Department of Homeland Security also participates with some programs designed to
deter or detect efforts to ship nuclear or radiological materials into the United States. Together,
these agencies are seeking nearly $1.65 billion for these programs in FY2014.25
Department of Defense (DOD)
According to the CTR program’s 2013 Annual Report, CTR works with other countries “to
reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies,
and expertise.” The program “focuses on eliminating, securing, or consolidating” weapons,
materials, delivery systems, and infrastructure in these “partner countries.” The report indicates
that the CTR Program also helps these countries build the capacity to prevent the proliferation of
CBRN materials across borders.26 DOD divides the projects funded by the CTR program into
several categories, including strategic offensive arms elimination, chemical weapons destruction,
global nuclear security, cooperative biological engagement, and proliferation prevention. These
program areas are described in more detail below.
DOD has requested $528.5 million for the CTR program in FY2014. This represents an increase
of $9.4 million over the FY2013 estimate of $519.1 million,27 although there are shifts, and some
significant reductions, within the project areas funded by this overall total. For example, as is
discussed below, in recent years DOD has allocated a growing proportion of CTR funding to
cooperative biological engagement. At the same time, funding for strategic offensive arms
elimination in Russia continues to decline, with DOD indicating that, in FY2014, this program
area will transition to Russia. As a result, as has been the case for the past several years, DOD’s
CTR program continues to reduce its emphasis on programs in Russia as many reach their
conclusion, continues to work with non-Russian countries in the former Soviet Union (FSU), and
continues to expand cooperative programs outside the former Soviet Union.
DOD CTR funds are requested through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs provides long-range planning and
guidance. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs provides program budget and implementation oversight. The Defense Threat
25 Appendix A at the end of this report contains tables that detail recent appropriations and the FY2014 budget request
for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in each of these agencies.
26 Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2013,
Washington, D.C, March 2013, p. 1.
27 The estimate for FY2013 appears in the DOD budget request for CTR for FY2014. It reflects funding provided by
Congress in the Consolidated Further Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6), but does not adjust for potential
sequestration reductions.
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Reduction Agency (DTRA) is the implementing agency and manages CTR programming and
contracting. DOD CTR programs are appropriated by the House and Senate Defense
Appropriations subcommittees and authorized by the Armed Services committees.
Department of Energy (DOE)
The Department of Energy has contributed to U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation
assistance to the former Soviet states since the early 1990s, when DOD’s CTR budget included a
small amount of funding for materials control and protection. DOE officials and their DOD
counterparts participated in early efforts to outline projects and reach agreement with Russian
officials on assistance to secure nuclear materials. This effort grew into the International Nuclear
Materials Protection and Cooperation Program, which seeks to increase “the security of
vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear materials worldwide, preventing the loss of such material, and
significantly improving the ability to deter, detect, and interdict their illicit trafficking.”28
Between FY1993 and FY2012, Congress appropriated nearly $5.5 billion for this effort. In 1994,
DOE also initiated efforts to help retrain and redirect Soviet-era nuclear scientists and engineers
so that they would not sell their knowledge to other nations seeking their own nuclear weapons.
In addition, DOE established in 2004 the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to secure,
protect, and in some cases, remove vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials at civilian
facilities worldwide. These program areas are described in more detail below.
The Department of Energy, in its budget request for FY2014, is seeking a total of $962.8 million
for these nonproliferation assistance programs. This total represents a small increase of $2.2
million over the FY2013 request, but a significant reduction from the $1.26 billion provided in
the Consolidated Further Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6).29 In addition, as is noted below,
within this total budget, DOE has reduced funding for several program areas that had been a high
priority in previous years. DOE claims that, for the most part, these reductions are a sign of
progress because they reflect the completion of many ongoing projects.
DOE funds these activities through the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s)
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account. DOE nonproliferation programs are authorized by the
House and Senate Armed Services committees, and are appropriated by the House and Senate
Energy and Water Development Appropriations subcommittees.
The State Department
The State Department has played an integral role in U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction
programs since their inception. It has taken the lead in negotiating the broad agreements needed
before recipient nations can receive U.S. assistance and in providing for broad policy
coordination among the U.S. agencies and between the United States and recipient nations. The
State Department also manages the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), which
“develops, negotiates, and implements programs to destroy, secure, or prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), WMD-related materials and delivery systems, and
destabilizing conventional weapons.” This program has received between $15 million and $40
28 Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, FY2014 Budget Request, Washington, D.C, April
2013, pp. DN-80, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/Volume1.pdf.
29 The FY2013 appropriation for DOE programs also does adjust for potential sequestration reductions.
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million per year since 1993, with most funds used on projects outside the former Soviet Union. It
currently is funding ongoing activities in South Asia and the Middle East.30 The State Department
also contributes to U.S. nonproliferation goals through its Export Control and Related Border
Security Assistance (EXBS) program, which addresses concerns about the illicit trafficking of
CBRN materials and dual use goods and technologies. The State Department also funds the
Global Threat Reduction (GTR) program, which manages programs designed to engage scientists
from Libya, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union so that they do not sell their knowledge to other
nations seeking CBRN weapons. These programs are described in more detail below.
The State Department is seeking $25 million for the NDF, $54 million for its EXBS program, and
$63.5 million for its GTR program for FY2014. This request reflects a reduction of $6 million
from the FY2013 request for these programs, with most of the reduction coming from the NDF.
The State Department nonproliferation programs are housed in the International Security and
Nonproliferation Bureau (ISN), and are funded out of the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining and Related Activities (NADR) account in the State Department budget.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
The Department of Homeland Security also implements programs that seek to stem the illicit
transfer of CBRN materials. The International Cargo Screening program31 screens cargo overseas
to prevent a nuclear or radiological device from being brought into the United States. DHS
personnel work with foreign customs officials to target and examine high-risk cargo before the
cargo containers are placed on vessels bound for the United States. DHS also works with the
DOE Megaports Initiative to install technology at foreign ports that rapidly scans shipping
containers for radiological or nuclear materials. Overall, these programs are shifting from relying
heavily on placing DHS inspectors overseas to installing and maintaining detection equipment.
DHS has requested $72 million for the International Cargo Screening program in FY2014, funded
out of the Customs and Border Protection portion of the DHS budget. These programs are
described in more detail below.
Issues for Congress
Over the years, Congress has addressed a number of issues that came up during implementation
of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia and the former Soviet Union.
Many of these issues may continue to resonate as the programs grow into global security
partnerships.
Coordination Across Government Agencies
The United States implements programs that seek to secure CBRN weapons, materials, and
knowledge through several different government agencies. In some cases, different agencies fund
30 NDF has “notwithstanding authority” to use funds regardless of the restraints of any other law, and was originally
authorized for the former Soviet Union states. Since 1994, Congress, through annual appropriations, has given NDF the
authority to use funds anywhere in the world and carry forward unspent balances as needed.
31 This program includes both the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). Prior to
FY2009, this program area was called “Container Security Initiative.”
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programs that seek to achieve the same goals. For example, the State Department and Energy
Department both fund programs that seek to secure borders, redirect scientists, and establish “best
practices in partner countries.” DOD and DHS also fund programs that seek to prevent the illicit
transfer of CBRN materials across international borders. At the same time, personnel from
different agencies may work together to implement a specific project.
This overlap, and the potential for redundant efforts, has led many analysts to suggest that the
United States identify a single coordinating authority, which could be either an individual or a
committee, to make sure the agencies establish agreed priorities and share resources and
expertise. A high-level program coordinator might also help resolve competing demands for
budgetary resources, eliminate overlap and redundancy, and coordinate implementation across
agencies. In the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L.
110-53), Congress called for the creation of an Office of the United States Coordinator for the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism within the Executive
Office of the President (§1841). Others, however, have rejected the call for a single program
coordinator, noting that the job can be achieved through the regular NSC structure.32 They note
that a new coordinator might complicate the existing interagency coordinating process.33
President Obama’s May 2010 National Security Strategy stated that “work remains to foster
coordination across departments and agencies. Key steps include more effectively ensuring
alignment of resources with our national security strategy, adapting the education and training of
national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities
and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and
programs that strengthen coordination.” This challenge was also highlighted in the 9/11
Commission’s report, the report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and
Terrorism, as well as oversight hearings.34
In response to concerns about program coordination, the Obama Administration designated a new
director on the NSC staff who would serve as the coordinator for the prevention of WMD
proliferation and terrorism. This NSC director had a deputy director who focused specifically on
threat reduction efforts, and sought to coordinate the threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs across agencies. This director did not, however, have direct control over the budgets of
the participating agencies. Nevertheless, officials in the Obama Administration have indicated
that the Administration has succeeded in coordinating program implementation across agencies.
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2013, Administration officials
emphasized that effective coordination allows the United States to pool expertise and maximize
the effectiveness of U.S. programs when resources are limited.35
32 For example, the George W. Bush Administration said that it coordinated these programs through a committee
chaired by a National Security Council senior director, with assistant secretary-level representatives from State,
Defense, Energy and other concerned agencies. U.S. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on
International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. Hearing. Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) with Non-proliferation Programs: Non-proliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001.
Statement of Vann Van Diepen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation. November 29, 2001.
33 Ibid. Statement of Marshall Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations.
34 For example, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing, “Nuclear Terrorism:
Strengthening Our Domestic Defenses, Part I”, June 30, 2010, and Part II on September 15, 2010.
35 See, for example, the testimony of Madelyn R. Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Global Strategic Affairs,
U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services, Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Proliferation Prevention Programs,
Hearing, 113th Cong., 1st sess., April 23, 2013.
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Several agencies have their own coordinators for related activities. The Department of Homeland
Security has a role in coordinating executive branch programs to combat nuclear terrorism. The
DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was tasked with formulating a “Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture” by the Safe Port Act (P.L. 109-347) to protect the United States against
nuclear or radiological attack.36 The “global” architecture is to be guided by DNDO. However,
DNDO was given authority to implement this architecture in the United States, while the
Departments of Defense, State, and Energy were to continue their activities related to nuclear
detection internationally. This has resulted in DNDO performing a coordinating function where
the other agencies submit lists of activities that DNDO then places in its overall framework to
assess where gaps or duplication might occur. A Joint Interagency Review is performed annually.
In addition, the State Department named a coordinator for threat reduction activities at the
beginning of the Obama Administration, Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins. Ambassador Jenkins is the
State Department’s lead for the Nuclear Security Summit, coordinates the State Department’s
activities toward the four-year nuclear security effort, and coordinates “a number of interagency
CTR programs to help ensure a coordinated U.S. approach when promoting these programs
internationally.”37
Policy coordination committees are a tool that can be used to formalize communication across
agencies. The WMD Commission in its December 2009 report identified “nearly 200 interagency
committees and working groups that address WMD, counterproliferation and counterterrorism
issues.”38 Some have suggested that an alternative to policy coordinating committees, especially
in the implementation-heavy work of nuclear terrorism prevention and nuclear security (i.e.,
border guard training, material removal from research reactors, etc.), may be informal
coordination between working level employees. Officials have told CRS that this kind of
coordination happens on a daily basis without need for formal mandates, for example on specific
threat reduction initiatives in a foreign country. Analysts and officials have pointed to the long-
term professional relationships amongst current senior officials across agencies that may lead to
more effective and regular (but not necessarily formal) coordination of tasks and responsibilities.
This raises the question of the sustainability of such coordination.
Priority Within the Executive Branch
Over the years, many analysts have argued that the United States can best succeed in securing
CBRN weapons, materials, and knowledge when the programs that support this goal receive a
high level of attention from senior government officials. This attention might signal that the
programs should be of high priority for the agencies, and this priority could then be reflected in
agency budgets. President Bush followed this pattern during his Administration, when he and
President Putin agreed at Bratislava to accelerate warhead and materials security programs. The
President’s budget requested additional funds for these programs, and the two countries
completed a number of projects on a shorter time frame.
In the Obama Administration, the President has also often emphasized the importance of these
programs and their goals. He highlighted his Administration’s concerns with the threat of nuclear
36 See CRS Report RL34574, The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues for Congress, by Dana A. Shea.
37 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/126045.htm.
38 CRS has not independently confirmed this number.
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terrorism repeatedly in his first term—in his April 2009 speech in Prague, when he chaired a
special U.N. session on nuclear security, and when he established the Nuclear Security Summit
process and convened the first summit in Washington in 2010. He reiterated his support for U.S.
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in a speech in December 2012, when celebrating
the 20th anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. He not only
stated, at that time, that his Administration had “continued to make critical investments in our
threat reduction programs” over the previous four years, but also that he intended to “keep
investing in these programs because our national security depends on it.”39
Some analysts outside government, however, have begun to question President Obama’s
commitment to the future of these programs. They note, specifically, that the President’s budget
requests for FY2013 and FY2014 reduce funding for programs, such as the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative, that are designed to secure and eliminate nuclear materials. They also note
that the Administration has scaled back its goals for the Second Line of Defense Program, which
is designed to help secure borders and prevent smuggling of nuclear materials. Some analysts
outside government argue that these reductions will undercut the programs and reflect a change in
Administration priorities.
There are, however, a number of reasons why funding and the pace of effort in these programs
may have declined. For example, these programs require cooperation from partner countries, and
that cooperation often comes through detailed, written agreements. Delays in reaching these
agreements can slow the start of a program, which can reduce the required level of funding in
subsequent years. Moreover, as some in the Administration have noted, a decline in funding can
be an indicator of a program’s success. This is the case for many of the early CTR programs, such
as strategic offensive arms elimination, through which Russia and Ukraine have nearly completed
the elimination of strategic weapons limited by arms control agreements.
Overall, decline in some major programs such as DOE’s IMPC&A and some DOD work, such as
CW destruction, generally reflects a wrapping up of major construction projects in the Russian
Federation. New areas of work related to facility security and border control training may be less
expensive than past projects. DOD and State Departments budgets have remained steady, as is
seen in Appendix A. Arguably, the DOE budget has been reduced in areas where existing
program goals have been accomplished. However, some critics of reductions point out that
funding should remain at least at the same level so that these programs can identify and work
against new threats and in new geographical areas. Others advocate for an expansion of funds for
specific regions of the world, such as the Middle East.
Measuring Success and Metrics
During its oversight of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, Congress has often
questioned whether U.S. assistance is achieving the desired goals. Members have questioned
whether specific programs, or areas of focus for several programs, have produced sufficient
results to justify the continued allocation of U.S. funds to the effort. In the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to
develop and implement metrics to measure the impact and effectiveness of DOD’s CTR activities.
39 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Symposium, Washington, D.C., December 3, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/03/
remarks-president-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-symposium.
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For many of the DOD’s CTR programs, measuring success has been a relatively straightforward
exercise. Senator Lugar often referred to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s CTR Scorecard
to describe the numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems that were no longer actively
deployed in Russia’s nuclear arsenal.40 DOD and DOE have also reported the numbers of nuclear
weapons transported to secure storage locations and the numbers of storage locations for nuclear
warheads and nuclear materials that received upgrades to their security systems. Other examples
of successes that are measurable are the removal of weapons-usable material and nuclear
enrichment technology from Libya, the destruction of chemical munitions and chemical weapons
agents in Libya, and the dismantlement of biological weapons infrastructure in Iraq.
As the United States has expanded its threat reduction assistance to nations outside the former
Soviet states, and as the programs have emphasized cooperative engagement, capacity-building,
and best practices instead of weapons dismantlement and facility security, the problem of
measuring progress has grown more complicated. As the National Academy of Sciences noted in
its 2012 report, “It is complex and challenging to develop metrics for the partner’s capabilities
and the personal and institutional relationships established.... ”41 While participants in the
program may be confident in their ability to share knowledge and build cooperative relationships,
they may be less confident in their ability to measure the relationship between funding and
progress in cooperation.
However, most of the threat reduction assistance currently underway is more difficult to quantify.
In many cases, progress is evident in access to decision makers and operators, and success is
reflected in the growth of relationships. In some cases, however, it may be possible to devise
metrics to measure progress. For example, the State Department’s EXBS program uses a Rating
Assessment Tool with a 419-point survey to score a country’s licensing, enforcement, industry
outreach, and nonproliferation regime adherence. According to the State Department, this tool
allows the program “to determine weaknesses in each partner country’s strategic trade control
system, ascertain effectiveness of prior bilateral EXBS assistance activities, and pinpoint areas
where limited assistance dollars can achieve the greatest impact.” This tool is also used to
measure how the EXBS assistance has improved the country’s strategic trade controls over time.
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) also mandated that DOD
contract with the National Academy of Sciences to review the report developed by DOD. The
National Academy completed this review, and published its report, Improving Metrics for the
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs, in 2012.42 This report
specifically addressed the challenges of measuring the success of programs focused on capacity-
building or scientist engagement. It noted that it is not only difficult to measure progress in these
programs, but also difficult to identify how these programs reduce threats to U.S. national
security. As a result, the NAS report indicates that before measuring whether or not the programs
are successful, the U.S. agencies responsible for the programs should identify clear, measurable
objectives and outline how those objectives relate to U.S. national security goals. The report also
notes that the effort to measure progress in some programs may be further complicated by the fact
40 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Nunn–Lugar CTR Scorecard, February 2013. http://www.dtra.mil/docs/default-
document-library/20130101_fy13_ctr-scorecard_slides_jan13.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
41 National Academy of Sciences, Improving Metrics for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs, Washington, D.C., 2012. p. 3. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13289.
42 National Academy of Sciences, Improving Metrics for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs, Washington, D.C., 2012, http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13289.
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that both the objectives and the steps taken to reach these objectives can change over time.43 In
addition, regardless of how precise the metrics or how well the measures of success are related to
addressing threats to U.S. national security, the process of measuring success may find it difficult
to capture the value of newly developed personal relationships and a more cooperative
atmosphere. Moreover, the programs are choosing partner countries and projects on the basis of
their proliferation risk (the assessment of which varies somewhat by agency) before starting a
project. Identifying threats and prioritization of work based on risk appears to be becoming
increasingly important in program management. As a result, as the United States continues to
shift its focus from “threat reduction” to “global security engagement,” with the programs doing
more to build capacity than eliminate weapons, Congress may continue to question how to
measure progress and identify success.
Access and Transparency
Over the years, as the United States provided assistance to Russia, it insisted on a level of
transparency and openness that would allow it to confirm that the equipment and assistance paid
for with U.S. funds were used for their intended purposes and that the equipment was installed
and operated correctly. Russia, however, in some cases, sought to limit access and transparency to
protect sensitive facilities and information from foreign inspection. For example, Russia did not
provide complete information about or access to facilities in its biological weapons complex,
which limited the implementation of cooperative biological engagement programs. In addition, it
did not provide the United States with access to many facilities in Russia’s nuclear weapons
complex, leaving large holes in the U.S. understanding of the potential security challenges
regarding security for the nuclear materials at those facilities.
Press reports indicate that Russia cited its concerns about U.S. demands for access and
transparency in the 2012 and 2013 discussions on the future of the CTR umbrella agreement.
According to some reports, Russian officials argued that the provisions that provide the United
States with extensive access to Russian facilities and Russian strategic forces, without offering
Russia similar access to U.S. nuclear facilities and forces, are inequitable and unfair.44 Russian
officials have indicated that a future agreement, if it exists, should provide for a more balanced
approach.
Some U.S. analysts have indicated that they do not think Russia was being unreasonable in
seeking changes, and more balance, in the CTR umbrella agreement. They note that times have
changed in the 20 years since the programs began. Russia’s financial position has improved and
Russia expects to be treated as more of a partner, rather than an aid recipient, when pursuing
cooperative security programs.45 There are limits, however, to how much the United States can
alter the access and transparency provisions in the umbrella agreement. DOD contracting rules,
for example, obligate the recipient to allow DOD access to confirm that the equipment is used
correctly and operating properly. Moreover, although Russia’s interest in protecting secret details
about its nuclear weapons programs may be understandable, this secrecy, and the resulting delays
43 National Academy of Sciences, Improving Metrics for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs, Washington, D.C., 2012. p. 5. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13289.
44 “Russia Scours Budget for Funds to Replace U.S. Disarmament Assistance,” Global Security Newswire, October 19,
2012.
45 See, for example, William Tobey, “Boost Phase,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2012. See, also, Douglas Birch,
“Letting Go of “Loose Nukes,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2012.
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in program implementation, can serve to undermine support in the United States for threat
reduction work in Russia.
As the United States expands it threat reduction and nonproliferation programs to a growing
number of countries around the world, it may face additional questions about the level of access
and transparency required for these programs. The dynamics of this problem are different in
countries that do not possess WMD. Therefore, working with states that possess nuclear weapons
such as India, Pakistan, and China, the access and transparency challenges will be greater than
with other partners. The majority of partner countries at present do not have WMD, and the
“cooperative engagement” model seems to presume that partner countries will willingly open
their facilities to U.S. experts so that they can work to improve security and share “best practices”
when handling dangerous materials. But these programs may still encounter legal or procedural
barriers to implementation, particularly if officials in other countries view U.S. interest in their
programs as a sign of U.S. concern about threats emanating from those countries. For example, if
a particular country is sensitive about working with a security-related United States government
agency, then other federal agencies, such as HHS or DOE, may take the lead for that project.
International Cooperation—The G-8 Global Partnership
There is near-universal agreement, both within the U.S. government and among analysts outside
the U.S. government, that the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue
nations or terrorist groups presents a global problem that requires an international response.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States decided to appeal to other
countries to increase the resources dedicated to preventing a terrorist attack using WMD. This
effort first expanded the number of donor countries contributing to threat reduction work in
Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU), and later expanded the number of recipient countries
beyond the FSU borders.
Under Canada’s initiative, during the G-8 summit in Kananaskis in July 2002, the United States,
Russia, and other G-8 leaders agreed to establish a long-term program—the G-8 Global
Partnership (GP) Against Weapons of Mass Destruction—to stop the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and related materials and technology. Under this program, known as 10+10 over 10,
the United States pledged to provide $10 billion over 10 years to sustain ongoing threat reduction
programs in Russia; this amount of $1 billion per year was essentially equal to existing U.S.
spending on threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia. The other G-8 nations also
agreed that they would provide, together, up to $10 billion over 10 years. This included a Russian
pledge to contribute $2 billion of its own money. According to the State Department, Global
Partnership funding has totaled $21 billion since 2002. The United States has promised an
additional $10 billion in Global Partnership funds in the 2012-2022 timeframe, subject to
congressional appropriations.
Russia and other Global Partnership funding recipients must adopt a set of guidelines that provide
for “effective monitoring, auditing, and transparency measures” and “adequate access for donor
representatives at work sites.” The guidelines stipulate that the assistance would be free from
taxes and other charges and that it would ensure adequate liability protections for donor countries
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and their personnel.46 These provisions mirrored those in the U.S.-Russia CTR umbrella
agreement, and the guarantees were considered key to convincing new donor states to participate.
In 2002, the G-8 leaders agreed that this program would initially focus on threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs in Russia; they have since extended it to countries around the world.
The first Latin American partner, Mexico, joined in 2012. As of June 2013, 25 countries (and the
European Union) were members of the Global Partnership: Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic,
Denmark, European Union, Finland, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine.
The GP also coordinates activities with relevant international organizations.
Analysts initially questioned how the group would set priorities and divide up responsibilities
over different types of nonproliferation projects. In the statement released after the Kananaskis
summit, they listed several projects, including the destruction of chemical weapons,
dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, disposition of fissile materials, and
employment of former weapons scientists as high-priority projects.47 The Global Partnership does
not rely on a single coordinating body to either identify new projects or set priorities among
competing projects. Each nation allocates its own funds to those programs that it views as high-
priority endeavors. Partners then share experiences and project information in a working group
and through the annual publication of the GP Annex, which lists all projects by donor country.48
This document shows continuing interest in nuclear security and the disposition of fissile
materials, chemical weapons destruction, and the decommissioning of Russia’s nuclear
submarines. The United States has advocated for expanded funding in the area of biosecurity in
recent years, and made this subject the focus of its 2012 G8 GP chairmanship.
The Programs
Securing and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it had more than 11,000 warheads deployed on nearly
1,400 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 940 submarine launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), and 162 heavy bombers. These weapons were deployed in four of the former
Soviet republics—Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. In 1994, Russia agreed to reduce its
nuclear forces to the limits outlined in the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),
while the other three all agreed to eliminate all the nuclear weapons on their territories. Promises
of U.S. financial and technical assistance through DOD’s CTR program helped win this
46 “The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.” Statement by the
Group of Eight Leaders. Kananaskis, Canada. June 27, 2002.
47 “The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.” Statement by the
Group of Eight Leaders. Kananaskis, Canada. June 27, 2002.
48 For more information on the project areas funded by participating nations, see U.S. Department of State,
Consolidated Report Data, 2012, Global Parntership Working Group Annual Report, , Washington, D.C.,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208032.pdf.
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agreement.49 The United States has provided these nations with technology and expertise needed
to deactivate and dismantle missiles, launchers, submarines, and bombers. More than half of the
CTR funding in the program’s early years served this purpose. That proportion has declined as the
work was completed in Belarus and Kazakhstan and as the level of effort has declined in Russia
and Ukraine. Much of it will conclude in FY2014, as the Memorandum of Understanding
governing these projects has expired.
According to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the CTR program has, as of January 31,
2013, helped deactivate 7,613 warheads, 910 ICBMs, and nearly 692 ICBM launchers; 695
SLBMs and 492 SLBM launch tubes; and 155 heavy bombers.50 The United States has continued
to provide this assistance to Russia as it implements the 2012 New START Treaty, and to
Ukraine, as it completes the elimination of Soviet-era missiles that had been deployed on its
territory.
In Russia, the United States has helped eliminate and dismantle SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs,
disassemble and eliminate components of the SS-N-20 SLBM, eliminate SS-25 ICBMs and their
road-mobile launchers, and destroy rail-mobile SS-24 ICBMs and their launchers. Funding in this
project area has also supported efforts to assist Russia in eliminating SS-19 and SS-25 ICBMs
and their launchers, and in completing the dismantlement of Russian Delta-III and Typhoon
submarines. These are partnership programs, with the United States responsible for some of the
dismantlement activities, and Russia responsible for others.51
In Ukraine, the United States and Ukraine have been working on a method to eliminate rocket
motors from SS-24 ICBMs. DOD did not request any more funding for this project area in
FY2006 and, at that time, planned to complete ongoing work with prior year funds, because the
two nations could not agree on a method to eliminate these rocket motors. However, a low level
of funding has resumed in recent years, as the United States now funds the safe storage of 160
rocket motors from SS-24 missiles and plans to buy the casings from Ukraine after Ukraine has
removed the propellant. Ukraine has been financing, on its own, the construction and operation of
a water washout facility for this purpose. The United States has purchased the empty motor cases,
and has helped Ukraine begin construction of an elimination facility for them. According to
recent reports, the facility opened in late May 2013.52 According to DOD, the United States will
help Ukraine maintain this facility, but will cease its support after the last of the motors has been
washed-out and eliminated.
Congress has routinely appropriated $50 million-$70 million per year for strategic offensive arms
elimination. In recent years, the Obama Administration has requested, and Congress has
appropriated, $60 million-$70 million per year. The Obama Administration requested $23.3
million for this project area in FY2013. This amount included funding for both strategic offensive
arms elimination activities in Russia and those in Ukraine. The Administration requested only $10
million for this project area in FY2014. According to DOD, the amount of funding needed in this
project area has declined sharply because most elimination activities necessitated by the New
49 U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, DC. p. 1.
50 For the full CTR scorecard, see Defense Threat Reduction Agency, http://www.dtra.mil/docs/default-document-
library/20130101_fy13_ctr-scorecard_slides_jan13.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
51 Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2013,
Washington, D.C, March 2013, pp. 13-14.
52 “Ukraine, U.S. Jointly Pursue Missile Destruction,” Worldwise News Ukraine, May 21, 2013.
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START Treaty are complete. As a result, the United States decided to “transition remaining
elimination activities” to Russia.
The Administration indicated that the funding requested for FY2014 would allow the United
States to complete its elimination efforts and terminate its strategic offensive elimination
activities in Russia. However, because these programs were governed by the MOU that expired in
June 2013, they will not be able to continue in FY2014. As a result, in its version of the FY2014
Defense Authorization Bill (S. 1197, §1302), the Senate Armed Services Committee reduced
funding for this program area to $5.7 million. The committee noted in its report that it would
transfer $75 million from programs that will end in Russia “to CTR nonproliferation efforts in the
Middle East, particularly related to Syrian chemical weapons.”53
Table 1 summarizes the amount of funding appropriated by Congress for strategic offensive arms
elimination projects.
Table 1. CTR Funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE)
($ millions)
Nation
Fiscal years
Total appropriation
Russia FY1993-FY2013 $1,768.7
Ukraine FY1993-FY2012
$590.8
Kazahkstan FY1994-FY1996
$64.6
Belarus FY1994-FY1996
$3.3
Source: CRS Estimates.
Global Nuclear Security
DOD altered the structure of its CTR program areas in the FY2012 budget, creating a new
program area, Global Nuclear Security. This combined the program areas that had funded the
secure transport of nuclear warheads and other qualifying nuclear material to secure storage
facilities and dismantlement facilities, security enhancements for storage areas for nuclear
warheads, weapons-usable nuclear material, and efforts to establish Centers of Excellence
with partner countries to enhance training for nuclear security, material control, and inventory
management. According to DOD, this program supports not only efforts to secure nuclear
weapons and materials in the former Soviet states, but also “new initiatives to secure nuclear
materials across the globe.”
When funded separately in FY2011, Congress appropriated $164.5 million for the programs
captured by GNS. In FY2012, this funding declined to $151 million. The Obama
Administration requested $72.3 million for FY2013 and $86.5 million for FY2014. The
budget documents did not provide details on how the money would be divided among the
constituent programs. However, it is likely that the focus of these programs is shifting to
53 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Senate Committee on Armed Services Completes Markup of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Press Release, Washington, D.C., June 14, 2013, p. 21,
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press/.
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nations outside the former Soviet Union, given the Administration’s added emphasis on
global cooperation and the completion of many projects in Russia. In addition, many of the
projects funded in this area are likely to conclude in the coming months, as a result of the
expiration of the MOU with Russia. As a result, the Senate Armed Services Committee, in its
version of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1197), authorized only $32.8
million for this program area.
Transportation Security
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, thousands of nuclear weapons were spread among
four states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), and, within each state, the weapons were
dispersed among hundreds of deployment and storage areas. The governments in these states
agreed to remove the nuclear warheads from non-Russian republics and to store them in a smaller
number of facilities in Russia. The United States has helped Russia improve the safety and
security of nuclear weapons in transit after they have been removed from deployment.
In its early years, the program provided armored blankets to protect warheads in transit from
potential attacks, storage containers to hold the warheads during transit, and assistance to enhance
the safety and security of rail cars used to transport warheads from deployment to storage or
dismantlement facilities. Transportation security projects also provided Russia with emergency
response vehicles, training, and support equipment that it might need to respond to a nuclear
weapons transportation accident. The funding for these programs, through 2012 when they were
aggregated in the GNS program area, appears on Table 2.
According to DOD’s budget request for FY2014, the United States has, in recent years, supported
the transportation of “approximately 48 trainloads of deactivated nuclear warheads (1,000 to
1,500 warheads) from deployed locations to enhanced security storage sites or dismantlement and
from storage to dismantlement facilities.” The Administration indicated in its budget request that
it would continue to do so in 2014,54 although the program is likely to end due to the expiration of
the MOU.
Table 2. CTR Funding for Transportation Security
($ millions)
Project
Fiscal years
Total appropriation
Armored Blankets
FY1992-FY1993
$3.1
Emergency Response
FY1992-FY1996
$29.2
Railcar security enhancements
FY1992-FY1994
$21.5
Weapons Transportation Security
FY1995-FY2011
$355.4
Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project
on Managing the Atom. March 2003; Updated Funding Analysis of FY09 International WMD Security Programs,
by Michel e Marchesano. Partnership for Global Security. July 2009.
54 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
Washington, D.C., April 2013, pp. 103-105, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2014/budget_justification/pdfs/
01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_2/CTR_OP-5.pdf.
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Nuclear Security Enhancements
Over the years, the CTR program has helped Russia improve security at storage facilities for
strategic and tactical nuclear warheads, a program initially referred to as “Weapons Storage
Security.” DOD now refers to this program as “Nuclear Security Enhancements.” Russia has
three types of storage sites—operational sites, storage sites for weapons removed from
deployment, and rail transfer points. The United States does not provide assistance at operational
sites. Under the CTR program, DOD has enhanced security at both large “national stockpile
storage sites” and smaller storage sites at Navy, Air Force, and Strategic Rocket Force (SRF)
bases.55 DOD provided perimeter fencing as a “quick fix” for vulnerable sites, and more
comprehensive upgrades, including alarm systems and inventory control and management
equipment to keep track of warheads in storage. The Department of Energy has also addressed
security needs at rail transfer points that store warheads from the Russian Navy, and storage sites
for warheads belonging to the Strategic Rocket Forces.
For several years, this effort was slowed by Russia’s reluctance to provide the United States with
information about the precise number of sites in need of security upgrades and its refusal to allow
the United States access to sites to design appropriate upgrades.56 The United States and Russia
completed agreements in February 2003 that provided the United States with a degree of access
to these sites so that U.S. personnel could begin to plan the installation of physical security
upgrades.57 In 2005, Presidents Bush and Putin pledged to accelerate work on weapons storage
security. After Russia identified all the sites in need of upgrades, the United States agreed to
provide assistance at 15 sites, 8 with funding from the CTR program and 7 with funding from the
DOE nonproliferation budget. With the accelerated effort, both DOD and DOE reported that they
completed the installation of security upgrades by the end of 2008. DOD then shifted funding
towards sustainment activities, rather than further upgrades.
In a complementary effort, DOD is establishing a Security Assistance Training Center that will
train Russian students to use and maintain the physical security upgrades that the CTR program
provided at nuclear weapons storage sites. DOD has noted that this project will also serve as a
model for the Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence discussed below. DOD is using funds
appropriated prior to FY2011 for this Center, and has not requested additional funding since that
time.
Between FY1995 and FY2011, before this program was combined with others in the GNS
account, Congress appropriated around $840 million for weapons storage security.58 Funding for
this program peaked in FY2006, when the Bush Administration requested $74.1 million for
weapons storage security, added $10 million more in a reprogramming from the strategic
offensive arms elimination account, and requested an additional $44.5 million in the FY2006
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations package. This funding was intended to accelerate the
program, in response to agreements that President Bush reached with Russia’s President Putin. As
55 The total number of sites remains classified. For details on DOD’s plans, see U.S. General Accounting Office.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security
at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. p. 34.
56 Ibid., p. 36.
57 U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy. March 4, 2003.
58 Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project on
Managing the Atom. March 2003.
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Table 3 below indicates, funding has declined to $10 million-$20 million per year in recent years,
after DOD completed many of the projects that had been accelerated earlier. In its FY2014 budget
request for the CTR programs, DOD indicates that it will continue to help Russia “build capacity
to sustain security at 18 nuclear weapons storage sites and 5 rail transfer points.” It did not
indicate how much of the $86.5 million requested for GSN will go to this effort and it is not clear
whether any of this funding is now necessary in FY2014, as the MOU governing this program has
expired.
Warhead Security and the Department of Energy
Through its International Materials Protection and Cooperation program, the Department of
Energy implements programs that “secure nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials
by upgrading security at nuclear sites, by consolidating these materials to sites where installation
of enhanced security systems have already been completed.... ”59 This effort is known as the
Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program (MPC&A).60 Through this program, DOE
installed security upgrades in two phases. First, it installed rapid upgrades that were designed to
delay unauthorized access to the storage facilities. These could include the installation of
hardened doors and windows, locks and keys to control access, perimeter fences, and moveable
barriers at entry points. The second phase provided comprehensive upgrades that were tailored to
meet the security needs at each individual facility. These could include monitoring and detection
systems, the relocation of guard forces, the consolidation of materials, central alarm systems, and
electronic access control systems.
The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) identified 105 nuclear sites, with 243
buildings, that needed assistance in improving their security systems. These include nuclear
warhead and nuclear material storage sites run by the Russian Navy and nuclear warhead storage
sites run by Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and 12th Main Directorate, the branch of
Russia’s Ministry of Defense responsible for warhead security and maintenance. The MPC&A
program has also supported security enhancements at sites in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex
operated by Rosatom and civilian sites that store nuclear material in Russia; these two efforts are
addressed below.
DOE has provided assistance to Russia’s Navy by improving security at 39 naval nuclear warhead
storage sites and 11 nuclear fuel storage sites. These sites house approximately 60 metric tons of
weapons-useable nuclear materials and 4,000 nuclear warheads. According to DOE, it had
completed rapid and comprehensive upgrades at all naval nuclear fuel storage sites by the end of
2004, and had completed the comprehensive upgrades at warhead sites by 2009. DOE continues
to work at these sites, but is now providing assistance with sustainability support. This includes
training and site level maintenance on the equipment at the sites, so that the security will remain
in place in the future.
DOE has reported that it has also worked with Russia to install security upgrades at 25 sites on 11
SRF bases; work on these sites was completed in late October 2007, nearly two years ahead of
59 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.
p. 623.
60 The MPC&A program also includes efforts to improve “nuclear smuggling detection capabilities at international
borders.” To do this, DOE funds the Second Line of Defense Program, which is described below.
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schedule.61 Through these projects, DOE has also upgraded security at nine sites under the
command of the 12th Main Directorate. DOE completed the work on upgrades at these sites in
FY2009. According to DOE, the process for working at these sites was based on the process
agreed with Russia’s Navy, with the installation of rapid upgrades to address immediate security
concerns followed by the installation of comprehensive upgrades. As with the naval sites, DOE is
now supporting sustainment activities at these facilities.
Congress appropriated $367.6 million for security upgrades at Russian Navy sites and $675
million for security upgrades at SRF sites between FY2002 and FY2012. Funding for the naval
sites declined in the mid-2000s, after much of the work was completed, but, as Table 3 below
indicates, it increased towards the end of the decade in support of the sustainment activities. The
Obama Administration requested $39.9 million in FY2013 to support sustainability and training
programs and the replacement of outdated equipment at eight sites. Funding for the SRF sites
peaked at $152.8 million in FY2007, in response to the agreement between President Bush and
President Putin to accelerate security upgrades at warhead storage facilities. It then declined to
$34.4 million in FY2009. The decline reflects the completion of most of the work on upgrades
and a shift to sustainment.
As with the budget for naval sites, the budget for SRF sites increased in FY2010-FY2012 to
support the expanded sustainment program and training programs at 23 SRF sites and 3 sites of
the 12th Main Directorate. The Obama Administration requested only $8.3 million for these
projects in FY2013, but funding remained at the FY2012 level of $59.5 million under the
Consolidated Further Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6). The decline in requested funding
reflects the completion of most of the security efforts and a shift to sustainment programs. The
Administration planned to use this funding to support three training and maintenance centers and
to replace outdated security equipment at up to 11 sites.
Table 3. DOD and DOE Authorizations for Warhead Storage Security Programs
(in $ millions)
FY2013
FY2014
Program FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
FY2011
FY2012 Estimate
Request
Nuclear
$74.1 $47.6 $24.1
$15.1
$9.6
na
na
na
Security
Enhancementa
Navy
$17.3 $13.2 $22.7
$33.9
$34.3
$33.6
$33.8
na
Complexb
Strategic
$152.8 $121.9 $34.4
$48.6
$51.4
$59.1
$8.3
na
Rocket
Forcesb
Nuclear
na na na
na
na
na
na $23.2
Warhead
Protection
Source: DOD and DOE budget documents.
a. In FY2012, DOD began to fund this project through the Global Nuclear Security program area, without
specifying the amount allocated to weapons storage security. Estimates indicate the amount remains below
$10 million.
b. In FY2014, DOE combined these two program areas into a single Nuclear Warhead Protection Program.
61 Chivers, C.J. Securing Russian Nuclear Missiles? U.S. Is Set to Say “Done.” New York Times, October 31, 2007.
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In its FY2014 budget request, DOE has combined the funding for these two program areas in a
new category called “Nuclear Warhead Protection.” The budget requests $23.2 million for
FY2014 to provide training and workshops and to continue upgrades and sustainability initiatives.
The decline in funding in recent years reflects the completion of most of the security projects and
a shift to sustainment efforts. It is not clear whether funding for this project will continue in
FY2014, as Russia’s MOD will no longer participate in threat reduction activities.
Securing and Eliminating Nuclear Materials
CTR Fissile Materials Storage
According to unclassified estimates, Russia inherited more than 30,000 nuclear warheads from
the Soviet Union. Russia is dismantling thousands of these warheads and DOD’s CTR program
has provided Russia with assistance in improving the long-term security of the fissile materials
removed from these weapons. The program helped Russia design and build a highly secure
storage facility at Mayak that is intended to provide long-term safe and secure storage for these
materials, and it has provided Russia with more than 26,000 containers to hold the fissile
materials. This facility is designed to hold the equivalent of fissile material from 25,000 nuclear
warheads. The first wing of this building was completed and certified for use in December 200362
and the facility began to accept nuclear materials for storage in July 2006.
Table 4. CTR Authorizations for Fissile Materials Storage
($ millions)
Project
Fiscal years
Total
Fissile Material Containers
FY1992-FY2000
$82.2
Storage Facility Design
FY1993
$15
Storage Facility Construction
FY1994-FY2001
$387
Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project
on Managing the Atom. March 2003.
DOE Nuclear Materials Security Programs
Russia also inherited enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for possible use in
thousands more warheads. DOE has helped Russia improve security at sites that house
considerably more than half of the former Soviet Union’s 600 metric tons of weapons-usable
nuclear materials.63 These include 11 sites that are a part of the Rosatom weapons complex and 31
civilian sites. Rosatom, like the Department of Energy in the United States, operates and manages
62 The United States and Russia no longer plan to construct an expected second wing. U.S. Senate. Committee on
Armed Services. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Testimony of Lisa Bronson, Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation. March 10, 2004.
63 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Statement of Ambassador Linton Brooks. Administrator, NNSA. June
15, 2004. See also, U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction. Additional Russian Cooperation
Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GA)-03-482. Washington, March 2003. p. 4.
See also, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Paul M. Longsworth. Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. March 10, 2004.
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Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. More than 80% of these materials are located at the Rosatom
sites.64 As was the case at naval sites and SRF sites, DOE installed security upgrades in two
phases at these sites.
The facilities managed by Rosatom house around 500 metric tons of “highly attractive” weapons-
useable materials.65 The pace of work at these facilities accelerated, during the past decade, with
increased funding and increased cooperation from Russia. DOE has also assisted with the
installation of security upgrades at 18 civilian nuclear sites throughout the former Soviet Union.
These are mainly research facilities that operate nuclear reactors. According to DOE, these sites
contain around 40 metric tons of weapons-useable materials. DOE had stated that it has
completed rapid and comprehensive upgrades at most of these facilities.
Congress appropriated more than $765 million for security upgrades at Rosatom sites and $447
million for security upgrades at civilian sites between FY2002 and FY2012. Table 5, below
shows the amount of funds appropriated since FY2007 and the amount requested in FY2014 for
these two programs. The Administration has requested $36.4 million for the Rosatom sites in
FY2014. According to DOE, this funding will support comprehensive upgrades at three additional
buildings, along with a number of other ongoing efforts. The Obama Administration has not
requested any additional funds for the civilian sites program in FY2014, as it now considers the
work to be a part of the Materials Consolidation and Civilian Sites program area.
Material Consolidation and Conversion
DOE’s Materials Consolidation and Conversion Program supports efforts to consolidate Russian
nuclear materials at sites where installation of enhanced security systems have already been
completed. It has also funded efforts to convert these materials to forms that might be less
attractive to nations seeking materials for nuclear weapons. Congress appropriated $243.4 million
for this program area between FY2002 and FY2012. The Obama Administration requested an
additional $17 million in FY2013.
In FY2014, DOE combined this program with MPC&A efforts at civilian sites program in a new
Materials Consolidation and Civilian Sites program. It has requested $132.3 million for this new,
combined program. This represents a significant increase of $58.9 million from the combined
level of around $73 million in FY2013. In its budget request, DOE noted that it had combined the
programs to reflect better how they were managed within DOE. According to the budget request,
the added funding will allow DOE to expand the scope of its efforts in Russia and to support
MPC&A activities with countries of concern outside Russia.
64 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.
p. 625.
65 Ibid., p. 639.
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Table 5. DOE Authorizations for Nuclear Materials Security Programs
(in $ millions)
FY2013
FY2014
Program FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010
FY2011
FY2012 Estimate
Request
Rosatom
$94.0
$79.0
$56.1 $71.5 $93.3 $80.7 $81.2 $36.4
(Minatom)
Weapons
Complex/
Weapons
Material
Protection
Civilian
$52.7 $54.2 $35.5
$63.5
$53
$59.1
$60.1
na
Nuclear Sites
Material
$23.8 $19.5 $21.6
$13.6
$13.9
$14.3
$17
na
Consolidation
and
Conversion
Material
na na na
na
na
na
na $132.3
Consolidation
and Civilian
Sites
National
$65.1
$69.6
$54.9 $68.5 $60.9 $60.9 $61.3 $37.8
Programs and
Sustainability
Source: U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004, FY2005, FY2006, FY2007, FY2008, FY2009, FY2010, FY2011,
FY2012, FY2013, FY2014 Congressional Budget Requests. Detailed Budget Justifications.
National Programs and Sustainability
The MPC&A budget has also supported an effort to build an infrastructure within Russia that can
operate effectively and be sustained after the initial and comprehensive upgrades are complete.
These efforts include developing regulations, inspection capabilities, site safeguards, security
programs, and other accounting capabilities. The program operates regional technical support
facilities that can repair and maintain equipment and develop training programs for participants.
Congress appropriated $586.7 million for this program area between FY2002 and FY2012. The
Obama Administration requested $46.2 million for FY2013, but Congress appropriated $60.9
million in the Consolidated Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6.) The
Administration has requested $37.8 million for this program area for FY2014. According to DOE,
this funding will support projects that develop the necessary training and maintenance
infrastructure for sustaining long-term MPC&A operations in Russia and other countries.
Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence
The DOD CTR program, DOE, and the State Department are coordinating efforts to help
establish Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence around the world. This initiative was part of the
commitments made by several countries at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. These centers are
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designed to enhance a country’s ability to train personnel, consistent with “international best
practices, for nuclear security, material control, inventory management, transport security, and
other activities important to improving nuclear material security.”66 DOE has provided technical
support to Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence in Japan and South Korea. The United States is
also supporting the establishment of the Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security in Beijing,
China, and nuclear security engagement with India, “with the goal of developing a partnership
through India’s planned Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership.”67 Both of these countries
had not previously engaged in bilateral nuclear security efforts with the United States. Current
activities emphasize nuclear material security best practices through workshops and training.
No detailed funding amounts were provided in FY2014 congressional budget documents.
However, Congress in the past has requested additional information on these programs and
limited funding amounts. Section 1304 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act limits
the use of FY2012 DOD CTR funds for Centers of Excellence in non-former Soviet Union (FSU)
countries. Not more than $500,000 may be obligated or expended in establishing such Centers in
non-FSU countries until Congress receives a report on the location, purpose, and funding plan for
the center. This measure was renewed for FY2013.
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
Since it was established in 2004, DOE/NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has
worked to secure, protect, and in some cases, remove vulnerable nuclear and radiological
materials at civilian facilities worldwide. The United States established this program primarily to
address the threat of terrorists obtaining nuclear material that could be used in a nuclear or
radiological device.
Research reactors all over the world have used weapons-usable nuclear material for fuel as a
legacy of U.S. and Soviet technology transfers from the Cold War era. GTRI repatriates U.S. and
Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent and fresh nuclear fuel from these research
reactors located in third countries. In some cases, the United States converts those reactors to
operate with low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, which is not useful for a nuclear weapon. In
addition, GTRI installs physical security upgrades at nuclear and radiological sites, and recovers
disused and unwanted radioactive sources at home and abroad.
The GTRI budget has increased a request of $131.2 million in FY2008 to $424 million in
FY2014. This is partly due to congressional support for the program, agreements from other
countries on material removal and reactor conversion, and high-level emphasis on this work by
the Bush Administration’s Bratislava Initiatives—which sped up work with the Russians—and
the Obama Administration’s global nuclear security agenda—which spurred more countries to
remove and secure material. Overall, the FY2014 request, however, represents a decrease in
funding compared to the FY2013 request of around $78 million. Within that budget, funding for
conversion of highly-enriched uranium (HEU)-fueled reactors saw an increase in the FY14
request to develop fuel for medical isotope production without the use of HEU. The decrease was
66 U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
Washington, D.C., April 2013, pp. 103-105, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2014/budget_justification/pdfs/
01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_2/CTR_OP-5.pdf.
67 Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Annual Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2013,
Washington, D.C, March 2013, pp. 17-18.
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primarily in the “Nuclear and Radiological Material Removal” and “Nuclear and Radiological
Material Protection” subprograms. The Administration has explained this decrease by saying that
the program is accomplishing its goals, and therefore there is less material to be removed. Critics
view the decrease as a sign that the Administration is giving this program a lower priority. Other
critics urge additional funds be given for radiological security projects in the United States.
International donors have contributed to GTRI activities in the past.
Table 6. DOE Authorizations for Global Threat Reduction Initiative
(in $ millions)
FY13
Annualized
FY14
FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12
CR
Request
Global
$131.23
$193.22
$404.64
$333.5
$444.69
$503.45
$501.05
$424.49
Threat
Reduction
HEU Reactor
$32.09 $33.82 $76.71 $102.77 $100.97 $139.54
$161
$162
Conversion
Nuclear and
$51.49 $67.76 $182.76 $144.83 $221.30 $221.05
$200
$155
Radiological
Material
Removal
Nuclear and
$45.91 $91.65 $135.53 $85.89 $113.72 $137.41 $140.05 $107.49
Radiological
Material
Protection
Funds from
$1.74 0 $9.64 0 $8.71 $5.45
0
0
International
Contributions
Source: DOE Congressional Budget Justifications.
According to a Department of Energy fact sheet on GTRI, some accomplishments include68
• removal of 3,575 kg of highly enriched uranium and plutonium;
• complete removal of HEU from 23 countries: Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Latvia, Libya, Mexico,
Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Ukraine;
• recovery of more than 32,000 disused and unwanted radiological sources
domestically; and
• recovery of more than 750 radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs)
internationally.
68 “GTRI: Removing Vulnerable Civilian Nuclear and Radiological Material,” Fact Sheet, April 12, 2013,
http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/gtri-remove.
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Securing Borders and Improving Export Controls
Preventing the smuggling or illegal export of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons-related
materials and technology is a key proliferation challenge. Several U.S. threat reduction and
nonproliferation programs seek to strengthen border controls and improve export control systems.
Originally, such programs were established in response to concerns over the collapse of political
control along the Soviet-era borders. Today, the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and
Homeland Security all manage cooperative programs with countries worldwide to prevent the
illicit transfer of WMD technology.
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
The State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program
helps nations improve their ability to interdict nuclear smuggling and stop the illicit trafficking of
all materials for weapons of mass destruction, along with dual use goods and technologies.
According to the State Department, the program “builds capacity to ensure that transfer
authorizations support only legitimate trade, and to detect and interdict illicit transfers at
borders.”69
When designing a nation-specific plan for border control assistance, the United States seeks to
address four key areas. First, if needed, it helps the recipient nation establish the legal and
regulatory basis for effective export controls. It then helps the nation develop appropriate export
licensing procedures and practices. Third, the United States helps the recipient establish and
enhance effective enforcement capabilities. When needed, it provides the recipient with detection
and interdiction equipment and training. Finally, the United States helps establish procedures that
promote effective interaction between government and industry so that business entities in the
recipient nation will abide by the laws and regulations of the new export control regime.
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, most of the funding for the EXBS program went to
projects along the periphery of the former Soviet Union. However, in the past decade, this pattern
has changed as the EXBS program has expanded its reach around the globe.70 For example, in
FY2005, approximately half of the $38 million spent on EXBS was allocated to projects in the
former Soviet states, with the rest going to other nations around the world. By FY2010, when the
Obama Administration requested $55 million for EXBS, less than $4 million was allocated to
projects in the former Soviet Union. The same is true of the budget for FY2011 and FY2012; the
State Department requested $61 million in each year, but allocated only a fraction to the former
Soviet Union. The FY2013 budget request sought $55 million for EXBS, but the continuing
resolution held the funding at the FY2012 level of $60.1 million. The Obama Administration has
sought $54 million for FY2014.
69 U.S. Department of State, Function 150 and Other International Programs, Executive Budget Summary,
Washington, D.C., April 2013, p. 115, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/207305.pdf.
70 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Testimony of John S. Wolf. Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation. March 19, 2003.
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Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI)
The Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative is a State Department-led initiative meant to
strengthen a country’s capacity to detect, interdict, and prosecute any nuclear trafficking
incidents. This program has been focused primarily on the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, but its partner countries also include the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan.71 The NSOI also partners with other donor countries and
organizations, including Canada, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Finland, France,
Germany, International Atomic Energy Agency, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. This
program is funded through the State Department’s WMD Terrorism program, which manages
projects that are designed “to improve international capacities to prepare for and respond to a
terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction.” The Obama Administration has requested
$5 million for the WMD Terrorism program area in FY2013 and FY2014. This includes funding
for NSOI and a related activity, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
Proliferation Prevention
In 2003, the Bush Administration added a border security effort to DOD’s CTR program.
Through the Proliferation Prevention Program, the United States has cooperated with the military
establishments, internal security forces, border guards, and custom forces in Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova to improve their border controls, with a focus on
the Black Sea region. DOD also helped Ukraine establish a comprehensive WMD monitoring and
interdiction capability along its border with Modova. CTR completed the radiation portal
monitoring program in Uzbekistan in 2008. The program also assisted Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
to develop a comprehensive capability for WMD surveillance and interdiction along their Caspian
Sea borders.
These programs are intended to help these nations deter, detect, and interrupt the unauthorized
movement of weapons or related materials across their borders. While the original focus was non-
Russian FSU states, the program began in FY2012 to partner with countries in Southeast Asia,
along the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. In FY2013, the Proliferation Prevention
program began to work with states in the Middle East by training and equipping border security
staff in Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and other countries. DOD plans to continue to work with these
countries in FY2014 to prevent proliferation of WMD across borders shared with Syria. In
addition, Secretary Hagel told the Senate Armed Services Committee at a hearing on April 17,
2013, that approximately $70 million was being spent on projects in Jordan to prevent the transfer
of weapons of mass destruction across its 256-kilometer border with Syria.
The George W. Bush Administration requested, and Congress appropriated between $40 million
and $60 million for this program each year through FY2009. In addition, in FY2008, Congress
added $10 million to the Administration’s request, which the Bush Administration used to expand
the reach of the Proliferation Prevention Program to nations outside the former Soviet Union. As
a result of this expansion, the budget for the WMD proliferation prevention program has grown to
between $80 million and $120 million per year in recent years. Funding requested for the
Proliferation Prevention Program has, however, decreased from $118.3 million in FY2013 to
$73.8 million for FY2014. According to the CTR budget documents for FY2014, this decrease
71 See also http://www.nsoi-state.net/.
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occurred because the program used FY2013 funds to initiate activities in Libya and the Middle
East.
Second Line of Defense
The Second Line of Defense (SLD) program seeks to improve nuclear smuggling detection
capabilities at international borders. This program has two parts, the Second Line of Defense
Core Program and the Megaports Program. While the SLD Core program began with projects at
the borders of the former Soviet Union, both of these programs now work with partner countries
around the world, at the invitation of the partner country.
Under the SLD Core program, DOE places detection equipment at ports of entry, international
border crossings, and other designated points of entry and exit, to detect illicit transport of nuclear
materials at international borders. After installation, DOE works with the country on
sustainability, then, ultimately, transfers responsibility for upkeep to the host country. SLD
“strengthens the capability of foreign governments to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking
in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global
maritime shipping system.” It also helps train law enforcement officials in the use of the
equipment installed at borders. According to DOE, the SLD Core program has signed agreements
with 24 countries under which it will provide fixed and mobile radiation detection systems at
borders. By the beginning of 2013, it had “completed over 449 priority sites and deployed 34
mobile systems to 11 countries.”72
In FY2004, Congress added $28 million to the Second Line of Defense program for a project
known as the Megaports initiative. This project is developing and deploying radiation detectors
for use at the largest foreign seaports that handle about 70% of the container traffic headed for the
United States.73 Megaports is designed “to detect the trafficking of nuclear or radioactive
materials in the world’s busiest seaports.” According to DOE, the Megaports Initiative has signed
agreements with 35 partner countries.
DOE conducted a strategic review of the SLD program in FY2013 to determine the most
effective approach to closing key gaps in the global nuclear detection architecture and to increase
the impact of detection and deterrence using fixed and mobile deployments. According to DOE,
the review recommended a plan to address remaining fixed detection gaps, expand mobile
detection, and fully fund sustainability. The review also resulted in the reorganization of SLD
Core and Megaports Programs under a joint implementation program and sustainability effort
funded in one SLD subprogram.
The funding appropriated for the SLD Core Program and Megaports appears in Table 7. The
funding requested for these two programs declined from $262 million in FY2012 to $92.6 million
in FY2013. However, in FY2013, Congress held the funding constant at the FY2012 level in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act. The programs’ combined budget level was reduced by $122
million in the FY2014 request to $140 million, but this was an increase from DOE’s earlier plan
to only spend $47 million in FY2014. DOE officials say this change reflects the internal strategic
72 Department of Energy, FY2014 Budget Request, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, D.C., April
2013, pp. DN-107, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/Volume1.pdf.
73 Hoehn, William. Update on Legislation Affecting U.S-Former Soviet Union Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction.
RANSAC. November 17, 2003.
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review’s recommendation that the program continue to install equipment at fixed sites, grant
mobile detectors, and continue to train on sustainability. Congress has emphasized the importance
of the long-term effectiveness of these systems after installation, including maintenance and
sustainability.
Table 7. DOE Funding for Second Line of Defense and Megaports
FY2013
FY2014
Program FY2007
FY2008
FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 Estimate
Request
Second Line
$75.8 $136.0 $71.9 $78.4
$140.3 $129.4
$73.0
na
of Defense
Core
Program
Megaports $116.1
$130.8
$102.9 $194 $194 134.4 $19.6
na
Total:
SLD $191.9
$266.8
$174.8
$272.4 $334.3 $263.8 $92.6 $140
Source: DOE budget documents.
Note: The FY2014 request includes a single line for both the SLD core program and Megaports.
Container Security Initiative and Secure Freight Initiative
Two overarching Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiatives, the Container Security
Initiative and the Secure Freight Initiative, work to increase the likelihood that nuclear material or
a nuclear weapon would be identified and interdicted during shipping. DHS works closely with
the DOE Megaports Initiative.
The Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) implements the
Container Security Initiative (CSI), which works with foreign customs authorities “to target and
examine U.S.-bound high-risk cargo while it is still at foreign ports.”74 As of September 2012,
CSI was operational in 58 ports worldwide, screening over 80% of the maritime cargo bound for
the United States, according to the DHS FY2014 budget justification. DHS funded this program
at $81 million in FY2012 and $75 million in FY2013. It has requested an additional $72 million
for FY2014.
The Secure Freight Initiative is jointly implemented with the Department of Energy. It gives
additional capacity to select CSI ports. SFI installs detection and communications equipment at
foreign seaports. DOE and DHS share the costs for this program. DHS installs communications
infrastructure at the partner port that would transmit any alarm data to the United States, and
cooperates with local authorities to resolve any alarms.
Chemical Weapons Destruction
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union amassed the largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the
world. After becoming a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Russia declared that
this stockpile contained 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. Russia has stored these
weapons at seven sites—five sites contain nerve agents in bombs and artillery shells while three
74 http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/.
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of these sites and two additional sites house bulk stocks of blister agents.75 Under the CWC,
Russia committed to eliminate the stocks by 2012, but it has not met that deadline and has
contended that it lacks the financial resources to do so.76 As a result, the international community
has provided Russia with a significant amount of assistance in eliminating its chemical weapons.
A European consortium, led by Germany, has constructed a destruction facility at Gorny to
destroy the blister agent stored there.77
The United States, with funding provided by DOD’s CTR program, has assisted Russia with the
design and construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. The chemical
weapons storage facility at Shchuch’ye contains nearly half of Russia’s stockpile of artillery
shells filled with nerve agent.78 The CTR-financed destruction facility is intended to destroy these
stocks and those stored at the other four storage sites, an amount estimated to be around 5,450
metric tons.
The majority of DOD’s roughly $1 billion in Russian chemical weapons destruction CTR funding
has supported the design and construction of the destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, as well as the
installation of equipment and training of operating personnel at the facility. Construction on the
Shchuch’ye facility began in March 2003. The United States and Russia had hoped that
construction would be completed and the facility would begin operations by the end of 2008.
Because it would then take around 3.5 years to destroy the stocks of nerve agent, this schedule
would have allowed Russia to meet the 2012 deadline. This schedule slipped, however, and the
process has been slower than planned. The facility began operations in March 2009. At the end of
2012, Russia had used it to eliminate over 3,321.5 metric tons of nerve agent.
Although major construction projects have been completed in recent years, DOD has continued to
request funding for chemical weapons destruction activities, so that it can provide “technical and
procurement advice and assistance support” at Shchuch’ye. The CTR program is also providing
technical support and design advice to Russia’s chemical weapons destruction facility at Kizner.
This facility is set to begin operations in late 2013 and will destroy 5,645 metric tons of nerve
agent.
In addition, the CTR program has helped Albania destroy all its chemical weapons stocks and is
now assisting the government of Libya with the elimination of legacy chemical weapons and
agents from the Qadhafi era.
DOD requested $21.2 million for chemical weapons destruction activities in the FY2014 CTR
budget. These funds would support continuing efforts in Russia and Libya. This request is down
from $38.6 million in FY2013. According to DOD, this decrease is due to the use of FY2013
program funds to begin the program in Libya. However, because the new Protocol governing U.S.
cooperation with Russia does not support chemical weapons destruction activities, a portion of
75 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. pp. 58-59.
76 The United States also has not met its destruction deadlines under the CWC. The OPCW has extended the deadline
for both nations.
77 For a description of this facility and program see Glasser, Susan B. “Cloud Over Russia’s Poison Gas Disposal.”
Washington Post. August 24, 2002. p. 1
78 The Department of Defense estimates this to be 5,460 metric tons of agent in nearly 2 million rocket and artillery
warheads. See U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union
Threat Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 4
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this funding is no longer necessary. As a result, the Senate, in its version of the FY2014 National
Defense Authorization Act, reduced funding for chemical weapons destruction to $13 million.
Table 8. CTR Funding for Chemical Weapons Destruction
(in $ millions)
FY14
FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13
Request
47,700
$1 $28 $8 $12 $9.8
$38.63
$21.25
Source: DOD Congressional Budget Estimates.
Cooperative Biological Engagement
The DOD CTR biological threat reduction program has evolved over the past 20 years. It has
expanded financially, growing from less than 10% of the CTR budget in the late 1990s to nearly
60% in the FY2014 budget request. It also has expanded geographically. It began as a program
focused on dismantling the vast biological weapons complex that Russia inherited from the
Soviet Union, but has now become a tool that the United States uses to promote “best practices”
in physical security and safety at biological laboratories with dangerous pathogens, and to
develop disease surveillance systems on several continents, particularly Southeast Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa. The name has also changed, from Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) to
Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE), to reflect the sensitivity of new partner countries to
being termed a “threat.” The Department of State also funds bio-security programs, managing
those that address scientist training, best practices, and industry partnerships under the Global
Threat Reduction’s Biosecurity Engagement Program (see “Securing Knowledge and Expertise”
section, below). Congress has also been concerned about measuring the effectiveness of these
programs in reducing threats. Section 1303 of the FY2012 NDAA set a limitation on funds for the
Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE) Program—“not more than 80 percent may be
obligated or expended”—until certifications by the Secretary of Defense are sent to Congress
regarding the effectiveness of the CBE program.
The shift in CTR’s biological weapons programs mirrors a similar shift in focus for CTR
programs overall, from a focus on threat reduction in the former Soviet Union to the prevention
of WMD terrorism from any source world-wide. The Obama Administration has stated that the
goal of the CBE program is to counter the “threat of state and non-state actors acquiring
biological materials and expertise that could be used to develop or deploy a biological weapon.”
The program does this by destroying or securing biological agents (“Select Agents”) at their
source and building the capacity to detect, diagnose, and report a disease outbreak.79 The 2009
National Strategy for Combating Biological Threats emphasized the need for global health
security and best practices. As a result, DOD’s CTR program works with several federal agencies,
other donor countries, international organizations, and the private sector to implement this
approach.
79 Select Agents are determined by the Center for Disease Control, and defined by law as biological agents or toxins
“which have the potential to pose a severe threat to public, animal or plant health.” For more information, see
http://www.selectagents.gov and the White House page on Biosecurity, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/
ostp/nstc/biosecurity.
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Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) in Russia
Since CTR’s inception, Congress and the executive branch have sought to address the challenges
posed by the potential proliferation of biological weapons and materials from Russia.80 This was a
particular concern because the Soviet Union reportedly developed the world’s largest biological
weapons program, employing, at its peak, an estimated 60,000 people at more than 50 sites. This
weapons complex developed a broad range of biological pathogens for use against plants,
animals, and humans.81 Russia reportedly continued to pursue research and development of
biological agents into the 1990s, even as the security systems and supporting infrastructure at its
facilities began to deteriorate. The United States began to provide Russia with CTR assistance to
improve safety and security at its biological weapons sites and to help employ biological weapons
scientists during the late 1990s, even though Russia had not provided a complete inventory of the
sites or people involved in biological weapons work.82 The problem was aggravated by the fact
that Russia reduced the size of its complex in the mid-1990s, leaving many scientists potentially
unemployed or underemployed. Biological pathogens are easily transported, further increasing
the proliferation risk.83
The CTR program has supported four separate BTR programs in Russia, working at dozens of
sites that include many weapons facilities: the Biological Weapons Infrastructure Elimination
program, the Biosecurity and Biosafety program, the BW Threat Agent Detection and Response
program, and Cooperative Biodefense Research. DOD has funded physical security upgrades at a
small number of facilities. Russia has not agreed to allow access or joint work at several key
military biological facilities, which has limited the scope of these programs. Many projects, such
as cooperative biodefense research, have been implemented through the International Science and
Technology Centers (ISTC), because DOD had been unable to conclude implementing
agreements with the relevant ministries in Russia.84 The Russian government has closed the
Moscow ISTC, so current projects will be finished, but no new projects in Russia are now
planned through that mechanism.
The FY2014 CTR budget request says that “activities are limited in Russia and Uzbekistan due to
both countries’ reluctance to cooperate with the DoD Cooperative Biological Engagement
Program.” This appears to still be a priority for the Obama Administration, and officials have said
they will continue to make attempts to cooperate on these issues, particularly through the Russian
Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health. The FY2014 budget request says the program
aims to initiate a project in Russia this year, but details are not provided.
80 “The security of existing pathogen libraries, the past scope of work, the current whereabouts of BW and BW-related
experts, and the future disposition of the FSU biological weapons capability are all critical concerns within the threat
reduction agenda.” Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. November 2002. p. 2.
81 For background on the BWPP programs, see CRS Report RL31368, Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons:
U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States, by Michelle Stem Cook and Amy F. Woolf.
82 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. pp. 48-49.
83 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482. March 2003. pp. 44-46.
84 Ibid., p. 54.
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Central Asia and the Caucuses
The non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union have been willing partners in dismantling the
Soviet biological weapons legacy and securing pathogen collections and laboratories. These
facilities were abandoned by the Russian military when the republics became independent states
and in many cases local governments were not aware of their existence or the dangers they
housed. The CTR Biological Threat Reduction program (now CBE) has supported activities in
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Kazakhstan, where the
Soviet Union housed much of its biological weapons production complex. For example, CTR
funding helped destroy the large-scale biological weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk,
Kazakhstan, and assisted in decontaminating the open-air BW testing site at Vozrozhdeniye Island
in the Aral Sea, Uzbekistan.
Over time, the United States learned of dangerous pathogen collections dispersed throughout the
region as part of the Soviet Anti-Plague System consisting of institutes in 11 republics. These
facilities lacked security and safety measures, they had lost expert staff due to economic
conditions, and many were in a state of disrepair a decade after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. The United States accelerated its assistance to these facilities starting in the late 1990s.
The CTR program built secure Central Reference Laboratories (CRL) for pathogen collections in
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Currently, there are 42 “Secured Labs” that have received
CBE upgrades in Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. DOD continues to support
upgrades and training at these facilities. Work in this region continues to be a part of DOD CBE
efforts.85
Global Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE)
DOD has also expanded the reach of its CBE program to Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle
East in recent years. While the majority of CBE partner countries are not and have never been
biological weapons producers, they do maintain dangerous pathogen collections for study or have
naturally occurring rare infectious or other diseases. Therefore, DOD CTR assesses security and
safety at specific facilities; provides training to improve clinical, laboratory, and epidemiological
safety and security for specific to dangerous pathogens; and helps countries build a disease
surveillance system for early detection of an outbreak. U.S. officials have stressed that this is
useful not only for public health reasons but to protect U.S. troops deployed overseas. CBE works
with the State Department, USAID, Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and U.S. Combatant
Commands.
According to the FY2014 DOD CTR budget request, DOD plans to initiate bio-engagement
efforts in “select areas of Africa, Middle East, and Southeast Asia to include regional
engagements.” This is to include
• securing 12 Labs in Afghanistan, Armenia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Pakistan,
Uganda, Tanzania, and Ukraine;
85 Marina Voronova-Abrams, “Biosecurity 2.0: Enduring Threats in the Former Soviet Union,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, August 3, 2011, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/biosecurity-20-enduring-threats-the-former-
soviet-union.
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• beginning construction and equipment installation of secure pathogen
repositories to include construction of the National Public Health Laboratory
(NPHL) in Afghanistan;
• conducting facility-specific bio-risk assessments and providing bio-security and
bio-safety upgrades as required;
• initiating projects in Africa, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia,
Pakistan, Ukraine, and other countries; and
• continuing to build an outbreak surveillance network in Laos, Cambodia, and
Vietnam.
Funding
Between FY1997 and FY2012, Congress appropriated to DOD around $1.6 billion for these
projects, with large increases in the amount of both the request and the appropriation in recent
years. Table 9 below displays the funding levels since FY2007. The increase in funding was the
largest between FY2007 and FY2008, when DOD planned to expand U.S. bio-safety and bio-
security assistance at facilities in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. This request reflected
growing concerns about the threat of biological weapons proliferation. But some believed this
increase would not be sufficient. Senator Richard Lugar sought to add $100 million for the CTR
program in FY2008, with the express purpose of expanding and accelerating biological weapons
nonproliferation programs.86 The Senate reduced this amount but still added $50 million to the
program for FY2008. The committee also requested that the National Academy of Sciences
prepare a report on how the United States might cooperate with other nations in preventing the
proliferation of biological weapons.
The requests and authorizations for CBE funding have grown steadily since FY2008. Recent
concerns have focused on whether DOD was the appropriate actor to be carrying out these tasks,
and whether biological engagement was being pursued at the expense of other programs. The
House Armed Services Committee, for example, in its report on the FY2010 Defense
Authorization Bill (H.Rept. 111-166) called on DOD continue its efforts to strengthen the
biological threat reduction programs and to pursue more interagency coordination, but also “to
maintain a strong focus on … other threat reduction challenges, including preventing the
proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons and weapons-related materials, technologies, and
expertise.”
Table 9. CTR Funding for Cooperative Biological Engagement
(in $ millions)
FY14
FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13
Request
$72.36 $174.5 $177.46 $169.13 $209.03 $229.47 $241.01 $306.33
Source: DOD Congressional Budget Estimates.
86 Lugar Wants $100 Million Nunn-Lugar Budget Increase. Press Release. Office of Senator Richard Lugar. February
5, 2007.
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Securing Knowledge and Expertise
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many experts feared that scientists from Russia’s
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs might sell their knowledge to other nations
seeking these weapons. Many of the nuclear weapons scientists had worked in the Soviet Union’s
“closed” nuclear cities, where they had enjoyed relatively high salaries and prestige, but their jobs
evaporated during Russia’s economic and political crises in the early 1990s. Biological weapons
scientists, who were employed at both military and civilian facilities, were left unemployed after
the closing of many large BW facilities in the former Soviet republics, while those in Russia saw
drastic budget cuts to civilian research science programs. Even those scientists who retained their
jobs saw their incomes decline sharply as Russia was unable to pay their salaries for months at a
time.
Both the State Department and the Department of Energy developed programs that were designed
to reduce the risk that the weapons scientists would sell their knowledge to the highest bidder. For
the first decade or more, these were through short-term grants that were meant to aid scientists
into transitioning to civilian scientific research or the private sector. Today, this suite of programs
is aimed at preventing terrorists from exploiting scientists, personnel, or materials to develop
these weapons. Because of increased attention to the terrorism threat in the past decade, the
programs have developed to emphasize “engagement”—shared best practices for physical and
personnel security, safety, joint R&D, and exchange of information. The programs also now train
not only scientists, but other lab personnel about international security standards and improve
personnel reliability programs to address the “insider threat.”
The State Department’s Global Threat Reduction Program supports the international science
centers (described below) and several separate scientist engagement programs: the Biosecurity
Engagement Program, the Chemical Security Engagement Program, and the Partnership for
Nuclear Security. In the past, these separate programs have worked primarily through the
international science centers. These programs have focused on redirecting former weapons
scientists to civilian work through grants or industry partnerships. For example, the State
Department’s Bio Industry Initiative (BII), which began in 2002, helped Russia reconfigure
former BW-related facilities for peaceful research and production, such as work on vaccines, in
partnership with U.S. biotech and pharmaceutical companies.87 The current State Department
Global Threat Reduction programs as well as the Department of Energy suite of scientist support
programs now are focused on security training programs for scientists, and less on grants for
scientific or commercial projects, although these types of projects are still funded through the
science centers. In recent years, these programs have also shifted grant funding away from
Russia’s nuclear scientists to biological and chemical weapons scientists and expanded assistance
to scientists from other former Soviet states. The State and DOE programs have, at the same time,
expanded beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union, with programs designed to engage
scientists in Iraq and Libya in a more traditional CTR format for those countries’ former weapon
scientists; and in other countries such as Indonesia, Yemen, Egypt, and Pakistan emphasizing best
practices and security training. The section below provides more detail about the evolution of
these programs.
87 The State Department conducted this program in cooperation with the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
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The Science Centers
In late 1992, the United States, Japan, the European Union, and Russia established the
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow. Several other former Soviet
states joined the center during the 1990s, and other nations, including Norway and South Korea,
added their financial support. In late 1993, the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Ukraine
established the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU). Several former Soviet states
have also joined this center, and Japan has joined to provide financial support. By early 2010, 39
countries were participating in the centers.
Since its inception, the ISTC has funded 2,702 proposals and awarded grants totaling $836.5
million, with the United States providing about $220 million of this total. The funds have
supported the work of more than 70,000 former weapons scientists. However, support for the
center in Russia has waned.88 In August 2010, Russia’s President Medvedev announced that
Russia was withdrawing from participation in the center. Preparations to move the ISTC
headquarters to Almaty, Kazakhstan, are underway. No current grants were canceled, but no new
grants will be awarded in Russia. Work will continue with the other recipient countries.89 The
United States provides support through the ISTC to the Biological Weapons Redirection
Program.90 As was noted above, this program provides research grants to Russian biotechnology
institutes to redirect scientists to commercial, agricultural, and public health projects. The State
Department collaborates with several other U.S. agencies on this program.91
The STCU gives grants to scientists in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
While originally focused on just former weapon scientists, the STCU has broadened its eligibility
requirements in recent years. Currently, at least 30%-50% of the work force assigned to projects
that receive STCU funding must be former weapon scientists. This is partially because so much
time has passed since the end of the Cold War, and a decreased number of current scientists have
been involved in weapons-related projects.
Iraq and Libya Scientist Engagement Programs
Both Iraq and Libya experienced a dramatic change in government while also possessing nuclear
and chemical weapons programs, and in the case of Iraq, biological weapons. According to the
State Department the Iraq Scientist Engagement Program “engages Iraqi scientists, technicians,
and engineers with WMD and weapons-applicable skills to promote Iraqi scientific and
technological development.” The Libya Scientist Engagement Program “supports the transition of
former Libyan WMD scientists to civilian careers through technological partnerships.” These
programs provide “training, travel grants, research and development grants, and technical
expertise” to redirect these people away from weapons work and towards peaceful, civilian
88 “Budget Cuts Threaten Support Program for Former Soviet Weapons Experts,” Global Security Newswire, June 19,
2009.
89 Statement of the 56th Governing Board of the International Science and Technology Center, December 7, 2012,
http://www.istc.ru/istc/istc.nsf/va_WebPages/56GB_StatementEng.
90 Ibid.
91 For more details, see CRS Report RL31368, Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the
Former Soviet States, by Michelle Stem Cook and Amy F. Woolf.
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pursuits. The United States spent a total of $31 million on both of these programs between
FY2002 and FY2010.92
The Iraq Scientist Engagement program grew out of the U.S. effort to eliminate Iraq’s WMD
capabilities after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. At that time, State Department officials began
mobilizing an effort to establish a science center in Iraq like those in the former Soviet Union to
help “redirect” former WMD scientists in the country. The purpose was to both prevent the
proliferation of expertise at a time of great instability, and to channel their technical expertise to
reconstruction efforts. This center had great difficulty matching scientists to civilian work, and
was phased out along with stipends for scientists.93 As a result, in 2009, the State Department
established the Iraqi Scientist Engagement Program. According to the State Department’s FY2013
congressional budget justification, this program is working to train scientists and improve
security at facilities that house potentially dangerous biological and chemical materials.
From 2004 to 2010, the State Department Global Threat Reduction program also managed a
scientist redirection program in Libya, following Qaddafi’s decision to rid the country of WMD.
The Libya Scientist Engagement Program (LSEP) was to support the transition of former WMD
scientists in Libya, especially from the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), to civilian
work through technological partnerships. From 2004 to 2010, $8 million was spent on LSEP
projects. The program paused during the civil war, but the State Department resumed its
engagement with Libyan scientists, “with new projects prioritized by threat and coordinated with
the new Libyan government and Libyan researchers.” No funds were spent in FY2011; $240,281
were spent in FY2012; and approximately $484,000 is expected to be spent on the program in
FY2013. According to the State Department, this will allow the program to promote a nuclear
security culture at TNRC and
enable work with public and animal health laboratories to improve Libyan biorisk
management and bolster Libya’s ability to detect and respond to intentional and naturally-
occurring disease outbreaks caused by potential bioterrorism agents.
Department of Energy Programs
During the 1990s, the Department of Energy initiated programs to help retrain and redirect
scientists and engineers who had worked in the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons enterprise. With
these programs, DOE sought to stop the leakage of knowledge out of Russia’s nuclear weapons
complex to states or groups seeking their own nuclear weapons. The programs were designed to
help Russia reduce the size of its nuclear weapons complex, by removing functions and
equipment, and to create “sustainable non-weapons-related work” for scientists through
technology projects that have “commercially-viable market opportunities.”94
These programs have evolved over time, expanding beyond the borders of the former Soviet
Union and beyond the nuclear enterprise to address concerns about scientists working with all
types of CBRN materials. The name of the program has also changed numerous times over the
years. DOE initially established two programs in the 1990s—the Initiatives for Proliferation
92 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/183039.pdf.
93 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_%2007-08/%20Securing_WMD_Expertise_Lessons_Learned_From_Iraq.
94 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003.
p. 663.
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Prevention (IPP) and the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI)—to meet these objectives. In late 2003,
the Bush Administration cancelled NCI, and DOE renamed its remaining program the Russian
Transition Initiative. The name changed again in DOE’s budget request for FY2006, to the Global
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP). This change demonstrated that the program would
begin to provide assistance to scientists outside the former Soviet Union. Then, in FY2013, to
reflect the overall shift in emphasis away from assistance and towards global engagement, DOE
renamed the program Global Security through Science Partnerships (GSSP). This section briefly
reviews the history of these programs, and highlights some of the issues that have come up during
their implementation.
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention and the Nuclear Cities Initiative
The Department of Energy began to fund the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)
Program in 1994. IPP matched U.S. weapons labs and U.S. industry with Russian weapons
scientists and engineers in cooperative research projects with “high commercial potential.” DOE
hoped that the focus on commercialization would help make the projects self-sustaining in the
long term. The IPP program received $35 million in the FY1994 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act, before its funding moved to the Department of Energy. This initial funding
helped establish nearly 200 research projects by 1995.
The IPP Program was the subject of several critical GAO reports.95 A study released in February
1999 noted that nearly half of the appropriated funds for IPP had been spent at the U.S. nuclear
weapons labs and that, after subtracting the taxes, fees, and other charges removed by Russian
officials, the Russian institutes had received only around one-third of the funds. The report also
questioned DOE’s oversight of the programs, noting that program officials did not always know
how many scientists were receiving IPP funding. The report also noted that the projects had not
yet produced any commercial successes. Congress responded to this criticism by reducing
funding for the program and specifying that no more than 35% of the funds be spent at the U.S.
labs. It also mandated that the United States negotiate agreements with Russia to ensure that
funds provided under this program are not subject to taxes in Russia. Furthermore, it requested
that the Secretary of Energy review IPP programs for their commercialization potential. A
subsequent GAO report published in 2007 asserted that DOE had overstated the number of
weapons scientists receiving support from this program by counting both weapons and non-
weapons scientists in its totals and that it had overstated the number of long-term private sector
jobs created as a result of this program. Further, DOE did not have an exit strategy for the
program, or a way to “graduate” institutes once they were self-sustaining or no longer posed a
proliferation threat.96 Partially as a result of these criticisms, the program was reorganized,
projects with commercialization potential were given greater priority, work in Russia over time
became channeled primarily through the ISTC, and the program was broadened to a global level.
The Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), which began in 1999, was designed to bring commercial
enterprises to Russia’s closed nuclear cities, so that Russia could reduce the size of its weapons
complex and scientists and engineers would not be tempted to sell their knowledge to nations
95 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the
Risks Posed by Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists, GAO Report RCED-99-54, February 19, 1999; U.S.
Government Accountability Office. DOE’s Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in the Russia and Other Countries
needs to be Reassessed. GAO-08-189, December 2007.
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seeking nuclear weapons. Throughout its brief history, Administration officials, Members of
Congress, and others raised questions about the value and effectiveness of the NCI program. The
program reportedly made limited progress in addressing the employment problems at Russia’s
closed nuclear cities. The NCI program received a total of nearly $87 million between FY1999
and FY2003, before it was absorbed into the Russian Transition Initiative.
Russian Transition Initiatives (RTI) and Global Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention (GIPP)
These programs were renamed the Russian Transition Initiatives—to reflect emphasis on
commercial partnerships—and Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention—to reflect
partnership with states outside the former Soviet Union. The Bush Administration requested
around $40 million per year for the RTI/GIPP program between in FY2005 and FY2006. In
FY2006, the Bush Administration indicated that it planned to phase out the last of the NCI
programs in Russia’s closed cities.
The funding levels for the GIPP/GSSP programs have declined in recent years, from a level of
around $40 million per year during the last years of the Bush Administration, to around $20
million per year at the beginning of the Obama Administration, to around $15 million per year in
recent years. The Administration has requested $13 million for FY2014. This decline has
occurred as DOE has begun to shift resources from this program to nations outside the former
Soviet Union. As some experts have noted, “the dramatically changed Russian economy creates a
very different threat environment; for many former weapons scientists, the risk of desperation-
driven proliferation that motivated the U.S. government to establish these programs is much less
than it was before.”97
At the same time, concerns have grown about scientists in other nations. In a review conducted in
2010, the Department of Energy determined the “WMD expertise proliferation threat” is not
limited to the former Soviet Union or to scientists who were directly involved in weapons
programs. As a result, in FY2013, DOE changed the name of the program to Global Security for
Science Engagement and initiated a new a global effort, using a new model, to address the
expertise proliferation threat. With this change, the program has increased its level of activity in
non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union and continued activities in Iraq. DOE plans to
engage these countries to build partnerships and share “collective responsibility for scientific best
practices.”98
In Iraq, GIPP/GSSP works to engage “former WMD scientists, technicians and engineers ... on
R&D projects to support global priorities including national security, energy efficiency, and the
advancement of medical science.” The program has engaged over 200 Iraqi scientists and
engineers (60% of them were former WMD) in more than 30 R&D projects in areas such as
public health, environment and water, food safety, and material science. The program expended
approximately $7 million to engage Iraq scientists between FY2006 and FY2012.
97 Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb, 2008, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, D.C., November 2008, p. 121,
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Securing_The_Bomb_2008.pdf?_=1317161155.
98 Department of Energy, FY2014 Budget Request, Washington, D.C., April 2013, pp. DN-65, http://energy.gov/sites/
prod/files/2013/04/f0/Volume1.pdf.
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Appendix A. Funding Requests, by Agency
Table A-1. Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
($ millions)
FY2013
FY2013
FY2014
Program FY2012
Request
Estimate
Request
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination
$28.2
$23.3
$23.3
$10.0
Chemical Weapons Destruction
$9.8
$38.6
$38.6
$21.3
Global Nuclear Security
$151.1
$72.3
$72.3
$86.5
Cooperative Biological Engagement
$229.5
$241.0
$241.0
$306.3
Proliferation Prevention
$63.1
$118.3
$118.3
$73.8
Threat Reduction Engagement
$2.5
$2.4
$2.4
$2.4
Other Assessments/Administrative
$24.0 $23.2
$23.2 $28.2
Support
Total $508.2
$519.1
$519.1
$528.5
Table A-2. Department of State Programs
($ millions)
FY2013
FY2013
FY2014
Program FY2012
Request
Estimate
Request
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
$30.0
$30.0
$30.0
$25.0
Export Control and Border Related Security
$61.0
$55.0 $60.9 $54.0
(EXBS)
Global Threat Reduction
$69.0
$63.6
$69.0
$63.5
Weapons of Mass Destruction
$5.0
$5.0 $6.0 $5.0
Terrorism (includes Nuclear Smuggling
Outreach Initiative)
Total
$165.0
$153.6 $165.9 $147.5
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Table A-3. Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs
($ millions)
FY2013
FY2013
Annualized
FY2014
Program FY2012
Request
CR
Request
International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation
Navy Complex
$33.7
$39.9
$33.7
na
Strategic Rocket Forces/12th Main Directorate
$59.1
$8.3
$59.1
na
Nuclear Warhead Protection
na
na
na
$23.2
Weapons Material Protrection
$80.7
$47.0
$81.2
$36.4
Civilian Nuclear Sites
$59.1
$60.1
$59.5
na
Material Consolidation and Conversion
$14.3
$17.0
$14.4
na
Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites
na
na
na
$132.3
National Infrastructure and Sustainability
$60.9
$46.2
$61.3
$37.8
Second Line of Defense
$262.1
$92.6
$263.8
$140.0
INMPC Total
$569.9
$311.1
$573.0
$369.7
Global Threat Reduction Initiative
HEU Reactor Conversion
$139.5
$161.0
$148.3
$162.0
Nuclear and Radiological Material Removal
$221.1
$200.0
$200.0
$155.0
Nuclear and Radiological Material Protection
$137.4
$105.0
$140.1
$107.5
GTRI Total
$498.0
$466.0
$488.4
$424.5
Global Inititiatives for Proliferation Prevention/ Global
$14.9 $15.1
$15.1
$13.0
Security Through Science Partnerships
Table A-4. Department of Homeland Security Programs
($millions)
Program
FY2012 FY2013 Request FY2013 Estimate FY2014 Request
International Cargo Screening (CSI)
$81.3
$71.5
$75.1
$72.3
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Appendix B. Major Provisions in Cooperative
Threat Reduction Legislation
Table B-1. Title XIII, National Defense Authorization Acts FY2001-FY2013
Category (Authorization,
Public Law
Title XIII
Limitation, Waiver,
Year
No.
Section
Notable Provisions
Reporting, Study)
FY2001 P.L.
106-398
1308
Annual reporting
Reporting
requirements
FY2004
P.L. 108-136
1304
Limitation on BW Defense
Limitation, Reporting
joint research until Secretary
of Defense certifies facility not
used for BW development and
site is secure
1306
Temporary authority to waive
Waiver
CWD funding limitation
1308
Authority to use CTR funds
Authorization
outside the former Soviet
Union in response to emerging
threats and not to exceed $50
million
FY2005
P.L. 108-375
1303
Extension of CWD funding
Waiver
waiver authority
FY2006
P.L. 109-163
1303
Permanent Waiver of
Waiver
restrictions on use of funds in
the FSU
1304
Report on impediments to
Reporting
CTR required
FY2007
P.L. 109-364
1303
Extension of CWD funding
Waiver
waiver authority
1304
NAS Study commissioned
Study
FY2008
P.L. 110-181
1303
Specification of use of funds
Authorization
for programs outside the FSU
1304
Repeal of restrictions on
Repeal of limitations and waivers
assistance to states of the
former Soviet Union for
Cooperative Threat Reduction
1305
Authorization for use of funds
Authorization
outside the FSU (removal of
funding limit), Secretary of
Defense determination with
concurrence of Secretary of
State
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Category (Authorization,
Public Law
Title XIII
Limitation, Waiver,
Year
No.
Section
Notable Provisions
Reporting, Study)
1306
Sense of Congress on new
Study, Reporting
initiatives for CTR: continue
work in Russia and the FSU;
expand to Asia and the Middle
East, DPRK; NAS study;
Secretary of Defense report
on new CTR initiatives
1307
Reporting requirement on
Reporting
Shchuch’ye, Russia CWD
facility
1308
NAS Study on Prevention of
Study
Proliferation of Biological
Weapons
FY2010
P.L. 111-84
1303
Terms for accepting
Authorization
contributions to CTR
programs from foreign
government, international
organizations or any entity
1304
Report on CTR Metrics by
Reporting, Study
Secretary of Defense and NAS
1305
CTR Authority for urgent
Authorization
threat reduction activities:
determination by Secretaries
of Defense and State;
notification to Congress
FY2011
P.L. 111-383
1303
Limitation on use of FY11
Limitation, Reporting
CTR funds for Centers of
Excel ence in non-FSU
countries—not more than
$500,000 until report to
Congress on purpose, funding
plan for center
1304
Secretaries of Defense and
Reporting
Energy joint plan on
nonproliferation and CTR
activities with the P.R. China
FY11-16
FY2012
P.L. 112-81
1303
Limitation on Availability of
Limitation, Reporting
Funds for Cooperative
Biological Engagement
Program to 80% of
appropriation until
certifications sent to Congress
1304
Limitation on use of FY12
Limitation , Reporting (extension
CTR funds for Centers of
of FY2011, §1303)
Excel ence in non-FSU
countries—not more than
$500,000 until report to
Congress on purpose, funding
plan for center
FY2013
P.L. 112-239
1303
Report on CTR programs in
Reporting
Russia by Secretary of Defense
with State, Energy, DNI
Source: CRS compilation.
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Author Contact Information
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nonproliferation
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745
awoolf@crs.loc.gov, 7-2379
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